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1. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM, 4 TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A

COUNTERCLAIM IS COMPULSORY
Section 2, Rule 9 Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. — A

compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. (4a)
4 tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory:
ANS: Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals (2012)
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following:
a. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
c. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim? and
d. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct
of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication
of effort and time by the parties and the court?
Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the
claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve
the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim
is compulsory.
2. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE (PLAINTIFF’S FAULT AND DEFENDANT’S FAULT); MOTION

TO DISMISS AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; EFFECT OF DISMISSAL TO COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM
Section 6, Rule 16 -> Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no motion to dismiss

has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. (5a)
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the
prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. (n)
Section 2, Rule 17 -> Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the
preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. (2a)
Section 3, Rule 17 -> Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
b. Effect of dismissal. - If the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the
counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself
states sufficient cause of action then it should stand independently of and survive the
dismissal of the complaint. However, if the dismissal is pursuant to circumstances covered
by Section 6, Rule 16 and Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17, then the dismissal of the complaint
does not result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive.
Pinga vs. Santiago (2006)
Facts: Pinga was a defendant in a complaint for injunction filed by Santiago in 1998. On
October 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) already ordered the dismissal of the complaint
after Santiago’s counsel had sought the postponement of the hearing scheduled then.
However, the order of dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by the RTC in an Order
dated 9 June 2005, which took into account the assurance of Santiago’s counsel that he
would give priority to that case. On the scheduled hearing, Santiago’s counsel still failed to
appear, thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and allowed Pinga to present his evidence ex
parte. Santiago filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC’s Order, opting however not
to seek that their complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be
dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. The RTC granted
the Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the counterclaim, citing as the only ground
therefor that "there is no opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of [Pinga].”
Issue: Whether the dismissal of a complaint for failure to prosecute must necessarily result in
the dismissal of the counterclaim therein.
Held: No. The dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the
same or separate action. Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of
the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or
separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of
such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the
merits of the counterclaim.
Ratio: Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a
complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the
counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the converse holds
true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action
cannot survive. It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint
somehow eliminates the cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive.
Yet that hardly is the case, especially as a general rule. More often than not, the allegations
that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other than
the plaintiff’s very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions imputed
to the plaintiff are often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the complaint
itself. The only apparent exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the
counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes
the violation of the defendant’s rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains
debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate
the pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.
These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is permissive or

compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the court
both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim. The fact that the culpable acts on
which the counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as
the complaint, is insufficient causation to negate the counterclaim together with the
complaint. The dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the boundaries of
time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the defendant, or vice versa. While
such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of litigation by the plaintiff, either through
his/her own initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous to similarly encumber the defendant who
maintained no such initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the
counterclaim or neglects to timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim
be premised on those grounds imputable to the defendant, and not on the actuations of the
plaintiff.
The other considerations supplied in Metals are anchored on the premise that the
jurisdictional foundation of the counterclaim is the complaint itself. The theory is correct, but
there are other facets to this subject that should be taken into account as well. On the
established premise that a counterclaim involves separate causes of action than the
complaint even if derived from the same transaction or series of transactions, the
counterclaim could have very well been lodged as a complaint had the defendant filed the
action ahead of the complainant. The terms ancillary or auxiliary may mislead in signifying
that a complaint innately possesses more credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many
instances wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is meritorious. In truth, the
notion that a counterclaim is, or better still, appears to be merely ancillary or auxiliary is
chiefly the offshoot of an accident of chronology, more than anything else.
The formalistic distinction between a complaint and a counterclaim does not detract from the
fact that both of them embody causes of action that have in their end the vindication of
rights. While the distinction is necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules
of procedure, it should be remembered that the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to
provide the means for the vindication of rights. A party with a valid cause of action against
another party cannot be denied the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the
good fortune of filing the case first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the
previous procedural rule and correspondent doctrine, which under their final permutation,
prescribed the automatic dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim upon the dismissal of the
complaint, whether upon the initiative of the plaintiff or of the defendant.
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is
based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional
flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from
dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the
counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified,
the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal
by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
3. COUNTERCLAIM BEYOND JURISDICTIONAL LIMIT = PLEADED BY WAY OF

