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418 2016
safe travel
Acknowledgements
Safety Committee
Aviation Subcommittee
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Revision history
Contents
1. Introduction 8
1.1 Why an airline safety scoring system is needed 8
1.2 The need for formal risk assessment 9
1.3 Origins of the IOGP mechanism 10
1.4 Application of the mechanism 10
2. Summary 11
2.1 Score components of the airline safety assessment mechanism 11
2.2 Illustrative results 12
Background to Version 3
The main changes made to the ASAM as the consequence of the review were as
follows:
• Based on a further extensive analysis of commercial passenger aircraft
accidents over the past 10 years, it was concluded that there was a strong
correlation between aircraft accident rates and aircraft age out to 40 years,
after which the data points became limited and inconclusive. The aircraft age
factor was therefore modified to reflect a straight-line reduction from 1.00 to
zero over 40 years.
• The Fleet Mix scores (AF2) have also been revised to take account of the
changes in technology levels as new generation types that are continuously
being introduced. Less modern types have in general been adjusted
downwards in 0.25 score intervals, thereby increasing the numbers of older
types scoring zero for AF2. Each 0.2 interval corresponds to a different
decade of aircraft development. A new Table 6 reflects the revised Fleet Mix
type scores.
• The Aircraft Equipment (AF3) default value has also been modified to reflect
the fact that aircraft invariably have some degree of the relevant equipment fit
to a minimum value of 0.5 plus 0.5 of the Fleet Mix (AF2) score.
• The Airline Finance score (AF6) had previously proved impractical to populate
with meaningful data. Therefore a simplified Finance Score, based on the
airlines past five years reported operating profit was adopted as a means of
scoring those airlines for which such data was available. The scale adopted
is from 1.00 to zero in line with the percentage operating profit over the range
+10% to minus 10%. The default value for the majority of airlines with no
meaningful finance data remains 0.50.
• Previously the Country Regulation Factor (CF1) assessment was somewhat
arbitrary. Now that ICAO publishes online summaries of its ongoing audits
of all Member States oversight, it is possible to have a more reliable source
of country’s regulatory performance and this has been adopted based on
ICAO percentage scores. Provision is also made for a 25 percentage point
reduction to apply to countries on a one-off basis, based on any further
identified regulatory deficiency. This includes any EU Country Ban, a US FAA
IASA Category 2 rating and ICAO’s own cautionary ‘Red Flag’ associated with
certain country audit scores.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 7
Other aspects of the ASAM were unchanged, including the calculation of the Safety
Multiplier and the relative weighting of the various Airline and Country Factors
included in the mechanism.
A number of editorial and style changes have also been made to the report.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 8
1. Introduction
The often unspoken requisite for all travellers is safe arrival at his or her
destination on each and every occasion a journey is undertaken. For personal
travellers, this is an individual concern but for business travellers it is also a
matter for the businesses involved, whether the traveller is a full time employee or
a contractor travelling for that business.
On a distance-flown basis, air travel has become one of the safest forms of travel.
However, because of the longer distances involved in air travel compared to most
surface journeys, it is the accident rate per flight that is of most concern. This is
especially so for frequent travellers whose journeys often involve multiple-sector
flights around the world; in extreme cases, accident rates for such flights can be
more than 25 times the industry norm, reflecting unsafe operations and putting
passengers and crew alike at risk.
There is also the problem of the smaller operators. The fact that they might not
have experienced an accident may not be statistically significant and over-reliance
on this fact may conceal underlying problems with air safety with, to use a popular
phrase – “an accident waiting to happen”. Larger operators do not have this
problem: the accident might indeed be waiting to happen, but its occurrence does
not generally significantly affect the overall accident rate, although it might hit the
headlines.
Charter operators, where they are used on a regular basis, may be subject to
safety audit before contracts are placed. This is standard practice in the oil
and gas industry and IOGP has in place its Aircraft Management Guidelines for
charter services. In contrast, scheduled airline users – even those with a large
corporate travel budget – have no automatic right to audit the operations of the
airlines which they use. They have to rely on regulatory oversight, limited company
knowledge and often-imperfect public perceptions of airline safety.
Any business that require significant amounts of business travel should have in
place a properly-constructed travel plan as part of its wider health and safety
policy. Before developing such a plan for air travel by scheduled airlines, to
be incorporated in a company safety management system, it is necessary to
undertake a formal risk assessment.
Many countries require formal risk assessment as part of health and safety
legislation but, even if this is not a specific legislative requirement, the assessment
process makes good sense in developing robust safety systems. It would also form
part of a duty of care defence in any case of litigation.
The Safety Mechanism outlined in this report is just one element to be taken into
account in assessing airline risk to passengers. In particular it should be noted
that achieving a low Safety Score does not necessarily imply that an airline is
unsafe to use or should necessarily be categorized as “high risk”. Often a low
score may be entirely due to the fact that an airline has only limited operating
experience, such as in the case of recent start-ups or long-haul operators flying
only a few such flights per week. In such cases it may be more appropriate.
