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French tends to use the single term «technique» to designate the entire
range of meanings. German is still more perverse, often using «Techno-
logie » to mean technique and « Technik » to mean technology /2. This
potential confusion has been further compounded by the choice of
deep-focus photography as the major proving ground of theories regar-
d ind the relationship between technology and history, for the produc-
tion of a deep-focus image -like many other filmic phenomena-
depends on a combination of technical and technological concerns.
While technological changes in the late thirties (availability of new
lenses) make deep-focus photography easier and more economical to
achieve, anyone who has ever used a camera knows that a depth-of-
focus choice must be made every time the shutter is tripped. The
difference between an exposure made at f 5.6with a speed of l /250and
another made at f 16with a speed of l/ 30 isa question of technique, not
of technology ; the latter image may be a deep-focus image, the former
cannot possible be. Indeed, given sufficient light, a cameraman and
director may choose to treat any shot with great depth of focus, with or
without the technological changes commonly associated with deep
focus. It is thus hardly surprising to find that articles which touch on
the topic of deep-focus photography characteristically alternate bet-
ween technical and technological concerns without making any distinc-
tion whatsoever between the two.
So what? one might well ask. Why so much commotion over a
simple question of vocabulary? Precisely because, I would claim, this is
no simple question of vocabulary, but a fundamental problem in the
theory of history. As we clearly see from the example of deep-focus
photography, the basic configuration is this: when the same result is
produced by two recognizably different causes, then critics feel justified
m conflating the terms habitually employed to distinguish one of those
causes from the other. When we scratch this simple surface we find a
logical application of one of the ground rules of semiotic analysis,
namely commutation: if substitution of one sound unit (or constituent
sense unit) for another makes no difference to the meaning (or higher-
level sense unit), then we say that the language (or text) recognizes no
difference in the alternate units. Following this reasoning, a generation
of film historians has taken technique and technology to be interchan-
geable notions because they yield similar results. This easy transferral
of methodology from synchronic semiotic analysis to the discourse of
history simply will not do. We must learn to use the familiar commuta-
tion test in a different way when we come to practice history. Whereas
/2. This confusion is especially evident in the work of Adorno. See Miriam Hansen,
« Introduction to Adorno, 'Transparencies on Film' (1966) >>,New German Critique
24-25. Fall-Winter 1981-82, 186-205.
Toward n theory of the hislory of representational technologies I 13
/ 3. lt is from this work that the frontispiece of Como!H·s first installment is drawn. In
passing it is perhaps worth noting that ComoUi truncates the plate, removing the
separate dose-ups of the devlces which make it possible for the depicted painter to
produce a perspective drawing automatically. In other words, Comolli's version seems
to rcfor to the technique of perspective alone, while the complete drawing clearly refers
to the te{;hnologizing of that technique as well. {See page 110 for a reproduction of the
comp1ete engraving).
J4. It is interesting to note similarity between Gomery's proposed stages of technolo-
gical deployment and the common pattern outlined he.re. Whereas Gomerts first stage
(invention) is largely technological, however. mine recognizes the possibility of inven-
tion thrnugh technique. In dealing with the technologization of technique~ however, I
do recognize the same economic impulse that characterizes the move from invention to
innovation for Gomcry,
ll4 Rick Airman
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"h Very cud(HH Md:Md ct JawLt>g ~II P,ripc,:fr,t$ if>lb¢. m,m .1u1uri! maflntt, without®·
$t'tYin.gtht' Rut.,:· F,om Tin Pr,:c/;u i,j Ptnpu,;,;.,; w, An E11s1,~fr,had <>/~~f>U>lnting
N"umd 01,J(tlf Auorditr& /4 iht P;:,l~J 'If Pff!}'ntiu, wdttten in fu:rich by;\ J¢tuit of hth
(L<»i<Mn:Th<Je&yt.,, and j<!hn 1.myklc,M OCC X.XVI).
