CASES SA SYLLABUS.

(3 CASES)
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the
trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion
on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,
ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO,
and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION,
committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard
Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to
close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall
and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio
Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher
Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo
Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended
that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to
the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and
the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated
that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a
violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two
(72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also
challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory
damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the
suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that
the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as
actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as
their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is
unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered
actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
 PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED
ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION
THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING
THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS'
PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER
6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF
ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability
arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the
effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery
of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil.
623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116
Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the
case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
 The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of
conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted
for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not
allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the
information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the
particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon
a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance
with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the
actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the
stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R.
1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the
civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties
contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there
is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to
institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with
the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v.
Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively
to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77
SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v.
Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can
create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from
the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced
against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types
of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence,
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
 Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in
the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled
to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby
incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may
be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to
that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not
constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the
criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the
interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit
is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based
does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability
arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would
not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the
 criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may
be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he
did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be
rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting
thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations.
(Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption
of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both
the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon
seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the
aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of
the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the
goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with
a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case,
the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the
demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that
time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones
and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax,
crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise
found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping.
Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
 Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the
complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did
so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This
finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the
premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is,
therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be
summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to
vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the
premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of
Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of
the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought
these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal
Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that
"when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law
calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the
interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but
inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable
nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the
doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with
the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other
independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the
injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or
enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise
resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate
civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil
actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art.
29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly
provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be
instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in
the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the
accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance,
and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
 In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much
sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the
same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on
reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate
character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the
vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil
action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted
in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy
can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is
no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal
and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by
side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision
which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a
condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved
party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and
exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation
of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
 complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a
separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand
to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects
of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not
exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155099. August 31, 2005]

