Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, petitioners, versus Aida Sy-Gonzales, Article 71 of the

rticle 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.
 accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
No. L-55960        November 24, 1988 such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Facts:
The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot
be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging
must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
among others that:
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China,
a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;

they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of acknowledged natural children.
b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;

c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and

d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the intestate estate of the
deceased. Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company , 100 Phil 168

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chenwho alleged that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
 as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and
 it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does
not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted
or entered into an agreement with the parents of her husband; that she and her husband have been
living in Fookien, China before he went to the Philippines; that in China, the custom is that there is a
go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of
the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on the wedding day, the document would be signed by the parents of both
parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that the parties do not
sign the document themselves; and that she and Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and the
document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now.
The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of his
sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document
signed by the parents and elders of the parties being sufficient. Statements were made by Asuncion
Gillego when she testified that a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to a Chinese custom.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.
Held:
The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact.
FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its
C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined
representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how
each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that
it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was
represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while
such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell
Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting
almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact
that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have
the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell
Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine
Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This
prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI
then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached.
Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order
for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell
Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the
C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages
because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a
common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD:  Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which
states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not
constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art.
2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or
negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
PEOPLE VS SOCORRO RAMOS
On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases--No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch XIV--identical in every respect, except for the fact
that they pertain to different editions of the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for
alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the Copyright Law, as amended. The information
in Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged--
"That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, as the proprietor and general manager of the National Book Store,
an enterprise engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and
there, wilfully and illegally sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school
textbook, entitled General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten
and Cornista, said accused knowing that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing
House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and
Sons, Inc."[1]   3. That prescription would not lie in this case because the complainant never waived the right to
On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash[2] were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of
prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that: "Consequently, the discovery of the alleged offense
was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and
possession of said books by the respondents, including that involved in the police search of
September 4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
and in the light of the afore-quoted ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case, supra; the
prescriptive period, therefore, commenced to run on the day after such discovery on July 17, 1963
and, accordingly, the offense has long since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act 3134:
'Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the
Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall prescribe after two years from the time the
cause of action arose.'
 Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be the starting point of computation, again the
offense charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out, the documented evidence on this point
shows that the last sale was made on August 30, 1963."
The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash[3] raising two issues,
to wit:
"1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence
and hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial.
"2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant was a continuing offense, the two-year
prescriptive period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the search in
defendants' premises, which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the textbook
in question."
The prosecution's theory is that "(T)he crime being a continuing offense, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts which constitute the offense," and
this last act was allegedly committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore, when the information was
filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of the
prescriptive period.
Again, in both cases, the accused filed a "Reply to Opposition to Motion to Quash."[4]  She alleged that
even assuming that the crime is a continuing offense, the prescriptive period should start from August
30, 1963, the date of the last invoiced sale, and not September 3, 1963, as there was no indubitable
proof that she had sold copies of the questioned book on that date. Nonetheless, accused contended
that even if the prescriptive period should start from September 3, 1963, as proposed by the
prosecution, the two-year period was tolled on September 2, 1965. She pointed out that two years
mean a period of 730 days in accordance with Article 13 of the New Civil Code, and 1964, being a
leap year consisting of 366 days, the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965. Hence, ". . . when the
information was filed on September 3, 1965, the offense, if any, had already prescribed."
The prosecution filed a Rejoinder[5] in both cases alleging as follow: "1. That February 28, and 29,
1964, should be regarded as one day only, and consequently, the two-year period commencing on
September 3, 1963 would end on September 3, 1965;
 2. That under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the proceedings
in the fiscal's office;
prosecute the defendant."
Accused Ramos, also in both cases, filed an Urgent Motion to Strike the Rejoinder,[6]  on the ground
that it was filed after the case had been submitted for resolution. She prayed that "in the event that
the same should at all be considered and allowed, that the accused be notified thereof and granted
reasonable opportunity to file a surrejoinder . . . ".
It appears that the Rejoinder was admitted by both trial courts, but a Surrejoinder[7] was filed only in
Criminal Case No. 80006. Here, the accused traversed the prosecution's contentions in the Rejoinder,
thus:
1. Under applicable and specific provisions of Philippine law, the two-year period of prescription
commencing on September 3, 1963 ended on September 2, 1965 x x x;
 2. The filing (of) proceedings in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt the
prescriptive period."
In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated
October 7, 1965.[8] Pertinent portion of his order reads:
". . . And now to the main issue - whether the crime had prescribed. In the Opposition to the Motion
to Quash, the Prosecution, in its insistence on the theory of a continuing crime, admits that the two-
year prescriptive period should run from September 3, 1963. This case was filed on September 3,
1965 - one day too late. Article 13, CCP provides that year shall mean a period of 365 days. This has
been applied to criminal cases (People v. del Rosario, 51 O.G., 2686). 1964 was a leap year so that
when this case was filed, it was filed one day too late.
 "The Motion to Quash is, therefore, granted and this case dismissed on the ground that the crime has
already prescribed." (Italics supplied.) The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court on
October 15, 1965.[9]
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 80006, the motion to quash was not resolved until December 23,
1965. On this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the motion to quash, and set the arraignment of the
accused on January 12, 1966, thus -- "Wherefore, finding the information to have been filed well
within the statutory period of two years from the date of the last offense committed by the accused
the Court denies the motion to quash.
"The arraignment of the accused is hereby set on January 12, 1966 at 8:30 A.M."
The trial court refused to accept the prosecution's view that the prescriptive period should run from
September 3, held, instead, that the same should commence on September 4, 1963.
"The evidence shows that on September 4, 1963, the Manila Police by virtue of a search warrant
procured by the offended party, seized, among other articles, 69 copies of General Science Today for
Philippine Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten and Cornista and one copy of the same textbook
for Second Year (Exhibit 5). The evidence likewise shows that on September 3, 1963, the National
Book Store, run and managed by the accused, sold one said textbook, Exhibit 'D' and Exhibit '2'. The
mere possession by the accused on September 4, 1963 of several copies of this textbook which is the
textbook alleged to be spurious and pirated, indicates that said accused was distributing or selling
said textbook on September 4, 1963 . . . This being the case, it follows of necessity that the period of
prescription commenced to run from September 4, 1963 and two years from this date, by excluding
the first and including the last, would expire on September 4, 1965 and hence, the action, which was
instituted on September 3, 1965 is well within the prescriptive period."
Furthermore, the trial court ignored the accused's theory on leap year:
 "Even if the last sale of said textbook could be considered to have taken place on September 3,
1963, Exhibits 'D' and '2', the Court is also of the opinion that the two-year period would expire
September 3, 1965.
"The argument that inasmuch as 1964 is a leap year the two-year period must contain 731 days, as
contemplated by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is, in the opinion of the Court,
without merits for this particular legal provision that a year is understood to be of 365 days each is
applicable only in determining the number of days a year must legally contain but not for the purpose
of ascertaining the period of prescription based on years. In the computation of the period of
prescription, a year should be construed as the calendar year comprising the whole period from
January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days it contains. Consequently, in this
particular case, if it is considered that the last sale took place on September 3, 1963, the two-year
period, following the rule exclude-the-first-and-include-the-last, will expire on September 3, 1965."
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[10] Two more pleadings were filed,[11] after which, the
trial court finally denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,[12] and reset the
arraignment of the accused on February 24, 1966 at 8:30 A.M.
The accused thus filed with this Court this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition,[13] with
the following prayer:
"(a) Forthwith issue, upon filing by petitioner of a bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may
fix, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining, enjoining and prohibiting respondents from further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, during the
pendency of this action:
(b) After due hearing, to render judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents -
(1) Annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge of December 23, 1965 (Annex 'G')
denying petitioner's motion to quash, and of January 20, 1966 (Annex 'K') denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration;
(2) Ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Criminal Case No. 80006 aforesaid; and
 (3) Making the writ of preliminary injunction hereafter to be issued permanent and final."
 This Court, on February 11, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial Court
from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006.[14] Also on the same date, the two cases, G.R.
No. L-25265 and G.R. No. L-25644, were consolidated.
1. In G.R. No. L-25265, the appeal, then Solicitor General Arturo Alafriz filed a four-page brief dated
December 21, 1965[15]  wherein he recommended affirmance of the order of Judge De Veyra quashing
the information, and the dismissal of the appeal, for the simple reason that "the order appealed from
is in accordance with law." Accused, now appellee Ramos, filed a brief dated January 21,
1966[16]reiterating her previous allegations in the lower court.
The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., the offended party, filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, on
the following grounds:
a) That the Solicitor General, instead of prosecuting the appeal, recommended its dismissal.
b) That, to protect its interest, it is necessary that the movant be allowed to intervene and to submit
memorandum to sustain its view that the criminal action against the accused had not yet
prescribed."[17] 
Over the opposition of the accused-appellee, this Court granted the same.[18] Accordingly, the
Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. filed its Memorandum[19] wherein it alleged that the trial court erred
I. IN ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION.
II. IN NOT APPLYING TO THIS CASE THE FOUR-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN ACT NO.
3326.
III. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE MANILA CITY
FISCAL'S OFFICE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERRUPTED PRESCRIPTION.
IV. IN NOT CONSIDERING FEBRUARY 28 AND 29, 1964, AS ONE DAY FOR PURPOSES OF PRESCRIPTION.
Accused-appellee, Ramos, filed a Reply Memorandum[20] refuting intervenor's assignment of errors.
Subsequent pleadings[21]  focused on whether February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as
one day or separate days in computing the period of prescription.
2. In G.R. No. L-25644--the special civil action--the issues raised in the foregoing assignment of errors
were relied upon in respondent People's Answer.[22]  And, following respondent Judge Ramos'
reasoning, it was contended that the period of prescription should start from September 4, 1963, and
not September 3, 1963, as originally proposed by the prosecution. Furthermore, as an affirmative
defense, it was alleged that the petitioner had no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus  since Judge Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash
the information. Respondent contended that the "(P)etitioner's remedy is to appeal the judgment of
conviction rendered after a trial on the merits." This allegation was opposed by petitioner Ramos;
[23] she insisted that she had a cause of action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Respondent
People filed a Reply Memorandum[24] disputing petitioner's allegations.
We are, thus, faced with conflicting orders of two different Branches of the Court of First Instance of
Manila--one holding that the crime has prescribed; the other that it has not.
1. Now to resolve the preliminary issues:
a. On the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
We find for petitioner. As We had occasion to hold in Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559:
"As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for
certiorari and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial
and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense
charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust for
which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate."
As to mandamus, We are inclined to agree with respondent's allegation that "petitioner has no cause
of action for mandamus  which is a writ intended to control the exercise of a purely ministerial
function. To quash an information is not a ministerial function."[25] However, mandamus as a remedy is
a superfluity here, considering that petitioner can obtain full relief thru certiorari and prohibition.
b. On the applicability of the four-year prescriptive period provided in Act No. 3326.[26]
The same is not applicable. Said Act provides:
"Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) .......... (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; ........" (Italics supplied.)
Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no
application here, where the Copyright Law provides for its own prescriptive period, viz:
"Section 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by
the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines and shall prescribe after two years from the time the
cause of action arose."
2. Now on the main issue of prescription. The question to be resolved is the proper computation of
the two-year period of prescription from September 3, 1963. Resolution of this issue hinges, in turn,
on whether February 28 and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be counted as one day, as proposed by
the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense.
This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now a settled matter. It was held in 1969
in Namarco vs. Tuazon[27]  that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days
in computing periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21,
1955, the filing of the action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-year period has lapsed -
since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since this
case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day fell
on September 2, 1965 - the year 1964 being a leap year.
In explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court took pains to trace the antecedent decisional
and statutory bases for its conclusion, thus -
"Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 30, 1887,
that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a 'natural' month or 'solar' month, in the absence of
express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain,
subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of
said Code, 'whenever months are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that months are of 30
days,' not the 'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are 'designated by name,' in which
case, 'they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have.' This concept was, later,
modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which
'month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with
which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-month and not the solar or civil month with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours has
added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days."[28] 
With respect to the opinion of some members of the Court that Article 13 of the Civil Code is
unrealistic, the Court adverted to the proper remedy thus -
"Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code
defining 'years' to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not judicial legislation. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be
done through legislative process, not by judicial decree."[29] 
Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start
from September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated
books in accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007,
with having allegedly sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question,
not of illegal possession  of the same. The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation
proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office and in the Prosecution Division of the Department of
Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held in People
vs. Tayco[30]  that the running of the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the
offended party in reporting the offense to the fiscal, but by the filing of the complaint or information
in court.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIV in
Criminal Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order
dated December 23, 1965 of the same Court, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 80006, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime charged therein had already
prescribed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE
INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE,respondents.
FACTS: SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural
machinery, products and equipment.  On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a
dealership agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province
of Iloilo. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and
to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis.  In the course of the business
relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for
unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s
fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) 21units of
Mitsubishi power tillers.  In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to
sell in 1977 24units of Mitsubishi power tillers to FSDC, which fact JII allegedly made known to
SEACOM, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC
and dealt with it and sold 21 units of said tractors with much lower prices, thereby depriving JII of
unrealized profit of P85,415.61.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held affirmatively; the act of SEACOM in dealing directly
with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent, and that there was fraud in the transaction between
FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII.  “SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII
in the market, joined the competition even as against the latter, and thereby changed the
scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they
entered into to the manifest prejudice of JII” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that
there was no agency relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages
for having acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer in the sale of the farm
machineries to FSDC.  Both courts invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows:"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.”
ISSUE:  Whether  SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale
of farm machineries to FSDC.
HELD: Yes. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive
basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty
or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19
of the Civil Code above-quoted.  This provision, together with the succeeding article on human
relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.” What is sought to be
written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.
SC accordingly resolves to affirm the award for unrealized profits.  The Court of Appeals noted that
the trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees the award for moral and exemplary
damages is granted. However, in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a general rule
granted to a corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling very
aggrieved and on his mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM “dealt with us
behind (our) backs”, the award should go to defendant Jamandre, President of JII.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award
of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.
Costs against appellant.
ABSCBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC
BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTION, INC., and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999
FACTS:
•       1.            In 1990, ABSCBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva
gave ABSCBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films.
•       2.            One of the provisions of the agreement states that ABSCBN shall have the right
of first refusal to the next twenty-four Viva films for TV telecast provided, however, that
such right shall be exercised by ABSCBN from the actual offer in writing.
•       3.            Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABSCBN, through its vice-
president Charo Santos Concio, a list of 3 film packages (36 title) from which ABSCBN may
exercise its right of first refusal under the aforesaid agreement
•       4.            ABSCBN, however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from
the list) "we can purchase" and therefore did not accept said list.
•       5.            On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached ABSCBN's Ms. Concio,
with a list consisting of 52 original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television) including the
14 titles subject of the present case, as well as 104 reruns (previously aired on television)
from which ABSCBN may choose another 52 titles.
•       6.            On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABSCBN general manager, Eugenio
Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package
proposal of Viva.
•       7.            What transpired in that lunch meeting is the subject of conflicting versions.
•       8.            Mr. Lopez testified that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABSCRN
was granted exclusive film rights to 14 films for a total consideration of P36 million; that he
allegedly put this agreement as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it
and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario.
•       9.            On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez
regarding the 14 Viva films; Denied the existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote
something; and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed at the lunch meeting was Viva's
film package offer of 104 films  for a total price of P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising to make
a counter proposal which came in the form of a proposal contract.
 •   10.            On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-
president for Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films,
after the rejection of the same package by ABSCBN.
•   11.            On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a
handwritten note from Ms. Concio – a draft of the counter proposal
•   12.            The said counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of Directors in
the evening of the same day
•   13.            On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABSCBN and following several
negotiations and meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in
consideration of P60 million, signed a letter of agreement dated April 24, 1992. granting RBS
the exclusive right to air 104 Viv produced and/or acquired films including the 14 films
subject of the present case.
•   14.            RTC rendered a decision favoring respondents.
•   15.            According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of
the offer.
•   16.            The alleged agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the
approval of the VIVA Board of Directors, and said agreement was disapproved during the
meeting of the.
•   17.            Hence, there was no basis for ABSCBN's demand that VIVA signed the 1992 Film
Exhibition Agreement.
•   18.            Furthermore, the right of first refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement
had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to Del Rosario ticking off ten titles
acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992 agreement an entirely new contract.
ISSUE:
            Whether or not there is a perfected contract between ABSCBN and VIVA films
RULING:
            A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself to give
something or to render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation, which is established.
            Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert
the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the
offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the
proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counteroffer and
is a rejection of the original offer.
            ABSCBN, sent, through Ms. Concio, a counterproposal in the form of a draft contract
proposing exhibition of 53 films for a consideration of P35 million. This counterproposal could be
nothing less than the counteroffer of Mr. Lopez during his conference with Del Rosario at Tamarind
Grill Restaurant. Clearly, there was no acceptance of VIVA's offer, for it was met by a counteroffer
which substantially varied the terms of the offer.
            In the case at bar, ABSCBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVA's offer. Hence, they
underwent a period of bargaining. ABSCBN then formalized its counterproposals or counteroffer in a
draft contract, VIVA through its Board of Directors, rejected such counteroffer, Even if it be conceded
arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counteroffer, the acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there
was no proof whatsoever that Del Rosario had the specific authority to do so.
Under Corporation Code, unless otherwise provided by said Code, corporate powers, such as the
power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. However, the Board may
delegate such powers to either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. The
delegation, except for the executive committee, must be for specific purposes.
Del Rosario did not have the authority to accept ABSCBN's counteroffer was best evidenced by his
submission of the draft contract to VIVA's Board of Directors for the latter's approval. In any event,
there was between Del Rosario and Lopez III no meeting of minds.
RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS

GR # 138964 Aug 9, 2001



FACTS:

Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate,
Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed the
respondents that they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately
secure title to the property in her name.

On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The
office of building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on
November 27, 1989. Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December 12,
the day respondents filed an appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the demolition
of the house.

Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision
and ordered petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.



ISSUE:

Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.



RULING:

The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.

A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law or
recognized as a result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.

The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to
P20,000 to each respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-24252           January 30, 1967
IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her alien registry
with the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.
 (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee,
 Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.

Imperio & Tinio and Artemio Derecho for petitioner and appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca — "as possessing all qualifications and
none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of
cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration".1  She avers that she is of legal age,
married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her
marriage, she  was  a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she
was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence
No. 46333. After making a number of other allegations and setting forth certain denials, she
manifests that "she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications required under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473" aforesaid.
Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main grounds, viz: (1) that
"there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual"; and (2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally
defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law", such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence
of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the documentary evidence
admitted, the case was submitted for decision.
The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO
BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and
executory.
The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit, Surigao (now
Surigao del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay Suy and her mother was Dee
See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of Nationalist Republic of China. She holds Native
Born Certificate of Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054. She married
Florencio Burca a native-born Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not — by
the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, Congress —
in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory precepts just quoted
with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a
citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized.2  Which
means that, in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife
must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law.3
This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18,1966, explains the reasons for
the rule in this wise:
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive;
and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4,
the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of
the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of
gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to be admitted as a citizen in
view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral
character'.
Similarly the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by
certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under
section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government", nor affiliated to groups "upholding
or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity
or of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic
de caeteris".
Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not to any alien woman on the sole basis of her
marriage to a Filipino — "irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with
Filipino ideals, customs and traditions".4
 The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born Filipino,5 a
naturalized Filipino,6 or a Filipino by election.
2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as
applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the premise that such an alien woman
does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec.
15, Revised Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of the Revised
Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of persons naturalized under the
law who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born
minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall
automatically become a Filipino citizen".7  No conditions are exacted; citizenship of said minor
children is conferred by the law itself, without further proceedings and as a matter of course. An
alien wife of a Filipino does not fit into either of the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to
be taken to make her a citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship.8  Citizenship is not an
appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings.9 And in one case, we held that citizenship
of an alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 10
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The record of this case
disclose that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the determination of whether an alien
woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of
Immigration.  11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could have given rise to
divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of doubt. Parties interested should not be
enmeshed in jurisdictional entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a
clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to
1.) file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority
for this view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person
2.)
desiring  to acquire  Philippine citizenship,  shall file  with the competent court" a petition for the
purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to  acquire  it. The
proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province
3.) where the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a
citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by
the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first
instance, where an alien woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or
official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively
with the competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the
Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where
petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any
action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for
citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts
were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for
naturalization, and, in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the Philippines".
We go to the merits of the petition.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her former
residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court,
however, she testified that she  also  resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in
home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for
naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence
encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided.  13 Cebu, where she studied
for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the
petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and
objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding".  14  And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's
fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that
failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. 15
Viewed from another direction, we find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of
time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines
and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set
forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce
at the hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who
those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to
ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face
value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses
should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of
this, the petition must fail. 17
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were
presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition
dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's
visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and
that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching
Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to G.R. No. L-21425 September 15, 1972
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. JOSE TIU, ONG WAN KING @ WONG YUEN KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen MARTINIANO VIVO, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of Engracio Fabre for petitioners-appellees.
her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico de Castro and
Solicitor Pedro A. R Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen. RESOLUTION

HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. from 3 months as visitors — 2 years and more admitted as a citizen of the Philippines, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 530, the
as special non-immigrants
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal on purely questions of law, from the decision in Civil Case No. 51488, of the Court of First
Instance Manila (Branch XIX) granting the petition for prohibition and enjoining respondent
Commissioner of Immigration from arresting, detaining and deporting petitioners Ong Wan King and
her two foreign-born minor children.
Petitioner Ong Wan King, wife of Jose Tiu, and her two minor children Tiu Chi Kiong and Tiu Chi Eng,
arrived in the Philippines on October 29, 1960 and were admitted as temporary visitors for a period of
stay of three (3) months. As a result of the favorable decree in Naturalization Case No. 42904 of the
Court of First Instance Manila (Branch VIII) on February 21, 1961, granting Jose Tiu's application to be
Secretary of Foreign Affairs on April 6, 1961, pursuant to a cabinet policy, approved Ong Wan King a
her two minor children's application for change of category from temporary visitors to special non-
immigrants for a period of stay up to February 21, 1963. On April 12, 1961, the Secretary of Justice
concurred in the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and approved the authorized stay of
petitioners up to February 21, 1963. The Assistant Chief of the Immigration Division on April 21, 1961,
accordingly informed said petitioners of the extension of their authorized stay.
The termination of petitioners' authorized stay by the Respondent Acting Commissioner of
Immigration on August 30, 1962, and his directive to them to leave the country within seven (7) days
otherwise the cash bond would be forfeited and warrants for their arrest issued, as a result of a
repudiation of the previous policy, by the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of
Justice led to the filing of the petition for prohibition before the court a quo.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the court of first instance of Manila in said Civil
Case No. 51488 rendered its decision on May 28, 1963, granting the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent Commissioner from arresting, detaining and deporting Petitioner Ong Wan
King and her two minor children, until the lapse of two years from the date of the decree granting
Jose Tiu's application for Filipino citizenship in Civil Case No. 42904, and declaring that section 37(a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, empowering the Commissioner of Immigration
to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens subject to deportation as violative of the constitution.
The principal issues raised were whether or not the trial court erred (1) in declaring that any alien
woman married to a citizen of the Philippines automatically follows the citizenship of her husband by
virtue of such marriage, provided she possesses none of the disqualifications to be admitted a citizen
of the Philippines, even without possessing all the qualifications required by law, (2) in not declaring
that the authorized stay of petitioners had already terminated and (3) in declaring section 37(a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended authorizing the Immigration Commissioner to issue warrants
for the arrest of aliens subject to deportation as unconstitutional.
During the pendency of this appeal, petitioners filed on September 13, 1966, a "Motion To Dismiss
Petition and Waiver of Decision" on the ground that the issues raised have become moot. In said
pleading they manifested that: (a) Ong Wan King after the promulgation of the decision in the
naturalization case of Jose Tiu (Civil Case No. 42904) had voluntarily left the Philippines and was
subsequently re-admitted as a non-quota immigrant by the Commissioner of Immigration under
Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, and (b) her two minor children Tiu Chi
Kiong and Tiu Chi Eng, had already been recognized as Filipino citizens by the Bureau of Immigration.
This motion was denied in view of the opposition of the Solicitor General. The supervening facts since
the case was submitted for decision, including the precedent setting Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner
of Immigration, promulgated on October 4, 1971, (L-21289) rendered a re-examination of the
relevant facts necessary. Consequently this Court required the petitioners to submit documents in
support of their claim that Ong Wan King had voluntarily left the country with the consent of the
Bureau of Immigration and was subsequently re-admitted as a non-quota immigrant, and that her two
minor children are already recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as Filipino citizens. The Solicitor
General was also required to inform the court of the status of the naturalization case of Jose Tiu
(Civil Case No. 42904) and to verify the alleged departure and re-admission of petitioner Ong Wan
King.
also because of the legal consequences on the petitioners of our ruling in  Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration,1 We held in that case (1) that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino native born or naturalized, becomes  ipso facto  a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of the same law, and
(2) that section 9(g) of the Immigration Act which required that to obtain permanent admission, a
non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of
the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility, does not
apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become
Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship.2 underlined — do not apply to alien who became filipino after
coming into the Ph
As a necessary concomitant of Jose Tiu's acquisition of Filipino citizenship, his wife unless disqualified
under section 4 of the naturalization law and his two foreign-born minor children dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization, became as a consequence thereof Filipino citizens. The
acquisition of Filipino citizenship naturally bestowed upon them the right to stay and reside in the
Philippines. Any question revolving upon the validity of the acquisition of such citizenship, should
there be any, cannot he resolved in the present case but at an appropriate proceeding.
Finally on the issue as to whether or not the issuance of warrants for the arrest of aliens by the
Immigration Commissioner under Section 37(a) of the Immigration Law trenches upon the
constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3) Article III of the Constitution, suffice it to state that the same
has been settled in previous decisions, wherein we held that such power is not violative of the
constitution as it is confined to warrants issued for the execution of a final deportation order.3
Under such circumstances, the issues involved in the present case have become moot, not only in the
present appeal, but including the case as originally filed and should therefore be as they are hereby
dismissed.

The Solicitor General on June 21, 1972, informed this Court that according to their records "the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, on February 21, 1961, rendered a decision granting the
petition for naturalization of Jose Tiu; that on January 13, 1964, the said Court issued an order
allowing the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance; and that on February 17, 1964, petitioner Jose
Tiu took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and was on the same date issued a certificate of
naturalization by the Court." Similarly on September 4, 1972, the same official manifested that
according to the records of the Bureau of Immigration, Ong Wan King left the Philippines for
Hongkong on March 23, 1966 and returned to this country on March 30, 1966. Upon a review of the
records of the present appeal, We find that the subsequent action of the Commissioner of
Immigration in re-admitting petitioner Ong Wan King, after the lower court's decision of May 28, 1963
and during the pendency of this appeal specifically the re-admission of said petitioner on March 30, Van Dorn vs. Romillo
1966, was never involved or placed in issue in the case. The issue of the expulsion of Jose Tiu's wife
and her two minor children as then overstaying temporary visitors, has become moot not only 139 SCRA 139
because of Ong Wan King's voluntary departure and subsequent readmission into the Philippines, but
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979.  They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children.  They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn.  A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.  He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets.  He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.  Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.  Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws.  She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia”
was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is
still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby
made permanent.
NO Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered
and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred
to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as
the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the
trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of
heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2]disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed
between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had
been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was
a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of
the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.[7]Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in
the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to TAKE NOTE
petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing,
in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order
of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of
the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and
admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him
and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on
23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication is
that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling
in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.
[15] The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve
her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married
in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a
basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right
to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a
certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before
another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted
by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned
to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only
to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.
[22] The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of
forum shopping.
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,

respondents

November 23, 2000



FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was
an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his
brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was
left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and
they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that
all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or
appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the

proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be
declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25
years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the
divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore,
his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is
likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 




“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the 

country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, RULING:

except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 YES.


 At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for
“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of
LAW.” those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.

o    ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was 

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. psychological incapacity of Fely.
o    Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) 

o    ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall (a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps ordinary duties required in a marriage;

to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or 

suppressed. (b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus- CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t
 


 (c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
FACTS: Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their means of the party involved.

marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 

1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign give meaning and significance to the marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
whom she eventually had a child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them. 
 By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent

 Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the laws
Philippines.


 III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
her present nationality shall govern her status.
 proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
 Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it
(1) RTC – Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
the Philippines.
 demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.
 before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over

 the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
ISSUE:
 interests of the State.
Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid and subsisting

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
 solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
 interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results

 or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
Facts:
 reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to

 case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry
invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.



On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis
City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along
their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
 GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL


 G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the
States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through
for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
 naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina,

 in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however,
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the when he came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another
petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
 man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

 Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The divorce decree
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to
the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and


registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the


registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law
THE PHILIPPINES.
 and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent


Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.


Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by
remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and the petitioner.
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.


 Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
 Ruling: No.


Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as
the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
the Filipino spouse.

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the
2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to

 petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that his conclusion is not a
The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
 Republic v. Manalo
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
 and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
 1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.


In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were
it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.


G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

Facts:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for
divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted.
Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry




According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law



Issues:

instead of the foreign spouse?



2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?



Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration.
According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign
spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court,
the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce
obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be
interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not
follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.



In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if
Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it
will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are
equally protected by the law.



The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause.
They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination
against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a
divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances
are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree
obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino
family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do
this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign
divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
 •


2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.



It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the
decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore,
the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
 citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception
of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
Although divorce is not allowed under Philippine laws, Article 26 of the Family Code recognizes the
validity of a divorce decree obtained in a foreign country in respect of mixed marriages. Article 26,
particularly second paragraph thereof, states:
Art. 26. X x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
For the provision to apply, the Supreme Court laid down the following requisites:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
It was held that under the second requisite it should be the foreigner spouse who initiated the
divorce proceeding. If it was the Filipino spouse who filed the case for divorce, the decree would not
be recognized as valid in the Philippines. Consequently, under Philippine laws, the Filipino spouse
remained married to his or her foreigner spouse and incapacitated  to contract marriage. Recently,
however, the Supreme abandoned that view in Republic v. Manalo.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221029

24 April 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO
MINORO;
• Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code,
the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as
rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married
to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et
al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice
to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that
the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in
the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights
and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based merely on superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
 50 PHIL 867
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and

Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant

January 31, 1963

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,
1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but
left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been
declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that
therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in
view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand,
counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our
Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the
internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that
finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?



RULING:

The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his
domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,
ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring
to both countries back and forth.
MICIANO v. BRIMO

GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the
law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees
have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of
such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action
of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to
the laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid? 

RULING:

It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would
HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored


in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the
herein oppositor.
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.



The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that
under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
 validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
 Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates cannot be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967



FACTS:

Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his
2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.



Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate
should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:



a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;

c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.



Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein.



Navarro v. Domagtoy
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the A.M. No. MTJ-96- 1088, 19 July 1996
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to
her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of FACTS:
P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions

for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
 Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts

 committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September
illegitimate children.
 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that


they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnizes marriage of


FlorianoDadoySumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
ISSUE:
 The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
RULING:
In the first allegation, Remarriage of Gaspar Tagadan is void.
The law provides that: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.”; “For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse”
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous,
and therefore void, marriage.
The second marriage is also void.
The law provides that marriage may be solemnized by an incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction. Additionally Art. 8 of the Family Code provides that: “Marriages shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple,
or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in
a sworn statement to that effect.”
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing the
aforementioned laws and its exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court
finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months.
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and 8
months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage
was void for lack of marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.Norma filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?
RULING:
1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages
involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage.
In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir ship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
REPUBLIC v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA                                     GR No. 210929, Jul 29, 2015
FACTS: Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she
was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left their home without telling
them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look and
find his husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common friends,
and parents-in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros
Oriental. 15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.
RTC grants her petition.
The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of
the RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to
established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.
CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition
for declaration of presumptive death of her husband.
RULING.NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was
found out that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record.
Edna did not present additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but
herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her
husband disappeared.
Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared
presumptively dead is DENIED.
G.R. No. 210580
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs

LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Nature of the Petition
Challenged before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Resolutions2  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3,
2013  3  and December 6, 2013.4  The assailed Resolutions denied the petition for  certiorari  filed by
petitioner for failure to file a motion for reconsideration.
Likewise challenged is the Decision5  dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao,
Cagayan, Branch 11, declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's (private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-
Catubag (Shanaviv), as presumptively dead.
The Antecedent Facts
Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv had been
cohabiting with each other as husband and wife. Their union begot two (2) children named Mark
Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A. Catubag, both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21,
2001, respectively.6
In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent took work overseas. Meanwhile,
Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the needs of their children.7
On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was
solemnized by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan.
8
Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to acquire a housing unit located
at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to
continue his work. While abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family.9
On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed by his relatives that
Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In the meantime, private respondent's relatives took
care of the children. 10
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his children, private respondent
took an emergency vacation and flew back home. Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile
Cagayan, but to no avail. He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close
friends and relatives, but they too could offer no help. Private respondent travelled as far as Bicol,
where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate her.11
Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, one of the more well-
known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance. Moreover,
private respondent searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no
avail. 12
On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a
petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead. 13
On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. The dispositive portion of the
decision which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG is hereby adjudged
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD only for the purpose that petitioner LUDYSON C. CATUBAG may contract a
marriage subsequent to what he had with SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without prejudice to the
reappearance of the latter.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA  via  a Petition for  Certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Petitioner's main contention is that private respondent failed to establish a "well-founded
belief' that his missing wife was already dead. 15
In its Resolution16  dated September 3, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition because no motion for
reconsideration was filed with the court  a quo. The CA ruled that such defect was fatal and
warranted the immediate dismissal of the petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the CA in its Resolution  18  dated December 6, 2013. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors its plea for the annulment of the assailed resolutions and the denial of private
respondent's petition to declare his wife presumptively dead on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PREVIOUSLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] ON THE
GROUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ATTACH THERETO COPIES OF ALL PERTINENT AND RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS.
III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A WELLFOUNDED BELIEF THAT HIS WIFE IS
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE HIS INTENTION TO RE-MARRY. 19
In sum, the instant petition rests on the resolution of two issues: (1) whether or not petitioner's
resort to a Petition for  Certiorari  under Rule 65 to challenge the decision of the RTC declaring
Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper; and (2) whether or not private respondent complied with
the essential requisites of a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies
available. Hence, a party aggrieved by an action of a court must first correctly determine the nature
of the order, resolution, or decision, in order to properly assail it.20
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration of presumptive death, the
relevant provisions of law are Articles 41, 238, and 253 of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly
provide that actions for presumptive death are summary in nature. Article 41 provides:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute  a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Article 238 in relation to Article 253, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY LAW, of the Family Code provides:
Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
xxxx
Article 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
Supplied)
Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code because by express mandate of law, judgments rendered
thereunder are immediately final and executory.21 As explained by the Court in Republic of the Phils.
vs. Bermudez-Lorino,22 citing Atty. Veloria vs. Comelec:23
[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 24 7 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in
the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.24
Further, it is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 25
While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal, in a
petition for declaration of presumptive death, they may challenge the decision of the court  a
quo  through a petition for  certiorari  to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.26
In  Republic vs. Sarenogon, Jr.,  27  the Court outlined the legal remedies available in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. If aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then
filing with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any subsequent decision by
the CA may then be elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 28
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to challenge the RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging the RTC's Order, the Court shall
now proceed to tackle the issue of whether or not private respondent has sufficiently complied with
the essential requisites in a petition for declaration of presumptive death.
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper: first,
the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code.29 Second, the present spouse wishes to remarry. Third, the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present spouse files for a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 30
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who has the burden of proving
that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. In the instant case, since it is
private respondent who asserts the affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the
same. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegations will not suffice.31
Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied with the first, second, and fourth
requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully
discharged the burden of establishing a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court in Cantor,32 pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief' has no exact definition under
the law. In fact, the Court notes that such belief depends on the circumstances of each particular
case. As such, each petition must be judged on a case-to-case basis. 33
This is not to say, however, that there is no guide in establishing the existence of a well-founded
belief that an absent spouse is already dead. In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva,34 the Court, through
Justice Mendoza, provided that such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent
spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort on the part of the present spouse to locate the missing
one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the present spouse to locate the
former, will not suffice. The Court expounded on the required diligence, to wit:
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the
spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still
alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.35 (Citations omitted)
Furthermore, jurisprudence is replete with cases which help determine whether belief of an absent
spouses' death is well-founded or not.1âwphi1  A perusal of the cases of  Republic vs. Granada,
36  Cantor,37  and  Orcelino-Villanueva38  reveal the circumstances which do not meet the Court's
standards in establishing a "well-founded belief."
In  Granada,39  the present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in locating her absent spouse by
inquiring from the latter's relatives regarding his whereabouts. The Court ruled against the present
spouse and stated that the mere act of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by
law. It pointed out that the present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of mass
media. Even worse, the present spouse did not even bother to present any of the absent spouses'
relatives to corroborate her allegations.40
Similarly in Cantor,41 the present spouse alleged that she exerted "earnest efforts" in attempting to
locate her missing husband. She claimed that she made inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and
friends as to his whereabouts. She even stated that she would take the time to look through the
patient's directory whenever she would visit a hospital.42
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise. It held that the present
spouse engaged in a mere "passive-search" Applying the "stringent-standards" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence, the Court pointed out four acts of the present spouse which contradict the
claim of a diligent and active search, 43 to wit:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the
records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients' directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits
were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which
the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present
spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report
his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse's bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband's whereabouts.44 (Citations omitted)
The foregoing conduct of the present spouse led the Court to conclude that her efforts in searching
for her absent spouse were insincere. Ultimately, the Courts considered these attempts insufficient to
comply with the requirement of conducting a reasonable, diligent, and active search.45
In Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court likewise ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that she had
a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead. In said case, the present spouse
began her "search" by returning home from her work overseas to look for her missing husband. She
then inquired from her in-laws and common friends as to his whereabouts. The present spouse even
went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse was born. Additionally, the present spouse
claimed that fifteen (15) years have already lapsed since her husband's disappearance.46
In that case, the Court held that the factual circumstances were very similar to the two
aforementioned cases. It further held that it was erroneous for the lower courts to grant the petition
for declaration of presumptive death. The Court explained why the present spouse's allegations
should not have been given credence, to wit:
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's
efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare
assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from
whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children
from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness.
Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the Court
cannot give credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her
husband. 47 (Citations omitted)
Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief," the Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances surrounding the current
case. In the case at bar, private respondent first took a leave of absence from his work in the United
Arab Emirates and returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire
about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private
respondent aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of
disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in
Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.48
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in  Cantor,49  Granada,50  and  Orcelino-
Villanueva,51  the Court finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First,  private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts from both
friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they
lived and in the place where his wife was born and raised. However, private respondent failed to
present any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no
explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to present any of the
persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely,
the local police authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In  Cantor,  the Court
reasoned that while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would
still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing
spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse cannot be said
to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse. 52
Finally,  aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his "well-
founded belief' on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the
present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence
required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his missing
wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court
otherwise by providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or
justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it by some other means than mere allegations.
Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's alleged
disappearance through a known radio station was corroborated.53  This act comes nowhere close to
establishing a well-founded belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms
the unfortunate theory that she abandoned the family.
To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal approach in complying
with the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that the missing spouse is dead. In Republic
vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),54  the Court cautioned against such a liberal approach. It opined
that to do so would allow easy circumvention and undermining of the Family Code. The Court stated:
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to
remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible
that those who cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of
its proceedings.
Stated otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply
agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never return again. Thus, there is a need for
courts to exercise prudence in evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse. A lenient approach in applying the standards of diligence required in establishing a "well-
founded belief' would defeat the State's policy in protecting and strengthening the institution of
marriage.55
On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite of establishing a well-
founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the RTC should have denied private
respondent's petition for declaration of presumptive death.
In fine, having determined the propriety of petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari and private
respondent's failure to meet the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by
jurisprudence to support his claim of a "well-founded belief' that his wife, Shanaviv, is already dead,
it is proper for the Court to grant the petition. Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner
need not be discussed further.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December
6, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE.  Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife,
Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.

G.R. No. 230751
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
 The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City
vs
 RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution3 dated March 20,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of
Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave
street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;
2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never
made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place
frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and
after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6  in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming
financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the  certiorari  petition of the Republic
and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for  certiorari  is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is
ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking
the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that
provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by
the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have
a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As
been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence
that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be invoked
in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal
I
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is
not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must,
therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred I Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death is Not Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on
the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC gave
the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was
likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of  contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim
for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended.10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was  not  filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo
was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been Dismissed; A
Petition Whose Sole Objective is To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code,
Like that Filed by the Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is
objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because,
in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead
under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance
of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of
Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is
merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-cannot be the
lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that
a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and
be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard
by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.  Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband.  Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does
not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration
that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense
at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted
because it is unauthorized.  The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be a  prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of
judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or matter involved in a case, or
upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between
the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact,
out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided
by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right
or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear
that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage
of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in  Szatraw  has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of  Lukban v.
Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based
on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on Article 391 of
the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of  Szatraw, Gue  and  Lukban  collectively, we are able to ascertain the
considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a
tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually
presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to
be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of
the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same
only confirms tha existence of a  prima facie  or disputable presumption. The function of a court to
render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code would be unnecessary.  The presumption in the said articles is already established by
law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting
upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the
RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA,
therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception
that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes
of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is
what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise
simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may
have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter
of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration
of presumptive death before processing the death before processing the death benefits of missing
serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and
the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1.  The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such
soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis of the
evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises
by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in
the said articles are established.19  Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court
declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and
contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any  "evidence"21  which shows that the
concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the circumstances
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the  "evidence"  referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant
and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article
390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to
apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to
invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof,
the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the
CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.1avvphi1  And finally, hold such recourse still fail, the
claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the
foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in
the future.
WHEREFORE,  the instant appeal is  DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution
dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are  AFFIRMED. The Court
declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not
requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for
their consideration.
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIASANTOS, respondents
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts: Leouel Santos, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986,
the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents
into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code” (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated
to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
Issue: Whether or not the failed to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts
for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
Held: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts: Sometime on May 22, 1988, at the lovely Manila Cathedral, the plaintiff married the
defendant. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception in South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant’s mother. There, they slept together on the same bed
in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother,
an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. They
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she did not: even see her husband’s private
parts nor did he see hers.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. The defendant insisted that their marriage will
remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor’s Medical Report. It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency, and
he is capable of erection. The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or
five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length.
But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that
the evidence is not fabricated. Due to such facts, the respondent instituted against the petitioner a
petition for the annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Both the RTC and
CA granted the petition and declared the marriage void.
In his appeal, petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make “a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons
for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to pyschological disorders” because there might
have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why
private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse. Petitioner claims that there is no
independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from psychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent’s refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
Held: Yes. As such, the petition for annulment should be granted. If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order”. Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say ‘I could not have cared less.’ This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled
self. The egoist has nothing but himself. (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at
the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldo’s part and of being
conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
In Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice
Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Marcos v. Marcos
343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the
EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to different
business ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm
on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately. She did not want him to stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in their house,
she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence,
this case.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological
incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003
FACTS:
Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children. On 29 March
1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the
non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their
varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, wasa disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister‘s house or would play tennis the whole day.
When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‘s
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time
of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity
was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in
Molina case and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE:
Whether of not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.
RULING:
YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission
as seen in facts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage – petition does not need to show root cause sinceonly
experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity. PETITION IS DENIED,
THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68
of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
The elements of Psychological incapacity are:
(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165321, [ August 3, 2010]
DOCTRINE: A marriage will be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code if it is characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Furthermore, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint and
duly proven. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita are husband and wife with three children. After 20 years
of marriage, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the
time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Therefore, he asked the court to
declare his marriage to Teresita null and void. He alleges that Teresita is a squanderer because she
did not know how to manage the funds of the family and is always incurring debts. Aside from this,
Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plastic-ware and cosmetics
company. She left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also missed
paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family. He also
alleges that Teresita is an adultress because she presents herself as a single woman and sees other
men while Ricardo is away for work as an overseas contract worker. He also suspected that she was
pregnant with another man’s child and proved himself correct when Teresita incurred a miscarriage.
He claims that he could not have fathered the child because his three instances of sexual contact
with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”.