DEFENSE AND NOT TO OBTAIN AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
c. The court must have jurisdiction both as to amount and nature of the counterclaim, except
when the original action was filed before the Regional Trial Court. In the latter case, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
Maceda vs. Court of Appeals (1989)
Facts: Private respondent Cement Center, Inc. (“Cement Center”) filed a case for ejectment
against Maceda. In his answer to the complaint, Maceda set up a counterclaim for P240,000,
the alleged value of the improvements which he introduced to the subject property. Maceda
claimed that the original owners of the property promised to reimburse him of his expenses
for said property’s improvement. In its decision, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) ordered
Maceda to vacate the premises and pay the plaintiff P2,000 per month as reasonable
compensation for his use of the premises until he actually vacates, and P5,000 as attorney's
fees. It ordered Cement Center to pay Maceda P158,000 as the value of his improvements
and repairs, less his accrued rentals of P64,000 as of December 1985 and the sum of
P12,000 which he had earlier received as partial reimbursement. The MTC’s mandate for
Cement Center to pay Maceda was upheld by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On appeal,
the Court of Appeals modified the RTC’s decision and set aside Cement Center’s obligation
to pay Maceda P182,200.00 corresponding to the value of the supposed necessary and
useful improvements.
Held: MTC had NO jurisdiction over Maceda’s counterclaim of P240,000. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that the MTC did not have original jurisdiction over his counterclaim
as it exceeds P20,000. Correspondingly, the RTC did not have appellate jurisdiction over the
claim. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan awarding him P158,000 on his
counterclaim, and that of the Regional Trial Court raising the award to P182,200, were invalid
for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum
of money (Maceda’s counterclaim for the value of his improvements is one such action) is
limited to a demand that "does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and
costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind." (Sec. 33, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129.) A
counterclaim in the municipal or city court beyond that jurisdictional limit may be pleaded
only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiffs claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief.
4. THREE WAYS TO COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING
Chua vs Metrobank case:
Three ways of committing forum shopping:
o Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet;
o Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved; and
o Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (Chua v.
Metrobank, 596 SCRA 535).
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice,
wreaks havocs upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.
5. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE DUE TO THE PLAINTIFF’S FAULT; EFFECT ON

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
Section 3, Rule 17 Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff
fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
PINGA VS. SANTIAGO (2006)
Facts: Respondent Santiago filed a complaint for injunction against petitioner Pinga. The
complaint alleged that petitioner and one Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco
lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut.
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner disputed respondent’s ownership
over the properties and claimed that his father had been in possession thereof since the
1930s. During the trial of the case, respondent failed to present his evidence. It appears that
on 25 October 2004, the RTC already ordered the dismissal of the complaint after
respondents counsel had sought the postponement of the hearing scheduled then. However,
the order of dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by the RTC in an Order dated 9 June
2005, which took into account the assurance of respondents counsel that he would give
priority to that case. At the hearing of 27 July 2005, respondent’s counsel once again failed
to appear, sending in his stead a representative who sought the postponement of the
hearing. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion for postponement and moved instead for
the dismissal of the case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents had failed to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented their
evidence yet. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, opting, however, not to seek that their complaint be reinstated,
but praying instead that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from
presenting evidence ex parte. They cited two cases which noted the instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication. The court granted
respondent’s motion and dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim. This prompted petitioner to file
a Motion for Reconsideration, but the court denied the same. Notably, respondent filed an
Opposition to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration wherein they argued that compulsory
counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiff’s cause of action, and a
conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaims.
Issue: Is the dismissal of the complaint due to failure to prosecute carries with it the
dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim?
Held: No. We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the
dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. Our
core discussion begins with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states: SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the
plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in
marked contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which were
superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due to failure to
prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit: SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to prosecute on
the pending counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority on remedial law
characterized as the nagging question of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint
carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules
was hardly silent on the matter. Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the
dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in
the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the
merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for
trial on the merits of the counterclaim. The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any
judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of
the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws, which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded
from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing
the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is
justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory
dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
6. ALL ABOUT DEFAULT 

Section 3, Rule 9. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18) 
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (2a, R18) 
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case,
the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18) 
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common
cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the
others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (4a, R18). 
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment rendered against a party in default
shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award
unliquidated damages. (5a, R18). 
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in an action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to
it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18) 
 
 
Section 3, Rule 18. Notice of pre-trial. — The notice of pre-trial shall be served on
counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with such notice is
charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. (n) 
 
 
Section 1, Rule 37. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may
move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for
one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said
party: 
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably
been impaired in his rights; 
 
 
RULE 38 
Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings 
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against
a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside. (2a) 
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final order
is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due
course. (1a) 
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for
in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be
set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. (3) 
Section 4. Order to file an answer. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance
to justify relief, the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse
parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof. The order
shall be served in such manner as the court may direct, together with copies of the
petition and the accompanying affidavits. (4a) 
Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. — The court in which the
petition is filed may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the
preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in
favor of the adverse party, conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the
petitioner fails on the trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party all
damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of such
injunction or the other proceedings following the petition, but such injunction shall not
operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may have
acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner. (5a) 
Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. — After the filing of the answer or the
expiration of the period therefor, the court shall hear the petition and if after such
hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall be
dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or
final order or other proceeding complained of upon such terms as may be just.
Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other proceeding
had never been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been
granted by it. (6a) 
 
Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. — Where the denial
of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due course to the
appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and proper
appeal had been made. (7a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remedies from judgment by default  
7.  
Before finality  
1. Motion for reconsideration or new trial  
2. Appeal  
8.  
MARTINEZ V. REPUBLIC (2006) FACTS: Jose R. Martinez filed a petition for the
registration in his name of three (3) parcels of land he allegedly purchased from his
uncle. He claimed continuous possession of the lots, that the lots had remained
unencumbered, and that they became private property through prescription. The
OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition. Despite the
opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even against
the Republic of the Philippines. This ensued when during the hearing, no party
appeared before the Court to oppose Martinez’s petition. RTC concluded that
Martinez and his predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in possession
characterized as continuous, open, public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC
thus decreed the registration of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez. From this
Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. However, after the records had been
transmitted to the CA, the RTC received a letter from the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) stating that only two of the lots sought to be registered were referred to in the
Notice of Hearing published in the Official Gazette, and that the third lot was omitted
due to the lack of an approved survey plan for that property. LRA manifested that this
lot should not have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter
was referred by the RTC to the CA for appropriate action. The CA reversed the RTC
and ordered the dismissal of the petition for registration. It found the evidence
presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the registration of the subject lots.
Martinez directly assailed the CA decision before the SC, claiming that the OSG no
longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its allowance by the RTC,
following the order of general default.  
9.  
ISSUE: Whether an order of general default bars the Republic from interposing an
appeal from the trial court’s subsequent decision.  
10.  
HELD: No. We hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even
without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. By 1997,
the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved
into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals: a) The
defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file
a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has
meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered
when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final
and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c) If
the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may
also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2,
Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provision’s deletion under the 1997
Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine,
including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful
proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the
doctrine still exists, applying the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the
1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this
right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this
petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise. The OSG does not impute error on
the part of RTC in improperly declaring the Republic in default even though an
opposition had been filed to Martinez’s petition. The RTC appears to have issued the
order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on
the hearing. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its
Opposition to Martinez’s petition long before the said hearing. It was improper to
declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for
the initial healing. Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default
order. It would thus be improper for the Court to make a pronouncement on the
validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue.  
11.  
After finality  
1. Petition for relief from judgment  
2. Annulment of judgment  
 
Is certiorari a proper remedy?  
12.  
JAO & COMPANY, INC. V. CA (1995)  
13.  
FACTS: Due to the non-appearance of the petitioner Jao & Company, Inc., during the
hearing on the merits, the RTC Manila, upon motion of herein private respondent Top
Service, Inc., issued an order dated April 14, 1989 declaring said petitioner in default
and allowed evidence to be presented ex-parte. The petitioner however filed an
answer. On May 26, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Jao to pay Top
Service the agreed rentals with 12% interest. A writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the RTC. By virtue of such decision, Top Service stated that Jao’s counsel
had withdrawn his appearance in the trial court and left no forwarding address. No
notice of the said order of default and the decision could be given it. The former
contends that the latter’s remedy was timely appeal, which the latter failed to perfect.
 
