From the Desk of the Bureau, Honourable Member Representatives, It gives

me immense pleasure in welcoming you all to the simulation of “Lok Sabha”

at the IDCModel United Nations conference. The agenda, is of utmost
significance in pertinence to the current global scenario.
It is advised that the delegates go through the background guide thoroughly.
The document will aid your
research. The aim of the study guide is to provide clarity regarding the
various aspects of the agenda as well
as providing direction and to channelize your research. However, it is to be
noted that this guide is not an all-
encompassing source of information. This study guide has been prepared to
give you a basic knowledge of
the agenda and we strongly recommend that you research on various aspects
on your own and try to gain an
insight into the details of the agenda.
We will be following the UNA-USA rules of procedure in this committee.
Those who are not well versed
with these rules of procedure are requested to have a look at it before the
committee begins.
Feel free to drop your queries at :
Moderator:
Kumar Saurabh (saurabh5881@gmail.com)
Deputy Moderator:
Avyakt
Scribe:
Anubhab Kundu
India’s maritime geographical position is both an advantage and a
challenge. The close proximity of international shipping lanes to
India’s coasts attracts other powerful countries too to try to dominate
and, thus, create the potential situation of confrontation with India.

India’s own strategic interests made it pay attention to waters beyond

its immediate proximity. Late 2015, we released our new edition
of Maritime Security Strategy. Contrast the aggressiveness vis a vis
the older strategy document released in 2007:

• 2015 – Ensuring Secure Seas

• 2007 – Freedom to Use the Seas

#1. India has accepted the concept of “Indo-Pacific” in India’s

maritime security. This essentially brings the Indian Ocean and the
Western Pacific – theaters of geo-political competition into one
strategic arc and broadens our focus.

#2. The latest Maritime Security Strategy (2015) enhanced its

definition of primary & secondary areas of maritime interest –

• Primary – Coastal areas, islands, EEZ, the Arabian Sea, Bay of

Bengal, Andaman Sea, their littorals, Persian Gulf, Gulf of
Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, various choke points and their
littorals, SLOCs and energy and resource interests

• Secondary – Various seas outside the Indian Ocean Region

South-west Indian Ocean and the Red Sea were formally under the
secondary area of interest. In defining the areas of interest, the navy’s
intention is to outline the geographic extension of its strategic
influence and give an indication of its involvement in those areas.

#3. Aim to become the “net security provider” to island states in

the Indian Ocean. What does that mean?

As per the document, the term net security describes the state of
actual security available in an area, upon balancing against the ability
to monitor, contain, and counter all of these.

#4. The strategy emphasises the importance of maintaining

freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal
regime at sea, particularly UNCLOS.

Geopolitical aspects of maritime challenges

 1. Indian strategists are, naturally, paying attention to
developments practically in all waters due to the country’s
growing international profile
2. Their growing concern is regarding tensions rising in the East
China Sea, the South China Sea and the Mediterranean
3. The Indian Ocean remains largely peaceful but has an unstable
littoral
4. Pakistan has declared its intention to put its nuclear weapons at
sea which raises the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into
the hands of Jihadis
5. We face a mix of the ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’
challenges – IT, biotechnology, race for natural resources
etc.Indian maritime agencies
#1. Indian Navy – It aims to be the ‘net security provider’ in the
maritime neighbourhood, including deployments for anti-piracy,
maritime security, NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operations)
and HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) operations

#2. Coast Guard – The Coast Guard protects India’s EEZ (Exclusive
Economic Zone) from criminals, pirates, smugglers, poachers,
human-traffickers and foreign subversion.

#3. Coastal police – The role of the coastal police gained prominence
following the Mumbai terror attacks of November, 2008. confines its
activities to largely coastal waters up to 24 nautical miles.

#4. Ocean affairs – Ministry of Earth sciences (2006) is responsible

for development of technology for exploitation and exploration of
marine resources, weather services, climate change and geo-hazards

Diplomatic dimensions
1. India has cooperated well in anti-piracy operations, played a key
role in IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association), launched IONS
 (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 2008) and shaped BIMSTEC
and MGC
2. Prime Minister’s articulation of India’s ‘Security and Growth
for All in the Region’ (SAGAR), on 12 March, 2015,
highlights both security framework for the Indian Ocean as well
as regional integration with emphasis on Ocean Economy
3. Japan’s inclusion into the MALABAR exercises
4. Navy has also carried out Non-combatant Evacuation
operations in Libya (2011), Kuwait (2014) and Yemen (2015)
5. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
(HADR) operations such as cyclone relief (in 2007, 2008, 2013
and 2014)

What are the challenges ahead?

1. The navy’s fleet is ageing, with an estimated 60% of vessels

reported to have reached various stages of obsolescence
2. The Scorpene-class submarine is the first to be acquired in 16
years, in an attempt to stabilise the fleet’s fast-dwindling
numbers
3. The navy is 16% below strength in officer ranks and 11% below
strength in non-commissioned ranks
4. In August 2013, the navy suffered its worst peacetime accident
when an ex-Russian Kilo-class conventional submarine sank in
Mumbai’s naval dockyard, killing 18 personnel

India’s understanding of the Quad & Indo-Pacific

India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific and its distinctive inclusiveness in the

region is against the premise of mini-lateralism that the Quad
presupposes.
Indo-Pacific, Quad, India, China, South China Sea, ASEAN, PM Modi,
Narendra Modi, Southeast Asia, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, US, Japan,
Australia, Bay of Bengal, Malabar Exercise
The Quad ships sailing through the Bay of Bengal during the first
trilateral Malabar Exercise, 2007. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Perceived as the league of like-minded democracies converging across
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Quad, comprising the US, Japan,
India and Australia, is symbiotically linked with the geopolitically
ascending region, the Indo-Pacific. However, there are more questions
than answers regarding structure, intentions and goals of the Quad at
this moment, making it difficult for each member of the Quad to align
their combined vision of the grouping with that of their individual
visions of the Indo-Pacific. This has led to the debate about the need for
re-purposing the Quad. In fact, stopgap sub-unions and disengagements
at various levels in the Quad have raised questions as to whether the
group can transcend into a productive mini-lateral arrangement from a
forum of inhibition. The other issue is whether the Quad is capable of
creating a potent security framework in the region and if so, then what
would such a structure look like? These questions have primarily
cropped up because of two factors. First, while the nations have
committed to the idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, the cohesion
is still loosely arranged and has not yet been formalised at the
ministerial level.

One way of looking at it would be that even though the states have a
conceptual consensus on the primary idea behind the Quad, their
individual politico-security considerations in the region vis-a-vis other
players subtly vary.

While all the member states in the Quad have a robust strengthening
network of ties with implications in the maritime domain, including
security dialogues and military exercises, the quad as a unit has failed to
deliver substantively in terms of achievements and commitments
towards laying a bedrock of a strong security arrangement in the Indo-
Pacific As such, informal promises, some members’ increasing
apprehension apropos China and dithering regional resolve from
Washington under Donald Trump have have not produced the required
joint resolve for concrete deliverables.

India has distinctively carved a space with its emphasis on the principle
of freedom of navigation and respect for the laws of the sea, finding
resonance with the central ideas of the Quad. However, India’s
increasing tangible cooperation with the Quad nations, its reservations
about a more formalised security structure in the region, while still
balancing at home and its desire to avoid being identified with any
particular group with regional security implications at the international
stage, is compounding complications in India’s vision of the Indo-
Pacific and its vision of the Quad. India’s de-hyphenation of the Indo-
Pacific and the Quad not only eclipses clarity but underscores the need
for a regional security architecture that emphasizes on a strategic
continuum rather than geopolitical fragmentation.

Decoupling the Quad and the Indo-Pacific

While India has engaged with the Quad states actively in the past couple
of years since the organization’s resurrection in 2017 after a decade, it
has also subtly emphasized on decoupling of the purpose of the Quad
with its vision of the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi has drawn conceptual and
structural policy demarcations between the Quad and the Indo-Pacific
through its actions, inhibitors and statements, outlined in some ways by
Ambassador Pankaj Saran. In the aftermath of two important informal
summits at Wuhan and Sochi with China and Russia respectively,
India’s enthusiasm towards the Quad has appeared faded. As such, New
Delhi seeks to place Quad as one of the many multilateral frameworks
operating in the Indo-Pacific region, not as the regionally consequential
one. India has distinctively carved a space with its emphasis on the
principle of freedom of navigation and respect for the laws of the sea,
finding resonance with the central ideas of the QuadEnumerating its
Indo-Pacific strategy in largely ‘pluri-lateral formats’, India seeks to
avoid restricting its Indo-Pacific strategy to the Quad at its helm, but
also seeks to maintain its long cherished principle of strategic autonomy
by keeping its options open to engage with Russia in the region, as also
by making conscious decisions not to provoke China.

New Delhi seeks to ensure a nimble-footed balance in the Indo-Pacific

between alignment and autonomy. While it separates the Quad with the
Indo-Pacific in its emerging discourse, it risks the loss of an opportunity
to create a strategic continuum, in favour of regionally fragmented
vision. A positive rationale to India’s purpose in the Quad is the need to
view the Indo-Pacific as a strategic continuum rather than an
assemblage of sub-regionally divided goals, partnerships and
alignments. The Quad provides India the opportunity to use its
geographic centrality in the region to connect with the strategic ends on
either side of the peninsula to enhance its security vision in the Indo-
Pacific region extending from the Gulf to the other side of the Strait of
Malacca.

Inclusivity and mini-lateralism

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi clarified India’s position on the Indo-Pacific by saying that,
“India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of
limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no
means do we consider it as directed against any country.” While Prime
Minister Modi made it clear that India’s Indo-pacific strategy is not
about cornering or side-lining China in the region, India also stands for
a positive vision of the Indo-Pacific that harps on ASEAN centrality and
emphasises inclusivity with South East Asia as a core area in the
region. In India’s definition of the Indo-Pacific, it “stands for a free,
open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of
progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also
others beyond who have a stake in it.” India has deliberately marked a
definitive and conceptual distinction in defining the regional scope of
the Indo-Pacific, primarily through a semantic spin in the word
‘inclusive’.

India’s definitive of ‘all’ stakeholders in its Indo-Pacific purpose

somewhat dilutes the Quad’s anti-China purpose. This is perhaps both
intended and desired by New Delhi as it creates comfortable navigating
space in the region for her to hedge against major powers while still
avoid antagonism.

The Quad is essentially rejuvenated against the backdrop of an

emerging narrative for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and not much for a
pan-regional inclusiveness. This narrative is presumably aimed against
China, as its heavy militarisation and territorial claims in the South
China Sea along with its strategic naval outposts in the Indian Ocean
region is being primarily held as the main disrupting force in the region.
While as a unit the Quad seeks to balance China in some ways, India
has not drawn a clear line vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific. Presently,
it is part of the Quad which emphasises on balancing Chinese
aggression in the region by seeking a rules-based order, and at the same
time it is talking of an inclusive region which is not aimed against any
particular country. As such, the limits of ‘inclusivity’ are left undefined
in India’s Indo-Pacific discourse. This narrative establishes the notion
that India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific isn’t about balancing or restricting
China. Rather, the tilt towards the Quad is only a commitment under
shared principles and values. The other issue in India’s Indo-Pacific
discourse is an inherent dichotomy. India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific
and its distinctive inclusiveness in the region is against the premise of
mini-lateralism that the Quad presupposes. Then, the puzzling question
is whether a certain degree of inclusivity, as sought by India, would
make the Quad’s mini-lateralism powerless? In effect, India’s Indo-
Pacific vision has added further uncertainty in the regional discourse
around grouping and partnerships. And, it is the lack of clarity which is
largely rendering the Quad unproductive.
Need for security architecture vision
New Delhi should visualise the Indo-Pacific as a springboard to connect
the ends of the two oceans across the maritime expanse of the Indo-
Pacific. As New Delhi gradually seeks to bolster its presence in the
region and take up the role of a net-security provider, it needs to shed its
reluctance to move up to the strait of Hormuz and beyond the Strait of
Malacca. While the Quad can be converted into a vehicle to provide a
much needed security architecture in the region, its effectiveness would
depend upon how much clarity India adds vis-a-vis its own regional
mini-lateral engagements in the Indo-Pacific. India needs to outline a
clearer stance with respect to its engagements on either side o the
spectrum; the rest of the Quad members as well as China. As such,
answers to a few questions that could bring clarity to India’s operational
strategy in the Indo-Pacific are much needed and in order. Should India
continue its strategy of perceiving the Quad and the Indo-Pacific as
decoupled or see the two as symbiotic? And, to what extent is India’s
Indo-Pacific strategy ‘inclusive’?

String of Pearls:
The String of Pearls is a term that has permeated Indian naval policy
circles in recent years. This term encapsulates the idea that, since the early
1990s, China has been developing a network of naval bases in south
Asian littoral nations as a means to project maritime power into the Indian
Ocean and beyond to the Middle East. Contrary to Indian perceptions,
Chinese activity in the littoral nations has, to this point, been primarily
economic, not military in nature. Nonetheless, this activity has prompted
a change in Indian naval doctrine to support the employment of a blue
water navy. This change in Indian naval doctrine can be explained
utilizing Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory describes the effects of a
psychophysical tendency that prompts people to become risk acceptant in
the face of losses. This study will show how the Indian National Security
Elite, when faced with the perceived loss of power and influence to China
in south Asian waters, endorsed blue water naval doctrine as a means to
reestablish the status quo of relative naval superiority in the northern
Indian Ocean.

Under this theory China is going to develop

1. Sittwe : Naval base.

2. Chittagong : Port at Bangladesh with container shipping facility.
3. Hambantota : Port being developed in Sri Lanka.
4. Maldives: Port of Marao
5. Gwadar : Port of Pakistan with Navy base.
6. Coco Islands : A runway and other infrastructure is being developed
7. Seychelles Islands : Naval base
8. Madagascar: Various infrastructure projects.
9. Tanzania : For development of port of Bagamoyo
10.Sudan : several major choke points such as the Strait of
Mandeb;Number of infrastructure projects

Motives behind string of pearls theory

1. Ensuring energy security and protect its sea lines of communication

(SLOCs) which faces a threats from state and non-state actors.
2. Access to new market
3. Control over value chain and supply routes
4. Social development and internal/domestic political stability
5. Competing against other interested parties .i.e India, US, Japan
6. Unblocking of choke point i.e strait of Malacca, strait of Hormuz
7. "encirclement" or to keep India strategically off-balance in the
region
8. Support for its contender position of superpower by exercising hard
and soft power on south Asian countries

How India is dealing with it?

1. In Myanmar, it is developing the Sittwe port.

2. Substantial monetary aid from India to The Tripartite Technical
Expert Group (TTEG) consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
at choke point of Malacca Straits
3. Presence in the IOR by setting up listening posts in Seychelles,
Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mauritius.
4. Air base in Maldives
5. India has also gained berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam
6. India’s state-run explorer, OVL signed a three-year deal with
PetroVietnam for developing long-term cooperation in the oil sector
7. Cordial relation with Japan
8. Increased co-operation with USA
9. An air base in Tajikistan and electronic monitoring facilities in
Mongolia.
10. Growing defense relationship with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
Vietnam, Mongolia.
11. Radar station on Narcondam Island in the Andaman and Nicobar
islands, located opposite the Coco Island.

INDIA’S MARITIME POLICY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea area comprising of islands, rocks and reefs are
considered strategic, economic and political assets for the littoral
states in the South China Sea because, they can serve as legal base
points for states to project their claims of exclusive jurisdiction over
waters and resources in the SCS. The sea is believed to be harboring
large reserves of oil and natural gas and is in demand for its rich
fishing. With the rise in demand for energy resources, the disputes in
the area have been further exacerbated. The island group and the
security of the sea lanes (marine terrorism, piracy, marine
ecosystems) has been perceived as important since it is an important
shipping lane and ASEAN, India, Taiwan, China, Japan and South
Korea are all heavily dependent upon international and extra
regional trade-most of which is shipped through the area. As
economies develop, the SCS is fast becoming the focus of tension.
The straits that separate these islands are important not only
because restrictions upon passage would seriously disrupt
international commerce but also because control over the islands
would permit dominance over those routes.
South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes revolve around
three primary issues:
(1) Competing territorial claims among claimants
(2) Competing maritime claims among claimants
(3) Excessive maritime claims asserted by some of the claimants.

Regarding competing territorial claims, there are six claimants to the

land features in the South China Sea: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

The claims made by the parties can be separated into historical,

claims of discovery and occupation and claims that rest on the
extension of sovereign jurisdiction under interpretation of the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
At the 2014 East Asian Summit, India along with the United States
and Vietnam affirmed its support to safeguard maritime security and
freedom of navigation. Further, India has been very vocal in the
settling the dispute through peaceful means and in accordance with
the UNCLOS.
India and the South China Sea:
Kenneth Waltz points out that in the anarchic international system;
the security is the highest end for states. Following this assumption,
defensive realism argues that states maximize security, and not
power, to maintain the state’s position in the system. Under such a
presumption, India’s interactions in the international arena are more
indicative of a country interested in maximizing its security rather
than power. That is, India is best understood as a security maximize
state, a rational actor seeking to secure its own economic and
political interests and military security.

India is a non claimant to the SCS Island it is concerned with the

developments in the SCS. Even though the SCS area may seem far
from the Indian mainland but in actual terms it is not so when one
considers the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It is also important to
note that India’s trade with Japan and South Korea has been growing
and hence, it is crucial that freedom of navigation is maintained in
the South China Sea through which the trading routes between India
and these East Asian countries pass. India’s sea bound trade that
passes through Indian Ocean constitutes 92-95 per cent of its total
trade and, there are estimates that nearly 25 per cent (and growing)
of this sea bound trade passes through South China Sea.

Any major conflict in the South China Sea region is bound to impact
Indian economic interests. India is concerned that should an armed
conflict break out, the SLOC would be disrupted, which India cannot
allow it to happen. Besides, India is worried that if China controls this
sea space it will dictate maritime traffic, both civilian and military.
Therefore, its priority is to maintain freedom of navigation in the sea
both merchant and naval ships. India is of the opinion that the SCS
region was a key to its energy security, and that the conflict must be
resolved peacefully as per international laws. India has in the recent
past increased its activities in that area. As for India, the threat over
freedom of navigation has taken central stage in its foreign policy.

In spite of China’s protests, Indian commercial activities have not

been halted, and India’s maritime activities have continued. Several
warships joined five ASEAN countries in joint naval exercises in June
2015 including port calls in Cambodia and Thailand, as well as a port
call in Vietnam where both countries signed two MoU on bilateral
defense and coast guard cooperation.

India has demanded freedom of navigation and oversights because

around 55 per cent of its seaborne trade passes through the South
China Sea. The demands for freedom of navigation have been clearly
articulated by high level officials in India. In 2015, the former
Minister of State for Defense Rao Inderjit Singh raised the issue.
These demands were echoed by the Minister of State for Defense
Shri Manohar Parrikar in 2016 (Ministry of Defence, Government of
India 2016), and in late July 2017 by External Affairs Minister Sushma
Swaraj in the Rajya Sabha that ‘our stand is there should be freedom
of navigation and unimpeded commerce’ (in South China Sea).

Externally, India and the Philippines have worked together to secure

the freedom of navigation. In 2015, during the Third India-Philippines
Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation, the parties agree to raise
the issue. Vietnam and India also raised the question through a joint
statement when Prime Minister Modi visited Hanoi in September
2016. Similarly, India drew attention to the issues of freedom of
navigation with ASEAN at the Chairman Statement of the 14 ASEAN-
th

India Summit Echoing other claimant states and stakeholders, India

refuses to accept that waters in the South China Sea within the 1948
U-shaped line map (map produced again by Beijing in 2009 to the
U.N.) portrayed as Chinese ‘historical water’ has validity in
international law.

It is therefore, in India and ASEAN’s mutual interests to pool their

efforts to ensure the freedom of navigation in this very important
stretch of water, while keeping the channels of communication open
with China for the peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes.
The almost-universal acknowledgement of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as international law and
the upward trajectory of Indo-ASEAN relations can set a precedent
for the peaceful and non-military resolution of future disputes by
reinforcing the role of non-littoral states in the South China Sea. Yet,
energy disputes such as this one reflect the disjointed state of the
South China Sea dispute. While regional peace and stability may be
the cited goal of both India and China, the shadow of intolerance
that China casts over energy diplomacy will continue to define the
potential paths to conflict resolution in the South China Sea. China’s
interest as well as the interests of India and other states will need to
be addressed through dialogue and negotiation. Till then India will
have to remain vigilant in order to safeguard its national interest.

USEFUL LINKS:
 https://idsa.in/idsacomments/why-india-south-china-sea-stand-matters_asingh_190816
 https://www.policyforum.net/indias-approaches-south-china-sea/
 https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/india-s-response-to-china-s-
assertiveness-over-the-seas-19-2018
 http://cc.pacforum.org/2013/05/chinas-growing-resolve-south-china-sea/
 https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-
P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF
 https://www.businessinsider.com/us-japan-india-and-philippines-challenge-beijing-with-
naval-drills-in-the-south-china-sea-2019-5?IR=T

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY ON THE INDIAN

OCEAN REGION
The Indian Ocean Region is abundant with resources, particularly in
the sectors of fisheries, aquaculture, ocean energy, sea-bed mining
and minerals, and provides tremendous economic opportunities to
develop marine tourism and shipping activities. Among these
resources, fisheries and minerals are the most commercially viable
industries. Commercial and artisanal fisheries sustain the livelihoods
of more than 38 million people worldwide.
In the Indian Ocean, fish production increased drastically from
861,000 tons in 1950 to 11.5 million tons in 2010. The United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report states that
while other world oceans are nearing their fisheries limit, in certain
areas, the Indian Ocean’s resources have the potential to sustain
increased production.
Poly-metallic nodules and poly-metallic massive sulphides are the
two mineral resources of commercial interest to developers in the
Indian Ocean. Typically found at four to five km in water depth,
polymetallic nodules are golf-to-tennis ball-sized nodules containing
nickel, cobalt, iron, and manganese that form over millions of years
on the sediment of the seafloor. India had received exclusive rights
for the exploration polymetallic nodules in 1987, in the Central Indian
Ocean Basin. Since then, it has explored four million square miles and
established two mine sites.
A strong impetus on Research and Development, and Innovation in
the areas of Ocean Energy, Marine Biology and Biotechnology must
be provided for the nation to achieve significant market shares in
these sectors.

It is necessary for India to tap the enormous potential of the Ocean

based Blue Economy, which will propel the nation into a higher
growth trajectory. The development of Blue Economy can serve as a
growth catalyst in realizing the vision to become a $10 trillion
economy by 2032. Additionally, the Indian Ocean Region is of
strategic importance to India’s economic growth as the most of the
country’s oil, and gas is imported through the sea.
Further, this dependency is expected to rise by 2025 exponentially.
The Indian Ocean Region presents tremendous trade potential for the
country. The countries in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
exhibited significant dynamism in the past few years as the trade in
the region increased by over four times from US$ 302 billion in 2003
to US$ 1.2 trillion in 2012.
The Indian Ocean has always enjoyed a place of prominence in global
strategy. Many nations have established a presence in the region to
ensure their strategic interests. India was very active in the UN Ad-
hoc Committee that was set up on the Indian Ocean and supported the
cause of keeping the Indian Ocean, a Zone of Peace during Cold War.
However, with the re-emergence of piracy issues and growing
importance to secure the oceanic ecosystem, India has been pro-
actively involved in cooperative arrangements with like-minded
neighboring countries. The Trilateral Cooperative in Maritime
Security between India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives is one such example.
The India Maritime Security Strategy published by the Indian Navy
articulates country’s policy in the Indian Ocean region. It states that in
the Indian Ocean region, India is committed to:
 Ensuring a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region;
 Deepening security cooperation, through increased surveillance
and monitoring with regional partners;
 Forging a multilateral cooperative maritime security initiative in
the Indian Ocean to combat terrorism and piracy;
 Deepening cultural linkages with the people in region;
 Building Indian Ocean Region as a frontier of sustainable
economic development.
Three essential pieces are visible in the geopolitics and economics of
the Indian Ocean Region.
First, the Chinese economy depends on access to this region. Energy
imports from the Middle East, resources from Africa, and trade with
Europe must transit the Indian Ocean in order to reach China. To
make things more difficult, Indian Ocean shipping towards China
must pass through the two‐ mile‐ wide Strait of Malacca. Former
PRC Chairman Hu Jintao termed this chokepoint ‘the Malacca
Dilemma’, both because of the difficulty of transiting trade back to
China through this narrow waterway, and also because of its
vulnerability to blockade or maritime interdiction. As such, China
must deal with a very difficult geography in the region which it
depends on for economic survival and growth. .
Second, the region is home to a rising India which possesses much
more advantageous geography than China does when it comes to
maritime trade and security. As China builds up its expeditionary
naval forces to embark on a ‘two‐ ocean strategy’ that focuses on the
Pacific and Indian Ocean, India, in its most recent maritime strategy,
made clear that it considers the Indian Ocean, from the Cape of Good
Hope to the Lombok Straits, as its primary area of interest. The Indian
Navy plans to field three aircraŌ carrier groups, one which will patrol
the Eastern Indian Ocean, a second for the Western Indian Ocean, and
a third to be held in reserve. Chinese naval visits to Indian Ocean
nations such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, two essential nodes on
China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’, have led to discomfort in New Delhi.
Third, while the Indian Ocean is increasingly the realm in which the
geopolitics of China‐ India relations will take shape in the coming
decades, many other nations are also dependent on its waterways for
commerce, and it is increasingly becoming a feature in national
strategy documents, where the ‘Asia‐ Pacific’ ocean becomes the
‘Indo‐ Pacific’ as nations measure their global and regional strategic
interests.
If the Pacific links the Americas to Asia, the Indian Ocean links East,
South, Southeast, and West Asia, as well linking Asia to Africa and
Europe. It is the waterway that makes an Asian trading system
possible, and with it the possibility of a world with Asia increasingly
at its economic center. As such, while access to the Indian Ocean is
essential to many, dominion of the Indian Ocean by any single power
is likely to be resisted.
The military dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region are evolving
rapidly, particularly as China and India build up expeditionary naval
forces, and each one supplies partner nations with military material.
China has agreed to provide Pakistan with eight diesel‐ electric
submarines, exercising with Pakistan’s navy last year in the East
China Sea, and this month in the Indian Ocean. India has upgraded its
relationship with Vietnam to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership,’
and has found substantial partners in the United States and Japan.
Meanwhile, India has extended its naval relationships across the
Indo‐ Pacific, inaugurating bilateral naval exercises with Japan,
Australia, and Indonesia.

Questions for you

1. Since we are talking about maritime security, discuss on the
point of convergence and divergence of Project Mausam &
Project Sagarmala
2. “Net security provider” – This term would have crossed your
reading sphere in our dealings with US (defence ties) as well. Is
India showing promising signs in becoming one? What has been
our progress on this front (land, air, sea)
3. Since we revised our maritime document very recently and
increased the ambit of Primary & Secondary areas of interest
USEFUL LINKS:
 https://thewire.in/2015/12/22/five-reasons-the-world-needs-to-pay-
heed-to-indias-new-maritime-security-strategy-17741
 https://idsa.in/idsacomments/indias-new-maritime-security-
strategy_asingh_211215
 https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy/
 https://www.orfonline.org/research/panel-discussion-on-
reconnecting-south-and-southeast-asia-return-of-the-bay-of-
bengal-region-48719/?amp
 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260042117_Maritime_Se
curity_in_the_Indian_Ocean_An_Indian_Perspective
 https://shodhgangotri.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/4509/1/s
ynopsis.pdf
 https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/consolidating-indias-indian-
ocean-strategy/
 https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/03/indias-move-towards-
collective-security-in-the-indian-ocean/