To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the testimony and evidence prepared by Dr. Cecilia R.
Albaran. The doctor stated that the demise of the marriage of the spouses was due to the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder of Teresita. Her behavioral patterns indicate this kind of disorder which is
considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor
based her diagnosis from the testimony given by Ricardo and Richardson, the eldest child of the
couple. This is because Dr. Albaran was not able to conduct a personal psychiatric evaluation over
Teresita.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and
general conclusion on these parties’ personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup.
The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the
medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity
was grave and incurable. G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011

The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of the evidence and testimony presented in court.
However, the Solicitor General appealed the case and the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the
ground that the RTC did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresita’s
psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time
of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not appear to have
been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors.
Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not
constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a
criminal charge for adultery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
HELD: No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision made by the trial court because the decision of
the latter failed to comply with the standards and guidelines provided for by jurisprudence. The
testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of Ricardo, the petitioner and their
son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the condition of Teresita to properly
conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Conclusions and
generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo,
are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.
It was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the marriage was
celebrated. The statement of the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it
may be proven either by an express statement or through the description of its physical
manifestations.
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children.
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
who gave birth to a son. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone.
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four
children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a
driver. The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the
Philippines and chose to live with Malyn. Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the
Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to
Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested
by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on
the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual
mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD). The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

“ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically Antonio vs. Reyes
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.  Barely
plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging wedding at Pasig in December 1990.  A child was born but died 5 months later.  Reyes persistently lied
the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. events or things.  She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to
her husband as adopted child of their family.  They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.  Petitioner then filed in 1993 a
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
Code.
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts
opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in null and void.
the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.  The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.   Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe
that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.  The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.  The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent.  It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.  Furthermore,
Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.   marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas
thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he
cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy case
against him.
RULING:
No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner failed to realize that a declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL 
G.R. No. 172060,  [September 13, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary  injunction  and/or
temporary restraining order before the  Court of Appeals. However, The  Court of Appeals  ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the  criminal case  because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:

No.

RATIO:

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the  criminal case  for G.R. No. 145370.        March 4, 2004
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on  Criminal
FACTS:
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their
which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where
illegitimate, or any of his  ascendants  or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the
the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed
annulment of marriage is not similar or  intimately  related to the issue in the  criminal case  for
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among
respondent were married. The subsequent  dissolution  of their marriage will have no effect on the
others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the marriage
her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
ISSUE:
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the HELD:
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no 18,  Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a Procedure).  A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
State’s penal laws are concerned.” evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”

“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between
the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.”
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even
did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution  requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”
Petition is GRANTED.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994
FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without
the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in
the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife until when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for
four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The
baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas and was brought to US. Desiring
to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States.
She filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefor that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila that their marriage license cannot be located and does not appear in the records. Castro
testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply
for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. The trial court denied the petition. Unsatisfied with
the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. The CA reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared the marriage null and void. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of
the marriage
RULING: Yes. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The court affirmed the decision
of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of
suspicion sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting
parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a
ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The
certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and inability to find”
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.
Social Security System v. Bailon
G.R. No. 165545, 24 March 2006
FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The
petition was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then
sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona
petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was
actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and
the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently
emerged. Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad
faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her
parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that
Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s
decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of
the SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the
contrary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
RULING:
No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of
law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, the action for annulment
became extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse,” as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
BPI vs. Posadas
GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931
FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila
absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in
recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de
Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the
deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914.  The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927.  The latter while in Germany, executed a will in
March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir.  The deceased
possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of
shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations.  Included in the personal property is a life insurance
policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, Manila Branch.  In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the
beneficiary without any qualification.  Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased.  BPI, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by
Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest.  Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and
belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were
paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion
paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as
part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax
according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that
the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.  
G.R. No. L-4156             May 15, 1952
FLORENCIA VITUG, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET ALS., defendantes;

DONATA MONTEMAYOR, defendant-appellant.
Filemon Cajator for appellee.

Macapagal, Punzalan and Yabut for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiff filed this action against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover
one twelfth (1/12) share of thirty (30) parcels of land situated in Lubao, Pampanga, which are
actually registered in the name of said defendant, praying at the same time that the latter be
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,00 yearly from May 29, 1929, and the cost of action.
The principle allegations of the complaint are: Clodualdo Vitug married two times, his first wife being
Gervacia Flores, with whom he had three children, to wit, Victor, Lucina and Julio. Julio Vitug is
survived by his only daughter, Florencia, plaintiff herein. His second wife is Donata Montemayor, with
whom he had eight children all of whom are made defendants herein.
After the death of Clodauldo Vitug, intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate were
instituted and his widow, Donata Montemayor, was appointed administratrix of the estate. In said
proceedings, all the properties of the deceased were inventoried and distributed among his heirs,
with the exception of thirty (30) parcels of land involved in this litigation. It was there agreed by the
widow and the other heirs to divide and partition all the properties composing the estate into twelve
equal parts, one twelfth (1/12) share to be given to each heir, including the widow.
Plaintiff claims that, taking advantage of her position as administratrix and of the fact that she was
in actual possession of the thirty parcels of land involved in this litigation, the widow, Donata
Montemayor, deliberately concealed said properties and excluded them from the inventory and the
project of partition she submitted in the intestate proceedings with the result that they were not
included in the distribution of the estate among the heirs.
In traversing the foregoing averments, defendants claimed in their answer that the thirty parcels of
land in question are paraphernal and as such belong exclusively to public, uninterupted, continous, in
the concept of owner, exclusive and adverse to all other persons, from time immemorial, and whose
little thereto evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 2842, 2289, 2887 and 2888 of the office
of Register of Deeds of Pampanga. These properties being paraphernal in nature, Donata Montemayor
claims that she is not in duty bound to include them in the settlement and distribution of the estate
of her deceased husband Clodauldo Vitug.
The issues being just joined, and after due hearing, the court rendered its decision, which was later
amended, holding that the thirty parcels of land in question are conjugal and should have been
included in the settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased Clodualdo Vitug.
Consequently, it rendered judgement against the defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court is of the opinion that the thirty parcels of land
described in the complaint, one twelfth (1/12) of which is claimed by Florencia Vitug, as heir to her
deceased father, Clodualdo Vitug, husband of Donata Montemayor, were purchased with the funds
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor. But from the
conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existance of their marital life, the
inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full ownership of
the thirty (30) parcels of land so bought to his wife, Donata Montemayor, thus considering the one
half (1/12) of the funds of the conjugal partnership so advanced for the purchase of said parcels of
land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug on his death. Consequently, the one twelfth
(1/12) share of Florencia Vitug is only the one twelfth (1/12) of the P95,000 funds advanced by the
marital partnership in the purchase of thirty (30) parcels of land involved in this case, or one twelfth
(1/12) of P47,500 which should have belonged to the deceased Clodualdo Vitug at the time of his
death, or P4,081.02. So this one twelfth (1/12) or P4,081.02 shall pertain to Florencia Vitug as her
share, plus six per cent (6%) on the said amount from the time of the presentation of the complaint.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby modified condemning the herein defendant Donata Montemayor to
pay Florencia Vitug the sum of P4,081.02 plus six per cent (6%) thereon from the time of the filing of
this complaint, and the payment of the costs.
The principal issue is to be determined in this appeal is whether the thirty parcels of land involved in
this litigation are conjugal, as claimed by the plaintiff, or paraphernal, as claimed by the defendants.
If the former the relief prayed for should be granted; if the latter the action should be dismissed.
It appears that Donata Montemayor married Clodualdo Vitug on January 15, 1898, and from their
marriage eight children were born. In the year 1905, she inherited from her parents several parcels of
land which mostly were swamps, mangrove or nipa in nature, with the exception of a small portion
which was already then a fishpond. All these properties had in 1906 to 1917 a combined assessed
value of P10,790. During their marital life, these swamp, mangrove or nipa lands were improved by
their conversion into fish ponds, although there is no proof as to the source of the money used in
making the improvement, and with regard to the property describe in exhibit "M" the evidence shows
that it was converted into fishpond during the marriage but the conversion was made by the lessees
in pursuance of an express condition agreed upon in the contract of lease covering the same. After
their conversion into fishponds, these properties were sold by Donata Montemayor, together with the
small fishpond, for an aggregate price of P116,468.37, the transactions having taken place in the
years 1925, 1927 and 1928 respectively. The increase in value of said properties as a result of their
conversion is P105,678.37.
The lower court considered this increase reimbursible to the conjugal partnership because, there
being no evidence adduced as to the source of the money used in the conversion of the properties
into fishponds, the legal presumption that arises, according to the court, is that the same had come
from the conjugal fund or from the income earned by the labor or industry of each spouse. To this we
agree, for under our old Civil Code, property acquired for a valuable consideration during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, or property obtained by the industry, wages or work of
the spouses, or of either of them, belongs to the conjugal partnership (Article 1401). In the same
way, any useful expenditure made for the benefit of the separate property of either one of the
spouses by means of advances made by the partnership, or by industry of the husband or wife, is
partnership property (Article 1404). This being the legal presumption with regard to property
acquired during the marriage in the absence of clear evidence proving that the money paid for its
acquisition pertains exclusively either to the husband or to the wife, it follows by the same token
that all monies spent during the marriage and paid for said property are presumed conjugal in the
absence of clear evidence proving that the said monies pertain exclusively either to the husband or to
wife. Manresa, commenting on article 1401 of the old civil code, says that all expenses incurred by
the spouses during the marriage are presumed to have come from the common fund (9 Manresa,
633-635).
Here it does not clearly appear how much actually spent by the spouses in converting the properties
into fishponds because the parties have not presented any evidence on the matter. There is,
therefore, no way by which we can accurately determine the money actually spent by the spouses of
the conversion. But such failure is no impediment at all for us to determine the amount that should
be actually reimbursed to the conjugal partnership, for in such a case the only way available is to
estimate and determine the increase in value, as we have already stated, is P105,678.37. This is the
amount refundable to the conjugal partnership. And as the evidence shows that the funds used in
purchasing the thirty parcels of land in question had come from this refundable amount, it logically
follows that said properties are conjugal and should have formed part of the estate of the late
Clodualdo Vitug. The fact that said properties are now registered in the exclusive name of Donata
Montemayor does not destroy their nature as conjugal because they are acquired during coverture
and the presumption of law created in favor of the conjugal partnership has not been overcome by
clear proof to the contrary (Guingguing vs. Abuton, 48 Phil., 144).
One point raised by appellants which needs to be considered refers to the claim that the conversion
during the marriage of the property described in Exhibit "M" and "M-1" at the expense of the lessees in
accordance with the contract of lease cannot be considered as part of the increase in value of said
property as a result of the version is not refundable to the conjugal partnership. This claim has no
merit. It appears that this property was given in lease subject to the condition that it should be
converted into fishpond at the expense of the lessees and that, upon the termination of the lease, it
shall be returned to the lessor as fishpond and in good condition. It also appears that the land has an
ares of 56 hectares, 25 ares 50 centares, and the lease was to run for a period of eight years, but the
cannon to be paid was only a lump sum of P8,500, or an average of P1,062.50 a year. This greatly
disproportionate to the extent and an area of the land leased. The reason for this inadequacy of the
cannon can only be attributed to the stipulation that the land was to be converted into a fishpond at
the expense of the lessees. It is, therefore, fair to presume that the expense incurred in the
conversion of the land into a fishpond which has greatly contributed to the increase of its value
partake of the nature of an additional consideration paid for the lease of the aforesaid property.
All things considered, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the errors attributed by the appellants
to the lower court are not well taken.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
[ GR No. L-15798, Dec 28, 1961 ]
JOSE P. TECSON v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM +
This is an appeal from a decision or ruling of the Social Security Commission denying payment of
death benefits to Jose P. Tecson, the beneficiary of an employee of the Yuyitung Publishing Company,
by the name of Lim Hoc.
The facts as found by the Social Security Commission are as follows:
"The facts attendant are as follows: The late Lim Hoc, a former employee of the Yuyitung Publishing
Company, was, at the time of his death on November 3, 1957, a member of the System, having
qualified as such on September 1, 1957. In the SSS Form E-1 accomplished and filed by him with the
System, he gave his civil status as married, but made no mention of the members of his family or
other relatives. Instead, he designated therein the petitioner Jose P. Tecson, reportedly a friend and
co-worker of his, as his beneficiary. After the death of Lim Hoc, petitioner, in his capacity as the
designated beneficiary, filed with the System a claim for death benefits." (ROA, p. 31).
In denying the petition of Tecson the Social Security Commission states that the legislative policy
underlying the system is to grant and afford protection to the covered employee as well as his family;
that while Section 13 of the law (Rep. Act No. 1161 as amended) makes mention of the beneficiary as
recorded by his employer, it is not just anyone that the employee designates who may be appointed
his beneficiary because Section 24 (a) of the law clearly provides that the employer shall report to
the system the names, ages, civil status, salaries and dependents of employees, and paragraph (a) of
the same section provides that if an employee subject to compulsory coverage should die or become
sick or disabled without the System having previously received a report about him from his employer,
the said employer shall pay to the employee or his legal heirs, damages, etc.
It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security System is protection of the
employee as well as of his family, but this purpose or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the
extent of contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained in Section 13, thereof, as follows:
"SECTION 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under such
conditions as the Commission may define, before becoming eligible for retirement and if either such
death or disability is not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he or, in case of his
death, his beneficiaries as recorded by his employer shall be entitled to the following benefit: * *
*." (R.A. 1161 as amended.)
When the provisions of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can do nothing but apply its clear and
explicit provisions. (Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720; Caminetti vs. U. S., 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. ed 442).
It should be remembered that the benefits or compensation allowed an employee or his beneficiary
under the provisions of the Social Security Act are paid out of funds which are contributed in part by
the employees and in part by the employers' (commercial or industrial companies members of the
System), Sections 18 and 19 of the Social Security Act (Republic Act No. 1161 as amended) provide
that 2½%, of the salary of an employee subject to compulsory coverage, shall be deducted and
withheld from his monthly compensation and paid over to the System, while the employer for his part
contributes another amount of 3½% of the salary of said employee. The contributions are collected by
the System, which acts as the trustee of such funds. It is provided also in the Act that of the total
yearly collection not more than 12%, during the first two years of the operation of the System and not
more than 10% during any year thereafter shall be disbursed for salaries and wages of the employees
of the System (Sec 24). A certain percentage of the funds of the System may be invested in interest-
bearing bonds and deposits and in loans or advances to the National Government (Sec. 25). As these
funds are obtained from the employees and the employers, without the Government having
contributed any portion thereof, it would be unjust for the System to refuse to pay the benefits to
those whom the employee has designated as his beneficiaries. The contribution of the employee is his
money; the contribution of the employer is for the benefit of the employee. Hence the beneficiary
should primarily be the one to profit by such contributions. This is what is expressly provided in
above-quoted Section 13 of the law.
It should also be noted that the Social Security System is not a law of succession. Its purpose is to
provide social security, which means funds for the beneficiary, if the employee dies, or for the
employee himself and his dependents if he is unable to perform his task because of illness or
disability, or is laid off by reason of the termination of the employment, or because of temporary lay-
off due to strike, etc. It should also be remembered that the beneficiaries of the System are those
who are dependent upon the employee for support. Section 23 of the law (before its amendment by
Republic Act No, 2658, which took effect on June 18, 1960) requires the employer to report and
transmit to the System such record of the names, ages, civil status, occupations, salaries and
dependents of all his employees. It is not the heirs of the employee who are to receive the benefits
or compensation. It is only in case the beneficiary is the estate, or if there is none designated, or if
the designation is void, that the System is required to pay the employee's heirs. Such is the express
provision of Section 15 of the same Act, as amended.
The Commission held that under its regulations, which are quoted below, the employee must choose
the beneficiaries from anyone of the persons enumerated therein:
"(a) The following persons may be designated as beneficiaries entitled to receive death benefits
provided they have been registered as such in the records of the System prior to said employee's
death, to wit:
(1) The legitimate widow or widower if not legally separated from the deceased;
(2) Legitimate and/or legitimated children;
(3) Grandchildren;
(4) Parents;
(5) Grandparents;
(6) Natural children duly acknowledged;
(7) Brothers and/or sisters;
(8) In the absence of any of the foregoing relatives, any other person designated by the
employee." (Rule 7, (3), of the Rules and Regulations of the Social Security System).
The above rule indicates the persons that may be designated as beneficiaries. The deceased Lim Hoc
must have designated Jose P. Tecson as his beneficiary under the provisinas of Section 23 of the Act.
The employer must have received no information from the deceased employee Lim Hoc about the
existence of Lim Hoc's wife and children, their names, ages, civil status, occupations, salaries, etc. It
was subsequently known that Lim Hoc had a wife and children in Communist China; the omission by
him of their existence and names in the records of the employer must have been due to the fact that
they were not at the time, at least, dependent upon him. If they were actually dependents, their
names would have appeared in the record of the employer. The absence in the record of his
employee of their existence and names must have been due to the lack of communication, of which
We can take judicial notice, between Communist China and the Philippines, or to the express desire
of Lim Hoc to extend the benefits of his contributions to the System to his "friend and co-worker", to
the exclusion of his wife. It is to be noted also that the funeral expenses of Lim Hoc are to be paid
from the benefits, so that what is to be paid to Tecson would be greatly reduced.
For all the foregoing considerations, the resolution should be, as it is hereby, set aside and annulled,
and the respondent System is hereby ordered to pay the monetary claim of Jose P. Tecson. Without
costs.
Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
Facts: Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a
property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with
whom he had three children. Leonor died on January 2, 1959.  On May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried
to Annette (respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her
husband, built an extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the lease was paid
and Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the
said property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners). On September 8, 1985, Daniel died.
Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage
due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage
(Jan. 8, 1975).
Issue: To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?
Held: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims that
reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period,
Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary
use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however,
the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given,
entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the property.
The time when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his second wife,
Annette, which makes the said property as their conjugal property.
ART 118: “any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed”
Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted
during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.
Uy vs CA and Jardeleza
GR No 109557 November 29, 2000
FACTS: This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand,
against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda
Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand.    The controversy came about as a result of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke  which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or
mental faculties.    Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza
and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Respondent wife filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of his husband and assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell one piece of real
properties.
  RTC granted said petition. Respondent opposed and filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending
that such petition is essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Jardeleza
Sr and that a summary proceedings was irregularly applied.
  RTC denied the motion. CA reversed RTC’s decision for lack of due process on the part of the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke,
a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could
not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its
improvements, worth  more than twelve million  pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary
proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million
pesos.
RULING: NO.  “ART. 124.    The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly.   In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration.    These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance  which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.  In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.   However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors..”
                               Art 124 does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. The situation contemplated in Art 124 is that one where the spouse is
absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. . Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular
accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such
case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires  to  sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians
under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code.
Court affirmed in toto CA’s decision.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ v. PLARIDEL MINGOA, GR No. 146548, 2009-12-18
Facts: The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 520.50 square meters
situated in Diliman,... registered in the name of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married to Sergia V.
Hernandez
Later on, said TCT No. 107534 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121[5] was issued in
favor of Melanie Mingoa.
a complaint[6] was filed with the RTC of Quezon City by herein petitioners, heirs of Domingo
Hernandez, Sr., namely, spouse Sergia Hernandez and their surviving children Domingo, Jr. and Maria
Leonora Wilma, against the respondents... herein, Dolores Camisura, Melanie Mingoa, Atty. Plaridel
Mingoa, Sr. and all persons claiming rights under the latter, and the Quezon City Register of Deeds...
petitioners asked for (a) the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT No. 290121 including all
its derivative titles, the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated February 14, 1963 in favor
of Dolores Camisura... the reconveyance and/or issuance to them (petitioners) by the Quezon City
Register of Deeds of the certificate of title covering the subject property.
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. (who was then a Central Bank employee) and his spouse Sergia V. Hernandez
were awarded a piece of real property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) by
way of salary... deduction.
then having paid in full the entire amount of P6,888.96, a Deed of Absolute Sale of the property was
executed by the PHHC in their favor.
It... bears an annotation of the retention period of the property by the awardee (i.e., restriction of
any unauthorized sale to third persons within a certain period). Tax payments due on the property
were religiously paid (until 1955) by the [petitioners] as evidenced by receipts... under the
[petitioners'] name... it was only after his burial that his heirs found out that TCT No. 107534 was
already cancelled a year before (in 1982), and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121 was issued to the
[respondents].
Upon diligent inquiry, [petitioners] came... to know that the cancellation of TCT (No. 107534) in favor
of the [respondents'] xxx TCT (No. 290121) was based upon three sets of documents, namely, (1)
Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (2) Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Deed of Absolute
Sale.
According to the [respondents] xxx, Hernandez, Sr. was awarded by the PHHC the Right to Purchase
the property in question; however, the late Hernandez,... Sr. failed to pay all the installments due on
the said property.
Hernandez, Sr. sold to Dolores Camisura his rights for the sum of P6,500.00 on February 14, 1963,
through a deed of transfer of... rights, seemingly a printed form from the PHHC. Simultaneous to
this, Hernandez, Sr. and his spouse executed an irrevocable special power of attorney, appointing
Dolores Camisura as their attorney-in-fact with express power to sign, execute and acknowledge any
contract of... disposition, alienation and conveyance of her right over the aforesaid parcel of land.
Apparently, this special power of attorney was executed for the purpose of securing her right to
transfer the property to a third person considering that there was a prohibition to dispose of the
property by the original purchaser within one (1) year from full payment. Else wise... stated, the
irrevocable power of attorney was necessary in order to enable the buyer, Dolores Camisura, to sell
the lot to another, Plaridel Mingoa, without the need of requiring Hernandez, to sign a deed of
conveyance.
On May 9, 1964, Dolores Camisura sold her right over the said property to Plaridel Mingoa for
P7,000.00. Camisura then executed a similar irrevocable power of attorney and a deed of sale of
right in a residential land and improvements therein in favor of Plaridel Mingoa
Plaridel Mingoa took possession of the said property and began paying all the installments due on the
property to PHHC.
On July 9, 1978, Plaridel Mingoa sold to his eldest child, Melanie Mingoa, the property in question for
P18,000.00. TCT No. 107534 was thus cancelled and TCT No. 290121 was issued in the name of
Melanie Mingoa.
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the
government's housing program at the time. Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the
name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the property was received by the
PHHC.
Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. On the other hand, the
[respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966 and are in actual and physical possession
thereof up to the present, and have made considerable improvements... thereon, including a
residential house where they presently reside.
The Owner's Duplicate Copy of the title over the property given by the PHHC to Hernandez, Sr. was in
the possession of Plaridel Mingoa, the latter being able to facilitate the cancellation of the said title
and [the issuance of] a new TCT xxx in the name of Melanie
Mingoa.
The realty taxes have been paid by [respondents], albeit in the name of Hernandez, Sr., but all
official receipts of tax payments are kept by the [respondents].
From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time
when the [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had already been
cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17... years; and from 1983
to 1995 (the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years.
The SPA[31] in favor of Dolores Camisura pertinently states that the latter is the lawful attorney-in-
fact of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr., married to Sergia Hernandez, to do and perform, among others,
the following acts and deeds:
. To sign, execute and acknowledge all such contracts, deeds or other instruments which may be
required by the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation with respect to the purchase of that
certain parcel of land known and designated as Lot No. 15 Block E-89 of the
Malaya Avenue Subdivision, situated in Quezon City and containing an area of 520 square meters,
more or less, which I have acquired thru the CENTRAL BANK STAFF HOUSING CORPORATION;
2. To sign, execute and acknowledge all such contracts or other instruments which may deem
necessary or be required to sign, execute and acknowledge for the purpose of selling,
transferring, conveying, disposing of or alienating whatever rights I may have over that
parcel of... land mentioned above
Issues:
whether or not such sale was valid.
Ruling:
the Court cannot but conclude that the SPA executed by Hernandez, Sr. in respondent Camisura's
favor was, in reality, an alienation involving the subject property... aside from executing said SPA,
likewise sold his... rights and interests over the property awarded by the PHHC to Camisura.
CA committed no error when it ruled:... the purported SPA appear to be merely a grant of authority
to Camisura (and then to Plaridel Mingoa) to sell and dispose of the subject property as well as a
grant of right to purchase the said property; but in essence,... such SPA are disguised deeds of sale of
the property executed in circumventing the retention period restriction over the said property.
The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his ½ share in
the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale
involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was... lacking because said wife's
signature on the SPA was falsified.
CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an
ordinary person.
Sergia's lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid.
It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was
awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title
in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on
May 23, 1966.
sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978.
the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,...
the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by
the wife.
alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent is not
null and void but merely voidable.
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife, otherwise, the contract is voidable
Even if we were to consider that their right of action arose when they... learned of the cancellation
of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance of TCT No. 290121 in Melanie Mingoa's name in 1993, still, twelve
(12) years have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by
law
Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together... with her children, filed the action for reconveyance,
the conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of
the latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners' action has prescribed.
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract
during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from
questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons.
Furthermore, Hernandez, Sr.'s inaction during his lifetime lends more credence to the defendants-
appellants assertion that the said property was indeed sold by Hernandez, Sr. by way of the SPAs,
albeit without the consent of his wife. xxx
Principles:
To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent.
The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988, provides that any alienation or encumbrance
made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void.
However, when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's
consent is not void but merely voidable.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the... presumption
that the party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus
operates as a bar in equity.
De Jesus v Syquia 58 Phil 866
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned
by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age
and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the
said barber shop.  He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship.    As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.  for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.  On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be
given to the child.  Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.   The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera
to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.  family.  It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where
they lived together for about a year.  When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.
ISSUES: 1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant
to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other
letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.  The mere
requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.    and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.
 “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit
the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.  Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as
to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month.  They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS: Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison,
death and when she was already 39 years of age.  
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.  Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.     
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.  Article 172 thereof provides the various
forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society




