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Motivation and Attention: A

Methodological Problem
a a
Ferdinand Stern & Samuel Karson
a
U. S. Naval Training Center , San Diego, California,
USA
Published online: 02 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Ferdinand Stern & Samuel Karson (1954) Motivation and
Attention: A Methodological Problem, The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and
Applied, 38:2, 321-329, DOI: 10.1080/00223980.1954.9712941

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 Published as a separate and in ThP Journal of P s y c h o l o g y , 1954, 98, 321-329.

MOTIVATION A N D A T T E N T I O N : A METHODOLOGICAL
PROBLEM*
U. S. N a v a l Training Center. San Diegn, California

FERDINAND
STERNA N D SAMUELKARSON’.

A recent symposium on motivation has revealed a marked discrepancy in

opinions as to the basic nature of this concept. T h e view is expressed that
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motivation is a distinctive process, a determinant of behavior, which is to be

distinguished from an associative phenomenon ( 3 ) . Stated more specifi-
cally this position holds that drives merely “activate or energize ...
(associa-
tive) tendencies” ( 3 , p. 18). A n opposing trend is evident in the belief
that “motivational selectivity becomes a consequence rather than a direct
determinant of such (associative) dispositions” (12, p. 58) although it is
maintained that often this view “merely serves to push back the problem
of motivational determinants” (12, p. 58). O t h e r theorists emphasize that
some manifestations of motivated behavior represent particular characteristics
of man without stating unambiguously whether they consider motivation t o
be a distinctive process per se o r merely an associative phenomenon ( 5 , 10).
T h e central topic of this paper is the methodological problem of keeping
psychological theory which aims a t the explanation of events determined by
the principle of causality free from all concepts alien to it. I n contrast to
natural science, which deals with the is, ethical systems, including the legal
law, determine w h a t the conduct of individuals ought to be. “ T h e distinc-
tion between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ is fundamental for the description of
(legal) law” (9, p. 3 7 ) as well as for the theoretical formulations of natural
science. It seems, however, that this distinction is not always adhered to
and that what appear to be fundamental concepts of psychology, such as
motivation and attention, are actually ethical concepts ; therefore, any at-
tempts a t incorporation of these concepts into psychological theory introduce
logical fallacies which result in interminable controversy. I t may well be
that some theorists find it difficult to accept a strictly mechanistic determina-

*Received in the Editorial Office on June 17, 1954, and published immediately at
Provincetown, Massachusetts. Copyright by T h e Journal Press.
‘The authors gratefully acknowledge many helpful criticisms and suggestions by
Dr. Virginia W. Voeks.
“he opinions or assertions contained in this article are the private ones of the
writers and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the view of the Navy De-
partment or the naval service at large.
32 1
 322 J O U R N A L OF PSYCHOLOGY

tion of all behavior because it seemingly denies freedom of action and is there-
fore difficult t o reconcile w i t h the concept of responsibility which is a corner-
stone of any social organization. Responsibility, however, which has been
pointed out in a different context (16), is a concept of ethics and the legal
law and not properly a concept of a natural science like psychology. T h e
present authors hold that such a methodological error is to a great extent
accountable for the distress experienced by many contemporary psychologists
“at the thought that, unlike other scientists, they have not yet reached agree-
ment on their basic repertoire of terms a n d concepts” (1, p. 138).
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Similarly, the tendency in some traditional theories of jurisprudence is

to ignore the borderline that separates a theory of legal norms which regulate
human behavior from a science that causally explains actual human behavior.
T h i s failure results in a confusion of the problem of “how men legally ought
to behave with the question as to how men actually do behave” (9, p. x v ) ,
resulting in the inclusion of concepts of natural science into legal theory. A
brief digression is required to clarify this point. A few of the many pseudo-
problems and fictions which arise from such a methodologically indefensible
syncretism of methods will be illustrated : a statute is mistakenly considered
the will or a command of the legislator; a l a w is held valid only in the case
of conforming behavior by the individuals who are bound by this law ; a
dualism of state and law is created which raises the further problem of the
applicability of the l a w to the state whose existence supposedly pre-dated the
creation of the law, a problem that “plays such a great rble, especially in
German jurisprudence” (9, p. 197). Finally, one of the most paradoxical
notions of all, that the state is an organism o r a t least “organic in ita na-
ture-meaning thereby, that its genesis and development, though partly
.
artificial, are to a large extent . . governed by natural laws” (15, p. 68).
T h e “pure theory of law” (9, p. xiii), a monistic theory formulated by
Kelsen, “is directed a t a structural analysis of positive law rather than a t a
psychological or economic explanation of its conditions, o r a moral or political
evaluation of its ends” (9, p. xiv). T h e theory demonstrates that the ex-
istence of a statute depends merely upon completion of the legislative proce-
dure prescribed by the constitution and that an identification of the psycho-
logical processes involved in voting for a measure with willing its content is
a t best a fiction considering the frequent instances when members of the leg-
islative assembly “have a t most a very superficial knowledge of its contents”
(9, p. 34). Kelsen’s theory shows further that the validity of the legal order
merely means “that men ought to behave as the legal norms prescribe” (9, p.
39) ; thus, validity is recognized as a “quality of law” (9, p. 40), and not
 FERDINAND STERN A N D SAMUEL KARSON 323

of the actual behavior of the individuals for whom the law is binding, since
this behavior may a t times radically differ from the behavior demanded by the
law. T h i s theory eliminates the problem of the dualism of law and state as
a theoretical problem by revealing the dualism to be a hypostatization of the
“personification of a legal order” (9, p. 197). T h e concept of an organic
nature of the state is recognized to be the outcome of a political ideology
aimed a t enhancing its prestige in the eyes of its ~ i t i z e n r y . ~
Returning now to motivation and attention, a critical analysis of the treat-
ment of these problems may well reveal that they are pseudo-problems which
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result from a hypostatization of labels conveniently used to evaluate certain

aspects of behavior. M a n y situations obtain in which only certain kinds of
behavior are approved and other kinds of behavior are disapproved. Approval
is sometimes expressed in stating that the subject has “motivation” o r pays
“attention” whereas disapproval is expressed by referring to lack of “moti-
vation” or “attention.” Failure to recognize that the terms motivation and
attention are merely labels denoting value judgments (approval o r disap-
proval) and that they are not determinants of behavior can lead to the notion
that some behavior occurs without “motivation” or “attention.” Now, once
motivation and attention are not considered characteristics of all behavior, then
they can easily acquire the status of determinants of same behavior and at-
tempts a t explaining their r6le leads to continuous controversy. I t follows
that any definitions of motivation or attention, whether conceived of as de-
terminants of behavior or merely as associative phenomena, actually contain
value judgments.
I n his treatment of the so-called “drive for money” (3, p. 16) Brown dis-
tinguishes between drives which themselves are nondirectional, merely activat-
ing or energizing latent associative reaction tendencies and the specific reac-
tion tendencies themselves. According to him unavoidable routine accidents
during the first years of a child’s life produce pain and anxiety. Concomitant
display of worry by the parents establishes an associative cue for anxiety. If
verbal complaints over the lack of money are included in the display of paren-
tal worry they also acquire a capacity for eliciting anxiety. Subsequent money-
seeking responses are strongly reinforced due to reduction of anxiety fol-
lowing receipt of money. T h e drive for money then can be explained by
“appeal to the cue stimuli attending anxiety and to the drive property of
anxiety in activating the latent reaction tendencies attached to those cues” ( 3 ,

3In Kelsen’s theory, all properties of the State are “presented as properties of a
legal order” (9, p. 207) : the territory of the State is “the territorial sphere of validity
of the legal order” (9, p. 208) and its population is the “personal sphere od validity
of this order” (9, p. 233).
 3 21 J O U R N A L OF PSYCHOLOGY

p. 1 6 ) . Brown’s distinction between a nondirectional anxiety drive and

directed associative reaction tendencies, however, does not necessarily follow
from observation of actual behavior. F r o m the behavioral point of view no
pure nondirectional anxiety drive exists, but only anxiety reactions that
a r e neither random nor nondirectional, b u t which are always jointly deter-
mined by the individual’s past experiences, the present state of the organism,
a n d the present combination of external and internal stimuli impinging upon
him.4 T h e contribution of past experience is singularly revealed by ihe
specific direction of the monev-seeking reactions. Relief of anxiety following
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receipt of money establishes a conditioned “goal-tendency” (4, p. 1 4 4 ) .

T h u s a distinction between anxiety and subsequent money-seeking reactions
which is based upon the criterion of direction suggests a value judgment con-
cerning their effectiveness in relieving anxiety elicited by lack of money.
H a r l o w stresses the r d e of externally elicited motives without denying the
importance of those motives that are internally aroused. H e concludes that the
“origin of the stimulating source is immaterial-internal o r external” ( 5, p.
45)and that temporospatial contiguity of conditioned and unconditioned stirnu-
li is the essential motivational condition for learning. H i s position, as Postman
points out ( 12), amounts to stating that all stimuli are motivating agents and
consequently, deprives motives and drives of their distinctive status. Harlow’s
view that the source of stimulation is immaterial holds only as long as there
is no concern over w h a t is being learned. As Hebb has pointed out, motiva-
tion is not a distinctive process and some learning is expected to occur even
when the animal has not “first been deprived of food o r injured by shock”
( 6 , p. 181). Setting up a motivation merely means that behavior is chan-
neled in the direction in which the experimenter is “interested” ( 6 , p. 181).
Hebb’s position is of particular interest because of his avowed rejection of
the stimulus-response point of view which provides the basic orientation of
the present paper. Actually this agreement is not too surprising since asso-
ciation is also the basic principle of Hebb’s theory. I t should be mentioned,
however, that his principle of sensori-sensory association ( 6 , p. 7 0 ) differs
from the S-R principle of association of conditioning theory which H e b b
considers to be applicable only to “non-set-influenced” (6, p. 107 ) learning
such as the “learned eyeblink” response ( 6 , p. 108).
Harlow’s paper ( 5 ) offers some hints as to w h y some theorists believe
t h a t S-R relationships are not sufficient for a complete explanation of certain
characteristics of human behavior. O n e of these characteristics mentioned
4This problem is related to the clinical concept of free-floating anxiety, i.e., an
anxiety reaction elicited by cues which the sufferer cannot identify.
 FERDINAND STERN AND SAMUEL KARSON 325

by him is that motivation may at times reach a high level of intensity and
persistence ; another, that this may occur even though such endeavors may
prove useless or harmful.
Hutchinson’s studies of sudden insight in creative thinkers (8) provide
some important clues as to the nature of the motivational mechanisms sug-
gested by such persistent efforts. H e reports that sometimes the most strenu-
ous attempts a t solution of an intellectual task are stymied and lead to a tem-
porary renunciation of the problem. T h i s is followed a t times by sudden
insight which may occur in periods of relaxation or of preoccupation with
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apparently entirely unrelated problems, Hutchinson states “owing to the

suddenness and apparent revelation of new material the experience is mis-
takenly looked upon by some as unrelated to past experience” (8, p. 324).
T h i s event can be explained by positing that the “irrelevant” situation con-
tained a cue that elicited the associative link necessary for the continuation of
the abandoned train of thought. T h u s it appears that behavior a t any given
moment, which is the only basis for inferring varying degrees of motivation
such as persistence or renunciation, is fully determined by S-R relationships.
Similarly, Guthrie states that the essential condition for relinquishing a spe-
cific goal or a desire is “a change in stimulation” (4, p. 188).
Newcomb holds that the same principles of learning obtain for “social and
non-social influences” (10, p. 145). H e believes that learning is influenced
by reward and punishment and motivated by anticipation or expectancy of
rewards. T h e justification of motivation as an independent concept thus
seems to depend on the r6le of expectancy. If expectancy is defined as an
anticipatory goal response, one of the alternatives envisaged by Newcomb,
then expectancy represents an associative phenomenon reducible to S-R rela-
tionships.
Postman’s analysis of motivation in perception ( 1 3 ) suggests that appar-
ent motivational selectivity is produced sometimes by “artifacts of perform-
ance” (13, p. 99) and further envisages the possibility of conceptualizing per-
ceptual behavior as well as apparent motivational selectivity in terms of asso-
ciative learning.
Hebb’s treatment of attention supports the position that attention is not to
be viewed as a separate process although this conclusion is somewhat obscured
by his terminology. H e holds that responses are “determined by something
else besides the immediately preceding sensory stimulation” ( 6 , p. 5 ) and
that attention or perceptual set is the factor that influences the “selectivity of
response” (6, p. 4). H e conceives of attention in this sense as a “partly
autonomous, or nonsensory, cerebral activity” (6, p. 11). A careful scru-
 326 J O U R N A L OF PSYCHOLOGY

