PALE Batch 1 Case 1
her mother. In the latter part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant
A.C. No. 11256
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant vs ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA,
Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court
and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client and must be disbarred to maintain the integrity of the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his
law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her
marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria.
After giving th e details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the
respondent told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain
for her the decree of annulment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost
₱25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he
would still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation,
she was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson
Argonza.1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19, 2002. On that
occasion, he showed her the petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She
paid to him an initial amount of ₱4,000.00.2 He acknowledged the payment through a
handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, 2002 to
deliver another partial payment, and to follow up on the case. The respondent
advised her to just wait for the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she
did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and processes
would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the
developments.4 On December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her
payment, and he also issued his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several follow-ups on behalf of
that her petition had been granted.6 Thus, Vanessa went to the respondent's office
and received a copy of the trial court's decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge
Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao
City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to
lapse after the release of the decision before she could safely claim the status of
"single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in her Voter's Registration Record
(VRR) that she was single.8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of
the certificate of finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao
of the RTC (Branch 4).9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported
decision and certificate of finality in applying for the renewal of her
passport.10 However, she became the object of an investigation by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew
Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision
for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the
certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the court records, as
borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of
Court of the RTC Branch IV, to wit:
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether Civil Case No.
6149 for the Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C.
Madria was filed and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April 25, 2003 but
was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged
decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine
Passport Act in the RTC in Tuguegarao City.12 She claims that she had relied in
good faith on the representations of the respondent; and that he had taken
advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the
falsified court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He
averred that he had informed her that he would still be carefully reviewing the
grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare the draft
of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also
prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had
been annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him
that such simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential; that he had
informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no
attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled
hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard from her since then, and that she
had not even returned to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
submitted her Report and Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the
respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation of suspension from the practice of
law for two years to disbarment through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria vs.
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a lawyer and a member of
the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the petition for annulment
of marriage of complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition.
Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.16
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage,
and of the simulation of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of
having done so only upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate
him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if not altogether
empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a
certificate of finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or
forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the respondent's
case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable. Specifically,
his deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the
decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery
of the administration of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of
continuing as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1. 01 and 1.02,
Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOY AL TY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the
complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the
simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations
upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was
aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to
deter him from committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly
frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act
with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon
forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor
consent to its commission."17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly
enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.18 As we have observed in one
case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.1âwphi1 Thus, a lawyer should determine
his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the
Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility required the respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By
choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he
committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to "delay
any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients." He compounded this violation by taking advantage of
his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives, thereby disregarding his
responsibility under Canon 17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on
any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a
party to a case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or
misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.24 The moral standards of the Legal
Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law.25 That he
turned his back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character,
dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the
Court.26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct.
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27he was suspended from the practice of law because
he had notarized documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance
shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the documents
that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should
be quickly removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for
the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing
and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in the respondent's
case. We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as
herein described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law Profession.
As we reminded in Embido v. Pe,29 in which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for
falsifying a court decision:
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession
is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court
may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the
Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for
acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings,
but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The
test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.30

