University of Cebu

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
OPEN-NOTES/BRING-HOME QUIZ
October 11, 2019

INSTRUCTION: This is an OPEN-NOTES, BRING-HOME seatwork. Write your answers

using the TRAC method/format of a syllogism in a yellow pad. I will collect your papers
when we meet again next week, October 18, 2019.

1. Villanueva v. COMELEC: Were the two grounds that the COMELEC invoked in
denying the petitioner’s substitute candidacy meritorious? (5 points)

No, the two grounds that the COMELEC invoked in denying the petitioner’s
substitute candidacy are not meritorious.

Laws and statute should be construed in accordance with the spirit of the
law. Moreover, election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to
achieve their purpose to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the
choice of their representatives. In the case of Guzman v. Board of Canvassers the
SC held that, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the
certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed
their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate
has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy.

In this case two grounds were invoked by the COMELEC, for the first
ground, the fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the
substitute candidate. Moreover, Mendoza’s withdrawal was an actual fact, so
much that no votes were cast for him at all. Although, his candidacy was filed
on the last day, his name was not on the certified list of candidates. Thus, his
unsworn withdrawal was accepted by the election registrar without protest or
objection. Also, since there was no time to include the name of the petitioner
in the candidates list, he circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all
chairmen and members of the citizen’s election committees in compliance with the
suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.

For the second ground, his withdrawal right on the very same day that
he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially
and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by
Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading
should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-
minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. Thus, the
grounds invoked by the COMELEC is not meritorious.
 2. Rufino Lopez & Sons v. CTA: Should the Court follow the literal import of Sec. 11
of R.A. 1125 (in the sense that persons affected by a decision of the Collector of
Customs may appeal directly to the CTA)? (5 points)

No, the court should not follow the literal import of section11 o R.A. 1125 .

Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the
spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which
matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would
contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter
of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal
meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the
Legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute as if it were within
the letter.

In the case at bar, Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court
of Tax Appeals(CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner
of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating of
the persons and entities who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a
decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner
of Customs. In this case it the court stated that a clerical error was committed in the
section 11, for mentioning the Collector of Customs. It should have been the
Commissioner of Customs instead. In this case clerical error is plain and obvious. Thus,
literal interpretation of Section 11 of R.A. 1125 is not applicable in this case.

3. Comendador v. De Villa: Was the withdrawal of the right to make a peremptory

challenge still effective? (5 points)

No, the petitioners now have the right to peremptory challenge.

Under the fundamental principle of statutory construction, cessante ratione legis,

cessat et ipsa lex, When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.The main
reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the law. For this reason
it plays a decisive role on its construction. Cessation renders the law inoperative.
(removable)

In the case at bar, the right to peremptory challenged was originally under Art. 18
of Com. Act. No 408 ( art. Of war) . When President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant
to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge. However, when
President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial
law throughout the Philippines, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically. Applying the rule Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex, the withdrawal of
the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus
of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the
old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now
again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
 4. Sajonas v. CA: Was the subject adverse claim still in force when the private
respondent registered the notice of levy on execution in TCT No. N-109417? (5
points)
Yes, the subject adverse claim was still in effect when the private respondent
registered the notice of levy on execution in TCT-N-109417.

Statutes are to be read as a whole, in context, and, if possible, the court is to give
effect to every word of the statute. The court is bound to give consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all of the parts of a statute, to the extent possible. For taken in solitude,
a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated."

In the instant case, the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we

must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529
provides: “The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the
date of registration.”

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse
claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately,
but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:

After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. ( Optional if
ganahan mo iexplain pa ang tibuok section)

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and
effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not
have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was
still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated
the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that
the property sought to be levied upon the execution was encumbered by an interest the
same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot
prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the
petitioners
5. National Tobacco Administration v. COA: Was the educational assistance benefit
still authorized under R.A. 6758? (5 points)

Yes, the educational assistance benefit was still authorized under R.A 6758.

Spirit of the Law or Intent of the Legislature as the primary object as

determined through construction. That the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole.

In the case at bar, there was a confusion as to the proper interpretation of

Section 12 springs from two seemingly contradictory provisions between the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 12 and the second sentence of Section 12.
Analysing the last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, in relation to the other
benefits therein enumerated, it can be gleaned unerringly that it is a "catch-all
proviso." And the benefits mentioned in the first sentence of Section 12 and sub-
paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 are entirely different from the benefit in
dispute, denominated as Educational Assistance. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that, the under the aforesaid "catch-all proviso," the legislative intent is
just to include the fringe benefits which are in the nature of allowances and since
the benefits under controversy is not the same category, the challenged benefit is
covered by the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758. The application
of sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 are only confined to the first
sentence of Section 12, particularly the last clause thereof which amplifies the
"catch-all proviso."

