1. G.R. No.

72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT;
SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADORCACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA,
respondents.

FACTS:

This was a petition for certiorari of the Resolution granting Sycwin Coating’s MFE pending appeal and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding WOE on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by PBA, Inc.
Sycwin filed for a collection of sum of money against Varian Industrial. During the pendency of the suit, it
managed to attach some of the properties of Varian in a supersede as bond. Varian managed to post a
counter bond of P1.4M through British Assurance, so the attached properties were released. Judgement
was ruled against Variant. Variant appealed, and Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Variant which was ordered by the Court. This was not satisfied so Sycwin filed that
surety, PBA be ordered to pay the value of its bond, citing Secs. 5, 12 and 17 of Rule 57 of the Rulesof Court.

ISSUE:

Whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the
Resolution of September 25, 1985 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the
petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order
complaint of.

HELD:

Petition by PBA is DISMISSED. The Order of Execution may be enforced on the counter bond to lift
attachment within the provisions of Section 5, “shall be charged with the payment of ANY JUDGEMENT.

That is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final judgement but also the execution of judgemtnpending
appeal.STATCON: Where the law does not distinguish, tge court should not distinguish.

(Another digest)
Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]

Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the
suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation
upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of
P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were
released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the
decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian,
thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond
of the petitioner.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against
petitioner.

RATIO:

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished
from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be
no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment
that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a
judgment pending appeal.

2. Pilar vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995]

Ponente: QUIASON, J.

FACTS:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his
certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24,
1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-
2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for
election

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a
candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth
paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided
that “[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did
not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

3. G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996

People v. Evangelista

Petitioner: People of the Philippines v. Respondents: Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista

Ponente: Mendoza, J

FACTS:

Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the RTC. The RTC appreciated in his favor the
priveleged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified his sentence. Private
respondent filed a petition for probation, alleging that (1) he possessed all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact
reduced the penalty imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no
action on a petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it so that the petition could be filed with
the trial court; (4) in the trial court’s decision, two mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and
voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Paño, the Supreme Court upheld
the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by
the trial court. RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer.
Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private respondent’s
application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could
have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation
Officer thought the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial court (1 year of
imprisonment) was probationable and there was no reason for private respondent not to have filed his
application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted private
respondent’s application for probation. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents is qualified for probation under PD 968 despite the fact that he had
appealed from judgement of the trial court

RULING:

No. Having appealed from the judgement of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the
Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits
of probation.

Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgement of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. If an appeal is truly meritorious the
accused would be set free and not only given probation. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in
P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, “probation was
not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice,
but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated.”

The petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation. Llamado v. CA,
174 SCRA 566 (1989).The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a
judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an
application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same “after it shall have
convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal.

4. Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson [G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990]

Ponente: CORTES, J.

FACTS:

The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved
to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the
power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of
former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in
Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing
wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own
alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does
not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and related executive orders.

HELD:

NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.

RATIO:

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – [w]here general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O.
Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent,
without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.
5. Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte vs. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. 169435. February
27, 2008, 547 SCRA 71

FACTS:
The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) to a
certain extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that
originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between
the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each
of which was under the independent control of a chief. In the virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5
dated September 30, 1916 united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era. The
Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of
R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality
of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into
a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon
boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the
common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on
March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled:
"Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation
of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."

Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. In view of its claim
over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the
law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern
isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed
that it was entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern
portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged that since
time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural
community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the
tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically
mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should
not go beyond the territory of said barrios.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its decision.R.A. No. 3753
expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva Era's barangays were
mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of
Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.

ISSUES:
Whether or not, CA erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous
with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend
MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East,
by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Niño, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra,
not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.
HELD:
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Since only the
barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore,
excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as
a guide to probable legislative intent is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human
mind. Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not
to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Furthermore, this conclusion
on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for
the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of
Marcos. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. Despite the omission of Nueva
Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva
Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.

6. LUISA G. DAZON v. KENNETH Y. YAP, GR No. 157095, 2010-01-15

FACTS:

Respondent Kenneth Y. Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc., (Primetown) the
developer of Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project. In November 1996,
petitioner Ma. Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract[1] with

Primetown for the purchase of Unit No. C-108 of the said condominium project. Petitioner made a
downpayment and several installment payments. Primetown, however, failed to finish the condominium
project.

