1

ADDITIONAL CASES:

Case digest

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

, GR No. 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to
male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up
with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court
considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
2

[G.R. NO. 166676, September 12, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of
the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of
entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2)
gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
3

birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs - female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones,
and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender
change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioner's body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He
has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following
corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.3

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES
NOT MAKE HER A "MALE"4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and
her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a
male.7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the
Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
4

proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30)
days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the
civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
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proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.12 Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too
short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to
promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before
it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the
local civil registrar.

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 904817 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics.
A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term
"intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.22 The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female.
An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.23 Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.24 More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which
is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
6

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes,
a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor truly `female'"25 The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to
be other than female, then a change in the

subject's birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent's body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully
his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as
one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent">27 and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal
judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature
has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus
help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.28 The trial
court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
7

CASE DIGEST

Raquel Kho v. Republic of the PH

GR 187462

June 1, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one afternoon of May 31, 1972 for the
intended marriage of parties herein on the midnight as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. They
were only able to fulfill such ceremony at 3AM of June 1, 1972 for reason that there was a public dance held in town plaza
that was adjacent to the church and such dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the shortness of period, said clerk was not
able to secure them a marriage license. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed it stating that the marriage
was valid and subsisting.

Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which established the absence or lack of
marriage license when the marriage was solemnized.

Held:

Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first issued by the LCR (Art. 58). Marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void
(Art. 80 (3)). Court favors petitioner.
8
9

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil
Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of
Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is
just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock
of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much
less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the
pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the
required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances
exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar,
null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
10

x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a
marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is
no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and
that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a
marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of
this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and
80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho
and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a
marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled
that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER
THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING

PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A
NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
11

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's
marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence
but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of
petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the
issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into
these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.
However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question
of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule,
nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained
by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification
of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
12

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity
to contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they presented
to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt should
be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy
which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar,
that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has
been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such
validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the
Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where
information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect
the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v.
Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the
absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court,
citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or
entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification,
the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage of
the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of
such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
13

not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan,
Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under
the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No.
464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Case Digest

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO vs RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018

14

Doctrine: Pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of
course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing.

FACTS:

Luzviminda was married to Ryoji Morisono in Quezon City. While living in Japan, Luzviminda and Ryoji submitted a
"Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, which was eventually approved on and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku. In view of the same, Luzviminda filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree before the RTC of Quezon City, so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and
for her to be able to marry again. The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of
the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code,
the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce
decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines. Via petition for review under Rule 45, Luzviminda
elevated the case before the Supreme Court on pure question of law

ISSUE: Whether, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry

RULING: Yes. pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an
alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce;
provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino
citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing.

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce
decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce
by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the
RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
remand to the court a quo is warranted.
15

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition
for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which
denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter,
they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married
life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older
than Luzviminda.4 As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree
obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport
and for her to be able to marry again.7

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose
her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and
absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by
16

an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of
the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code,
the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce
decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for
absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil
Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.13

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code
which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care
and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for
this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply,
17

namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the same case, the Court also initially
clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her
marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree.19

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2)
of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse.
Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended
its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that
one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status
and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in
the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. x x x.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There
are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
18

circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated
and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime
shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to
suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to
the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are
made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the
same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. x x x.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of
course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.22

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce
decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce
by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the
RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
remand to the court a quo is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant
case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
19

Case Digest

Noveras vs. Noveras

GR No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014

Facts:

In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in California and eventually granted with American
citizenship. Out of this marriage, they produce two children and also several properties both in USA and Philippines.

In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their business. But after a year, Leticia learned that David had an
extra-marital affair with other woman. She then filed a petition for divorce in California and in 2005 the court granted the
decree of nullification of their marriage. Also, the California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two minor children,
as well as all the couple’s property in USA.

In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora. In his answer, David filed for a
petition to grant him all of their properties in the Philippines considering that Leticia got all of their properties in USA.

Issue:

Whether or not David is right in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines?

Ruling:

The court held no, David was wrong in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines.

Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and during marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community
Property.

