Labor Law

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION et. al. v CYNTHIA DE JESUS

G.R. No. 203943 August 30, 2017, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

General rule in compensability of death is that a seafarer's death must have

occurred during the term of the employment contract, an exception to this rule
is when a seafarer contracted an illness while under the contract and this illness
caused his death.

FACTS:

Bernardine, hired by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation as an Accommodation

Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess, was soon diagnosed with Aortic
Aneurysm and died two months later after the termination of his contact of
employment. Cynthia De Jesus, Bernardine's widow, filed a complaint against
Magsaysay for "payment of death benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance,
damages, and attorney's fees.” Labor Arbiter granted Cynthia's complaint.
National Labor Relations Commission denied Magsaysay's appeal. Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Cynthia. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation argue that
the award was issued with grave abuse of discretion considering that
Bernardine's death was not compensable under the POEA-SEC.

ISSUE:

Was the award of death benefits issued with grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:

NO. Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC requires that for a seafarer to be entitled to
death benefits, he must have suffered a work-related death during the term of
his contract. However, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC acknowledges the
possibility of "compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the
employment contract on account of a work-related illness" as long as the
following conditions are met (1) The seafarer's work must involve the risks
described herein; (2) The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks; (3) The disease was contracted within a period
of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; (4) There was
no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. The court found that the
conditions, such as the climate the worker was exposed to, helped trigger the
onset of illness of the deceased. Being said, there is therefore a reasonable
connection between the conditions of employment and work actually performed
by the deceased seafarer and his illness. Hence, the award of death benefits was
proper.

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Labor Law

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION et. al. v UNIVERSAL ROBINA

CORPORATION, SUGAR DIVISION-SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

G.R. No. 220383 July 5, 2017, SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement

is not demandable. However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its
unfair labor practice against the union members, this benefit should be granted.

Facts:

In the absence of Collective Bargaining Agreement, URC-SONEDCO offered a

₱l6.00/day wage increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees
had to sign a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent Collective
Bargaining Agreement is negotiated between Management and Union, the new
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall only be effective on January 1, 2008."
Some members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union refused to sign as they
alleged constitutes unfair labor practice. The same was offered the following year
and several refused to sign as well. Consequently, they did not receive the wage
increase. In a case heard, both the National Labor Relations Commission and the
Court of Appeals found URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor
practice. Nonetheless, court ordered the company to give petitioners the same
benefits their co-workers received in 2007 and 2008 and denied the claim to 2009
wage increase. Hence, a motion for partial reconsideration was filed. URC-
SONEDCO argues that since the 2009 wage increase was not included in the
2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement, it cannot be demanded.

ISSUE:

Should the ₱32.00/day wage increase beginning January 1, 2009 to present

should be awarded to petitioners?

HELD:

Yes. Generally, the Collective Bargaining Agreement controls the relationship

between the parties. Any benefit not included in it is not demandable. The
respondent company granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to
waive their collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an unfair
labor practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the
wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule
otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the
consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed. The grant of the
₱32.00/day wage increase is not an additional benefit outside the Collective
Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this increase to petitioners is to
eliminate the discrimination against them, which was a result of respondent's
unfair labor practice.

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Labor Law

ANTONIO B. MANANSALA v MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC./MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO. LTD./CYPRUS et. al.

G.R. No. 208314 August 23, 2017 THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

As laypersons, seafarers cannot be expected to make completely accurate

accounts of their state of health. Unaware of the nuances of medical conditions,
they may, in good faith, make statements that tum out to be false. These honest
mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from pre-existing
illnesses shown to be aggravated by their working conditions. However, when a
seafarer's proper knowledge of pre-existing conditions and intent to deceive an
employer are established, compensability is negated.

FACTS:

Manansalals services were engaged by Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. as a "fitter"

on board the vessel M/V Seaboxer. On a Pre Employment Medical Examination
(PEME) Manansala was required to disclose information regarding all existing
and prior medical conditions, among which were hypertension and diabetes
which he denied. While on board the M/V Seaboxer, Manansala suffered a stroke
and became ill. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding that Manansala was
suffering from pre-existing, rather than work-related, ailments. Therefore, he was
not entitled to disability benefits. NLRC and CA affirmed. Hence, the present
Petition. He now asserts that he properly disclosed his pre-existing illnesses
during his medical examination and that his stroke was work-related.

Issue:

Is petitioner Antonio B. Manansala entitled to disability benefits occasioned by

work-related illnesses?

HELD:

No. Jurisprudence holds that, in analogous cases, company-designated

physicians' assessments are to be upheld. This could have entitled petitioner to
Grade 10 disability benefits. However, his failure to observe Section 20(B)(3)'s
requirements is not all that there is to this case. We cite his non-referral to a
third physician, not as a mitigating circumstance, but to emphasize how
multilayered exigencies militate against him. We have explained at length how
petitioner engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation, deceptively concealing his
pre-existing hypertension and diabetes. This, in itself, is fatal to his cause. In
keeping with Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC, petitioner is, thus, disqualified from
receiving any compensation.