 
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the trial court, promulgated on May 26, 1989,
became final.  
14.  
HELD: Yes. Under ordinary circumstances, the proper remedy of a party wrongly
declared in default is either to appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition
for relief from judgment, and not certiorari. A default judgment is an adjudication on
the merits and is, thus, appealable. Since appeal is the proper remedy, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie. Petitioner contends that it could not be
bound by the questioned Order of April 14, 1989 declaring it in default and the
subsequent Decision of May 20, 1989 because it did not receive copies thereof.
Respondents counter that such non-service was due to petitioner's fault in not
furnishing the trial court with its "forwarding address" after its counsel withdrew his
appearance. This Court is not in a position to settle this issue of fact — as indeed the
Supreme Court does not decide such questions. But it is not disputed that after
receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, whatever
defects — if indeed there was any — may have been committed by the trial court in
failing to give constructive notice of its erroneous default order was cured by
petitioner's voluntary filing of the said motion for reconsideration. Upon denial thereof,
petitioner should have appealed. But instead of doing that, it opted for the wrong
remedy of certiorari.  
15.  
INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
(2001)  
16.  
FACTS: In 1996, the Chairman of the Technical Panel for Engineering, Architecture,
and Maritime Education of CHED, received a letter from Douglas Macias, Chairman of
the Board of Aeronautical Engineering, PRC inquiring whether petitioner Indiana
Aerospace University had already acquired university status in view of their
representation in the advertisement in the Manila Bulletin. After investigation, it was
found that there was a violation committed by petitioner when it used the term
“university” when it had not yet complied with the basic requirement of being a
university as prescribed in CHED Memorandum. It was affirmed that petitioner
(registered as Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc.) had not amended its Articles of
Incorporation to change its name to a “university.” CHED ordered petitioner to desist
from using the word “university.” Petitioner through its chairman and founder
appealed the Order of CHED averring that the school will suffer damage if it will not
be allowed to use the word “university” in its school name. Prior to the court
decision granting the Cease and Desist Order filed by CHED, petitioner filed
Complaint for Damages before the Court. Respondent CHED then filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint for damages. Petitioner filed Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss. The trial court denied respondent CHED’s motion to dismiss and issued a
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner. The trial court also directed CHED
to file its Answer to the decision within 15 days from the receipt of the Court Order –
which was August 15, 1998. On September 22, 1998, petitioner filed Motion to
Declare Respondent in Default pursuant to Section 9, Section 3. On the same day,
respondent CHED filed for Motion for Extension of Time to File its Answer until
November 18, 1998 and submitted its Answer on November 17, 1998. On November
11, petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion for Extension of Time to File
respondent’s Answer. The trial court rendered its Decision and granted petitioner’s
motion to declare respondent CHED in Default. Respondent CHED consequently filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari arguing that the RTC had committed grave abuse
of discretion in declaring respondent CHED in default despite its Filing of an Answer.
The CA ruled that respondent CHED should not have been declared in default,
because its answer had been filed long before the RTC ruled upon petitioner’s Motion
to declare respondent in default. Thus, respondent had not obstinately refused to file
an Answer; on the contrary, its failure to do so on time was due to excusable
negligence.  
17.  
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the order declaring
CHED in default.  
18.  
HELD: The SC agreed with respondent CHED that certiorari was the only plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, because the default Order
had improvidently been issued.  
19.  
The remedies available to a defendant declared in default are as follows: (1) a
motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion
for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after
judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if
judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment
under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
resorted to. These remedies, however, are available only to a defendant who has
been validly declared in default. Such defendant irreparably loses the right to
participate in the trial. On the other hand, a defendant improvidently declared in
default may retain and exercise such right after the order of default and the
subsequent judgment by default are annulled, and the case remanded to the court of
origin.  
20.  
The former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 of
the pre 1997 Rules of Court, and can therefore contest only the judgment by default
on the designated ground that it is contrary to evidence or law. The latter, however,
has the following options: to resort to this same remedy; to interpose a petition for
certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default, even before the promulgation
of a judgment by default; or in the event that judgment has been rendered, to have
such order and judgment declared void. In prohibiting appeals from interlocutory
orders, the law does not intend to accord executory force to such writs, particularly
when the effect would be to cause irreparable damage. If in the course of trial, a
judge proceeds without or in excess of jurisdiction, this rule prohibiting an appeal
does not leave the aggrieved party without any remedy. In a case like this, a special
civil action of certiorari is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a petition
for certiorari is available to respondent CHED to assail the judgment by default on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently
invalid order of default. 
21.  
22.  
7. MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON A PLEADING WHICH DOES NOT STATE ANY
CAUSE OF ACTION vs. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE 
Section 1, Rule 16. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (1a)
Section 1, Rule 34. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied he shall
have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (1a,
R35)
Republic vs Tuvera (2007)
Facts: The Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG), in behalf of the Republic,
filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint against Juan and Victor Tuvera, seeking to
recover funds allegedly acquired by said parties in flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary
obligations with grave abuse of right and power in violation of the Constitution and the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines. In particular, the Complaint alleged that Juan Tuvera, as
Presidential Executive Assistant of President Marcos, took advantage of his relationship to
influence upon and connection with the President by engaging in a scheme to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of the Republic and of the Filipino people, specifically, by securing
TLA No. 356 on behalf of Twin Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the
exportation of mahogany of the narra species and Twin Peaks’ lack of qualification to be a
grantee thereof for lack of sufficient logging equipment to engage in the logging business.
In their Answer, respondents Victor Tuvera and Twin Peaks claimed that Twin Peaks was
awarded TLA No. 356 only after its articles of incorporation had been amended enabling it to
engage in logging operations, that the Republic’s reference to Chinese operations and
revenue of approximately P45 million were merely imagined, and that the PCGG has no
statutory authority to institute the action. The trial ensued. After the Republic rested its case,
with leave of court, respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Respondents argued that the
Republic failed to present sufficient legal affirmative evidence to prove its claim. In particular,
respondents’ demurrer contends that the memorandum (Exh. B) and TLA No. 356 are not
"legal evidence" because "legal evidence" is not meant to raise a mere suspicion or doubt.
Respondents also claim that income tax returns are not sufficient to show one’s holding in a
corporation. Respondents also cited the factual antecedents culminating with the Court’s
decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Corp., Inc. v. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources.
The Republic filed a Manifestation, contending that the demurrer is not based on the
insufficiency of its evidence but on the strength of the evidence of respondents as shown by
their own exhibits. In its Resolution dated 23 May 2001, the Sandiganbayan sustained the
demurrer to evidence and referred to the decision of this Court in Ysmael in holding that res
judicata applies.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly sustained the demurrer to evidence.
Held: No. The Supreme Court noted that the Sandiganbayan justified the grant of demurrer
with res judicata as rationale. Res judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustaining a
demurrer to evidence, even as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. A

demurrer may be granted if, after the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, it appears upon the
facts and the law that the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In contrast, the grounds for res
judicata present themselves even before the presentation of evidence, and it should be at
that stage that the defense of res judicata should be invoked as a ground for dismissal.
Properly speaking, the movants for demurral who wish to rely on a controlling value of a
settled case as a ground for demurrer should invoke the ground of stare decisis in lieu of res
judicata.
Distinguished from motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [g])

-> The Supreme Court distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complainant to
state a cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. 1. The
first [situation where the complaint does not alleged cause of action] is raised in a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from
the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matter aliunde. The
second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised
in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be
resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim.
(Republic vs. Tuvera, id., citing Domondon v. Lopez, 383 SCRA 376). 2. The first does not
concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely
because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the
evidence wanting. (Id.) 3. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the
defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has
shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on
preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to
dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. (Id.)
4. If a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is DENIED, the defendant may file his responsive
pleading. Under Rule 33, the defendant may present his evidence. (Riano, p. 399) 5. If a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is GRANTED, the complaint may be refiled, depending on
the ground for dismissal. In Rule 33, the complaint may not be refiled, and the remedy of the
plaintiff is to appeal from the order of dismissal. (Id.)
8. AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT; REMEDIES
Amendment of judgment
1. Before it becomes final and executory
Eternal Gardens Memorial v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)
Facts: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North
Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists executed a Land
Development Agreement whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own
expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private
respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots.
Respondent executed in petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage) on the
lots with titles involved in the land development project.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in
question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for
interpleader against respondent and Maysilo Estate, alleging that it has no claim of
ownership except as a purchaser thereof and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared
to be the owners of said properties. During trial of the case, respondent presented a motion
for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. The trial court
denied judicial deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984. Another order dated October
26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order, (1) setting aside the order for
respondent's deposit of the amounts it had previously received from petitioner; and (2)
denying respondent’s motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance under the
Land Development Agreement. Respondent filed before the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) a petition for certiorari praying that the Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26,
1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in court
or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private
respondent. The IAC dismissed the petition in its decision on February 27, 1985. However,
in its Resolution dated 5 September 1985m ut reversed its decision and ordered the
respondent to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development
Agreement. Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the IAC abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
reconsidering its resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the resolution of
September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from
it under the Land Development Agreement.
Held: No. There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments,
to make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have not yet
attained finality. In fact, motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts that
their rulings are erroneous and improper and in so doing, said courts are given sufficient
opportunity to correct their errors. In the case at bar, petitioner admitted among others in
its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private
respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is
declared entitled to said amounts. Such admissions in the complaint were reaffirmed in open
court before the IAC as stated in the latter court's resolution dated September 5, 1985.
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections
to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower
court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only
required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the
Land Development Program. The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of
interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property
or funds in controversy with the court. The IAC found that more than twenty million pesos
are involved; so that interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now
accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of
the complaint for interpleader, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the
lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the
requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the
Court.
2. After it becomes final and executory
Nunal v. Court of Appeals (1993)
Facts: Respondents filed a case for partition and accounting of a parcel of land located in
Isabela against Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs.
Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon,
deceased parents of petitioner and the respondents. Respondents claimed that said parcel
of land has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since 1946 and that she made
no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private
respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares. On December 17, 1974, the trial
court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the
property. On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. The case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition. On July
17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, filed
a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she
contends that not being a party to the case her rights, interests, ownership and participation
over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of
execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is
concerned, said share not having been brought within the jurisdiction of the court. The trial
court dismissed the motion to quash order of execution with preliminary injunction filed by
Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition. The private respondents filed motion for
clarification as to whether the partition of property is to be confined merely among the party
plaintiffs and defendants, to the exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin. On January 9, 1987, the
lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner
with a share in the partition of the property, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left
out in the partition of said property. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir
entitled to participate in the partition of the property in considering that the decision rendered
in that case has long become final and executory.
Held: No. In the case of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, We held that ". . .,
nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "any amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose." In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in the case has become final and
executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an
independent suit against the parties in the case and all other heirs for her share in the subject
property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
Industrial Timber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (1994)
Facts: In the earlier case of Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83616, the
Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the NLRC that the petitioners are the employers of
private respondents and remanded the case for a determination of the validity of the
quitclaim allegedly signed by the latter. In its resolution dated February 3, 1992, the NLRC
affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter on February 26, 1987, ordering the petitioners
to reinstate the private respondents, and to pay them back wages and other benefits. In view
of the lapse of time since the promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise directed the
petitioners to pay the private respondents severance benefits should reinstatement of the
private respondents to their former position be no longer possible. This resolution became
final and executory on March 9, 1992, and entry of judgment was made on March 25, 1992.
The respondents meanwhile had filed on March 20, 1992, an ex parte motion for issuance
of a writ of execution with manifestation that from February 26, 1987, up to the present, they
have not been reinstated and thus were entitled to back salaries for the said period and until
actual reinstatement shall have been made. Upon computation, the Labor Arbiter held
petitioners liable to the respondents for the total amount of P387,122.65 for back salaries.
The NLRC, on appeal, only made a slight modification of the amount of the award and
directed the petitioners to pay respondents the sum of P375,795.20. Petitioners submit that
the recomputation should not have been allowed because the monetary awards due the
respondents had already been determined and fixed in the order which became final and
executory. It is argued that to allow the recomputation and the increase of the monetary
award to the respondents would in effect allow an arbiter to change a decision that has
become final and executory.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can be held liable for the recomputed amount although
the resolution has already become final and executory.
Held: Yes. It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer
be modified or otherwise disturbed. However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where
facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it
therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to
harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances." In this case, the back wages
and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private respondents in the
amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on
April 26, 1986, up to the time of the rendition of the decision on February 26, 1987. There is
no dispute that from April 26, 1986, to this date, the private respondents have not been
reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards decreed by the NLRC been made to
them. It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits due to the private
respondents as recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of the dispositive
portion of the decision subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that
at the time the recomputation was made in 1992, five (5) years had already elapsed from the
time the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on February 26, 1987. Thus, a recomputation
was necessary to arrive at a just and proper determination of the monetary awards due the
private respondents.
Supplemental Judgment
Esquivel v. Alegre (1989)
Facts: Spouses Teotimo and Visitacion (“private respondents”) filed a case for unlawful
detainer against Spouses Cresenciana and Lamberto (“petitioners”). The trial court ruled in
favor of private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. After private respondents secured a writ of execution in the unlawful
detainer case, petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance with nullity of judgment
damages and preliminary injunction (the “second case”) alleging that they had prior
possession over the land subject of the unlawful detainer case. Notably, the question of prior
possession of the land in question was raised and passed upon in the unlawful detainer
case. Hence, the courts ruled in favour of private respondents in the second case. After
their motion for reconsideration of the second case was denied, petitioners filed their notice
of appeal but due to the opposition of private respondents to the non-inclusion in the record
on appeal of certain pleadings, orders and decisions which they claimed are relevant to the
disposition of the appeal, petitioners were ordered by respondent court to amend their
record on appeal to satisfy the objections of the private respondents. In the meantime private
respondents
transferred the property in question to the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia
Dasmarinas. Petitioners must have learned of the sale before they could file their amended
record on appeal, which must have prompted them to file a motion for supplemental
complaint against the vendees of the property in question, the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and
Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was admitted by respondent court. As borne by the records of
the case, respondent court ruled in favor of herein petitioners in the supplemental complaint
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners claim that the decision of
respondent court in the supplemental complaint revised the decision in the original complaint
tantamount to an amendment or reversal of said original decision of respondent court
penned by a previous presiding judge therein.
Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered by a trial court in a supplemental complaint
modified the decision of the same branch of the court in the original complaint and amounts
to an amendment of the original decision
Held: No. There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental

judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of
the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering
all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new
decision which supersedes the original decision. Following the Court's differentiation of a
supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental
decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name
denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement
exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. In the
instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision but only on
the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental decision cannot stand
alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the respective rights and
duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest
of the defendants in the original complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the appealed
case shall be legally binding upon them ...". The part of the supplemental decision which
petitioners claim to have revised the original, is quoted as follows: In the light of the
foregoing testimony of the witnesses presented by supplemental plaintiffs together with the
documentary exhibits supporting the allegations of the supplemental complaint, the Court
finds that the evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are preponderantly sufficient
to justify and warrant a judgment in their favor. There can be no other interpretation of the
above statement of respondent court than that all documentary and testimonial evidence
prescribed by supplemental plaintiffs, petitioners herein, sufficiently prove that when
supplemental defendants entered into the contract of absolute sale with the original
defendants, they already had full knowledge of the controversy between supplemental
plaintiffs and the original defendants in Civil Case No. 4883 such that they must be adjudged
as successors-in-interest of original defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno. This
interpretation is borne by the statement of respondent court at the end of the paragraph
preceding that which petitioners herein claim to have revised the original decision, which
states: ... One thing, however, clear is that both supplemental defendants are successors-in-
interest of Teotimo Alaurin The prayer for reconveyance of the property in question cannot be
justified in the light of the decision of Hon. Jose C. Razo. It must be pointed out that the
dispositive portion itself of the supplemental decision is clear and unambiguous. It does not
make any declaration or pronouncement that may be taken to have revised or amended the
original decision. All that it declares is that the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas
and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and
Visitacion Magno such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally
binding upon them.
Judgments Nun Pro Tunc
Cardoza v. Singson (1990)
Facts: Plaintiffs in Civil Case No.1853 filed for a Motion for Execution of Judgment on 29
August 1979. The motion alleged that a decision dated February 7, 1938 of the Court of First
Instance, Leyte which was affirmed with modification in the decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A. G.R. No. 3645, promulgated on December 6, 1939 had long been final and executory.
Plaintiffs allegedly acquired knowledge of the appellate court's decision only in November
11, 1974 because before the death of their original counsel in 1944 they were not informed of
the said decision. In an order dated September 4, 1979, the trial court directed the plaintiffs-
movants to submit their memorandum within fifteen days and for the defendants-oppositors
to file their opposition thereto within the same period from receipt of the memorandum. On
May 4, 1980, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion to defer the consideration of the motion for
execution on the ground that in during one of the hearings, they allegedly discovered that no
entry of judgment had been made and that nobody could tell whether parties or their counsel
received a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs therefore, prayed for the
recording of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the book of entries of Judgment. On July
6, 1981, the trial court issued an order that "a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant
to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545." For the
satisfaction of the judgment it likewise ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. On July
21, 1981, the writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Southern Leyte
or his deputies to enforce and execute the decision of the trial court as modified by the
appellate court. On January 8, 1982 herein petitioner Juanito Cardoza filed the instant
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In his petition, he alleged inter alia that the respondent judge usurped the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals when it issued the Order of July 6, 1981 directing that "a non pro tunc'
judgment be entered pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case C.A. G.R.
No. 3545" because (a) under Section 10 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, its issuance
is the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals; (b) that the trial court
erred in granting the application for issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment because plaintiffs'
inaction to move for the execution of the Judgment 40 years after its promulgation is a
ground for its denial; (c) that private respondents have not adduced evidence to overcome
the regularity in the performance of official function so that it can be presumed that the Clerk
of Court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment; and (d) that respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he deprived petitioner of his property without due
process of law.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it made
the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.
Held: Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the trial court correctly
made the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals
in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In so doing, the lower court merely ordered the
judgment of the, Court of Appeals to be executed. The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order
was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 where an order or
judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as
rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it
was made. Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the lower courts action—decreeing the
entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc—was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously. The petitioner
was allowed to oppose the motions in open court and was even required to submit a
memorandum to support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to submit a
memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims over the
properties in question. Finally, well settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final
and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors
or mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to
execute the final judgment, as in this case. Law of The Case According to this principle,
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court. This principle generally finds application in cases
where an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings. The question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal (RCPI v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139763, April 26, 2006). Note: This
rule does not apply to resolutions rendered in connection with the case wherein no rationale
has been expounded on the merits of that action (Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
80194, Mar. 21, 1989).
Immutability against Final Judgment
Griffith vs. Estur (2008)
Facts: On 25 July 1997, respondents Estur, Ofalsa, and Ereve (respondents) filed an
amended complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of legal holiday pay, 13th month pay,
and service incentive leave pay against Lincoln Gerald, Inc. (Lincoln) and petitioner Dominic
Griffith (petitioner). Lincoln, a corporation owned by the Griffith family, is engaged in the
manufacture of furniture. Respondents alleged that petitioner Dominic Griffith, the Vice
President for Southeast Asia Operations, managed the corporation. On 4 October 1999,
Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen (Labor Arbiter Layawen) decided the case in favor of
respondents. Lincoln filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 1999 but failed to file the
required memorandum of appeal. On 6 July 2001, the decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen
became final and executory, and the first writ of execution was issued on 2 October 2001. In
February 2002, petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution dated 7 January
2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno (Labor Arbiter Reyno) directed against him and
Lincoln. On 19 February 2002, petitioner filed a motion to quash the first alias writ of
execution. Petitioner alleged in his motion that he was unaware of the labor case filed against
him because he was Lincolns Vice President for Southeast Asia Operations only until 17
September 1997. Petitioner contended that the addition of the execution fee in the writ in
effect modified Labor Arbiter Layawens decision, and thus nullified the writ. Furthermore,
petitioner maintained that as an officer of Lincoln, he was not personally liable to pay the
judgment debt because he acted in good faith and within the bounds of his authority. Labor
Arbiter Reyno denied the motion in an order dated 24 April 2002. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied on 16 July
2002. On 11 September 2002, Labor Arbiter Reyno issued a second alias writ of execution
against petitioner and Lincoln.
Issue: Whether the petitioner Griffith can assail the decision of Labor Arbiter Layawens
based on the defenses which he raised Held: No. Labor Arbiter Layawens decision is already
final and executory and can no longer be the subject of an appeal. Thus, petitioner is bound
by the decision and can no longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a
decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The doctrine of finality of judgment is
explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time
fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main
role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
While petitioner can no longer challenge the decision which has become final and executory,
he can question the manner of its execution especially if it is not in accord with the tenor and
terms of the judgment. As held in Abbott v. NLRC: In Sawit v. Rodas and Daquis v. Bustos,
we held that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial
declaration. Accordingly, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing
party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution; and issuance thereof is a
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. In the instant case, however, what is sought to
be reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner of its execution. There is a big
difference. While it is true that the decision itself has become final and executory and so can
no longer be challenged, there is no question either that it must be enforced in accordance
with its terms and conditions. Any deviation therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal.

8. BARRED BY FORMER JUDGMENT vs CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT
Section 47, Rule 39 Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of
a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration or
the condition, status or relationship of the person, however, the probate of a will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (49a)
Bar By Former Judgment And Conclusiveness Of Judgment, Distinguished
Del Rosario vs Far East Bank and Trust Company (2007)
Facts: On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement
under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso
loan of P2.5 million or a total amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at the then
prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso. The loans were secured by real estate
mortgages over six parcels of land. Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the
latter applied to interest, service fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCP’s
computation, with an outstanding balance on the principal of more than P10 million as of
May 15, 1983. By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of
contract and damages. The appeal before the Supreme Court was docketed as G.R. No.
73198. In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from petitioners (the
receivables) to its co-respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under a Deed of
Assignment dated April 10, 1987 for a consideration of P5,435,000. FEBTC, as assignee of
the receivables, and petitioners later executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated
December 8, 1988 whereby petitioners agreed to, as they did pay FEBTC the amount of P6.4
million as full settlement of the receivables. On September 2, 1992, the Supreme Court
promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 73198. It determined that after deducting the P3 million
earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP, their remaining balance on the principal loan was only
P1.4 million. Based on the Supreme Court decision, petitioners filed on April 25, 1994 a
Complaint for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to
recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 million -- P4.335 million from
PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1610. On
May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 94-1610
ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 million, to bear interest at 12% per
annum from April 25, 1994 until fully paid; to execute a release or cancellation of the
mortgages. As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the trial court
dismissed it for lack of cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between petitioners and
FEBTC was not subject to the Supreme Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 73198, FEBTC not
being a party thereto.
From the trial court’s decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50591. On May 22, 1998, the
CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, holding that petitioners outstanding
obligation, which the Supreme Court had determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million,
could not be increased or decreased by any act of the creditor PDCP. The CA held that when
PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount
payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have
provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not
bound by its terms. Citing Articles 2154 and 2163 of the Civil Code which embody the
principle of solutio indebiti, the CA held that the party bound to refund the excess payment
of P5 million was FEBTC as it received the overpayment; and that FEBTC could recover from
PDCP the amount of P4.035 million representing its overpayment for the assigned
receivables based on the terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general principle of
equity. Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the amount of
P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief different from or in excess
of that prayed for. Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the
payment of P1.4 million had no basis, DATICORs obligation having already been paid in full,
overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million. This decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal. On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the
RTC of Makati a Complaint against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment of
P4.335 million. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540. In its Answer, FEBTC
denied responsibility, it submitting that nowhere in the dispositive portion of the CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held liable to return the whole amount of P5.435 million
representing the consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables, and since
petitioners failed to claim the said whole amount in their original complaint in Civil Case No.
94-1610 as they were merely claiming the amount of P965,000 from it, they were barred from
claiming it. On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision dismissing
petitioner’s complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action.
Issue: Whether in filing an action against FEBTC for the difference in its original claim and
the claim adjudged by the courts in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, FEBTC forum-shopped
Held: Yes, the filing of Civil Case No. 00-540 constitutes forum shopping as the issue raised
by petitioner is covered by the doctrine of res judicata. Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, on the doctrine of res judicata, reads: Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: x x x x (b) In other
cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
whichappears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (Underscoring supplied) The above-quoted provision
lays down two main rules. Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as bar
by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which states that the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
either before the same or any other tribunal. Stated otherwise, bar by former judgment
makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action
since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it
but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which
could have been adjudged therein. It is in this concept that the term res judicata is more
commonly and generally used as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is conclusiveness of
judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim
or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to a situation
where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters
actually determined or which were necessarily included therein. In determining whether
causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the rule of res judicata, the test is
to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action
would suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms or nature of
the two actions are different. Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a
bar to the subsequent action. There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil
Case No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not only
did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a consequence of the
denial of FEBTCs motion for reconsideration and appeal.
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the
merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. To recall, it was ruled that: (1)
DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC was bound to refund the excess payment but
because DATICORs claim against FEBTC was only P965,000, the court could only grant so
much as the relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR because
its obligation had already been paid in full. Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case
based upon the same cause of action.

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 1 of 24

1. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM, 4 TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A

Section 2, Rule 9 Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. — A

4 tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory:

ANS: Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals (2012)

2. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE (PLAINTIFF’S FAULT AND DEFENDANT’S FAULT); MOTION

Section 6, Rule 16 -> Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no motion to dismiss

Pinga vs. Santiago (2006)

These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is permissive or

3. COUNTERCLAIM BEYOND JURISDICTIONAL LIMIT = PLEADED BY WAY OF

Maceda vs. Court of Appeals (1989)

4. THREE WAYS TO COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING

Chua vs Metrobank case:

Three ways of committing forum shopping:

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 5 of 24

5. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE DUE TO THE PLAINTIFF’S FAULT; EFFECT ON

PINGA VS. SANTIAGO (2006)

6. ALL ABOUT DEFAULT

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 13 of 24

Republic vs Tuvera (2007)

demurrer to evidence, even as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. A

8. AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT; REMEDIES

1. Before it becomes final and executory

Eternal Gardens Memorial v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)

2. After it becomes final and executory

Nunal v. Court of Appeals (1993)

Industrial Timber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (1994)

Esquivel v. Alegre (1989)

Held: No. There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 19 of 24

Judgments Nun Pro Tunc

Cardoza v. Singson (1990)

Immutability against Final Judgment

Griffith vs. Estur (2008)

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 21 of 24

8. BARRED BY FORMER JUDGMENT vs CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 MIDTERMS REVIEWER - TIPS Page 22 of 24

Bar By Former Judgment And Conclusiveness Of Judgment, Distinguished

Del Rosario vs Far East Bank and Trust Company (2007)

Potrebbero piacerti anche

6. ALL ABOUT DEFAULT 