RULE 114 order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the

MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

Agbay v. People
FACTS:
 is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
 Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still
a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.
 In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a residential house. However,
they came to know that the portion where they built their house is a public land and part
of the salvage zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA)
over the subject land wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent
Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in
court. David filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the
same was denied. Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that the latter’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA.
Thereafter, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the
Municipal Trial Court and a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter
then filed an Urgent Motion for ReDetermination of Probable Cause, which was denied.
David’s petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.
 In Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person,
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
*If a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law

ISSUE: WN the MTC properly deny David’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused?

HELD:
 The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as
ground for denying petitioner’s motion for redetermination of probable cause, as the
motion was filed prior to his arrest.
 However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.
 In Miranda v. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person,
and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
 Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's
People v. Piad
Accused-appellant Piad was charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs weighing 0.05 gram and illegal possession of dangerous drugs weighing 0.06 gram.
While accused-appellant Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were charged in two (2) informations with the
crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party weighing 0.03 gram and illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia during a party.
On August 8, 2005, Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned and they pleaded "Not Guilty." Davis,
however, was not arraigned because he had jumped bail.3
Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. On May 15, 2008, after Davis was arrested, he was arraigned
and, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges against him.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented PO1 Larry Arevalo (PO1 Arevalo), PO1 Joseph Bayot (PO1
Bayot), Forensic Chemist PSI Stella Ebuen (PSI Ebuen), PO2 Clarence Nipales (PO2 Nipales), and
P/Insp. Donald Sabio (P/Insp. Sabio), as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to prove
the following:
On April 23, 2005, the Special Operations Task Force, Pasig City Police Station, Pasig City, received
information from a confidential informant that a certain "Gamay," who was later identified as Piad,
was selling drugs along Ortigas Bridge, Pasig City. P/Insp. Sabio led the team, composed of PO1
Arevalo, PO1 San Agustin, PO1 Bayot, PO1 Danilo Pacurib, PO2 Nipales, and PO1 Bibit, to
conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1 Arevalo was assigned as poseur-buyer and was provided with
the marked money - P150.00 in P100.00 and P50.00 peso bills. The Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) issued a certificate of coordination authorizing the team to proceed with the
operation.
Around 6:45 o’clock in the afternoon, the team arrived at the house of Piad in Lifehomes
Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig City. The back-up team took up position about 5 meters away from
Piad’s house. The confidential informant, with PO1 Arevalo, knocked on the door. When Piad
opened the door, the confidential informant introduced PO1 Arevalo as a buyer of shabu. Piad asked
PO1 Arevalo how much he wanted and the latter answered P150.00. Thereafter, Piad closed the
door and returned after a few seconds.
Upon opening the door again, PO1 Arevalo noticed that a group of male individuals were inside
the house. PO1 Arevalo handed to Piad the P150.00 marked money. In turn, Piad handed to PO1
Arevalo a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After the transaction was
completed, PO1 Arevalo immediately grabbed Piad’s right arm and introduced himself as a police
officer. Piad, however, struggled to free himself. PO1 Arevalo was eventually forced to enter the
house amidst the struggle. The back-up team followed suit and entered the house.
After arresting him, PO1 Arevalo asked Piad to bring out the marked money. Piad complied. PO1
Arevalo also asked him about the source of the drugs he sold. Piad pulled out a metal box from his
pocket and it revealed two (2) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO1
Arevalo marked all the items confiscated from Piad at the place of the arrest. Meanwhile, the back-
up team saw Villarosa, Davis and Carbo inside the house, sitting on the floor. They were surrounded
by three (3) sachets of white crystalline substance (one was heat sealed, while the other two were
unsealed), aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable lighters. The items were confiscated and were
marked by PO1 Bayot thereat.
The team brought Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis to the police headquarters. There, PO2 Pacurib,
PO1 Bayot and PO1 Arevalo executed a joint affidavit on their arrest. P/Insp. Sabio prepared the
requests for laboratory examination and drug test, which were brought by SPO1 Bayot to the
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen examined the confiscated items which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented Piad, her sister Maria Zennette Piad (Maria), Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis as
its witnesses. They all testified to establish the following:
On April 23, 2005, Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis were celebrating a birthday party in the house
of Piad. Between 1:00 o’clock and 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a tricycle and a vehicle stopped in
front of the house at Pilar Apartment, Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. Two (2) armed men in civilian
clothes alighted from the vehicle, while another armed man alighted from the tricycle. All of them
suddenly entered the house of Piad, where the accused-appellants were having a drinking spree.
Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis were then ordered to lie down on the floor facing downwards.
Thereafter, the armed men searched the house. Subsequently, the accused-appellants were
handcuffed and brought to the police station. Piad claimed that the police officers were asking
P20,000.00 in exchange for their freedom; while Carbo claimed that the officers were demanding
P10,000.00 for their release.
The RTC Ruling
In its Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, the RTC found Piad guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, while Villarosa, Carbo
and Davis were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs during parties and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during parties.
The RTC held that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs were established because
PO1 Arevalo handed the marked money to Piad, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachet, which was
confirmed to contain 0.05 gram of shabu. The elements of the crime of illegal possession of drugs
were also established because two (2) more sachets of shabu weighing 0.06 gram were found in the
metal container inside the pocket of Piad immediately after his arrest.
As to Villarosa, Carbo and Davis, the RTC found that they committed the crime of illegal possession
of drugs and paraphernalia during a party because they were surrounded by plastic sachets
containing 0.03 gram of shabu and different drug paraphernalia when the team found them. The
elements of such crimes were clearly proven because they were in a proximate company of at least
two persons and without any legal authority to possess such illicit items.
The RTC did not give credence to the defense of denial and frame up put up by the accused because
their testimonies were inconsistent and self-serving. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE:
 1. In Criminal Case No. 14086-D, the Court finds the accused Glen Piad alias Gamay
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) with the accessory penalties provided for under Section
35 of said R.A. 9165.
2. In Criminal Case No. 14087-D, the Court finds the accused Glen Piad alias Gamay
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, and
hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, as maximum, and a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) with all the accessory penalties under the law.
3. In Criminal Case No. 14088-D, their guilt having been established beyond reasonable
doubt, accused Renato Villarosa y Platino, Agustin Carbo y Pavillon and Nilo Davis y