2. Summary
Details of the various score components are set out in the following sections.
In brief, the airline safety assessment scores (AS) are derived from the following
three main elements
• an airline safety factor (SF) or multiplier, calculated between zero and
one, based on the reported accident rate over a maximum ten-year period
of scheduled airlines operations, also taking into account the severity of
accidents in terms of loss of life and injury and damage to aircraft
• an airline factor (AF) ranging from zero to ten made up of various specific-
to-the-airline management factors, operating parameters and operational
environment components
• a country factor (CF) ranging from zero to five that takes into account national
factors of regulation, security and safety culture of the airline’s home country.
The factors in the airline and country scores have made provision for a number of
default values to be used where information is not currently available. The purpose
of the default values is to achieve a reasonably conservative approximation of the
appropriate score, without unduly penalizing the airline concerned.
AS = SF × (AF + CF)/1.5
where
SF = safety factor
The safety factor is multiplied by the sum of the airline and country scores divided
by 1.5 to provide an overall airline score between zero and ten.
• Ten represents an airline with a perfect safety record and other favourable
attributes.
• Zero represents a high-risk airline where the overall risk of an accident
approximates to less than one per 4,000 flights.
While it is quite possible to achieve a zero score (and some airlines do), it is not
possible to achieve a perfect ten because of the principle of an additional accident
built into the system.
Whatever the actual airline accident score, the number is increased by 1.0,
representing a further serious-injury accident. This means that airlines’ safety
records and their resulting safety scores can be considered in the light of what
becomes hindsight in the unfortunate (and it should be emphasized, statistically
unlikely) event that they do have an accident in the immediate future. In effect, this
introduces a sensitivity element into the mechanism.
The example safety assessment scores shown in Appendix B are derived from a
Microsoft™ Excel spreadsheet model described later which may be used as an
aid to compiling such scores. Further guidance on the use of the mechanism
spreadsheet is contained in section 6.
Table 1 contains a summary of the airline safety scores derived from Appendix B.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 13
The above, and all similarly calculated scores, are arrived at only for the purposes
of indicating relative risk based on the identified and quantified factors described
in this report. They do not constitute advice to use, or not use, particular airlines.
Decisions on airline use are for individual travel organizers to take based on their
corporate safe-travel policies. The guidelines have been developed simply to aid
that process.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 14
Airline safety is typically measured either by the accident rate per the number of
flights/hours flown, or by the rate per passenger-kilometres flown. Since a high
proportion of accidents are associated with the take-off and landing phases of
flight, and relatively few such events with the en-route phase, it is considered most
appropriate to base the mechanism on the accident rate per 100,000 landings. This
measure is used throughout this report.
Only operational accidents – those that involve an intended or actual flight – are
counted in the analysis. Non-operational accidents that occur on the ground
before flights are initiated or after flights are completed, such as when aircraft
are parked, or during maintenance or towing are therefore excluded from
consideration. Injuries or deaths to stowaways outside the pressure bulkheads,
particularly those entering wheel-wells as the aircraft waits at the runway hold,
are not included in the analysis.
The safety mechanism presented in this report considers five classes of accidents:
• accidents involving more than 20 fatalities from the aircraft’s occupants are
given a weighting of 3.0
• accidents involving between 11 & 20 fatalities from the aircraft’s occupants
are given a weighting of 2.5
• accidents involving 10 or less fatalities from the aircraft’s occupants are given
a weighting of 2.0
• accidents involving serious injury are weighted 1.00, and
• minor or no-injury accidents are weighted with a factor of 0.25.
A very small minority of accidents, less than 1%, involve death or injury to non-
occupants. These are not relevant for the purpose of determining air travel safety
or grading accidents for severity.
Sources for accident information include the World Aircraft Accident Summary –
(CAP479 or ‘WAAS’), maintained for the UK CAA by Ascend Worldwide, the Aircraft
Loss Record, published by the same company, as well as Aviation Safety Net – ASN
(see Appendix C).
Airline safety assessment mechanism 15
These three sources cover the great majority of significant events involving
fatalities and injury, and aircraft hull loss. Much of the information contained in
them is common to all three, but WAAS and ASN also contains details of accidents
to some smaller aircraft types excluded from the Loss Record, while the Loss
Record also contains many more reports of non-operational accidents resulting
only in aircraft damage. Other sources, including National accident investigation
reporting, provide a further valuable source of accident data.
The mechanism uses the most recent 10-year period of airline operations as
the basis for calculations. Where an airline has operated for less than 10 years,
accident and flight data for the maximum available period of operation should be
considered. Where an airline has operated for a longer period, accident and flight
data for the period prior to the most recent 10 years operations should be excluded.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 16
Following further review of the available data and definitions contained in the
Ascend Worldwide Aircraft Loss Record, for scheduled passenger airlines the
following types of operations and events were included and, by definition, all others
excluded. The selection process is also shown in the form of a flow chart (Figure 2).