In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs. But, considering that they are both American
citizen, the California court decision with regards to their property in USA governs. The property in the Philippines will be
equally divided between them.
20

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No.
88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch
96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines.
They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They
then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
21

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

FAIR MARKET
PROPERTY
VALUE

House and Lot with an area of

150 sq. m. located at 1085
₱1,693,125.00
Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)

Agricultural land with an area of

20,742 sq. m. located at Laboy, ₱400,000.00
Dipaculao, Aurora

A parcel of land with an area of

2.5 hectares located at Maria ₱490,000.00
Aurora, Aurora

A parcel of land with an area of 3

175 sq.m. located at Sabang ₱175,000.00
Baler, Aurora

3-has. coconut plantation in San

₱750,000.00
Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora

USA

FAIR MARKET
PROPERTY
VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover

Street, Daly City, California

$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of
$285,000.00)

Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup

$13,770.00
truck

Bank of America Checking

$8,000
Account

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

22

Retirement, pension, 4
$56,228.00
profit-sharing, annuities

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and
mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the
redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia
claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias
Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the
amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and
interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. 5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the
sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on
29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties
in the USA.7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She
relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed
for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from
selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4)
David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be
charged against the conjugal partnership.9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result
intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the
judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will
amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their
property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras,
including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their conjugal
properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes. 10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded
to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership
of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The
titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said
properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to
Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from
23

these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting
January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them
US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The
monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby
ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the
respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of
thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court
only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them individually. 11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are
those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their
marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of
the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children,
instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to
Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the
grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her
children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant
evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she
already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the
Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that
under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is
void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate
court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8,
2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally
between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half
of January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00
to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of
the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and
the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only
by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
24

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California
court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for
judicial separation ofconjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our
Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the
office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances
provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of
the Family Code, to wit:
25

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as
to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has
been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and
that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that
she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more significantly,
they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
26

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements,
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the
risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by
the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of
David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which
the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both
claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions
came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may
be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14
of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of
each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the
same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
27

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, GR No. 215723, 2016-07-27

Facts:

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who
was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.[5]

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate[7] and the same
was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code[11] before the RTC

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike"[14] both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate"
issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification[15] issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce
certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their
28

corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil
Code of Japan 2009"[17] were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.[18]

In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven

The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official
records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law
on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented
were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan... adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented
as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
particularly those on family relations and divorce.

since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.[23]

Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a Resolution[25] dated November 28, 2014

Issues:

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.

Ruling:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:... the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.[26]

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.[30]
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.[31]

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent
laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC,
the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.[32] In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from
judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.[35]

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this Decision.
29

July 27, 2016

G.R. No. 215723

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated November
28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who
was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. 5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce 6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate 7 and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage 9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code 11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. 12 On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents,
namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both
issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka,
Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for
the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation,
as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" 17 were likewise
submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her
husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and
"The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found
therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert
witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family
relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46, 22 Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and law. 23

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.1âwphi1

The Court's Ruling

30

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent
laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC,
the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to
the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred
to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not
issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when
there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the
question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for
further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts. 35

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
31
32

G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018

REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012 Decision1 and the 6 March 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635, which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y
Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.

THE FACTS

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2) marriages: the first,
with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with
private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4
June 2007. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as
evidenced by hereto attached Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex "A," and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein
complaining witness, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial ensued wherein Redante
admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally
dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.

On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's deposition considering that she was set
to leave the country on the first week of June 2008.5 This was granted by the RTC in its Order,6 dated 26 May 2008.

Maria Socorro's deposition was taken on 28 May 2008. On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or
reverse trial on the basis of Redante's admissions.7 The RTC granted the motion in its Order,8 dated 27 August 2008,
wherein the defense was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together, tended to establish
the following:

Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31 August 1984 in a ceremony held in
Angono, Rizal.9 Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for
Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April
1988.10 Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The
divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1 November 1988.11

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. While there Redante's mother and
grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced her and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which
they acceded. Their attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993 in
Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile.12

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria Socorro who,
however, divorced him.13 Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29
December 1998 at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City.14 They established a conjugal home in Pasay City and
had two children. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with
Redante to persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria
Socorro's meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on 31 May 2007.15 On
4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.16

Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5 August 2000, in Chilliwack, British
Columbia, Canada.17

The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce18 issued on 14 January 2008, to prove the fact of divorce.

Evidence for the Prosecution

33

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented instead, the Marriage Contract19 between
Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the solemnization of their marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the
Marriage Contract20 of Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante's second marriage on 29 December 1998,
in Naga City. The prosecution also adopted the Certificate of Divorce21 as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving that
the same was secured only on 14 January 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated
that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case because of his failure to present competent
evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission
that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court
hereby sentenced him an imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.22

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court ratiocinated that assuming the
authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce, since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not
presented, it could not ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry.
It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first
marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante Sarto y Misalucha of Bigamy in
Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED.23

Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March 2013 resolution.

Hence, the present petition.