J.,,,.Duhrcuil, ih<:unn~mN lu!Mr, txpb!m rhu in the c.~guvi11g (A) i< a rinc nf g!a,, 1h;1l
~lip-; ir,w 1he ft.l""! {BC). !l:) ;, tn tdjustibtc 1ighl: vt<K, wiih a minute f('<i'{> hclc lt ii< !-Op,
thi1 litt inW 1h<,N.,c BO af l:is in;trum,:,-ir. Th{ 1rt!11 {F} u~>:d the oudin.:~ ,of wl:m he ~i
1.1pon ,•in<k;·,, (G). "EYte,jb<ldykll<Y"·a off, what it thu~ -0n th<:c1~,s," the
how to iakt. or ~<.>py
Jcwir t4nduJu, ··''fi1 bt~r to duw dit lbtt ;u,d figut¢S on the Ghtt with Pm ;;nJ fr,k: th~n
"~lrir.g th!! Back,1i<:kof th1:Gbu liuk am! loy,'ng i m-Oi11, S!,«1 .;;f P;rer on th~ Si\k du!
h:1 the D:Jign; tub of p«rn 1h; f'3pe, gtndy 1hcrton wilh !he H,rnd, ;uJ th<: "lrn!e Draught
will b,; imp,u\J m \C~fli.iN\l (rom th<:Gbu upor, the P,pet. . , A liiik Pu,1i£e will ttn,kr
ti"" M~lvx! o««lill8, fusil>le 3ndosy."
/5. I have, however, benefitted greatly from reading an unpublished paper by NoBI
Carroll on «The Specificity of Media and the Arts,>.
Toward a theory Qf the history of representationaltechnologies 117
lity. From this point of view the seemingly uncoded nature of the iconic
mode nevertheless offers up its potentially complex coding. It is this
coding that ensures a sense of reality for the spectator while at the same
time bonding that spectator to an ideological position.
On the one side, then, the real ; on the other side its representation -
less coded for Bazin, more coded for Comolli ; leaving Bazin's specta-
tor at liberty, ·invisibly binding Comolli's. To my mind Comolli's
position is a significant gain over the Bazinian stance, yet from another
point of view the two critics are surprisingly similar in their views. In
both cases the real, that which is represented, appears as a natural fact
and not as a coded construct. To be sure, Comolli discusses at length
the codes which identify a representation as successfully representing
the real, but he never shows the least concern for the codes which mark
the real as real. The panchromatic film stock example might well have
permitted him to do so, but instead of identifying the photographic
codes with which cinema aligns itself as part of the code of reality to
which cinema must conform, he treats the photographic codes as a new
component of the code of representation. As in the case of the coming
of sound, cinematic technology is seen as responding directly and
nearly automatically to some new ideological development.
Yet the real is no less coded than representation. Let us take the
extreme example, already evoked, of perspective painting. It seems that
the rise of perspective corresponds to a desire to imitate the three
dimensions of nature on a two-dimensional plane. Yet where is it said
that nature has three dimensions? And why is it that the earliest
perspective paintings are nearly without exception of religious subjects,
usually including architectural decor? From Giotto to Lorenzetti, the
pioneers of perspective always refer to the reality that is coded by their
world. Actions have reality to the extent that they are recognizable as
deriving from a limited number of accepted texts; building have reality
to the extent that they appear to possess the three dimensions which can
be traced back to the Temple in Jerusalem; people have reality to the
extent that the culture ascribes to them that reality. Thus Virtue and
Vice exist, as do Good Government and Bad Government, but indivi-
dual portraits and townscapes of Siena as Siena will have to wait a
century. Well known individuals and cities may serve as models for
disciples or principles, but only later will their success as representa-
tions depend on the personal resemblance rather than resemblance to a
well coded, previously established category (at which time the very
notion of« personal resemblance» will be subjected to a coding particu-
lar to its age).