All accidents
was the flight on which
the accident occurred: Excluded accidents
Commercial or Non-commercial,
military/commercial? purely military
No
Yes
Passenger or
All cargo
passenger/combi? No
Yes
Yes
Non-operational (parked,
Operational? towing or in maintenance)
No
Yes
Non-revenue
Ferry flying?
No (except positioning flights)
Yes
Technical malfunction or Training (excluding
poor flight management technical malfunction or
on training flights? No poor flight management)
Yes
Included accidents
NOTE: In the event that the mechanism user wishes to include other types of operation, such as non-
scheduled revenue passenger or cargo flights, then he or she may do so. However, he or she should
always ensure that the aircraft flight data and accident data are fully consistent.
In view of the greater concern over accidents involving death and serious injury
to occupants, it was decided to weight accidents on the basis of their severity.
Alternative weighting schemes were considered, but the following scheme was
adopted because of its simpler and more transparent method of calculation:
Definitions of severity
Fatal accident
Serious accident
Minor accident
The definitions of major and minor aircraft loss are those provided by Ascend
Worldwide:
• major aircraft loss: repair costs of $1.0 million or more, or 10% or more of
the value of the aircraft
• minor aircraft loss: repair costs less than $1.0 million or less than 10% of
the value of the aircraft.
WNA = (OF1 x 3.0) + (OF2 x 2.5) + (OF3 x 2.0) + (OF4 x 1.0) + (OF5 x 0.25)
Airline safety assessment mechanism 20
Examples:
Airline ‘A’ has experienced 12 operational accidents: two of them ‘fatal’ (OF3),
ten of them ‘minor’ and no ‘serious’ accidents. Its unweighted number of
accidents is simply 12. Its weighted accident score however, is:
Airline ‘B’ has also experienced 12 accidents but, in its case, three of them
fatal (OF1), three of them fatal (OF2), three are serious and three of them
are minor accidents. Its weighted number of accidents is therefore:
The WNA of airline ‘B’ therefore reflects the greater severity of its
accidents, and this will be reflected in its overall safety evaluation score.
Many medium-sized airlines, and most small ones, have never reported an
accident. Especially in the case of the smaller airlines, this fact is not statistically
significant as the expected number of accidents for their scale of operations
based on average accident rates and their sectors flown is most likely to be zero
or 1 as the average operator score is only 0.44. A notional additional accident for
all airlines is therefore included to highlight the sensitivity of their score to such
events.
the total number of airline landings over the most recent 10 year period of
operations, divided by 100,000, where all accidents occurring prior to the
10-year period are excluded.
The effect of any new accidents may be mitigated by the extent to which any
accidents that occurred in the first year of the 10-year period drop out as the 10-
year rolling operations period advances. However, at very small scales of operation,
the effect of just one single accident on the safety score of the airline concerned
can be quite dramatic, which weights the conclusions somewhat against smaller
airlines. Startup airlines will be similarly affected. Intuitively this is correct, as
smaller and newer airlines will have significantly less operating experience than
larger ones, and can be at higher risk during their earlier years of operation.
where
All accidents prior to the most recent 10 year period of operations are
excluded.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 22
Where an airline has operated for less than 10 years, then the maximum available
period of operation should be considered. Care needs to be taken in aligning the
operating period with the accident data so that the true accident rate is always
calculated.
A number of sources exist for this data (see Appendix C), including:
• the airline’s own annual report statistics, which may be available via the
Internet directly or via an on-line information service such as Flightglobal and
trade journals
• figures reported to regulatory authorities and contained in the relevant
country’s civil aviation statistics (e.g. UK CAA Airline Statistics)
• industry statistics collated by IATA in its World Air Transport Statistics (WATS)
or by regional airline trade associations such as the AEA or ATA
• national airline operating statistics collated by ICAO, and available via
Flightglobal, or regional inter-governmental bodies such as ECAC
• Jet Operating Statistics issued by Ascend Worldwide, which gives take-offs
and landings for the last 10 years.
These included having a separate, additive, score-element forming part of the total
score, and the use of a multiplier applied to the other score elements.
After discussion in the working group, it was determined that in view of the
overwhelming importance of past safety performance as a guide to future safety
levels, the use of a safety factor was preferable to a single score element.
This was so because the multiplier approach had the effect of returning very low or
even zero scores if the airline safety record is very bad. Depending to some extent
on the relative weightings of the score elements, the additive approach still leaves
the accident-prone airline with a substantial score.
The factor chosen takes the form of a parabolic sliding-scale factor that reduces
in value as accident rate increases, eventually reaching zero at unacceptably high
accident rates.
Safety factor (SF) = {1.0 – 0.2 × the SQRT of the Effective Accident Rate
per 100,000 landings}
The safety factors to be applied for a range of Effective Accident Rates, using the
scale formula, are illustrated in Table 2.