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against
respondent

Meanwhile, respondent, in connection with the resolution finding probable cause filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice (DOJ). On June 14,2002, the DOJ rendered a Resolution[8] ordering the trial
prosecutor to cause the withdrawal... of the Information. Hence, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information[9] with the RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation of PD 957

Petitioner contends that jurisdiction is conferred by law and that there is no law expressly vesting on the
HLUKB exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.

RULING:

Jurisdiction over criminal actions...arising from violations of PD 957... is vested in the regular courts.

Noticeably, cases that are criminal in nature are not mentioned in the enumeration quoted... above. The
primordial function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade and business and not
the conviction and punishment of criminals. "It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies... quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its
intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial... prerogatives must be
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of
administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested
in the courts".

Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only wield such powers as are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes. PD 957 makes the following specific grant of powers to the NHA
(now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative... fines, and it also mentions penalties for criminal cases...
the power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately succeeding... provision, to impose,
upon conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it

Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in nature,
as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions
arising from violations of PD 957.

The DOJ made no reversal of such finding of probable cause. Instead, it directed the withdrawal of the
information on the erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the case.

7. ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109902, August 2, 1994, 243 SCRA 678
Ponente: FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:
[P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate
complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter
declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long
as such [project] activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific
undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the
time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel
manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by
regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are “regular”
employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondent’s
main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private
respondent NSC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being only “project
employees” of NSC.

HELD:
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

RATIO:
Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However, contrary to
petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project employees” and their
assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of
evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as “regular
employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or
legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a
regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between
municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.

8. VALENTINA A. NUÑEZ v. GSIS FAMILY BANK, GR No. 163988, 2005-11-17

FACTS:
Leonilo S. Nuñez... obtained three loans from the GSIS Family Bank. The first loan... was secured by a
mortgage over a parcel of land. The second loan... was secured by mortgage of properties. The third loan...
actually amended the first loan... to secure which amended loan the same property... when the three loans
were maturing, Leonilo purportedly obtained a "fourth loan."
On the maturity of the three loans, Leonilo executed a Promissory Note. More than nineteen (19) years
after Leonilo's Promissory Note matured... The bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties...
which... secured the first two loans.
The bank alleged that Leonilo violated the terms and conditions of the loans... when he failed, despite
repeated demands, to pay his principal obligations, and interest due.
Leonilo later filed... a complaint against the GSIS Family Bank... for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sale. Leonilo denied securing a "fourth loan" but nevertheless alleged that "for purposes of the action, the
same shall be assumed to have been validly secured."
Invoking prescription, he citing Articles 1142[13] and 1144[14] of the Civil Code, Leonilo contended that his
first three loans and the "fourth loan" matured... hence, they had prescribed. When... the bank filed the
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo concluded that it no longer had any right as
prescription had set... in.
RTC found for Leonilo who died during the pendency of the trial of the case, hence, his substitution by his
heirs. The appellate court... found for the bank.

ISSUES:
Invoking prescription, he citing Articles 1142[13] and 1144[14] of the Civil Code, Leonilo contended that his
first three loans and the "fourth loan" matured on June 30, 1978 and December 27, 1978, hence, they had
prescribed on June 28, 1988 and December 25, 1988, respectively.[15] When, on December 11, 1997 and
September 1, 1999 then, the bank filed the Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo
concluded that it no longer had any right as prescription had set... in.
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the
Regional Trial Court denying the notice of appeal and in giving due course to the notice of appeal.
Whether the private respondent could still appeal a judgment which has become final and executory... the
applicable provision is Article 1141,[56] not Article 1142[57] of the Civil Code.

RULING:
Article 1141 of the Civil Code speaks of real actions over immovables or rights. Article 1142 of the Civil Code
speaks of a mortgage action which prescribes in ten years. The strategic location of Article 1142
immediately right after Article 1141 of the same Code, which speaks... of real actions, indicates that it is an
exception to the rule in the previous article.
That an action for foreclosure of mortgage over real property prescribes in ten years is in fact settled. In
Buhat, et al. v. Besana, etc., et al.[58] where an action was instituted on December 6, 1952 for the
foreclosure of... mortgage over real property to secure an obligation payable on or before May 31, 1930,
this Court affirmed the dismissal of the action by the then Court of First Instance as the action was filed
more than ten years from May 31, 1930 or some 22... years after the obligation had become due and
demandable.

