Pecson v.

Mediavillo
28 Phil. 81

FACTS:
Florencio Pecson last will and testament of was presented to the CFI of the Province of Albay
for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground
that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the
Judge, found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law.
Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words
following: That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to
show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him; that the interested party
did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental
faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks. The
CFI ruled that Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane,
was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

Issue:
Whether the disinheritance is valid.

Ruling:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices
the person disinherited. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years
of age, she had received some attentions from a young man — that she had received a letter from
him — and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations
between her and the said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her
disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use
of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the
present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very
soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not
responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.

1 – Abe Pasandalan
 Patricio v. Dario III
GR No. 170829, Nov. 20, 2006

FACTS:
Marcelino Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties
he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon. Perla,
Marcelino Marc and, Marcelino III, extrajudicially settled his estate.
Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino III of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Marcelino III refused to partition the property
claiming that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino
and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-
year-old son, the grandson of the decedent. He argued that as long as the minor is living in the family
home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Hence, petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition.

Issue:
Whether the respondent's minor son can be considered a beneficiary under Family Code 154.

Ruling:
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson’s legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of
the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for
its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in
Art. 996 of the Civil Code. Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children
survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half
of the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory
heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the
property), the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the
respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla
Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.

2 – Abe Pasandalan
 Seangio v. Reyes
508 SCRA 177 (2006)

FACTS:
Respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia
is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because
she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20,
1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for
the probate of the will.

Issue:
Whether there was preterition.

Ruling:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et
al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. The other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However,
insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply since she not being
a compulsory heir in the direct line.

Manuel v. Ferrer
247 SCRA 476

FACTS:
The property involved is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses
Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio
had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of
the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was executed in favor of Juan Manuel
by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his
name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their
own "daughter".
Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro
(with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died
intestate. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

Issue:
Whether or not Modesta is entitled to share even being an “ampon” who was not formally
adopted in accordance with law.

Ruling:
In Article 992 of NCC it enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession
as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family."
3 – Abe Pasandalan
The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the
one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent,
it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. Thus, it has ruled that where the
illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle
who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is
animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must
always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.
Modesta admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward
(ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

Javier v. Lucero,
G.R. No. L-6706, March 29, 1953

FACTS:
Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son before they got married, named Alfredo
Jr. After the celebration of marriage, the father went to US since he was listed as US Navy. The
mother and Alfredo Jr. went to live with her parents while the husband was in US. When the
relationship between the spouses become strained, husband petitioned for divorce before State of
Alabama. After the decree was issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice (having been divorced
with the former before celebration of subsequent marriage).

Issue:
Whether or not if the testator has been acquitted on the ground of “lack of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt” or “lack of criminal intent,” does this necessarily mean that the accusation
was groundless?

Ruling:
Article 919 of NCC, par. 2 states that “When a child or descendant has accused the testator
of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has
been found groundless.”
The causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants will not apply. In other words,
the testator would not, in such a case, have the right to disinherit the accusing heir.

4 – Abe Pasandalan
 Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court
150 SCRA 645

FACTS:
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of
Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son
of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in
1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and the petitioners six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. Judge
Jose Raval in his Order declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero. Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further
taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Issue:
Whether or not David is a Filipino citizen as contemplated by R.A. 9225 at the time of
application.

Ruling:
There is a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Section 3 of R.A. 9225 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The
second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention
of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and
"retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
Thus, David still a Canadian citizen at the time of the filing of MLA application.

5 – Abe Pasandalan
 Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828, June 7, 1966

FACTS:
There is a petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was
filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI. It was alleged that both parents of the minors
have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that
since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children
have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. Later, the court granted the petition for
adoption. Eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of
the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and
Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living
and had not abandoned them. Also, Demetria Ventura, a first cousin of the deceased and mother of
Paulina opposed the petition of Simplicio.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are disinherited on the ground of void adoption.

Ruling:
They are not disinherited since consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was
abandoned.
Article 920, par. 1 of NCC provides that a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of parents or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate is, "When the parents have abandoned their children
or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue."
Abandonment includes not merely the exposure of the child or descendant to danger but also
the failure to give it due care or attention. (6 Sanchez Roman 274). Abandonment is indeed physical,
moral, social or educational; hence, it does not have the technical signification of “abandonment”
under the Rev. Penal Code. Moreover, whether intentional or not, the negligent and careless failure
to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element of abandonment.
Hence, the respondents are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.

6 – Abe Pasandalan
 Delos Santos v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-45027, Jan. 27, 1992

FACTS:
Virginia T. Reyes had a baby who died after the mother died of coronary embolism on the
same date she gave birth to the baby girl. This allegation was specifically denied in the answer of
respondent Reyes, who repeated his averment therein in his testimony in court that the baby was born
dead because its head was crushed when extracted from the mother's womb with forceps. Yet,
appellant did not take the witness stand to deny this fact. None of his documentary evidence on the
sole reliance of which he rested his case relates to how the baby was born — alive or dead.

Issue:
Whether or not most the petitioner have inherited the property in question from the child,
because the latter inherited it from its mother.

Ruling:
The appellant failed to discharge the duty imposed upon him for having alleged the death of
his wife prior to that of his child, but also failed to contradict the positive and categorical testimony
of Reyes that the child was born dead.
The alleged admission in the answer of the appellees spouses to substantiate the allegation of
the appellant in his complaint is ineffective against the specific denial in appellee Reyes' answer,
repeated in his testimony. With this particular matter in issue, it is Reyes who is directly concerned,
and the supposed admission of the appellee-spouses who are complete strangers to the family of
appellant and Reyes, can have no binding force and effect upon the latter. Hence, on the opposing
claims as to who would inherit the property in question, that of appellee must be sustained as the
lower court ruled correctly. With this finding alone, the dismissal of the complaint would be in order
and fully justified.

Pastor, Jr. v. CA
G.R. No. 56340, June 24, 1983

FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor
Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada
consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.‘s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court
appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered
or affected by the holographic will. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate.
For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained
unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but
upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing
was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of
Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS
and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS
was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent‘s estate, of which
Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr.
and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being
―immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment.

7 – Abe Pasandalan
Issue:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity.

Ruling:
The question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto,
but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order
allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere
in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary,
it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will ―with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.

8 – Abe Pasandalan
 Vera v. Navarro
10
79 SCRA 608

FACTS:
A petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction filed by herein petitioner
Michael Vera, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, against Honorable Judge Pedro
Navarro, in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI).
Elsie Gaches died without a child and left a last will testament. Respondent Judge Bienvenido
filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the said will as he was appointed as executor. The
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue filed with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly estate
tax, inheritance tax, and income tax

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs should be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the probate
court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them.

Ruling:
The distribution of the ascendants assets may only be ordered under the following three
circumstances namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond
is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the nature
enumerated therein, or (3) when the payment of said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in
the said rule has been provided for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the
inheritance due from the estate is concerned were present when the questioned orders were issued in
the case at bar; likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient bond has been filed to
meet the outstanding obligation

9 – Abe Pasandalan