The airline factor component of the overall safety score is intended to reflect those
items which are specific to the particular airline under consideration.
Each airline’s score is based upon a total of nine different components each of
which are weighted to reflect their relative importance. This gives an overall score
for airline factors that can vary between zero and ten depending on the precise mix
of values involved.
The resulting airline factor score is subsequently divided by a factor of 1.5 in order
to provide two-thirds of the total score. Country factors provide the remaining one-
third of the overall score.
The nine airline score factors are described in the following paragraphs.
Research for the original ASAM mechanism established that older aircraft have
poorer levels of safety than those more recently built. The early assessment
models used a straight-line relationship between brand-new aircraft and those
aged 30 years or more.
The accompanying chart (Figure 3) was produced to show in more detail the
results of this examination. It is based on a sample of some 1,340 accidents to
operators included at the time in the IOGP database.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 25
Figure 3 shows the distribution of numbers of accidents by aircraft age at the time
of each accident (in red) and the equivalent distribution of flights flown, also by age
of aircraft, in dark blue. Dividing the values in the aircraft distribution by the flight
distribution produces the green curve. From this green curve, it can be seen that
there is a significant degree of correlation between aircraft age and accident rates.
The correlation is, of course, imperfect, but is considered sufficiently good for the
present purpose.
Inverting the green curve produces the orange line to give an indication of the age
score. However, to avoid the need to use a complex mathematical formula, the
orange curve has been approximated to a series of straight lines shown in light
blue/cyan.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 26
The data used to derive Figure 3 is shown in Table 3. The age score line for
individual aircraft has been converted into Table 4. Values may be interpolated
between integer years for greater precision if desired.
The relevant fleet is the then current in-service scheduled passenger fleet over the
10 years; taken as July 2005 to June 2015. Aircraft known to be out-of-service, or
used for other purposes, such as cargo were excluded from the fleet calculation.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 27
Table 4 may be used to calculate the Aircraft Fleet Age Factor, AF1, for a particular
airline, as illustrated by the accompanying example.
The fleet age factor score is derived as shown in the following Table 5.
An important distinction needs to be made between the average age of a fleet and
its relative design age in terms of the design certification standard. The previous
age factor, AF1, reflects the average age of the individual aircraft. AF2, however,
takes account of the fleet design age:
Aircraft types are categorized into one of several score groups based on the
decade of certification as follows:
• 2010 onwards scores 1.0
• 2000 to 2010 scores 0.8
• 1990 to 2000 scores 0.6
• 1980 to 1990 scores 0.4
• 1970 to 1980 scores 0.2
• pre-1970 scores 0.0
• aircraft certificated by non-Western authorities are downgraded by one
category
• aircraft certificated prior to 1990, but which are still in production are
upgraded by one category.
Fleet composition values are calculated based on the numbers of aircraft in each
type score category. As with Fleet age (section 4.1), the relevant fleet is the current
in-service scheduled passenger fleet. Aircraft known to be out-of-service or used
for other purposes should again be excluded from the fleet calculation.
Table 6 gives a list of current aircraft types categorized by score groups. The
table will need to be further modified by mechanism users as new aircraft types
entering scheduled service are identified and classified, and more existing types
gradually become outdated and receive lower scores than at present.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 29
Airline A’s fleet consists of twenty MD-90-30 aircraft, fifteen 737-300 series,
ten 757-200s, ten 737-200 Advanced and five 737-200 non-advanced
aircraft. The total fleet (TF) is thus 60 aircraft.
Scores are applied based on the equipment fit of the airline’s aircraft fleet. Specific
items of equipment are given component scores in accordance with Table 8, which
are added together to provide a single score factor for the airline. All transport
aircraft must carry a basic standard of avionics for communication, navigation and
certain additional equipment, as required by the safety regulator for the national
airspace concerned.
Standards differ amongst the various aircraft types, for example between long and
short-haul (or domestic versus international-route aircraft), so an average figure
needs to be taken across the fleet.
The equipment list will undoubtedly develop, in which case changes will need to be
made to the individual equipment factors. For example, one emerging equipment
is Head-up Guidance (HGS).
One element becoming more and more important is the IATA Operational Safety
Audit (IOSA) Programme. This audit is seen as an additional assurance factor for
all airlines and adds value to the IOGP Mechanism by virtue of the fact that a site
visit has been made by a team of accredited auditors.
Inherent in the IOSA Programme is a degree of quality, integrity and security such
that mutually interested airlines and regulators can all comfortably accept IOSA
audit reports. As a result, the industry will be in a position to achieve the benefits
of cost-efficiency through a significant reduction in audit redundancy.
