Labayen vs Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. G.R. No.

L-29298 (1928)

Labayen vs Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. G.R. No. L-29298 (1928)

Ponente: Justice Malcom

Facts:

Reynaldo Labayen and Teodoro Labayen are the owners of Dos Hermanos, a hacienda in Talisay, Negros Occidental.
They entered into a contract with Talisay-Silay Milling Company Incorporated, also called the Central, for the milling of
sugar canes from their hacienda.

Stipulated in the contract is the construction of a railroad with three and a half meters right of way and maintenance of
such railroad by the central. However, the central was only able to construct a railroad reaching hacienda Esmeralda No.
2, four kilometers away from hacienda Dos Hermanos. For a railroad to extend to hacienda Dos Hermanos, the
construction would require a gradual elevation of 4.84% to 7%, would necessitate 26 curves and would cost
Php80,000.00. A civil engineer testifying in behalf of the defendants allege that to construct such would be possible but
it would be very dangerous.

This led to an action for damages in the amount of Php 28,620.00 by the petitioners for the alleged breach of contract to
grind sugar canes at the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The court ruled against the petitioners and on the
cross-complaint of the defendants, condemned the petitioners to pay the sum of Php 12, 114.00.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the action for damages should prosper.

Ruling:

No. If the obligor voluntarily prevented the fulfillment of the condition of the obligation, such condition shall be deemed
fulfilled (article 1186 of the New Civil Code). The path of the railroad has to pass through the haciendas of Esteban de la
Rama. Since he would not grant permission to use his land, therefore preventing the compliance of the obligation to
grind, the action cannot prosper

Reynaldo Labayen and Teodoro Labayen are the proprietors of Dos Hermanos, a hacienda in Talisay, Negros Occidental.
They went into an agreement with Talisay-Silay Milling Company Incorporated, additionally called the Central, for the
processing of sugar sticks from their hacienda.

Stipulated in the agreement is the development of a railroad with three and a half meters option to proceed and upkeep
of such railroad by the focal. Nonetheless, the focal was just ready to develop a railroad achieving hacienda Esmeralda
No. 2, four kilometers from hacienda Dos Hermanos. For a railroad to reach out to hacienda Dos Hermanos, the
development would require a continuous height of 4.84% to 7%, would require 26 bends and would cost Php80,000.00.
A structural architect affirming for sake of the litigants assert that to build such would be conceivable however it would
be extremely unsafe.

This prompted an activity for harms in the measure of Php 28,620.00 by the applicants for the supposed break of
agreement to granulate sugar sticks at the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The court ruled against the
applicants and on the cross-objection of the litigants, sentenced the solicitors to pay the whole of Php 12, 114.00.

Issue: Regardless of whether the activity for damages ought to prosper

Ruling: No. In the event that the obligor intentionally kept the fulfillment of the state of the obligation, such condition
will be esteemed fulfilled (article 1186 of the New Civil Code). The way of the railroad needs to go through the haciendas
of Esteban de la Rama. Since he would not give authorization to utilize his territory, along these lines keeping the
consistence of the commitment to granulate, the activity can't succeed.

Rodrigo Enriquez Et. Al. vs. Soccoro Ramos

March 17, 2016
Case Digest

G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976

Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de Dizon and Urbano Dizon, Jr., plaintiffs-appellants,

Vs.

Socorro A. Ramos, defendant-appellee.

Castro, C.J. :

Facts:

On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and spouses Dizon sold to Ramos 20 subdivision lots in Quezon
City for the sum of P235,056 of which only P35,056 had been paid. The balance of P200,000 was to
be liquidated within 2 years from the date of the execution of the deed of sale, with interest at 6% for
the 1st year and 12% thereafter until fully paid. To secure the payment of that balance, Ramos
executed in the same document a deed of mortgage in favor of the vendors on several parcels of land
variously situated in Quezon City, Pampanga and Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies certain
stipulations which Ramos invoked. But according to the appellants the defendant violated the terms of
their agreement in the following respects:

The defendant refuse to pay the sum of P200,000 within the stipulated period.
The mortgage on Bulacan property was never registered and,
The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgage were not paid by the defendant.
Ramos admit that she has not paid the realty taxes and has not registered the mortgage on Bulacan
property but argues that it was a minor ones and still her obligation to pay the sum of P200,000 has
not arisen as no previous notice and demand for payment has been made and according to her the
road is not completed because the appellants have not yet planted trees nor put up water facilities as
required by the ordinance.
The court held that the non-payment of 1959 realty taxes as well as the non-registration of the
mortgaged on Bulacan estate by the defendant were minor matters. On the issue of the completion of
road the appellant adduced the testimonies of 2 witnesses that the road was completed on May 9,
1960 in accordance with the ordinances of Quezon City and there is nothing in Ordinance 2969 which
would indicate that a street may be considered completed with water facilities are built on the
subdivision and these activities are definitely segregable. As to be alleged lack of previous notice
completion and demand for payment, the filling of the case is sufficient notice to the defendant of the
completion of the roads in question and of the appellee’s desire to be paid the purchase price of the
questioned lots.

Issue: Whether or not Ramos should pay her balance to Enriquez and spouses Dizon even though
she is not yet fully satisfied with her demand?

Ruling: Yes, the effect of such demand retroacts to the day of the constitution of the defendant
obligation as it was stated in Art. 1187 provides that “THE EEFECTS OF A CONDITIONAL
OBLIGATION TO GIVE, ONCE THE CONDITION HAS BEEN FULFILLED, SHALL RETROACT TO
THE DAY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE OBLIGATION.” her demand on the road is already
considered completed and the filling of the case against her is sufficient notice to her therefore she is
obligated to pay her balance of P200,000 to the appellant’s within 2 years from the date the roads in
question are completed.
On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and life partners Dizon sold to Ramos 20 subdivision parcels in Quezon City for the
entirety of P235,056 of which just P35,056 had been paid. The equalization of P200,000 was to be sold inside 2 years
from the date of the execution of the deed of offer, with enthusiasm at 6% for the first year and 12% from there on until
completely paid. To verify the installment of that balance, Ramos executed in a similar report a deed of home loan for
the merchants on a few packages of land differently arranged in Quezon City, Pampanga and Bulacan. The deed of home
loan epitomizes certain stipulations which Ramos summoned. Be that as it may, as indicated by the appellants the
litigant abused the terms of their assention in the accompanying regards:

The litigant won't pay the total of P200,000 inside the stipulated period.

The home loan on Bulacan property was never enlisted and,

The realty charge for 1959 on the parcels contract were not paid by the litigant.

Ramos concede that she has not made good on the realty government obligations and has not enlisted the home loan
on Bulacan property but rather contends that it was a minor ones and still her commitment to pay the total of P200,000
has not emerged as no past notice and interest for installment has been made and as indicated by her the street isn't
finished in light of the fact that the appellants have not yet planted trees nor set up water offices as required by the
mandate.

The court held that the non-installment of 1959 realty charges just as the non-enlistment of the sold on Bulacan bequest
by the respondent were minor issues. On the issue of the fruition of street the appealing party cited the declarations of
2 observes that the street was finished on May 9, 1960 as per the statutes of Quezon City and there is nothing in
Ordinance 2969 which would demonstrate that a road might be viewed as finished with water offices are based on the
subdivision and these exercises are unquestionably segregable. As to be affirmed absence of past notice culmination and
interest for installment, the filling of the case is adequate notice to the litigant of the finishing of the streets being
referred to and of the appellee's longing to be paid the price tag of the addressed parcels.
Issue: Whether or not Ramos should pay her parity to Enriquez and companions Dizon despite the fact that she isn't yet
completely happy with her interest?

Administering: Yes, the impact of such interest retroacts to the day of the constitution of the respondent commitment
as it was expressed in Art. 1187 gives that "THE EEFECTS OF A CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE, ONCE THE
CONDITION HAS BEEN FULFILLED, SHALL RETROACT TO THE DAY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE OBLIGATION." her
interest out and about is as of now viewed as finished and the filling of the body of evidence against her is adequate
notice to her thusly she is committed to pay her parity of P200,000 to the appealing party's inside 2 years from the date
the streets being referred to are finished.

TOPIC: LOAN/S SECURED BY A MORTGAGE IN RELATION TO SINGLENESS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. VS. SOCORRO RAMOS, ET. AL.; GR 16797, 2/27/63
REYES, J.B.L., J

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a direct appeal made by Socorro upon the decision of the CFI against her averment that
the Enriquez and the spouses Dizon are guilty of splitting a single cause of action.

FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Dizon sold to Socorro Ramos 11 parcels of land
located in Quezon City which are covered by their corresponding certificates of title. The lands were sold to Ramos for the
price of P101, 000 through a notarial deed. Ramos paid P5,000 down, P2,500 cash, and P2,500 by check drawn against
the PNB. Ramos agreed to pay the remaining P96,000 balance within 90 days. For security, Ramos mortgaged the
eleven parcels of land in favor of the vendors in the same deed of sale. Additionally, Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her
children and as judicial guardian of her minor child, executed another morgage on a lot situated in Malinta.
Ramos failed to comply with some conditions of the mortgage so Enriquez and the spouses Dizon filed an action
for foreclosure of the mortgage. In response, Ramos moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Enriquez and the
spouses Dizon had previously filed an action against her in the CFI of Manila for the recovery of P2,500 paid by check as
part of the down payment accrued and demandable. Enriquez and the spouses Dizon, then, are guilty of splitting a single
cause of action under sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the first action for P2,500 was a defense that
could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit.
Enriquez and the spouses Dizon opposed Ramos' motion to dismiss, which was granted by the CFI of Quezon
City. But, Ramos repleaded her aforementioned averments as a special defense in her answer.

CFI: Its decision was against Ramos and she was ordered to pay P96,000 with 12% interest from Feb. 24, 1959 ntil
payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of
the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days.

RAMOS: She insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action,
and that the obligation not having fixed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date
of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure.

ENRIQUEZ, ET.AL. : They did not split a single cause of action. They are correct in filing two cases against Ramos. The
first case they filed was for collection of the unsecured portion of the consideration of the sale or collection of the check
drawn by Ramos, while the second was to foreclose the mortgage used as security on the balance.
ISSUE: WON the case filed by Enriquez, et. al. should be dismissed on the ground of splitting their cause of action.

HELD: No, the Court finds no merit on this appeal.

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that it was
based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees;
while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage.
The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was
constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two
causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
Facts: Rodrigo Enriquez and the life partners Urbano Dizon and Aurea Dizon sold to Socorro Ramos 11 packages of land
situated in Quezon City which are secured by their relating testaments of title. The grounds were sold to Ramos at the
cost of P101, 000 through a notarial deed. Ramos paid P5,000 down, P2,500 money, and P2,500 with a money order
drawn against the PNB. Ramos consented to pay the remaining P96,000 balance inside 90 days. For security, Ramos sold
the eleven bundles of land for the sellers in a similar deed of offer. Furthermore, Ramos, as lawyer in-truth of her
youngsters and as legal watchman of her minor tyke, executed another morgage on a ton arranged in Malinta.

Ramos neglected to conform to a few states of the home loan so Enriquez and the mates Dizon recorded an activity for
abandonment of the home loan. Accordingly, Ramos moved to reject the case on the ground that Enriquez and the
companions Dizon had recently documented an activity against her in the CFI of Manila for the recuperation of P2,500
paid with a money order as a major aspect of the initial installment collected and demandable. Enriquez and the mates
Dizon, at that point, are liable of part a solitary reason for activity under sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. The
recording of the main activity for P2,500 was a safeguard that could be argued in decrease of the second suit.

Enriquez and the companions Dizon contradicted Ramos' movement to expel, which was conceded by the CFI of Quezon
City. Be that as it may, Ramos repleaded her previously mentioned averments as an exceptional safeguard in her
answer.

Its choice was against Ramos and she was arranged to pay P96,000 with 12% enthusiasm from Feb. 24, 1959 ntil
installment, 10% of the sum due as lawyer's charges, and the expenses of the suit; and further declared the
abandonment clearance of the sold properties in the event of non-installment inside ninety (90) days.

Ramos demands that the activity ought to be expelled because of the supposed part of appellee's reason for activity,
and that the commitment not having settled a period, albeit one was planned, the court underneath ought to have set
initial a date of development before requesting installment or abandonment.

Enriquez, et.al. didn't part a solitary reason for activity. They are right in recording two bodies of evidence against
Ramos. The principal case they documented was for gathering of the unbound segment of the thought of the deal or
accumulation of the check drawn by Ramos, while the second was to abandon the home loan utilized as security on the
parity.