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty
of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S
OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name
be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c)
the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to the respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
PALE Batch 1 Case 2
[ AC. No. 9018, Apr 20, 2016 ]
TERESITA P. FAJARDO v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ +
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in
the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of
Health is authorized to privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount
charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle
of quantum meruit.
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty.
Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as follows:
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases filed against her
before the Office of the Ombudsman.[1] Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health.[2] He asked for P1,400,000.00 as
acceptance fee.[3]However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the
Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.[4]
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.[5] Atty.
Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against
Teresita dismissed.[6]
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal
complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.[7]
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave.[8] Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to
heed.[10]
On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health under the
Department of Health.[11] He has authority to engage in private practice of the
profession.[12] He represented Teresita in several cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.[13]
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult Atty.
Alvarez whenever a case was filed against her.[14] Atty. Alvarez would then advise
Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its attachments through
courier.[15] Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would evaluate the case and call Teresita to
discuss his fees in accepting and handling the case.[16] A 50% downpayment would
be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his secretary's bank account.[17] The balance would
then be paid in installments.[18] The success fee was voluntary on Teresita's part.[19]
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a meeting at
Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision and resolution she received from the Office
of the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for dishonesty and indicting her for
violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.[20] Atty. Alvarez
accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as acceptance fee.[21] According to
Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at the amount after considering the difficulty of the case and
the workload that would be involved, which would include appeals before the Court
of Appeals and this Court.[22] However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees, appearance
fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying and mailing.[23]
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in connection with
Teresita's case:
motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the
(1)
administrative case;
motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the criminal
(2)
case;
petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court of
(3)
Gapan City; and
petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(4)
filed before the Court of Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the amended
 petition on November 26, 2009.[24]
Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different government
officials and agencies.[25]
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for the amounts they
agreed on.[26] Teresita only paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee equivalent
to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010.[27] While Teresita paid P60,000.00 for the
miscellaneous expenses, she did not pay the expenses for other legal work
performed and advanced by Atty. Alvarez.[28]
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of the Ombudsman's
Decision, Teresita informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in
retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva
Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the cases against Teresita.[29]
On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified
Complaint praying for the disbarment of Atty. Alvarez.[30]This Court required Atty.
Alvarez to file his comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice.[31]
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report, and recommendation.[32]
In his Report and Recommendation[33] dated November 12, 2012, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.[34] Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return the
amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest from the time of demand until
its full payment.[35] The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful, immoral and
deceitful acts of the Canon of Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended that
he be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law and he be ordered to return
the amount of P700,000.00 to the Complainant within two (2) months from receipt of
this order with legal interest from the time of demand, until fully paid, with a warning
that repetition of [a] similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.[36]
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found that while
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he was authorized by his superior to privately practice law,
the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed did not bear his name and
signature.[37] Hence, the Investigating Commissioner stated that:
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in the Office
of the Ombudsman is a time lost to the government which could have been used in
the service of many taxpayers[.][38]
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his
profession, the Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited
to handle cases involving malversation of funds by government officials such as a
municipal treasurer.[39]
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the attorney's fees Atty.
Alvarez asked for were unreasonable:
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the Respondent the amount of
P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he has friends in the Office
of the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That because of that guarantee,
Complainant was obligated to shell out every now and then money for the
satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or 5th class municipality and
the amount of attorney's fees demanded by the Respondent is very much excessive.
. . . The exorbitant amount that he demanded from complainant is too much for a
lowly local government employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal,
immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a defenseless victim.
....
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast rule
may be set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That
must be established from the facts of each case[.]
....
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged cases he handled
despite the fact that the records and evidence does not show that he ever signed
pleadings filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus, fairness and equity
dictate, he has to return the excess amount of P700,000.00 to the complainant[.][40]
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-778[41] dated June 21, 2013, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner:
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is guilty
of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with [a]
Warning that repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more sever[ejly. Further,
he is Ordered to Return the amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest
from the time of demand.[42] (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution,[43] but the Motion was
denied by the Board of Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-286[44] dated
May 3, 2014. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject
of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated
June 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.[45] (Emphasis in the original)
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
authorized to engage in the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is
reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical declaration that
respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of his profession. The Investigating
Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's unauthorized practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession[46] as shown in the
letter dated August 1, 2001 of National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A.
Vicente.[47] The letter reads:
TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
Legal Officer III
This Center
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of profession
This refers to your request for permission to engage in private practice of your
profession.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the Department of Health,
which vested in the undersigned the authority to grant permission for the exercise of
profession or engage in the practice of profession, you are hereby authorized to
teach or engage in the practice of your profession provided it will not run in conflict
with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole. In the
exigency of the service however, or when public interest so requires, this authority
may be revoked anytime.
Please be guided accordingly.
[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II[48] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this
case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized
practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[49] the modern concept of the term "practice of law" includes
the more traditional concept of litigation or appearance before courts:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."
....
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for
new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute."
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
....
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law,"
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.[50] (Emphasis supplied)
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:[51]
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing]
acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice
of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the
Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is
practice of law.[52] (Citations omitted)
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to complainant, respondent