Artiga are hereby CONVICTED of violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. 9165 for
possessing methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing less than five grams in the
proximate company of at least two persons without legal authority and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to Twenty (20) years as maximum, and fine of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php400,000.00) each.
4. In Criminal Case No. 14089-D their guilt having been established beyond reasonable
doubt, accused Renato Villarosa y Platino, Agustin Carbo y Pavillon and Nilo Davis y
Artiga are hereby CONVICTED of violation of Section 14, Article II of R.A. 9165 for
possessing paraphernalia for dangerous drug in the proximate company of at least two
persons without legal authority and hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to four (4) years, as
maximum, and fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) each.
HOWEVER, the four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance or shabu (Exhs. H,
H-1, H-2, and J) and the illegal drug paraphernalia (Exhs. I, K, L, M, N, O, P) are hereby ordered
turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction and proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis filed their notices of appeal. 5 Subsequently, Carbo
withdrew his appeal,6 which was granted by the CA in its Resolution,7 dated October 21, 2011.
In their Appellants’ Brief,8 Piad, Villarosa and Davis argued that the chain of custody rule was not
complied with because PSI Ebuen did not testify on the condition of the confiscated items; that it
was not shown how the said items were brought before the court; and that no photograph was
taken or an inventory of the seized items was conducted.
In its Appellee’s Brief,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 required only substantial compliance
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the items were preserved; and that the testimony of
the police officers showed that the items were properly handled.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated January 22, 2014, the CA affirmed the conviction of Piad, Villarosa
and Davis. The CA held that all the elements of the crimes charged were indeed proven. As to the
chain of custody, the appellate court enumerated in detail how the prosecution was able to establish
its compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. As the chain of custody of the seized items was
sufficiently established not to have been broken, then the admissibility and credibility of the said
items were appreciated. The CA disposed the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 14086-D,
14087-D, 14088-D and 14089-D, finding accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
In its Resolution,11 dated November 19, 2014, the Court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired.
In its Manifestation and Motion,12 dated January 8, 2015, the OSG manifested that it would no
longer submit a supplemental brief because its Brief for the Appellee, dated February 10, 2012,
before the CA had extensively and exhaustively discussed all the issues and arguments raised by the
accused-appellants.
In their Manifestation (in lieu of Supplemental Brief),13 dated February 4, 2015, the accused-
appellants manifested that they would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that no new
issues material to the case were raised.
In his Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal,14 Villarosa signified his intention to
withdraw his appeal, adding that he understood the consequences of his action. In its
Resolution,15 dated April 8, 2015, the Court granted Villarosa’s motion to withdraw his appeal.
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated January 13, 2015, the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that
there was no record of confinement of Davis in all the prison facilities of the said Bureau. In the
same resolution, dated April 8, 2015, the Court required the Clerk of Court of the RTC to confirm
the confinement of Davis within ten (10) days from notice.
In her Manifestation/Compliance,16 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Rachel G. Matalang (Atty. Matalang), reported that Davis was never committed in any detention or
prison facility as he posted bail under a surety bond from Summit Guaranty and Insurance
Company, Inc. on May 6, 2005 during the pendency of the trial; that on November 12, 2009, during
the promulgation of the judgment, Davis and his counsel appeared before the trial court and
manifested that he would file a notice of appeal; that no warrant of arrest or commitment order was
issued against him; and that she could not confirm the confinement of Davis.
In its Resolution,17 dated July 8, 2015, the Court required Davis, the OSG and Summit Guaranty
and Insurance Company, Inc., to comment on the manifestation of Atty. Matalang.
In its Comment,18 dated October 16, 2015, the OSG asserted that when Davis jumped bail on
August 8, 2005, the RTC should have immediately cancelled his bailbond; that he should have been
placed under custody after the promulgation of the judgment; and that he had become a fugitive
from justice who had lost his standing to appeal.
In its Manifestation,19 dated December 8, 2015, the Public Attorney’s Office informed the Court
that, despite earnest efforts to locate Davis and the surety company, they were not able to determine
their whereabouts; and that his wife informed the office that Davis had received the July 8, 2015
Resolution of the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal lacks merit and Davis has lost his right to appeal.
Elements of the crimes charged were duly established by the prosecution
After a review of the records of the case, the Court holds that Piad was properly convicted of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It was proven that, on April 23, 2005, the police went to
his house to conduct a buy-bust operation; that PO1 Arevalo acted as the poseur-buyer; and that
when PO1 Arevalo gave the marked money to Piad, the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet.
A laboratory examination confirmed that the plastic sachet contained 0.05 gram of shabu. Clearly,
all the elements of the said crime were established.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Piad committed the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in flagrante delicto, he was asked about the source of his drugs.
He then brought out a metal box, which contained two (2) more sachets. It was confirmed in a
laboratory test that these sachets contained 0.06 gram of shabu.
With respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party and the crime of
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the prosecution also established that after
the arrest of Piad, the team found Villarosa, Carbo and Davis sitting on the floor and surrounded
by one (1) heat-sealed sachet and two (2) unsealed sachets. A laboratory report showed that these
sachets contained a total of 0.03 gram of shabu. The said persons were also found with an aluminum
foil, a tooter and disposable lighters, which were considered drug paraphernalia. As correctly held
by the RTC, the elements of such crimes were proven because there was a proximate company of
at least two (2) persons without any legal authority to possess the illicit items, citing Section 14 of
R.A. No. 9165.20
Substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.21 Section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence" as long as it can
be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.22
In this case, the CA meticulously assessed how the prosecution complied with the chain of custody
rule. When Piad was arrested, PO1 Arevalo marked the confiscated drugs at the crime scene.
Likewise, when Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were arrested, PO1 Bayot immediately marked the
seized items at the crime scene. The items were brought to the Pasig City Police Station where PO1
Bayot was designated as evidence custodian. P/Insp. Sabio then prepared the requests for
laboratory examination and drug test, which were brought by PO1 Bayot, together with the drugs,
to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen, received the confiscated items for
examination. The said items tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Based on the
foregoing, the Court is satisfied that there was substantial compliance with the chain of custody
rule.
Davis lost his standing to appeal
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
If the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.23 In case bail is granted, the accused must appear whenever the court requires
his presence; otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited.24
When a person is finally convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
xxx
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman. xxx
Here, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party
and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party.1avvphi1 Both offenses did not have a
prescribed penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, thus, bail was a matter of right.
Accordingly, Davis secured a surety bond with Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. on
May 6, 2005.

