Lambayan, Jeff Gerard P.

ID No.: 19539121
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402

FACTS:
The Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, a rebel group, were about to sign
the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace.
The Tripoli Agreement on Peace contained “the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
Domain Aspect.” The MOA-AD, according to the Solicitor General, contains “the commitment of
the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity
in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force
to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.”
The MOA-AD also mentions the “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) which has the authority
and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and land of the Bangsamoro, the natural resources, and
the internal waters. However, a TRO was issued enjoining the GRP from signing the MOA-AD.
The case at hand involves a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition which seeks
to declare the nullity of the MOA-AD, and to permanently enjoin the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution, particularly the rights of the
indigenous people.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the MOA-AD conflicts with the Constitution and the
rights of the indigenous people.
The MOA-AD sought to vest the BJE with a status of an associated state, or that which is
closely approximating it. This status is used in international practice as a “transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence.” This is, however, not recognized in the
Constitution. “The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.”
 The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with the Organic Act of the ARMM and the IPRA.
Firstly, the use of the term Bangsamoro is in conflict with Section 3, Article X of the Organic Act
since it distinguished between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal people instead of grouping
them together as “all indigenous peoples of Mindanao.” Secondly, the IPRA’s procedure for the
delineation and recognition of the ancestral domains is violated by the manner which the MOA-
AD delineated the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro. The right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government was recognized in the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Alcantara v. DENR,560 SCRA 753

FACTS:
Petitioner is a lessee under FLGLA No. 542, issued by the DENR, of nine hundred twenty-
three (923) hectares of public forest land3 (subject land) located in the vicinity of Sitio Lanton,
Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. The subject land, however, is being claimed as the ancestral
land of the indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao people, who maintain that they and their
predecessors have been cultivating, possessing and occupying it since time immemorial.
Petitioner, a son of one of the settlers, used to hold a pasture permit over the subject land,
which was later on converted into FLGLA No. 542 covering the subject property. Petitioner claims
that FLGLA No. 542 has been subsisting since 1983.
Private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes, filed a complaint
against petitioner before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking
the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities.
However, petitioner was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 when it expired that year.
Meanwhile, on October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the
Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and promote all the rights
of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the
framework of the Constitution.
In the proceedings, the COSLAP decided in favor of the complainants, recommending to
the DENR after the Cancellation of FLGLA No. 542. The CA affirmed the decision.
Petitioner alleges that when he filed the Petition for Certiorari before the CA below (CA
G.R. SP No 74166), questioning the clear determination of his residual rights after such
cancellation in the context of the provisions of the IPRA Law considering that the right to 'lands
of the ancestral domain' arose only in view of the IPRA Law and cultural minorities had no right
to recover their ancestral lands.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No.
542, or December 31, 2018, based on his alleged residual rights.

RULING:
No.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410 is explicit on the matter when it states that, “all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the
ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further
declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the
indigenous cultural group concerned.”
In the case at bar, the Court applied P.D. No. 410, the law in effect before the IPRA, in
finding that FLGLA No. 542 was illegal. This finally disposes of petitioner's claim that he has
rights under the IPRA.

DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of

AGUSTIN KITMA, represented by EUGENE KITMA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Respondent.

FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land.
While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof
and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her family’s ownership
and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap.
Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. When
Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners
Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot
No. 1. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property
among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. This state of affairs
changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the
subject property and selling portions thereof, hence the complaint.
 Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1.
According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith
(not parties to the case). The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin and Agustin’s parents to
occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that
it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita
and her parents.
In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita
presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying the Smiths’
application for recognition of the subject property as part of their ancestral land. The land subject
of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. The herein applicants by
themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest have been in exclusive, continuous, and
material possession and occupation of the said parcel of land mentioned above under claim of
ownership, devoting the same for residential and agricultural purposes.
The trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of
and claim of ownership over the subject property. The survey plan of the subject property in the
name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued
to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their predecessors-in-
interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of others.
The CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving her title and
interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply supported by the
testimonial evidence of her witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription

RULING:
No.
Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof.
Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by
prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen
into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession
not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership
by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such
repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due
to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed,
do not start the running of the period of prescription.
 In the case at bar, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of repudiation
sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can find on record the sale
by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the
same was done only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a case against them.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR

REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner, v. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG,
Respondent.

FACTS:
The Mayor of Baguio issued three Demolition Orders against the illegal structures
constructed by Bawas, Ampaguey, Sr., and Basatan on the portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation at Aurora Hill, Baguio City because it does not have the required building permits in
violation of Section 69 of PD No. 705, PD No. 1096, RA No. 7279.
When the demolition advices were issued against the occupants, Gumangan, Basatan, and
Bawas, private respondents, filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Public Petitioners. The Private Respondents claimed
that the lands “where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been
occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership
thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and
recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion
from the coverage of the Busol Forest.
The TROs were issued against the petitioners. The NCIP thereafter issued a Resolution
granting the Preliminary Injunction. The Court of Appeals upheld the said resolution and held that
“Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). Petitioners are contending that by virtue of
Proclamation No. 15, the Busol Forest Reservation is part of their ancestral lands since the said
proclamation mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having claims over portions of
the Busol Forest Reservation.

ISSUE:
Whether, under the law, the NCIP has jurisdiction over the controversy.

RULING:
Yes.
 “The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being
of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.” It has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving the rights of the ICCs/IPs, with the condition precedent of exhausting all remedies
provided by customary laws, and to obtain a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders.
In the case at bar, since petitioners alleged that by virtue of Proclamation No. 15 they have
a claim over the Busol Forest Reservation, the controversy in this case falls under the jurisdiction
of the NCIP. The IPRA likewise provides for the prohibition against the issuance of a restraining
order or preliminary injunction against the NCIP in “any case, dispute or controversy arising from
or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral
domains.”

Unduran, et al. v. Aberasturi, et al., G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the Miarayon,
Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed
to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon,
Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.
On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed
to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land (Lot No. 7367
Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361 hectares, which appears to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig tribe.
Respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages4 (original
complaint for accion reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe members,
assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the processing, validation, and
delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim in May 2003. Subsequently, petitioners contend that
the RTC has no jurisdiction on the matter because of the abovementioned law.
In the decision, the RTC denied petitioners and favored respondents. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether, under the law, the court of appeals erred in affirming the jurisdiction of the court a quo
over a complaint for injunction involving an ancestral domain.
RULING:
No, because the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion
reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value
of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction,
a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
In the case at bar, the qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes
may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council
of Elders/Leaders. The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of
the amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

SYNTHESIS
The Supreme Court has decided five cases involving indigenous people, specifically those
that are covered under the IPRA law.
In the case of Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, the Supreme Court ruled
that he right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or
self-government was recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UN DRIP), and at the same time, IPRA was promulgated in order to emphasize the
protection of these rights hence agreements between government agencies must consciously take
into account these established rights.
In the case of Alcantara v. DENR, the Supreme Court ruled and emphasized the scope of
PD 410 which provides that, “all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public
domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the
same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively
among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.”
In the case of Lamsis v. Semon Dong E, the Supreme Court ruled that the ancestral lands
can be owned by the heirs that belong to the same group, in accordance with the procedure
provided by law, which also grants a right to exclude other parties from acquiring it.
In the case of City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng, the Supreme Court ruled that
the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation
of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous
cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains
as well as their rights thereto.
Finally, in the case of Unduran v. Aberasturi, the Supreme Court ruled and emphasized the
jurisdiction of the NCIP wherein it provides the conditions before a dispute can be brought to the
NCIP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought
before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2)
compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of
Elders/Leaders.