Where the airline has passed a full IATA/IOSA audit then it should score 1.0
(un-weighted), except where IOSA audits report are qualified by excluding parts
of the operation (e.g. domestic flights) and particular types of aircraft from their
scope (mainly FSU and older Western types as well as some regional and business
aircraft). Where this is the case, the AF4 score should be reduced to 0.75
(un-weighted).
In prospect for mainly smaller operators, IATA is developing its a simplified audit
Standard Safety Assessment scheme (ISSA) mainly for the operators of small
aircraft, i.e. those less than 5,700 kg maximum take-off weight that are presently
excluded from IOSA audits. ISSA will also provide a one-time audit for operators of
larger aircraft as a precursor to eventual full IOSA registration after two years.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 34
Airlines can benefit commercially and technically from their associations with other
airlines, particularly where these are established major players in the industry.
Various maturity periods have been considered. Some early models used a
relatively short, straight-line, learning period of five years and other linear and
logarithmic timescales running out as long as 30 years were considered. Since use
of the logarithmic curves is arithmetically complex, after further consideration, a
linear scale was adopted assuming an airline reaches full maturity after ten years.
This provides a reasonable representation of a long-term exponential learning
curve as shown in the accompanying Figure 4.
Selected
maturity
curve
Typical Learning
curve
0.0
0 10 20 30
Airline age (years)
The resulting airline maturity scores are as shown in Table 12. Values may be
interpolated between integer years for greater precision.
The assessment mechanism provides five categories of airline risk ranging from
high to low. These are aligned with appropriate airline score factors ranging from
zero to 1.00 as shown in the Table 13.
Alternatively default values may be used based on country risk factors (see 5.5).
Table 13: AF8 Lookup table – Airline security scores based on risk categories
Airline risk category Airline security score
Extreme risk 0.00
High risk 0.25
Medium risk 0.50
Low risk 0.75
Insignificant risk 1.00
Airline safety assessment mechanism 38
The country component of the overall safety score is intended to reflect those
items that are specific to the country where the particular airline under
consideration is based. Each country’s score is based upon a total of five different
factors each weighted in accordance with their relative importance. This gives an
overall score for country factors that can vary between zero and five depending on
the precise mix of values involved.
The resulting country factor score is divided by the value 1.5, in order to provide
one-third of the total score. The airline factors described earlier provide the
remaining two-thirds.
The five airline score factors are described in the following paragraphs:
The original systems from which this mechanism is derived relied on general
judgement on the likely standard and effectiveness of safety regulation based
largely on historic powers and the involvement of the relevant country’s regulator
in setting its own aircraft certification standards. Since then, the number of
industry safety assessment programmes has increased significantly, with
programmes in place at the FAA, ICAO, IATA, and across Europe.
Since January 1999, the Safety Oversight Audit Section of the Air Navigation
Bureau of ICAO has been conducting safety oversight audits of the civil aviation
authorities of member countries in relation to personnel licensing, operation of
aircraft, and airworthiness. The audits are designed to determine the status of
States' implementation of the critical elements of a safety oversight system and
the implementation of relevant ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPS), associated procedures, guidance material and safety-related practices.
Initially this information was not available publicly and subsequently only became
available for a limited number of countries. However, more recently the summary
findings have become available online, including measures of the extent of each
member country's compliance with ICAO standards across the range of subject
headings.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 39
The aspects of regulation covered by the USOAP results cover eight areas:
Legislation, Organization, Licensing, Operations, Airworthiness, Accident
Investigation, Air Navigation Services and Aerodromes. Each national authority is
assessed in percentage terms for its compliance across the eight headings and,
for the purposes of the ASAM, these are converted to a score value as indicated in
Table 14.
Table 14: CF1 Lookup table – Regulatory score based on ICAO USOAP findings
ICAO score average Regulatory oversight factor
100% 1.00
50% 0.50
0% 0.00
Scores reduced by 0.25 in the event of any one of an ICAO ‘Red Flag’, an EU Country Ban or an FAA IASA
Category 2. Intermediate scores pro rata for all other scores.
Overall, the ICAO system provides a sound basis for grading country’s regulatory
oversight, at least for those countries with airlines serving the US. However, other
ratings may be used to supplement USOAP.
Other potential sources of guidance include the US FAA's IASA system and the
European Commission (EC), which for some years has published ‘banned lists’
of airlines prohibited from entering their airspace. The EC banned list mainly
comprises of airlines subject to a country ‘blanket ban’, which excludes all airlines
from a particular country, with a few exceptions in some cases. However, such
bans may not always relate only to safety issues, and audit by aviation specialists
might well permit restricted use. These bans put IOGP member companies in
the position that they need to assess the risk where there is the need to fly on
a banned airline overseas, when that airline might be going about its normal
business in its own country or region despite the EC blacklist.
Where airlines may have multiple regulators, they should attract the lowest
scoring regulator’s score.
One disadvantage with the USOAP system is that the review cycle to update the
audit findings takes up to ten years. To partially overcome this, ICAO takes account
of more recent findings and where it finds a clear risk to air safety, issues a ‘Red
Flag’ against the countries concerned.