practiced law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and
Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,[53] government officials or employees
are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless authorized
by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession
must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government
official or employee:
Republic Act No. 6713:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
....
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions[.]
....
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the
head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair
in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That
no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties,
and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer
or member of the board of directors",
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in
each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
In Abella v. Cruzabra,[54] the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of General
Santos City. While serving as an incumbent government employee, the respondent
"filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned . . . without
obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of
Justice."[55] According to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around
3,000 documents.[56] This Court found the respondent guilty of engaging in notarial
practice without written authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public,
she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the D[epartment] [of]
J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any
authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that
the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that
written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum
Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.[57]
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National
Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of
Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.[58]
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the
Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a
situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole."[59]
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,[60] the petitioner was
an incumbent City Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bago
City. He was a lawyer by profession and had continuously engaged in the practice of
law without securing authority from the Regional Director of the Department of Local
Government.[61] In 1989, the petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and
Rolando Catapang and filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages against Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City. [62]
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the Department of
Local Government for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and
relevant Department of Local Government memorandum circulars on unauthorized
practice of profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct, and abuse of
authority.[63] While the case was pending before Department of Local Government,
the petitioner was able to secure a written authority to practice his profession from
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, "provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions."[64]
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in
conflict with his functions as City Councilor and against the interests of government:
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or
incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their
real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment
against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic]
A[ct] [No.] 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the
government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.[65]
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing
against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same
employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring
employees and their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public
trust."[66] The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople,"[67] is
mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient."[68]
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee
represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against
government's mandate under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or
employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.[69] Furthermore, this is consistent with the constitutional
directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."[70]
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but
to continue to uplift the People's trust in government and to ensure excellent public
service:
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment
of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government. . . . These
constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working
standards by all in the public service.[71]
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is now no
need to determine whether the fees he charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must
prove his or her allegations through substantial evidence.[72] In Advincula v.
Macabata,[73] this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the lack of
evidence in proving the complainant's allegations:
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam
factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed
to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[74] (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown
that they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on
their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the bar:
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of
the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to
such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of
law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended
the commission of the offense should also be considered.[75]
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it
appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of
their profession.[76] Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain
a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff
in the Office where the case was pending.[77]
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules
1.01, and 1.02[78] prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the
Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."
In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or
her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable
outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[82] This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in
the legal profession:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge evincing
a willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that
judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on
different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla,
leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to
rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession.[83]
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,[84] we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release
order for his clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice and the
stationery of the Secretary:
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the
judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice.
To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of
the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even
in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.
....
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds
of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is
expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find
that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case,
a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty
for the offense.[85]
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,[86] we disbarred a lawyer who
solicited bribe money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court
believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment
because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he
proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client,
to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in
fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by
giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through
deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the
least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its
disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on
the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let
this be a signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general public—
that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend
the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and
to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of
the Bar.[87] (Emphasis supplied)
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence
peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees
in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from
government service when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals:[88]
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring
court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that
decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the
public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad
eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the
supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring
personnel.[89]
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . . .
Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that
he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould] help with a fee."[90] It is
because of respondent's assurances to complainant that she sent him money over
the course of several months.[91] These assurances are seen from the text messages
that respondent sent complainant:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa allowance lang muna later
na ang bayad pag labas ng reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung
isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb.. Parang dun tayo nagkamali
pero ang solusyon ay sana ibalik nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi dapat
apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may deadline yun
DATE: 31-05-2010
 nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya tawag ko sayo update
TIME: 5:24 pm
DATE: 15-04-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 12:44 pm
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ...
SUBJECT:
DATE: 21-05-2010
Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan hndi tlga sumasagot
TIME: 5:13 pm yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya
"istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa omb yung letter at
TYPE: Text Message istudzahan pa