The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1.          That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. 
With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco
was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child,
it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce
her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an
action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous
possession”.  Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.



Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action
well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown
by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.  Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael
and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD: Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.  after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they could play.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.  Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority.  The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.  The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen.  He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The requirements on residency
and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. 
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and
physical character and well-being.
G.R. No. L-14342             May 30, 1960
CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.
Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.

Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to pay
P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of
petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the Lourdes
Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner, father of the above-mentioned Mercado. The facts
found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and
Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an
empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right
cheek with a piece of razor.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably,
the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto
lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right
was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from
Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the
holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the
latter. The fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was
clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in
a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for plaintiffs-
appellants, he did not declare as to the amount of fees he collected from plaintiff-appellants for the
treatment of Manuel, Jr. the child was not even hospitalized for the wound. We believe that the sum
of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffs-appellant's
complaint come under the class of moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child
suffered moral damages by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of
damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the sum of P2,000.00 would
fully compensate the child.
As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages they
allegedly suffered due to their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel
Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of
mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering of which
arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule
stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the
other's suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical
injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence
of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees, it not
appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their claim for damages.
In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess
time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be
held responsible instead of the latter. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde
vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of arts
and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the
school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the
pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused
by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We
note that the wound caused to respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight
between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the medical expenses incurred in treating
and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did not even require hospitalization.
Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing's face pronounced to
have caused a deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55
Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the
incised wound could cause mental pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered
moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included
physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil
Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219
of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical
injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable
would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender,
Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment
when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219.
Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the
moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which
motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or
interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to the
decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn,
also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to
Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying
to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown
to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petitioner is
declared exempt or free from the payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical
expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

PALISOC v. BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-29025  [October 4, 1971]
FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and  defendant  Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at
the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation
transpired between the deceased and the  defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was
sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador
looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman.
As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon
Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter
died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of
Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI,
(3) Quibule who was the  teacher  in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a
member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.
 othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other  defendants-officials. It stated that the
clause “so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code  applies  only where the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the
pupil’s actions would  pass  from the father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was
based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The
trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as  defendant  Virgilio did not live
with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?
HELD: The head/president and  teacher  of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable
jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability  attaches  to Brillantes as a mere
member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been
properly impleaded as party defendant.
 exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in
Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such
liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and
students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In
this case, The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could
have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision
over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since
Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the  exemption  to the liability. The judgment of
the  appellate  court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was increased in
accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of
gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito
Daffon resulting to the former’s death.  Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence.  The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together
with Daffon and 2 other students.  Complaints against the students were dropped.  Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1.
Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That
students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no
clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary
diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.  Petitioners on
with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was
in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there
for a legitimate purpose.  On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. 
Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence
 
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that
he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.  Though it was clear negligence
on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student.  Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
PROPERTY
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop
their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the
land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s
Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the
issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in
actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and
property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due
process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the
land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in
CA but were denied thus this appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner?
RULING: YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents
have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines
the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although
the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of
―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property
the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which
the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only
be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in
fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article
536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to
judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.
GALLAR V. HUSSAIN
20 SCRA 186
 
FACTS:
Teodoro  sold  to  Chichirita  with  right  to  repurchase.      Former  failed  to repuchase  the 
property  but  the  same  was  purchased  by  his  sister.  Thereafter, Graciana transferred her rights
to Gallar in exchange of a cow.
HELD:
This action is not for specific performance but to quiet title, to remove the cloud  cast  on 
appellee’s  ownership  as  a  result  of  appellant’s  refusal  to recognize  the  sale  made  by  their 
predecessor.    And  as  the  plaintiff  is  in possession, the action is imprescriptible.
ROBLES v. CA- Action for quieting of title | Free patent
FACTS
Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and
Silvino, their grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvino’s death in 1942, said petitioners
inherited the property and started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-
brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the property. In
1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering the property and its
transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax
declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged the property to
private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said bank acquired by
public bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of
the mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as parties-defendant
the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free patent in favour of
spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the
heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no
longer had title to the property.

ISSUES

(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant
issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is valid

(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid

(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid

FABIAN vs. FABIAN

G.R. No. L-20449

HELD
January 29, 1968
(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as
FACTS:  Pablo Fabian bought from the Philippine Government  lot 164  of the Friar Lands Estate in
owners of the subject property.
Muntinlupa, Rizal. By virtue of this purchase, he was issued sale certificate 547. He died on August 2,
In this case, the cloud on petitioners’ title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent 1928, survived by four children, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II, and Silbina.
issued and the tax declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading to the
 On October 5, 1928 Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian, niece of the deceased, executed an affidavit.
transfer of the property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/
On the strength of this affidavit,  sale certificate  547 was assigned to them. The acting Director of
inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have
Lands, on behalf of the Government, sold lot 164  to Silbina Fabian Teodora Fabian. The vendees
prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate. He must have first repudiated
spouses forthwith took physical possession thereof, cultivated it, and appropriated the produce. In
the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider the irregularities in the transactions
that same year, they declared the lot in their names for taxation purposes. In 1937 the RD of Rizal
involving the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show any transaction
issued a TCT over lot 164 in their names. They later subdivided the lot into 2  equal parts. 
between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.
The plaintiffs filed the present action for reconveyance against the defendants spouses, averring that


Silbina and Teodora, through  fraud  perpetrated in their affidavit aforesaid. That by virtue of this
(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilario’s undivided interest is concerned there being co-
affidavit, the said defendants succeeded in having the sale certificate assigned to them and
ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on
thereafter in having lot 164 covered by said certificate transferred in their names; and that by virtue
part of bank by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such
also of these assignment and transfer, the defendants succeeded fraudulently in having lot 164
was unregistered.

registered in their names. They further allege that the land has not been transferred to an innocent
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land
purchaser for value. A reconveyance thereof is prayed for.
by virtue of the adverse possession in the concept of owners since.
 In their answer, the defendants spouses claim that Pablo Fabian was not the owner of lot 164 at the
time of his death on August 2, 1928 because he had not paid in full the amortizations on the lot; that
(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the they are the absolute owners thereof, having purchased it from the Government, and from that year
Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands. having exercised all the attributes of ownership thereof up to the present; and that the present
action for reconveyance has already prescribed. The dismissal of the complaint is prayed for.
Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but
the patent issued was null.  The lower court rendered judgment declaring that the defendants spouses had acquired a valid and
complete title to the property by acquisitive prescription, and accordingly dismissed the complaint.
The latter’s motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

(1) Was Pablo Fabian the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death, in the face of the fact, admitted
by the defendants-appellees, that he had not then paid the entire purchase price thereof?

(2) May laches constitute a bar to an action to enforce a constructive trust?

(3) Has title to the land vested in the appellees through the mode of acquisitive prescription?
HELD: The judgment a quo, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed
1. YES. Lot 164 was a part of the Friar Lands Estate of Muntinlupa, Rizal; its sale to Pablo Fabian was
therefore governed by Act 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. While under section 15 of
the said Act, title to the land sold is  reserved to the Government until the purchaser makes full
payment  of all the required installments and the interest thereon, this legal  reservation refers to
the bare, naked title. The equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the moment
he paid the first installment and was given a certificate of sale. The reservation of the title in favor
of the Government is made merely to protect the interest of the Government so as to preclude or
prevent the purchaser from encumbering or disposing of the lot purchased before the payment in full
of the purchase price. Outside of this protection the Government retains no right as an owner. For
instance, after issuance of the sales certificate and pending payment in full of the purchase price,
the Government may not sell the lot to another. It may not even encumber it. It may not occupy the
land to use or cultivate; neither may it lease it or even participate or share in its fruits. In other
words, the Government does not and cannot exercise the rights and prerogatives of owner. And when
said purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of
conveyance and a certificate of title, the title at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first
occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. In
other words, pending the completion of the payment of the purchase price, the purchaser is
entitled to all the benefits and advantages which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the
losses that may befall it.
That Pablo Fabian had paid five annual installments to the Government, and in fact been issued a
sale certificatein his name, are conceded. He was therefore the owner of lot 164 at the time of his
death. He left four daughters, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and Silbina to whom all his rights
and interest over lot 164 passed upon his demise.
 In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then
the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the person who
under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the
death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all
the requirements of the certificate.
2.  Theassignment and sale of the lot to the defendants Silbina and Teodora were therefore null and
void. To the extent of the participation of the appellants, application must be made of the principle
that if property is acquired through  fraud, the person obtaining it is considered a  trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
 Laches may bar an action brought to enforce a constructive trust such as the one in the case at bar.
Illuminating are the following excerpts from a decision penned by Mr. Justice Reyes:
  But in constructive trusts, . . . the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the
trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is a concealment of the facts giving rise to the
trust …
 The assignment of sale certificate was effected in October 1928; and the actual transfer of lot 164
was made on the following November 14. It was only on July 8, 1960, 32 big years later, that the
appellants for the first time came forward with their claim to the land. The record does not reveal,
and it is not seriously asserted, that the appellees concealed the facts giving rise to the trust. Upon
the contrary, paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts of the parties states with striking clarity “that
defendants herein have been in possession of the land in question  since 1928 up to the present
publicly and continuously under claim of ownership; they have cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves.”
  3.  it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based
upon a constructive or implied trusts, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of
limitations.  the discovery in that case being deemed to have taken place when new certificates of
title were issued exclusively in the names of the respondents therein.
 
[A]lthough, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true
only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title.  The
statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by
the possessor of the property
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of “extra-judicial settlement” upon
the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud. Upon the undisputed facts in the case at bar, not only had laches set
in when the appellants instituted their action for, reconveyance in 1960, but as well their right to
enforce the constructive trust had already prescribed.
 It logically follows from the above disquisition that acquisitive prescription has likewise operated to
vest absolute title in the appellees, pursuant to the provisions of section 41 of Act 190 that:
 Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land
or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for  ten years  by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise,  in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,  shall vest in every
actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title
  Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold not only that the appellants’ action to enforce the
constructive trust created in their favor has prescribed, but as well that a valid, full and complete
title has vested in the appellees by acquisitive prescription.
 
Miguel v. Catalino
G.R. No. L-23072, 29 November 1968
FACTS:
Bacaquio was an owner of a parcel of land and subsequently sold it to Catalino Agyapao, father of
defendant Florendo Catalino for for P300.00 in 1928 which of  the purchase price P100.00 was paid
and receipted for when the land was surveyed, but the receipt was lost; the balance was paid after
the certificate of title was issued. Bacaquio. No formal deed of sale was executed, but since the sale
in 1928, or for more than 30 years, vendee Catalino Agyapao and his son, defendant-appellee
Florendo Catalino, had been in possession of the land, in the concept of owner, paying the taxes
thereon and introducing improvements. Grace Ventura, by herself alone, “sold” as per her
Transferor’s Affidavit presented, anew the same land for P300.00 to defendant Florendo Catalino.
Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his son, the defendant Florendo Catalino. It is worth noting
that in the Original Certificate Title of the subject land, no encumbrance or sale has ever been
annotated in the certificate of title. Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina Miguel, and appellant Grace
Ventura brought suit against Florendo Catalino for the recovery of the land, plaintiffs claiming to be
the children and heirs of the original registered owner, and averred that defendant, without their
knowledge or consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the land, gathered its produce and
unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. Defendant answered pleading ownership and adverse
possession for 30 years. After trial the Court dismissed the complaint, declared defendant to be the
rightful owner, and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate in lieu of the original.
ISSUE:
Who is the rightful owner of the land? Does the principle of estoppel apply?
RULING:
The sale of the land by Bacaquio to Catalino Agyapao, defendant’s father, is null and void ab initio,
for lack of executive approval. Section 145(b) of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu,
providing that no conveyance or encumbrance of real property shall be made in that department by
any non-christian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other requirements, the deed shall bear
indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial governor or his representative duly authorized in
writing for the purpose and Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every contract or
agreement made in violation of Section 145 “shall be null and void”.Since the sale is technically
invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his title
passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
Notwithstanding, the Court is of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee
Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father
of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land
in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn,
while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reivindicate the
lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants’
proposition that no prescription lies against their father’s recorded title, their passivity and inaction
for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable
defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered
barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their
silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in
cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring
from ambush and claim title when the possessor’s efforts and the rise of land values offer an
opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
The four elements of laches are present in the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred. In
the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor’s approval.
The vendor, and also his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to annul the sale from that
time, since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they did not have to
wait for 34 years to institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no action
would be filed against him by such passivity, and also because he “bought” again the land in 1949
from Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly
prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be barred.
The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of
limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of the inequity of
permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of
the property or the relation of the parties. The prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies
in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time laches is not.
Since the plaintiffs-appellants are barred from recovery, their divestiture of all the elements of
ownership in the land is complete; and the Court a quo was justified in ordering that Bacaquio’s
original certificate be cancelled, and a new transfer certificate in the name of Florendo Catalino be
issued in lieu thereof by the Register of Deeds.
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS,
HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities, respondents.
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of the verification, report and
recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative
remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City.
Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on
which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the
latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same
became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and
petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case
for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject
lots they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being
claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was
protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land
Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional
Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad.
237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file
appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a
decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating
therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may file public land
applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary
of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the
motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions
adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced
thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado
Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment
of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by
respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision
of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying
Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs
exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court
respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said
survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio
Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by respondent
Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as
Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of
Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case
does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also
held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE
ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY
CHANGED THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT
FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the subject
land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his
titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of
the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying
the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the
late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of
said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been
the subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was
conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land
was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by
respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular
inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of
Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully
planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of
petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of private
respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. 6
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed
by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular
inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has often enough held that findings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court. 9
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial.
In Republic v. CA, 10 this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the
direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of
the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the subject
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill
 land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private
accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.
boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his
While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by them, they
land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.
nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact directed to do so. In any case,
Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted
accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint that petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted. concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He may issue decisions
Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of
Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was fact.
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands,
Director of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the
the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his
Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau
jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act of
of Lands.
grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the
Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When decision of the Court of Appeals.
he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or adopting
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the
Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 15 this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may
modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions
involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted
beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial
accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the
same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive
officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of
Lands who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive GEMINIANO v. CA
control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or


disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as
to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good faith are not synonymous. Article 1678 may apply to the
Agriculture and Natural Resources. former’s case and Art 448 may apply to the latter’s case. If a person knew that his stay would likely
end or that he knew somehow that he is not the owner of the land then he is not a BPS in good faith.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the
execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds
otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the subject land was public
land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his FACTS: The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their
rights when he issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions. unfinished bungalow to the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the latter. The
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the subject property was later leased to the respondents for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40 a month as
land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to evidenced by their written lease contract. The respondents built their house and introduced some
assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private respondents Salasalans improvements in the lot. In 1985 petitioner’s mother refused receiving monthly rentals. It turned out
and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution that the lot in question was subject to litigation which resulted to its acquisition by Maria Lee which
order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was was sold to Salcedo, who further sold to Dionisio spouses. The property eventually came back to the
actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of
the petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the latter’s names. (petitioners never lost 

possession of the land because Lee and company never issued a writ of possession against them). 1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, stating
that the suit is barred by res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have

 jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real property – only the CFI has jurisdiction.
In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding them to vacate the premises and when
the latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be entitled to buy
the land because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them the land and because they were
builders in Good faith. The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448 regarding builders and ISSUE:
land owners in good faith or Art. 1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be reimbursed half of
1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?
the expenses of the improvements if the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such lessee have
the right to retain in the premises until fully reimbursed. 2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court (with both
LO and BPS being in good faith)?
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith?