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MANUEL D. VICTORIO, Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 141; THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE MAR FISHING COMPANY, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66879, dismissing the petition for prohibition and mandamus of the Security Bank and Trust
Company, later renamed Security Bank Corporation (SBC), for the nullification of the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141, dated March 15, 2001, denying the banks
motion for the suspension of Civil Case No. 99-1581 on the ground of a prejudicial question relating to
the issues raised in Civil Case No. 17563 pending in Branch 141 of the said RTC.
The Antecedents
On February 3, 1983, the MAR Fishing Company, Inc. (MFCI), obtained a US$2-million loan from the
PISO Development Bank (PISO Bank) to finance its importation of a fishing vessel to be used in its
fishing activities under the PISOs re-lending credit line from the Asian Development Bank. Under the
Loan Agreement executed by the MFCI, it was obliged to pay the loan in 10 years, from the date of
PISO Banks approval of the loan with a two-year grace period.[2]
On July 19, 1983, SBC and MFCI executed a Standby Credit Line Agreement, in which SBC extended
an irrevocable Standby Credit Line in favor of the PISO Bank for the account of MFCI in an amount
covering 50% of the PISO Bank loan or up to the principal amount of the peso equivalent of US$1
million, plus the interests, fees and charges due on the loan. PISO Bank conformed to the agreement,
under which MFCI was allowed to draw from the said fund the payment of its maturing obligations to
PISO Bank. However, upon PISO Banks declaration that the entire obligation of the MFCI is due and
payable, the former could withdraw the entire amount of the account. The parties also agreed that SBC
shall be subrogated to all the credits under the promissory note/s or any other instrument evidencing
MFCIs obligation to PISO Bank, and to all the credits of the said bank appertaining thereto.[3] The
parties further agreed that:
3. The BANK agrees that the LENDER may draw on the Line, in accordance with the provisions
hereinbelow, any and all amounts due from the BORROWER to the LENDER under the terms of the
Loan Agreement up to the extent of the SECURED AMOUNT. Provided, that the BANK shall not be
obliged to release such drawings unless the LENDER shall have delivered in favor of the BANK a
promissory note(s) in the form hereto attached as Annex A covering the amount of said drawing(s)
executed by the LENDER for and on behalf of the BORROWER in accordance with the Power of
Attorney executed by the BORROWER in favor of the LENDER dated July 14, 1983. The said
promissory note(s) shall be apart and distinct from the Note(s) executed by the BORROWER in favor
of the LENDER as evidence of the Loan.
7. The BANK hereby undertakes that drawing(s) under the Line in compliance with the terms hereof
will be honored immediately upon delivery by the LENDER of (1) its duly signed statement and
certification in duplicate that the amount drawn represents payment due from and unpaid by the
BORROWER under the terms of the Loan Agreement and the Notes; and (2) the appropriate Note(s) or
any other instrument evidencing the obligations of the BORROWER to the LENDER. Such required
documents shall be presented at the principal office of the BANK within five (5) banking days after
due date of the obligations subject to the Loan Agreement and the pertinent Note(s) without prejudice
to whatever grace period the LENDER may give to the BORROWER.
11. It is understood, however, that an availment of the LENDER of the Line shall be subject to the
conditions of paragraphs 3 & 7 hereof. Further, the BORROWER binds itself to pay interest on the
amount availed of from the BANK on the prevailing money market rate of interest at the time of
availment corresponding to the term and maturity of such availment as may be imposed by the BANK
upon the BORROWER, and agrees to reimburse the BANK on demand for all reasonable expenses
incurred by the BANK in connection with the operation and enforcement of this Agreement.[4]
To secure the payment of its drawdowns under the Standby Credit Facility, MFCI executed on August
8, 1983 a First Preferred Mortgage on Vessel in favor of SBC over its vessel Southward Ho (formerly
Sand Piper), as described in the Certificate of Ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard.[5]
Under the said deed, in the event that an action would be filed in court for the enforcement of any right
under the contract, the SBC would be entitled, as of right, to the appointment of a receiver of the
vessel, and to any revenue, earnings, rent income and other income.[6]
MFCI failed to pay its loan account to the PISO Bank. On August 11, 1987, the PISO Bank filed a
Complaint against SBC with the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 175634. The case
was raffled to Branch 147 of the court. PISO Bank alleged, inter alia, the following:
1.8. Pursuant to the Standby Credit Line, PISO BANK, on 25 June 1987 sent a demand letter dated 24
June 1987 to SECURITY BANK. In said letter, PISO BANK informed SECURITY BANK that MAR
FISHING defaulted in the payment of the amortizations due on the Loan in the total amount of
TWENTY-TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-
TWO AND 36/100 (P22,380,862.36), including interests, fees, and other charges, as of 15 May 1987.
Consequently, in said letter PISO BANK demanded that SECURITY BANK pay PISO BANK fifty
percent (50%) of the said amount, or ELEVEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE AND 18/100 PESOS (P11,190,431.18), representing SECURITY
BANKs obligation under the Standby Credit Line. Attached to said letter were all the documents
required to call the line under the terms of the Standby Credit Line. However, SECURITY BANK,
despite its obligation under the Standby Credit Line to pay PISO BANK immediately upon call, refused
to honor its obligation under the Standby Credit Line.[7]
PISO Bank prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in its favor, as follows:
(a) Ordering SECURITY BANK to pay the amount of at least ELEVEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED
NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE AND 18/100 PESOS (P11,190,431.18) plus
the amortizations, fees, stipulated interest, penalties and charges that may accrue after 15 May 1987;
(b) Ordering SECURITY BANK to pay exemplary damages in such amount as may be deemed
reasonable by the Honorable Court; and
(c) Ordering SECURITY BANK to pay PISO BANK attorneys fees equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the total amount due plus litigation expenses and costs of suit.
PISO BANK likewise prays for such other relief, just and equitable under the premises.[8]
In its Answer, SBC denied any liability to PISO Bank, and alleged, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that the latter failed to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Standby Credit Line
Agreement; even after it became aware that MFCI was undergoing financial distress as far back as
1985, it breached the mandatory conditions under the said agreement, thus, placing the defendant in
jeopardy of not being reimbursed for the MFCIs drawdowns. As a consequence, PISO Bank should be
deemed and declared to have waived its right under the said agreement. SBC further alleged that the
plaintiff and MFCI entered into a secret agreement, whereby the stipulated 14.5% interest per annum
on its promissory note was increased to 23% per annum, and that the plaintiff received or collected
interests on the promissory note at such rate.
As an alternative defense, the defendant alleged that since the Standby Credit Line Agreement was
based on the peso equivalent of the US dollar, it should only be liable, if at all, for no more than
P6,496,066.66.
SBC incorporated in its Answer, a Third-Party Complaint against MFCI, in which it prayed that it be
appointed as receiver over the Southward Ho and over its profit, income and other receivables from the
operations thereof. It also alleged that in the remote event that the trial court should hold the it liable to
PISO Bank, then, as third-party plaintiff, it would be entitled to subrogation, and/or indemnification
and/or reimbursement against the third-party defendant for the latters failure to pay its obligation under
the Loan Agreement, to the amount adjudged against the third-party plaintiff plus attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs with indemnification which may be paid partially by the foreclosure of the
property mortgaged.[9]
SBC prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor and against the plaintiff and the third-party
defendant, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. The Complaint be dismissed for being totally unmeritorious;
2. After hearing on the counterclaim, to render judgment ordering plaintiff to pay defendant:
(a) P1,000,000 as damages to its goodwill and prestige;
(b) Exemplary damages in an amount left to the sound discretion of this Honorable
Court;
(c) P40,000 as attorneys fees;
(d) Expenses of litigation as shall be proven at the trial; and
(e) The costs of this suit;
3. In the event that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant third-party plaintiff to pay plaintiff
any amount claimed in the latters complaint, to render judgment simultaneously ordering the third-
party defendant to pay third-party plaintiff whatever amount is adjudged to be paid by the third-party
plaintiff to the plaintiff, plus attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs;
4. In default of such payment by the third-party defendant, that the above-described mortgaged
property be sold and the proceeds of the sale be applied to the partial payment of the amounts due to
the third-party plaintiff from the third-party defendant;
5. During the pendency of this case, that the third-party plaintiff be appointed as the receiver of the
mortgaged property as well as to the earnings, rents, issues, profits and other income thereof with such
other powers as this Honorable Court may confer;
6. For execution for the deficiency which will remain unpaid after applying the proceeds of said sale.
Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff prays for such other and further relief, general and special, as it may
appear entitled to, in law and in equity.[10]
In its Answer to the third-party complaint, MFCI alleged, inter alia, that (a) the mortgage contract
executed by it and the third-party plaintiff was not the proper subject of the third-party complaint as it
was not in respect of SBCs complaint, nor did it arise from the same transaction subject of the original
complaint; and (b) assuming that SBC as third-party plaintiff was entitled to subrogation and/or
reimbursement, its liability to was limited to those amounts or expenses secured by it under the Loan
Agreement and Standby Credit Line Agreement; (c) the third-party complaint was premature as there
had been as yet no judgment against it based on the Loan Agreement.[11] MFCI prayed that judgment
be rendered in its favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed:
1. The Third-Party Complaint be dismissed for lack of merit;
2. After hearing on the counterclaim, judgment be rendered against Third-Party Plaintiff to pay Third-
Party Defendant the sum of P50,000.00, as and by way of attorneys fees, as well as cost of suit.[12]
In a separate transaction, the MFCI obtained loans from Export Credit Corporation of Canada (EDC) in
August, 1981, guaranteed by the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
(PHILGUARANTEE), covered by LG No. 81-383F and 385F. PHILGUARANTEE later became the
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORPP). Because of financial
difficulties, the MFCI failed to pay its loan accounts to PHILGUARANTEE and proposed a
restructuring of the loan; PHILGUARANTEE agreed, provided that MFCI execute an Indemnity
Agreement in its favor to secure it from damages and/or liabilities that may arise. MFCI complied and