For the purposes of the ASAM the regulatory scores are to be reduced by a
score of 0.25 in the event of a Red Flag being indicated. A similar reduction
should be applied in the event of an EC country ban and/or a US IASA Category 2
classification. For the avoidance of doubt, any such reduction should be applied
only once to a country; multiple downgrading only confirming that some safety
problem exists.
The current EC banned list and FAA IASA country list can be found at:
• http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-ban/pdf/list_en.pdf, and
• http://www.faa.gov/safety/programsD;finitiatives/ oversight/iasa/
Airline safety assessment mechanism 41
This proved to be the most difficult item to assess. The working group discussed
wide-ranging possible national approaches to safety at length without satisfactorily
resolving the issue. Some of the topics raised were as diverse as crime rates, road
traffic accidents, building site safety, taxi drivers, the wearing of seat belts, vehicle
driver behaviour generally, and national queuing habits.
The working group examined the effect of various types of air traffic service on
accident risk. This was based on a comprehensive analysis by the Flight Safety
Foundation (FSF) of landing and terminal area accidents.
From the FSF analysis, the working group was able to isolate and then combine
the increased risk factors due to the absence of various types of services. These
risk factors were then weighted according to the affected number of movements in
each region to establish an overall risk factor for each main geographic region.
The effect of four types of approach aid or procedure were considered, as follows:
• The absence of STARs (Standard terminal arrival routes)
• the absence of a visual approach guidance system such as VASIS or PAPIS
• the absence of precision approach radar (PAR), and
• the use of non-precision approaches.
Western Europe and Asia/Pacific proved to be the least risky regions from an
air traffic perspective and Latin America and Africa the riskiest. North America
and Eastern Europe were about average. Table 16 shows the risk factors and
associated ATC scores for the identified regions.
The airfield environment score was divided into two elements: the first related
to terrain or topography, the second due to climate. The two elements should be
added to give a maximum possible airfield environment score of 1.0.
The working group examined various country risk scores, which ranged from a few
countries graded extreme risk or similar, to a larger number categorized as having
minimal or insignificant risk. Scores between zero and 1.0 were allocated to the
various risk categories as shown in Table 19).
6. Implementation of the
mechanism
Members wishing to use the IOGP mechanism to create their own tool are free to
do so. The type of information required to evaluate safety scores is available from a
wide range of potential sources relating to airline operations and accidents, airline
fleets and other relevant data. Several of these sources are listed in Appendix C.
Some of this information is proprietary and involves costs for data access.
Outputs from a specimen spreadsheet model for evaluating safety scores, using
the same methodology as the subscription website, is provided in Appendix B. This
example model consists of a single Microsoft™ Excel file divided into individual
worksheets plus a graphic chart for visualizing the results. Appendix B also
shows the overall form of a typical spreadsheet model. The example assessments
in Appendix B are intended as a help for members who wish to develop and
implement a workable system of their own and, as such, are populated with
dummy data.
Appendix B includes:
• a results chart (Table B.1) showing indicative comparative overall scores for
15 notional airlines. (The number of airlines to be considered in an actual
model will depend on the prospective user’s requirements.)
• a corresponding summary worksheet (Table B.2) that identifies the airlines to
be analysed, their countries and their world regions, and an overview of the
safety scores of the notional airlines
• An example Airline Scores’ sheet (Table B.3) that shows a format that could
be used for calculating and totalling the weighted individual airline (AF) score
elements
• A typical Country Scores’ sheet (Table B.4) that could be used for calculating
and totalling the weighted individual country score (CF) elements
• A Safety Factors worksheet (Table B.5) that could be used to calculate the
Safety Multiplier for each airline.
Airline safety assessment mechanism 46
Additional knowledge by local company staff of relevant airlines can also be taken
into consideration if considered appropriate and companies may want to introduce
additional generalized rules in areas such as fleet composition.
All the example worksheets are colour-coded to indicate what happens in each box:
• dark blue text on light grey background cells are used for headings
• blue text on light blue background is used for data to be input by the user
• blue text on a light green background is used for the various weighting factors.
In the example, default values for the individual score elements are also included
for use where appropriate.
There are a number of key points to bear in mind when populating the mechanism.
These have been highlighted at relevant points in the main text, but are repeated
below in Table 20 for ease of reference.
The mechanism is intended for use as part of a wider system of establishing safe
air travel policies, and it remains the responsibility of individual companies to
establish such policies, having regard to over-all travel risks and to the specific air
travel risks associated with its business operations.
A number of decisions are possible based on the safety mechanism results. These
might include:
• preferential and/or unrestricted use of potentially safer, higher scoring,
airlines, possibly incorporating IATA/IOSA registration
• more restricted use of moderately scoring airlines, for example where an
unrestricted category airline is not available
• limited use of low scoring airlines, such as only where required by
operational necessity
• outright bans on the use of the highest risk, lowest scoring, airlines.