On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution24 requiring the respondent Republic of the Philippines to file its comment.

The OSG's Manifestation

In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)25 advocating Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued that the RTC had convicted
Redante solely because of his failure to provide evidence concerning the date when Maria Socorro acquired Canadian
citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the exact date when she acquired Canadian citizenship
because of the loss of her citizenship certificate at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that
Redante was able to submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship certificate as an
attachment to his appellant's brief. The said certificate stated that Maria Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as early
as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce decree which took effect on 1 November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that
substantial rights must prevail over the application of procedural rules.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND PETITIONER REDANTE SARTO y
MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF BIGAMY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; burden of proving the termination of the first marriage.

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.26

Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the termination of his first
marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.

It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.27 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is
incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national
34

law.28 Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of
the second.29

Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage. As in any
other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition
by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this
jurisdiction.30 Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that
purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.31

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.32 For the
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence.
This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is
presented and admitted in evidence.33

In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must present copies thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.34 Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree
and foreign law may be proven through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having
legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.35

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact or that it
was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the defense to prove
the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14
January 2008. Said certificate provides:

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia

Certificate of Divorce

This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were married at ANGONO, RIZAL,
PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the Divorce Act (Canada) by an order of this Court which took
effect and dissolved the marriage on November 1, 1988.

Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court January 14, 2008

(SGD.)
__________________
REGISTRAR

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante. First, the certificate of
divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree
required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere
certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not
accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as
required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it
could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce
supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce
which merely suspends it36 - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such,
Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe.
His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido,37 a
case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact
that Maria Socorro had already remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances, however, can never justify
the reversal of Redante's conviction.
35

In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and remarried another. The Filipino
spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article 26. His petition was granted by the RTC.
However, this Court set aside said decision by the trial court after finding that the records were bereft of competent
evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of the alien spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules
regarding the recognition of the foreign divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show that
the divorce decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry.38

Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the sole reason for the RTC's
judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to provide evidence, during trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired
Canadian citizenship.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the said decision after finding that
there was lack of any competent evidence with regard to the divorce decree39 and the national law governing his first
wife,40 not merely because of the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. Thus,
even if the Court were to indulge the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship certificate, which was a mere
photocopy and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal. The fact
that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the celebration of the
second marriage still subsists.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 31 July 2012, of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 32635 which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
Naga City, in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
36

Juego-Sakai vs. Republic (2018) GR. 224015

Petitioners
: STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI
Respondents
: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente
: Peralta (Second Division)
Topic
: Civil Law; Remedial Law
SUMMARY
: The SC applied the landmark ruling in
Republic vs. Manalo
in this similarly-situated case.
DOCTRINE
:

The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decreewas granted should not affect the
application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 ofthe Family Code which states that "where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validlycelebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her toremarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that
tointerpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spousewould depart from the
true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with thegeneral purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where theFilipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in thecountry where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision,
therefore,should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place andin like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.---Time and again, the Court has held that the
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is theacknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. This means that theforeign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with thealien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both theforeign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24 [15] of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legalcustody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a)accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
servicestationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
FACTS
: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japanpursuant to the wedding rites therein.
After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decreein said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5,
2013, petitioner filed a Petition for JudicialRecognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In itsDecision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between the partiesas
valid and effective under Philippine Laws.On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.In an Amended Decision
dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set asideits previous decision.

ISSUES
:

WoN the CA gravely erred when it held that the second requisite for the application of the secondparagraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not present because the petitioner gave consent to thedivorce obtained by her Japanese husband

o
YES. The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
37

Republic v. Manalo
,the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein.

o
Despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it isassumed that she initiated the same, she
must still be allowed to benefit from the exceptionprovided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakaihad already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, therebycapacitating Toshiharu to
remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry underPhilippine law.
o
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for JudicialRecognition of Foreign Judgment for she
has yet to comply with certain guidelines before ourcourts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof.
o
The Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, renderingthe same admissible. What remains to
be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law ondivorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among thosematters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its
former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding
rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the
petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. 3 On November 25,
2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its
previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family
Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 5 This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino
citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled
that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause. 6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED

UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE
APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE
DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW
WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE
SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO
DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
38

Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as
opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great
disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the
benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted
abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the application
of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the
same no longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v.
Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by a
Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship. 9 As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that the
reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce
is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a
copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There,
she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies of
Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation
thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence. 10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts of which fall
squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same
and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree
recognized in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro
Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court,
however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the
Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which
states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature and would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject
provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. 12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner
participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be
allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree
and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. 13 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 14 Since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the
same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
39

SO ORDERED.

Marriages exempt from license requirement

Joan Diaz- Salgado and Dr. Gerard Salgado vs. Luis G. Anson

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

Ponente: REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
and the of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
40

daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. During his
marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila. According to Luis,
because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale in favor of
Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September 21, 2002,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002,
adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful
share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. Jo-Ann countered that she was
unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a
common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement executed
in November 1980. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described
therein as single without reference to any husband. After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United
States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the
guardianship and custody of Severina. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage
(between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. The Spouses
Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a
marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the
Partition Agreement. The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by
Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of
Luis. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted
that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive
as to the fact of marriage. The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were
considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the marriage is valid even without the marriage license falling under the exceptions;

2) who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

3) whether or not the properties subject of the Deed of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by
Severina without he consent of hher husband/partition agreement valid

RULING:

1) The Court held that Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on
December 28, 1966. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the
absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).
The marriage is not of an exceptional character. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina
reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations,
rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. The reference
to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is
not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The foregoing
provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly.
For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be
married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil
ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records.

2) Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not
obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied
mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

3) As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation
and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
41

properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise
that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a
judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and
Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners, v. LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated
August 6, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989.
The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil
Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann
Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa)
and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale 6 dated January 23, 2002
and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25,
2002.7chanrobleslaw

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous
relationship.8chanrobleslaw

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered
by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties
pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral
Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of
Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September 21,
2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25,
2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos.
8478-R, 44637 and 8003.12chanrobleslaw

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.13chanrobleslaw

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband,
Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however
that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a
Partition Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the
said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The
TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without
reference to any husband.18chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer, 19 stating that Maria Luisa is
also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as
common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the
Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
42

common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis
already received his share in the properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her;
while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. 22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002.
The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from the
Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.24chanrobleslaw

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which included a certified true
copy of his marriage contract with Severina, 25cralawred the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective
Demurrers to Evidence.26 The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of
lack of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on
cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. 27 Luis had also admitted the
existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the
properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she
had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29chanrobleslaw

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis
is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary. 30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses
Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado
were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings before the
trial court.34chanrobleslaw

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division
directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the
Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya
and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch. 36chanrobleslaw

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in
more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence presented
by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40 where the
validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract. 41 The trial
court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be
disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.42chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the
Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO

FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by
[Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the
three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the
name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT
Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and
[Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision 44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING
ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased
Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of
new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.46chanrobleslaw
43

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on September 11,
200747 and August 28, 2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order 49 dated October 30, 2007 for
lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the
CAon December 13, 200750 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement 52 which was approved by the CA in its
Decision53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal. 54chanrobleslaw

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July
23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer
any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis. 57 The CA further explained that
"the best evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the
parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office
that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before December 28, 1966
in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said
certification and present evidence during the trial."58chanrobleslaw

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration 59 which the CA denied through its
Resolution60 dated November 26, 2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible
error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as
conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license
based on the Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its absence. 62chanrobleslaw

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which
cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any
evidence to support their theory.64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses
Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence. 65chanrobleslaw

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised
by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage
license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule,
limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66 recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.67chanrobleslaw

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration 68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets
forth:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
44

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages." 71 To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of
exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was
indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of
Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is
quoted as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said
parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an
exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.72chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the
marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract me prima facie proof that at the time of their
marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with
the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply
with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a
purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage
license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil
ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also
consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Francisco:

You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late
Q-
[Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was
1966 December something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember
45

1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

x x
xx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marrfied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966. 74 (Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was
not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this
marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the
provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not
obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied
mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If
there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all.
Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to prove its existence,
whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is
46

uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his
testimony:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

ATTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and the Mayor
is a close friend of ours. So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the
A-
invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before you
travel because your daughter will be illegitimate.75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.
47

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of the
A-
Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of your
marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?

A- No.76

xxxx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [LUIS]:

Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well as a
question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a marriage license when
Q-
you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you
meant by that?

COURT:
48

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered no.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we went
to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a
week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.
49

In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the solemnization of
Q-
the marriage?

It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or
A-
Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed (sic) an
A-
application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld
the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an
exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78chanrobleslaw

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo,
despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of
the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also
testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased was
able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section where the marriage
license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."79 Considering that the absence of the marriage
license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80 the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the
marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that
all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false affidavit to take
the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further
explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit
will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The
contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.81chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a
formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
50

and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."82 "The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
'autonomous social institution."83chanrobleslaw

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized
Partition Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis
sought to annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective
only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."85chanrobleslaw

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86 the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x." 87 It
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and
considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." 90 "Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.'"91chanrobleslaw

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by
Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value."
As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be
valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the
Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.92 It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no
reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders
such contract invalid or at least, voidable.
51

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
license,93 such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis'
failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until
Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her. 94 All those years, he never presented himself to be
the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any
other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly
contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence
he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well." 95chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
52

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES / GR No. 207406 / January 13, 2016 / LEONEN,
SECOND DIVISION
(MARRIAGE LICENSE, DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE)

FACTS:

On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After some time, Eduardo discovered that petitioner was married to a Gina
Gaerlan on July 1987, before the Family Code became effective. She then filed for bigamy.

The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA affirmed that decision. In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues
that there is no bigamy as there was no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage in the first marriage which
was the marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether the essential requisites of marriage was present in the first marriage.

RULING: YES.

The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of bigamy. The SC stated that “petitioner was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice.”

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void
from the beginning:

No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
53

4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

“The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents the state’s “involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.”

“To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”

“Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar” but the SC held that the Certification “does not
prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that
Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.”

“Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his
first wife. The first marriage contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage.”

“A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses
may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.”

“In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily
signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was
celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7)
years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage
as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue
by his own actuations.”

“Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains
liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.”

“As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.”

“The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
54
55

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If
they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 2 dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision 4 of Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy. 7 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to
GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has
all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to
and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in
Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]" 11 She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987.13 "After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage" 15 with his college
girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed
with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man.
He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour. 18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also
warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.20
56

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18,
2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated
September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced.
Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as evidence a Certification28 from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of
marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that
requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]" 31 Norberto prays for his
acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the
marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not
legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that
the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be
convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first
marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did
nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present
any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

57

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the
municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This
was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988. 35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void
from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s "involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested." 39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in
this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his
first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of
petitioner’s first marriage.44This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of
any record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro 46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.47 As part of
its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said
license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." 49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not
issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of
58

suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto
for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the
cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence
presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be
found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found
is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses
may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit
is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage contract between Santiago
Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number. 52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that
it has no record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao. 53 This court declared Santiago
Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed
and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on
July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4)
months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even
while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words,
petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The
prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or
subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to
discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus,
pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. 55 There is no evidence to show that
the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to
whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is
no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there
was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil
registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just discussed
can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not
mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner
and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a
conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is
not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair
or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the
discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but
which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of the
bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to
that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial
court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II
59

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains
liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of
Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage
is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first." 60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner
insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G.
Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice
without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged.1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the
minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision
correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period
within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum
penalties are within the ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’" 68 we
lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus,
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A.
Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
60

ABBAS vs. ABBAS G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 Void ab initio Marriage, Marriage License as a Formal Requisite
of a Valid Marriage
MAY 8, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, met Gloria, a Filipino, in Taiwan in 1991 and they got married there in 1992.

Later, Gloria filed bigamy cases against him. As advised bt his counsel, he went to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
where their Marriage License was issued, to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license. There, he was asked
to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. It appeared that the marriage
license number appearing in their marriage contract was the number of another marriage license issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan.

The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed. Hence, their marriage was declared void ab initio.

On appeal, the CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal.

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties
had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him
for bigamy.

Syed’s MR was denied.

61

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for Syed and Gloria.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3) of the Family Code, which read as
follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony

xxxx

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. While Syed was able to secure a certification that there was no
marriage license.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.
62

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution
dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz
St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11,
2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said
certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
on advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9
63

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and
copy of the marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of
the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was
told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria
against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
64

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria
Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS
NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING
THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE
OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION
THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

65

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from
the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus,
hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage
license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
66

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number
of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance
in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
67

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures
were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
68

Bayot v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix,
born in November 27, 1982 in California.
69

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to judgment ordering
the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and
support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred
by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the CA, RTC ought to have
granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce
decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being born to
American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to
those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed,
asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate,
when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which
allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ
Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining
whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
70

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen 7 born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement 10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256
of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
71

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount
of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the
posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition
for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No.
01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for
failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
72

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when
she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995,
or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No.
96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under
G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING
THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
73

Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of
the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle
of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued
by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto
and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6,
1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five
years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11,
1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
74

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995
when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this
patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official
copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the
Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau
pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation
or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that
no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn
first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:
75

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality,
42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of February of 1996, signed before the
Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. 39 Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true
with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction
to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we
stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."43
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Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. 44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists only of
the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference
but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on
lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. 50 With the valid foreign
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divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved
as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the
CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.