Ergo, the educational assistance benefit was still authorized under R.A
6758

6. De la Cruz v. Paras: May the municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan validly prohibit the
operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses? (5 points)

No, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan cannot validly prohibit the

operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses.

When statutes admit of two constructions, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, construction in favour of constitutionality should be favoured.

In the instant case, On June 20, 1953, RA No. 938 entitled “An act granting
municipal or city boards and counsils the power to regulate the establishments,
maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective
territorial jurisdiction,” was enacted to which gave municipalities the power to
regulate night clubs within their territorial jurisdiction. On May 21, 1954, the first
section was amended to include not merely “the power to regulate, but likewise
prohibit.” The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
This made the amendment unconstitutional due to its unconformity to the title of
RA No. 938. The provision without the amendment should be favoured.

Thus, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan cannot validly prohibit the

operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses.
7. Cabada v. Alunan: Did the NAPOLCOM gravely abuse its discretion in denying
due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal? (5 points)

Yes, NAPOLCOM did gravely abuse its discretion in denying due course, for lack
of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal?.

Every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statutes as to

form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

The provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations
implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed
decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith
appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided
the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the
Secretary of the DILG.

In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was addressed to "the Honorable

Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government . . . as Chairman
and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission," while De Guzman's
petition for review was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government and Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati
City, Metro Manila." The appeal and the petition for review are considered as
appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The
NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and
just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding
Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the
NAPOLCOM.

Hence, NAPOLCOM did gravely abuse its discretion in denying due

course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal.
8. Declarador v. Gubaton: Did the respondent court gravely abuse its discretion in
ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales? (5 points)

YES, the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension
of the sentence of the respondent Bansales.

Jurisprudence teaches that statutes in pari materia should be read and

construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system. Furthermore, later
statutes are considered supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments
and should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national
policy.

In this case, Frank Bensales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Under the earlier law Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as reproduced
in Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the benefits of suspended sentence shall
not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time
of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
over. On the other hand, Section 38 of a later law R.A. 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. RA
9344 merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if
he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep.
Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other
disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.

Hence, the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
suspension of the sentence of the respondent Bansales.

9. Ty-Delgado v. HRET: Was respondent Pichay—who was the president of the

company that published the libelous articles but was not the author thereof—
disqualified to run as congressman due to his conviction for the crime of libel? (5
points)

Yes, Pichay is disqualified to run as congressman due to his conviction for

the crime of libel.

(1) When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides any person who has
been sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. Jurisprudence also teaches that to be liable
for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

In the present case,Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. The
Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are
libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact
 that another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be
considered as further evidence of malice.Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual
malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

Hence, Pichay is disqualified to run as congressman due to his conviction for the
crime of libel.

10. Garvida v. Sales: Considering that the petitioner was qualified as a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, was she also qualified for election as an SK official? (5
points)

No, even if the petitioner was qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan,
still she was no qualified to be an SK official.

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish ( wa ko kibaw unsaon pag
explain) ( pwde raman mag verbal egis but sa syllabus kay kana man so wa ko sure unsaon??? L

In the case at bar, the The age requirement for the Katipunan ng Kabataan
membership is fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age (S424, LGC)
while an elective official must be at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one
(21) years of age on the day of his election (S428, LGC). The provision that state that an
elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of election
is very clear. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on Election
Day ( basin mao ni ang di gidistinguish???), contrary to the petitioner’s claim. Petitioner
must be a qualified voter prior to her eligibility as a candidate for the election. At the time
of the filing of her candidacy, petitioner is already more than the maximum age limit of 21
years old, and just less than 10 days before she turns 22, at the time of her
proclamation.Thus, the petitioner is ineligible for being over the age of qualification for
candidacy as SK Official.
Yes, Pichay is disqualified to run as congressman due to his conviction for the crime of
libel.

Under the rules of statutory construction, it is basic that where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.

In this case, Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides any person who has been
sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office. Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel
after publishing four defamatory articles but insists that since he was only the publisher of
the libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to payment of fine, the
circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude. However, The
Revised Penal Code provides that under the crime of libel, "Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or
the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall
be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof." The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the
nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel.
Accordingly, Pichay's criminal liability cannot be distinguished from the others' criminal
liability only because he was the president of the company that published the libelous
articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the
others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of
the libelous articles.

Hence, Pichay is disqualified to run as congressman due to his conviction for the crime of
libel.