2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
RULING:
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their stay would end after the
lease contract expires. They can’t bank on the promise, which was not in writing, of the petitioners
that the latter will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be
produced. Other than the alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove
their claim.
HELD:
In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be one for ejectment and the
other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2 options –
to buy the building or to sell/rent his land. This is so because the rights of the owner of the land is
older, and by the principle of accession, he also has a right to the accessories.


The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the land, the expenses
incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of the land, and whether the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to
exercise such option.



2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the lessor chooses to
appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the private
respondents can’t compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements.
Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents’ sole
right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary.
TECHNOGAS PHIL. v. CA
DEPRA v. DUMLAO

FACTS:
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built
his house on his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s property. Upon
finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to move back from his encroachment, then subsequently
filed an action for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.


The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay rent
(PhP5.00/month) – forced lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so Dumlao
deposited this with the MTC. Neither party appealed judgment so this became final and executory.
FACTS: Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and improvements including the wall which
encroached that of the defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner offered to buy
the land but defendant refused. After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish
the wall (but the case did not state what happened to this agreement, my assumption is that it did
not happen due to conflicts that arose after) Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a
portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re the action and a separate
criminal action of malicious mischief (which the wife was convicted of)
RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that respondent wants to have the wall
demolished.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed to know the metes and
bounds of his property.'

B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy

C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure without exercising the option to sell
the land to the petitioner and the latter cannot do buy the same

RULING: Petition was granted. Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal statement that supports
that the knowledge of metes and bounds of a land due to the Torrens system would amount to bad
faith if there was encroachment on the land of another.

A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the respondent did not
knew about the encroachment until he has hired a surveyor.

B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And
possession in good faith does not lose this character except when the possessor is aware of this
impropriety.



C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as a mere error. Remedy – the 
petitioner, despite being a purchaser of the original builder, can compel the landowner to either buy
the property or sell the piece of land because:

1. He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact presented by both sides.

2. When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the original owner
(hence, the right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also transferred)

Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because it has previously agreed to
demolish a part of the wall. Rather, it was to be negotiated by the parties concern. In the
meantime, petitioner has to pay the rent for the property occupied by its building only up to the
date when respondent serves notice of their option. Case remanded back to the trial court for
determination of the value of the land and the number of days to allot for the respondent to
choose an option. PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 79688, 1996-02-01

Facts:

Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at
Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought
the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.

Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on
December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had
taken possession thereof.

It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner.After discovering that
Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him.  The parties tried to reach an amicable
settlement, but failed.

On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with damages against
Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault
or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated
in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up"
when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8.
Issues:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
Ruling:
On issue no. 1
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals
that Kee was a builder in good faith.
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it
pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a
lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by... another, deliberately
exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all improvements
thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would follow.
"Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity
of his property.
Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's
employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot
8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive
identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance
of any defect or flaw in his title.[9] And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee.[10]
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.
Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
On issue no. 2
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent who
exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage.
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it
made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent.  It is this
negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910
of the Civil Code.
For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for damages.  Now, the extent and/or
amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is
adduced. 
However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court; hence no
damages could now be awarded.
On issue no. 3
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00,
respectively, as prayed for in his complaint.  The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling
that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of Appeals, however reinstated the award
of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case.[19] We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and for the recovery of
damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent.
Principles:
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent who
exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs.  INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO
PASCUAL



Facts: 
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares.
This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land
also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant
was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and,
therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta
quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the
public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent
court reversed the findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject
property but excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the
same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners ISSUE: Whether or not Article 461 applies
vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries,
respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

RULING: YES. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his


property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in
Issue: 
the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion
 covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought

 to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the
Held:  Baeses for their loss.

The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose 

estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated
which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value and
Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property the agreement was freely entered into by the parties.
is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part
of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in
litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority. "Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and
the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for
coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative
department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

[ GR No. L-46345, Jan 30, 1990 ]

BAES V. COURT OF APPEALS
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that
adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. If the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more
reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial
means.
FACTS:
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in order to streamline the Tripa de
Gallina creek (in other words, there was a mand-made change of river course). Said private estate
was acquired by petitioner Baes, and was subdivided in to three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was
totally occupied by the canal so the Government in exchange granted him a lot near but not
contiguous to C. The old river bed was filled up by soil from Lot C. Petitioner now claims ownership
over the old river bed on the basis of Article 461 which says that abandoned river beds belong to the
riparian owners whose land is occupied by the new course of water.
RESTITUTO CENIZA v. CA
This is a petition for review of the order dated October 29, 1976, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 48546 entitled, "Restituto Ceniza, et al. vs. Magno Dabon, et al.," dismissing the petitioners'
complaint for reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision of the
trial court in their favor.
On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an action in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C (being portions of Lot No.
627 with an area of approximately 5,306 square meters) situated in Casuntingan, Mandaue, Cebu
(now Mandaue City), which originally formed part of "Hacienda de Mandaue" of the Seminario de San
Carlos de Cebu. The property is covered by reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10996
issued on February 8, 1939 (formerly Decree No. 694438 issued on February 27, 1934) in the name of
"Vicente Dabon married to Marcela [or Marcelina] Ceniza." (pp. 7 and 19, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants
of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana
Ceniza, who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter named Marcelina
(or Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this marriage
and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.
On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose
Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children
and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in
1929. Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were residing in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627
on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of
Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective
portions of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective
shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
After Dabon died in 1954, his seven (7) children, named Magno, Jacinta, Tomas, Flaviana, Soledad,
Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his possession of a portion of the land.
On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the request of Jacinta Dabon and
Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed the cost, divided Lot 627 into three parts, namely:  others in proportion to the interest of each."
(1) Lot No. 627-A with 3,538 square meters for Marcela Ceniza;  This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the
(2) Lot No. 627-B with 884 square meters for Restituto Ceniza; and  possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
(3) Lot No. 627-C with 834 square meters for Nemesia Ceniza-Albina, who later bequeathed her share
to her brother, Jesus Ceniza. (p. 19, Record on Appeal.)
The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and
627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the
sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. In their
answer to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the petitioners'
right of action had already prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their
action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners. Finding that there existed
a co-ownership among the parties, it ordered the private respondents to execute deeds of
conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C in favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza,
respectively (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
On appeal by the defendants (now private respondents) the Court of Appeals on October 29, 1976,
reversed that decision of the trial court. It ruled that the petitioners' right of action had prescribed
after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8, 1939 in Vicente
Dabon's name (p. 32, Rollo).
The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The legal issue presented by the petition is whether the registration of the title of the land in the
name of one of the co-owners constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of
acquisitive prescription.
We find merit in the petition for review.
The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist
between the predecessors-in-interest of both petitioners and private respondents, prescription did
not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and
made the repudiation known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza (Cortes vs. Oliva, 33
Phil. 480).
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides  
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner
Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of the Civil Code states: 
"If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in
the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse
 
a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of
the cestui que trust; 
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and 
c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/co-owners have not been ousted from
the land. They continue to possess their respective shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the
realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the land. Assuming that the private
respondents' rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of repudiation
of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the petitioners instituted the present
action for reconveyance. These circumstances were overlooked by the Court of Appeals.
In Custodio v. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841, we ruled that: 
"Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would
act as a trustee of his sisters, and there is  no evidence that this trust relation had ever been
repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a relation of co-ownership existed between such trustee
and his sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to bring the present action for
recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said trustee cannot be barred by
prescription, despite the lapse of 25 years from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's
name." (underscoring supplied.)
In  Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86, we affirmed the duty of the courts to shield fiduciary relations
"against every manner of chicanery or detestable design cloaked by legal technicalities" and to guard
against misuse of the Torrens system "to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust."
In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action for reconveyance,
after the defendants had repudiated the co-ownership in 1961, had not yet run its course when the
petitioners filed said action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby  REVERSED AND SET ASIDE  and the
decision dated August 31, 1970 of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, in Civil Case
No. R-10030 is reinstated. Costs against the private respondents.
PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership of Property
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro
indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2
children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking,
Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that
he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name.
He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes,
the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental, however,
Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the
CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense was that
the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT
and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said
property.


The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court
decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did
not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were
ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mother’s lot

(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property
HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where there
are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still
alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded
him in the co-ownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell
his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that “each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.” Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the
buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.
G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989
BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR IBAÑEZ VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix, ANTONIO
DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER, respondents.
In this petition for review on certiorari, We are asked to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on September 19, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 53197-R 1 which affirmed the order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City dated March 26, 1973, issued in Special
Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.". 2
Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr., while petitioner Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of said
estate, namely, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Jose de Zuzuarregui, are the
illegitimate children of the decedent. The parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased whose
estate was the subject of said settlement proceedings. Petitioner was the daughter of the deceased
by a mother different from that of his aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita Javier who
was the niece of the herein respondent administratrix. 3
According to the project of partition dated June 17, 1958 and approved by the probate court, the
respective shares of said heirs in the real estate left by the deceased are as follows: Pilar Ibañez Vda.
de Zuzuarregui, 12/16 thereof, inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her share in the
conjugal partnership; Beatriz, 1/16; Antonio, Jr., 1/16; Enrique, 1/16; and Jose, 1/16. 4
Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area
is stated as 83,781 square meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.00. This statement of said area
was repeated in said document four time, 5 that is, in adjudicating the corresponding portions of said
land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15). Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15). 6 The petitioner did not
have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her
bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property." 7
On January 29, 1973, the respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to
reopen Special Proceedings No. Q-325 for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in
the description of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since,
according to them, the correct land area is 803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square
meters. 8 The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes filed their opposition to said motion. 9
The court a quo issued the contested order, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE,
(1) Sp. Proceeding No. Q-325 entitled, The Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr. is ordered opened for the purpose of correcting a clerical error in
the description of the parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643;
(2) The area of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643 be corrected by cancelling 83,781
sq. meters and changing it to 803,781.51 sq. meters to conform with the
description of land area in T.C.T. No. 42643;
(3) That said corrections be made as pages 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 of the project of
Partition. 10
As already stated, the affirmance of said order by the Court of Appeals eventuated in the elevation of
the controversy to Us under the present recourse.
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission
plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has
been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no
amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become
final. 11 The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in
the body of the decision. 12
However, according to the petitioner, there was no such clerical error. While it is not disputed that
the area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 is 803,781.15 square meters, the
petitioner insists that "the area intended by the heirs of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the
Project of Partition as approved by the trial court is the area of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq.
m. 13
She claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of land if the true area was
not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of partition was executed. 14 She further
contends that the fact that the description of the area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several
times is sufficient evidence to show that such was the area intended in the project of partition. 15
Such contentions are without merit. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb, much less to reverse,
the factual finding of the lower court that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by
inadvertence in the project of partition.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle
the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to
intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided
because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by
co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.
It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and
complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire
area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the
queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and
distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of
the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding
in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? 16
Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the male heirs could not see eye to eye because they did
not have a common mother. 17 If so, this supposed antagonism would even be a compelling reason for
the parties to insist on the total partition of all the properties in the first instance, rather than for
them to remain as co-owners for a long time. As hereinbefore indicated, the project of partition is
dated June 17, 1958, 18 while the motion to re-open the proceedings was filed only on January 29,
1973.
If We were to indulge petitioner in her stand that the area of 803,781 square meters was typewritten
in the document as 83,781 square meters, not because of the typist's error in omitting the number "0"
between the numbers "8" and "3" in the first three digits but because the latter area of only 83,781
square meters was the one intended for distribution, then the irresistible question would be how and
why the parties arrived at that particular latter figure. It will be observed that such a portion would
constitute only 10.42336% of the total land area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643.
On top of this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters has still to be divided into fifteen (15) parts
to arrive at the aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of the other heirs in this particular property. Why
would the parties deliberately create such an unlikely mathematical situation which would
complicate the actual physical segregation of the area supposed to be distributed?
It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between the figures
"8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has not
offered any plausible contrary explanation. Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal counsel in
the intestate proceedings and in the preparation of the project of partition.19
Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the partition are demonstrably unfounded. It will be observed
that according to her own computation, 20 she received her 1/16 share in the estate consisting of
279,803 square meters of land, while her half brothers received on the average 154,975.11 square
meters each. Even if the supposed shares of the respondents in the remaining 720.000 square meters
in the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 were to be added, the share of each
brother would be only 202,975. 11 square meters. There would not be a substantial difference in
value since the petitioner received 190,000 square meters of land located also in Antipolo, Rizal;
while in Balara, Quezon City, she received more than her half brothers, that is, 75,803 square meters
as against their individual 74,309.70 square meters. It was only in Pasong Tamo where she received
slightly less, 14,000 square meters compared to Enrique's and Jose's 14,115 square meters each, but
more than Antonio, Jr.'s 13,621 square meters.
The ineluctable consequence of the foregoing considerations is that, both in law and equity, the
court a quo and the respondent court committed no error prejudicial to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 109262. November 21, 1996.]

DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN, Petitioners, v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR., CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN,
SEGUNDA BAUTISTA CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T. CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T.
CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN, REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN,
GERTRUDES CATAPUSAN and FLORA DIAZ CATAPUSAN, Respondents.
The parties in this case are the children of the second marriage (petitioners) and the heirs of the first
marriage (respondents) contracted by Bonifacio Catapusan, claiming ownership of a parcel of land
located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal (hereinafter referred to as Wawa lot)
The facts: 
 as they constitute proof of respondents’ ownership of the land in their possession. The statement in


Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga
Piguing. 2 They had four (4) children namely, Felix, Vicente, Benicio and Loreto. 3 Narcissa died in
1910. In 1927, Bonifacio married Paula Reyes and out of their wedlock petitioners Domingo, Minelio
and Filomeno Catapusan were born. Bonifacio died in 1940. 4 Felix, Vicente and Benicio, Bonifacio’s
sons from the first marriage, died before the institution of this case, survived by their respective
widows and children, respondents herein.
The petitioners filed on June 11, 1974, an action for partition of the Wawa lot, which they allegedly
co-own with their half-brothers and half-sisters. 5 Petitioners contend that the said lot belongs to
their father Bonifacio and should therefore be partitioned among the heirs of the first and second
marriages. 6 In support thereof, they presented the tax declarations of the Wawa lot’s four (4)
adjacent lot owners. These four tax declarations state that each of them bounds on one side the
Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio. Stated differently, the petitioner’s proof of Bonifacio’s
ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjoining lot owners which noted that they
each border on one side the Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio. 7



In their answer with counterclaim, respondents asserted that the Wawa lot was originally owned by
Dominga and inherited by Narcissa as her paraphernal property. 8 Upon Narcissa’s death, the Wawa
lot passed to her four children who are the predecessor-in-interest of respondent These children
possessed and occupied the Wawa lot 9 and secured tax declarations thereon in their names.
Respondents likewise alleged that they had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of
the said lot for more than 50 years when the suit was filed in 1974. 10 They also invoke laches and
prescription against petitioner’s action. In response, petitioners argue that their action had not
lapsed since respondents repudiated the co-ownership only in 1968. 11 They also questioned the
respondents’ lack of documentary proof (like "titulo real") with regard to Dominga and Narcissa’s
title, as the two lived during the Spanish era.
After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint, 13 declared the respondents as the true and
lawful owners of the Wawa lot and granted the counterclaim for P10,000.00 attorney’s fees. 14 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC, but set aside the award of attorney’s fees. 15
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. 16 Hence, this appeal raising three issues: (1)
whether an action for partition includes the question of ownership; (2) whether Bonifacio had title to
the Wawa lot, and (3) whether petitioner’s action is barred by laches and/or prescription.
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue
of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. 18 Needless to state, an action for partition
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule
69 requires the party filling the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to
the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the properties. 19 Hence, on the first issue we rule in the affirmative. 

Anent the second and third issues, it is a basic rule of evidence that the party making an allegation
has the burden of proving 20 it by preponderance of evidence. 21 In this case, petitioners’ evidence
of their father’s (Bonifacio) ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent lot
owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw Bonifacio working on the lot. On the
other hand, respondents presented tax declarations which indicated that the same lot is owned by
their predecessors-in-interest, the children of the first marriage, evidence which carry more weight
the neighboring lot owners’ tax declarations is not a conclusive proof that Bonifacio owned the
surrounded lot. In fact, petitioners cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of their ownership
over the same lot. Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet
when accompanied by proof of actual possession for the required period, they become strong
evidence to support the claim of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession
contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in
concept of owner. 22 Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the kind of
possession that may lead to title by prescription. It is the respondents’ open, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession far beyond the 30 year extraordinary period for acquisitive prescription, 23
coupled with the tax declarations of their predecessors-in-interest, that constitutes a superior weight
of evidence that clinched their claim. Moreover, petitioners’ bare and unsubstantiated allegation that
respondents’ tax declarations were fraudulently issued is insufficient to sustain the imputation of
fraud considering that good faith is always presumed. Besides, respondents’ tax declarations are
deemed regularly issued. Being an action involving property, the petitioners must rely on the strength
of their own title and not on the weakness of the respondents’ claim.
In any event, the second and third issues pertain to factual findings of the courts below. It is a settled
doctrine that factual findings of the lower court when supported by substantial evidence on the
record is not usually reviewed by the Supreme Court, especially when it is affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in this case. 25 No cogent evidence appears from the records of this case for us to apply
the above doctrine differently. No essential facts were overlooked by the courts below, which if
considered, may produce a different outcome. Besides, the credence of the evidence and the
assessment of the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies presented are best appreciated by
the trial court judge having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness’
deportment on the stand.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Kilario v. CA
 description that she was a “widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000
Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario. The latter occupies a portion
of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, Grandfather of Silverio. The Kilario’s have been living therein
since 1960 by sheer tolerance. When Jacinto Pada dies, his heirs entered into extrajudicial partition
of his estate in 1951. As a result thereof, lot 5581 was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became
co-owners of said lot. Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner. Eventually,
Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr. Paderes. Mariaon the other hand, heir of Marciano,
sold her share to her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The latter demanded sps. Kilario to vacate but
the sps. refused. On June 1995, a complaint for ejectment was filed against sps. Kilario. On July1995
a deed of donation in their favor was executed by heirs of Amador Pada.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition was valid
RLILING: The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is
valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to
be in writing and  be registered  in order to be valid. The object of  registration  is to serve
as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed
with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no  creditors  are involved.
Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a
public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The extrajudicial
partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has
produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto
Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is
conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had
not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of
Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating
the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of
the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus,
is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches  have equally set in. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial
partition  executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that
they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only
relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their  admissions  are  evidence of a high
order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
CRUZ v LEIS- Redemption and Co-ownership
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole
property subject of the co-ownership
FACTS:
Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her name, with the


Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the
land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed
of Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the
property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.


When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint
with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their
marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely
affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his
name after failure of Isidro to comply with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on co-
ownership?
HELD:
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, the conjugal property regime
ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis’ half of the property to be divided among his
legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.