But what difference does it make that reality should be coded? And
what is the source of that coding? The answer to the latter question is
obvious and would no doubt have occurred to Comolli had he not
120 Rick Altman Toward a theory of the history of representational technologies 121
lity. From this point of view the seemingly uncoded nature of the iconic limited his attention almost entirely to a single expression of Western
mode nevertheless offers up its potentially complex coding. It is this ideology. Only by stressing perspective nearly exclusively is Comolli
coding that ensures a sense of reality for the spectator while at the same iIi able to make the history of Western apparatuses from the Quattrocento
time bonding that spectator to an ideological position. to the tw�ntieth ce�tury seem _to nearly s_traight:li_n e. For if each appa
On the one side, then, the real ; on the other side its representation - ratus defines a particular version of reality, cod1f1es the systems requi
less coded for Bazin, more coded for Comolli ; leaving Bazin's specta red for successful representation, thus establishing the necessary and
tor at liberty, ·invisibly binding Comolli's. To my mind Comolli's sufficient conditions for representing the real, then we must conclude
position is a significant gain over the Bazinian stance, yet from another that each apparatus establishes the code of reality to which the subse
point of view the two critics are surprisingly similar in their views. In quent apparatus must adhere. Perspective painting imitates architec
both cases the real, that which is represented, appears as a natural fact ture and sacred narrative, for those are the privileged apparatus
and not as a coded construct. To be sure, Comolli discusses at length -Focillon's master art- of the early middle ages. With panchromatic
the codes which identify a representation as successfully representing film and the addition of sound, film is responding to the definition of
the real, but he never shows the least concern for the codes which mark reality propounded by its three most immediate predecessors and early
the real as real. The panchromatic film stock example might well have competitors - photography, radio and the theater. In order to repre
permitted him to do so, but instead of identifying the photographic sent properly, each new technology must therefore succeed in represen
codes with which cinema aligns itself as part of the code of reality to ting not reality itself, but the version of reality established by a
which cinema must conform, he treats the photographic codes as a new previously dominant representational technology.
component of the code of representation. As in the case of the coming In other words; there is no such thing as representation of the real ;
of sound, cinematic technology is seen as responding directly and there is only representation of representation. For anything that we
nearly automatically to some new ideological development. would represent is already constructed as a representation. The struc
Yet the real is no less coded than representation. Let us take the ture of representation is thus that of an infinite mise-en-abyme, with the
extreme example, already evoked, of perspective painting. It seems that new apparatus having to represent the old, itself representing the
the rise of perspective corresponds to a desire to imitate the three previous one, and so on. Each new apparatus might thus be likened to a
dimensions of nature on a two-dimensional plane. Yet where is it said translation. Expressive of an ideology different from that of the former
that nature has three dimensions? And why is it that the earliest apparatus, the ·new apparatus must simultaneously find a way to
perspective paintings are nearly without exception of religious subjects, express that new ideology and -in the same words, as it were-seem to
usually including architectural decor? From Giotto to Lorenzetti, the be expressing the old. For only with this appearance of translation can
pioneers of perspective always refer to the reality that is coded by their the new apparatus be taken as representing the real. The new system
world. Actions have reality to the extent that they are recognizable as must thus -at least provisionally- speak with two voices or risk
deriving from a limited number of accepted texts; building have reality failure. It must sound like the old, and yet be new. When a change of
to the extent that they appear to possess the three dimensions which can apparatus appears to involve nothing more than an addition to the old,
be traced back to the Temple in Jerusalem; people have reality to the as in the case of sound film, the operation is carried out with little help
extent that the culture ascribes to them that reality. Thus Virtue and from the techniques deployed by the texts for which the new apparatus
Vice exist, as do Good Government and Bad Government, but indivi serves as vehicle. When the change of apparatus is as radical as the
dual portraits and townscapes of Siena as Siena will have to wait a move from architectural three-dimensional painting to a flat surface,
century. Well known individuals and cities may serve as models for then only by extraordinary technical developments, like that of pers
disciples or principles, but only later will their success as representa pective, can the new apparatus retain its right to representation.
tions depend on the personal resemblance rather than resemblance to a Now the process of translation, as everyone knows, can never pre
well coded, previously established category (at which time the very iend to complet�n�ss. From _the very fact that each language is an
notion of« personal resemblance» will be subjected to a coding particu independent sem10t1c system, 1t would appear that every translation is
lar to its age). by definition partial. Part of the message may be retained, but part will
But what difference does it make that reality should be coded? And also be left behind. This essential characteristic is perfectly visible in the
what is the source of that coding? The answer to the latter question is development of photography. In order for a photograph to serve as an
obvious and would no doubt have occurred to Comolli had he not adequate representation in nineteeth-century Europe, it had to satisfy
122 Rick Altman
Jane Feuer has called it/8, serves alternately to point out the similarities
between the two media and then to erase them, in the process aligning
the new representational mode on the old codes ofreality, then offering
an ideological plus which forever sets the new mode over the old. I
know it's not a pristine 35mm print, but what the key, there are no
commercials and I can stop for a beer whenever I want.