tiny of Hebb’s various references to this factor of attention suggests that he

attributes to it the r d e which in formulations of S-R theorists is assigned to
associations learned in the past, an interpretation supported by his explicit
statement that attention is “closely related to association” ( 6 , p. 101). I n the
present context his rejection of unity of attention and his emphasis upon
multiplicity of attention is of particular interest. T h e present authors hold
that his position has to be extended since he limits it by stating that attention
“may often be multiple” (6, p. 153) and that we “very often carry on two
familiar activities at the same time” (6, p. 152). “Arguing and driving a
.. . neither seems possible without ‘atten-
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car (is given as such an instance)

tion’ ” (6, p. 152). Actual observation, however, suggests that the appar-
ent division of attention in this case is the result of learning (practice), which
is completed only after an individual has learned to respond to the various
stimuli of the traffic automatically, i.e., without initiating his responses by his
own verbal stimulations, a phase of driving usually characteristic of the be-
ginner. T h i s example of behavior with multiple attention can be interpreted
as simultaneity of two activities which do not interfere with one another after
practice and familiarity does not appear t o be an indispensable requirement
for simultaneity of two actions. Such an interpretation is supported by the
results of Broadbent’s experiment dealing with speaking and listening simultan-
eously (2). H e found that interference between speaking and listening resulted
in a significant decrease in the number of correct verbal answers to simple
questions which sometimes were presented while the subjects were still an-
swering a previous question. Broadbent does not offer a conclusive explana-
tion for the reported observations. If we consider, however, that listening
usually does not consist merely of auditory stimulation, but also includes
speech of the listener, even though such speech will in routine situations be
of a highly fragmentary and subvocal nature, then an interpretation of his
results is suggested which implies the impossibility of conducting two clon-
versations simultaneously. T w o of Broadbent’s specific findings add further
support to this interpretation. A significant increase in the percentage of
mistakes resulted from making the questions more concise through reduction
of their length by omission of a stereotyped component which the subjects could
easily learn to ignore. T h i s modification deprived them of additional time for
responding without interference from an immediately following question. Fur-
thermore, the percentage of correct answers to questions which occasionally im-
mediately followed another, increased significantly by a reduction of the length
of the prescribed response without a concomitant shortening of the question.
T h i s improvement in performance may be attributable to the fact that ,the
 FERDINAND STERN AND S A M U E L KARSON 327
shorter response to the preceding question interfered less with listening to the
immediately following question. Before closing the discussion of Hebb’s treat-
ment of multiple attention it must be stated that the “supposed ... extraor-
dinary unity about attention” (6, p. 151) criticized by him refers to mean-
ings of attention as “state or end result of attending,” or the “selectivity of
the process,” or “various properties of the mind which apparently cannot be
defined” ( 6 , p. 102). Since Hebb rejects these meanings of attention as
“no longer precise enough” (6, p. 152) his theory is neither capable of
proving or disproving multiplicity of attention if attention refers to one of
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these meanings. T h e concept of multiple attention following from his theo-