ISSUE: WON the case recorded by Enriquez, et. al. ought to be expelled on the ground of part their reason for activity.

HELD: No, the Court finds no legitimacy on this intrigue.

An examination of the main grievance recorded against litigant in the Court of First Instance of Manila demonstrates
that it depended on appellants' having unlawfully halted installment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued for
appellees; while the protest in the present activity was for non-installment of the equalization of P96,000.00 ensured by
the home loan. The case for P2,500.00 was, in this way, a particular obligation not secured by the security; and since the
home loan was established on terrains arranged in Quezon City, the appellees couldn't request its dispossession in the
Manila courts. The two reasons for activity being extraordinary, area 4 of Rule 2 does not have any significant bearing.
G.R. No. 3019 February 9, 1907

LA COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VICENTE ARAZA, defendant-appellant.

T. L. McGirr for appellant.

Domingo Franco for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

FACTS

The plaintiff brought this action in the court below to foreclose a mortgage for 8,000 pesos upon certain land in the
Province of Leyte. The contract send upon was executed on the 11th day of June, 1901. By terms thereof the defendant
promised to pay the plaintiff 8,000 pesos as follows: 500 pesos on the 30th of June, 1901, and the remainder at the rate
of 100 pesos a month, payable on the 30th day of each month, until the entire 8,000 pesos was paid. The defendant paid
400 pesos and no more. The suit was commenced on the 12th day of June, 1903.

ISSUE

Whether or not the creditor can recover the said installment and the entire indebtedness.

HELD

There was no provision in the contract by which, upon failure to pay one installment of the debt, the whole debt should
thereupon become at once payable. We are of the opinion that the obligation can be enforced in this action for only the
amount due and payable on the 12th day of June, 1903.

The court below gave no credit for the payment of 400 pesos admitted by the complaint to have been received by the
plaintiff. It is allowed interest upon the entire debt from the 1st day of July, 1901. The contract does not provide for the
payment of any interest. There is no provision in it declaring expressly that the failure to pay when due should put the
debtor in default. There was therefore no default which would make him liable for interest until a demand was made.
(Civil Code, art. 1100; Manresa, Com. on Civil Code, vol 8, p. 56.) The transaction did not constitute a mercantile loan
and article 316 of the Code of Commerce is not applicable. There was no evidence any demand prior to the presentation
of the complaint. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to interest only from the commencement of the action.

The judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the court below with directions to determine the amount due in
accordance with the views hereinbefore expressed and to enter judgment for such amount. No costs will be allowed to
either party in this court.
Facts: The offended party acquired this activity the court underneath to abandon a home loan for 8,000 pesos upon
certain land in the Province of Leyte. The agreements send upon was executed on the eleventh day of June, 1901. By
terms thereof the respondent guaranteed to pay the offended party 8,000 pesos as pursues: 500 pesos on the 30th of
June, 1901, and the rest of the rate of 100 pesos every month, payable on the 30th day of every month, until the whole
8,000 pesos was paid. The litigant paid 400 pesos and no more. The suit was initiated on the twelfth day of June, 1903.

ISSUE :Regardless of whether creditor can recuperate the said portion and the whole obligation.

HELD: There was no arrangement in the agreement by which, upon inability to pay one portion of the obligation, the
entire obligation ought to immediately end up on the double payable. We are of the conclusion that the commitment
can be implemented in this activity for just the sum due and payable on the twelfth day of June, 1903.

The court underneath gave no credit for the installment of 400 pesos conceded by the grumbling to have been gotten by
the offended party. It is permitted enthusiasm upon the whole obligation from the first day of July, 1901. The agreement
does not accommodate the installment of any intrigue. There is no arrangement in it announcing explicitly that the
inability to pay when due should put the account holder in default. There was subsequently no default which would
make him subject for enthusiasm until an interest was made. The exchange did not establish a trade credit and article
316 of the Code of Commerce isn't material. There was no proof any interest before the introduction of the grievance.
The offended party is along these lines qualified for intrigue just from the initiation of the activity.

The judgment is put aside and the case is remanded to the court underneath with headings to decide the sum due as per
the perspectives hereinbefore communicated and to enter judgment for such sum. No costs will be permitted to either
party in this court.