Additional knowledge of relevant airlines by local company staff may also be taken
into consideration, if appropriate, and companies may want to introduce additional
generalized rules in areas such as fleet composition.
Table 20: Populating the mechanism – Summary
Item Description Score range Weighting factor Default values Possible data sources Scoring basis
†
AF1 Aircraft fleet age 0 to 1.0 2.00 None CASE, ACAS, CAPA Fleets Linear 0 to 40 years old (Table 4)
†
AF2 Fleet composition 0 to 1.0 1.00 None CASE, ACAS, CAPA Fleets Based on type numbers and scores (Table 6)
AF3 Aircraft equipment 0 to 1.0 1.5 0.5 +50% of AF2 Airlines, plus published operating rules Basic values need to be based on in-depth
industry knowledge (Table 8)
AF4 Conduct of operations 0 to 1.0 3.00 0.75 Ideally based on audit Per Table 9 + 10SA audit
†
AF5 Partnerships and 0 to 1.0 1.00 None Flightglobal, or trade journals. Three equal elements, per Table 10
alliances
AF6 Financial standing and 0 to 1.0 0.50 0.50 Various sources, including airlines' Based on recent profitability per Table 11. Default
quality of management Annual Reports and Accounts, IATA and to 0.50 if no good data available.
ICAO Financial Statistics, FlightGlobal
and, Euromoney Airline Analyst
AF7 Airline maturity 0 to 1.0 0.50 None Year of commencing service: Flight Increases linearly from 0 to 10 years old per
Global and ACAS CAPA Fleets Table 12
†
AF8 Airline security 0 to 1.0 0.50 Same as CF5 Security specialists and consultants Default based on degree of country risk (Table 13)
CF1 Regulatory oversight 0 to 1.0 1.50 0.5 ICAO USOAP results. EU banned list or Based primarily on ICAO USOAP compliance
FAA IASA Categories gradings converted per Table 14. May be
amended to take account of other data, for
Airline safety assessment mechanism
CF2 National safety 0 to 1.0 0.50 By region (see N/A Use FSF safety study values per Table 15
influences section 5.2)
CF3 ATC Environment 0 to 1.0 1.25 None N/A See Table 16
CF4 Airfield environment 0 to 1.0 1.25 None See Tables 17 and 18
†
CF5 Country security 0 to 1.0 0.50 None Security specialists and consultants Per Table 19
†
OF1 Fatal accidents Number of 3.00 None WAAS and/or Aviation Safety Net See definition section 3.3
>20 fatalities occurrences in
previous 10 years
†
OF2 Fatal accidents Number of 2.50 None WAAS and/or Aviation Safety Net See definition section 3.3
>10 ≤20 fatalities occurrences in
previous 10 years
†
OF3 Fatal accidents Number of 2.00 None WAAS and/or Aviation Safety Net See definition section 3.3
1-≤10 fatalities occurrences in
previous 10 years
†
OF4 Serious accidents Number of 1.00 None WAAS and/or Aviation Safety Net See definition section 3.3
occurrences in
previous 10 years
†
OF5 Minor accidents Number of 0.25 None WAAS and/or Aviation Safety Net See definition section 3.3
occurrences in
previous 10 years
Airline safety assessment mechanism 49
It is for the individual user to choose from these and any other policy guidelines
that it might formulate and set the appropriate score levels.
The basic scores relate to the relative risk of a single flight, and cannot simply be
combined to assess the overall risk of a multi-sector trip. However, it is possible to
combine scores by the following process.
• Appropriate accident rates and safety multipliers can be calculated by
aggregating the accident occurrences and flight operations of the carriers
involved. These should be weighted in proportion to the numbers of sectors to
be flown on each airline.
• The sum of the relevant airline and country factors are also taken as the
weighted averages for the airlines and countries concerned. These are
denoted respectively as Combined Airline factor (CAF) and Combined Country
factor (CCF).
Airline safety assessment mechanism 50
• A new combined safety factor (CSF) can then be derived by adding the
Equivalent Accident Rates (EAR) for the sectors. These are based on the
weighted number of accidents but modified for all but the final sector to
exclude the additional accident (see 3.4). The standard formula for converting
accident rates to safety factors is applied (see Figure 5). Although this is
not strictly accurate, since it ignores second order effects and includes the
additional accident for the last sector only, it is an acceptable approximation.
• The combined safety factor is multiplied by the combined airline and country
factor (CAF plus CCF) divided by 1.5 to obtain a combined airline score (CAS)
for the relevant number of flights. This score may then be compared directly
with other single sector or multiple sector journey scores.
Each journey may also be judged according to company policy for single journey
airline scores. For example if the minimum score for a single flight is to be taken as
5.0, then any combination of flights scoring less than 5.0 should also be rejected.