retical premises merely means that behavior a t any given moment comprises
several activities which are determined by an “immediately preceding sensory
stimulation” ( 6 , p. 5 ) and by a “partly autonomous, or non-sensory cerebral
activity” ( 6 , p. 11) which is the result of an associative process.
Careful observation of an active organism will reveal the impossibility of
a complete analysis of its total behavior into discrete components and of
identification of those components upon which attention supposedly is focused.
Any such selection can be based only upon an arbitrary principle varying
with different observers according to the importance ascribed to the aspect of
behavior under observation. Berlyne holds that an “animal ... will gen-
erally, unless it is asleep, tired or ill, be found to be doing several things a t
once but one thing in particular, i.e., it is expending much more energy on
one group of responses than on others” and that “there is reason to believe . ..
that if it were not concentrating on that activity it would be concentrating on
something else” (1, p. 144). T h e apparent tendency to ascribe attention to
important or the most important component of the total behavior, and the
distinction between the healthy and the sick animal is apparently based upon
an unrecognized value judgment. Further, the use of the criterion of out-
put of energy as an indication of attention may well lead to surprising results
in instances of strenuous physical work performed while preoccupied with
one’s thoughts. Hilgard’s treatment of the problem of sustained attention
suggests that his definition of attention as “perceptual focusing” (7, p. 295)
does not refer to a particular quality of behavior a t any given moment, but
rather to the persistence of a certain course of action over an extended period
of time. T h e impression of persistence, however, is merely an artifact of in-
accurate observation because of the continuous changes of behavior. T h u s
the concept of persistence applied to behavior denotes a value judgment based
upon the criterion of the appropriateness of a sequence of responses to accom-
plish a certain result.
 328 J O U R N A L OF PSYCHOLOGY

Paschal believes that attention is an “act, not a state” (11, p. 4 0 2 ) , an

I,
implicit anticipatory reaction” (11, p. 397). H e further holds that the
“degrees of attention will correspond to the degrees of identity between the
implicit anticipating and the subsequent overt reactions” (11, p. 397). T h i s
formulation of the problem of attention simply means that behavior a t a
given moment is influenced by its antecedents and that the existence of the
pseudo-problem of attention is due to the fact that the antecedents sometimes
include implicit components not readily observed. Guthrie states that atten-
tion “includes general movements of orientation, looking, listening, and so on,
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and includes also the inhibition of conflicting response” (4, p. 122). T h i s

description of attention is limited to an avowedly incomplete listing of same
of its supposed components and does not provide any basis for an identifica-
tion of attention per se. T h e impossibility of describing attention in strictly
behavioral terms. adds further support to the position taken in this paper
that attention merely refers to a value judgment of behavior.
T h e moral nature of the concept of attention is clearly recognizable in
Ribot’s theory of attention ( 1 4 ) . H e identifies voluntary attention with
sustained effort which he believes did not exist prior to civilization. H e con-
trasts the savages’ passion for hunting, war, and gambling with work which
he considers to be the “concrete, the most manifest form of attention” (14,
p. 37). Many years ago Woodworth recognized the moral nature of the
term attention. H e states that “ ‘attention’ is one of those nouns that are
properly verbs” (17, p. 43) and that inattention means “attention to some-
thing else” (17, p. 50).
SUMMARY
T h e goal of the present paper was to illustrate the inevitable creation of
pseudo-problems which arise from a syncretism of methodologically incom-
patible concepts. Pseudo-problems necessarily will arise from the inclusion
of value judgments into psychological theory. Precisely the reverse holds
true for theories of law and state following an intrusion by the concepts of
natural science into these realms. I n support of this position reference was
made to Kelsen’s critical analysis of various legal concepts. T h e relevance
of this position to psychological theory was shown by a discussion of motiva-
tion and attention which included recent formulations of the problem of
motivation by Brown, Harlow, Newcomb, and Postman. T h e paper in-
cluded a discussion of various theoretical formulations of attention and of
multiple attention in particular. T h e results of this analysis seem to lend
support to the position of the present paper that the terms motivation and
attention refer only to apparently unrecognized value judgments.
 FERDINAND STERN A N D SAMUEL KARSON 329
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4409 W e s t Point L o r n a Blvd.
Sun Diego 7 , C a l i f o r n i a