On August 8, 2005, Davis failed to appear before the RTC which considered him to have jumped
bail. At that point, the RTC should have cancelled the bailbond of Davis with Summit Guaranty &
Insurance Company, Inc. Although he was subsequently arrested and arraigned on May 15, 2008,
it is alarming that no record of Davis’ confinement in any detention facility was ever found.25

When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were present in the
courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before the RTC or the CAI°
Nonetheless, any motion for bail pending appeal should have been denied because Davis violated
the conditions of his previous bail.26 Necessarily, as he previously jumped bail and no bail pending
appeal was secured, the R TC should have immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him.

In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he
loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.27 As no such surrender was made in
this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled to seek
relief from the courts.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 164, Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 14086-D, 14087-D, 14088-D and 14089-D
is AFFIRMED in toto.

For failure to submit to this Court's jurisdiction, the appeal filed by Nilo Davis y Artiga is
deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City, is
hereby ORDERED to issue a warrant of arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of
sentence of Nilo Davis y Artiga
People v. De Gracia
DOCTRINE:
 In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and
detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
Facts:
 Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged
coup d’état in December 1989 against the Government.
 Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team,
conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of
December 1, 1989, which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around
10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the
said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as
communication command post.
 Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards
their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area.
However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which
resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for
they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
 Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales
Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-
shells of different calibers, and molotov.
 Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door.
 No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped
up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the
offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did
intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils,
the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law?
This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, 8 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are
not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary.
It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act
is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must
be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is
done freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess
on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other
criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No.
1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm
cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of
weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive
possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed
guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the
requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified
that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in
evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives.
Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to
possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension
of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted
that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior
to his separation from the service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and
knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were
confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not
to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign
ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and
ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or
office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal
or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds
articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has
nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia
actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in
this case. While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light
of advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted
by the raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be
convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with
a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to
break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely
not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of
high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In
addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack
by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter,
the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under
one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained
in People vs. Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search
warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing
a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs,
their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very
same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to
Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted
a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous
drugs, based on information supplied by some informers.
Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer
was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when
faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and
there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein,
and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection,
that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to
present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to
arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.
For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from
the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of
 the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a
probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of
the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them,
were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to
present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To
deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously
the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989
up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him
was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person
merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had
been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding
the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below
as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him.
It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct
from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These
are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal
Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as
illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal
possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, the Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere
fact that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if
considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that,
subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with
variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised
Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for
its recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have
served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous
importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from
appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly
existing at that time. In the words of the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons
of M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports
received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the
rebels was not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal
defense. They are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per
instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from
Antipolo to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding
in that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at
the birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and
ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the
company of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with
soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9,
1989 was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked
with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a
highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore
 discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of
the AFP intelligence agents. 25

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this
case was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was
proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve
the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an
erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.

WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its
recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby
DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

RULE 115 precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one
of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
A. Presumption of innocence – People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60; taken into account.
 The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
Facts: be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant
 In the morning of 9 January 1964, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate
of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It cannot
Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police, to shed light on a robbery committed in be denied that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty
Nogaliza's house 5 days before. The response was decidedly in the negative as they being entertained not only by the trial judge but by the Supreme Court as to the culpability
themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least 2 individuals who had of Dramayo and Ecubin.
confessed.  The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three
 At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while they were in the house of Priolo Billona, accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and Ecubin, the
Dramayo invited all those present including Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present.
Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school  There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being like-vise no
house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito longer subject to any criminal liability. The judgment of conviction should not have
Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery case. occasioned any surprise on the part of Dramayo and Ecubin, as from the evidence
 The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated.
Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Soon Nogaliza was sighted. He was The presumption of innocence
accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with
a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow
of Ecubin.
 It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as
to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next
morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon
that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito.
 The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing
blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a
skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo, et. al. were charged for the
murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The lower court found Pableo Dramayo and Paterno
Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder, qualified by the
circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon
each of the said accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not
convicted as, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as
state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto
Ronquilla acquitted. Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.