9. [ GR No. 80593, Dec 18, 1989 ]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. TERESITA CRUZ + 259 Phil. 696
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1980 Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) laid-off about seventy percent (70%) of its
employees because it was experiencing business reverses. The retained employees constituting thirty
percent (30%) of the work force however, were not paid their wages. This non-payment of salaries went
on until July 1982 when AMEX completely ceased operations and instead entered into an operating
agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation whereby the latter would be leasing the
equipment and machineries of AMEX.
The unpaid employees sought redress from the Labor Arbiter[1] who, on August 27, 1986 rendered a
decision finding their claim valid and meritorious. The dispositive part of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the claims of complainants for payment of unpaid wages and separation pay to be
valid and meritorious, respondents Aggregate Mining Exponent and its president Luis Tirso Revilla should,
as they are hereby ordered to pay the same to said complainants in the total amount of P219,452.03. To
properly effectuate the payment of the same, the necessary arrangement should be made between
respondents Amex and T.M. San Andres Development Corp. and Philippine National Bank (PNB) on their
respective role and participation herein. For should the principal respondent be unable to satisfy these
Awards, the same can be satisfied from the proceeds or fruits of its machineries and equipment operated
by respondent T. M. San Andres Dev. Corp. either by operating agreement with respondent Amex_or thru
lease of the same from PNB.
To obviate any further differences between complainants and their counsel to the latter's attorney's fees
which seems to be the cause of their earlier misunderstanding, as can be gleaned from the Charging Lien
filed by said counsel, respondents are, moreover, ordered to segregate and pay the same directly to said
counsel, the amount of which is to be computed pursuant to their agreement on July 14, 1983
AMEX and its President, Tirso Revilla did not appeal from this decision. But PNB, in its capacity as
mortgagee-creditor of AMEX interposed an appeal with the respondent Commission, not being satisfied
with the outcome of the case. The appeal was primarily based on the allegation that the workers' lien
covers unpaid wages only and not the termination or severance pay which the workers likewise claimed
they were entitled to.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 110 of the Labor Code only covers for unpaid wages of workers.

RULING:
At the outset, petitioner PNB did not question the validity of the workers' claim for unpaid wages with
respect to the mortgaged properties of AMEX, provided that the same be limited to the unpaid wages, and
to the exclusion of termination pay. In the instant petition however, PNB starts off with the question of
whether or not the workers' lien takes precedence over any other claim considering that this Court has
ruled otherwise Republic vs. Peralta.[5]
This Court cannot allow the petitioner to alter its stance at this stage inasmuch as it is deemed to have
acquiesced in the decision of the labor arbiter concerning payment of unpaid wages. The records reveal
that the petitioner failed to question the same on appeal. Hence, it is now barred from claiming that the
workers' lien applies only to the products of their labor and not to other properties of the employer which
are encumbered by mortgage contracts otherwise.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attempt on the part of the petitioner to seek relief from that portion of
the decision would still be in vain.
The respondent Commission noted that "AMEX failed to adduce convincing evidence to prove that the
financial reverses were indeed serious."[15] After a careful study of the records of the case, this Court finds
no reason to alter the findings of the respondent Commission.
Indeed Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, aforecited, now provides that the workers' preference
covers not only unpaid wages but also all other monetary claims.
The respondent Commission was, therefore, not in error when it awarded the termination pay claimed by
the private respondents. As far as the latter are concerned, the termination pay which they so rightfully
claim is an additional remuneration for having rendered services to their employer for a certain period of
time. Under these circumstances then, this Court holds that the termination or severance pay awarded by
the respondent Commission to the private respondents is proper and should be sustained.
Lastly, it must be noted that the amount claimed by petitioner PNB for the satisfaction of the obligations
of AMEX is relatively insubstantial and is not significant enough as to drain its coffers. By contrast, that
same amount could mean subsistence or starvation for the workingman.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

10. [G.R. No. 87119. April 16, 1991.]

HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, Petitioner, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the City
Council of Manila, and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, Respondents.

FACTS:

On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the
Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the
National Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the
Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Section 15, of said
Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 15. . . .The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees
of the Board.

The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor’s office "comment
and/or recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council
may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. The Personnel Bureau then forwarded
the query to the City Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September 19, 1988, 3 rendered an
opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This opinion was
transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor to the Commission.

On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to the
opinion of the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested. The
dispositive portion thereof is as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the
proper appointing authority of the officers and employees of the City Council of Manila is the City Council
and the signatory of individual appointments thus issued is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employees under
Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether the power is now
vested with the City Mayor pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg.
337, the Local Government Code

HELD:

As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating
to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction.

There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the
Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337,
which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor General points out, and
we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law —
regardless of their dates of passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the
general.
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is
possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes
should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.

Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put by the Court as follows:

. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. The
Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting
a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing
provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of its intention to
amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis v. Cook County,
74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co. v. Nolting, 34 Phil., 401.) 12

In the light of all the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Commission. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

11. GORDON vs. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO (G.R. No L-55230)

San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda
Yambao, are located a few meters from each other in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo City.
They were covered by Mayor’s Permits Nos. 1954 and 1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, and
licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year.

A joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary
conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium, 10 mg. worth
P410.00 without a doctor’s prescription. On April 17, 1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor’s
Permit No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the
Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."

Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio
Regala, on April 25, 1980, directed the closure of the drug store for three days and its payment of a P100.00
fine for violation of R.A. No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao against a repetition of the
infraction. On April 29, 1980, the FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties imposed had
already been discharged and allowed the drug store to resume operations.

Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revocation of
Mayor’s Permit No. 1954. Having received on reply, she and her husband filed with the RTC of Olongapo
City a complaint for mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, against the
petitioner and Vice-Mayor de Perio.

On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of the San
Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for reasons of "business preference." The request
was granted. But when informed to this action, the petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent dated
May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and suspended Mayor’s Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City
Drug Store. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Mayor Gordon.

ISSUE: WON Mayor Gordon, in the exercise of his power, prevent the operation of the drugstores previously
permitted by the FDA.

HELD: As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility
to execute, the mayor had no authority to... interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them
for the decision already made by the FDA.
In the present case, the condition allegedly violated related to a national law, not to a matter of merely
local concern, and so came... under the jurisdiction of the FDA. The petitioner magnifies the infraction
committed by the San Sebastian Drug Store but the FDA minimizes it. According to the FDA Administrator,
valium is not even a prohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only a 3-day closure of the drug
store and a fine of P100.00. The FDA had no authority to revoke that particular condition of the mayor's
permits indicating the sites of the two drug stores as approved by the mayor in the light of the needs of the
city. Only the mayor could. Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor's Permit No.
1954 after the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store following
the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it. However, it was competent for the... petitioner to
suspend Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug Store in violation of the said
permit.

Principles: Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.

The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due
respect to a coordinate department of the government.

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative authorities are accorded great respect because
of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.

12. CITY OF MANILA VS. GENARO N. TEOTICO AND CA G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board
the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay
damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the
damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned
were and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is
under its control and supervision.

Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street
or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

13. BAGATSING V RAMIREZ GR No L-41631, December 17, 1976

FACTS: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public
markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The
Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the
noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila
declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE: What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which requires
publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only
demands publication after approval? Is the ordinance valid?

RULING: The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is
a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because
it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general
law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation
where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The
Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of “ordinance” in general, while the Local
Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other
charges” in particular. The ordinance is valid.

14. MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP., INC.234 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 11097

FACTS: .In 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan De Oro (“CDO” for brevity). To this end, it leased a portion of its operation of a
building to Pryce Properties Corporation(“Pryce”) and prepared said premises for the inauguration of the
casino during the Christmas season. In view of opposition coming from different civic organizations, as
shown by massive protests and demonstrations, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of CDO enacted Ordinance
No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 to prevent the operation of casino in the said province. Pryce, joined
by PAGCOR acting as intervenor and supplemental petitioner, assailed the said ordinances before the Court
of Appeals (“CA”). On March 23,1993, CA declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement.4.On July 13, 1993, CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by CDO and
its mayor.5.A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed by the petitioners averring
that the CA erred in its decision to invalidate the aforementioned ordinances.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “gambling and other prohibited games of chance” mentioned in Sec. 458 of R.A.
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (henceforth “LGC”) could only mean “illegal gambling”?

HELD Petition was denied and the decision of CA invalidating the aforementioned ordinances was affirmed.

RATIO: Obviously excluded in the provision contested are the games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners erred in claiming that the LGC could have excluded such
games of chance yet it did not, when as a matter of fact it does. By the virtue of the rule of noscitur a sociis
wherein a word or phrase is interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words which it is
associated. The court inferred from the debated provision that the word “gambling” was used in association
with “other prohibited games of chance”, hence the said word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance must be prevented or suppressed.

RULES/DOCTRINES APPLIED:

Noscitur a sociis –where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found or with which it is associated.

15. CENTENO V. VILLALON-PORNILLOS G.R. No. 113092

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not
there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent
purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied,
but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy.

Facts: This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for violating
P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of their
chapel without a permit from the DSWD. In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan. The petitioners
approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00.
The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the
Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not expressly
included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.

HELD: NO. Decision appealed was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was acquitted.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police
power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor.

It is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or
equitable considerations. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not
to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

16. Republic of the Philippines vs. IAC and Spouses Pastor (G.R. No. 69344. April 26, 1991)

FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara
Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge and monthly interest, and
costs. The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. They filed an answer
admitting there was an assessment against them for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor.
They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid
the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a final
payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s Official Receipt. The trial
court held that the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not
under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213.
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private respondents were
not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to
persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72
and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from
availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued that “tax
exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. The Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and holding that the
payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance thereof by the
Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency income taxes from the
private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for
recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.

HELD: YES. Petition for review is denied.

RATIO: The Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax assessment
and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency
income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty
to persons who are required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the
highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances.

The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer strictisimi juris for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond
what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares.

17. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE: Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is
basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting
and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers
to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
18. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, v GSIS, G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel
has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

19. Dabalos vs. RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City, Pampanga G.R. No. 193960

Facts: Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the complainant
whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling of hair, punching the
complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have demeaning and degrading effects on the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act
9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the relationship had already ceased at the time of the alleged
incident.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate cause of
the violence?

Held: Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women through
physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common
child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of violence should be a consequence of
such relationship.

20. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and Victoria Amante

FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu.
On January 14, 1994, she obtained a cash advance for the defrayal of seminar expenses of the Committee
on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed but as of December 19, 1995 no liquidation
was made. The investigation report of the Commission on Audit submitted to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) recommended for further investigation to ascertain whether
appropriate charges could be filed against her. On May 21, 2004, an Information for Malversation of Public
Funds was filed against her. However, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
Salary Grade 26 who is charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

RULING: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

Violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 which states that
“Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office“. An offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is “intimately connected” with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

Public officials below Salary Grade 27 may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided
that they hold the positions particularly and exclusively enumerated under Section 4(a) such as provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

Applying the above provisions, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the
time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

21. Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 540

Facts

A complaint for forcible entry3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara
and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of
Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file
an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time;
hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the
MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer.4 On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied
the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.5 On
September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an
urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer,6 which was attached thereto. Two days later,
petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer.

Issue

WON Sec. 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, mandatory or directory statutes, such that answer is filed
beyond the time stated be accepted

Ruling

From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of
expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put
premium on dilatory maneuvers — the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.

22. Carmelita Lledo vs. Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, February 9, 2010, 612 SCRA 54

Facts

On February 4, 1994 Mrs. Carmelita Lledo filed a case against her husband, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, branch
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, who was a living with another woman named
Katrina Narvaez with whom he has children.

Issue

WON Atty. Lledo has acted which constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct violative of the provisions of
Administrative Code of 1987 (PD 807) and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees)

Ruling

The Court has further held that "a court personnel, being a public servant, must exhibit the highest sense
of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the court's good name and standing." The Court has also
admonished court personnel that their conduct "should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and
integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain
it good name and standing as a temple of justice."

In the present case, sufficient proof, both oral and documentary, was presented to show that Respondent
Lledo abandoned his conjugal dwelling without providing support for his legitimate children and
subsequently cohabited with Katrina Narvaez with whom he had three children. It is beyond dispute that
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and his elementary obligation
to provide for his legitimate children. Worse, he executed several Sworn Statements that he was lawfully
wedded to his mistress. Clearly, the respondent in this case has failed to comply with the strict standard
required of court employees. His conduct betrays an unscrupulous streak that has, in turn, tarnished the
image of the judiciary.

23. Ma. Virginia Remo vs. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 281

Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring
on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her
passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name.
Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the
renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with
a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.

Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote
then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request. Howver, the DFA, denied
the request.

Issue

whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the
use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage?

Ruling

No. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of
the Civil Code provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using
her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who
applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt
her husband's surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname
in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will
not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except
in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce,
(3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to
the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames.

A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law,18 thus:

[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a
general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective
dates of passage.

24. Danilo Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015

Facts

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act No. 6758 the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section
8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. He has failed to disclose in his SALN the financial and business
interests that he and his family are registered owners. Such non-disclosure may damage and prejudice the
public interest.

Issue

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try Duncano of the case filed against him.

Held

No, Sandiganbayan does not have the jurisdiction to try Duncano. The Sandiganbayan can only have such
when violations of Section 3 (a) and (e) of RA No 3019 are committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher salary with Salary Grade 27 or higher.

Those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among
those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for
those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of
the proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG
27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect.

The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat
quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every
word.

25. People vs. Guillermo Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, July 31, 1962

Facts

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.
Ruling

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for
trial on the merits.

Ratio

Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include
justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic
and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.

A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee.
Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said
officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar,
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges".
Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the
officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such
as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were
not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".
26. Republic of the Philippines Represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC)
vs. Daisy Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014

Facts

Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the respondent
from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal support to
the respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a counsel and with an answer to the charges
against him, the court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that
Sgt Yahon should provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits.
However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement
benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. The petitioner
contended that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors of the said employees
in the process of garnishment.

Issue

Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the
financial spousal support of respondent.

Held

Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in
statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. As section 8 (g)
of RA No. 9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in its coverage the military institution, which
is the employer of Sgt Yahon.

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.18 However,
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is
the latest expression of the legislative will.19

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down
an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law
itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

27. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club vs. The City of Cebu, et al., G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016

Facts

A golf course has been operated in the city of Cebu for 5 years already. The local government has
promulgated a law for imposing tax on amusement places in their jurisdiction.
Issue

WON golf course is to be considered an amusement place

Held

Golf course cannot be considered as an amusement place and is therefore not subject to amusement tax.
According to Section 140 of the Local Government Code on amusement tax, the province may levy an
amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement

In applying the principle of ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follows the former, the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. A golf course is not similar to that of the expressly
provided amusement places as it cannot be considered as an amusement place in itself. An amusement
place is defined as a place where people enter to witness a show or a performance.

28. Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, et al., vs. Secretary Juan Flavier, et al., G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993

Facts

The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions
required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant
case”

Issue

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.

Held

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

Ratio

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be
given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company
of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.

29. Paredes vs. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. and/or Dr. Virginia Lao, Hercules Paradiang and Benjamin
Escobia, G.R. No. 184397, September 9, 2015

Facts

PETITIONER Rosalinda G. Paredes was the national director of respondent Feed The Children Philippines,
Inc. (FTCP), a nonstock, non-profit, and non-government organization duly incorporated under Philippine
laws. On Aug. 12, 2005, 42 FTCP employees signed a petition letter addressed to the board of respondent
corporation expressing their complaints against petitioner for alleged detestable practices.

On Oct. 24, 2005, petitioner received a phone call from her staff that auditors were already at their office.
Respondent Dr. Virginia Lao called to instruct petitioner that she should meet the auditors and
accommodate them. She refrained from obeying the order and was adamant that she should receive her
requested information first. Consequently, respondent’s board resolved to suspend petitioner because of
her indifferent attitude and unjustified refusal to submit an audit. Before it could be implemented,
petitioner submitted her resignation letter.

On Nov. 2, 2005, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was forced to resign and
thus was constructively dismissed. She alleged that she was not included in the supervisory team which
performed her functions and issued memorandum directly to her subordinates. She further claimed that
she was excluded from respondent’s executive committee (execom) meetings.

30. Grace Grande vs. Patricio Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

Facts

Grande and Antonio had an illicit relationship. Out of it was born two children. Antonio did not expressly
recognize the illegitimate children. He wanted to have the children use his surname.

Issue

Whether or not it is legal to let the illegitimate children use Antonio surname even when they were not
expressly recognized by the father.

Held

The case was reprimanded to the RTC.

However, according to Article 176 of the Family Code which was amended by RA 9255 Illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of
a legitimate child.

According to the rule on statutory construction, the use of 'may' is permissive and operates to confer
discretion. In applying the same to the case at bar, the use of the word 'may' in the provision readily shows
that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.