executed said Indemnity Agreement on November 10, 1987.[13]
On July 29, 1988, the MFCI and the SBC executed a Sinking Fund Agreement with the following
terms:
1. The Borrower undertakes to course export receipts of at least US$8.3 million thru the Lender and
hereby irrevocably authorizes the Lender to set aside five percent (5%) of the peso proceeds from the
Borrowers export receipts.
2. A minimum amount of P5,000,000.00 shall be accumulated from the 5% export deduction within one
and one-fourth (1) years from the drawdown date of the US$1.0 million Term Loan. The export
deductions shall be for a minimum amount/year counting from the date of release of the Term Loan as
follows:
Before Nov. 30, 1988 - - - P2,500,000.00
Before Feb. 28, 1989 - - - P2,500,000.00
By Feb. 2, 1989 - - - - - - - P5,000,000.00
3. The deduction shall be increased to 10% during peak season for fishing.
4. The Sinking Fund shall earn interest at the same rate being paid by the Lender on savings deposit.
5. The balance of the Sinking Fund on or at the end of 1-1/4 years from date of release of the Term
Loan should be at least sufficient to cover the Minimum Balance.
6. In the event the export receipts are not coursed to the Lender, or the export deduction is not sufficient
to cover the Minimum Balance, the Borrower shall deposit in cash the deficiency upon five (5)
business days of such deficiency from the Lender.
7. Any balance in the Sinking Fund cannot be withdrawn while the Term Loan facility remains unpaid
notwithstanding usage or non-usage of the Import Line by the Borrower.[14]
The parties agreed that any balance in the Sinking Fund could not be withdrawn while the terms from
the loan facility remained unpaid, and whether MFCI used its Import Line.[15]
On October 31, 1991, MFCI executed an Addendum to the Sinking Fund Agreement in which it agreed
that the Sinking Fund would secure all the loans granted to it (including the P4.5 million Export
Packing Loan from TIDCORPP), thus:
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Sinking Fund Agreement shall now
and hereinafter secure all the Loans granted to Mar Fishing Company, Inc., including the Export
Packing Loan of P4,500,000.00
2. All the terms and conditions not inconsistent herewith shall continue to be in full force and effect.
[16]
When it failed to pay its loan account with PHILGUARANTEE, MFCI, as assignor, and the
PHILGUARANTEE (TIDCORP), as the assignee, executed on August 20, 1998, a Deed of Assignment
in which the former offered to pay to TIDCORP its outstanding account by assigning all its rights and
interests over the Sinking Fund in SBCs custody in the amount of P5 million. It was specifically agreed
therein that:
1. The ASSIGNOR hereby assigns, transfers and conveys by way of payment to the ASSIGNEE the
entire amount covered by the FUND including all deposits and interests that may have accrued thereto
which in no case shall be less than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). For this purpose, the
ASSIGNOR hereby delivers to the ASSIGNEE all documents evidencing the ASSIGNORs rights and
interest in the Fund hereby assigned.
2. The ASSIGNOR undertakes to notify SBTC of this Deed of Assignment not later than five (5) days
from date hereof. The ASSIGNOR shall provide the ASSIGNEE a certified true copy of such notice not
later than five (5) days from date of service of such notice.
3. In order to give real meaning and substance to this Assignment, the ASSIGNOR shall
3.01 Provide and deliver to the ASSIGNEE all pertinent documents, papers and things related to or in
connection with the FUND herein assigned;
3.02 Provide and make available to the ASSIGNEE all witnesses having personal knowledge of the
FUND, should the matter subject hereof requires judicial action; and,
3.03 Perform any and all acts and deeds necessary to effectuate the assignment herein made in
accordance with the real intention of the parties.
4. This DEED OF ASSIGNMENT shall produce the effect of payment only upon actual receipt by the
ASSIGNOR of the entire proceeds of the FUND in which event the obligations of the ASSIGNOR to
the ASSIGNEE shall be reduced only to the extent of the amount actually received by the ASSIGNEE
which is no case exceeds the amount of the FUND. It shall remain in full force and effect until full and
complete payment and performance by the ASSIGNOR of all its obligations to the ASSIGNEE.[17]
On October 8, 1998, SBC issued a Certification stating that MFCI had no more outstanding account
loan with it.[18]
On November 20, 1998, TIDCORP, through counsel, wrote SBC[19] requesting that the amount of the
Sinking Fund in its custody be remitted to it, conformably with the Deed of Assignment executed by
MFCI, and in light of its Certification dated October 8, 1998.[20]
On September 1, 1999, TIDCORP filed a complaint for sum of money against the SBC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1581 and raffled to Branch 141 of the court. TIDCORP alleged, inter alia, that on or
about August, 1981 MFCI obtained loans from Export Credit Corporation of Canada (EDC) in the
amount of US$6,333,564.00 which was covered by its irrevocable and unconditional guarantee; MFCI
defaulted in the payments of its said loan, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay and/or settle the
obligations of MFCI to EDC; on November 10, 1987, the plaintiff and MFCI executed a Restructuring
Agreement covering the latters obligations, but still failed to pay P855,766,785.00 as of September 11,
1998; on August 20, 1998 MFCI assigned the amount of P5 Million to TIDCORP, including all
deposits and interests that may have accrued thereto from MFCIs Sinking Fund under the custody of
SBC; by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed by MFCI to the plaintiff (TIDCORP), the latter
demanded from SBC the delivery and/or payment of the said amount, including all deposits and
interests that may have accrued thereto, but SBC refused to do so.
TIDCORP prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to
render judgment in favor of Plaintiff ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of:
1. Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) including all deposits and interests that may have accrued
thereto, plus interest thereon at the legal rate until the entire sum is fully paid; and
2. The sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for and as attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises.[21]
SBC as defendant filed an Answer to the complaint, alleging as special and affirmative defense, that the
phrase all the loans granted to Mar Fishing Company secured by the Sinking Fund Agreement included
its potential liability to PISO Bank under the Standby Letter of Credit Line it had issued to secure
MFCIs loan, which still had to be adjudicated in Civil Case No. 17563. It likewise incorporated a
Third-Party Complaint against the MFCI, and alleged that such third-party defendant executed an
Addendum to the Sinking Fund Agreement as far back as October 31, 1991, securing all the loans
granted to MFCI, including the P4.5 million Export Packing Loan; nevertheless, MFCI fraudulently
executed a Deed of Assignment on August 20, 1998 to TIDCORP despite its knowledge that such
Sinking Fund secured any and all credit facilities it had obtained from the defendant including the
potential liabilities of the defendant to the PISO Bank which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 17563
pending in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 147; the execution of the deed of assignment by the third-
party defendant in favor of the plaintiff served as an erroneous basis of the complaint filed by the
plaintiff against the defendant (Third-Party Plaintiff); in the event that the court shall declare that it was
liable, then, it would be entitled to subrogation and/or indemnification and reimbursement against the
third-party defendant to the amount adjudged against the third-party plaintiff including attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs with indemnification from the Sinking Fund; and, in the alternative, that
the third-party defendant alone should be held liable directly to the plaintiff.[22]
In its answer to the third-party complaint, the third-party-defendant MFCI averred that the October 31,
1991 Addendum to the Sinking Fund Agreement do not cover potential liabilities of third-party
defendant.[23]
On February 1, 2001, the defendant third-party-plaintiff, filed a motion in Civil Case No. 99-1581,
praying that all proceedings should be suspended on the ground of a prejudicial question still to be
resolved in Civil Case No. 17563. At that time, the plaintiffs second witness in Civil Case No. 17563
was to be cross-examined. The defendant averred in its motion that the issue before the court was
which of the parties had a better right to the Sinking Fund, and insisted that it had a lien over the fund.
SBC argued that, if the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 17563 would be unfavorable to it, it
would be held liable to plaintiff PISO Bank, then third-party defendant MFCI would be liable to
defendant SBC, in which case the obligations of the third-party defendant MFCI would be outstanding,
and entitling SBC to enforce its lien over the Sinking Fund. It averred that it had a better right to the
fund because its lien antedated the assignment of the fund. If, on the other hand, the judgment of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 17563 would be in its favor in that it would not be held liable to the plaintiff
therein, then, the third-party defendant will not be liable to the defendant in which case, it would lose
its lien over the Sinking Fund.
SBC further averred that the transactions and issues in Civil Case No. 17563 and in the case before the
court were interrelated, and that the proceedings should be suspended to await the outcome of Civil
Case No. 99-1581. The defendant cited the rulings of the Court in Quiambao v. Osorio,[24] Vidad v.
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 42[25] and City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,[26] that
prejudicial questions may be appreciated even if no criminal case is involved.
TIDCORP opposed this motion, contending that (a) the issue of whether SBCs liability to PISO Bank
was anchored on the Sinking Fund Agreement as to preclude the assignment thereof to the plaintiff still
had to be resolved by the court; (b) the parties had agreed that the issue for resolution was who between
the parties had a better right to the Sinking Fund, and under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court,
SBC was precluded from filing a motion for the suspension of the proceedings; and (c) the contracts
and transactions subject of Civil Case No. 17563 were different from those before the trial court.
Moreover, SBC did not have a lien over the Sinking Fund, and its reliance on the Courts rulings in
Quiambao and City of Pasig was misplaced.
On March 15, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying SBCs motion, ruling that during the pre-
trial, the parties had agreed that the main issue for resolution was which party had a better right to the
Sinking Fund, and that this issue was not raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 17563.
In its Order of August 3, 2001, the trial court denied SBCs motion for a reconsideration of its March
15, 2001 Order.
Thus, SBC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, averring that:
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE IN DENYING
THE SUSPENSION OF FURTHER HEARINGS IN THE TIDCORP CASE UNTIL AFTER A FINAL
JUDGMENT SHALL HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED IN THE PISO CASE[27]
On April 29, 2002, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The CA held that the issues in
Civil Case No. 17563 were not related to the issues before the court a quo. The claim of the PISO
Bank, in Civil Case No. 17563, was based on transactions different from those in the instant case.
Moreover, the resolution of the issues before the RTC in Civil Case No. 17563 was not prejudicial to
the resolution of the issues before the court a quo.
The petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court in the Resolution
dated September 4, 2002.
The petitioner argues that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proceedings before the trial courts may
be suspended on the ground of a prejudicial question pending the termination of another criminal case.
It argues that it is enough that the issues are logically interrelated or interlinked, even if they are not
identical; otherwise, there can never even be a prejudicial question. For, if the issues were identical,
then the second case would be dismissed. It asserts that it was impossible for it to have alleged in its
Answer and Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 17563 that it had a better right to the Sinking
Fund, for the simple reason that it was only on October 8, 1987 that it filed its Answer to the complaint
in Civil Case No. 17563, long before the Addendum to the Sinking Fund Agreement was executed on
October 31, 1991.
In its Comment on the petition, the respondent avers that there was no factual and legal basis for the
petitioners claim that it had a lien over the Sinking Fund. This issue was precisely raised in the court a
quo as agreed upon by the parties, during the pre-trial, which has yet to be resolved by the RTC.
Besides, the respondent asserts, the circumstances obtaining in the two cases are not analogous to a
situation where the elements of prejudicial questions are present. It filed the case for the purpose of
enforcing its right to the Sinking Fund held by petitioner, pursuant to an assignment by the funds
owner, respondent MFCI. On the other hand, the PISO case involves the enforcement of the right to the
Standby Letter of Credit Agreement which the petitioner executed in favor of PISO Bank, for the latter
to lend its money to respondent MFCI. The fact that both petitioner and respondent TIDCORP lay
claim to the Sinking Fund does not make the issues logically interrelated or interlinked. Even if the
petitioners contention that it was a creditor of respondent MFCI had yet to be established, respondent
TIDCORP has already been established as creditor of respondent MFCI, and not a would-be creditor as
alleged by the petitioner.
The respondents maintain that the rulings of this Court in Quiambao, Vidad, and City of Pasig do not
apply in the case at bar: in Quiambao,[28] the Court affirmed the holding in abeyance of the
proceedings in the ejectment case pending the determination of the issue of possession in the
administrative case, considering the identity of parties and issues. In this case, the parties are not
identical, and the issues in the cases before the RTC are not related to each other (having arisen from
different transactions as to warrant the suspension of the case a quo on the ground of prejudicial
question). Vidad is not applicable because it involves the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which is not
present herein.
The petition has no merit.
For clarity, the Court will refer to Civil Case No. 17563 pending in Branch 141 of the RTC as the
FIRST CASE. The plaintiff therein is the PISO Bank, while the defendant and third-party plaintiff
therein is the petitioner. The MFCI is the third-party defendant. The Court will refer to Civil Case No.
99-1581 as the SECOND CASE, the plaintiff therein being the respondent TIDCORP, and the
defendant is petitioner SBC. The MFCI is also the third-party defendant therein.
The petitioner was burdened to prove that the CA committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing its petition for certiorari, and that the RTC did, likewise, in
denying the motion to suspend the proceedings before it. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or is equated to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, or despotically, or whimsically. A writ of certiorari is not
the remedy for errors of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.[29]
The ruling of the CA that petitioner SBC failed to make out a good case for the stay or suspension of
the proceedings in the court a quo is correct. The petitioner failed to prove its claim that the court a quo
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying its
motion for the suspension of the proceedings before it, on its claim that the issue of whether it would
ultimately be held liable in the FIRST CASE for the claim of the plaintiff therein still had to be
resolved by the trial court.
The petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in the SECOND CASE based on
a prejudicial question still to be resolved in the FIRST CASE. But the doctrine of prejudicial question
comes into play generally only in a situation under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[30] where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil cases
before the criminal action can proceed. There is no prejudicial question to speak of when the two cases
are civil in nature.[31] However, a trial court may stay the proceedings before it in the exercise of its
sound discretion:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another
pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its dockets with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action
cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action
should be stayed.[32]
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants.
But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing
that whether or not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its
sound discretion.
Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on
review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared
in Landis v. North American Co.,[33] the burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the
departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to
wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare
circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another, settling
the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a
just, speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in
another case. After all, procedure was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.
The test to determine whether the suspension of the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is proper is
whether the issues raised by the pleadings in the FIRST CASE are so related with the issues raised in
the SECOND CASE involving the Sinking Fund,[34] such that the resolution of the issues in the
FIRST CASE would determine the issues in the SECOND CASE.
We agree with the findings of the CA that petitioner SBC did not raise the issue of whether it had the
right to the Sinking Fund in its Answer to the complaint in the FIRST CASE and in its third-party
complaint against MFCI. But we also agree with the petitioners contention that it could not have
asserted its right over said fund because it was established only on July 29, 1988, when the petitioner
and the MFCI executed the Sinking Fund Agreement when the petitioner filed its Answer to the
complaint in the FIRST CASE much earlier, on October 3, 1987.
The Sinking Fund consisted of the export earnings of MFCI, deposited with petitioner SBC. The MFCI
remained to be the owner of the fund, but could withdraw the same, regardless of whether it had
drawdowns under its Loan Agreement with the PISO Bank, or whether the petitioner had paid any of its
demandable obligations under the Loan Agreement, in relation to the irrevocable letter of credit.
However, under the Addendum to the Sinking Fund Agreement, the fund became a security for the
payment of MFCIs liability to PISO Bank. And under the Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit executed
by petitioner SBC in favor of the MFCI, SBC was subrogated to the credits in favor of the PISO Bank
under its Loan Agreement to MFCI. However, such fund was also made to secure the payment of the
P4.5 million loan granted by TIDCORP to the MFCI.
However, the PISO Bank failed to file a supplemental complaint[35] in the FIRST CASE to order the
petitioner SBC, as defendant therein, to pay to it the amount of P5 million from the Sinking Fund.
Neither did the petitioner, as the defendant and third-party plaintiff in the FIRST CASE, file a
Supplemental Answer and Supplemental Third-Party Complaint, praying that, in the event that
judgment is rendered against it on the complaint, and judgment is rendered in its favor on its
Supplemental Third-Party Complaint (declaring that petitioner SBC is entitled to the corresponding
amount from the Sinking Fund to the extent of its liability to the PISO Bank under the decision of the
court). Hence, the issue of whether or not the petitioner therein had a right to the Sinking Fund was not
raised as an issue in the FIRST CASE; as such, the court had no jurisdiction over such issue. The court
in the FIRST CASE cannot and will not resolve an issue which the parties did not raise in their
pleadings. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is to be determined by an
examination of the parties pleadings.[36] It is conferred by the pleadings of the parties.[37] Hence,
even if the trial court would render judgment in the FIRST CASE in favor of the plaintiff PISO Bank
and order petitioner SBC, as defendant therein, to pay the plaintiffs claim; and order therein third-party
defendant MCFI to pay the amount paid by SBC to the PISO Bank, the court cannot declare that
petitioner SBC is entitled to the Sinking Fund or even a portion thereof.
In the FIRST CASE, it is possible that the court would render judgment in favor of PISO Bank, the
plaintiff therein, and against the defendant of its principal claim of P11,190,431.18; and, on the third-
party complaint of the petitioner SBC against the third-party defendant MFCI, order the foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage and the sale thereof at public auction. However, the sheriff will not be able to
enforce the judgment against the petitioner and collect the deposit in the Sinking Fund until after the
RTC in the SECOND CASE shall have resolved, with finality, the issue of who as between respondent
TIDCORP and the petitioner, as the subrogee to the rights of PISO Bank to the fund and the defendant
therein had the better right to the said fund.
Whether or not the sheriff may garnish the Sinking Fund in the custody of the petitioner will depend
upon the outcome of the SECOND CASE, where the issue of whether the petitioner is entitled to
subrogation and had a better right to the fund or even a portion thereof was raised by agreement of the
parties therein. The proceedings in the SECOND CASE should not be suspended, even in the event that
the petitioner files a supplemental answer and a supplemental third-party complaint against MFCI in
the FIRST CASE, after the decision of this Court in this case shall have been final and executory.
Respondent TIDCORP should not be prejudiced by the petitioners failure to file a supplemental answer
and third-party complaint in the FIRST CASE before the execution of the Deed of Assignment by the
MFCI in favor of TIDCORP, and the filing by the respondent of its complaint in the SECOND CASE.
The petitioner cannot rely on the rulings of the Court in Quiambao, Vidad and the City of Pasig, for the
simple reason that the issue of the Sinking Fund was not raised in the FIRST CASE but as the sole
issue raised not to be resolved in the SECOND CASE. In Quiambao, the Court held that the issue of
the validity of the agreement to sell pending in the administrative case was prejudicial to the issue of
whether or not the private respondents therein had the right to continue in possession of the property
subject of the two cases; hence, there was a need to suspend the proceedings. In Vidad case, the
resolution of the case before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) was prejudicial
to the resolution of the issue in the civil case for injunction and damages. Involved therein was the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the DECS. In City of Pasig, the issue of territorial jurisdiction in the
civil case was prejudicial to the resolution of the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an

action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which
was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings

before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing
in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and
whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with
respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC
Quezon City denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the
13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court
of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and
did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court
of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at
the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped
date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly,
the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant
the suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:
 x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In
this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime
that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the

judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x
a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the
criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.
ASSIGNMENT CASES TO BE DIGESTED

G.R. No. 86939 August 2, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO DUCAY, accused. SANTOS DUCAY,
accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Valmonte Law Office for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, father and son, were charged with the complex crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder in an Information 1
filed on 16 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, allegedly committed as follows:

that on or about the 12th day of October, 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma.
Cristina Labos, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and
shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos; Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, hitting
them on their body, thereby causing them serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos;
thereby, also, with respect to Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, performing all the acts of execution which
ordinarily would have produced the crime of murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their
will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos which
prevented their death.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 before Branch 172 of the said court. Upon arraignment, both accused entered a plea not guilty. 2 In due
course, the trial on the merits proceeded.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Edwin Labos, Lina Labos, Sgt. Ponciano Casile, Dr. Rodolfo Lizondra, Dr. Tahil Mindalano and Dr. Leo Arthur
Camagay. 3 On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the defense were accused Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, Ruben Ampuan, Mario Abad and
Cristino Mariano.

Prosecution witness Lina Labos testified that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 October 1986, she was sleeping in the sala at the second floor of the
house together with her husband, Manuel Labos, and their six-month old daughter, Ma. Cristina Labos, when she was awakened by the pounding of the door on
the first floor leading to the sala. Moments later, Santos Ducay and his son, Edgardo Ducay, appeared in the sala. Santos was carrying a long firearm while
Edgardo held a caliber .45 pistol. The two started firing at Manuel, who was already standing albeit half asleep. Then they shot her mother-in-law, Pacita Labos.
Both Manuel and Pacita were killed. The accused also shot her, Ma. Cristina, and Edwin Labos, her brother-in-law, who was then coming out of the bedroom.
She was hit in the stomach and gall bladder while Ma. Cristina was hit in the right leg, left thigh and abdomen. The accused then turned their backs and one of
them uttered "Ubos ang lahi." She was able to identify the two accused, who are her former neighbors, because of the fluorescent light in the sala. After the
accused had left, the police came and brought the wounded to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center.4

Edwin Labos testified that on 24 December 1985 his brother Manuel Labos and Santos Ducay quarreled and stabbed each other; however, Santos Ducay did not
file any charges against Manuel who gave the former P200.00 for medical expenses. 5 He also corroborated the testimony of his sister-in-law. He heard the
banging of the door and several gunshots, then he went out of his room and saw his brother Manuel already sprawled dead on the floor. He saw both accused
shoot his sister-in-law and his niece. 6 Edgardo then fired at him, hitting him in the right thigh, while Santos shot his mother. 7 He was later treated at the Jose
Reyes Memorial Medical Center where he spent P13,299.53 (Exhibits "Q" to "Q-165"). They paid P13,200.00 to Popular Memorial Chapels and P9,060.00 to
Holy Cross Memorial Chapel for the interment of his mother and brother.8

Sgt. Ponciano Casile, a police investigator of the Valenzuela Police Station, testified that he was ordered to investigate the incident. In the course of his
investigation, he learned that the assailants were Santos Ducay and a yet unidentified man who, upon Lina Ducay's sworn statement given two days later, was
identified as Santos Ducay's son, Edgardo.9

Dr. Rodolfo Lizondra, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), testified on the post-mortem examinations he conducted on
the cadavers of Pacita and Manuel Labos, the results of which are embodied in two autopsy reports (Exhibits "K" and "M"). 10 He determined the cause of death
of Pacita as "hemorrhage, secondary to shotgun wounds of the chest, abdomen and left arm," and that of Manuel as "hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wounds
of the head and chest." Dr. Tahil Mindalano testified regarding the injuries sustained by Lina and Ma. Cristina Labos and the medical assistance rendered to
them, 11 while Dr. Arthur Leo Macasiano Camagay testified about the injuries sustained by Edwin Labos. 12 Drs. Mindalano and Camagay declared that without
the medical attendance given to Lina, Ma. Cristina and Edwin Labos, said persons would have died because of the nature of the injuries sustained by them. 13

Per the Medico-Legal Certificates issued, Lina Labos sustained three gunshot wounds on her "left umbilical," "left buttocks," and "lateral D/3rd left thigh." The
point of exit of the last wound was at the "anterior middle 3rd left thigh," thereby "penetrating the liver by 1.5 cm. thru and thru, perforating the duodenum by 1
cm. thru and thru, perforating jejunom by 0.5 cm. lacerating the pancreas by 2 cm. transecting muscular branch aorta (abdominal)" (Exhibit "A"). Edwin Labos
sustained a gunshot wound at the "middle 3rd anterior surface thigh, right" with no point of exit resulting in "Gustilo-Anderson type III open fracture comminuted
M/3rd femur, right," (Exhibit "V") and Ma. Cristina Labos sustained three gunshot wounds located at "lateral aspect D/3rd thigh right," "antero-medial aspect
M/3rd thigh, left" and "periumbilcal right" (Exhibit "B").

Both accused testified that they were in their house at Area 4, Valenzuela at the time of the incident in question. At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning, they were
roused from their sleep by a friend, Martin Gabukan, who informed them that Santos was a suspect in the shooting of the Labos family. 14 Gabukan told Santos
not to worry because "many people heard that [the accused] were really not the one." 15 Santos was arrested on 14 October 1986 in Balagtas, Bulacan 16 while
he was looking for a lawyer, while Edgardo was taken into custody by the police while he was attending to his father in the police headquarters. 17

Cristino Marinao, a neighbor of the Ducays, testified that at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 October 1986, Santos Ducay came and said that he (Santos)
was a suspect in the shooting incident in question. 18 The following day, he brought Santos to the Barangay Captain, Pio Angeles, who entered in the barangay
blotter (Exhibit "6") Santos' profession of innocence of the crime he was suspected of. On cross-examination, Cristino stated that the distance between Area 4,
where he and the Ducays are residing, and the house of the Laboses at Area 6 (also referred to as Area 11) is about one kilometer. 19

Ruben Ampuan, a neighbor of the Laboses, testified that at the time of the incident and while he was still lying down, he heard gunshots. He stood up, opened
the window and saw two men leaving the house of the Laboses. He stated that they were not the accused in this case. 20
Mario Abad Allegado testified that he was at the "tambakan" which is about thirty meters from the scene of the crime when he heard several gunshots. As he
headed for home, he met two persons in front of the lamp post near the house of the Eugenios heading towards Maysan Road. One of them, a tall, thin fellow,
with curly hair and mestizo features, was carrying a firearm, while the other, whose face he did not see, 21 was shorter. He believed that both persons were the
assailants. 22 He declared that they were not the accused whom he knows very well being his former neighbors. 23 Upon reaching home, he heard a commotion
from the house of the Laboses. He went inside the Laboses' house and saw the wounded family members. He asked Edwin and Lina Labos whether they
recognized their assailants and both answered that they did not. 24

Capt. Carlos Tiquia, Chief Investigator of the Valenzuela Police Station, who was presented as the only defense witness during the hearing for the application for
bail and whose testimony was adopted in the trial on the merits, declared that he proceeded to the crime scene after receiving a report on the incident from the
investigator assigned to the case. When he and the investigator returned to the office, his investigator took down the statements of the witnesses, one of whom
was Erwin Labos and whose statement was taken down at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 14 October 1986. However, he believed that Erwin was not telling the
truth so that he personally talked to him, and at 6:00 a.m., Erwin executed a supplemental statement (Exhibit "4") in the presence of several people including his
brother Renato Labos. This time, Erwin described one of the alleged assailants as tall, with curly hair and mestizo features. On the basis of such a description,
Tiquia made a request for a cartographic sketch to the PC Crime Laboratory. 25

On 29 April 1988, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding Santos Ducay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but acquitting Edgardo
Ducay on ground of reasonable doubt. 26 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt Santos Ducay of the complex crime of double murder and multiple
frustrated murder as charged.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death is equivalent to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to death, the minimum
being 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years, the medium being reclusion perpetua and maximum, death.

The Court, could have meted the death sentence on Santos Ducay but is prevented from doing so by the New Constitution. Santos Ducay
is, therefore, hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty provided by
law, and all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Pacita Labos in the sum of P30,000.00 and the
heirs of Manuel Labos P30,000.00; to indemnify the victims Edwin Labos in the sum of P13,299.53 as reimbursement of medical
expenses, and the sum of P4,500.00 as lost earnings for the period from October 12, 1986 to July 1987; to indemnify Lina Labos and Ma.
Cristina Labos in the total sum of P10,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses; and to pay the costs of suit.

The Court finds Edgardo Ducay not guilty of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted. The Jail Warden of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is hereby ordered to release Edgardo Ducay from detention unless held for any other lawful cause. 27

In convicting Santos Ducay, the trial court said:

The Court never doubts the participation of Santos Ducay not only on the basis of the positive identification made by surviving victims,
Lina and Edwin Labos, the motive Santos Ducay had to avenge the assault done on him by Manuel Labos, but also because his positive
identification sweeps aside altogether his defense — that of alibi — a very weak defense in the light of the overwhelming evidence against
him.

xxx xxx xxx

From the evidence thus adduced the Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was Santos Ducay who was one of the persons
who conspired with another in killing the victims, Manuel Labos, Pacita Labos, and in trying to kill Lina Labos, Maria Cristina Labos and
Edwin Labos, but was frustrated, The evidence of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, were clearly shown by
the prosecution when it proved convincingly to the Court that considering the time of the attack, 5:00 at dawn, evident premeditation is
clear especially if the testimony of Edwin Labos will be considered that months previous to this attack, Santos Ducay had a quarrel with
one of the victims shot to death. There was abuse of superior strength and treachery because the victims were asleep at the time of the
attack and were therefore unprepared and unarmed for the attack. They had no chance whatsoever to fight back, the six months baby Ma.
Cristina Labos especially. 28

The trial court expressed the view that two murders and three frustrated murders were committed, or that there are as many crimes as there are victims in this
case because "the trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act. However, it did not
impose the corresponding penalties therefor "because the information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated
murder." 29

On 13 May 1988, Santos Ducay filed a Partial Motion For Reconsideration And/Or New Trial. 30 He sought the admission of the alleged result of a paraffin test
conducted on him on 13 October 1986, or a day after the incident, which shows that he was found negative for powder burns. For lack of merit, the trial court
denied the motion in its Order of 24 May 1988. 31

Santos Ducay, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, then filed on 7 June 1988 a Notice of Appeal. 32

In his "Brief for the Defense" filed on 24 September 1992, 33 the appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS "POSITIVE" PROSECUTION WITNESSES EDWIN LABOS AND LINA LABOS'
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED; HENCE, IT ERRED WHEN IT REJECTED ACCUSED'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FOR THE
ADMISSION OF THE PARAFFIN EXAMINATION ON ACCUSED A DAY AFTER THE INCIDENT FINDING HIM NEGATIVE OF POWER
(sic) BURNS.

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED.

In the first assigned error, the appellant attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Lina and Edwin Labos and alleges that their identification of the appellant
is vague and highly dubious. To buttress this claim, he refers this Court to his testimony that a neighbor by the name of Martin Gabukan told him that while the
victims were the hospital, he (Martin) overheard Edwin Labos say that he did not really see the appellant and Edgardo Ducay; that Edwin only happened to
mention the name of the appellant when he has asked by the police about their enemies in their place. The appellant then concludes that the crime was imputed
upon him not because he was seen at the scene of the crime but because of the motive alleged, namely, that he and Manuel Labos had an altercation on 24
December 1985. As to Lina Labos, the appellant maintains that she gave her statement only on 14 October 1986 or two days after the occurrence of the incident;
she thus had sufficient time to concoct a story and implicate the appellant and Edgardo after she had talked with her brother-in-law, Edwin, and her father-in-law,
Jesus Labos.

The appellant further claims that since the trial court did not believe Lina and Edwin's testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo Ducay, then following the
maxim "falsus et (sic) uno, falsus et (sic) omnibus," 34 it should not have also believed their testimony as regards the appellant. He also faults the trial court for
rejecting the supplementary statement (Exhibit "4") of Erwin Labos, brother of Edwin Labos, and Erwin's "contemporaneous" statement to Edgar Ducay: "Kuya
pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, hindi naman ikaw," allegedly absolving the accused and pointing to a tall, mestizo and curly-haired man as one of the
assailants, which statement was allegedly confirmed by Sgt. Casile and Capt. Tiquia and made as the basis of the cartographic sketch by the PC Crime
Laboratory. According to the appellant, these declarations of Erwin are declarations against interest and are part of the res gestae. Finally, the appellant asserts
that the evidence for the prosecution is weak because no disinterested witness was presented despite the fact that the incident occurred in a thickly populated
area. He also contends that the prosecution suppressed evidence by failing to present Erwin Labos as a witness.

These claims are without merit.

A careful evaluation of the records and the evidence adduced by the prosecution discloses that the appellant had been positively identified by Lina and Erwin
Labos. In his sworn statement (Exhibit "H") executed barely four hours after the incident and while he was still in the emergency room of the hospital, Edwin
explicitly declared that the appellant was one of the assailants. This sworn statement was spontaneously given at the time he was hovering between life and
death. He had no opportunity then to contrive or fabricate a story. The appellant is the only one identified therein by Edwin. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

TANONG Bakit ka narito ngayon sa loob ng Dr. Jose Reyes Hospital, Emergency Room, Manila?

SAGOT Binaril po ako.

T Sino and bumaril sa iyo?

S Ang kasama ni Santos Ducay po nakatira sa Area-4, Family Compound, Karuhatan, Val. M.M.

T Kilala mo ba ang bumaril sa iyo na kasama ni Santos?

S Kong makikita ko muli.

xxx xxx xxx

T Paano mo nasabi na kasama ni Santos Ducay and bumaril sa iyo?

S Nakita ko po si Santos Ducay na ang hawak niya shotgun at siya ang bumaril sa kuya ko, Manuel, nanay ko,
Pacita, Ate ko, Lina at bata na si Maria Cristina.
T Dati mo bang kilala si Santos Ducay?

S Opo.

T Paano mo siya nakilala?

S Dati po siyang (Santos) kapitbahay namin at lumipat as Area-4 Family Compound, Karuhatan, Val., M.M. 35

In court, Edwin unhesitatingly pointed to the appellant as one of the assailants. 36

Lina Labos also identified the appellant as one of the malefactors both in her handwritten sworn statement, Exhibit "E," 37 executed on 14 October 1986 or two
days after the incident, and in her court testimony. 38 That her statement was executed two days after the incident does not perforce affect her credibility. With
the three gunshot wounds she sustained and the thought of the death of her husband and mother-in-law and the serious injuries of her daughter and brother-in-
law, it would be too much to expect from her that physical and emotional fortitude to forthwith give her statement as what Edwin did. Delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 39 In any case, the speculation that
she could have contrived her testimony after having talked with her father-in-law and brother-in-law is wholly unsupported by evidence.

We agree with the appellee that the alleged statements made by Martin Gabukan to the appellant, which the latter related in court, is hearsay and has little, if
any, probative value. Counsel for the appellant knew, or ought to have known, that this was so. Yet, the defense did not present Martin as witness.

Nor can we subscribed to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to Edwin and Lina's testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it
should, pursuant to the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit him. In
People vs. Dasig, 40 this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw.
In People vs. Pacada, 41 we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs. Osias, 42
we ruled that:

It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And
it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that
the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.

The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the accused] as
one of the perpetrators of the crime charged . . . .

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless—first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose
fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of
utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a
superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and
secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant
in themselves. 43

The trial court did not err in rejecting the supplementary statement (Exhibit "4") of Erwin Labos, brother of Edwin Labos, and his alleged contemporaneous
statement to Edgardo Ducay. Erwin Labos was not called by the defense as its witness—even as a hostile one. Whatever declaration he made to any party,
either written or oral, is thus hearsay. The prosecution seasonably objected to the admission of Exhibit "4." 44 Besides, as noted by the prosecution, this
document is not under oath while his first statement implicating the appellant is duly subscribed and sworn to. The defense should have presented Erwin as a
witness if indeed it was convinced that Exhibit "4" expresses the truth. There is no showing that this could not have been done because Erwin was not available.
His brother, Edwin, testified that Erwin was staying with his father in Escolta. 45 This information should have been utilized by the defense to have compulsory
process issued to bring Erwin to court.

Instead, the defense imputes suppression of evidence upon the prosecution in not presenting Erwin Labos as its witness. It is settled that suppression of
evidence is inapplicable in a case where the evidence is at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. 46 Besides, the prosecution had no cogent
reason for presenting Erwin since there is no showing that he was in the house when the incident occurred. On the other hand, the defense needed his testimony
for if, indeed, he should affirm his supplemental statement, he may somehow enhance the theory of the defense.

We do not likewise agree with the appellant that Erwin's alleged statement to Edgardo Ducay: "Kuya pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, hindi naman ikaw,"
uttered immediately after he made his supplemental statement, is a part of the res gestae and thus an exception to the hearsay rule.

The rule on spontaneous statements as part of the res gestae is stated in Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: "statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae. . . . ." There are three requisites for the admission of spontaneous statements as evidence of the res gestae: 1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 47 The rationale for the exception lies in the fact that a statement made under the stress of
an exciting event or condition tends to ensure that the statement is spontaneous and, therefore, trustworthy; and the likely proximity in time between the event or
condition and the statement minimizes the possibility of a memory problem. 48 Erwin's alleged statement to Edgardo Ducay does not refer to the incident in
question but rather to his prior statement (not the supplemental statement) implicating Edgardo Ducay. Furthermore, the alleged "contemporaneous" statement
was made two days after the shooting incident. In no way can it be said that Erwin was under the stress of an exciting event or condition.

Nor do we find merit in the appellant's argument that the prosecution's evidence is weak because unlike the defense, it did not present any disinterested witness.
He suggests that since the place where the incident happened is thickly populated, there were many people who saw the gunmen and who could have pointed to
the accused if they were the ones who committed the crime considering that they were familiar to the residents of the area. In the first place, it was not shown
that at the time the incident occurred, many people were already awake and were able to see the gunmen. In the second place, assuming that it was so shown,
the determination of who should be utilized as witnesses by the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case. 49 That the
prosecutor did not present any disinterested witness does not lessen the strength of the prosecution's case, which is anchored on the testimonies of Edwin and
Lina Labos, who were themselves eyewitnesses and victims of the crime.

In the ultimate analysis, the first assigned error involves the credibility of witnesses. It is settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 50 We find no reason to depart from this rule in this case.

In his second assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for denying his motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of
Chemistry Report No. O-1630-86 of the PC Crime Laboratory Service, the result of the paraffin test conducted on Santos Ducay on 13 October 1986 or the day
after the incident on question, which allegedly shows that "both hands of the [appellant] gave NEGATIVE result to the test for gunpowder residue (nitrates)." 51

One of the grounds for a new trial mentioned in Section 2, Rules of Court is the discovery of new and material evidence. The requisites therefor which must
concur are: (1) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that such evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, it will probably change the judgment. 52 In the present case, the appellant was subjected to a paraffin test the day after the crime was committed.
Certainly, he knew that the findings of such test would be forthcoming. He should have asked for the result of the test to find out if it is exculpatory, in which case
he could have presented it during the hearing of his application for bail or, at the latest, during the trial on the merits. In any event, the chemistry report cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already existing even before the trial commenced and could have been easily produced in court by
compulsory process. The appellant either did not exercise reasonable diligence for its production or simply forgot about it. Forgotten evidence is, of course, not a
ground for a new trial. 53 Moreover, the result of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is not conclusive evidence that he did not fire a gun. 54 It is possible
for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates, as when he wore gloves or washed his hands afterwards. 55 The trial court, therefore,
correctly denied the motion for new trial.

The testimonies of the witnesses and the nature of the wounds suffered by the victims show that there were two different firearms used by two assailants, one of
whom is the appellant. The crimes committed were not caused by a single act nor were any of the crimes committed as a necessary means of committing the
others. In this case, there are as many crimes committed as there are victims. The trial court correctly ruled that there was no complex crime "considering that
the trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act." It is settled that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 56 However, the trial court erred when it ruled that "(i)t cannot, however,
impose the corresponding penalty of the crime committed against each victim because the information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder." The information in this case, although denominated as one for a complex crime, clearly charges the accused with five
different criminal acts. It states: "the above-named accused, with intent to kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos, and Ma. Cristina
Labos, . . . did then and there . . . attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos,
Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos, . . . ." The appellant and his co-accused did not move to quash the information on the ground of
multiplicity of charges. At no other time thereafter did they object thereto. They therefore waived such defect 57 and the trial court thus validly rendered judgment
against them for as many crimes as were alleged and proven. 58

The crimes committed by the appellant and his companion, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt are: (1) two counts of murder with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery since the attack on the victims was so sudden and at a time when the victims were barely awake, thus giving them no chance
whatsoever to defend themselves; and (2) three counts of frustrated murder. Conspiracy 59 between the assailants was duly proven. Together they came to the
house of the victims, simultaneously attacked them, and then, together again, they fled. Before fleeing, one of them even exclaimed "Ubos ang lahi." These acts
sufficiently established a common plan or design to commit the crimes charged and a concerted action to effectively pursue it. Hence, the act of one is the act of
all. 60

We do not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation was sufficiently established. Although Manuel Labos stabbed the appellant on 24
December 1985, there is paucity of evidence as to when the latter determined to kill the former and any member of his family and as to acts manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination. 61 Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which was proved without objection from the defense should
be appreciated against the appellant since the victims were attacked and shot inside their own dwelling. The assailants displayed greater perversity in their
deliberate invasion of the home of the Laboses. 62

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death. The maximum of the penalty should be
imposed in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance. However, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution; 63 hence, the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion
perpetua. The penalty for the crime of frustrated murder is the penalty next lower in degree that the prescribed for murder, 64 that is, prision mayor medium as
maximum to reclusion temporal medium. 65

The appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the frustrated murder cases. Thus, he may be sentenced in each of the three
frustrated murder cases to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

ACCORDINGLY, the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED
subject to the modifications herein indicated. As modified, appellant Santos Ducay is convicted of (a) two crimes of murder for the death of Pacita Labos and
Manuel Labos and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each death, with the indemnity in each crime increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in
conformance with the current policy of this Court; and (b) three crimes of frustrated murder committed on Lina Labos, Ma. Cristina Labos and Edwin Labos, and
is hereby sentenced in each crime to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES and
FERNANDO RAMIREZ (at-large), accused.
FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Traditionally, religious fervor nourishes love, respect and concern for one another among brethren; it
was not so however in the case of one whose adherence to his faith became the harbinger of his tragic
end, sending his wife hanging by the thread of death, and worse, the crimes were perpetrated
apparently by their brethren professing to be "denizens of the temple."
Accused Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the latter being still at large, stood charged
with the murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As the perpetrators
were found to be in unlawful possession of firearms they were also charged with violation of PD 1866,
as amended by RA 8294.
Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was
arraigned and tried.
For violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended (Crim. Case No. T-2054), accused Fernando "Ando"
Costales was found guilty and sentenced[1] to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.
For the murder of Miguel Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2057), accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was
found guilty and meted the ultimate penalty of death.
For the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2056) he was found guilty only of
attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. Additionally, he was ordered "to pay the
heirs of the two (2) victims P250,000.00 in damages to be shared by and among them in a manner that
suits them best."
Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas, was a placid but forlorn barrio in Pangasinan where the spouses Miguel
and Crispina Marcelo resided in a small one-room shanty with concrete flooring and cogon roofing.
Although their married daughters Donabel, Jessie and Erlinda already had their own houses they would
spend the night with them every once in a while. And so it was on the night of .
Jessie Molina recalled that at around in the evening of , she and her sisters Donabel and Erlinda
together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken their own corners of their small house to
prepare for the night. Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while the others occupied a bamboo
bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of available space settled instead on the concrete floor.
Jessie and Erlinda had just watched tv when two (2) persons suddenly barged into their house passing
through the door kept ajar by sacks of palay and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie readily recognized
the two (2) intruders because the entire room was illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept
burning overnight.
Jessie narrated that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at the head of her
father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter the other assailant Fernando Ramirez sprayed on
their faces what she described as "something hot and pungent," and with his firearm pumped a bullet on
her mother's chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused suddenly entered their house and
strangled their father after which Fernando Costales shot him point blank in the head. According to
Erlinda, when tear gas was sprayed by Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she heard a
gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened her eyes, she saw her mother Crispina
clutching her breast, reeling from the blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap. In her testimony
Crispina herself confirmed that Ramirez shot her once on the right chest which caused her to bleed and
lose consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with the two (2) accused because, like the rest
of the family, they were members of the "Baro a Cristiano" also known as Lamplighter, of which
Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the high priests in their respective areas.
According to Jessie, her parents decided to quit the brotherhood because Ramirez warned them not to
sever their ties with the sect if they did not want any harm to befall them. In fact, according to her, a
month earlier Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Like her sister, Erlinda stated that their family distanced themselves from the congregation when
Ramirez threatened her father. According to her, on , Miguel tried to fetch her from the house of
Ramirez but Miguel relented only after Ramirez threatened her with a bolo. Her father tried to get her
when he learned that Ramirez was molesting her every time his wife was away. She however did not
report this matter immediately to the authorities because she feared for her life.
Dr. Alex E. Trinidad, Rural Health Physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, after conducting an autopsy on
the body of Miguel Marcelo reported: (a) The gunshot wound penetrating the left lobe of the liver of
deceased Miguel Marcelo was fatal; (b) Considering the trajectory of the gunshot wound, the assailant
was probably pointing slightly downward; (c) The cause of death of the deceased was internal
hemorrhage arising from the gunshot wound; and, (d) Considering the wound of the victim, he could
have survived for a few minutes after he was shot.
To show that he could not have been a party to the crimes charged, accused Fernando Costales gave a
detailed account of his activities by retracing his steps from late afternoon of until dawn of the
following day. He narrated that at in the afternoon of 27 November he was irrigating his land in
Barangay Libeg, then proceeded to a nearby chapel to pray. At past in the evening, he went to see a
certain Isidro who was irrigating his own land with the use of his (Fernando's) water pump. That being
done he went back home.
A couple of hours later, in the company of his wife and children, he returned to the mission house to
attend another religious service. At past that same evening he dropped by Isidro's farmland to verify if
the latter had finished irrigating. He went back home at around to sleep and was awakened by Isidro at
about only to inform him that he (Isidro) was through. When Isidro left, Fernando went back to sleep
only to be roused again by Gregorio Baguio who also wanted to borrow his water pump. With his sleep
disrupted, he decided around to visit as he did the nearby mission house to pray. Shortly after, he
resumed his sleep but woke up again at in the morning to see if had already finished watering his farm.
Defense witnesses Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio corroborated the claim of Fernando Costales
that he could not have perpetrated the crimes as he was with them all the time they were irrigating their
farms. Likewise, Elvie Costales, wife of accused Fernando Costales, presented an "attendance
notebook," purportedly prepared by her, showing that her husband, who was the chapter's religious
leader, was worshipping in the Barangay Libeg chapel from 4:45 to 4:47 o'clock and from 5:30 to 5:37
o'clock at daybreak,[2] from 7:22 to 8:00 o'clock after sunset, [3] and from 12:10 to 12:15 o'clock
midnight[4] of 27 November 1997, although he would periodically leave the prayer meeting to check if
Isidro had already finished watering his farm so that Baguio could also use the pump.
But the trial court viewed the alibi of the defense with askance and assigned full credit to the
declarations of the prosecution witnesses.
In disbelieving the veracity of the "attendance notebook," the court a quo opined that Exh. "2" could
have been more impressive had it borne the confirming signatures or thumbmarks of the "Baro a
Cristiano" faithful, including their leader Fernando Costales, or had Exhs. "2-B" and "2-C" been
corroborated on the witness stand by a less interested member, or had the church secretary who
allegedly kept record of attendance been some member other that Mrs. Costales or the nearest of kin.[5]
The court below also virtually jettisoned the testimonies of Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio when
it said that "they had every reason to come to the rescue of the accused Costales, their admittedly
common nephew." Further, it pointed out that the accused and his witnesses issued contradictory and
irreconcilable statements when, on one hand Isidro testified that before midnight of 27 November 1997
he went to the house of his nephew Fernando Costales to inform him that the irrigation of his farm was
already through; on the other hand, Baguio claimed that at around 11:00 o'clock that night he roused
the accused who thereafter went to operate the pump and stayed put beside it until Baguio's farm was
completely irrigated at 4:00 o'clock the next morning.
The above statements, the court a quo observed, did not jibe with those made by the accused that his
uncle Isidro woke him up at around 11:45 o'clock in the evening and told him that the irrigation of his
farm was finished, after which he returned to bed and when he awakened at past 4:00 o'clock the
following morning, he met Baguio who told him that he too was through irrigating.
In contrast, the trial court saw no dark motives behind the respective testimonies of Crispina Marcelo
and her two (2) daughters. The Costaleses and the Marcelos used to be members of the same religious
sect and accused "Ando" Costales even stood as a sponsor at the wedding of Jessie Marcelo, and again
when Crispina's brother got married. In short, the Marcelos could not have mistaken "Ando" Costales
and Fernando Ramirez for other felons.
In this automatic review, accused Fernando Costales takes exception to the findings of the trial court
and thus seeks reversal of his convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses although the same are perforated with material inconsistencies
and bias; (b) in not giving weight to the defense of alibi despite the weakness of the prosecution
evidence; (c) in convicting him of violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended, since the same was
absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the crime was attended by conspiracy despite the
fact that no aggravating circumstance was established beyond reasonable doubt; and, (e) in not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.
The first and second assigned errors will be discussed jointly since they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant argues that the seemingly flawless and unwavering testimonies of the three (3) key
prosecution witnesses on the assault of the Marcelo household are obviously biased that they invite
suspicion and disbelief.
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors
carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled by both
intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on the other
occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such consistency and uniformity may
be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take into account the following factors which
account for the "near flawless" statements of the prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was
very small with no substantial obstruction to impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was
lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his
cohort, especially so since the assailants were prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c)
at the time of the incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very near each other
because of the very limited space of their shanty such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or
at least sensed, by all of them.
Accused-appellant is seeing ghosts where there is none. Contrary to his submission, it would be highly
irregular indeed if the prosecution witnesses failed to observe the events that transpired on that fateful
night of and their statements did not dovetail, at least on material points, despite very favorable
conditions for a fairly accurate observation.
Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an apparent
"inconsistency" by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted intrusion occurred
shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that barangay Capas was
without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified that the television set was
powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in unenergized "barrios," as the trial
court would put it,[6] and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not still have electricity at that time.
Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court observed, by the three (3)
prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself, immensely fortifies the conclusion
that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no impure motive on their part has been
established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode their credibility.
Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since he and his co-accused were positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses. More so when it is undisputed that the proximity of their place
to the scene of the crimes did not preclude the possibility that they were in fact present at the time of
their commission.
On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the crimes of
murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time convicting him
for violation of PD 1866, as amended.
We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm
under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect , amended the decree and now considers
the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as
a separate offense.[7]
As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require the qualifying
as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or
information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial.
Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that accused-
appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in
imposing the proper penalty.
Moving now to the modifying circumstances raised under the fourth assigned error, accused-appellant
points out that the trial court grievously erred in appreciating unlicensed firearm, evident premeditation
and nighttime which were alleged in the Informations in Crim. Case No. T-2056 for frustrated murder
and Crim. Case No. T-2057 for murder.
While we yield to the trial court's finding of treachery, we take exception to its view that evident
premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been
established by the prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales and
his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo residence in the
middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life,
and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house. The suddenness
of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry the assault thereby ensuring
the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims
was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation accompanied
the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery, [8]
while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof of the planning and
preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.[9]
The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply justifies the imputation that they acted
in concert and in unity in their unlawful objective when in the stillness of the night they both crashed
into the Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim Miguel, then one of them shot him in the head while
the other sprayed tear gas on the other members of the family obviously to disable them, and thereafter
pumped a bullet at the horrified Crispina. This series of actions betrays a concerted design and
concurrence of sentiments to cause mayhem and murder. Accordingly, conspiracy was properly
appreciated by the trial court.
Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant's misplaced sentiment that he had been denied the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As found by the trial court, his alleged surrender was
made too late, and in a place too distant from the crime site as well as his place of residence.[10]
We observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the justification
that the same had been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award of damages is
dictated, not by the agreement of the parties; worse, "in a manner that suits them best," [11] but by the
mandate of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with established law and jurisprudence,
the award of P50,000.00 as civil indmenity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages should be
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances found in Crim. Case No. T-2057,
and applying par. 2 of Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated murder but
was convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that the failure of the
prosecution to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that Crispina
would have died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the accused's conviction for
attempted murder only.
We call to mind People v. De La Cruz11 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the
shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that "his injuries,
though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they
would have caused his death." In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa,[12] we enunciated the doctrine
that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically
attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales guilty of
murder and attempted murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In Crim. Case No.
T-2057, the crime of murder not being considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is sentenced to suffer only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T-2056, the crime of attempted murder not likewise
considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused-
appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is accordingly sentenced in addition to his penalty imposed in
Crim. Case No. T-2057 herein before mentioned, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6)
months of prision mayor minimum as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Miguel
Marcelo P50,000.00 as death indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.