Issue: Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused have
been acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

Held:
 The starting point is the presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which
is a right safeguarded both Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies.
 Dramayo and Ecubin were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf.
Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction
be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
 To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for
the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
(B) Right to counsel – Garry V. Inacay v. People, G.R. No. 223506, November 28, 2016;
Facts
Garry V. Inacay (Inacay) was a former sales agent of Mega Star Commercial (MSC), a business
enterprise engaged in the wholesale of electrical and construction materials. As part of his duties,
Inacay was tasked to find clients in Pangasinan, solicit orders, collect payments, and issue receipts.
Inacay was able to collect a check payment from Gamboa Lumber and Hardware (GLH), one of
MSC's clients, in the amount of P53,170.00.3
Fernando Tan (Tan), the proprietor of MSC, claimed that he demanded Inacay to remit the said
amount paid by GLH, but he failed to do so.4 Tan then filed a criminal complaint for estafa with
the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City against Inacay. Consequently, an Information for the
crime of estafa was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against Inacay.5
In the proceedings before the RTC, Inacay was represented by a certain Eulogia B. Manila (Manila),
who represented herself as a lawyer. During arraignment, Inacay pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.6
Inacay admitted that he received the payment made by GLH, but claimed that he remitted the same
to Melinda Castro, the accounting officer of MSC. However, on cross-examination, Inacay claimed
that he previously executed an Affidavit dated November 3, 2006, stating that he was held up by
robbers and among the things taken from him were several checks issued by the customers of
MSC.7
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution further
mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there
will be a grave denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle
of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned.15 "Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled,
and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel."16
"The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-
going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully
keeping his client company."17 Unless the accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger
that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. 18
In this case, Inacay, during the proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court, was
represented by Manila who, based on the Certification issued by the OBC, is not a lawyer. At that
time, Inacay had no inkling that he was being represented by a sham lawyer. It was only when his
conviction of the offense charged was upheld by the appellate court did Inacay learn that Manila is
not a lawyer. Clearly, Inacay was not assisted by counsel in the proceedings before the lower courts
and, hence, was denied of due process.

On February 21, 2013, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80 rendered a Decision 8 finding Inacay In People v. Santocildes, Jr.,19 the Court held that:
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315(1)(b) of the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, eight (8) Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. The RTC likewise directed Inacay in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
to pay MSC the amount of P53,170.00.9 because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is
guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
Unperturbed, Inacay appealed the RTC decision to the CA; he was still represented by Manila in the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
the proceedings before the appellate court.10 principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere
On March 15, 2016, the CA rendered a Decision,11 affirming the RTC's disposition in toto. When formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.20 (Citations
Inacay learned of the CA's decision, he requested Manila to file the appropriate petition with this omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Court, but the latter refused and told him to find another lawyer.12 Considering that there was a denial of due process, there is a need to set aside the judgment of
conviction against Inacay and remand the case to the trial court for new, trial. Further, Manila, for
Subsequently, Inacay found out, after talking to a lawyer, that Manila is not a member of the Bar. representing herself as a lawyer, should be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Thus, Inacay obtained a Certification13 from the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) showing that
Manila is indeed not a member of the Philippine Bar.14 WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated March 15, 2016 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35652 is
In this petition, Inacay claims that he was denied due process since he was not represented by a hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
lawyer. He, likewise, avers that the lower courts erred in convicting him of the offense charged since Branch 80, for new trial.
there was no evidence presented showing that he actually encashed the check paid by GLH and
misappropriated the proceeds thereof.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Eulogia B. Manila in
connection with this case, the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Quezon City
is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to
Issue: whether Inacay's guilt of the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this Resolution. Let
all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this
Ruling of the Court Resolution for their appropriate action.
The petition is granted.
(C) Speedy trial – Federico Miguel Olbes vs. Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, G.R. No. 173319,
December 4, 2009;
FACTS:
Samir and Rowena Muhsen filed a complaint against petitioner Frederico Miguel Olbes. Olbes was
then indicted for Grave Coercion before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, by Information dated
June 28, 2002.
 October 28, 2002: Olbes posted bail and was released.
 Judge Hipolito dela Vega denied Olbes’s motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in
light of his pending petition for review before the DoJ from the City Fiscal’s Resolution
finding probable case.
 February 12, 2003: Judge dela Vega then proceeded with Olbes’s arraignment in which
Olbes pleaded not guilty to the charge.
 May 28, 2003: pre-trial was set to this date. BUT it was declared a non-working holiday
due to the occurrence of typhoon Chedeng.
 October 23, 2003: Pre-trial reset to this date. Olbes failed to appear thus prompting the
trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The warrant was later recalled on discovery
that neither Olbes nor his counsel was notified of said schedule.
 January 21, 2004: Pre-trial was reset again to this date.
 November 3, 2003/ before pre-trial: Olbes filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on
the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under RA 8493 or the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 and the Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. Olbes insists that
considering that he was not—without any fault on his part— brought to trial within 80
days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119,
Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 119, Sec. 6 of the Rules.
 December 5, 2003: Respondent Judge Danilo A. Buemio denied Olbes’s Motion to
Dismiss holding that Olbes played a big part in the delay of the case and that technical
rules of procedure were meant to secure, not override, substantial justice.
 March 3, 2004: Olbes’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied after Buemio noted that
during Olbes’s arraignment, Olbes interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial
to May 28, 2003 and that given the volume of the cases filed with the MeTC, strict
compliance with the Speedy Trial Act was improbable. Buemia also ruled that the term
“speedy trial” as applied in criminal cases is a relative term such that the trial and
disposition of cases depended on several factors including the availability of counsel,
witnesses and prosecutor, and weather conditions.
 Olbes challenged Buemio’s orders via certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of
Manila, alleging that not only was he (Olbes) not brought to trial within 80 days from the
date of his arraignment as required under Sec. 6, Rule 119, but the prosecution had failed
to establish the existence of any of the “time exclusions” provided under Sec. 3 of the
same Rule to excuse its failure to bring him to trial within the 80- day period.
 January 31, 2006: the RTC denied the petition, holding that (1) Sec. 9 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case just because trial has
not commenced within 80 days from arraignment; (2) that the proceedings before the
MeTC were not attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; (3) that the
concept of a speedy trial is not a mere question of numbers that could be computed in
terms of years, months or days; and (4) that in “determining whether petitioner’s right to
speedy trial was violated,” the circumstances that Buemio was the pairing judge of Br. 22 of the
MeTC who “may be assumed also to preside over his own regular court and devotes limited time
to his pairing court” and that first level courts in Manila have an excessive load of cases should also
be taken into consideration.
Thus, this present petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Olbes’s right to speedy trial is violated
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO, “speedy trial” is a relative term.
Olbes draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up
to the first pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to
the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days—a clear contravention,
according to Olbes, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial. However, on his arraignment
on February 12, 2003, Olbes interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003
which was, as earlier stated, later declared a non- working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the
scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
Olbes further argues that the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23, 2003) was not
justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time exclusions specified under Section
3 of Rule 119. The argument is unavailing.
The principle of speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. Thus,
in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that while justice is
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious, and not mere speed. It
cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with the delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice hence, a balancing test of applying
societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Moreover, the time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.
 (D) Speedy trial – People vs. Gines, 197 SCRA 481;
FACTS:
PARAS, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Order of Judge Genaro Gines of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union dated October 15, 1987, which dismissed
Criminal Case No. 1829 entitled "People vs. Ramon Labo, Jr. and Francis Floresca" and the Order
dated February 8, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On complaint of herein private complainant retired Supreme Court Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero in
the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, an information for libel was filed on January
27, 1987 before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 26) of San Fernando, La Union against Ramon
Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong
Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its
August 3, 1986 issue.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1829 of the San Fernando, La Union Court. On March
23, 1987, accused Labo and Floresca were arraigned, and with the assistance of counsel, both
entered "not guilty" pleas. The other accused, Perfecto Manaois, was then at large. After the pre-
trial conference was conducted and thereafter terminated, public respondent set the case for hearing
on April 20 and 21, 1987. Accused Labo and Floresca waived their right to appear at the hearing of
the case.
On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for joint hearing and at the same time asked
the court to defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21, 1987, on the ground that the
other accused, Manaois, had lately been arrested and filed bond for his provisional liberty. The
motion was granted and the court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of the case with
respect to the accused Manaois for May 18, 1987.
Upon arraignment on May 18, 1987, Perfecto Manaois pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.
Trial was set for June 22, 1987.
On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for postponement on the ground that he has
a serious eye ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate medical attention. In an order
dated June 16, 1987, the Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of the case to July 30,
1987.
On July 30, 1987, when the case was called for initial reception of evidence for the prosecution, the
trial fiscal appeared together with private complainant. However, since counsel for Labor and
Floresca failed to appear despite due notice to him, the court again reset the hearing of the case to
August 17 and 18, 1987.
On September 16, 1987, with the conformity of private complainant the court issued an order for
the exclusion of accused Perfecto Manaois because it was found out that he was neither the
publisher nor the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba where the alleged
libelous article appeared. Since private complainant was not present, hearing of the case was once
more reset to October 15, 1987. The court gave warning that should private complainant fail to
present any evidence on the said scheduled hearing, the case will be dismissed for lack of interest.
According to the prosecution, when the Regional Trial Court on September 16, 1987 reset the
hearing to October 15, 1987 private complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second eye
operation, that is, "removal of cataract of his left eye and implantation of intracellular lens therein,"
done at the Manila Medical Center September 14, 1987." To support this allegation, the prosecution
attached with its petition a copy of the receipt issued by the Manila Medical Center showing
payment of his hospital deposit dated September 13, 1987, marked therein as Annex "K". (Petition,
p. 7; Rollo, p. 7)
On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel
against private complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois as the editor of the August
3, 1986 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 1829 in lieu of Manaois who had been discharged earlier.
On September 29, 1987, Benefredo Esquivel was required to submit his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidence. The letter was however "returned to sender" (Fiscal's office) on November
18, 1987.
On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued the now assailed Order dismissing the case as
against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice Guerrero to appear
despite the vigorous objection of the fiscal who requested that the hearing of the case be deferred
as the Fiscal's Office was then conducting a preliminary investigation with respect to Benefredo
Esquivel.
The prosecution avers that when the respondent court ordered the dismissal of the case due to the
absence of private complainant, the latter was scheduled to depart for abroad for a medical check
up. Thus, a motion for reconsideration dated October 19, 1987 asking for a reinstatement of the
case was filed by the prosecution, to which private respondents filed their opposition. The motion
was denied on February 8, 1988 hence the instant petition.
ISSUE: whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the
dismissal of the case.
HELD:
the Court finds that said right has not been violated in the case at bar and thus holds that the
dismissal of the case as regards private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature and
erroneous.1âwphi1 "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of
fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice." (Mercado vs. CFI, et al., 66 Phil. 215; Gunabe, et al. vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993;
Bermisa vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 136) The Court is convinced that private complainant's
absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious
reasons therefor. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two
accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the
right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness,
medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that
private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad.
The subject case for libel was dismissed on October 15, 1987, some eight and a half months after
the information was filed. This period is not such an extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to
cause capricious and vexatious delay. For, speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after
indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial (Mercado v.
CFI, supra). While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved
also have the same rights.

The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly unmeritorious. Private respondents contend that to
grant the petition would be tantamount to reviving and re-opening the case, thus placing them in
double jeopardy. In support thereof, they cite several cases which reiterate the doctrine that "a case
which was dismissed after the accused had invoked their rights to speedy trial for failure of the
prosecution to present evidence, amounts to an acquittal which would bar the subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense." (Comment of private respondents, p. 8, citing in
particular the case of Salcedo vs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811).

The requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are: a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a court of competent jurisdiction; c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and d) the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of
the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case was obviously dismissed
upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. Private respondents invoked their
constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution failed to present evidence due to the
absence of private complainant at the hearing. It was on their motion that the lower court ordered
the case to be dismissed. "For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the
case must be without the express consent of the accused. (Que v. Cosico, 177 SCRA
410 citing People v. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167, People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81, and People vs. Cuevo, 104
SCRA 312). This is the general rule.

As exceptions, the case of People vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516, states that: "There are only two
occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the
accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution,
and the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right
to a speedy trial." None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar.

We hold in sum that the criminal information for libel against private respondents Ramon Labo, Jr.
and Francis Floresca was validly filed, that the dismissal as to these two respondents was erroneous,
and that its reinstatement will not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED in part. The Orders of public respondent judge
dated October 15, 1987 and February 8, 1988 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1829, with the
exclusion of Benefredo Esquivel, is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
(E) Speedy Disposition – CommoLamberto (Ret.) v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. Nos.
221562-69, October 5, 2016;
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
annulment of Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated August 27, 20151 and October 28, 2015,2 with
prayer for the issuance of a status quo order or a temporary restraining order against the
Sandiganbayan.
The Facts
From 1991 to 1993, petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval
Staff for Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy. Sometime in July
1991 until June 1992, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit at the
Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN) pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine
by emergency mode purchase, among others. On June 18, 1993, the COA issued Special Audit
Report No. 92-128, uncovering an alleged overpricing of medicines at the HPN or its units, and
triggering a Fact-Finding Investigation by the Office ofthe Ombudsman.
On December 11, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman commenced a preliminary investigation
against petitioner and several others or Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 301 9, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed
as case number OMB-4-97-0789; and for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as case
number OMB-4-97-0790, based on an Affidavit by COA auditors.
In OMB-4-97-0789, it was alleged that the purchase of additional drugs and medicines worth P5.56
million was not properly supported and accounted for, and that additional drugs and medicines
purchased were supposedly not included in the list of drugs and medicines received by the Supply
Accountable Officer of the Hospital for that period. Petitioner was included as a respondent for
being a signatory of the checks involved.
In OMB-4-97-0790, it was alleged that supplies and materials amounting to P6,663,440.70 were
purchased but equipment were delivered, instead of the items indicated in the purchase orders.
Petitioner was included as a respondent in the OMB-4-97-0790 because he allegedly recommended
the approval of the purchase orders and signed the certificates of emergency purchases.
These cases, however, were dismissed against petitioner for lack of probable cause in a Joint
Resolution dated March 8, 1999.
A few years after petitioner's retirement from the service in 2001, Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo
issued an Internal Memorandum dated October 11, 2004, recommending a new fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation relative to other transactions in other units and offices
of the Philippine Navy. Pursuant to this Internal Memorandum, a new Affidavit Complaint
dated February 22, 2006 was filed by the Ombudsman against petitioner and several others, this
time, for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, docketed as case number OMB-P-C-06-
0129-A.
Notices of the new preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old address in
Kawit, Cavite, which he had already vacated in 1980. Thus, petitioner was not informed of the
proceedings in the new preliminary investigation. Unknown to petitioner, eight (8) Informations
were filed by the Ombudsman against him and the other accused before the Sandiganbayan
on August 5, 2011. The first set of Informations, consisting of four (4) Informations docketed as
Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, SB-11-CRM-0424, SB-11-CRM-0426 & SB-11-CRM-0427,
charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, while the remaining four (4)
Informations, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0429, SB-11-CRM-0430, SB-11-CRM-
0432 & SB-11-CRM-0433, charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019.
Petitioner and his co-accused were charged for allegedly g1vmg unwarranted benefit to several
pharmaceutical companies, certifying the existence of an emergency, and approving the emergency
purchase of overpriced medicines without the proper bidding. It was determined that no emergency
existed and the overpriced items bought were only kept in stock and were, essentially, over-the-
counter drugs.
More particularly, petitioner's participation is limited to his issuance of the Certificates of
Emergency Purchase3 that do not indicate the actual condition obtaining at the time of the purchase
to justify the emergency purchase.
It was only sometime in July 2014, when petitiOner was about to travel to the United States, that
he learned of the pending cases before the Sandiganbayan by virtue of a hold departure order issued
against him. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail with Appearance of Counsel and Motion for
Preliminary Investigation before the Sandiganbayan. With his motion granted, the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan were deferred with respect to petitioner and a new preliminary investigation for
petitioner was conducted.
Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman,
where he prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his constitutional rights to due
process and speedy trial were violated by the inordinate delay of the case.
In its May 7, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman nonetheless resolved to maintain the Informations
filed against petitioner. According to the Ombudsman, the Affidavit Complaint filed on February
22, 2006, which resulted in the filing of the August 5, 2011 Informations, was based on a new
investigation. Thus, petitioner's "inordinate delay" argument does not apply.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Informations before the Sandiganbayan, claiming
that the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations having conducted the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation for too long, in violation of his rights to a speedy trial
and to due process. According to petitioner, the protracted conduct of the fact-finding and
preliminary investigations lasted for eighteen (18) years.
Hence, it was inordinate and oppressive. Petitioner argued that "'there was already this case to speak
of pending against" him since both sets of factfinding and preliminary investigations conducted by
the Ombudsman were triggered by the same COA report.
The Ombudsman filed its Comment and/or Opposition, arguing that the preliminary investigations
conducted against petitioner in the different periods (from 1996 to 1999 and from 2006 to 2011)
involved different transactions pursuant to the various findings embodied in the COA Special Audit
Report of 1993. In fact, so the Ombudsman argued, the COA Audit Report is not a prerequisite to
any of its investigation and it may conduct fact-finding and/or preliminary investigation with or
without said repmi.
In his Reply to the Ombudsman's Comment and/or Opposition, petitioner insisted, among others,
that it still took the Ombudsman another six (6) years to file the Informations against him.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In a Resolution dated August 27, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash and
sustained the prosecution's position. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated October 28, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion to Quash. He argues that the eight (8) Informations should
have been quashed by the Sandiganbayan considering that the Ombudsman had lost its authority
to file them since petitioner's constitutional rights to both the speedy disposition of cases and to
due process were grossly violated by the inordinate delay of almost 18 years in conducting the fact-
finding and preliminary investigations. Petitioner further argues that, with the Ombudsman losing
its authority to file the Information, the Sandiganbayan also lost its jurisdiction over the crimes
charged in consequence.
In its Comment,4 respondent People of the Philippines prays for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner's constitutional rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were
not violated. Respondent stresses that, prior to 2006, petitioner had no case to speak of since it was
only in 2007 when the Ombudsman recommended his indictment. It differentiated COA's audit
investigation from 1993 to 1996 as administrative in nature, from the preliminary investigation from
1996 to 2006 for the cases which were dismissed in favor of petitioner, and from the preliminary
investigation conducted from 2006 to 2011 where petitioner's involvement was established.
Respondent further asserts that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolution since it was "firmly anchored on a judicious appreciation of the facts and relevant case
law."
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply to Comment (On Petition for Certiorari With Application for Status Quo
Order and/or Temporary Restraining Order) asserting that respondent is guilty of "hair-splitting" by
distinguishing between the fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations conducted in
1999 and in 2006 since they both originated from the June 18, 1993 COA Special Audit Report No.
92-128.
The Issue
Essentially, the principal issue is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's right to
speedy disposition of cases.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a court or tribunal is whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious as to amount to an "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."5 Grave abuse of discretion was
found in cases where a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law, or
existing jurisprudence.6chanrobleslaw
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner invoked Section 3, paragraph (d) of Rule 117, asserting that the
Ombudsman had lost its authority to file the Infonnations against him for having conducted the
fact-finding and preliminary investigations too long. He raised a similar argument in the present
petition-that the Ombudsman had no more authority to file the Informations since petitioner's
rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were violated.
In denying the Motion to Quash, the Sandiganbayan ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ultimately, the results of the 2006 preliminary investigation itself may not be impugned due to
inordinate delay that would rise to the level of being violative of herein accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases protected under the Constitution. If ignorance is bliss, the accused had been
spared from the travails of the preliminary investigation which started in 2006, not like the other
respondents who showed up or were involved therein. By this Court's reckoning it took the OMB-
MOLEO only two (2) years, six (6) months and nineteen (days) [sic] from August 7, 2007 after the
issues were joined with the filing of the last counteraffidavit therein and the issuance of the
Resolution by Graft Investigator & Prosecution Officer Marissa S. Bernal on February 25, 2010,
which terminated the preliminary investigation process, finding probable cause. Furthermore, as
requested by the accused, the OMB-Office of the Special Prosecutor again conducted a new or
another preliminary investigation upon order of this Court, resulting in a new resolution, dated May
7, 2015, which maintained the informations herein. This was approved by Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio Morales on May 15, 2015. This investigation only took a little over than six (6) months and,
therefore. could not be said to be violative of movant's right to a speedy disposition of his case.
There is no showing that movant was made to endure any vexatious process during the said periods
of investigation.
We disagree.
In Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division),7 this Court has laid down the guiding
principle in determining whether the right of an accused to the speedy disposition of cases had been
violated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 16, Atiicle lil of the Constitution declares in no uncertain tenns that "[A]ll persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive,
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The constitutional
guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right
to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents claim that the investigation conducted by the COA from 1993 to 1996 was a "special
audit which is administrative in nature"; thus, it should not be included in counting the number of
years lapsed. They further contend that the preliminary investigations conducted from 1996 to 2006
which pertain to the "overpricing of medicines" procured through emergency purchase never
included petitioner, but involved other PN officials, employees, and a private individual.
Respondents maintain that it was only in 2006 that petitioner was implicated in said questionable
transactions. Moreover, the preliminary investigations conducted from 1993 to 1996 against
petitioner refer to different transactions, specifically, for Unaccounted Drugs and Medicines
(docketed as OMB-4-97-0789) and for Conversion (docketed as OMB-4-97-0790), thus, cannot be
considered in determining if his right to speedy disposition of cases had been violated.
While it may be argued that there was a distinction between the two sets of investigations conducted
in 1996 and 2006, such that they pertain to distinct acts of different personalities, it cannot be denied
that the basis for both sets of investigations emanated from the same COA Special Audit Report
No. 92-128, which was issued as early as June 18, 1993. Thus, the Ombudsman had more than
enough time to review the same and conduct the necessary investigation while the individuals
implicated therein, such as herein petitioner, were still in active service.
Even assuming that the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128 was only turned over to the
Ombudsman on December 11, 1996 upon the filing of the Affidavit ofthe COA Auditors, still, it
had been in the Ombudsman's possession and had been the subject of their review and scrutiny for
at least eight (8) years before Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, and at least sixteen (16) years before the Ombudsman found probable cause on
February 25, 2010.
Nevertheless, even if we start counting from Tanodbayan Marcelo's issuance of Internal
Memorandum on September 30, 2004, there was still at least six (6) years which lapsed before the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause.
We find it necessary to emphasize that the speedy disposition of cases covers not only the period
within which the preliminary investigation was conducted, but also all stages to which the accused
is subjected, even including fact-finding investigations conducted prior to the preliminary
investigation proper. We explained in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:8
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional
provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the
right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation
the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2),
which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under
Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present
constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (citations
omitted; Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the subject transactions were allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992, and the fact-
finding and preliminary investigations were ordered to be conducted by Tanodbayan Marcelo in
2004, the length of time which lapsed before the Ombudsman was able to resolve the case and
actually file the Informations against petitioner was undeniably long-drawnout.
Any delay in the investigation and prosecution of cases must be duly justified. The State must prove
that the delay in the prosecution was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it.9 Our
discussion in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division)10 is instructive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated
to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service."
This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case
but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should
not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness
of its dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty
of the questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal
work activity - any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar
- there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have
earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners. (citation
omitted; Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, respondents failed to submit any justifiable reason for the protracted conduct
of the investigations and in the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. Instead,
respondents submit that "the cases subject of this petition involve issues arising from complex
procurement transactions that were conducted in such a way as to conceal overpricing and other
irregularities, by conniving PN officers from different PN units and private individuals."
A review of the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128, however, shows that it clearly enumerated
the scope of the audit, the transactions involved, the scheme employed by the concemed PN
officers, and the possible basis for the filing of a complaint against the individuals responsible for
the overpricing. Respondents' argument that the case involves "complex procurement transactions"
appears to be unsupported by the facts presented.
There is no question that petitiOner asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases at the earliest
possible time. In his Counter-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman during the reinvestigation of
the case in 2014, petitioner had already argued that dismissal of the case is proper because the long
delayed proceedings violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. This shows
that petitioner wasted no time to assert his right to have the cases against him dismissed.
As for the prejudice caused by the delay, respondents claim that no prejudice was caused to
petitioner from the delay in the second set of investigations because he never participated therein
and was actually never even informed of the proceedings anyway. We cannot agree with this
position. A similar assertion was struck down by this Court in Coscolluela, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the
objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to
the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context
of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan
(Corpuz) illumined:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial (F) Public trial – Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the
his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense right to hold a public trial.
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused
is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to
living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may the principle of right to a public trial.
be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall Facts:
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v.
United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than IS reasonably attributable appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon
to the ordinary processes of justice. Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial even on Saturday on the
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request.(as police officers under suspension
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many
be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).
to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other
hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily
On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner judge order should be
against the State. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
reversed.
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the entire
proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage. the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should equally
apply to the case at bar.11 x x x (citations omitted; emphasis in the original) Issue: Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
Adopting respondents' position would defeat the very purpose of the right against speedy
disposition of cases. Upholding the same would allow a scenario where the prosecution may Held:
deliberately exclude certain individuals from the investigation only to file the necessary cases at
another, more convenient time, to the prejudice of the accused. Clearly, respondents' assertion is
subject to abuse and cannot be countenanced. Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance.
In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
resolution of the cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a respondent
in the investigation conducted from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the "overpricing of medicines'' There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
procured through emergency purchase, he has already been deprived of the ability to adequately 21
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
prepare his case considering that he may no longer have any access to records or contact with any
witness in support of his defense. This is even aggravated by the fact that petitioner had been retired
for fifteen (15) years. Even if he was never imprisoned and subjected to trial, it cannot be denied WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .
that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by virtue of the delay in the resolution of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 27, 2015 and
October 28, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423,
0424, 0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, 0424,
0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 for violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases of petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres (Ret.).