Pointers
1. midnight appointment (LOCGOV topic)
Midnight Appointments Ban
General Rule: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections (2nd Monday of March), and up to
the end of his "term" (June 30), a President (or Acting President) shall not make appointments. (Art. VII, Sec. 15)
Exception: Temporary appointments to executive positions, when continued vacancies will: (a) prejudice public
service; or (b) endanger public safety.
Limited to Executive Department - The prohibition against midnight appointment applies only to positions in the
executive department.(De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010)
N.B. In re: Valenzuela [A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998], which extended the prohibition for midnight
appointments to the judiciary, effectively overruled.
Limited to Caretaker Capacity - While "midnight appointments" (i.e. made by outgoing President near the end of
his term) are not illegal, they should be made in the capacity of a "caretaker" [a new president being elected],
doubly careful and prudent in making the selection, so as not to defeat the policies of the incoming administration.
Hence, the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President may be regarded as abuse of presidential prerogatives. [Aytona v.
Castillo (1962)] (N.B. The 1935 Const. did not contain an explicit prohibition on midnight appointments)
BUT the Aytona ruling does not declare all midnight appointments as invalid, and that the ad interim appointment
of the petitioner chief of police here, whose qualification and regularity were otherwise not disputed, is thus valid.
[Quimsing v. Tajanglangit (1964)]
Applies only to President - Ban does not extend to appointments made by local elective officials. There is no law
that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. [De Rama
v. CA (2001)]
2. Umali v COMELEC
Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province
of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered
residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-
Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the
corresponding plebiscite.
Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration,
maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of
Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new
or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase
“qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of
the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.
Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s
conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its
residents but also of the province as a whole.
On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote
of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.
Issue:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan
City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a
Highly Urbanized City (HUC).
Held:
Entire province of Nueva Ecija
Ratio:
The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a
steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding
decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial
jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the
province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva
Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”
2. Samson v Executive Secretary
Samson v. Aguirre
MOISES S. SAMSON (PETITIONER) VS. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET (RESPONDENTS)
SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
J. QUISUMBING
creation of municipal corporations
SUMMARY: Samson, a councilor in Quezon City, assailed RA 8535 which created the City of Novaliches.
According to him, the RA failed to conform to the requirements of the LGC as to certifications in income, population,
and land area. It has not been proved that the mother city would not suffer adverse effects from the creation of
Novaliches. Court held against him. The presence and oral declarations of the government officials armed with
records during the public deliberations and hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates which
are routinely signed. The representatives all declared that Novaliches exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor
was also present, and his conformity implies that there is no damage done to QC. The non-receipt of copies is too
insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson failed to overturn the presumption of constitutionality
accorded legislative acts.
FACTS:
President Ramos signed into law RA 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon
City. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the constitutionality of the RA.
He sought to enjoin its implementation, holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement of funds as RA 8535 failed to
conform to the criteria in the LGC as to income, population, land area, seat of government, having no adverse
effect to its mother city, and furnishing a copy of the barangay resolution. Also, he said the law would amend the
Constitution.
In answer, the respondents claimed Samson failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. He had
the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under
the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, there is no document supporting the
unconstitutionality claim.
ISSUE: Was RA 8535 unconstitutional? NO.
 There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One who attacks a statute must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Samson has failed to discharge the burden.
1. Samson did not present any proof, only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to
the House Committee on Local Government—as such certifications attesting compliance with the
LGC and its IRR is required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.
a. The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the
combined average annual income of the 13 barangays for 2 years to be around P27M.
Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual
income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years.
b. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 350,000. This figure is more than
the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
c. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income
and population or land area. Other than the income requirement, the proposed city must
have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that
Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
2. Samson averred that oral manifestations are not enough certification. But in the hearings, the DBM,
DILG, and Finance Officials were present along with other officers armed with official statistics and
reference materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on population, land area and
income of the proposed city. Their official statements could serve the same purpose contemplated
by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification
submitted to either chamber routinely.
 3. Samson failed to show that the representatives did not also submit written certifications. Under the
IRR, written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be
submitted by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Samson
did not present a copy to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by
law. It is presumed that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed
legislative act.
 Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as
required. However, this omission is not as fatal to the validity. Under Section 12 of the Local Government
Code, the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation. While Section 12
speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from
where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.”
 Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the adverse effect to Quezon City. Quezon City Mayor
Mathay was present during the deliberations and made no mention of anything concerning such. As chief
executive, he would be the first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon
City. This is indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the plebiscite, all persons
concerned will obviously have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal
question of the cityhood of Novaliches.
 That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling for
the creation of the City of Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid the RA. The evident purpose of this
requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of the move to create another
city and to enable it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City
Council members are obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the mass
media. Surely members of the Council could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents
of the barangays’ petition to create the City of Novaliches.
 The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the
Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro
Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a
reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.
3. diplomatic immunity on the part of the govt and on the part of the diplomatic person
A. BASIC CONCEPTS/PRINCIPLES
1. Diplomats have personal inviolability
The rational for diplomatic immunity has changed over time:
 formerly, it was justified in terms of the sovereignty of the state and the respect due to
the state
 now, the rationale is for functional necessity – we give diplomats the protection they need
to discharge their duties, and we want other states to treat our diplomats similarly
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (p. 342)
Article 29: diplomatic agents are not liable to any form of arrest or detention, subject to
wavier by the sending state.
Article 31: diplomatic agents are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction, except
in the case of…an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions
B. TWO CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY:
– Immunity ratione personae – procedural
 Immunity that attaches to the person of the diplomat while he is a diplomat
 This is irrelevant for former diplomats
– Immunity ratione materiae – substantive
 This is normally irrelevant while a person is a diplomat; we look at it for former officials (it
is applied retrospectively)
 When a person ceases to be a diplomat, or his government waives his immunity, the
person retains substantive immunity for actions he performs in his civil function
o The definition of “official acts” is not always clear
C. ORIGIN OF DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE
India, China and Egypt showed practices observing respect for their emissaries and even recognizing
the sacred character of their office even before the rise of the Greek civilization.
On December 7, 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by Resolution 1450 (XIV),
convened an international conference to consider the question of diplomatic intercourse and
immunities. The Conference adopted (1) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, (2) Optional
Protocol concerning acquisition of nationality, and (3) Optional Protocol concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes. (Jorge Coquia and Miriam Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, U.P.
Law Complex, 1984, p. 485)
D. THE RIGHT OF LEGATION
It is the right to send and receive diplomatic missions. It is strictly not a right since no State can be
compelled to enter into diplomatic relations with another State. Diplomatic relations is established by
mutual consent between two States.
The right of legation is purely consensual. If it wants to, a state may shut itself from the rest of the
world, as Japan did until the close of the 19th century. However, a policy of isolation would hinder the
progress of a state since it would be denying itself of the many benefits available from the international
community.
Active right of legation – send diplomatic representatives
Passive right of legation – receive diplomatic representatives
Resident Missions
E. CLASSIFICATION OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES [ A N E M I C ]
1. Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State and other heads of missions of equivalent
rank, who when abroad are allowed to represent the person of their sovereign;
2. Envoys, ministers or persons accredited to the sovereign; and
3. Charge’s d’ affaires who are accredited to the minister of foreign affairs.
The appointment of diplomats is not merely a matter of municipal law for the receiving state is not
obliged to accept a representative who is a persona non grata to it. Indeed, there have been cases
when duly accredited diplomatic representatives have been rejected, resulting in strained relations
between the sending and receiving state.
How are diplomatic agents chosen?
To avoid such awkward situation, most states now observe the practice of agreation, by means of
which inquiries are addressed to the receiving state regarding a proposed diplomatic representative
of the sending state. It is only when the receiving state manifests its agreement or consent that the
diplomatic representative is appointed and formally accredited.
Agreation: It is a practice of the states before appointing a particular individual to be the chief of their
diplomatic mission in order to avoid possible embarrassment.
It consists of two acts:
(i). The Inquiry, usually informal, addressed by the sending state to the receiving state
regarding the acceptability of an individual to be its chief of mission; and
(ii). The agreement, also informal, by which the receiving state indicates to the sending
state that such person, would be acceptable.
Letter of Credence (Letre d’ Creance)
The document, which the envoy receives from his government accrediting him to the foreign state to
which he is being sent. It designates his rank and the general object of his mission and asks that he
be received favorably and that full credence be given to what he says on behalf of his state.
F. FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES
The functions of diplomatic mission consist inter alia in:
(a) Representing the sending state in the receiving state.
(b) Protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and its nationals.
(c) Negotiating with the government of the receiving state.
(d) Ascertainment through lawful means of the conditions and developments in the
receiving
state and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state.
(e) Promoting friendly relations between the sending and receiving state and developing
their economic, cultural and scientific relations.
(f) In some cases, representing friendly governments at their request.
G. CONSULAR RELATIONS
1. Letter Patent (Letre d’ Provision)
The appointment of a consul is usually evidenced by a commission, known sometimes as letter patent
or letre d’ provision, issued by the appointing authority of the sending state and transmitted to the
receiving state through diplomatic channels.
Consuls belong to a class of state agents distinct from that of diplomatic officers. They do not
represent their state in its relations with foreign states and are not intermediaries through whom
matters of state are discussed between governments.
They look mainly after the commercial interest of their own state in the territory of a foreign state.
They are not clothed with diplomatic character and are not accredited to the government of the country
where they exercised their consular functions; they deal directly with local authorities.
2. Two Kinds of Consuls
1. consules missi – professional or career consuls who are nationals of the sending state and are
required to devote their full time to the discharge of their duties.
2. consules electi –may or may not be nationals of the sending state and perform their consular
functions only in addition to their regular callings.
Consuls derive their authority from two principal sources, to wit, the letter patent or letter ‘de
provision, which is the commission issued by the sending state, and the exequator, which is the
permission given them by the receiving state to perform.
3. Consular Functions: Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) that
consular functions shall consist of:
(a) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals,
both
individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law;
(b) furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations
between the sending State and the receiving State and otherwise promoting friendly
relations between them in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention;
(c) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the commercial,
economic,
cultural and scientific life of the receiving State, reporting thereon to the Government of
the sending State and giving information to persons interested;
(d) issuing passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State, and visas
or appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending State;
(e) helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending
State;
(f) acting as notary and civil registrar and in capacities
(g) safeguarding the interests of nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the
sending States in cases of succession mortis causa in the territory of the receiving State,
in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
(h) safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving
State,
the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of the
sending State, particularly where any guardianship or trusteeship is required with respect
to such persons;
(i) subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State, representing
or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the
tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State, for the purpose of obtaining, in
accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, provisional measures
for the preservation of the rights and interests of these nationals, where, because of
absence or any other reason, such nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the
defense of their rights and interests;
(j) transmitting judicial and extrajudicial documents or executing letters rogatory or
commissions to take evidence for the courts of the sending State in accordance with
international agreements in force or, in the absence of such international agreements, in
any other manner compatible with the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
(k) exercising rights of supervision and inspection provided for in the laws and regulations
of the sending State in respect of vessels having the nationality of the sending State, and
of aircraft registered in that State, and in respect of their crews;
(l) extending assistance to vessels and aircraft mentioned in subparagraph (k) of this
article, and to their crews, taking statements regarding the voyage of a vessel, examining
and stamping the ship’s papers, and, without prejudice to the powers of the authorities
of the receiving State, conducting investigations into any incidents which occurred during
the voyage, and settling disputes of any kind between the master, the officers and the
seamen insofar as this may be authorized by the laws and regulations of the sending
State;
(m) performing any other functions entrusted to a consular post by the sending State
which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State or to which no
objection is taken by the receiving State or which are referred to in the international
agreements in force between the sending State and the receiving State.
H. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
By way of customary and conventional international law, a diplomatic agent enjoys a wide
range of privileges and immunities, to include among others, the following:
1. Personal inviolability;
2. Inviolability of premises and archives;
3. Right of an official communication;
4. Exemption from local jurisdiction;
5. Exemption from subpoena as witness;
6. Exemption from taxation
Cases:
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242(1972): The Supreme Court has held that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question. Where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity.
U.S.A. v. Iran, 74 AJIL 743 (May 24, 1980): The U.S. government instituted action against Iran before
the ICJ due to the takeover by student militants of the US Embassy in Tehran and the American
consulates in Tanriz and Shiraz and the detention of some 50 Americans. While the ICJ ruled in favor
the U.S. government, the enforcement of judgment was difficult. Under the facts, it was believed that
if diplomats were committing acts of espionage, the ultimate action of the receiving country would only
be expulsion of the diplomatic mission.
Fatemi v. United States of America (U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1963): Fourteen
Iranian nationals appealed their cases from convictions for “unlawful entry”. The claim of immunity
involving inviolability of premises must be invoked by a member of the diplomatic mission.
Ali Kouni v. Nahiba Khari (wife of Kouni) Tunisia, Court of Appeals of Tunis, 1963. Mr. Kouni
served as counselor of the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. He filed an action for
divorce against his wife, Nahiba Khari, a Tunisian national. The Tunis court granted the divorce but it
also awarded counterclaim of the wife by way of damages and alimony. On appeal, Kouni invoked his
diplomatic immunity. The Court rejected the appeal since the action was purely personal in nature.
Areco Leon (minors) Chile, Second Juvenile Court of Santiago, 1955: A warrant of arrest was
issued against Don Alberto Areco Pittaluga for failure to make alimony payments for a period of four
months. He alleged that as First Secretary of the Uruguayan Embassy, he was invested with immunity.
The court ruled that he cannot invoke immunity for his personal acts.
U.S. v. City of Glen Cove, 322 Supp. 149 (1971). The U.S. District Court sustained the immunity
from local taxation of property occupied by the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the
United Nations.
Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F. 2d. 360 (1948). The U.S. District of Appeals dismissed the case where
the defendant French diplomat was served with process in a court action in New York while on his
way to Bolivia for his diplomatic post. The Court said that the diplomat must be granted immunity on
the principle that a diplomatic in transitu would be entitled to the same privilege as diplomatic in situ.
U.S. v. Rosal, 191 F. Supp. 663 (1961). The U.S. District Court denied the claim for immunity of
Rosal, a Guatemalan ambassador to Belgium and the Netherlands who caught with possession with
narcotics while on a personal visit to New York.
I. POINTERS ON DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
(a) The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable and he shall not be liable to any form of arrest
or detention. The receiving state shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps
to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.
(b) A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state, except in certain cases as, for example, when the civil action deals with property
held by him in a private or proprietary capacity.
(c) The diplomatic premises shall be inviolable, and the agents of the receiving state may not enter
them without the consent of the head of the mission. Such premises, their furnishings and other
property thereon and the means of transportation of the mission shall be immune from search,
requisition, attachment or execution.
(d) The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may
be.
(e) The receiving state shall permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all
official purposes. In communicating with the government and other missions, and consulates of the
sending state wherever situated, the mission may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic
couriers and messages in code or cipher. The official correspondence of the mission shall be
inviolable.
(f) Subject to its laws and regulations concerning national security, the receiving state shall insure to
all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory.
(g) A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
h) A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional, or
municipal except in certain specified cases like the imposition of indirect taxes.
(i) The mission and its head shall have the right to use the flag and emblem of the sending state on
the premises of the mission, including the residences of the head of the mission and on his means of
transport.
J. TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
A diplomatic mission may come to an end by any of the usual methods of terminating official relations
like:
1. Under Municipal Law:
 (a) Resignation
(b) Accomplishment of the purpose
(c) Death
(d) Abolition of the office
(e) Removal
2. Under the International Law:
(a) War - the outbreak of war between the sending and receiving states terminates their diplomatic
relations, which is usually severed before the actual commencement of hostilities;
(b) Extinction - extinction of either the sending state or the receiving state will also automatically
terminate diplomatic relations between them; or
(c) Recall – may be demanded by the receiving state when the foreign diplomat becomes a persona
non grata to it for any reason. Where the demand is rejected by the sending state, the receiving state
may resort to the more drastic method of dismissal, by means of which the offending diplomat is
summarily presented with his passport and asked to leave the country.
Dominican Republic v. Pequero, 225 F. Supp. 342 (1963), 58 Am. J. International Law, 1012
(1964). The U.S. District Court ruled that despite the change of government, the receiving state will
continue to recognize the powers of the vice consul until such time the exequatur is withdrawn.
6. nature of ad interim appointment – pubcorp
Ad interim appointments – appointments made while Congress is not in session, before confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; immediately effective and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by the
Commission on Appointments. This is a permanent appointment and its being subject to confirmation does not
alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. [Matibay v. Benipayo
(2002)]
Ad interim appointments are interim, not temporary or acting, and so members of Constitutional commissions may
be appointed on an ad interim basis.
I. REQUIREMENT OF APPROVAL OF AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
Being a permanent appointment, COA approval, where required, must still be obtained in the case of ad interim
appointments. If an ad interim appointment is disapproved for lack of qualifications, the disapproved appointee
cannot be a reappointed.

Cf. Bypassed Appointee.

4. Calling out powers of the president
From beda reviewer:
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a power that the constitution directly
vests in the President. The resident does not need a constitutional authority to exercise the same. (Ampatuan v
Puno)
While emergency power is the power vested by the congress to the President to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy during a state of war or national emergency. There must be a law
authorizing the President to exercise such power.
As held in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The Court further ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.”
The Commission on Appointments’ failure to confirm an ad interim appointment is NOT disapproval. An ad interim
appointee disapproved by the COA cannot be reappointed. But a by-passed appointee, or one whose appointment
was not acted upon the merits by the COA, may be appointed again by the President.
B.4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS
Permanent appointments are those that last until lawful termination. Security of tenure attaches to the appointment.
In contrast, temporary or acting appointments are those that last until a permanent appointment is made, or in the
absence or incapacity of the incumbent. There is no security of tenure.
Permanent Acting
Must be qualified Must be qualified if a presidential appointment. See difference under portion
under “The Civil Service,” where even persons unqualified for a particular
position may fill a vacancy if civil service eligible.

What must be emphasized is that the Proclamation does not amount to a suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus nor is it tantamount to a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

Of the powers granted to the President as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
Security of tenure—may not be No security of tenure—may be removed at the pleasure of the appointing
the calling-out power is considered as the mildest. In the case of Ampatuan v. Puno, the Supreme Court held that
removed unless for cause. authority.
the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. There is no need for a congressional authority to exercise the same.
Must be confirmed by Cannot be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, because
Unlike the calling-out power of the President, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration Commission on Appointments confirmation presupposes a valid nomination or ad interim appointment.
of Martial Law may only be done in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Endures until lawful termination
While it is true that the Supreme Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the calling
out power, it would generally defer to his judgment on the matter.

As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that
the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Despite the widespread speculation on the effects of the President’s proclamation of a state of lawlessness, such
declaration does not affect the citizen’s fundamental political and civil rights. Under the calling-out power, the
President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires.
5. act of aggression on the part of external state
C. AGGRESSION
Article 1 of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3341 defines aggression as “the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”
B.5. DURATION OF TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS
General Rule: At the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Exception: Fixed-Period Temporary appointments, which may be revoked ONLY at the period’s expiration.
Revocation before expiration must be for a valid cause.
B.6. STEPS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTING PROCESS
(1) Nomination—exclusive prerogative of the President on which no limitation may be imposed by Congress,
except the requirement of concurrence by the Commission on Appointments and the prescription of qualifications
by Congress.
(2) Confirmation—by Congress through the Commission on Appointments
Where necessary, no appointment until confirmed.
If not necessary, the President cannot confer participation to the CA, nor can the CA create a power to confirm
appointments.
Confirmation need not be done at a regular session of Congress.
It cannot be reconsidered after the President is notified of the confirmation and has issued the commission
(3) Issuance of commission—not strictly a requirement, but serves as evidence of the consummation of the
exercise of the appointing power.
(4) A commission is a written authority from a competent source given to the officer as his warrant for the exercise
of the powers and duties of the office to which he is commissioned. It is written evidence of appointment.
7. power of the local govt to expropriate
B. EMINENT DOMAIN
It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. [Moday v. CA (1993)]
Requisites for the Exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU
(1) An ordinance [not a mere resolution]is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local Chief
Executive to exercise the power of eminent domain;
(2) The power is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
(3) There is payment of just compensation based on the fair market value of the property at the time of taking; and,
(4) A valid and definite offer was previously made to the owner of the property, but the offer was not accepted.[Heirs
of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong (2000)]
Jurisdiction
An expropriation suit falls under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. The subject of an expropriation suit is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. [Barangay San
Roque v. Heirs of Pastor (2000)]
Just Compensation
_The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Hence, a statutory
provision on a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right
of way is not binding upon the Court. [National Power Corp. v. Ileto (2012)]
_Just compensation is determined as of the time of actual taking [LGC, sec. 19]
Requisites for the Immediate Entry by the LGU
(1) Filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) Deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on
the current tax declaration [LGC, sec. 19]
Upon compliance with the requisites, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial. There is no need
for a hearing for the writ to issue. [City of Iloilo v. Legaspi (2004)]
Socialized Housing [R.A. No. 7279]
Under the Urban Development and Housing Act, expropriation by an LGU for purposes of urban land reform and
housing shall occur only as a last resort. It must be shown by the LGU that other methods of acquisition have been
exhausted: community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint venture agreements, and negotiated purchase.
If all the other methods have been exhausted and expropriation to continue, the LGU shall acquire lands for
socialized housing in the following order:
(1) Government lands
(2) Alienable lands of public domain
(3) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands
(4) Lands within Areas for Priority Development
(5) Unacquired BLISS sites
(6) Private lands
Furthermore, lands of small-property owners are exempt from expropriation for purposes of socialized housing.
“Small-property owners” are defined by two elements:
(1) They are owners of real property which consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 sq.
meters in highly urbanized cities, and 800 sq. meters in other urban cities; and
(2) They do not own real property other than the same.
8. mmda power
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and all its functions
are administrative in nature. [MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)]
But the MMDA is duty-bound to confiscate/suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. [MMDA v. Garin (2005); Sec. 3(b), Rep.
Act No. 7924]
9. 3 term limit
B. LIMITATION OF CONSECUTIVE TERMS [N]o such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected. [CONST. art X, sec. 8]
B.1. WHAT CONSTITUTES A TERM OF OFFICE
The term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. [Borja v. COMELEC (1998)]
The interruption of a term that would prevent the operation of the three-term rule involves “no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office [or the right to hold on to an office]” or “at least an effective break from holding
office.” [Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC (2009)]
2 Conditions for the Application of the Disqualification
(1) Elected for three consecutive times for the same position; and
(2) Fully served three consecutive terms [Borja v. COMELEC (1998)]
Prevailing doctrines on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption
[Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC (2013)]
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law: When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position pursuant
to the rules of succession under the LGC, supra:
(a) For the office assumed: The successor’s service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official is
not treated as one full term and is not counted in the application of any term limit. [Borja v. COMELEC (1998)]
(b) For the office held before succession: The successor’s assumption by operation of law to the higher office (e.g.
vice-mayor) is considered an involuntary severance or interruption of the office he previously held (e.g. councilor).
[i.e. it is not counted in the application of any term limit.] [Montebon v. COMELEC (2008)]
2) Recall Elections: An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of his service. For, he had become in the interim [i.e. from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election]
a private citizen. [Adormeo v. COMELEC (2002); Socrates v. COMELEC (2002)]
(3) Conversion: The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not,
by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service [Latasa v. COMELEC (2003)]
(4) Preventive Suspension: Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is
barred from exercising the functions of his office [Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC (2009)]
(5) Losing in an Election Protest:
(a) When a candidate is proclaimed a winner for an elective office and assumes office, his term is interrupted when
he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise
be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed [Lonzanida v. COMELEC (1999) and
Dizon v. COMELEC (2009)]
(b)
(c) However, when an official loses in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had
served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he
managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service should be counted in the application of the term limits [Ong v. Alegre (2006) and Rivera III
v. COMELEC (2007)]
(6) Effect of Winning in an Election Protest: The period during which the winner of an election protest is unable to
assume office as it was occupied by his opponent is considered to be an involuntary interruption in the service of
his term and therefore bars the application of the three-term limit rule. [Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC (2013)]
10. qualification to run for congress (see chart)
11. principle of condonation
Note: The exceptions may be condensed into three:
C. DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION (1) Grave abuse of discretion;
Rule: A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since (2) Pure question of law; or
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting (3) No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
off the right to remove him therefor. [Aguinaldo v. Santos (1992)]
When not applicable: However, the long list has been developed by jurisprudence. It is prudent to cite it over the shortened list.
(1) There is already a final determination of guilt. Subsequent re-election cannot be deemed a condonation B.2. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:
if there was already a final determination of his guilt before the re-election. [Reyes v. COMELEC (1996)] It does not affect jurisdiction of the court.
(2) Criminal cases. The doctrine finds no application to criminal cases, as these are violations against the The only effect of non-compliance is that it will deprive complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground
state itself.[Aguinaldo v. Santos (1992)] for a motion to dismiss.
But if not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived. [Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)]
N.B. The doctrine of condonation does not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was
committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. Hence, C. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (UP)
the fact that the misconduct was committed so near the election day does not prevent the application of the Courts will not interfere with the act of an administrative agency before it has reached finality or it has been
doctrine. [Garcia v. Mojica (1999)] completed.
Rationale: Without a final order or decision, the power has not been fully and finally exercised.
12. exhaustion of admin remedies Prohibition is not the proper remedy [when] the enabling law itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has specifically
tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners
B. DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial
General Rule: Where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could process. [Paredes v. CA (1996)]
be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated. [Pascual v.
Provincial Board (1959)]
Requisites: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine of Primary
(1) The administrative agency is performing a quasi-judicial function; Administrative Jurisdiction
(2) Judicial review is available; and Jurisdiction of Appellate Concurrent Original Jurisdiction
(3) The court acts in its appellate jurisdiction. Court with Admin Body
Ground for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy a condition The court yields to the
Rationale: Non-exercise of precedent. jurisdiction of the Administrative
(1) Legal reason: The law prescribes a procedure. Jurisdiction agency because of its
(2) Practical reason: To give the agency a chance to correct its own errors and prevent unnecessary and specialized knowledge or
premature resort to the courts expertise.
(3) Reasons of comity: Expedience, courtesy, convenience. Court Action Dismiss Suspend Judicial Action

B.1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES:

(1) Purely legal questions. [Castro v. Secretary (2001)] 13. SALN rule (UP)
(2) Steps to be taken are merely matters of form. [Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)] (1) SALN: Art. XI, Sec. 17 Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as
(3) Administrative remedy not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. [Pascual often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
v. Provincial Board (1959)] worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
(4) Validity and urgency of judicial action or intervention. [Paat v. CA (1997)] Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed
(5) No other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.[Paat v. CA (1997); forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by
Information Technology Foundation v Comelec (2004) law.
(6) Resort to exhaustion will only be oppressive and patently unreasonable. [Paatv. CA (1997); Cipriano
v.Marcelino (1972)] What: Declaration under oath of assets, liabilities, and net worth
(7) Where the administrative remedy is only permissive or voluntary and not a prerequisite to the institution When:
of judicial proceedings. [Corpuz v.Cuaderno (1962)] (a) Upon assumption of office
(8) Application of the doctrine will only cause great and irreparable damage which cannot be prevented (b) As often as may be required by law
except by taking the appropriate court action. [Paat v. CA (1997); Ciprianov.Marcelino (1972)]
(9) When it involves the rule-making or quasi-legislative functions of an administrative agency.[Smart v. NTC Who must declare:
(2003)] (a) President
(10) Administrative agency is in estoppel. [Republic v.Sandiganbayan (1996)] (c) Vice-President
(11) Doctrine of qualified political agency (d) Members of the Cabinet
(12) Subject of controversy is private land in land case proceedings. [Paat v. CA (1997)] (e) Members of Congress
(13) Blatant violation of due process. [Paat v. CA (1997); Pagara v. CA] (f) Members of the Supreme Court
(14) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction. [Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)] (g) Members of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices
(15) Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [Paat v. CA (1997)] (h) Officers of the Armed Forces with general or flag rank [Art. XI, Sec. 17]
(16) Resort to administrative remedy will amount to a nullification of a claim.[DAR v. Apex Investment (2003);
Paat v. CA (1997)] (2) Financial and business interests: Members must make full disclosure upon assumption of office [Art. VI,
(17) No administrative review provided for by law. [Estrada v. CA (2004)] Sec. 12]
(18) Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies rendered moot. [Estrada v. CA (2004)]
(19) In quo warranto proceedings. [Corpus v. Cuaderno (1962)]
(20) Law expressly provides for a different review procedure. [Samahang Magbubukid v. CA (1999)]
Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office,
make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
(3) Potential conflicts of interest: Members must notify House, if conflict arises from the filing of a proposed
legislation which they authored. [Id.]
(4) Amounts paid to/expenses incurred by each member: To be reported annually by the COA. [Art. VI, Sec.
20]
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public
in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
14. jurisdiction of ICJ and ICC
. JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
States may either seek an opinion or submit a conflict for resolution before the International
Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the ICJ in contentious issues involves three issues:
(1) jurisdiction over parties;
(2) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and
(3) jurisdiction regarding the time limits.
In an obiter dictum in its 1970 judgment in the Barcelona Traction case, the International
Court of Justice identified a category of international obligations called erga omnes,
namely obligations owed by states to the international community as a whole, intended
to protect and promote the basic values and common interests of all.
Examples of erga omnes norms include piracy, genocide, slavery, torture, and racial
discrimination. The concept was recognized in the International Court of Justice's
decision in the Barcelona Traction case [(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970
3 at paragraph 33]:
"… an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-
à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature,
the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. [at 34] Such obligations derive,
for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of
protection have entered into the body of general international law . . . others
are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character."
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (“ICC”)
NATURE OF ICC AND ITS HISTORY
This is an intergovernmental organization and international tribunal, has the jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. It sits in The Hague in the Netherlands.
The ICC is intended to complement existing national judicial systems and it may therefore only
exercise its jurisdiction when certain conditions are met, such as when national courts are
unwilling or unable to prosecute criminal also or when the United Nations Security Council or
individual states refer investigations to the Court. The ICC began functioning on 1 July 2002,
the date that the Rome Statute entered into force. The Philippines is a signatory to the Rome
Statute.
The ICC has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry. The President is the most senior judge chosen by his or her peers
in the Judicial Division, which hears cases before the Court. The Office of the Prosecutor is
headed by the Prosecutor who investigates crimes and initiates proceedings before the Judicial
Division. The Registry is headed by the Registrar and is charged with managing all the
administrative functions of the ICC, including the headquarters, detention union, and public
defense office.
E. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1. What is the ICJ: The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations. All members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ. A non-member may become a
party on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
2. What are the principal functions of the ICJ?
(a). To render advisory opinions; and
(b).To decide contentious cases which includes:
(i). The interpretation of any treaty, any question of international law,
(ii). The existence of any fact which if established would constitute a
breach of international obligation; and
(iii). The nature and extent of reparation to be made for the breach of
international obligation.
Case:
The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 533-534, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc: State is not
lost when one of its elements is changed; it is lost only when at least one of its elements is
destroyed. State does not lose its identity but remains one and the same international person
notwithstanding changes in the form of its government, territory, people, or sovereignty.
3. The Jurisdiction of the ICJ
The Court is competent to entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its
jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways:
(a). by the conclusion between them of a special agreement to submit the dispute
to the Court;
(b). by virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a
treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event of a disagreement over its
interpretation or application, one of them may refer the dispute to the Court.
Several hundred treaties or conventions contain a clause to such effect; or
(c). through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the Statute
whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event
of a dispute with another State having made a similar declaration. The declarations
of 65 States are at present in force, a number of them having been made subject
to the exclusion of certain categories of dispute.
4. Composition, Term of Office, Voting Rules and Inhibitions of Judges
The ICJ is composed of 15 judges.
Each judge serves a term of 9 years, staggered at three yea intervals by dividing the judges
first elected into three equal groups and assigning them by lottery terms of three, six and nine
years respectively. Immediate re-election is allowed. The President and the Vice President
elected by the Court for three years may also be re-elected. Terms of office of 5 of the 15
members shall expire at the end of every 3 years.
ICJ Voting Rules
All questions before the Court are decided by a majority of the judges present, the quorum
being nine when it is sitting en banc. In case of tie, the President or his substitute shall have
cast a vote.
Rule for Inhibition of Judges
No judge may participate in the decision of a case in which he has previously taken part as
agent, counsel or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international
court, or of a commission of injury, or in any other capacity.
Nicaragua Case (1986 ICJ Report 14), The International Court of Justice considered the
planting mines by one state within the territorial waters of another as a violation of Art. 2(4) of
the UN Charter. If the support provided by America to rebels of Nova goes beyond the mere
giving of monetary or psychological support but consist in the provision of arms and training,
the acts of America can be considered as indirect aggression amount to another violation of
Art. 2(4).
In addition, even if the provision of support is not enough to consider the act a violation of the
non-use of force principle, this is a violation of the principle of non-intervention in customary
international law.
5. What is the relationship of ICJ with the International Criminal Court (ICC)? The ICC is
an independent judicial institution created by the treaty known as Rome Statute with the power
 to try and punish individuals for the most serious crimes of international concern, to include the
following:
1. Genocide
2. Crimes against humanity
3. Crimes of aggression, and
4. War crimes.
15. Estrada and Tubar Doctrine
3. Recognition of States (Loanzon)
3.1. Theories on nature and effect of recognition
Constitutive Theory: maintains that it is the act of recognition which constitutes or creates the
statues of a State as a subject of public international law and thus gives it a legal personality.
Declaratory Theory: asserts that recognition merely confirms the acceptance of the States of
the status of the entity as a State.
3.2. Functions of Recognition:
First, the determination of statehood is a question of law.
Second, the act of recognition is a condition for the establishment of formal, optional and
bilateral relations including diplomatic relations and the conclusion of treaties.
Three different approaches to recognition of governments by other states:
(a) Traditional approach: States consider four factors in deciding whether to recognize a state:
(1) effectiveness of control
(2) stability and permanence
(3) popular support
(4) ability and willingness to fulfill obligations
(b) ESTRADA DOCTRINE: when a new government comes to power either through
constitutional means or otherwise, its relations with other states remain unchanged.
This was created by the Mexican government, which found that it would be insulting to make
determinations about recognition of governments because it would involve passing judgment
on the internal affairs of other states.
(c) TOBAR DOCTRINE: States will not recognize governments which come into power as a
consequence of a coup or of a revolution against the government, so long as the freely elected
representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country.
3.3. Consequences of Recognition of Government
1. The recognized government or State acquires the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations
with recognizing States and to make treaties with them.
2. The recognized government or State acquires the right of suing in the courts of law of the
recognizing States.
3. It is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of law of recognizing States.
4. It becomes entitled to demand and receive possession of property situated within the
jurisdiction of a recognizing State, which formerly belonged to the preceding government.
5. Its effect is to preclude the courts of recognizing State from making the new State liable for
any judgment on the legality of its acts, past and future since recognition is retroactive.
Case:
Marcos v. Manglapus, G. R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989: The Supreme Court held that:
“The Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry…But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court’s jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President…We cannot, for example, question the
President’s recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such
action may appear.”
Doctrines on Recognition of De Facto Governments (UP)
1. Wilson/Tobar Doctrine: Also known as “Doctrine of Legitimacy” or “Policy of Democratic Legitimacy.”
Holds that governments which came into power by extra-constitutional means [e.g. revolution, civil war, coup
d’etat or other forms of internal violence] should not be recognised, at least until the change had been
accepted by the people. [After US President Wilson, 1913 and Ecuadorian FM Tobar (1907)]
2. Stimson Doctrine: Doctrine of not recognizing any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by non-
legal means. Precludes recognition of any government established as a result of external aggression. [After
US Sec. of State Henry Stimson (1932)]
3. Estrada Doctrine: Automatic recognition of governments in all circumstances. Posits
that dealing or not dealing with the government established through a political upheaval is not a judgment
on the legitimacy of the said government. [After Mexican Minister Genaro Estrada (1930)] [SHAW]
16. Nepotism, limitation on the appointing powers of the President (up to 4th), other officials (up to
the 3rd)
C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWER TO APPOINT
C.1. IN GENERAL
The appointee must possess the prescribed qualifications.
The power of appointment must be exercised with disinterested skill and in a manner primarily for the benefit
of the public.
There can be no appointment without an actual vacancy.
C.2. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
I. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
Nepotism — _President may not appoint his spouse and relatives within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity as members of the Concomms, Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or
heads of bureaus or offices
Midnight appointments — _the president shall not make appointments 2 months immediately before the
next presidential elections, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
General Rule: The Civil Service Decree (PD 807) prohibits all appointments in the national and local
governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof made in favor of relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity of:
(1) appointing authority;
(2) recommending authority;
(3) chief of the bureau office; or
(4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee
In the last two cases, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative of the chief of
the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee [CSC v. Dacoycoy
(1999)]
Exceptions to rule on nepotism:
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity
(b) teachers
(c) physicians
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(e) those who were already appointed to the same office, but later got married.
(10) Under the Local Government Code, the ff. cannot be local government officials [Sec. 40]:
(a) Sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1
year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence;
(b) Removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those holding dual allegiance
_Note that dual citizenship in itself is not a disqualification. See discussions under Citizenship.
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of the Local Government Code;
(g) The Insane or feeble-minded.
(Loanzon) 5. Nepotism
General Rule: The Civil Service Decree (PD 807) prohibits all appointments in the national and local
governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof made in favor of relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity of:
(a) appointing authority;
(b) recommending authority;
(c) chief of the bureau office; or
(d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee
In the last two cases, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative of the chief of
the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee
Case: CSC v. Dacoycoy (1999)
Exceptions to rule on nepotism:
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity
(b) teachers
(c) physicians
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(f) those that were already appointed to the same office, but later got married.

17. audit powers of COA

(UP) B.3. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Powers and Functions
(1) Examine, audit, and settle accounts pertaining to government funds or property: its revenue, receipts,
expenditures, and uses

Post-audit basis:
(a) Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices;
(b) Autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) GOCCs with no original charters and their subsidiaries;
(d) Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity.

(2) Exclusive Authority to

(a) Define the scope of its audit and examination;
(b) Establish techniques and methods required ;
(c) Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.

Note: Art. IX-D, Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiaries
in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
Composition: A Chairman and 2 Commissioners
Qualifications:
(1) Natural born Filipino citizens
(2) At least 35 years of age
(3) CPAs with not less than 10 years of auditing experience OR members of the Philippine bar with at least
10 years practice of law

Note: At no time shall all members belong to the same profession.

C. PROHIBITED OFFICES AND INTERESTS
No member of the Constitutional Commissions shall, during their tenure:
(1) Hold any other office or employment. This is similar to the prohibition against executive officers. It applies
to both public and private offices and employment.
(2) Engage in the practice of any profession.
(3) Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office.
(4) Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
[Art. IX-A, Sec. 2]