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37.

Republic v Mambulao Lumber Company

FACTS:
From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering it to pay to plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines the sum of P4,802.37 with 6% interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until
fully paid, plus costs, defendant Mambulao Lumber Company interposed the present appeal.

Under the first cause of action, for forest charges covering the period from September 10, 1952 to May 24,
1953, defendants admitted that they have a liability of P587.37. Under the second cause of action, both
defendants admitted a joint and several liability in favor of plaintiff in the sum of P286.70, also covered by
a bond dated November 27, 1953; and Under the third cause of action, both defendants admitted a joint and
several liability in favor of plaintiff for P3,928.30, also covered by a bond dated July 20, 1954. These three
liabilities aggregate to P4,802.37.

It appears that from July 21, 1948 to December 29, 1956, defendant Mambulao Lumber Company paid to
the Republic of the Philippines P8,200.52 for `reforestation charges' and for the period commencing from
April 30, 1947 to June 24, 1948, said defendant paid P927.08 to the Republic of the Philippines for
`reforestation charges'. The total amount of the reforestation charges paid by Mambulao Lumber Company
is P9,127.50, and it is the company’s contention that said sum of 9,127.50, not having been used in the
reforestation of the area covered by its license, the same is refundable to it or may be applied in
compensation of P 4,802.37 due from it as forest charges.
Thus, the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the set-off or compensation is proper

HELD:
No. There is nothing in the law which requires that the amount collected as reforestation charges should be
used exclusively for the reforestation of the area covered by the license of a licensee or concessionaire, and
that if not so used, the same shall be refunded to him.

The conclusion seems to be that the amount paid by a licensee as reforestation charges is in the nature of a
tax which forms part of the Forestation Fund, payable by him irrespective of whether the area covered by
his license is reforested or not.

Said fund, as the law expressly provides, shall be expended in carrying out the purposes provided for
thereunder, namely, the reforestation or afforestation, among others, of denuded areas needing reforestation
or afforestation.

The weight of authority is to the effect that internal revenue taxes, such as the forest charges in question is
not subject to set-off or compensation. Taxes are not in the nature of contracts between the parties but grow
out of a duty to, and are positive acts of the government, to the making and enforcing of which, the personal
consent of the individual taxpayers is not required.

With respect to the forest charges which the company has paid to the government, they are in the coffers of
the government as tax collected, and the government does not owe anything. It is crystal clear that the
Republic of the Philippines and the Mambulao Lumber Company are not creditors and debtors of
each other, because compensation refers to mutual debts.
38. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITF) v.
COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004
FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the
March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004
elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely,
Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing
System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated
the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she
authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

Five individuals and entities (including ITF, represented by its president,Torres, and Corazon) wrote a letter
to COMELEC Chairman Abalos. They protested the award of the Contract to Mega Pacific Consortium
(MPC) “ due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted.” They
questioned the identity and eligibility of the awarded MPC where the competing bidder is Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. COMELEC claims that MPEI is the lead
partner tied up with other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com, and ePLDT. COMELEC
obtained copies of Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements. Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been
discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding. They claimed that COMELEC awarded and
contracted with a non-eligible entity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers.

HELD:

Yes, petitioners have standing.

According to the court, the matter at hand is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest and
possesses “transcendental importance”. Moreover, the court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when
there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or if public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose; or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

In the case,the petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used. In the petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder
not a qualified entity, and the award of the contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek
to restrain respondents from implementing the contract and from making any unwarranted expenditure of
public fund.

39. Jumamil v. Cafe G.R. No. 144570


FACTS:
Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition
for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against Mayor
Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the
constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting
Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls
around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire.

Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution 49, series of 1989 (Resolution
49), denominated as Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of
additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already
entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their
personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et
al. The construction of the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the
RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls
were then awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each.
Thus, the petition was amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents.
Jumamil alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the
business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents, some of which were close friends
and/or relative of the mayor and the sanggunian, who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall,
and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private
respondents; that resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special
privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents may be availed of by anybody who
can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there were any prior notice or publication pertaining to
contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to
private respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed Jumamil’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered Jumamil to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000
to each of the 57 private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR CV 35082), the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief

HELD:
Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte
and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing
the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party
to the contract to challenge its validity. ...Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds
by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication
of such funds.

The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations
ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment
and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even
before they were passed, Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for
the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each
with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the
construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls
after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited
only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did not seasonably allege
his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the “Remark to Comment” he
filed in the Supreme Court did he first assert that “he (was) willing to engage in business and (was)
interested to occupy a market stall.” Such claim was obviously an afterthought.

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