The straight-line model assumed throughout this paper is of course
used here only for the sake of presentational convenience. There is no
single straight line from the Ark of the Covenant passing through
Assisi, Quattrocento perspective painting, Renaissance and neo-
classical theater, photography, cinema, and TI. Instead, there is a
complex web of constantly changing relationships.among representa-
tional technologies. The challenge of the history of representation, as I
have sketched is here, is in the task of identifying the return of one
repressed representational system in another, and thus in observing the
unceasing pressure to which media subject each other. Seen as a system
with its own history and internal dynamics, the ideology of representa-
tion opens itself up to the kind of historical analysis in which the system
itself, once launched, must be seen as retaining a certain life of its own.
Changes in external ideology occur as pressures on the system, espe-
cially in the form of new codes of representation, but external ideology
is no longer the only thing driving the system. New ideologies cannot
simply generate new representational systems without taking into
account the reality codes established by previous and/ or competing
representational systems. Once again, we are led to a type of history
which remains fundamentally dialectical. Instead of seeing a straight
line between an initial ideological impulse and an ultimate technologi-
cal development (as does Comolli), this new approach considers that
every ideological force must by necessity grapple with the residue of
another ideological impetus embodied in competing representational
modes. To write the history of representational technologies is thus to
trace the dialectic which grows out of the confrontation between repre-
sentational and reality codes.
/8. Jane Feuer, The Hollywood Musical, Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1982.
124 Rick Altman Toward a theory of the history of representational technologies 125
Jane Feuer has called it/8, serves alternately to point out the similarities Revenant sur /es rapports technique/ideologie don/ /'analyse avail ete
between the two media and then to erase them, in the process aligning initiee en par tie par J. L. Comolli a partir des travaux sur l'apparei/ de
the new representational mode on the old codes of reality, then offering base de Jean-Louis Baudry et Marcel/in Pleynet, ce texte vise a re
an ideological plus which forever sets the new mode over the old. I historiser et a dialectiser ces conceptions qui re/event d'une histoire par
know it's not a pristine 35mm print, but what the key, there are no trop lineaire et accumulative. Revenant sur /'opposition, la plupart du
commercials and I can stop for a beer whenever I want. temps neutra/isee entre technique et technologie, ii introduit la notion
d'appareil historique. II etudie la nature des liens non seulement entre
The straight-line model assumed throughout this paper is of course /es codes de representation et /'appareil de base mais aussi entre celui-ci,
used here only for the sake of presentational convenience. There is no /es codes de representation et /es codes historiques qui definissent
single straight line from the Ark of the Covenant passing through /'apprehension de la dite rea/ite.
Assisi, Quattrocento perspective painting, �enaissance and neo
classical theater, photography, cinema, and TV. Instead, there is a
complex web of constantly changing relationships.among representa
tional technologies. The challenge of the history of representation, as I
have sketched is here, is in the task of identifying the return of one
repressed representational system in another, and thus in observing the
unceasing pressure to which media subject each other. Seen as a system
with its own history and internal dynamics, the ideology of representa
tion opens itself up to the kind of historical analysis in which the system
itself, once launched, must be seen as retaining a certain life of its own.
Changes in external ideology occur as pressures on the system, espe
cially in the form of new codes of representation, but external ideology
is no longer the only thing driving the system. New ideologies cannot
simply generate new representational systems without taking into
account the reality codes established by previous and/ or competing
representational systems. Once again, we are led to a type of history
which remains fundamentally dialectical. Instead of seeing a straight
line between an initial ideological impulse and an ultimate technologi
cal development (as does Comolli), this new approach considers that
every ideological force must by necessity grapple with the residue of
another ideological impetus embodied in competing representational
modes. To write the history ofrepresentational technologies is thus to
trace the dialectic which grows out of the confrontation between repre
sentational and reality codes.
/8. Jane Feuer, The Hollywood Musical, Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1982.