.... DATE: 31-03-2010

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TIME: 8:25 am

SUBJECT: TYPE: Text Message

Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly ....
@ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
DATE: 15-04-2010
SUBJECT:
TIME: 6:07 pm
Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw nya letter
TYPE: Text Message habang wala pa omb reso., Txt mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays., (sagot ko
yan tess)
....
DATE: 03-03-2010
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TIME: 5:03 pm
SUBJECT:
TYPE: Text Message
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si orly at dun din siya
subok kuha letter pero nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko pwwde b ....
 TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep omb si orly dun
nya kukunin letter SUBJECT:

DATE: 30-03-2010 Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at malapit ako dun
maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx
TIME: 5:00 pm
DATE: 14-04-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 1:29 pm
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi
rw bumalik aq aftr Holy wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya. SUBJECT:

DATE: 30-03-2010 Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak tess kausapin ko
mbuti sa letter)
TIME: 4:52 pm
DATE: 14-04-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 10:25 am
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita pa kami
marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy letter natin kay sales at CA reso SUBJECT:

DATE: 15-04-2010 Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar
30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 @ kunin q 20thpara sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx
TIME: 12:32 pm
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 10:58 am FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

TYPE: Text Message SUBJECT:

.... Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng naming omb tnx.

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> DATE: 24-03-2010

SUBJECT: TIME: 10:23 am

Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client panero at ang TYPE: Text Message
impression nya yun na ang hningi natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa MR at
yung letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag nakakuha tayo ....
nakahanda na 150k dun
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
DATE: 08-04-2010
SUBJECT:
TIME: 10:56 am
Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong letr adrsd 2 DOF
TYPE: Text Message Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr, pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq
ng Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n
.... abyans implmntation of hr dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> DATE: 11-03-2010

SUBJECT: TIME: 7:03 pm

Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly delivery ng Reso
granting d MR pro ung delivery by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at
pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng Dcsion. Nung
1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng
Omb c Orly. Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control d2
and Dep. Omb.
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 10:55 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
TYPE: Text Message[92]
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must
have confused him with her other contacts.[93]Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that
complainant was able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2) years
ago.[94]Moreover, assuming these messages were "true, still they [were] not legally
admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client privileged communication as
those supposed texts '[had been] made for the purpose and in the course of
employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion [was] strictly
enforced.'"[95]
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in
secret and often only between the two parties concerned."[96] Nevertheless, as found
by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is
enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.
We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines SO ORDERED.
Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with
unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law. To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that is
tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's character and his
attitude towards the courts and the bar.

Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with
regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of
law, and debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble
profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have illicit access.
Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as
seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It should be about making a
discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining
justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and
unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by
unduly influencing people or public officials.

It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer
knows who will make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we
are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its members must live within its ethical
parameters. There is never an excuse for influence peddling.

While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors,[97] this Court has
ordered restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers.[98] Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant the amount of
P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with
the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of

Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's
Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return
the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
PALE Batch 1 Case 3
A.C. No. 10911
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated
October 16, 2009 filed by complainant Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty.
Anselmo S. Echanez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 1
The Facts
Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-784
before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City, Isabela, complainant was one of
the plaintiffs while respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the said case
was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal dated May
22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating the date of issue thereof. 2 On
appeal, respondent filed the appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number. 3
In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for the same
clients, filed a Petition for Injunction wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE
Compliance Number. 4 Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court
datedJuly13,2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his MCLE Compliance
Number without the date of issue. 5 1âwphi1
Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had no
MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a Certification dated
September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE
requirements for the First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007). 6
Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and
unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels concerned into believing that
he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious
malpractice and grave misconduct. 7 The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to
recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court. 8
In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the respondent to file a
comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice. 9
Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to comply with the said
resolution. 10 This Court, thus, issued another resolution dated July 11, 2011
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt for such failure and, again, to file a comment to the
complaint. 11 However, the respondent again failed to comply. 12
On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission- on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) issued a
Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing. 13 On the date of the hearing, however,
none of the parties appeared despite due notice. 14Nonetheless, the IBP directed the
parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. 15only
the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations and arguments in
his complaint. 16
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD rendered a
report 17 dated December 17, 2013 with the following recommendation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted by the
complainant, it is recommended that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon finality of
the decision.
So ORDERED. 18
On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2014-685, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP
Investigating Commissioner, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled· case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified
his MCLE Compliance Number and used it in his pleadings in Court, including his
having ignored the Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar Discipline and his
having been previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo Echanez is
hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. 19
No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.
The Issue
Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the
complaint and evidence on record?
The Ruling
We answer in the affirmative,
Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the respondent was given
ample opportunity to answer the imputations against him and defend himself but he
did not do so despite due notices.
At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850 20 . No
less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that respondent had not
complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE. 21
Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false
MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial courts. 22 In indicating
patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only once
but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith,
dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants - his own
clients · included - professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on
such pleadings containing false information. 23
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is
a mockery of the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that
authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated. 24
The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment
to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both
court and client, among others, viz.:
I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (emphasis supplied)
Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his
own clients at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as
pleadings with such false information produce no legal effect. 25 In so doing,
respondent violated his duty to his clients. 26 Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court,
the IBP-CBD, and also this Court despite due notice. In the special civil action
above-cited, the trial court directed the respondent to file a comment on a motion
which raised in issue respondent's use of a false . MCLE compliance number in his
pleadings but he did not file any. 27 This Court also directed respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so. 28 We then issued a show
cause order against the respondent to explain why he should not be disciplined or
held in contempt for failing to file the required comment but again, respondent did not
heed this court's order. 29 The IBP- Court orders should be respected not only
because the authorities who
issued them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. 31CBD also notified the respondent to appear
before it for mandatory conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored. 30
Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued them
should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be
extended to the judicial branch of the government, which is absolutely essential if our
government is to be a government of laws and not of men. 31
Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates the
lawyer's oath and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. · By his repeated
dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court.
likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers, or attended mandatory
conferences despite due notices. 34
Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance
number in his pleadings 35 , his repeated failure to obey legal Orders 36 , and the fact
that he had already been sanctioned twice by this Court On separate cases 37 , We
are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685,
recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal
practice. 38 It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice. 39 As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing. 40 Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. 41 He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore the very
bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a detrimental
example to the society. 42
WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of
the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited by the IBP
Board of Governors in its resolution, respondent had already been sanctioned by the
IBP twice. In a decision dated April 11, 2013 by this Court en bane, respondent was
found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and was
thus suspended from the practice of law for two years with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction. 32 In another decision dated May 31, 2016, this Court en bane again found
respondent guilty of performing notarial acts without a notarial commission and was
thus suspended from the practice of law for two years and barred permanently from
being commissioned as notary public with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt with severely. 33 It is noteworthy that in both cases, respondent
already manifested his lack of regard, not only for the charges against him, but most
importantly to the orders of the IBP and the courts. In the said cases, the respondent
PALE Batch 1 Case 4
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly
only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably
have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing
and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for
new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either
be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
[1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership
and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers
do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer.
Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public
image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in
this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery
should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least
some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such
as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a
social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
 dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327,
the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of
four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President
issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times
a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by
the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected No blade shall touch his skin;
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or No blood shall flow from his veins.
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an
iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes.
We now proceed: This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah
was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
has been clearly shown.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Additionally, consider the following:
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in
the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that
the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be
confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion
and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman,
while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for
respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10)
years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to
judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139)
"upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the
tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified
public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as
an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive
or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
 sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra,
p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al.,
v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice
of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice
of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute
the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law."
To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or
a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to
such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent
just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of
course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could
not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court
for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no
less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining
is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of
law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does
not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker
and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation
is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of
such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code
and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge
and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility
vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the
practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
"because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer
to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least
part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only
remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception
is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade
me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in
which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and
not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various
positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on
the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in
these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of
the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras,
but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive
terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on
official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating
that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work
of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into
the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs,
we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion
or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses
superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the
petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into
the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He
has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the
bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life
to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of
law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but
also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges
or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened
to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that
one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it
out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never
practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice
must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine
Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
following companies: Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was
b. Dataprep, Philippines the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations,
agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning.
Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know,
follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher,
policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice
of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least
ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
 skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially
correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only
be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed,
habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half
a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making
the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said."
When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered:
"Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer
as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on
the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over
the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a
class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be
true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA
109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as
a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared
and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
 Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from
his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod
while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the
Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the
case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the

Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for
the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for
that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court
to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of

discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent