EN BANC In its September 5, 2002 Resolution, the Committee on Decorum
It resolved to disbar respondent on the
A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO
UNTIAN, JR.
RESOLUTION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Subject of this Resolution is an Anonymous Complaint1 dated
May 14, 2002 against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr.
(respondent) for his alleged sexual harassment of students of
Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City (Xavier).
The May 14, 2002 Complaint requested the Court to investigate
the alleged sexual harassments that respondent had committed
against students of Xavier, particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco),
Christina Sagarbarria (Sagarbarria) and Lea Dal (Dal). The
complaint was written in the local dialect and made by an
individual identifying himself or herself only as "law practitioner."
In a September 26, 2002 Letter, the "law practitioner" sent copies
of the complaint-affidavits of the victims of sexual harassment
and the Resolution of the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (Committee on Decorum).
Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous
interest when he sent her flowers anonymously through another
law student. She stated that thereafter, respondent would often
text her through the phone of another law student. Toyco noted
eventually that respondent texted her through his own phone
where he would send romantic messages, poems, love notes
and sweet nothings. She said that respondent also invited her to
go to Camiguin with another law student but she turned it down.
Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted,
respondent's unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as
she could not easily ignore respondent for fear of reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that respondent
showed her a photograph revealing only the face of a woman
and asked her if she knew who the woman in the picture was.
After she realized that the woman in the picture looked like her,
respondent revealed the entire photograph revealing a naked
woman and teased her within hearing distance of other law
students. Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because
she had a distinctive mark on her back for the past six years. She
averred that the incident caused her depression, fearing what
other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria highlighted that
she was unable to participate in a scheduled moot court
competition because she broke down in the middle of practice
and cried uncontrollably.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during
respondent's class, she clarified a question propounded to her
saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted "What? You want
me to come again? I have not come the first time and don't you
know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me to
come again?" She later learned that respondent would narrate
the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt offended that
she was subjected to such sexually charged language and the
fact that her embarrassment was retold in other classes.
Commissioner Hababag.
recommended that respondent's teaching contract not be
renewed on account of the accusations of sexual harassment
against him. It explained that respondent was guilty of violating
Xavier's anti-sexual harassment guidelines. The Committee on
Decorum noted that respondent's unwanted sexual advances
or innuendos caused distress to the complaining students as it
created a hostile or offensive environment.
Respondent's Position
Respondent lamented that the complaints for sexual
harassment was made by disgruntled students who failed their
classes for the 2001-2002 school year as manifested by the fact
that the incidents happened years apart but the complaints
were made all at the same time.
Respondent denied sending flowers and text messages with
romantic undertones to Toyco. He highlighted that it was in fact
her who gave him gifts during Valentine's Day in 2002.
Respondent added that he texting "luv u" and "miss u" are
friendly text messages sent without malice especially
considering that they were misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he
confiscated the photograph from another student and jokingly
showed it to her in the spirit of their open and uninhibited
relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his niece and they
were previously close as they would oftentimes exchange
discussions on sensitive and mature matters as adults without any
malice. Respondent claimed that she was never humiliated
when he showed her the photograph because she even gamely
lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in the
photograph because unlike her, the naked woman did not have
any tattoo.
On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered
disrespectfully when she was called for recitation uttering "Come
again?" He posited that to inject humor during class, he
responded "Never use slang language in my class because you
might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?'
It takes me several minutes before I come again." Respondent
expounded that the joke was directed at himself and that Dal
never showed any resentment or showed any sign of humiliation
as she even laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front of
the class.
IBP Proceedings
In his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 19, 2009,
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag)
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two years. He observed that respondent was
given all the opportunity to explain his side in the investigation
that Xavier had conducted. Commissioner Hababag reminded
that lawyers must be of good moral character and must
continue to possess it so long as he is part of the legal profession.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2010-2896 dated April 16, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
affirmed with modification the recommendation of
ground of gross immoral conduct.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. In its Resolution No. XXII-
2017-8047 dated January 27, 2017, the IBP-BOG partially granted
his motion for reconsideration. It reduced the penalty to two
years suspension and directed the Director of the Commission
on Bar Discipline to prepare an extended resolution explaining
its actions.
In his June 9, 2017 Extended Resolution, Director Ramon S.
Esguerra (Director Esguerra) explained that respondent was not
guilty of sexual harassment as defined under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7877 or the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995." He noted
that there was no evidence to show that respondent demanded
or requested sexual favors from Toyco, Sagarbarria and Dal.
Nevertheless, Director Esguerra expounded that while
respondent's actions do not constitute sexual harassment as
defined by law, the way he interacted with his students were
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. He stressed
that being a law professor, respondent should be worthy of
emulation and should not have used his position and stature to
make offensive sexual insults on his students. Director Esguerra
postulated that the penalty of two years suspension is a sufficient
sanction to protect the public and the legal profession.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the recommended penalty of the IBP-BOG.
In the case at bench, some of respondent's students accused
him of sexual harassment claiming that his actions were sexual in
nature and had offended or humiliated them.
R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as
sexual harassment committed by a teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainer or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in an education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the same is
accepted by the object of the act. In particular, it is committed:
Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the
offender;
Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or
tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a
passing grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the
payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or
considerations; or
When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.10
The IBP-BOG opined that respondent was not guilty of violating
R.A. No. 7877 because there was no evidence to show that he
demanded or requested sexual favors from the complainants.
1
Nevertheless, it found respondent's action unacceptable and
conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to
the sexual desires of the abuser. Further, it is not necessary that a
demand or request for sexual favor is articulated in a categorical
manner as it may be discerned from the acts of the offender. In
addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an educational
environment when the sexual advances result in an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment. In short, it is not necessary that
there was an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a
superior's conduct with sexual underpinnings, which offends the
victim or creates a hostile environment would suffice.
In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court explained that the
essence of sexual harassment is not the violation of the victim's
sexuality but the abuse of power by the offender. In other words,
what the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power and
authority manifested through sexually charged conduct or one
filled with sexual undertones. In Domingo v. Rayala, the Court
clarified that R.A. No. 7877 speaks of the criminal infraction of
sexual harassment and without prejudice to any administrative
charge which may be filed against one who sexually harasses
another.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in CSC Resolution No. 01-
0940 defined the administrative offense of sexual harassment in
an educational environment as existing when:
SEC. 3 x x x
(b) x x x
(1)
submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a
basis for any decision affecting the complainant, including, but
not limited to, the giving of a grade the granting of honors or a
scholarship, the payment of a stipend or allowance, or the giving
of any benefit, privilege or consideration.
(2)
the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering
with the performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive academic environment of the complainant; or
(3)
the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause
discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a
complainant who may be a trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or
ward of the person complained of.15
In addition, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides examples of
sexual harassment, to wit:
SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:
(a) Physical
i. Malicious Touching
ii. Overt sexual advances
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation
(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for
sexual favors, and lurid remarks
(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or [written] notes
with sexual underpinnings
(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing].16
Respondent's actions towards the students concerned definitely
constitute sexual harassment as defined by R.A. No. 7877 and
the pertinent rules and regulation.
A reading of respondent's Answer would show that he
substantially admitted the accusations against him, although
providing a justification for them. He stated that he showed a
picture of a naked woman to Sagarbarria only as a joke and
after he had confiscated it from another student to prevent
further circulation in the school. Respondent narrated that he
would text Toyco with "luv u" and "miss u" but claimed that it was
a common everyday text devoid of any romantic overtones as
evidenced by its informality. Meanwhile, he clarified that the
statement he made to Dal was meant to inject humor in the
classroom and to teach her not to use slang language in class.
Respondent assailed that these accusations were due to them
failing in his class and that none of the purported victims
exhibited embarrassment or discomfort during the incidents in
question.
Respondent's conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco
created a hostile and offensive environment which has no place
in a learning institution. He publicly showed a lewd picture to
Sagarbarria in the presence of other students. The incident
deeply distressed her to the extent that she was unable to
continue with her Moot Court practice because she became
emotional and cried uncontrollably. The fact that Sagarbarria
was bothered and humiliated was even supported by one of
respondent's witnesses who stated that respondent demanded
that the photograph be surrendered to him because
Sagarbarria was disturbed by it.
In addition, respondent's action was reprehensible regardless of
Sagarbarria's reaction. He had the audacity to show lewd
images to one of his students in the hallway where other students
were present. Respondent's alleged close relationship with
Sagarbarria is not an excuse as it does not detract from the fact
that he exhibited the indecent picture in a public place. It would
have been different had he shown the photograph privately to
Sagarbarria especially since he claims that as uncle and niece,
they could talk about mature and sensitive topics without
malice. Respondent could have saved Sagarbarria from
embarrassment in having to identify the naked woman as herself
in public.
On the other hand, respondent should not brush aside his text
messages to Toyco and his joke to Dal as innocent remarks
devoid of any impropriety. He readily admits that he would text
"luv u" and "miss u" but explains that these are sweet nothings
and used in everyday ordinary text messages. These are not
harmless text messages especially since it appears that these
were unwelcome flirtations which made Toyco uncomfortable.
In addition, they cast a cloud of impropriety considering that
respondent was Toyco's teacher when he sent them.
Meanwhile, respondent's statement to Dal during her recitation
in class cannot be categorized as an innocent joke only meant
to lighten the mood of the class. When she was unable to
comprehend the question propounded to her, she asked him "to
come again." In response, respondent said, "Never use slang
language in my class because you might be misinterpreted.
What do you mean by 'come again'? It takes me several minutes
before I come again."
It is readily apparent that the remark is tasteless, vulgar and
crude and has no place in any academic setting. It is not a
clever word play or a mere statement with sexual innuendos as
its intended meaning is obviously discernable. Respondent's
attempt at humor miserably fails as his words clearly refer to him
needing five minutes to ejaculate again. Respondent's
statements made Dal uncomfortable and embarrassed in front
of her classmates as it went beyond an innocent joke and was
instead a gross, graphic and an insensitive remark.
Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he
possessed over the complainants. His sexually laced conduct
had created a hostile and offensive environment which deeply
prejudiced his students. In what was supposed to be a safe
place for them to learn and develop, they were instead
subjected to unwarranted sexual advances.
What makes respondent's act of sexual harassment even more
reprehensible is the fact that he is both a professor and a
member of the legal profession.
Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because public confidence in law and in lawyers
may be tainted by the irresponsible and improper conduct of
members of the Bar.17 Those privileged to practice the legal
profession are expected to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality considering that they are
always under the watchful public eye scrutinizing them both in
their public and private lives. 18
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the other hand,
Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at all times, uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Further, Rule 7.03 of
the CPR commands lawyers not to engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, or behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In
Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,19 the Court emphasized on the primacy
of maintaining a high sense of morality and decorum among
lawyers, to wit:
2
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement
of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more
than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he
is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."
xxxx
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards. (Emphases
supplied)
Much is expected of lawyers in that it does not suffice that they
are persons of integrity and values, but must also appear to be
so in the eyes of the people, and of God. Notwithstanding the
relativity of morality, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility — they must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution.20 In other
words, members of the bar are measured in a more demanding
light because their actions or inactions not only affect
themselves, but also the legal profession and the public's trust
and respect for the law. As such, any errant behavior on the part
of the lawyer, whether in a public or private capacity, which
tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.21
It must be remembered that lawyers are both preachers and
stewards of law, justice, morals and fairness in that they are duty-
bound to propagate observance and deference thereto. It is
not enough that they know right from wrong, just from unjust,
moral or immoral, because they must not only speak of such
ideals, but must also live by them. Lawyers, aside from being
competent and adept in dealing with the intricacies of the law,
must also be individuals of honor and virtue. Legal knowledge
and ability, without the guidance of morals and justice, is a
dangerous tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Respondent's responsibilities and expectations are even more
heightened because he is a law professor. He should be a
beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct. Respondent,
as a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers, should guide his
students to behave and act in a manner consistent with the lofty
standards of the legal profession. Instead, he abused his position
of authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable
atmosphere in school. Again, what should be a place of learning
and growth had become a place of fear and distrust for the
affected students.
Further, it is even more disappointing that respondent fails to
acknowledge the consequences of his actions and disregard
the hurt Sagarbarria, Toyco and Dal may have felt. He generally
claimed that they did not express any distress, embarrassment,
or humiliation during the incidents complained of. It must be
stressed that as their law professor, respondent exercised moral
ascendancy over them. Thus, it is within reason that the
concerned students could not have readily expressed disgust or
annoyance over a person in authority. It takes courage and
strength to stand up and speak against any form of sexual
harassment. This is especially true considering that in most cases,
the offender wields power, authority, or influence over the
victim.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and ten
(10) years from teaching law in any school effective upon the
finality of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be reflected on the records of respondent; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
January 10, 2018 A.M. No. P-17-3772
JOVITA B. LAMSIS, Complainant vs. JUDE F. SALES, SR., Process
Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet,
Respondent
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, J.:
For resolution is a complaint 1 filed by Jovita B. Lamsis (Jovita)
against respondent Jude F. Sales, Sr., Process Server, Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC) for Sexual
Harassment under Republic Act No. (RA) 7877,2 which was
forwarded3 to the Office of theCourt Administrator (OCA) by
Executive Judge Danilo P. Camacho (Judge Camacho).
The Facts
In an undated Complaint,4 Jovita narrated that she is an
employee of Sparrow Integrated Services, Inc. (Sparrow),
assigned as a janitress in the Hall of Justice, Benguet (HOJ) from
2004 up to the present. On October 6, 2012, she arrived at the
RTC for her Saturday duty. While she was removing the garbage
from the trash bin located at the second floor of the HOJ,
someone approached her from behind, calling her name. When
she turned around, she saw respondent walking towards her,
holding his private organ and showing it to her. Shocked, she
called respondent "bastos" and nervously ran to the first floor to
seek help. She claimed that it took her two days to muster the
courage to disclose her ordeal to her co-worker and later to the
Vice Executive Judge.5 She asserted that respondent's indecent
act towards her constitutes sexual harassment under RA 7877
and prayed for his preventive suspension pending investigation.6
In his Comment dated January 25, 2013, respondent pointed out
that the allegations in the Complaint were essentially lifted from
the October 24, 2012 Affidavit-Complaint8 for sexual harassment
filed by Jovita against him before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Benguet, docketed as NPS Docket No. 1-05-INV-
12J-1446. 9 Respondent admitted reporting for Saturday duty on
October 6, 2012 but denied showing his organ or committing any
act amounting to sexual harassment against Jovita on said date.
He maintained that he was actually busy on that date inside the
staff room of the RTC, which fact can be corroborated by his
officemates. 10 He also asserted that Jovita filed the present
administrative complaint after he filed a complaint against her
for Oral Defamation, Slander by Deed and Intriguing against
Honor before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, 11 adding that she violated the
rule against forum shopping by filing the Complaint after she had
filed the Affidavit-Complaint before the Prosecutor - now subject
of an Information 12 for Unjust Vexation before the Municipal Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet - based on the same facts. 13
Finally, he contended that the administrative complaint before
the OCA is premature for non-compliance with the procedures
laid down in A.M. 03-03-13-SC Resolution dated December 14,
2004 (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment
Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary).
14
On May 6, 2014, 15 the OCA recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondent for sexual
harassment be dismissed for being premature and that the entire
records of the complaint be referred to the Committee on
Decorum and Investigation (CODI) for its corresponding action
in accordance with A.M. 03-03-13-SC. 16
In a Resolution17 dated July 9, 2014, the Court adopted the
OCA's recommendation.1âwphi1 Hence, in a Memorandum18
dated September 30, 2014, the OCA referred the administrative
complaint to Judge Camacho, who was also the Chairperson of
the CODI, for corresponding action as recommended.
On March 14, 2016, the OCA received the Report and
Recommendation 19 of the CODI dated December 17, 2015
recommending the dismissal of the complaint for sexual
harassment against respondent, without prejudice to him being
charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct. 20 The CODI
found Jovita's allegations as true, noting that respondent had
been convicted of Unjust Vexation for the same act, but ruled
that respondent cannot be held liable for sexual harassment
under RA 7877 due to the lack of the element of moral
ascendancy over Jovita. This notwithstanding, it found that
respondent's actuation was reprehensible and constituted
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of the Civil Service
Rules.21
In a Resolution 22 dated October 10, 2016, the Court referred the
administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
3
In a Memorandum 23 dated September 29, 2017, the OCA
recommended that: (a) the administrative complaint against
respondent be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter;
and (b) respondent be found guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct, this being his second offense of the same nature; that
he be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
24
The OCA agreed that respondent, a Process Server of the R TC,
cannot be said to have moral ascendancy over Jovita, a critical
element of sexual harassment under RA 7877, as Jovita is a
contractual employee of independent contractor Sparrow. This
notwithstanding, respondent's act constitutes disgraceful and
immoral conduct which is classified as a grave offense and
punishable by suspension for six ( 6) months and one (I) day to
one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second
offense in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. Considering
that, per the records, respondent had been previously found
guilty of immoral and disgraceful conduct - an offense of the
same nature - in A.M. No. P-14-3267,25 the OCA concluded that
respondent should be meted the "severe penalty of dismissal
from the service without any mitigating circumstance to be
considered in his favor."26
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
OCA that respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and, considering that this is his second infraction of the
same nature, should thus be dismissed from the service.
Immoral conduct has been defined as conduct that is willful,
flagrant or shameless, showing moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community,27
and includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness.28 Section
1 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15,
Series of 2010 29 particularly defines disgraceful and immoral
conduct as a willful act that violates the basic norm of decency,
morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the
society.1âwphi1
In this case, the OCA's findings that respondent deliberately
exposed his private organ to Jovita and exhibited "gross sexual
innuendo" are well supported by the records.1âwphi1 In this
relation, the Court notes that respondent was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Unjust Vexation for the same acts
by the Municipal Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet in a
Decision30 dated May 14, 2014, which conviction was
subsequently affirmed, on appeal, by the Regional Trial Court, La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 on December 23, 2014. 31 It should
be emphasized that in administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. 32 All things considered, this standard of
substantial evidence has been satisfied in this case.
What made matters worse for respondent is the fact that this is
his second offense of the same nature.1âwphi1 As correctly
noted by the OCA, respondent had been found guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct and was sanctioned with "six
(6) months suspension without pay with a warning that a
repetition of the same act in the future will be dealt with more
severely"33 in a Resolution34 dated October 15, 2014 in A.M. No.
P-14-3267 entitled Jennylyn L. Colingan, Court Interpreter Ill v.
Jude F. Sales, Sr., Process Server, both of Branch 10, Regional Trial
Court, La Trinidad, Benguet. Clearly, respondent has not learned
his lesson, thus, calling for the harsh penalty of dismissal from the
service pursuant to Section 46 (B) (3),35 Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service36 (RRACCS), in
relation to Section 46 (b) (5),37 Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book
V of Executive Order No. (EO) 292, 38 otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." Under Section 52 (a), 39 Rule 10
of the RRACCS, in relation to Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty of dismissal carries with
it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification for holding public office.40
A final word. "It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court
of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel."41 Court employees should be circumspect on how
they conduct themselves in their professional and private affairs
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of
justice. 42 Respondent's actuation in this case is reprehensible
and has no place in any decent society, more so in the premises
of the HOJ that deserves respect from its employees even during
unofficial hours. This is a clearly offensive and indecent behavior
which the Court cannot countenance.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jude F. Sales, Sr.,
Process Server of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10 GUILTY of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, without
prejudice to his criminal liabilities.
SO ORDERED.
March 11, 2015 G.R. No. 175433
ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. MAILA CLEMEN F.
SERRANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales,2
assailing the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
August 16, 2006, and its Resolution4 dated October 4, 2006, in
CA G.R. SP No. 76959. The CA reversed and set aside the
Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 and the Order
dated February 11, 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162,
and reinstated the Decision dated March 19, 2002 of the
Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau approved by
then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-01-0162
(RAS-2001-0156).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty.
Maila Clemen F. Serrano (respondent) against her direct
superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal
Division of the Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), for
grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness.
In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent
alleged that on November 23, 2000, petitioner invited her, along
with her officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty.
III Eugene Juanson, and Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat
lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St., Makati City. While
seated at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner
suddenly took hold of respondent's face and forcefully kissed her
lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers.
Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away
from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her will. She was
so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly talk
and move. She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of
further embarrassment. After releasing her, petitioner said: "Ang
sarap pala ng labi ni Maila..." Then, he held her hand and said
"Maila sige na..." But, she took away her hand from him.
Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to
PHILRACOM Executive Director Juan Lozano.
Respondent also alleged that prior to that "kissing" incident,
petitioner had already degraded her person on four (4)
separate occasions, namely: (1) on the very first day she met him
in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell phone so that he
can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused;
(2) on that same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going
home, which she likewise refused; (3) a week later, he asked her
to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and (4) on August 23,
2000, after her sick leave from office, petitioner called her in his
office and scolded her and uttered the following unsavory
remarks:
Eh ayoko na sa iyo. Hindi mo sinabi sa akin na may anak ka!
Nasaan na ang tatay ng anak mo? Wala na? Ano pang hindi
mo sinasabi sa akin, may boyfriend ka? Akala ko pa naman ok
ka, kaya nga sinabihan kita dati na sumabay ka sa akin! Ang
daming nagrereklamo sa iyo dito. Hindi ka marunong makisama.
Makisama ka naman! Paano na kung alisin ka dito, makakabalik
ka pa ba sa dati mong opisina? Eh ayoko talaga sa iyo dito.
Ano? Do you have a choice? Alam mo ba na ako ang
nagrekomenda kay Eva diyan sa Admin. kay Chairman. Kaya ka
nakapasok dito dahil pakiusap ka lang [ni] Eva sa akin. Alam mo
bang nakasalalay dito and posisyon mo dito? Alam mo bang
kung ano mo ako dito? Ha? Ano mo ako dito? xxx Ano ngayon
ang gagawin natin eh ayoko nga sa iyo? Anong gagawin natin
ngayon?
4
Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate
her complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman because
the PHILRACOM Grievance Committee had not taken any
concrete action on her administrative case which had been
pending for over a month, and also because of petitioner's
relatively high position in the office.
To support her complaint-affidavit and to corroborate her
account, respondent submitted the Joint Affidavit6 of her
officemates Eva, Eugene and Roman, who witnessed the entire
"kissing" incident on November 23, 2000.
In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner
alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed to treat them
for lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money
for a "blowout".7 While their group were talking in the restaurant,
he greeted respondent and planted an innocent birthday
greeting kiss on her left cheek, near her lips. He also alleged that
he first met respondent when she applied for Attorney III; that on
July 1, 2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints
forwarded by the Personnel and Administrative Division as to her
frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of reviewing
her official functions was in accordance with his duties and
responsibilities as a legal counsel of PHILRACOM.
In her Reply-Affidavit,8 respondent stated that she never
solicited any favor from petitioner, let alone obliged him to
spend money for her birthday "blowout"; that his birthday lunch
treat was part of a premeditated evil plan to have her submit to
his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss her on the
cheek, much less on the lips; that in the course of her
employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he had often
made sexual advances and gestures towards her, but she still
tried to keep their relationship on a strictly professional level; that
the alleged work-related incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and
laziness were all intended to harass her; and that because of the
administrative case she filed against him, she lost her job.
Meanwhile, records show that in an Order of Termination dated
January 18, 2001, Executive Director Lozano ordered the
termination of respondent at the close of business hours of
January 19, 2001.9 Records also show that the Commission on
Human Rights issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2001 in CHR Case
No. 2001-037 which found petitioner to have committed acts of
sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and illegal dismissal
against respondent.10
In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to
appear for the preliminary conference of the administrative
case. Both parties appeared as directed and agreed to submit
the case for decision based on the evidence on record and
pleadings filed.
A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall
Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. (Overall Deputy
Ombudsman) in OMB-0-01-0039, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds sufficient
evidence that supports the conclusion that the crime of violation
of Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as "An
Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment,
Education, or Training Environment, and for other purposes," was
committed probably by the herein respondent. Let therefore,
the appropriate information be filed against Jacinto C. Gonzales
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
SO RESOLVED.11
On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation Officer Marlon
T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
among other officers, the Decision has the following dispositive
portion:
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial
evidence that respondent JACINTO G. GONZALES is guilty of
Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service is hereby
imposed upon him pursuant to Section 52 (A), par. 3, Rule IV of
Resolution No. 991936 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
The Honorable Chairman of the Philippine Racing Commission,
Electra House Building, Esteban Street, Legaspi Village, Makati
City is hereby directed to implement this Decision in accordance
with law and promptly report to this Office compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman
Administrative Adjudication Bureau denied in the Order dated
September 9, 2002.13
However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman
approved the Memorandum issued by Graft Investigation
Officer II Julita M. Calderon, with a decretal portion that states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we most
respectfully recommend that the herein ORDER dated
September 9, 2002 prepared by GIO Molina be MODIFIED insofar
as the infraction and the penalty to be imposed upon the herein
respondent is concerned, i.e., from
GRAVE MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from
DISMISSAL from the Service to a mere ONE (1) MONTH
SUSPENSION, without pay, pursuant to Section 52B (2) of Rule IV
of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.14
Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, attributing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006,
the CA sustained respondent and rendered the herein assailed
decision. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The memorandum-order dated 03 January 2003 and
the Order dated 11 February 2003 approved by then Overall
Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-
01-0162 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 19
March 2002 approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
in OMB-ADM-0-01- 0162 (RAS-2001-0156) is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.15
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time
to File Motion for Reconsideration,16 but the CA denied it in a
Resolution17 dated October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited
motion.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE MEMORANDUM-ORDER DATED 03
JANUARY 2003 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2003
APPROVED BY THE THEN OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. IN OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, IT
APPEARING THAT THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS ONLY SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN
TO HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION [sic], UPON
WHICH THE INSTANT PETITION IS BASED, IN GROSS
CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GROSSLY ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
THE GROUNDS INVOKED THEREIN NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR AND MOREOVER, THE DENIAL THEREOF HAS
SACRIF[I]CED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY
TO TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE.18
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that it is only in an appealed
case, not in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, that the CA
has authority to substitute its own findings and conclusions with
that of the disciplining authority. He points out that what is
claimed as "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman was his alleged erroneous approval of the
Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 which modified the
infraction and the penalty from grave misconduct to simple
misconduct, and from dismissal to a mere one (1) month
suspension without pay. But, he argues that such was merely an
error in the exercise of judgment or discretion which is not
correctible by a writ of certiorari. He also argues that the mere
fact that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman made findings and
conclusions contrary to or inconsistent with those of the
Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau cannot, by
itself, be considered grave abuse of discretion, as the findings of
the disciplining authority is always subject to amendment,
corrections or reconsideration. He concedes that the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman found him to have committed misconduct
amounting to sexual harassment. However, he points out that
such finding of simple misconduct, instead of grave misconduct,
is supported by facts and circumstances, and such finding is
within sole discretion of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman over
5
which the courts have no authority to interfere. At any rate, he
submits that his misconduct was not motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose; hence, the
extreme penalty of dismissal is not warranted. Finally, he
maintains that the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed
and resolved in the criminal case for violation of Section 3(a) of
R.A. No. 787719 (docketed as Crim. Case No. 311165) pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for to
do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust
and extremely unreasonable.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the CA grossly
erred in applying the two prohibitions laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Court of Appeals,20 which was reiterated
in Ma. Imelda Argel, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,21 i.e., the
doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-
extendible, and the prohibition against the filing of a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in all courts,
except the Supreme Court. He insists that the denial of such
motion for extension should be based on the court's assessment
of the grounds relied upon and not on purely procedural
technicality. He seeks to justify his urgent motion for extension on
the fact that, as Presiding Judge and Pairing Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Olongapo City, he was beset with
pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation
of court orders and decisions, and large volume of case load.
He prays for a liberal construction of procedural rules in order to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.
Ruling
There is no merit in the petition
The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In
Imperial v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court ruled:
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v.
Japzon, we have laid down the following guideline:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution,
the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as
the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny the extension requested.
Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is consistent
with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial
is filed within the 15- day reglementary period, the CA’s decision
becomes final. Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of the 15-
day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the
end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final, immutable
and beyond our power to review.23
This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal
reading of the rule,24 so long as the petitioner is able to prove
the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.25
No such reasons were shown to obtain in this case. Petitioner's
reasons of pressures of work attending to numerous court trials,
preparation of court orders and decisions, and large volume of
case load, are foreseeable and perennial problems of most trial
court judges. Such reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary
prudence should have prompted him to secure the services of
an independent counsel to defend his administrative case.
While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for
Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration for being a
prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into
the merits of the case, and opted to suspend the prohibition
against such motion for extension after it found that a
modification of the CA Decision is warranted by the law and the
jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual
harassment. The emerging trend of jurisprudence, after all, is
more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of
procedural rules.26 Rules of procedure exist to ensure the
orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end,
inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their
operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the
purpose of justice requires it.27
The Court shall now delve on the substantive issue of whether the
CA gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-Order of the
Overall Deputy Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's
infraction from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and the
penalty imposed on him from dismissal to a mere one (1) month
suspension without pay.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari,28 the Court
explained the difference between simple and grave
misconduct, as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.1âwphi1 The misconduct is
considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as
corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence;
otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an
element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In other words,
in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be evident.
In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner used his position and
authority as Head of the Legal Division of PHILRACOM, as well as
his moral ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors and to indulge in
sexually malicious acts from his respondent, his female
subordinate.29 As to petitioner's sole defense that he merely
gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is
unconvinced in view of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates
attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips and said: "Ang
sarap pala ng labi ni Maila. x x x"
In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,30 the Court found the respondent
public officer, who merely attempted to forcibly kiss the
complainant, guilty of grave misconduct through sexual
harassment, thus:
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss
her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred
months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to
[complainant] De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual
advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts
respondent committed against petitioner were much more
aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his
actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that
petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous
relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner
while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as
petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons),
respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored
petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule
attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995.
Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of
this law and its contents, more so because he was a public
servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her
without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his
intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual
harassment in the work environment. Assuming arguendo that
respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss
petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had
existed since time immemorial – that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s
defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex
were more appalling because he was a married man.
Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women and
disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.31 (Emphasis
added)
However, it bears emphasis that in Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,32 the
Court ordered the respondent public officer's dismissal from
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, because it was the third time that he was
penalized for acts of sexual harassment. In determining such
penalty, moreover, the Court considered the length of his service
as an aggravating circumstance.
Apropos to this case is Civil Service Commission v. Nierras33
where the Court upheld the CA's decision finding the
respondent public officer guilty of grave misconduct through
sexual harassment with a reduced sentence of six (6) months
suspension without pay, thus:
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying
the case of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing the proper penalty
6
on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it
should be noted that in the instant case, Oña and Nierras are
not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the
complainants were the subordinates of the offender. Also, in the
Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual
harassment by a judge from whom the expected standard of
morality was more exacting. But here, there was only one
incident of sexual harassment. If a six-month suspension can be
meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality
is more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be
meted to Nierras. Moreover, in the Caminade case, the offender
actually forcefully kissed and grabbed the complainants.
However, in this case, Oña was able to flee from the arms of
Nierras even before he could cause more harm to her. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that suspension of the offender for a period of six (6)
months without pay is sufficient penalty.34
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court agrees with
the CA that petitioner should be held liable for grave
misconduct, but holds that a reduction of the penalty from
dismissal from service to a mere suspension of six (6) months
without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade,35 there is
only one incident of sexual harassment in this case where
petitioner forcibly kissed respondent who was his subordinate. If
a six (6)-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom
the expected standard of morality is more exacting, it is logical
that a similar penalty should be meted to petitioner.
Moreover, the Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months
suspension without pay is in conformity with Civil Service
Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940 entitled the
Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.
Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as
grave, less grave and light offenses, while Sections 55 and 56,
Rule XI provides the corresponding penalties therefor, to wit:
"RULE X
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave
and light offenses.
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
1.unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia,
buttocks and breast);
2.sexual assault;
3.malicious touching;
4.requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment,
promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable working conditions
or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or
scholarship, or the grant of benefits or payment of a stipend or
allowance, and
5.other analogous cases.
B.Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to: 1.
unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body; 2.
pinching not falling under grave offenses;
3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed
toward the members of one sex, or one’s sexual orientation or
used to describe a person;
4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
5. other analogous cases.
C.The following shall be considered Light Offenses;
1.surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person’s private part
or worn undergarments;
2.telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text,
electronic mail or other similar means, causing embarrassment
or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised
that they are offensive or embarrassing or, even without such
advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing,
offensive or vulgar;
3.malicious leering or ogling;
4.the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
5.unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
6.unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7.making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
8.persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
9.unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing
discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the receiver; and
10.other analogous cases.
RULE XI
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 55. Any person who is found guilty of sexual harassment
shall, after the investigation, be meted the penalty
corresponding to the gravity and seriousness of the offense.
Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses
are as follows:
A. For light offenses:
1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Fine or suspension not
exceeding thirty (30) days 3rd offense – Dismissal
B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days
and not exceeding six (6) months 2nd offense – Dismissal
C. For grave offenses: Dismissal" (Emphasis added)
Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual
harassment offense petitioner committed falls under less grave
offenses which is analogous to "unwanted touching or brushing
against a victim’s body", and to "derogatory or degrading
remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one
sex", with the corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay.36
Section 53 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, or the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),37 states that
in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating,
aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered. The following
circumstances shall be appreciated:
a.Physical Illness
b.Good faith
c.Taking undue advantage of official position
d.Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e.Undue disclosure of confidential information
f.Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g.Habituality
h.Offense is committed during office hours and within the
premises of the office or building;
i.Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the
offense
j.Length of service in the government
k.Education
l.Other analogous circumstances.
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be
invoked or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, said
circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of
proper penalty. The Commission, however, in the interest of
substantial justice may take and consider these circumstances.
The Court notes that the Deputy Overall Ombudsman was
correct in appreciating the following mitigating circumstances
7
in determining the imposable penalty, to wit: (1) petitioner's
weak physical condition and (2) commission of the offense in a
public place and in the presence of their office mates. However,
the said Ombudsman gravely erred in failing to consider the
following aggravating circumstances: (1) taking undue
advantage of official position; (2) taking undue advantage of
subordinate; and (3) education. As the Head of the Legal
Department of PHILRACOM and the direct superior of
respondent, petitioner's act of forcibly kissing her lips and saying
"Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila x x x" in front of their office
mates, smacks of bad faith, abuse of official position, flagrant
disregard of the anti-sexual harassment law,38 and willful
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Under
Section 54 (d) of the URACCS,40 where more aggravating
circumstances are present than mitigating ones, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty
of suspension of six (6) months without pay.
Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and
unqualified power41 to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee
of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof,42 the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason to
indicate otherwise.43 As discussed above, the Court finds such
good and compelling reasons based on law and jurisprudence
as would warrant the modification of the CA decision, as well as
the Memorandum-Order of Overall Deputy Office of the
Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that
the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed in the pending
criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, for to do so in an administrative proceedings
would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable. It bears to
stress that administrative and criminal charges filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman and the trial court, respectively, are
separate and distinct from each other even if they arise from the
same act or omission. This is because the quantum of proof
required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
while in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required. Moreover, the purpose of the administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On
the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime.44 Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal
case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative action
against the respondent.45
Finally, considering that the Court is reducing the penalty
imposed on him from dismissal from service to a mere 6-month
suspension without pay, and that he is no longer connected with
PHILRACOM, petitioner should refund the salaries and all other
monetary benefits he had received equivalent to six (6) months
with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from
finality of this Decision until fully paid.46 His earned leave credits
for the duration of such suspension are likewise deemed
forfeited.47 The Court stresses that his appointment48 as a trial
court judge should not be viewed as a sort of exoneration from
such suspension that he should have served while he was then
PHILRACOM's Legal Department Head. Thus, in addition to the
refund of salaries and benefits, and forfeiture of earned leave
credits during such suspension, the Court sternly warns petitioner
not to commit similar acts, otherwise, his conduct may be
construed as tainted with impropriety which shall merit the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial
and Bar Council which disqualifies from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post those with pending criminal or
regular administrative cases, the Court finds it necessary to
investigate whether petitioner declared in his application for
appointment his pending administrative case for grave
misconduct and criminal cases for sexual harassment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution dated
October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959,are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, reducing the penalty for grave misconduct
through sexual harassment from dismissal from service to
suspension of six (6) months without pay, and with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be punished
with dismissal from the service. Considering, however, that
petitioner Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales is no longer connected with
Philippine Racing Commission, he is ORDERED to REFUND the
salaries and other monetary benefits he could have received
during the period of such suspension with legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid. Further, his earned leave credits during such period of
suspension are also deemed FORFEITED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to form part of petitioner's service record.
The OCA is hereby DIRECTED to investigate, report and
recommend the necessary action on whether petitioner
declared in his application for appointment his pending
administrative and criminal cases.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4149-RTJ),
February 25, 2015
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA (SAMABAHU),
Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from an unsigned
letter received by the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) on April
18, 2013, purportedly written by a group of female court
employees styled as “Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura”
(SAMABAHU).
The aforesaid letter charging respondent with sexual harassment
reads:
April 5, 2013
Hon. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the Philippines
P. Faura St., Manila
Ma’am,
Tulong po, marami po kaming kasamahang babae dito sa RTC,
Makati na binabastos at hinihipuan sa SUSO, PUWET at harapang
bahagi ng katawan ni Judge Cezar Untalan, [J]udge ng RTC,
149, at naging Acting Judge ng RTC Br. 145.
Isa siyang MANYAKIS na nagtatago sa Bible pero kurap at
salbahe sa empleyado. Kawawa po ang mga kasama kong
sina:
1) Sarah - court aide ng Br. 149, tuwing pinapapasok siya ni
Judge Untalan sa kuwarto niya ay hinihipuan ito umiiyak na lang.
2) Tess Rol - Stenographer ng Br. 65 at kamag-anak ni Sarah,
pinuntahan niya si Sarah sa Br. 149 para tanungin sa tsismis, pero
siya rin ay hinipuan sa PUWET ni Judge Untalan kaya minura niya
ito.
3) Weng - Clerk III, RTC 145 mas madalas siyang hipuan sa puwet
kahit galit na galit siya noong Acting Judge sa Br. 145 si Judge
Manyakis.
4) Marissa - Stenographer, Br. 145 hinipuan din sa suso.
5) Ana San Pedro - Process Server, Br. 145 HINALIKAN sa nguso
habang hinihimas ang SUSO.
6) Sarah - Interpreter, Br. 145. Hinalikan din at hinimas ang suso.
May nakakita po sa kanila. Ang 2 nasa huli (Ana & Sarah) ay
pumayag na pagsamantalahan dahil lahat sila ay takot sa
banta ni Judge na ibabagsak ang performance rating noon.
7) Aurora - Legal Researcher, Br. 149. Dinukot din ni Judge
Untalan ang gilid ng suso.
NATATAKOT PO SILA para daw pong BALIW si Judge,
ipapsychological test po siya.
SAKLOLO ipatawag po niyo sila upang malaman ang totoo.
SUSPENDEHIN MUNA si manyakis habang iniimb[e]stigahan o
ilipat sa ibang Br. sa Metro Manila ‘wag sa Makati.
Alam po ito ng Judge ng 145 na si Judge Calpatura, at marami
pang Huwes. Pati ba sila ay takot kay Judge Untalan?
8
Mayabang siya at bastos, pag binati mo siya ng “Good morning
Judge” ang isasagot parati sa iyo ay “What is good in the
morning?.
Corrupt siya at yumaman nang maging Judge ng “Commercial
Court.” We challenge you your Honor, gawin niyong “Drugs
Court” siya para di siya kumita. Tingnan niyo ang Administrative
cases niya NAPAKARAMI. Malakas daw siya sa inyo at kay DCA
Delorino at Vice-President Binay. (Bakit matagal idecide mga
administrative case niya?)
Noong isang Linggo sinigawan niya at hiniya si Atty. Jamora Br.
Clerk of Court at Process Server ng RTC Br. 56 dahil sa agawan
ng parking ng kotse niya at Judge Pascua ng Br. 56. Nilamukos
at ibinato sa mukha ng Process Server ang papel na katunayan
na kay Judge Pascua ang parking space sabay mura kay Atty.
Jamora at Process Server. BALIW NA PO SI JUDGE UNTALAN,
SAKLOLO. Babae ka rin po.
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA
The anonymous letter was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) which dispatched a team of four (4)
lawyers tasked to conduct a “discreet investigation” and submit
a report. The team verified the identities of the alleged victims
named in the letter thru telephone calls. They eventually met
with two female employees of Makati City RTC, namely Mrs.
Rowena “Weng” P. Ripdos (Ripdos), Clerk III at Branch 145, and
Ms. Marissa Fe B. Herradura (Herradura).
On June 17, 2013, Ripdos and Herradura executed their
respective affidavit-complaints2 before the City Prosecutor of
Makati.
In her Affidavit-Complaint,3 Ripdos alleged that on April 22, 2011,
she and Herradura remained at Branch 145 while their office
mates went out for lunch. Respondent suddenly arrived and
shouted for her to come inside the chambers. She was made to
sit infront of respondent’s table while respondent looked angrily
at her. She then asked “Bakit po, Judge?” and respondent
inquired if her husband was around. When she replied that her
husband, who is an employee of the Makati City Hall detailed at
Branch 145, was not there, respondent quickly stood up saying
“pahalik” while holding her cheeks. She hurriedly rose from her
seat and told respondent she was going out but he also stood
up, saying “sandali! pahalik ulit.” Respondent embraced her
and kissed her on the neck and chest while rubbing his body
against hers. She tried to push him away but respondent knelt
down with one hand clasping her waist while the other was on
her breast. Respondent’s face was slumped on her womb while
her hand was on her breast; his body seemed to be
“nanggigigil.” When respondent stopped and released her, she
quickly went out of the chambers and ran towards Herradura.
She narrated to Herradura what respondent did to her and
Herradura exclaimed “Putang-inang Judge, iyan pati ako pinisil
ang aking suso” at the same time demonstrating how
respondent pinched her breast.
After the alleged incident, Ripdos claimed that respondent
threatened her with a low performance rating and transfer to
the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Since then, she tried to
avoid the respondent but when the time for accomplishing the
employees’ performance ratings came, respondent summoned
her and her husband. Respondent declared that he intended to
write this Court to request for her removal and attach her
performance rating with “Satisfactory” grade. When she
retorted that she will just respond to such charge, he got mad
and told her she is hard-headed and that he will talk to the judge
who will replace him at Branch 145 to give her a low rating. At
this point, she told respondent that he knows what he did to her.
Upon hearing this, respondent changed his mood and calmly
told them that he actually went to church where St. Andrew
pleaded to him because if she is dismissed from her job, she and
her husband would be pitiful and they would have no means to
send their children to school, and respondent would see them
living on the streets while his car passes by them. Respondent
then warned her not to complain to the administration because
no one will believe her, she is just an employee and her enemy
is a Judge and he can have her removed.
Herradura corroborated the statement of Ripdos that she
divulged to her what respondent did to her. She narrated her
own experience with respondent whom she claimed pinched
her breast twice while she was working infront of the computer
and respondent was standing behind her. When she asked
respondent why, the latter did not answer and just left. She felt
shaken and later told everybody in Branch 146 and her office,
and also Atty. Danilo Lacson, what happened to her. Sometime
thereafter, respondent called her to his chambers and told him
that her office mates have many stories about her. She
repeatedly denied it but respondent kept on saying she was
lying. Respondent also asked her to report to him what Anna,
Sarah and “Tatang” (retired clerk) have been saying about him,
which confused her because these were his loyal employees
and thus she refused. Respondent then said the reason he called
for her was to tell her he will give her a low performance rating if
she will not apologize right away, but she told him she does not
know what she has to apologize for. After this, respondent said
her office mates dislike her because she does not talk to them.
She dared him to call all her office mates to confront them but
respondent said “Never mind, no need.” Respondent then
reiterated he was going to give her a low performance rating,
and when she asked why respondent said “I don’t have to tell
you, you know.” He even made her read each criterion in the
performance rating sheet, saying she would fail. Again, he
insinuated at another employee (“Tatang”) who supposedly
complained that she does not talk to him, and she denied
having dealt negatively with said employee. She told
respondent that she and her office mates have been together
for 20 years already and have not quarreled until now, which
respondent did not take well as it alluded to him as the reason
for the rift. When respondent insisted he will still give her a low
rating, she replied that she will just fight it and told him he was
being unfair and unjust. Realizing that she will not apologize to
him, he asked how the matter was going to end and she told
him it was him who is more broad-minded.4cralawlawlibrary
In their Report5 dated October 1, 2013, the investigating team
submitted the foregoing affidavits and stated that they have
gathered information that the following staff members serve as
the “eyes and ears” of respondent: Myrna Dizon and Roberto
Guilang (locally funded employees) and Eugyne del Rosario
(Clerk III, Branch 149, RTC Makati City). The team said it is
necessary to place respondent under suspension “to literally
clear the air and ensure an unhampered investigation”6 as they
believed once respondent is suspended, “more victims will
come out or it will be easier for the Team to reach out and solicit
more information/evidence.”7 It was further recommended that
Dizon and Guilang be recalled to their mother unit while del
Rosario in the meantime should be detailed to the OCC-RTC
Makati City.
After evaluation, the OCA concluded that the allegations in the
anonymous complaint are far from being figments of the
imagination as the complainants described in detail their
experience with respondent. It thus recommended that the
case be docketed as a regular administrative matter and
referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding Justice to be
raffled off among their Justices for investigation, report and
recommendation. Respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and directed to file his comment to be submitted to
the CA Investigating Justice. Further, the OCA ordered that del
Rosario be detailed to the OCC-RTC Makati City, and that Dizon
and Guilang return to the City Government of Makati.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied all the allegations of
improper conduct imputed to him and submitted the supporting
affidavits of his three female employees (Atty. Grace C. Tang-
Togado, Branch Clerk of Branch 149; Shara Joy Brillo, Branch 149
Court Aide; and Aurora T. Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher II at
Branch 149). He argued that the standard of substantial
evidence is not met in this case considering that the alleged
date mentioned by Ripdos in her affidavit, April 22, 2011, was in
fact an official holiday as it was Good Friday. The manner in
which the “discreet investigation” was conducted was likewise
assailed by respondent, pointing out that the OCA team’s
findings were apparently based on hearsay from unnamed
sources. Respondent also lamented the fate of Dizon, Guilang
and del Rosario who were unjustly labeled as “moles” by
anonymous, unevaluated sources. He stressed that the team
itself admitted the flaws in their investigation, as they had to
resort to measures in order for them to reach out and “solicit
more information/evidence.” As to the charge of corruption,
respondent asserted there was no evidence on record except
for the allegation in the anonymous letter. Accordingly, he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The case was assigned to CA Justice Danton Q. Bueser who
conducted hearings where the following witnesses testified: Atty.
Analiza T. Parra (OCA), Ripdos, Herradura, Herman Manigbas,
respondent Judge Untalan, Shara Joy Brillo, Rosanna San Pedro
and Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson.
In his Final Report and Recommendation, Justice Bueser found
respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual
harassment as he exercised moral ascendancy over the
complaining female court employees. He found the testimonies
given by Ripdos and Herradura credible and that their silence
for two years before filing the present complaint can be
explained by their fear of losing their jobs. On respondent’s
denial, Justice Bueser declared that it cannot prevail over the
witnesses’ credible testimony. He thus recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.
9
After thorough evaluation of the records, we are unable to
concur with the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden
of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.9 Further, it is settled that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the
Investigating Justice.10 The findings of investigating magistrates
are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of the
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses
as they testified.11 The rule which concedes due respect, and
even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.12 However, there are some exceptions to
the rule according finality to the trial judge’s assessment of a
witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would affect the result of the
case.13cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the OCA and the Investigating Justice found
credible the allegation of Ripdos that respondent made sexual
advances on her despite respondent’s assertion that such
incident could not have happened considering that the date
stated in her Affidavit (dated June 17, 2013) - April 22, 2011- was
Good Friday, a regular holiday and hence all government
offices including courts are closed. Notably, it was only during
the investigation proper at the CA that Ripdos corrected herself
in her Judicial Affidavit14 dated June 2, 2014, after respondent
had raised the issue in his Comment,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
88. QUESTION: Sinasabi ni Judge Untalan sa kanyang Motion for
Reconsideration at Comment na ang date na April 22, 2011,
kung kelan nangyari umano ang pangmo-molestiya sa iyo, ay
Biyernes Santo o Good Friday. Nabasa mo ba ito?
ANSWER: Opo.
89. QUESTION: So kung Good Friday ang April 22, 2011, bakit mo
nasabi na ikaw at si Marissa Herradura ay nasa opisina nuong
araw na ito?
ANSWER: Maari po na ako ay nagkamali sa pagsabing April 22,
2011, pero sigurado po ako na naganap sa araw ng Biyernes sa
petsang April 2011 yung pangmo-molestiya sa akin ni Judge
Untalan.
90. QUESTION: Paano ka nakaka-siguro na araw ng Biyernes,
April 2011, nangyari ang insidente?
ANSWER: Kasi po wash day po kami kapag Biyernes, hindi po
kami required mag[-]uniform.
91. QUESTION: Sabi mo wash day kayo nuong Biyernes na iyon,
natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang suot mo nuong araw na
iyon?
ANSWER: Opo, sir.
92. QUESTION: Ano ang suot mo nuong araw na iyon?
ANSWER: Ako po ay naka-jacket na maong, pulang blouse at
maong na pantalon.
93. QUESTION: Bakit mo naa-alala ang suot mo nuong araw na
iyon samantalang 3 taon na ang nakakalipas?
ANSWER: Hindi ko po makakalimutan ang aking suot nuong
Biyernes na iyon dahil may ginawa sa akin si Judge Untalan na
hindi maganda at hindi mawala sa aking memorya.15 (Italics
supplied)
It may be recalled that as early as June 13, 2013, the OCA team
gave Ripdos a copy of her Affidavit so she can read and review
the same. When the team returned on June 17, 2013, Ripdos
when queried on the contents of her affidavit said that she was
satisfied with it and did not make any correction on the date of
the alleged incident stated therein.16 Her claim that it was pure
oversight on her part is thus difficult to believe, and so with her
silence for two years when, except for Herradura, she had not
complained to the proper authorities about respondent’s
improper act.
Respondent vehemently denied the charge of sexual
harassment. On Ripdos’ claim, he presented the following
documentary evidence to prove that on all Fridays of April 2011,
except April 22, he conducted hearings on his own court (Branch
149)17:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Certification dated July 9, 2014 issued by Branch Clerk Atty.
Danilo C. Lacson stating that hearings of cases presided by
Judge Cesar O. Untalan at Branch 145 were regularly scheduled
at 2:00 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, except for
some instances when Judicial Dispute Resolutions were at times
held on Thursdays in the afternoon, and that for the month of
April 2011, these were held at 2:00 p.m.;
Court Calendar, Journal entries of scheduled hearings and
Minutes of hearings, as well as Orders issued by Judge Cesar O.
Untalan at Branch 149 on the Fridays of April 2011, except April
22, the court sessions starting at 8:30 a.m., and hearing of
motions at 2:00 p.m.
The OCA contends that these pieces of evidence are irrelevant
because as narrated by Ripdos, the incident took place during
lunch break and it lasted for only a few minutes. It points out that
while Atty. Tang-Togado testified that she normally sees
respondent taking his lunch at the canteen, she admitted that
she does not know his whereabouts after that. However, the
OCA failed to consider the fact that since respondent had no
scheduled hearing at Branch 145, where he was merely a Pairing
Judge, and with his hands full of hearings morning and afternoon
at Branch 149, it was unlikely that on one Friday of April,
respondent would momentarily escape to Branch 145 at lunch
break to commit the act of sexual harassment imputed to him
by Ripdos. Meanwhile, Atty. Tang-Togado clarified that while she
leaves the canteen after buying her lunch, with respondent
there still eating, the latter usually returns to their office (Branch
149) after eating his lunch, then takes a nap, comes out at 1:00
to 1:30 p.m. to ask about his scheduled hearings for the day, and
conducts hearing again at 2:00 p.m.
Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-
related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is
committed when “the sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee.”18cralawlawlibrary
In this case, while respondent exercised moral ascendancy over
Ripdos and Herradura, his subordinates at Branch 145 where he
had temporarily presided as Pairing Judge at the time, the
alleged sexual advances by respondent were not proven with
moral certainty. We find that the totality of evidence failed to
convince that respondent committed the acts imputed against
him.
For one, SAMABAHU appears to be a non-existent group as
Ripdos and Herradura, and the other female court employees
who testified for respondent, all declared they had not known
nor heard about such organization. This Court has stressed that
an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution,
originating as it does from an unknown author. But such nature
of the complaint does not always justify its outright dismissal for
being baseless or unfounded, as it may easily be verified and
may, without much difficulty, be substantiated by other
competent evidence.19 While the herein letter-complaint may
be treated as an anonymous complaint, the Court must still
prudently examine it in the light of all evidence presented.
The letter-complaint not only raised serious allegations of
improper conduct against respondent, it also listed no less than
seven female employees in Makati City RTC who were allegedly
victims of sexual harassment perpetrated by respondent. The
OCA team’s “discreet investigation” resulted in the affidavits of
Ripdos and Herradura procured through coordination with
Makati RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr..
Accusing some staff members of Branch 149 as “moles”, the
OCA team had them transferred and respondent placed under
preventive suspension because supposedly such measure will
pave the way for more victims to come out or it will be easier for
the team “to reach out and solicit more information/evidence”.
But on the contrary, even with the suspension of respondent and
removal of his purported “eyes and ears” in his court, the team
never got to obtain any information/evidence, other than those
claims of Ripdos and Herradura, to support the charges against
him, and the team also did not investigate further in the Office
of the Executive Judge. In defense of respondent, his Branch
Clerk together with three of his female subordinates and another
10
employee assigned at Branch 145, who were listed in the letter-
complaint as “victims” of respondent, submitted their respective
affidavits and testified on his good character, categorically
denying having been sexually harassed at any time by
respondent.
Atty. Grace C. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk at Branch 149,
affirmed the contents of her affidavit and identified the
documents relative to the hearings for the month of April 2011.
She worked for respondent for almost ten years and attested to
his dedication to his duties and responsibilities and his adherence
to the laws and rule in performing their functions; his being a
devout Catholic who starts his day with reading the Bible; he
would leave often during lunch break, telling her he was going
to attend Mass. Upon learning that respondent was charged
with sexual harassment, she was shocked because she had
known him as a person of morals and integrity.20 On the work
habits of respondent, she recounted that before and after a
hearing, respondent is usually at his chambers reading the cases
to be heard, reviewing the pleadings filed each day and
signing/annotating Orders he issued. On Fridays, she sees
respondent eating his lunch at the canteen, then proceed to his
chambers to take a nap, after which he comes out asking for
the cases scheduled to be heard, and thereafter conduct
hearings again in the afternoon at 2:00 p.m. Respondent usually
reports for work at 8:00 a.m. and leaves the court at 5:00 p.m.,
and he is not fond of going out of his sala as he seldom socializes
with other people. She normally sees respondent eating his lunch
at the canteen and usually goes back to their office after having
his lunch.21cralawlawlibrary
Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher at Branch 149, was
the “Aurora” mentioned in the letter-complaint. She testified that
she felt bad upon being shown said letter because it contains
false allegations. Despite her inclusion in the list of alleged
victims, she was never contacted by anyone to verify such
allegation.22 She confirmed her statements in her Affidavit
where she described respondent as a diligent, dedicated and
hardworking Judge who imparted to his staff his high standards
of work ethics, as well as his moral and religious principles, always
showing concern for the welfare of his staff, and inspires them to
become better individuals. She vehemently denied that
respondent committed any sexual misconduct on her person
and neither has she experienced anything offensive in the
workplace, and likewise not heard of the existence of
SAMABAHU nor have knowledge of the alleged sexual
complaints against the respondent.23cralawlawlibrary
Shara Joy Brillo, Court Aide at Branch 149, testified she was the
“Sarah” mentioned (No. 1) in the letter-complaint, and learned
about the case filed against respondent sometime in October
2013. She told respondent that she had nothing to do with the
complaint as no association or person even approached her.
She voluntarily executed her affidavit as she could not believe
respondent can do such things. She knows another Sarah, court
interpreter at Branch 145 whom she asked if respondent had
done anything bad to her but she replied in the negative. The
latter also confided to her that there was some
misunderstanding among her office mates at the time and Sarah
feared that the other staff of Branch 145 were against her
because she had wanted to testify for
respondent.24cralawlawlibrary
Rosanna San Pedro, former Process Server of Branch 145 and
now Barangay Captain of Napindan, affirmed that she was the
“Ana San Pedro” mentioned in the letter-complaint. She testified
that the alleged lewd act of respondent against her never
happened. As to SAMABAHU, it was only at the hearing of the
case that she heard about such group. She denied the claim of
Herradura that she was also present when Herradura was being
molested by respondent.25cralawlawlibrary
Sarah Cuares, Court Interpreter of Branch 145 testified that she is
the “Sarah” mentioned (No. 6) in the letter-complaint and
denied that respondent sexually harassed her, nor that anyone
else had witnessed that respondent was molesting her and
another female staff. While she admitted that Ripdos is her office
mate, she had no idea that Ripdos has executed an affidavit
against respondent. As to Herradura, she recalled that she had
been telling stories that she (Herradura) was pinched by
respondent at her back. Since she was busy working at the time,
she did not pay attention to such story.26cralawlawlibrary
The foregoing testimonies of witnesses who have worked more
closely with respondent on a daily basis, testifying as they did in
a candid, spontaneous and straightforward manner, and there
being no reason to believe they had any other motive in
testifying except to tell the truth, put serious doubts on the
veracity of the allegations of Ripdos and Herradura.
To refute the declarations of respondent’s witnesses, counsel for
complainants (Atty. James Navarrete) presented their rebuttal
witness, Herman L. Manigbas, an employee of the City
Government of Makati who is detailed at the office of Atty.
Escasinas (OCC) as Court Aide at Branch 149, and had been
office mates with Shara Brillo from 1988 to 2007. Manigbas made
a sketch showing their respective desks at the office. On the
alleged sexual advances committed by respondent against
Brillo, he had seen this many times from 2005 to 2006. About ten
times, he saw respondent holding Brillo at the side of her breast.
On Brillo’s denial that these happened, he said that Brillo was just
afraid to tell the truth because she might lose her job. Although
they always talked, he never asked her about it especially since
respondent did it jokingly. As to Aurora Usero-Jackson, he
claimed that he also witnessed about three times respondent
holding the side of her breast but did not complain and simply
goes to Atty. Tang-Togado. He worked at Branch 149 only until
2007 when respondent had him transferred and it was Atty.
Escasinas who accepted him at the OCC as casual
employee.27cralawlawlibrary
We are not persuaded by this bare claim of Manigbas who
could not even state the date, time and factual circumstances
when he allegedly witnessed respondent’s improper behavior.
Moreover, giving weight to his testimony aimed at disproving the
alleged victims’ categorical declarations in court, is an affront to
the dignity and reputation of these women who have
categorically and publicly denied they were sexually molested
by respondent.
In sum, the Court finds that Ripdos and Herradura failed to
substantiate their charges against respondent by the required
quantum of proof. While it is true that their affidavits were replete
with details describing the alleged sexual advances, such
detailed narration by itself will not suffice and will not
automatically result in a guilty verdict. Ripdos never reported the
alleged lascivious acts by respondent to the proper authorities
until two years later when the OCA team went to their branch.
This seeming lack of urgency on her part in taking concrete
administrative action against a wayward judge bears heavily on
her case.
The same thing can be said of Herradura, who appeared to
have told everybody at Branch 149 and Branch 145 her story
about respondent pinching the side of her breast, and yet failing
to complain before the proper authorities considering that the
alleged infraction took place within the court premises. Rosanna
San Pedro even denied Herradura’s claim that she was also
present when the aforesaid incident allegedly took place. In
contrast, respondent presented credible testimonial and
documentary evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that
he could not have committed the alleged sexual advances.
Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence
to create a moral certainty that Judge Cesar O. Untalan
committed the acts complained of.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are
viewed by this Court with utmost care, for proceedings of this
nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents
concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well.28
Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial
evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances committed
against them by respondent, elementary justice dictates that he
be exonerated from the said charge.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Cesar O. Untalan is hereby
EXONERATED of the charges against him. The present
administrative complaint is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of
sufficient factual basis.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 146053 : April 30, 2008]
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN,
Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Dioscoro F.
Bacsin questions the Decision1 dated August 23, 2000 of the First
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900,
which affirmed Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998
and Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999, both issued
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner from
the service for Grave Misconduct.
Facts of the Case
Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary
School, Pandan, Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent
Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school
student of the petitioner.
11
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be
at his office to do an errand.2 Once inside, she saw him get a
folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and
place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and
when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her
breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that
she felt afraid.3 A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas,
claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the
fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.4
Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge
dated February 12, 1996 by Regional Director Vivencio N.
Muego, Jr. of the CSC.5
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident
happened by accident, just as he was handing AAA a lesson
book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about
two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any
complaint.7
Resolution of the CSC
In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found
petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual
Harassment), and dismissed him from the service.8 Specifically,
the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act
constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied in Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the recourse docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 51900.
Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:
1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and
the Honorable Civil Service Commission to magnify the
accidental touching incident on August 16, 1995;
2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the
evidence on record; andcralawlibrary
3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the
penalty of removal.9
In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved
around petitioner's right to due process, and based on its finding
that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there
was no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner
was formally charged with "disgraceful and immoral conduct
and misconduct," the CSC found that the allegations and
evidence sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt of grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.
The Issues Before Us
The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present
petition:
1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual
harassment, grave misconduct, which was different from or an
offense not alleged in the formal charge filed against him at the
inception of the administrative case.
2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and misconduct as charged by complainant, whether
or not the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed by the
Civil Service Commission and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and applicable rulings.
3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense,
includes the offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty
of an offense, such as "Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual
Harassment)," different from that specified in the formal charge
which was "Misconduct." He further argues that the offense of
"Misconduct" does not include the graver offense of "Grave
Misconduct."
This argument is unavailing.
As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case
need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a
criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the
substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.10
It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of
the charge against him, which was his act of improperly
touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself
from such charge. The failure to designate the offense
specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case.
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877,
The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the
petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to
the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need
not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala,11 it was held, "It
is true that this provision calls for a 'demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor.' But it is not necessary that the
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender."
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit
demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA
was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under
Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education
or training environment is committed "(w)hen the sexual
advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice." AAA even
testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.12 It
cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when
it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence
presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of
grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of
administrative agencies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are binding upon the Court.
Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense
in the formal charge, it must be discussed whether or not
petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by the CA and CSC, of
"Grave Misconduct," as distinguished from "Simple Misconduct."
From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear that there is
misconduct on the part of petitioner. The term "misconduct"
denotes intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule
of law or standard of be
We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be
manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is
against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The
particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a
case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any
norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a
grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their
children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians
while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of
grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his
unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the
functions of his office.
Petitioner's second argument need not be discussed further, as
he was rightly found guilty of grave misconduct. Under Rule IV,
Section 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases,
"Grave Misconduct" carries with it the penalty of dismissal for the
first offense. Thus, the penalty imposed on petitioner is in
accordance with the Rules.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his
claims. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 These
elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly
informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a
student should not be allowed, under any circumstance, to
practice this noble profession. So it must be here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
12
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his
capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as
Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations Commission);
and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority"
which is enough to dampen an employee’s spirit and her
capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it
changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari
assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA’s Former
Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified
the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals’
Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office
of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala
(Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo),
then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for
sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit
narrating the incidences of sexual harassment complained of,
thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman
Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman
at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang
ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa
mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka
mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na
nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw
gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor,
may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor
kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na
gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para
gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman
Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na
sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya
sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal
na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga
magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw
ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law
at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at
inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot
at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka
siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung
saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may
makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I don’t
give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at
pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento
ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang
kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na
nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni
Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot
ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita
Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko
ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na
nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil
marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong
Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din
sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking
palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni
Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay
nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza
Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong
araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap
ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si
Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay
umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may
mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hpon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-
aapply na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman
Rayala:
13
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po
yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman
Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon
niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng
unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby
Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako
ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na
niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman,
hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang
kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta.
Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay
niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at
pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko
inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang
kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi
ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na
nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of
absence and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter,
she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of
Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the
Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee.
The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the
Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative
Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a Committee on
Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with
Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective
evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report
and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala
guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition
of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it
erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the
Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with
the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora,
issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with
the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the
respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by
clear and convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent’s situation is the undeniable
circumstance that he took advantage of his position as the
superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest
position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office,
it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the
others as to how they should conduct themselves in public
office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in
accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to
provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-
workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and
cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be
benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182
SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and
strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a
public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to
duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec.
4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a
public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and
employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987
Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondent’s acts not
just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to his co-
employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a
government official must at all times uphold, one that is contrary
to law and "public sense of morality." Otherwise stated,
respondent – to whom stricter standards must apply being the
highest official [of] the NLRC – had shown an attitude, a frame
of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to
remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I.
Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is
found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective
upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied
in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was
dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding
the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated
September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held
that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral
certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with.
It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her
straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated
by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x
x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious
motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is
very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from
office. Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala
failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook
doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and
convincing evidence (People v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]).
Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a
story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the
NLRC and thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her
job, or be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps
public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed
out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral
conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that
the OP was correct in concluding that Rayala’s acts violated RA
6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship
of the National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the
sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such
an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price
for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life
should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That
the acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of
[his] office compounded the objectionable nature of his
wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the
solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the
integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral
conduct warrants his removal from office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the
Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-
9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
14
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices
Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14
Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO
250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the
CA, a Special Division of Five was constituted.17 In its October
18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is
MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED
and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the
petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which
we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a
defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court
essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same
in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’ Motion
for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the
three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty
imposed by the Office of the President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the
respondent from dismissal to suspension from service for the
maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative
to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring
Presidential appointee. The President was well within his power
when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to dismiss the
respondent from the service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential
appointee, is lodged with the President who has control of the
entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process.
Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is
entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same
was not intended to cover cases against presidential
appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the
DOLE Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO
does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an
erring presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE
OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION
OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS
MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY
APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the
definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he
posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there
must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
(b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment,
or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in
discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish
any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in
exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without
malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of
malice in his alleged acts – a "product of her own imagination"25
– that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by the
CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of
absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual
harassment is considered an offense against a particular person,
not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an
essential element of the offense because the law requires as a
conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the
offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual
harassment is committed with the perpetrator’s deliberate intent
to commit the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in
RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of
sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual harassment may
be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited
to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes
of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or
offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand,
request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as
contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making
power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is
limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to
the employer the power to promulgate rules which would
provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to
come up with its own definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss
respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts
of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual
harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or
improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a
sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the
victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction
of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala’s dismissal is valid and
warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the
NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by
the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only
a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly
imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even
though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the
Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave
misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The
Republic adds that Rayala’s position is invested with public trust
15
and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from
the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by
Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of
the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during
good behavior.33 Since Rayala’s security of tenure is
conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from
office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in
two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by
Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this
Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.34 It
consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1)
identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent
the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the
same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or
will constitute litis pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we
note that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on October
18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on
November 22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition
before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republic’s
Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the
CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its
Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on June 16,
2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court on July 3,
2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum
Shopping" (sic), that there was a case involving the same facts
pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With
respect to Domingo’s petition, the same had already been
dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo’s petition was
reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by
the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own
petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty
of forum shopping. We must point out that it was Rayala who
filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse
party. Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the
CA’s December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more
favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to
one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling
(Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same
on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a
Petition for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the
Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely
exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then
already filed cases before the SC did not take away this right.
Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment
on Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be
cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the
case were unanimous in upholding the findings of the
Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the
Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate
analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses." 38 They
differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty
of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the common factual finding
of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,
the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when
supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle,
therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There
appears no valid ground for this Court to review the factual
findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee.
These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite
significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some
of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint
that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her
promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his
case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public
officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.
An action for each can proceed independently of the others.43
This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.
Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this
wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted
by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or
privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the
criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The
same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of
an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative
relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for
administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,
Education or Training Environment. – It shall be the duty of the
employer or the head of the work-related, educational or
training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts
of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of
office shall:
16
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation
with and jointly approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated representatives,
prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the
proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a)
shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in
the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases
on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings,
as the case may be, with other officers and employees,
teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students
or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of
sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the
alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall
be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the
management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative
from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case
maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution
shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of
all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he
is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the
CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of
the President, found substantial evidence to support the
administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards
set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable.
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated
in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a
promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound
with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating
and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the
common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP
and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate
and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and
requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced,
because the factual setting in that case is different from that in
the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the
Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice)
Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained of several
incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced
her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred
to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report,
Justice Salonga found that "the complainant failed to show by
convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting
her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso’ fashion, were
carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated
by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that
most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other
people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or
happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the
cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the context
of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and
not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge
Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were
simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design.
The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the
cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was
corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem
and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice
'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas,
New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not
matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays.
Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays,
respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck on the
cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several
festive occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked
respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of
Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six
occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her
cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant
was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were
given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she
did not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those
incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was
exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the
case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts
(of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with
other people present, in the instant case, Rayala’s acts of
holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office
when no other members of his staff were around. More
importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s
acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work
environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the
matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a
leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he
argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time
of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of
program and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even
assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its
coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250
covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events of this case
unmistakably show that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly
assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the
participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by
the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process,
reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the
investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action
to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct
of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual
harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that
intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the
acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he
should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for
sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment
is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus
constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions
cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As
we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been
proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on
the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample
reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill
motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses – all
employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs or
suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and
charging their boss with sexual harassment.
17
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to
due process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of
railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the
OP’s decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for
violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for
"disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is
a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In
previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all
these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the
beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try
him,49 he appeared, personally and with counsel, and
participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in
criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not controlling,
thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts
to disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any finding of
liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability
for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises
penalty to be imposed. control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took
advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis
under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who
conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is
charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating In yet another case, this Court declared:
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing
the penalty. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more
exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for
22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.60
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on
immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months how his employees should conduct themselves in public office,
and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working
by dismissal. atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a good
example.61
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to
sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo’s character in
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55 question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President
who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here
valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as
provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October
was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as
As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of to costs.
either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for
disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months SO ORDERED.
and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the
Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of
dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed
upon commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took
advantage of his high government position, it still could not
validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue
advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance57 and where only aggravating and
no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty that can be
imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the
rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid
standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-
Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of
therein respondent Judge, said:
18