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Labor Law

ANGELITO L. CRISTOBAL v PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. et. al.

G.R. No. 201622 OCTOBER 4, 2017, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a matter, a

motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first
time, is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

In line with a downsizing program of PAL, Cristobal, pilot, applied for leave
without pay from PAL to enter into a four (4)-year contract with EVA Air. PAL
approved the application and advised him that he would continue to accrue
seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire from PAL during this
period. Later, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire. In response, PAL
advised him that he was deemed to have lost his employment status. Cristobal
filed a complaint and Labor Arbiter found Cristobal's dismissal illegal and entitled
him retirement computed pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code. Acting on
the motion for reconsideration the retirement pay was ordered to be computed
based on 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. Cristobal filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by NLRC deeming it a second motion for
reconsideration. Cristobal filed his Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, which was dismissed.

Issue:

Was the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Angelito L.
Cristobal assailing the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011
Decision a prohibited second motion for reconsideration?

HELD:

No. Rule VII, Section 15 of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules of
Procedure provides: Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or
order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable
or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service
that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the
adverse party; and provided further, that only one such motion from the same
party shall be entertained. Cristobal raises in issue whether or not the PAL Pilots
Retirement Benefit Plan is part of the retirement benefits that should be
computed in comparing the retirement benefits accorded to him under the Labor
Code as against what he is entitled to under PAL policy. However, the matter of
retirement benefits is not addressed in respondent's memorandum. It would
better serve th1e interest of substantial justice to remand this case to the Court
of Appeals to allow the parties to folly discuss this issue.

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Labor Law

SHARPE SEA PERSONNEL, INC. et. al v MACARIO MABUNAY, JR.

G.R. No. 206113 November 6, 2017, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

The company-designated physicians' failure to arrive at a final and definite

assessment of a seafarer's fitness to work or level of disability within the
prescribed periods means that the seafarer shall be deemed to be totally and
permanently disabled.

Facts:

Mabunay was hired as an oiler aboard M/V Larisa for C.F. Sharp & Company
Pte. Ltd/Monte Carlo. Sharpe Sea. On board, Mabunay slipped and hit his back
on the purifier. Despite the accident, he was informed to continue his work. Upon
seeing medical checkup, he was diagnosed with chest and spinal column bone
damage and was declared unfit to work by his attending physician. Repatriated,
Mabunay was directed to report to company-designated physician. He filed
complaint for the payment of his medical expenses, total disability benefits,
damages, and attorney's fees. LaborLabor Arbiter ruled in Mabunay's favor and
directed Sharpe Sea to pay him permanent and total disability benefits.Labor
Arbiter pointed out that even if Mabunay's personal physicians' assessment were
disregarded, Mabunay had proven that he was unable to perform his function as
an oiler for more than 120 days. This already constituted permanent disability,
which would merit the award of total and permanent disability benefits. NLRC
and CA affirmed.

Issue:

Should the Grade 8 disability rating of the company-designated physician be

upheld over the contrary findings of respondent's private physicians?

HELD:

Yes. In Kestrel Shipping v. Munar, the Court ruled indeed under Section 32 of
the PO EA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1
may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or
disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent,
would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period
of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical
treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently
disabled. Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a
definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability
within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer
s medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled. With the company-designated physicians' failure to issue
either a fit-to-work certification or a final disability rating within the prescribed
periods, respondent's disability was rightfully deemed to be total and permanent.

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Labor Law

DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. et. al. v ROSALIO A. LERON

G.R. No. 204288 November 8, 2017, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE:

To justify the dismissal of an employee based on abandonment of work, there

must be a showing of overt acts clearly evidencing the employee's intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship.

Facts:

Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. Afterwards, Leron was
dismissed by Demex's foreman, Marcelo Viray, and Demex's personnel manager,
Nora Francisco. Both accused him of instigating a campaign to remove Viray as
the company's foreman. Before Leron was dismissed from service, he was given
a memorandum stating that the dining chair he had previously weaved for export
to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex expressed that it would no longer
avail of his services. Consequently, Leron did not report for work. Three notices
were sent to Leron: 2 notice to return to work and 1notice terminating his
services. An illegal dismissal case was filed before the Labor Arbiter. The LA hold
that the dismissal was valid. NLRC affirmed but damages were given for none
compliance with due process. CA reversed the decision ruling that the elements
of abandonment were not satisfied and there was no intent to sever the
relationship.

Issue:

Was respondent Rosalio A. Leron validly dismissed from employment by

petitioners Demex Rattancraft, Inc. and Narciso T. Dela Merced on the ground of
abandonment of work?

HELD:

No. Valid termination requires the employer to send an initial notice to the
employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for dismissal and directing the
submission of a written explanation answering the charges. After considering the
employee's answer, the employer must give another notice informing the
employee of the employer's findings and reason for termination. These are the
operative acts that terminate an employer-employee relationship. The employer
has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal from service was for a
just or authorized cause. Having failed to clearly establish that respondent
abandoned his work, this Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of
Appeals' finding that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.