However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the
land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did
not transfer back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title
in the Torrens System.
PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the
land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against
the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee should
have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an
action to quiet title.
FACTS:
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private
respondent), payable in 6 years. In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000
downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot
and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and
demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with
Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol
averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract
to sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the
sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The
acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties
intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its
actual (upon Donasco’s possession and construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon
execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot
recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that
the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for
rescission has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence,
Donasco has equitable title over the property.
(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was
actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the
title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object
of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they
no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring
suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that
Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with
personality to bring an action to quiet title. Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos
because an action to quiet title to property in ONE’s POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute.
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited
their lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area
alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214
square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square
meters more or less.
Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond
portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470
square meters.
The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an
area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the
earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said
portion.
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant
said that he merely reconstructed the same.
Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action
RULING: No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the
action must fail.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is,
in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be
brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could
been a “cloud” to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the
agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to
them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute,
and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry,
whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also
within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary
dispute may be fully threshed out.
G.R. No. 108926 July 12, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA , respondents.
Petitioner implores this Court review and set aside the decision  1  February 8, 1993 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34950 which affirmed the decision of June 14, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati in LRC Case No. M-99 confirming respondent Democrito O. Plaza's title over Rel. Plan
1059, which is the relocation plan of Psu-97886.
After the filing of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in its resolution of May 24, 1993, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The
petitioner filed its Memorandum on June 29, 1993 while private respondent filed his Memorandum on
July 6, 1993.
The factual background is summarized in the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals as follows:
According to petitioner-appellee, the subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly
Pamplona), Las Pinas, Rizal, now Metro Manila, having an area of 45,295 sq. m., was first owned by
Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932 for the year
1913; 3933 for 1917; and 6905, for 1921 (Exhs. 2-B, 2-C and 2-D, Exh. K for petitioner-appellee, pp.
514-516, Record). Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired by Pedro
Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To evidence their respective acquisition
of the property in question, Tax Declaration Nos. 7937, for the year 1923; 8463, for 1927; 9467, for
1934; and 2708 (year not available) were presented.  3  After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-
judicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration Nos.
5595 and 5596 for the year 1960.  4  On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage"
deeding the subject property to petitioner-appellee for P231,340.00 payable in three (3)
installments, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Upon receipt of the
full payment, they executed a "Release of Mortgage" on 1 August 1968.  5 After the sale, petitioner-
appellee took possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due thereon for the years 1966
up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and
B-013-01391.  6 He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker
thereof, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a while. Five (5)
years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966, up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas. 7
On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987, for
the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property alleging among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof;
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property prior to, and since 12 June 1945;
3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or having any interest over the property;
and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon. 8
On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity),
filed its opposition maintaining, among others, that: (1) petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-
interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as
well as tax payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject property pertains to the
public domain and is not subject to private appropriation. 9
On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction requirements was proved and, on motion,
the lower court issued its order of general default. 10
Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their opposition
thereto prior to, or were allowed to submit their opposition despite, and after, the issuance of the
order of general default. They are:
(a) Arsenio Medina who withdraw his opposition on 29 May 1989; 11
(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon; Heirs of Andres Reyes; Maximo Lopez; and,
Marilou Castanares who prayed that the lower court direct petitioner-appellee to see to it that their
respective property, which adjoins the land in question, are not included in the petition; 12
(c) the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz and the Kadakilaan Estate. Upon their respective motion, the order
of default was set aside as to them and they were allowed to file their opposition.
The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the
"primitive owner" of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other
persons have been in open, peaceful, notorious and continuous possession of the land in question
since time immemorial until the present.
The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its  Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos  of 1891
Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in compliance with, and
as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the owner of the subject property; and, (2) petitioner-appellee or
his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier.13
(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among others, that by reason of a  Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891; Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol of 1891; Decree No. 659, approved
Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated 10 September 1963, their predecessor-in-interest is the
owner of the subject property. Despite (sic) that their motion to lift order of default as to them and
admit their opposition, which motion was opposed by petitioner-appellee, does not appear to have
been
 to look after the property; and,
acted upon by the lower court, they were able to present one (1) witness; 14 and,
(e) Phase II Laong Plaza Settlers Association, Inc. It filed a motion to intervene in the case but the
motion does not appear to have been acted upon by the lower court. 15
On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, West Sector (CENRO-
WEST) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources requested the lower court to furnish
it photocopies of the records of the petition as the property in question was the subject of a request
for a Presidential Proclamation reserving the land in question for Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Site (SIR) of the National Housing Authority. 16
On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular inspection was conducted on the subject
property by the court-appointed commissioner who submitted his report on 2 July 1990. 17
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the same) for slum
improvement and sites and services program under the administration and disposition of the National
Housing Authority in coordination with the National Capital Region, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources subject to actual survey and private rights if any there be, . . . The National
Housing Authority was authorized to develop, administer and dispose of the area in accordance with
LOI 555, as amended (by LOI Nos. 686 and 1283), and LOI 557. 18
On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee filed his memorandum.  19 The oppositors did not. Nevertheless,
among them, only the Republic and the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz formally offered their evidence. 20
On 14 June 1991 the lower court rendered the judgment referred to earlier.
On 8 July 1991, from among the oppositors, only the Republic filed a notice of appeal which was
approved on 10 July 1991.  21 By reason of the approval thereof, the motion filed on 23 July 1991 by
the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez for the reconsideration of the judgment was denied on 1 August

1991. 22
On February 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment.
Hence, this petition filed by he Republic of the Philippines alleging that:
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND IS
CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
Petitioner argues that he burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing evidence that he has a
registrable title over the property sought to be titled, which the latter failed to do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent vintage, private
respondent has not established actual possession of the property in question in the manner required
by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, no evidence was
adduced that private respondent cultivated much less, fenced the subject property if only to prove
actual possession. The actual fencing of the property was done only starting 1988 when the actual
occupants were forcibly ejected and driven out from their respective abodes and that its witnesses
namely: Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco, who were all
actual residents of the questioned area, categorically testified on this score, summarized as follows:
1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant being Domitita who had been in the
premises for more than thirty (30) years nobody ever claimed ownership over the subject property;
2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private respondent had filed a petition to have the
property titled in his name;
3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement nor was there a caretaker assigned by him
4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families residing in the area but through force,
intimidation and illegal demolitions, were driven out by private respondent from the premises.
We are not persuaded. On this point, the respondent Court correctly found that:
Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have been in open, to those of the trial court; and 8.) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for a period of 30 years under specific evidence on which they are based. 28
a  bona fide  claim of ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellee's predecessors-in-
Concededly, none of the above exceptions obtains in the case at bar.
interest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax declarations. The
evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner-appellee have been Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable portion of the
declaring the property in question in their names in the years 1923, 1927, 1934 and 1960; and, (2) in public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 entitled "Reserving for Slum
1966, petitioner-appellee purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil Alhambra and since then paid the Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Sites and Services of the National Housing Authority, A Certain
taxes due thereon and declared the property in his name in 1985. Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila," which
was issued on January 7, 1991 or almost 6 months prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals opined that "the issuance of the proclamation did not have any effect on the
. . . Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax payments, they can hardly be
subject property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved the same
said to be of recent vintage indicating petitioner-appellee's pretended possession of the property. On
for slum improvement and sites and services program, but subject to actual survey and existing
the contrary, they are wrong evidence of possession in the concept of owner by petitioner-appellee
private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and
and his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, the realty tax payment receipts show that petitioner-
proves, to be the owner thereof." We agree. At any rate, registration does not vest title. It is merely
appellee has been very religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This is indicative of his
evidence of such title. 29 Our land Registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what
honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
he actually has. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for a
certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the
period of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the property in question has
acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 30
become private property. 23
Of the particular relevance is the finding of the respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that —
Contrary to the representations of the Republic, petitioner-appellee had introduced some
improvements on the subject property from the time he purchased it. His witnesses testified that We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property.
petitioner-appellee developed the subject property into a ricefield and planted it with rice, but only As provided in the proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must be respected and
for about five years because the return on investment was not enough to sustain the continued he cannot be barred from having the land titled in his name. This does not contravene or negate the
operation of the riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation of the intention of the proclamation. Besides, its implementing Letters of Instruction recognize that there
land into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered "improvements" thereon. 24 may be lands declared included in the Slum Improvement Resettlement (SIR) program that are
privately owned. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555 provides that if the land declared to be included in the
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
SIR program is privately owned, the concerned local government, upon the approval by the National
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
Housing Authority of its project plan, shall acquire the property through expropriation. In LOI No. 686
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive

paragraph 3, it is mandated that the NHA, upon request of the local government, expropriate or
possession. 25 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
otherwise acquire land for the SIR program. Proclamation No. 679 is, therefore, not a valid
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere
justification to deny the petition.
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the . . . At the time the Proclamation was issued, the controversy over the subject property was sub-
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 26 judice. The conflicting rights over it had been presented to the court for resolution. That jurisdiction
could not be removed from it by subsequent legislation. The President must have been aware of this.
Neither do we find merit in the assertions of petitioner's witnesses Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom,
Hence, the inclusion of the cautionary clause "subject to existing private rights." 31
Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly stated by the public respondent,
Over time, Courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient or
. . . Their alleged possession is not based on any right. Neither do they claim to have title or interest
contrary to reason is not allowed in law —  Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
over the subject property. As a matter of fact, they did not bother to oppose the petition. The most
permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly, reason and law find respondent entitled to rights of ownership
that can be said of their alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful owners of
over the disputed property.
the property — plaintiff-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no bar to the granting of
the petition. We do not see why we should accept the bare assertions of the alleged occupants at ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant
their face value as against the claim of ownership of plaintiff-appellee backed up by legal petition is hereby DISMISSED.
documents, tax declarations, and tax receipts. 27
EASEMENTS
Well-settled and oft-repeated is the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive on the Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd DAVID-CHAN VS CA
or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4.) when the judgment is based on a
In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the requirements of law but
misapprehension of facts; 5.) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6.) when the Court of
fails to provide factual support to show her entitlement thereto. Since findings of facts by the Court
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court, the petition must thus
admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7.) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
fail. Even petitioner's plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort to equity is possible only in
the absence, and never in contravention, of statutory law.
 of merit." Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The land sold


The petition assails the Decision[1] of respondent Court[2] promulgated on April 30, 1992. The Decision
of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July 26, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive portion of the affirmed
decision of the trial court reads:[3]
 The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they alleged that they did not


"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiff's petition to be without merit,
the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against plaintiff.
 because, being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be acquired by prescription.


On defendant's (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence."
The Facts
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and
depriving her of access to the highway. Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635
square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, was
delineated on its northern and western sides by various business establishments. Adjoining her
property along its southern boundary was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-
northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot
with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by private respondent. In short, petitioner's
lot was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only
access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
aforementioned property of private respondent. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider
compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of private respondent. The
prospective subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square meters and
covered by TCT No. 163033-R, which was formerly owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as "Singian Brothers") and was sold to private respondent without the
knowledge and consent of petitioner, who was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right
of pre-emption or right of redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to
complete the construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result in depriving
petitioner of the only available right of way, and that therefore, she was constrained to petition the
trial court to enjoin private respondent from fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot and to pay the
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.



Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of petitioner were
never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally
occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
4865. The dispositive portion of the judgment of ejectment reads:[4]



"WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo David including their
agents/representatives and, any and all persons given access by them to the disputed premises
claiming any right under them, are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area in question,
remove all the improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the plaintiff corporation
jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos - as Attorney's fees and the costs of this suit.
 condensed into two, as follows:
The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby dismissed as the action has
become moot.



The defendants' counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is hereby dismissed for lack
by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the property.
Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through the lot in question.



authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed lot. As their affirmative and special defenses,
Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no cause of action
Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she was not entitled to a right of pre-
emption or right of redemption. Finally, petitioner had another access to the National Highway
which, however, she closed during the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended the
construction of her fence.[5]
The Issues


Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now submits the following
issues for consideration of this Court:



"I.              In its reaffirmation of the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals missed to temper
with human compassion of the Art. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Phil. which requires the
presence of four requisites for a compulsory easement of way."[6]



"II.             (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal niceties to favor
respondents, violating time-honored and deeply-rooted Filipino values."[7]



"III.            With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in favor of the
respondent despite the facts existing at the background."[8]



"IV.           The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet measuring two (2) feet
and four (4) inches to the national highway without passing through respondent's property as per the
commissioner's report."[9]



In her Memorandum[10] dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one issue:

"Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over that portion of the
property of respondent Rabbit?"
On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues:[11]



"1.                 Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private respondents?

2.            Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way of `pakikisama' and
'pakikipagkapwa-tao'?"



After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds that the issues can be


(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent's property?



(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition and application of the
Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?

The Court's Ruling procured the isolation of his property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought

 about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to
The petition is devoid of merit.
 assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being
to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it
First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify

 a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.' (Underscoring ours)

Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,[12] petitioner submits that "the owner of an estate may 

claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper
requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet indemnity, to wit:[16]

to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own
acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar  "2. The second requisite - that there was payment of the proper indemnity was likewise not met by
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of right of
the shortest."[13]
 way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff ever

 made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, 'The
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she nevertheless fact that plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the disputed premises hardly
failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements. Evaluating her evidence, satisfies the requisite regarding the payment of the proper indemnity.'"
respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not "without adequate outlet to a public highway" as
follows:[14]
 The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the public highway, or (2) she
caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of
"1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon.[17] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[18]

property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the 

case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are
without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can binding upon this Court.[19] While there are exceptions to this rule,[20] petitioner has not convinced
always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through the property of us that this case falls under one of them.

the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioner's Report, has an open
space on the southern boundary of plaintiff's land.
 Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values

 

2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot, plaintiff has no more way to Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims to be an "ordinary
the National Highway.
 housewife (with) x x x meager resources" pleads that "those who have less in life should have more in

 law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao in
Plaintiff's apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer fence off their property resolving the case.

because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence to separate the two properties. And even granting 

that the Pineda family would eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as "justice outside
of right of way from the Pineda family." legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure.[21] As found by respondent Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she right of way on the property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail
caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property, thus:[15]
 over the legal findings.



"1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to separate her property from There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may
that of the Pineda family on the southern boundary. And she even closed the small opening causing be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied with because
her property to be isolated and losing one access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed to easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the
meet the third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way. As held by the Hon. Supreme Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly
Court in the case of Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, 534-535: not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment
and must bear the consequences of such choice.

'The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been granted 

an adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 1992, of
even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for another the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
passageway through the latter's property. If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such
access (through the property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be used, it was because he himself had
closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no
reason to which the record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in
his complaint. But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself

FRANCISCO V. IAC- Easement of Way
An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway
and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own
acts.
FACTS: Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-
owners.

On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which
an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided
1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an
undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A
partition was then executed.
The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dila’s lot came
to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively
isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.
 On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the establishment
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
 of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties
Ramos asked for a right of way through Francisco’s land but negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal
for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was
supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dila’s lot. Yet in
August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very
right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of
passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did
not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.]
 road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along
Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him asserting his
right to a legal easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging
to Francisco
HELD: NO. The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own
act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought
about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to
assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being
to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it
has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify
a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.
STA. MARIA V. CA|FAJARDO, 285 SCRA 351- Compulsory Servitude of Right of Way
Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1) surrounded by immovables and no
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is not due to the owner
of the dominant estate; 4) least prejudicial (and shortest if possible)
FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No.
124, in Bulacan.


Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof; by
Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b
owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the
southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.


belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate
outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the alternative
defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs' only
convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-
in-interest have been passing through the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot;
that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an
easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the
dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an
easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their favor. They also prayed for
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.


RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement of right of way. On appeal, the Sta.
Maria's allege that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own actions which caused their lot to
be enclosed or cut-off from the road.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isolation was not
caused by the plaintiffs themselves?
HELD: The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation.

As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither have the private respondents been
able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-
in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have found the existence of the
requisites. The petitioners, however, insist that private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have,
through their own acts of constructing concrete fences at the back and on the right side of the
property, isolated their property from the public highway. The contention does not impress because
even without the fences private respondents' property remains landlocked by neighboring estates
belonging to different owners.
Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to
wit:

1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);


2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest (Art. 650).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way
RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1)
when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is
difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried
river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no egress or ingress from the highway.
For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy
season, it is impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it
has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability
of the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of
the dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate …” To grant the additional easement of right
of way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied
plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way


 ALMENDRAS V. CA

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a GR 110067, MARCH 13, 1997
public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires
payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages FACTS:
caused.
Almendras’ property was surrounded by different properties owned by different people—on the north
FACTS: was Pang Eng’s, east was Yap’s, west was Opone’s, and south was Bongo’s. Yap and Pang Eng both
enclosed their properties against Almendras. She filed for an easement of right of way. Bongo then
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the servient enclosed his property and this was followed soon after by Opone.
estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the Taal Lake.
The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway. HELD:

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no Where there are several estates surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause less damage should be
roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant chosen.
nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more difficult to transfer the
plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type jeep for
transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the roadpath so he approached
Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property to add to the
existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a
right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint for there
is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at
bar.

CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS 291 SCRA 122
[G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998.]
FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City,
where they have been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the
other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once included
the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2.
The said lots were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar
Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma
Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into
residential lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots
designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in
whose favor Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione
conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When
the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found
out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used as
a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about
the intrusion into their property to the barangay office. At the barangay conciliation proceeding,
petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started
enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their
property was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to different owners and had no
adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of the Paciones. As their
protest went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a TRO directing the
Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the disputed property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of a
right of way was not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners filed the present petition together with the issue of legality or illegality of the conversion
of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the Cesar Ledesma, Inc.
ISSUE: WON the conversion of lot 2 to a residential lot was legal.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court ruled that the first element of a compulsory
easement of right of way, i.e., “that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway” is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners’
property and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement.
The second assignment of error was likewise properly rejected by the appellate court. Primarily, the
issue of legality or illegality of the conversion of the road lot in question has long been laid to rest in
LRC Case No. Q-1614 15 which declared with finality the legality of the segregation subdivision survey
plan of the disputed road lot. Consequently, it is now too late for petitioners to question the validity
of the conversion of the road lot
 RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their improvements and pay
Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are
properly cognizable by the National Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 16 and not by the regular courts.

The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.”

SEC. 22.No owner shall charge or alter roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use
and/or other form of subdivision developments as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written
conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter,
by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.


Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is vested upon an
administrative body, no resort to the courts may be made before such administrative body shall
have acted upon the matter.
BALLATAN v. CA


-Land Owner in Good faith, Builder in Good faith scenario -The right to choose between
appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter
or sower stands, is given to the owner.
-If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the
time of payment.
FACTS:
Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24.
Respondent Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is
living in and the registered owner of Lot. 27. The Lots are adjacent to each other.


When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the
eastern side of her property. She was informed by her contractor of this discrepancy, who then told
respondent Go of the same. Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the
parameters of his father’s lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the
authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). Petitioner called the attention of AIA on
the matter and so the latter authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter
then did the survey twice which led to the conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go)
and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot 24 (owned by
petitioner Ballatan.) –(it was later on discovered by the courts that Go encroached 42 square meters
from the property of Ballatan and Yao encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which
were in GOOD FAITH) Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their
improvements and since the latter wasn’t answering the petitioner filed accion publiciana in court.
Go’s filed their “Answer with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third party defendants
respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.


damages to Petitioner but dismissing the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third
party-complaint as to AIA but reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also
affirmed the demolition and damages awarded to petitioner and added that Yao should also pay
respondent for his encroachment of respondent Go’s property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay
attorney’s fees for his negligence which caused all this fuzz.
ISSUE: What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone was in good faith)?
RULING:
Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was established in
the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of
them were builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land
owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the land given
that the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or tree; otherwise the owner
may remove the improvements thereon.
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably
more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent
to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or
selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the
owner. If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value
at the time of payment.
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
GR No. 911, March 12, 1903
Facts: The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows
therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63
of the same street; that these windows have been in existence since the year 1843, and that the
defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising
the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of one of the windows in said house No. 65 has
been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received
through the window. The court practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the
plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63 from
making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.
The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows during a
period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of light in favor of the house No.
65, and as a servitude upon house No.63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the
making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any manner be prejudicial to the
enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore
the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the
date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to
this case, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the
house No.63, and without opposition on his part. However, the defendant contends that the easement
is negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the
date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of
the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the
easement.
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.
Issue: Whether or not the easement of light in the case of windows opened in one’s own wall is
negative.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a wall belonging to the
wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the windows opened in one’s own wall is of
negative character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Civil Code,
except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate
may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it
would be lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. That, in consequence thereof, the
plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No.63
Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct
the light of house No.65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time
prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not
acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time
might have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house no.65, because the
period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run,
the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.
When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of
ownership inherent in the right of property with no limitations other than those established by law.
By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of
the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the property is
used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement. It is that the
use if the windows opened in a wall on one’s own property, in the absence of some covenant or
express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner
of the abutting property and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of
the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting owner a
waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner
of the windows for the effects of possession according to Art.1942 of the Civil Code, because it is a
mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement of light with respect to the
openings made in one’s own edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using
them. The easement really consists in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing
anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of
not impeding the light.
G.R. No. 3598. July 24, 1908.
MIGUEL FABIE Y GUTIERREZ,  Petitioner-Appellee, v. JULITA LICHAUCO AND THE CHILDREN OF
FRANCISCO L. ROXAS, Respondents-Appellants.
Ledesma & Sumulong, and Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher for Appellants.
Rosado, Sanz & Opisso for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REALTY; INCUMBRANCES; PRESUMPTION. — It is a settled rule that real estate shall be presumed to
be free from incumbrance unless and until the contrary is shown. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of April 7, 1864, and December 13, 1865.)
2. ID.; EASEMENTS. — When the construction of windows and balconies does not constitute an actual
invasion of the rights of another, but is a lawful exercise of an inherent right, the easement of light
and view is negative.
3. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. — One who opposes the registration of title to land upon which he
claims all easement in the name of another, basing his claim on the provisions of article 541 of the
Civil Code, must show that the "apparent sign of the easement," upon which he relies, was in
existence at the time the servitude was established.
4. ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION. — When an easement of light and view is negative, the period for
prescription begins to run from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate, by a formal act,
prohibited the owner of the servient estate to do something which he might properly do if the
easement did not exist., (Art. 538, Civil Code.)
DECISION MAPA, J. :
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner applied for the
registration of his property, situated at 22 Calle San Jacinto, district of Binondo, Manila, free from all
incumbrances, with the exception of an easement of right of way which he recognizes as existing in
favor of the estates of the respondents Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas, which adjoin the property of the
petitioner on the right and left of its entrance, respectively. In addition to the said easement of right
of way the respondents claim that of light, view, and drainage in favor of their respective properties;
said claim was modified in part during the course of the litigation as far as it referred to Julita
Lichauco, who finally reduced her opposition (fol. 138) to the easement of right of way and of light
and view.



In the judgment appealed from it is held that the easement of right of way exists in favor of the
respective properties of Julita Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas, and the latter are further entitled to the
easement of drainage. The claim of both respondents as to other easements was dismissed.
(a) Opposition made by Julita Lichauco. This opponent invokes as the only legal foundation for her
claim the provisions of article 541 of the Civil Code. The language of said provision is as follows: 



"The existence of an apparent sign of an easement between two estates established by the owner of
both shall be considered, should one of them be alienated, as a title, in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time of the division of the ownership of both estates,
the contrary should be expressed in the instrument of alienation of either of them, or if said sign is
removed before the execution of the instrument.”
It is alleged by Lichauco, as a material fact for applying the above legal provision, that her property,
as well as that of the petitioner, came from Juan Bautista Santa Coloma, the original owner of both
estates, who, at the time of constructing them, established upon the latter estate, not only an
easement of right of way, which the petitioner admits, but also the easement of light and view which
she claims; and that when both properties were alienated, that of the petitioner on the 28th of
November, 1848, and that of the respondent (Julita Lichauco) on the 31st of October of the same
year, the apparent sign of the existence of said easement was not removed, nor was it expressed in
the instrument of alienation of the estates that such easements should be abolished.
The apparent sign of the easements claimed in this case is made to consist of a gallery with windows
through which light is admitted. In her written opposition Lichauco states that the said gallery is
supported on columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner, and on the first page of her
brief submitted to this court she again states that the balcony of her building is supported by uprights
erected on land owned by the petitioner.