Glossary of terms
Aircraft equipment factor (AF3)
the airline factor based on the equipment standard of the airline’s
in-service passenger fleet
Fatal Accidents
aircraft accident occurrences involving fatalities to the occupants
(passengers or crew)
Airline safety assessment mechanism 53
Minor Accidents
non-fatal aircraft accident occurrences involving no serious injuries to the
occupants (passengers or crew) and only minor damage to the aircraft
Minor injury
an injury sustained by a person in an accident or incident and which:
• requires hospitalization for less than 48 hours; or
• results in painful injury or strain; or
• results in simple fracture of finger, toes, or nose; or results in minor
burns.
Qualifying accident
an accident occurrence that meets the criteria discussed in 3.2 for
inclusion as part of an airline’s accident score
Serious Accident
a non-fatal aircraft accident occurrence involving serious injuries to the
occupants (passengers or crew) or major damage to the aircraft
Serious injury
an injury sustained by a person in an accident and which:
• requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within
seven days from the date the injury was received; or
• results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fracture of fingers,
toes or nose); or
• involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle
or tendon damage; or
• involves injury to any internal organ, or loss of sight in one eye, or loss
of hearing; or
• involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more
than 5% of the body surface; or
• involves verified exposure to infectious substances or harmful
radiation.
Abbreviations
AEA Association of European Airlines
CASE Client Aviation System Enquiry from Airclaims Ltd (now Ascend)
Overall
Airline Fleet Fleet Equipment Operations Partnerships Finance Maturity Security
Airline
Name Age Mix Standard Score & Alliances Score Score Score
Score
Airline
AF AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 AF6 AF7 AF8
Factor
Weightings 10.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Airline 1 7.95 0.85 0.74 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.25 1.00 0.50
Airline 2 8.48 0.90 0.77 0.89 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.50
Airline 3 7.24 0.54 0.66 0.83 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50
Airline 4 6.01 0.83 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.75
Airline 5 5.94 0.37 0.54 0.77 0.75 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
Airline 6 6.81 0.58 0.68 0.84 0.75 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.75
Airline 7 1.25 0.28 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.25
Airline 8 2.00 0.53 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.50
Airline 9 2.25 0.53 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.75
Airline 10 1.80 0.79 0.70 0.85 0.90 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00
Airline 11 5.86 0.66 0.67 0.83 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.75
Airline 12 5.44 0.66 0.67 0.83 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.50
Airline 13 5.74 0.66 0.67 0.83 0.50 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.75
Airline 14 7.51 0.87 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.75
Airline 15 4.25 0.13 0.21 0.61 0.63 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.50
Airline safety assessment mechanism 59
Aircraft Loss Record published by Ascend Limited as part of its on-line aviation
database (see contacts above).
Aviation Safety Net (ASN) published on-line by Harro Ranto, The Netherlands at
http://aviation-safety.net
Flight Safety Digest published by the Flight Safety Foundation, ISSN 1057 5588,
601, Madison Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA, http://www.flightsafety.org
The Official Airline Guide (OAG), 450 Capability Green, Luton, Bedfordshire,
LU1 3LU, UK, http://www.oag.com
CAPA Fleets published on-line by CAPA Centre for Aviation, Level 4, Aurora Place,
88 Phillip Street Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia http://centreforaviation.com/data/fleet/
JP Airline-Fleets international, ISBN 978 385 758 1410, published annually until
2014 by Flightglobal. Back issues available from: http://www.flightglobalshop.com
Airline safety assessment mechanism 62
Ackerman Group, Inc, Risks Forecast Service, 1666 Kennedy Causeway, Suite 506,
Miami Beach FL33141, USA. Tel +1 (305) 865 0072,
email: info@ackermangroup.com http://www.ackermangroup.com
The Anvil Group, Vicarage House, 58-60 Kensington Church Street, London W8 4DB.
Tel +44 (0)20 7938 4221. http://www.anvilgroup.com
ASI Group - Global Risk Management Services, 2925 Briar Park Drive, Suite 1100,
Houston TX 77042, USA. Tel +1 (713) 430 7300, fax +1 (713) 430 7318.
http://www.airsecurity.com/aviation.asp
Control Risks Group, Cottons Centre, Cottons Lane, London SE1 2QG, UK.
Tel +44 (0)20 7970 2100, email: crlondon@control-risks.com http://www.crg.com
Kroll Associates, 900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor, New York, New York 10022, USA.
Tel +1 (212) 593 1000, fax +1 (212) 593 2631
http://www.kroll.com/en-us/security-risk-management
Air Transport World, published by Penton Aviation. 1911 N. Fort Myer Drive,
Arlington, VA 22209, USA, Tel +1 (301)755-0200, fax +1 (913)-514-3909.
http://www.atwonline.com
Travel Document Systems, 925 15th Street NW, Washington DC 20005, USA,
Tel +1 (202) 638 3800, fax +1 (202) 638 4674.
https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice