The Zimmermann Telegram: a failure of American scholarship

Part 1

Introduction
1. The Zimmermann Telegram was a telegram which in January 1917 was sent by
the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German ambassador in
Mexico. As set out below the telegram offered German financial support for a
Mexican attack on the United States of America, to regain its lost territories. Also
referred to is the possible involvement of the Japanese.

2. This affair has been the subject of two books, Barbara Tuchman’s, The
Zimmermann Telegram published in 1959 and Thomas Bogart’s The
Zimmermann telegram: intelligence diplomacy and America’s Entry into World
War I published in 2012. The central thesis put forward here, which in this first
part focuses on Tuchman’s book, is that both these works are ideologically
interventionist and that the writer’s political agendas blind them to obvious
inconsistencies inherent in the affair. Of the two Tuchman is by far the most
crass. In a work hailed at the time as ‘an obeisance to evidence’ by the New York
Times she falsifies, by truncation, the telegram itself in order to support her
analysis. This outright re-writing of history is but the worst of many distortions that
typify a piece of propaganda that is almost Stalinist in its crudity but which is still
today recommended reading and described as a ‘classic’.

3. Bogart’s work is far less blatant and appears to be more of a work of history than
a polemic. Bogart’s militarist, rather than liberal, interventionism position blinds
him to the obvious inconsistencies inherent in the affair and particularly to the
possibility that the telegram was not deciphered, in a triumph of illegal
surveillance as is officially claimed, but was always intended to be publicised.

4. Tuchman’s book, the accepted historical account from 1959 to 2012, is oblivious
to the fact that it was impossible for the alliance, suggested by Zimmermann in
his telegram, to be realised and so does not raise the question: why was the
telegram sent? Despite widespread belief that the telegram was an invention of
British propaganda, particularly by the highly influential Hearst press,
 Zimmermann publicly admitted sending the telegram, and this at a time when
American intervention in World War I hung in the balance. This hugely significant
facet of an affair, which can only be described as bizarre, Tuchman utterly fails to
engage with. As Tuchman’s work is at such divergence with reality this essay
commences with setting out the issues inherent in the affair. In Part 2 it then
embarks on a critique of Tuchman’s book.

The Telegram

5. On 11 January 1917 the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, sent a

telegram to the German ambassador in Mexico which stated:

https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann/

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Timeline
11 January 1917 Zimmermann telegram sent to German Embassy in Mexico
I February 1917 Germany resumed unrestricted U boat attacks
3 February US breaks of diplomatic ties with Germany
1 March Telegram published in press
3 & 29 March 1917 Zimmermann states publicly that telegram sent by him
9 March US Executive order arming merchant ships
2 April 1917 US Pres Woodrow Wilson seeks congressional support for
declaration of war on Germany
6 April 1917 US declares war on Germany

Background - the German military situation

6. By late 1916 the British blockade was throttling Germany and the poor were
beginning to starve. On the Western front the Entente was getting the upper
hand, British invention of the tank and Monash’s Australian troops’ tactics gaining
ground in the trenches. To have any hope of a negotiated peace, let alone victory
it was crucial for the Germans that the Americans were kept out of the conflict,
which conversely the British were doing everything they could to achieve.

7. The prime strategic consideration of keeping America from siding with Britain was
directly at odds with the prime strategic objective of counter blockading Britain by
means of the U-boat. The U-boat blockade, entailing attacks on American
shipping and American civilian casualties, was highly controversial and a rich
source of British propaganda against the Germans. When the Americans had
threatened that this issue could bring them into the war, after the sinking of the
Lusitania, Germany had limited its U-boat campaign. By late 1916 Germany’s
ability to wage war was so reduced that unlimited attacks on shipping was seen
by the German military as the only way to knock Britain out of the war and so
prevent defeat.

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Analysis

8. The telegram begins with informing that Germany intends unrestricted submarine
warfare as of 1 February 1917. It says Germany will endeavour to keep the US
neutral but in the event that this is not successful it proposes a military alliance by
which Germany will provide “generous financial support” on the basis that Mexico
“is to reconquer their lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona”,
“settlement in detail” being left to Mexico.

9. The question must be what financial support could the Germans have offered
which would enabled Mexico to defeat America and take back these territories. To
be able to do so Germany, with its armies bogged down in a stalemate on the
Western Front and grinding away on the Eastern Front, blockaded, now chancing
desperate moves to avoid defeat, would have to simultaneously provide “financial
support” at least equivalent to that of America, the greatest economic power of
the time. In addition it is at this time that Zimmerman and the German military
were in the process of adopting Israel Helphand’s plan to fund the Russian
Bolsheviks, ultimately to the tune of 50 million Gold Marks. The answer must be
that there was not the slightest possibility that Germany could have offered
financial support to the Mexicans in the magnitude required and that Zimmerman
knew this at the time.

10. On receipt of the telegram the Mexican president Carrenza set up a military
commission to consider the offer. One wonders why he didn’t reject it out of hand
as being plain crazy but we must be grateful to him as the Commission’s findings
are a primary resource of the first order and a welcome expression of common
sense in what is otherwise an illogical and incoherent landscape. It should be
noted that Tuchman does not reference or cite in any way this core historical
document. The Commission of course rejected the alliance on every ground. In
regard to the offer of financial support it noted that the Germans had not even
been able to provide the gold necessary for the establishment of a Mexican
national bank.

11. The next oddity stated in the telegram is that the above message was to be given
to the Mexican president when the German ambassador in Mexico “is certain”

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 that America is about to enter the war against Germany. This is an incredibly
heavy responsibility to place on a person in what would not be thought of as
being in a top level diplomatic post. So the German ambassador in Mexico was
being asked to commit his country to a military alliance against the most powerful
nation in the world, when he thought the time was right? This cannot be right and
in fact was not what happened, the Telegram was merely passed on directly to
the Mexican president on receipt.

12. The telegram goes on to say to the German ambassador:

“add the suggestion that he [the Mexican President] should, on his own
initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time
mediate between Japan and ourselves”

13. It is Tuchman’s core proposition that the real and substantial threat to America,
inherent in the telegram, was the threat from Japan. When looked at closely this
is completely illusory. If we take the first line of the above extract it is of course a
logical impossibility that the Mexican president could do something on his own
initiative, when this is being suggested to him by another. What is being asked is
that the Mexican president engage in subterfuge, intended to conceal the fact
that Germany is the instigator of this proposed alliance.

14. In the context that Germany is about to recommence unrestricted U-boat warfare
with the very likely result that America will forthwith declare war on Germany, it is
not at all clear why this subterfuge is necessary. In regard to Zimmermann’s
attitude in a somewhat similar situation, the sinking of the Lusitania Boghardt
relates the following exchange between Zimmermann and a journalist in which
Zimmermann “remarked cheerfully”:

“Now, this will have quite an effect! The hatred towards us can’t possibly
increase, they will always hate us, but in this situation the only thing we
can do is lash out at all sides, we have no room for any consideration
whatsoever”.1

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Zimmermann telegram: intelligence diplomacy and America’s entry into World War I p31

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15. Leaving aside the claim that these words are spoken “cheerfully”, if this is
Zimmermann’s attitude at the time of the Lusitania, then why is he not talking
directly to the Japanese when according to the Telegram the Japanese are to be
invited to immediately enter mediations with Germany, which is clearly the major
party. It makes no sense to ask the Mexicans to invite in Japan.

16. The issue of Japanese involvement raises an enormous problem for the
proposition that the telegram was intended for the purpose it claimed and that is
the problem of time. The telegram was sent on 11 January 1917. Zimmermann
knew that Germany would recommence unrestricted U-boat attacks on 1
February 1917. He knew that as Germany had restricted its attacks on neutral
and specifically American shipping because America had threatened to enter the
war, that renewal of unrestricted attacks will probably bring America into the war.
To prevent this, any attack on America by a third party such as Mexico, should be
made before America declared war on Germany. America declared war on 6 April
1917. Realistically then there were about three months in which to launch the
attack. If the Japanese have not yet been invited to join this alliance and nor had
they previously been engaged in discussions, then there had been no planning or
preparation by them and if they were only being invited subsequent to Mexican
agreement then not enough time to do so.

17. The part the Mexicans were called upon to play was to invade America with the
intention of retaking of its lost provinces. On their own the only response that the
Mexicans could realistically expect from America was for Mexico to go the way of
the lost provinces and be wiped off the map. The only way that such a response
could possibly be avoided would be for the Mexicans to receive military support
on a massive scale, and this just to avoid total defeat, still more would be
required to actually achieve the outcomes sought.

18. To provide such military support Japan would have to do three things. It would
have to raise a large army. As the Americans raised a force of approximately 2.8
million men for the war in Europe and as it could not be argued that the
Americans would expend less effort defending their own soil, the force the
Japanese would have to have raised would be of the same order. Japan would
then have to be ready to transport this enormous military force across the Pacific

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 and be able to supply it. At some point the Japanese would have to destroy the
larger American Pacific Fleet. It would then have to be be able to maintain and
supply this huge force on continental America and be able to repel counter attack
by the American Atlantic Fleet and the British Navy.

19. This run down does not even consider the difficulties in deploying and forward
supplying these forces in an area with limited communications infrastructure.
There are immense logistical and planning preparations that are absolutely
necessary for any such plan to become a reality, we are talking many months if
not years. By comparison America declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917 but
it was not until 1918 that the Americans began landing substantial forces in
Europe.

20. Such an undertaking must be contrasted with Japan’s effort in World War II.
Then, faced with the existential threat of the American oil embargo, the high point
of the Japanese effort vis-a-vis ‘Continental’ America, was to junk some obsolete
battleships in Pearl Harbour and provide the Americans with an excuse for going
to war with Germany. It is true that the Japanese did manage to extend the scope
of their atrocities beyond Korea and China for a while but after the battle of
Midway in June 1942 the threat to America was so insubstantial that American
forces were concentrated on Europe. Importantly this later period is the dawn of
the power of the aircraft carrier and in this development Japan ranked second in
the world, behind America. The period at issue is the era of the dreadnought and
here the British Navy was pre-eminent.

21. It is correct that an attack could have been launched after America entered the
war, obviating the necessity of prior planning and mobilisation. The difficulty here
is the advantage a surprise attack would have had, as isolationist America had a
small standing army and some initial success might have been hoped for. Once
America declared war it began mobilising its enormous forces, forces large
enough to contend with anything that Japan could put in the field, without
significantly detracting from the forces it committed to Europe, as it did in World
War II.

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22. All this does not even take account of the fact that at this time the Japanese were
a British ally and a contingent of their Navy was engaged in the Mediterranean, in
action against the Austrian fleet.

23. A possible interpretation is that the words ‘invite Japan to immediate adherence”
conveys that the Japanese were already on board the alliance with Germany and
was only awaiting Mexico’s agreement. The proposition of prior Japanese
involvement raises a fundamental problem. There is not a single shred of
evidence in any archive document, memoir or biography of what would had to
have been an enormous amount of military planning and mobilisation on the part
of the Japanese. The single most important factor which counts against there
being any treaty between Germany and Japan, agreeing to a joint attack on the
US, is the absence of any record which indicates that this existed. While it is
highly improbable that all records of any such agreement have been lost, it is
inconceivable that the Japanese could have engaged in the enormous planning
and preparation that an attack on the US would have entailed and there not be a
single document left which suggest this. And this after Japan’s unconditional
surrender in World War II and American occupation.

24. The possibility of prior Japanese involvement being discounted one must return
to a literal interpretation of the telegram and conclude that at the time the
telegram was sent there was no Japanese involvement in Zimmermann’s plan.
This interpretation is supported by what is an almost fantastical facet of this affair.
Prior to the telegram being sent Zimmermann did not consult or have sanction
from the government, the Kaiser, or the military high command. Considering that
he was apparently attempting to form a military alliance in time of war this is truly
incredible.

25. It is also important that during the recriminations by German politicians that
followed exposure of the telegram, Zimmermann claimed he was merely acting in
accordance with the Kaiser’s policy of forming alliances against the Entente.
While policy was discussed there was never any mention of any agreement with
Japan still less a treaty.

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Conclusion

26. It follows from the above that:

(a) it was not possible for Germany to make good the offer of financial support
of the magnitude required;
(b) it is highly unlikely that the timing of the offer would be left to the German
ambassador;
(c) the suggestion that Mexico invite Japan to join in this attack on America,
admits of two possibilities. First that prior to the telegram the Germans had
come to an understanding with the Japanese but wanted Mexico to broach
tripartite negotiations, for no obvious reason. It this was the case then to
be an actual strategy, immense planning and mobilisation by the
Japanese was required. In the absence of any record of such a huge
undertaking this possibility can be discounted. Second if the Japanese
were not already on board then there was simply not enough time to
mount the invasion prior to American mobilisation and the prospects of
success post American mobilisation were zero.

27. All the above indicates that it could never have been thought by Zimmerman that
the telegram could have accomplished what it purported to. The question then
becomes “is this treason or is it stupidity”. Two things point to the former. If one
discounts the idea that the telegram intended to put in train a Mexican invasion of
America then the only point of the exercise was to threaten the possibility. At best
this might have meant the commitment of some US forces to America’s Mexican
border. It may have sowed distrust with Japan, which was engaged in an
important theatre of the war.

28. The official story is that the telegram was intercepted by British intelligence,
illegally, as it was sent via the US ambassador, all German telegram services
having being cut by the Entente powers. As such the interception and decoding is
held up as an example of the virtue of illegal military action. The point is that you
cannot threaten someone if they are not aware of the threat. Looked at this way
the alleged interception must have been intended by Zimmerman, as the only
way you can have a secret treaty that becomes public knowledge and hence a
threat, is to have it revealed.

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29. This theory is reinforced by the fact that a widespread American reaction to the
publication of the telegram was one of incredulity. The perfidious nature of British
propaganda was well known and the conflict between reality and assumptions
made in the telegram were ridiculed, importantly by the enormously influential
Hearst press. Despite ‘plausible deniability’ Zimmermann publicly acknowledged
responsibility for the telegram, twice. In doing this he must’ve been conscious
that he was contributing to his nation’s military defeat, which the Entente had
made clear would only be on unconditional surrender.

30. On the other hand some folks do really dumb stuff, although such is not generally
expected of Foreign Ministers of major powers. It is possible that Zimmerman
thought that the Americans could be threatened because he mistakenly conflated
isolationism with weakness, which ironically is the position both Tuchman and
Boghart take. It is possible that Zimmermann’s gambit reflected the mindset
apparently exemplified in the above comments he made on the sinking of the
Lusitania but for myself there is a question mark over the accuracy of that quote
as I find it very difficult to equate the words used with the claim that they were
cheerfully spoken. It may have been that Zimmerman was certain unrestricted U-
boat warfare would bring America into the war and thought it didn’t matter what
he did. However the Telegram itself says that he will be doing all he can to keep
America neutral, which is what one would think was the German Foreign
Minister’s job description.

31. It should be mentioned that in Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress seeking

that America declare war on Germany, very little mention is made of the
Zimmermann telegram and the great bulk of that speech focuses on Germany’s
unrestricted submarine warfare. However, it could be seen that the effect of the
telegram was to attack American isolationism, particularly in Congress, by linking
Germany with the spectre of war on American soil.

32. It appears then that the reason why the Telegram was sent and Zimmermann
admitted to sending it, was possibly one of the following:
(a) Zimmermann was an incompetent fool who didn’t know what he was
doing;

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 (b) Zimmermann expected the proposed alliance to be revealed and intended
for it to operate as a threat rather than a reality. Quite how he thought this
would advance German interests is unclear and we probably return to (a)
above;
(c) Zimmermann was an incompetent fool who didn’t know what he was
doing. He was manipulated by British intelligence into sending the
Telegram and the interception story is a myth. This sounds pretty wacky
but the cue bono, or ‘who benefits’ approach is often the right one.
Certainly the British were the only ones who benefited from the
Zimmermann telegram and that the interception was bogus was a widely
held view at the time. There is some foundation. Boghart writes that the
idea was not Zimmermann’s own2 and that Zimmermann was a man who
was easily manipulated by lobbyists3. Unfortunately it is a weakness of
Boghart’s work that he does not drill deep enough and we do not learn
who these lobbyists were. What cuts against this theory is Zimmermann’s
public acceptance he sent the telegram as it is hard to see him as being
that stupid.
(d) Zimmermann was a traitor. He was part of a British plot to undermine
American isolationism and bring America into the war against Germany. He
sent the telegram knowing it would be revealed and antagonise America. He
admitted responsibility for it so as to hasten American involvement in the war
and the defeat of Germany.

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