The parties to the suit having admitted the actual existence of the aforesaid gallery, the question
now to be decided is whether or not it existed when the ownership of the two estates of Juan
Bautista Santa Coloma was divided by the alienation of the one which now belongs to the respondent
(Lichauco) and which was the first sold on October 31, 1848.

The instrument of sale (fol. 78) presented by said respondent contains a description of said house
such as it was at that time, and after setting forth the boundaries thereof, states that the house is
built of stone and mortar, and that it is erected upon the lot of the owner, and has a frontage of
twenty and one-fourth varas and three and a half inches, with a depth of thirty-one and one-fourth
varas. Converting the varas into meters and disregarding the centimeters, it results that said house
had a frontage of 16 meters, equivalent to the twenty and one-fourth varas and three and a half
inches stated in the instrument when it was alienated for the first time in October, 1818. Twenty
years thereafter — that is, on the 13th of September, 1869 — the house was surveyed and appraised
by Architect Luciano Oliver at the request of the person who then owned it, and in the certificate
issued by the said architect (fol. 94) it is set forth that the house measures 16 meters on the front
facing Calle San Jacinto which confirms and corroborates the measurement stated in the aforesaid
instrument. Now then, according to the plan on folio 137, Exhibit I of the respondent (Lichauco), the
house has now a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which 16 meters and 60 centimeters
correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to the gallery in question.
It results, therefore, that at the present day, the house has nearly" meters more frontage than when
it was alienated by Santa Coloma, the original owner thereof, or rather by the executors of his estate
on the 31st of October, 1848.
According to this it is evident that the front line of the house was increased by about 2 meters after
the same was sold by Santa Coloma, and it also seems clear to us that it is the gallery mentioned
above which constitutes the increase, both because it measures 1 meter and 90 centimeters, which,
with a difference of a few centimeters, exactly represents such excess, and because it has neither
been alleged nor claimed by the said respondent, that the rest which forms the main part of the
house has suffered any alteration in its frontage since the year 1848.
 which is constructed on land owned by another person. The omission of this detail in such a document


There is furthermore another detail in support of said conclusion. As stated by the respondent, the
gallery is supported by columns erected on the lot of the petitioner, so that it is not merely a body
projecting, over the said lot without materially resting thereon but a construction erected and having
foundations in the lot of the petitioner inasmuch as the columns that support the said gallery are
planted therein. Therefore, at the present day the house is erected partly on land belonging to the
owner and partly, the gallery, over a lot belonging to another; that is, over that of the petitioner.
When it was sold in October, 1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last mentioned, but the
entire building was erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set forth in the instrument of sale.
To the foregoing considerations the following may be added in conclusion: In view of the fact that the
two buildings — namely, that of the petitioner and that of the respondent — originally belonged to
the same owner, and on the supposition that the gallery did already exist and that, as stated, it is
supported on columns erected in the lot now owned by the petitioner, it is not an easy matter to
explain how it was that when the ownership of the two properties was separated the house of the
respondent, of which the said gallery forms a part, was sold to one person while the lot over which
said gallery is erected or in which its columns are embedded was sold to a different person. It would
be a logical and natural thing to suppose that in the sale of the gallery the land occupied by the same
would have been included in order to avoid the division of the ownership of the ground and the
superficies, that is, the lot and that which is erected upon it. The necessity for such division does not
appear nor can any reasonable justification therefor be discovered in the present case.
On the other hand, in none of the numerous papers presented by the respondent is there any mention
made of the gallery in question, notwithstanding the fact that in some of them the house of the
respondent (Lichauco) is minutely described. And it does not seem that this is due to mere
carelessness or inadvertence, or that it was considered unnecessary to mention said gallery, inasmuch
as a deliberate, careful, and repeated mention is made of the other gallery on the side of the house
facing the street, as may be seen from several of the other documents above alluded to, among
which are the certificate issued by Architect Luciano Oliver on September 13,1869, (fol. 94), the
instrument of sale executed in favor of Manuel Gonzalez Junquito (fol. 104), and the mortgage deed
of the same date in favor of the Obras Pias (fol. 116). In each of the said documents the statement is
made that the house has a corridor supported on columns on Calle San Jacinto, while nothing is said,
even incidentally, regarding the other corridor or gallery that now exists over the lot of the
petitioner. In our opinion there is no reason why in the description of the house, as made by various
persons at different times, mention should always have been made of only one of the galleries, the
other being entirely ignored, if both had really existed on the respective dates of the documents
above referred to.



And it is useless to say, as argued by the respondent in her brief, that Architect Oliver’s certificate,
from which the description made in the subsequent documents was taken, contained but a superficial
description of the property without details of its four sides. For said reason she states that the fact
that no mention is made of the balcony or gallery in question is of no importance, as the said
certificate deals with the value of the property only, it being well known that such a work is
performed taking into account all the details and circumstances which may increase or decrease the
value of the same. Hence, the respondent goes on to say, that mention was made, by said architect,
of the veranda facing the street for the purpose of distinguishing between the one built on private
land and the one which was built over land belonging to the city. For the very same reason she should
have mentioned also the veranda built over the lot of the petitioner, if it had been in existence,
especially as the value of a property erected on land belonging to the owner is not the same as that
wherein in order to omit nothing mention is even made of a well and stable both of which are
unimportant portions of a building; such an omission, we say, added to the reasons given above,
induces us to come to the conclusion, as a result of the documentary evidence adduced at the trial,
that the gallery in question did not exist at the time when the house of the respondent was alienated
by its original owner, Santa Coloma, in October, 1848.
This conclusion is not weakened by the expert testimony offered by the respondent, the only
testimony which she introduced aside from the documentary evidence already mentioned. As the
judgment appealed from properly states, even if the forty or fifty years of existence of the house
referred to, according to the unanimous reckoning of the experts offered by said party is accepted,
yet, we do not reach the year 1848, more than fifty-seven years back, when the separation of the
ownership of said house and that of the petitioner took place; such date constitutes the essential and
culminating point of the question. Moreover, it does not appear that said experts, who, among other
things, base their opinion on the condition of the building and its materials, have made a careful and
sufficient examination and survey of the latter. This is evidenced by the fact that one of them,
Enrique Lafuente, states, on folio 146, that the columns which support the gallery facing the street
are built of stone, and that those of the other gallery over the lot of the petitioner are of wood;
while according to another, Ramon Herrera Davila, (fol. 152) both sets of columns are built of stone,
and the third, Jose Perez Siguenza (fol. 157), affirms that they are all built of wood, those facing the
street as well as those embedded in the land of the petitioner.
Furthermore, all the experts discuss and reason, and render their opinion as if the house was in the
same condition as when sold by Santa Coloma in 1848, when it seems certain and unquestionable that
long after the said year it underwent, or must have undergone, very important repairs of an essential
nature. This is shown by the letter written by Manuel Gonzalez Junquito, who owned it at the time,
to his attorney in fact under date of March 25, 1889, and was incorporated in the instrument of sale
executed by said attorney in fact of the owner in favor of the  Respondent. In said letter Junquito
states that the house was converted into a heap of ruins, and that (undoubtedly for the said reason)
during three years it had not yielded him a single cent; for this reason he prayed his said attorney to
see the way to sell it by all means at the best price obtainable . . . It was thus that the said house
which, as stated by Junquito in the same letter, had cost him 15,000 pesos was sold to the respondent
for only 8,000. If in 1889 the house was a heap of ruins, it seems to us too hazardous to certify solely
ill view of its present condition, after undergoing repairs or having been practically rebuilt, the real
condition in which it was in 1848 — that is, forty years before it became ruined — especially since, as
the petitioner’s expert properly states, in the repair or rebuilding of the property old or used
materials may have been employed which would give it the appearance of being older than it actually
is.
The respondent states in her brief, as though intending to prove the great antiquity of the gallery in
question, that, notwithstanding, the fact that the petitioner acquired his property before she
acquired the adjoining building he has not been able to testify that the said gallery was built by
Julita Lichauco or by her predecessor after he had purchased his property, nor has it been proven
that since that time or at any time previous thereto there had been any disagreement between the
owners of the two properties on account of the gallery in question. Such allegation absolutely lacks
foundation, (1) because it is not true that the petitioner acquired his property prior to the time when
Julita Lichauco acquired hers, but entirely on the contrary since the petitioner purchased his
property on the 9th of May, 1894, and the respondent acquired hers on the 25th of October, 1889,
that is, five years previously; and (2) because the burden is not on the petitioner to prove at what
time the gallery in controversy was constructed inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining and
defending the freedom of his property, denying the easements of light and view that the respondent
pretends to impose over it. It is a settled doctrine of law that a property is assumed to be free from
all incumbrance unless the contrary is proved. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of April 7,
1864, and December 13, 1865.) The respondent who claims the said easements, basing her claim on
the provisions of article 541 of the Civil Code, is obliged to prove that the aforementioned gallery, in
which the apparent sign of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time
the ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated, in October, 1848. And
inasmuch as this issue has not been proved, the claim of the respondent as to the easements of light
and view, which the petitioner does not admit, must of necessity be dismissed.
 windows with balconies projecting over his estate."
(b) Opposition of the heirs of Francisco L. Roxas. The real terms of this opposition do not appear well
defined. As the Court of Land Registration says in the judgment appealed from, when this party
appeared at the trial it stated (fol. 71) that it had no opposition to offer and only desired that the
matter of the easement of right of way, acknowledged by the petitioner, be clearly established, and
that the other rights of easement which their property holds over the former be respected, not
specifying, however, either at the time or during the course of the proceedings as to which of said
easements they referred when appearing. Hence the questions raised by these respondents do not
appear as clearly determined.
 denying, on page 14 of his brief, that the word balconies was used in the agreement as synonymous


In the absence of due specification of the said points, and inferring it only from the language of the
agreement submitted by the parties to the suit, the Court of Land Registration assumed that beyond
the acknowledged easement of the right of way, the respondents claimed those of light, view, and
drainage, and on such supposition entered judgment in connection with said easements only. Upon
moving for a new hearing the respondent alleged as a foundation therefor, as stated in the overruling
thereof (p. 9 of the bill of exceptions), that the easement with reference to balconies had not been
acknowledged, and now in setting forth their injuries before this court they speak of the eaves . . .
Admitting, for the sake of argument, that all of the above questions were duly set up and discussed in
the court below, the fact is that in the judgment appealed from no other easements than those with
reference to right of way and drainage from the roof have been allowed in favor of the property of
the respondents; therefore, the easements of light, view, and balconies remain in dispute in the
present instance. The easement with reference to eaves mentioned also in the brief of the
respondents should, in our opinion, be discarded inasmuch as it is included in this case in the
easement of drainage from the roof acknowledged in the judgment appealed from. (P. 7 of the bill of
exceptions.)
The Court of Land Registration in order to dismiss the opposition with reference to the easement of
light and view bases its decision on the fact that, the same being negative, according to article 533
of the Civil Code, because the owner of the servient estate is prohibited to do something which he
could lawfully do if the easement did not exist, the time of possession for prescription (and it is a
matter of prescription for the reason that the respondents hold no title) should begin to run, not
from the date of the existence of the windows or balconies, but from the day when the owner of the
dominant estate, by means of a formal act, might have prohibited the owner of the servient estate to
do something which he could properly execute if the easement did not exist; this was never carried
out by the opponents or by their principals as agreed to by the parties at the hearing.



In rebuttal of this portion of the judgment the respondents state in their brief as follows: 



"We agree with the trial court that as a general rule the easement with reference to view is a
negative one . . .; but we understand that there are cases in which the easement is positive because
it imposes on the owner of the servient estate the obligation to allow the owner of the dominant
estate to do on the property of the former something which the latter could not lawfully do if the
easement did not exist, . . . such as happens in the present case in which the windows have a balcony
projecting over the lot of the petitioner. In the case at bar there exists the positive fact of windows
with projecting, balconies opening over the land of the servient estate which is not a right inherent
to the dominion of the owner of the dominant estate, but a real invasion of the right of another, a
positive act which limits the dominion of the owner of the servient estate which, constituting an
easement, imposes on him the obligation to permit the owner of the dominant estate to have such


According to this no question is raised by the respondents as to the legal nature of the easement of
view (in their brief the easement of light is ignored) which they acknowledge for the reason that, in
general, it is a negative one although in their opinion there are exceptions where it acquires the
nature of a positive easement, among them, when as in the present case, view is obtained by means
of windows with balconies projecting over the adjoining estate. On page 4 of their brief they state
that the latter fact was agreed to by the parties, which is tacitly contradicted by the petitioner when
with projecting windows and differing from windows, for although, according to the said agreement,
they overlook the lot of he petitioner, they are not, however, over the same, nor is the contrary
claimed in connection therewith by the representative of the Respondents.
In reference to the above question the said agreement of facts reads as follows: 



"(1) That house No. 114, Calle San Jacinto, district of Binondo, this city, owned by the children of
Francisco L. Roxas, adjoining the property of the petitioner, underwent alterations in the early part
of the year 1882, and ever since that time it exists as it appears now with windows and views
overlooking the lot of the petitioner, with balconies and eaves from which rainfall drops on the
aforesaid lot."
It seems evident under the terms of this agreement, that the house of the respondents has balconies,
it being, immaterial for our point of view that the word balconies be taken as synonymous with
windows or projections, since whether it be the one or the other the truth is that the agreement does
not state that such balconies are over the lot of the petitioner or overlooking it, as claimed by the
respondents. weather would this follow from the mere fact that the said balconies jut out, because
the projecting parts of a building may be constructed, and as a matter of fact they are generally
constructed, over the area of their own ground without invading the limits of the adjoining land. For the reason above set forth, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all its parts with the costs
What actually falls over the estate of the petitioner according to the agreement is the water of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
dropping from the projecting eaves of the respondents’ house, which is precisely the fact that has
originated the easement of drainage from the roof acknowledged in favor of solid house; projecting
eaves, thus the agreement reads, from which part of its water falls on said lot. Notwithstanding the
G.R. No. L-15628             November 18, 1920
fact that the word eaves, in the language of the agreement, is preceded by the word balconies, upon
both being united by the copulative conjunction and, it becomes evident that the words in italics do MANUEL SORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
not refer nor could they refer to the balconies for the simple reason that their object is not to shed
the water, a thing which, on the contrary, is done by the eaves. vs.

OSCAR STERNBERG, defendant-appellant.
And that it is the water and not the balconies of the house of the respondents which falls over or
overlooks the lot of the petitioner, is further evidenced by the language of the other clauses of the Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
agreement in which the ideas are expressed with precision, from which it may be seen that the
preposition over is always in relation to the fall of the water and not to the balconies. Thus, for MALCOLM, J.:
example, clause 2 reads "that it does not appear if the construction of said windows, balconies, and
By means of this action, the plaintiff desires to obtain a judicial order, to compel the defendant to
projecting eaves, as well as that part of the water from the roof of the said house, fall on the lot now
close the windows in the wall of his house adjacent to the property of the plaintiff, because the wall
owned by Don Miguel Fabie . . ." And this very same thing is twice repeated in clause 3, "that on the
of defendant's house is less than 2 meters from the division line. The defendant pleads prescription
part of the children of Francisco L. Roxas there has not been an act of opposition to prevent Miguel
and relies exclusively upon these defense. The lower court agreed with the plaintiff's contention and
Fabie . . . work that may obstruct the light, remove the windows or balconies and projecting eaves of
ordered the windows of the defendant's house to be closed, with costs against the defendant.
the said house which now belongs to the children of Francisco L. Roxas, or prevent a portion of the
water from the roof of the same from falling on the lot of Miguel Fabie . . ., neither has there been The facts, the law, and the issue are certain.
on the part of the said Fabie . . . any act to obstruct said light or windows, preventing the
continuance of the balconies and projecting eaves, or that part of the water from the roof of the The case was submitted to the lower court upon the following stipulated facts:
house falling . . . on his lot." 


 1. That the wall of the house of defendant Oscar Sternberg, in which are found four windows and a
Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement, which is the only evidence we have before us, no gallery (upper story), two windows, one door and an opening with wooden lattice (lower story), with
other having been offered at the hearing, that the house of the respondents has balconies over the the dimensions indicated in the diagram, Exhibit A, attached to, and made a part of this agreement,
land of the petitioner; and as it is, since it has not been positively shown that the said balconies is 1 meter and 36 centimeters (1.36 m.) distant from the dividing line between the lot on which said
exceed the limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of building stands and the lot of the plaintiff.
the lot belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by the
2. That the building of the defendant has stood with the identical openings before mentioned, since
respondents with which, on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal herein as the year 1905.
to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the existence of the
balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the erection of the same 3. That both lawyers will inspect the building to determine precisely the distance existing between
would not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the right of another, but the its outermost portion and a line erected on the dividing line perpendicular to it, which distance they
lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents to construct within their own will embody in a written agreement to supplement the present.
lot. And as said easement is negative, it can not have prescribed in favor of the property of the
respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or 4. That the views which defendant pretends to have over plaintiff's lot are direct, and that the
their principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which might windows and the gallery of plaintiff's edifice have direct views on defendant's lot.
obstruct the balconies in question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the
necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing the time required by law for the 5. That in the Torrens titles which both parties have to their respective buildings, there does not
prescription of negative easements. (Art. 538, Civil Code.)
 appear any easement of view in plaintiff's title, nor any right to easement in defendant's.

 6. That considering these facts, the point at issue between both parties is submitted to the decision
After the foregoing it is not necessary to say anything further to show the impropriety of the claim of
of the court.
the respondents in connection with the other easement of balconies (projiciendi). They claim this
easement on the supposition that the balconies of their house are or look over the lot of the The provisions of law upon which plaintiff bases his action concern easements, and are found in the
petitioner; therefore, considering that this fact has not been proven, as shown heretofore, said Civil code. Reliance is principally made upon the first paragraph of article 582 of the Civil code
pretension fails and can not prosper in any way. It is unnecessary to discuss the questions of law to reading as follows: "No windows or balconies or other similar projections which directly overlook the
which said fact might give rise had it been duly proven at the hearing.
 adjoining property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of not less than 2 meters

 between the wall in which they are built and such adjoining property.
The provisions of law upon which the defendant grounds his defense concern prescription of actions,
and are found in Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure. The maximum time within which an
action for relief can be brought is there fixed as within the years after the case of action accrues.
The subject of easements of light and view is so thoroughly covered in two learned 3rd decisions
handed down by the Chief Justice that it would be highly unprofitable to enter this intricate field of
the law. (Cortes  vs. Yu-Tibo [1903], 2 Phil., 24; Fabie  vs. Lichauco [1908], 11 Phil., 14). But here
there is no question of easement. The point now to be decided is whether or not a right of action to
enforce article 582 of the Civil code may be lost by failure to prosecute within the prescriptive period
fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure.
It should first be noted that the defendant in this case has never prohibited the plaintiff from
building on his, the plaintiff's, own land, any wall that he may desire to construct. Further, it should
be noted that the offending edifice of the defendant was constructed in 1905. This was the year
when the defendant violated the law. This was the date when the cause of action accrued.
Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted to be open for thirteen years without
protest. The plaintiff must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be considered to have waived
any right which he may have had to compel the windows to be closed. The argument of plaintiff that
it was only in 1917, when he bought the land in question, that the statute of limitations began to run,
is not convincing, for the general rule is, that once the statute begins to run, it never stops, and the
transfer of the cause of action does not have the effect of suspending its operation. (Ervin vs. Brooks
[1892], 111 N. C., 358.)
It is our holding that plaintiff right of action under article 582 of the Civil Code accrued in 1905 when
the windows in defendant's house were opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III of the Code
of Civil Procedure, his action has prescribed.
A point was made at the hearing of this case as to the right of the attorney for the appellee to appear
and make an oral argument. The record discloses that the appellee was not permitted to file a brief
because of his failure to ask for an extension of time within the period fixed by the rules of this
court. (Rules 22, 23.) This failure does not, however, prohibit counsel from making an oral argument
at the hearing, but does prohibit him from filing a memorandum or brief at that time, for this would
be tantamount to absolving him from his failure to file his brief in time. The oral argument of
appellee has been noted and has been taken into consideration.
Judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with costs of both instances against
him. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
DONATION
HEMEDES vs CA
316 SCRA 347
FACTS:   Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions” conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his
third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or
remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the
DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE.
Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.
Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.
R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan
even.  The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new title
was subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was
maintained in the new title.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes,
pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late
husband Jose Hemedes.  Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property, when the
assessed value of the property was raised.  Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property
from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him.  In the cadastral survey, the property
was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes.  Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the
property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.
Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium).
Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who made
constructions therein.  Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R & B Insurance sent it a letter
informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference was held between R & B
Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful
owner of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of R&B.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT issued in
favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property alleging that
Dominion was the absolute owner of the land.
The trial court ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.
ISSUE: W/N the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?
HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the
subject property.  Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier
transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first
condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband.  Thus, the donation in favor of
Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the
transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by
Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its
predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D.
Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his being
designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and in the
records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a certificate of
title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and tax receipts,
this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove title
to land.
JOINT TENANCY VS TENANCY IN
COMMON
G.R. No. L-40064         December 4, 1934
RESURRECCION TAGARAO, BUENAVENTURA TAGARAO and SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
 certificate of title. In view thereof, Claro did not ask for the revision of the decree but he later
MARCOS GARCIA, ET AL., defendants.

MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES RUFINO, and ELUETERIO RUFINO, appellants.
This action was brought by the brothers and sisters Resurreccion Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, and
Serafin Tagarao, children of the deceased Merced Garcia, daughter of the deceased Buenaventura
Garcia who was a brother of the defendant Marcos Garcia, against the latter and the other
defendants named Paula Tabifranca, Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores Rufino and Eleuterio
Rufino, praying that judgment be rendered against the defendants ordering them to deliver to the
plaintiffs, after executing the necessary deeds of transfer, one-fourth of the land known as lot No.
510 of cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela, Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O. Cad.
Record No. 100), which was formerly covered, first by original certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit
M), later by transfer certificate of title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3), and at present by transfer certificate of
title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7), all of the office of the register of deeds of said Province of Occidental
Negros.
The facts which have been clearly established at the trial, according to the record and the evidence
before us, may be briefly stated as follows:
The land in question has an area of 31 hectares, 3 ares and 65 centares. It was originally purchased
with pacto de retro by the defendant Marcos Garcia and his brother Ventura Garcia from Vidal Saravia
on July 20, 1900. As the latter failed to exercise his right of repurchase the two brothers became the
absolute owners of said land and it was so held by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in
case No. 274 which was instituted by Pedro Saravia, as administrator of the intestate estate of Vidal
Saravia, against said two brothers to compel the latter to resell it to him (Exhibit L). When the two
brothers purchased said land, the defendant Marcos Garcia was yet single because he had not even
been married to his former wife, as the defendant Paula Tabifranca is only his wife by a second
marriage. Marcos Garcia had by his first wife three children who are the defendants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and the deceased Catalina Garcia, mother of the defendant Dolores Rufino. Ventura
Garcia, now deceased, also had two children: Merced Garcia who was married to Rafael Ragarao, and
Claro Garcia.
While Merced Garcia was still living, or at least until June, 1914, the defendant Marcos Garcia had
been delivering to her and her brother Claro Garcia their share of the products harvested from the
land in question. Merced Garcia who, as stated, died about the year 1914 and was followed years
later by her husband Rafael Tagarao, had three children, the herein plaintiffs Resurreccion Tagarao,
Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao. When this action was brought on October 14, 1928,
Resurreccion Tagarao was more than 24 years of age; Serafin was then only 23 years, 1 month and 1
day, and Buenaventura, 18 years, 4 months and 3 days.
With the plaintiffs' grandfather, Ventura Garcia, and their mother, Merced Garcia, already dead, the
defendant Marcos Garcia claimed the lands in question in cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of
Isabela of the Province of Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 100), known in said
case as lot No. 510, alleging in the pleading presented by him to that effect (Exhibit I) that he had
acquired it on July 20, 1904, when he was yet unmarried to his codefendant Paula Tabifranca. Before
the original certificate of title acknowledging him to be the owner of the land in question was issued
to him, and during the period within which any person could ask for the revision of the decree issued
to that effect, Marcos Garcia, fearing that Claro Garcia, brother of the plaintiffs' mother, might
frustrate his designs by asking for said revision, executed in favor of Claro Garcia a document binding
himself to give to the latter four hectares of said land upon the issuance to him of the corresponding
brought an action, case No. 4091 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, against Marcos
Garcia to recover from him four hectares of said land, lot No. 510 of the cadastre of Isabela, basing
his claim on the document which Marcos Garcia executed in his favor in order to promise and bind
himself to give Claro said four hectares, because after Marcos Garcia had obtained his certificate of
title he refused to comply with his promise; and as a result said court, on October 10, 1927, rendered
judgment against Marcos Garcia ordering him to segregate four hectares of said land to be delivered
to Claro Garcia and furthermore to pay to the latter as indemnity 90 cavans of palay, or the value
thereof in the sum of P360.
In the certificate of title which was issued in favor of Marcos Garcia on May 17, 1918 (original
certificate of title No. 10009), by virtue of his claim presented in said cadastral case No. 11 of the
municipality of Isabela. Occidental Negros, it was stated, as in the decree ordering the issuance
thereof, that one-half of the land therein described belonged to him, and that the other half to his
wife by a second marriage, Paula Tabifranca.
A few years after the issuance of said certificate of title the defendant Paula Tabifranca, second wife
of the defendant Marcos Garcia, sold her rights to the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, her husband's daughters and granddaughter, respectively, by his first marriage,
executing the deed Exhibit N dated December 31, 1921, while the alleged purchaser Dolores Rufino
was yet a minor. This was agreed upon between her and her husband Marcos Garcia to prevent the
land, part of which belonged to her under said certificate of title, from ever passing to her son by her
first marriage named Juan Tabigui, as she was already a widow when she contracted marriage with
said Marcos Garcia.
In the meantime the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao was informed that her uncle Claro Garcia had
succeeded in obtaining his share of the land in question and, desiring to protect her rights and those
of her brothers and coplaintiffs, she negotiated with Marcos Garcia so that he might give them their
corresponding share. Marcos Garcia at first entertained her with promises that he would see to it that
she got what she wanted but later, at her back, he sold his share of the land to the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino, brother of his son-in-law Lope Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario Garcia,
executing in favor of Eleuterio Rufino the deed Exhibit 8 wherein it was made to appear that the
price paid to him for only one-half of the land, lot No. 510, was P6,567.
Twelve days after Paula Tabifranca had executed said deed of transfer Exhibit N in favor of her
stepdaughters Margarita Garcia and Rosario Garcia and of her husband Marcos Garcia's granddaughter
named Dolores Rufino, said three defendants together with Marcos Garcia obtained transfer
certificate of title No. 3001, after the cancellation of original certificate of title No. 10009, and two
days after Marcos Garcia had executed in favor of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino the deed of sale
Exhibit 8 whereby he sold to the latter his half of the land described in the above stated certificate
of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M), he and his daughters and granddaughter jointly with the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino succeeded in having said transfer certificate of title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3) cancelled to
be substituted, as it was in fact substituted, by transfer certificate of title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7).
The transfer made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of her stepdaughters Margarita and Rosario Garcia and
her husband's granddaughter Dolores Rufino, and that made by Marcos Garcia in favor of Eleuterio
Rufino, stated in said deeds Exhibits N and 8, are fictitious and feigned in view of the following
reasons inferable from the evidence of record:
Notwithstanding the fact that in the original certificate of title No. 10009 Paula Tabifranca's right to
one half of the property therein described has been acknowledged, she was conscious that she was
not entitled thereto because it belonged exclusively to her husband or, at least, he had acquired it
long before he married her. This explains the ease with which she parted with her alleged right for a
sum disproportionate to the true value of the land sold by her. The alleged purchasers Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino were not in a financial position to pay her the alleged
purchase price which, according to Exhibit N, amounted to P1,500; and Dolores Rufino, being then of
tender age, could not have taken part in said contract that she was represented by her father Lope
Rufino, because it does not appear that the latter was then the guardian of her property and it is a
fact that minors cannot give consent to any contract.
Neither was Eleuterio Rufino in a financial position to pay what he allegedly paid to the defendant
Marcos Garcia for the latter's share in the land in question on the ground that the amount of six
thousand five hundred sixty-seven pesos (P6,567) which is the price allegedly paid by him to Marcos
Garcia is a fortune greater than the income he could have had for several years, because his means of
livelihood, according to his own testimony, consisted simply of extracting  tuba  from about 200
coconut trees leased from different persons and in retailing fresh fish bought by him for a lump sum
in order to obtain a small profit. He is a brother of the defendant Rosario Garcia's husband, and
notwithstanding that the deed Exhibit 8 was executed in his favor, the land continues until now to be
registered for taxation purposes in the name of Marcos Garcia; and notwithstanding the alleged deed
of transfer Exhibit 8 the land in question continues to be under the Isabela Sugar Company Inc., of
Occidental Negros, as property of named "THREE SISTERS — A," "THREE SISTERS — B," and "HACIENDA
GARCIA," the first portion being under the management of Macario Torilla, husband of the defendant
Margarita Garcia; the second under the management of Lope Rufino, husband of the defendant
Rosario Garcia; and the third under that of Claro Garcia, uncle of the plaintiffs (Exhibit D). In
addition to these reasons, it may and should be stated that Elueterio Rufino's testimony explaining
how the transaction between him and Marcos Garcia was effected, does not agree with the text of
the deed of transfer Exhibit 8. It is expressly stated in said document that the price paid by him for
the land in question was P6,567 and that he also assumed the lien in the form of a mortgage
constituted on said land to secure the payment of Candido Montilla of a loan in the sum of P4,675
from which it may be inferred that the total price paid by him for said land was really P11,242.
Notwithstanding this, he testified that he paid only P1,892 to the defendant Marcos Garcia. It should
be stated furthermore that on December 1, 1928, or scarcely two and a half months from the time he
bought said land from Marcos Garcia, Eleuterio Rufino leased it, according to Exhibit 9, to Marcos
Garcia's sons-in-law and husbands of the defendants Margarita Garcia and Rosario Garcia, when it is
natural that as he was poor and his business of tapping tuba and reselling fishes was not lucrative, he
should have personally taken charge of the cultivation and exploitation of the land bought by him.
Furthermore, on January 10, 1930, long after the alleged transfer of said land, Exhibit 8, Macario
Torilla and Lope Rufino, as Marcos Garcia's attorneys-in-fact, the latter having executed in their favor
the power of attorney, Exhibit O-1, by virtue of which they mortgaged the land in question in the
name of their principal to Candido Montilla on July 7, 1928, Exhibit O, paid to Montilla the sum of
P514.25 as interest on the loan secured by the mortgage above stated (Exhibit 4). This last fact
convinces us more that said deed of transfer Exhibit 8 is fictitious because if it were genuine, there
being as in fact there is in said document a stipulation that the purchaser Eleuterio Rufino assumed
all the lien on said property, Eleuterio Rufino, not Marcos Garcia, personally, nor through his sons-in-
law Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, should have paid said interest.
The foregoing proves to our satisfaction that errors 2, 3 and 4 relied upon by the appellants Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino in their brief are absolutely unfounded, and so is alleged
error No. 3 attributed to the lower court by the appellant Eleuterio Rufino.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions and considerations that errors 5 and 2 attributed to said
court by the defendants Garcia and Eleuterio Rufino, respectively, are likewise unfounded. If the
transfers made under the deeds which later made possible the issuance to the interested parties of
certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) are fraudulent, it is but proper, being in
accordance with law, that the defendants execute the deeds of transfer prayed for by the plaintiffs in
their complaint in order to give them what is theirs; and this is undoubtedly one fourth of the entire
land because if one half belonged to the plaintiffs' grandfather who, as already stated, had only two
children: Claro Garcia, the plaintiffs' uncle, and Merced Garcia, their mother.
But the question now arises whether or not the three plaintiffs are entitled to what they jointly pray
for in their complaint. There is no doubt but that the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura
Tagarao are entitled thereto on the ground that the former was only 23 years, 1 month and 1 day,
when this action was brought, and therefore the three years exception granted by the provisions of
section 42 of Act No. 190 had not yet elapsed as to him, and because Buenaventura Tagarao, then
being only 18 years, 4 months and 3 days of age, was yet a minor and the period of prescription as to
him is extended to three years after he was attained majority.
The plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao, notwithstanding that she was of legal age when this action was
brought, contends that neither has her right to seek the same relief prayed for by her brothers and
coplaintiffs prescribed, and cites in support of her contention the ruling laid down in the case
of  Velazquez vs. Teodoro  (46 Phil., 757). It was truly stated in said case, citing with approval a
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in the case of Sturges and Anderson vs.
Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545), that:
Where the interests of two defendants are joint and inseparable, and the rights of one are saved
under the provision of the statute of limitations, on account of his disability, such saving inures to the
benefit of the other defendant, although laboring under no disability.
As may be seen, this ruling refers to cases in which the rights of the defendants are joint and
inseparable because when they are not so, that is, when they are joint and several at the same time,
as is the case of the plaintiffs whose rights are joint and several, the rule according to said court,
interpreting the section from which section 42 of Act No. 190 was copied, is different; and said court
stated that in said cases the disability which protects an heir from the effects of prescription is no
protection to coheirs, or in other words, using the same language of the author of the footnotes on
the decision rendered in the case of Moore vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein
the same Supreme Court of the State of Ohio sustained the latter point of view, "where the rights of
the parties are not joint, the cases are uniform, and hold that the disability of one will prevent the
operation of the statute as to him, but that those who are not under a disability will be barred."
The case of Moore vs. Armstrong, supra, has more points in common with the case at bar than those
of Sturges and Anderson  vs. Longworth and Horne, and Wilkins  vs. Philips cited in said case
of Velazquez vs. Teodoro, supra. The question for determination in the former case was whether or
not the period of prescription runs not only against the heir who is laboring under disability but also
against his coheirs who are sui juris. The plaintiffs, to all appearances, were the heirs of one Furgus
Moore and the heiress who seemed to be laboring under disability was a married woman named Mrs.
Fleming. The Supreme Court of Ohio decided the question in the negative with the remark that
whatever doubt might once have been entertained on this subject, it was conclusively settled both in
Great Britain and in the United States that the statute is saved in favor only of the person laboring
under the alleged disability, adding in succession that this is precisely the rule with respect both to
coparceners and tenants in common.
It cannot be argued that the separation of rights among the plaintiffs was not practicable in the sense
that one of them could not have disposed of or alienate his legal portion of the thing possessed in
common without the consent of the others, because the law provides otherwise. It says:
Every part owner shall have the absolute ownership of his part, and of the fruits and benefits derived
therefrom, and he may, therefore, sell, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, unless personal rights are involved, but the effect of the sale or mortgage, with
respect to the other participants, shall be limited to the share which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community.
Furthermore, whosoever among said plaintiffs should have desired the partition of the property of
which he was a coowner, could have demanded such partition inasmuch as the law then allowed and
still allows such act (article 400, Civil Code; and section 181, Act No. 190). What particularly
distinguishes the case at bar from that of Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth and Horne, supra, and
the other cases wherein it was established that when the rights and joint the exception which saves
one of the interested parties also inures to the benefit of the others, is that it was assumed in the
latter cases that the rights and interests involved therein pertained to joint tenancy, not tenancy in
common, which are two distinct relations, each having its own juridical meaning. The distinguishing
feature between the one and the other, as stated in the case of Mette vs. Feltgen (148 Ill., 357, 371),
is that the surviving coowner in joint tenancy is subrogated in the rights of the deceased coowner
immediately upon the death of the latter, by the mere fact of said death, but this does not take
place in cases of tenancy in common which corresponds to what is known in our law as community of
property (articles 392  et seq. of the Civil Code). For this reason, according to American
jurisprudence, a coowner in joint tenancy can not dispose of his share or interest in the property
which is the subject matter of the joint tenancy, without the consent of the other coowner because
in so doing he prejudices the other's rights and interests.
That the separation of rights and interests among the plaintiffs was practicable is further evidenced
by the fact that Claro Garcia with whom they were entitled to one-half of the land in question could
recover his legal portion thereof from Marcos Garcia, although certainly not in its entirety, having
failed to assert his rights. This being so, and it being known as it is in fact known that the purpose of
the statute of limitations is no other than to protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who
sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of exercising them one way or another to
show that he truly has such rights, it is logical to conclude that the right of action of the plaintiff
Resurreccion Tagarao is barred, and the fact that that of her brothers and coplaintiffs Serafin and
Buenaventura Tagarao still subsists does not inure to her benefit.
Although Resurreccion Tagarao could have enforced the right which she exercised in this case on May
17, 1918, when Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca obtained original certificate of title No. 10009
(Exhibit M) or shortly afterwards, or long before, that is, from the death of her mother Merced Garcia
in 1914 or 1915, she did nothing to protect her rights. On the contrary, she allowed said spouses to
perform acts of ownership on the land covered by said certificate, publicly, peacefully, uninterrupted
and adversely to the whole world including herself, and from that time until the filing of her first
complaint more than ten years had elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot be sustained that the
defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, after it has been shown that the transfers made by
them are null and void, being fictitious and false, hold the land in question in trust, because if they
ever held it in said capacity it had been during the lifetime of the plaintiffs' mother to whom said
defendants used to give part of the fruits thereof. But after she had died, their possession was under
the circumstances above stated and the law provides that in whatever way the occupancy by a person
claiming to be the owner of a real property may have commenced, if said occupancy is under claim of
title and is furthermore open, continuous for ten years and adverse, it constitutes sufficient title for
the occupant thereof (sections 40 and 41 of Act No. 190), and there can be no other exception to this
rule than the disability of persons who are entitled to said property, by reason of age, some mental
defect, or imprisonment, for whom the same law provides the exceptions contained in its section 42.
It having been established by the evidence for both the plaintiffs and the defendants that Candido
Montilla holds a lien on the land in question, which is noted at the back of transfer certificates of
title Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) for a loan in the sum of P4,675 which he granted to Marcos
Garcia in the honest belief that the latter was the true owner of the land described in certificates of
title Nos. 10009 (Exhibit M), 3001 (Exhibit 3), and 8782 (Exhibit 7), it is but just that said lien be
acknowledged by the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao, with the necessary
reservations in favor of said two plaintiffs.
It should be stated in passing that the land in question, lot No. 510 of cadastral case No. 11 of
Isabela, Occidental Negros, is assessed at P15,530, and therefore one-twelfth (1/12) thereof is worth
P1,294.17 on that basis.
As to the indemnity which the plaintiffs claim for the defendants, the conclusion arrived at by the
lower court in its decision and judgment is supported by the evidence, that is, the plaintiffs' share of
the crops from 1918 to 1929, including that of Resurreccion Tagarao, should be 1,000 cavans of palay.
However, it being clear that Resurreccion Tagarao's action is barred, it should be understood that only
the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled to compel the defendants to pay
to them the value of two-thirds of the 1,000 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan.
For all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it favors the plaintiffs
Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao, and said defendants are hereby ordered to execute in
favor of said Tagarao brothers and deed or deeds necessary to transfer to them, by virtue of this
judgment, two-twelfths (2/12) of the entire lot No. 510 of the cadastre of Isabela, Occidental
Negros, including the portion transferred to Claro Garcia (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100); to
indemnify each of them in a sum equal to what he may pay to the mortgage creditor Candido Montilla
to free his said portion from the lien thereof in favor of said Montilla; or likewise to pay to each of
them, upon failure of the defendants to deliver said portion and execute the necessary deed of
transfer, the sum of P1,294.17; and furthermore to pay, as indemnity, the value of two-thirds of 1,000
cavans of palay, at the rate of P3 a cavan, with costs against the defendants. Said judgment is
reversed as to the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao. So ordered.
USUFRUCT
VDA DE ALBAR v. CARANDANG, 106 PHIL 855-
The reparation or indemnity given in exchange for the destruction of the building is the substitute
for the building itself. The indemnity is the capital which belongs to the naked owner while the
interest on the capital is the fruits which belong to the usufructuary.
FACTS:
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building and
improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised the
naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa
Fabie for life.


During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of Manila,
the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements that were
not destroyed by the fire.


One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time
agreeing to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary
sign the agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to
cede the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while
on the other hand the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was extinguished when the
building was destroyed, the right of the usufructory being limited to the legal interest on the value of
the lot and the materials, in order that the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed
on a temporary compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly
rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was
likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the building to be constructed would accrue to
the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The
parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the termination of the
contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.


By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to
and received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due
on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or
naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay
the real estate taxes?
HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that when the
deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo
streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is erected
for indeed the building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land, being an
indispensable part of the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value
whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not
only building but land as well. (Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador) Since only the
building was destroyed and the usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land as
well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the destruction of the building for under the
law usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article
603, old Civil Code).

FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to
the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the
administrator of the property. This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75
Phil., 536, which was litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision
of the will has been the subject of interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate
taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years previous to the present
litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound
herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the
same parties and the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable
agreement which was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound
herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the
necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said
agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.
Notes:

The Civil Code contemplates a situation where the owner pays for the construction of a new building.
However, the twist in this case was that the naked owner did not have to construct a new one
because the Chinaman had one built at his own expense. This is the reason why the court had a
difficult time ascertaining who had the right to the indemnity given by the government for the
destruction of the building due to the war.



Majority Opinion: The reparation should be treated as fruits. Usufructuary should get 6% of the
reparation (from the time it was actually received to the tend of the life of the usufruct) because it
was not used to construct a new building. Otherwise, the naked owner is enriched twice – first from
the reparation and second from the fruits if payment of rent stops when the building is constructed.
Thus, the new building should be considered as the capital, and the reparation as fruits. The naked
owner should share the reparation with the usufructuary to prevent unjust enrichment.



Ponente’s Opinion: The reparation should be treated as capital (NCC). Only the interest on the
reparation up to the date that the new building was constructed time should be given to the
usufructuary, not the interest until the end of the usufruct. The reparation itself which is considered
as the capital (which rightfully belongs to the naked owner) intended to replace the old building. The
intention was fulfilled when the Chinaman constructed a new one. It was not the naked owner’s fault
that he need not use the reparation to construct a new building. The owner is not doubly
compensated because it was not his fault.



Dissenting opinion: There is double benefit in either case. In the first, the usufructuary will be
receiving interest on the reparation and rent from the building. In the second, the naked owner
receives value for the building and the construction of a building at no expense to him.



Payment of interest should continue during the life of the usufruct (not just 6%) because the war
damage is the equivalent to the building. The construction of the new building does not relieve the
owners of the land used in the war damage payment from continuing the payment of interest. If they
had used it to construct the building, they would have been freed from paying interest – but they did
not.