THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS, ) Case No. 2019-0306

Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) RULE 22(2) ORAL
) ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PAUL MARAVELIAS,
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Paul Maravelias (“Appellant”) respectfully requests this Court reconsider its

9/27/19 Order affirming the trial court’s extending a “stalking” protective order
because Maravelias responded to a stranger on a website and cited the undisputed
legal fact in the record hereunder that David DePamphilis’s daughter Christina
publicly bragged at age 16 about her fucking a 21-year-old adult man behind her
father’s back. (A17) In further support, Appellant states as follows:

I. THIS COURT COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED MARAVELIAS’S

DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED
ON AN ALLEGATION NEVER ADVANCE-NOTICED TO HIM.

1. The Court’s Order at 3 erroneously summarizes that Maravelias’s due

process argument regarding notice was solely on the issue of the trial court’s
limitation of paragraphs. The Court overlooked Brief at 32 - 33, which noticed that
no specific allegation of an “offensive” “online” comment ever appeared anywhere
in Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend, not even within the other non-cited paragraphs.

2. This Court’s willful ignorance of Maravelias’s thoroughly developed

due process argument under the state and federal constitutions amounts to a
violation of RSA 490:4 and an act of treason against the State of New Hampshire.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
II. APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES WERE
PRESERVED AND RIGOROUSLY DEVELOPED.

3. This Court overlooked the fact that Maravelias’s as-applied First

Amendment challenge is exactly what he argued to the trial court, before this appeal:

“To constitutionally attribute extension to a defendant’s public speech-acts, such

speech must evince an objective likelihood of imminent crime or violence. Here, it
is undisputed Maravelias made no such unprotected speech … Since Maravelias’s
public ‘comments’ on the ‘internet’, made in response to and about the existence
of this very same court case and unjust restraining order, do not fall into any
categories lacking First Amendment protection (e.g., threats of violence or ‘fighting
words’), the Court’s extension is unconstitutional.”

(A199) (Emphasis added)

4. Maravelias’s appeal brief herein identically argued, before further

developing with case law analysis,

“The trial court never found Maravelias’s ‘statements’ – whatever they, in fact,
were – fell into a category of speech validly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
as unprotected. As such, it violated his free speech rights under U.S. CONST.,
Amend I., and N.H. CONST, Pt. I., Art. 22, by applying RSA 633:3-a, III-c. to
punish his protected speech with an extended restraining order limiting his
fundamental rights.”

Brief at 48. (Emphasis added)

5. Accordingly, this dishonest Court’s statement is demonstrably false

that the “record submitted on appeal does not demonstrate that the defendant made
the same First Amendment argument to the trial court that he now makes on appeal”.
Order at 4. This Court would uphold a willful, brazen lie if it does not issue a new
Order adjudicating Maravelias’s as-applied First Amendment challenge.

6. This Court overlooked that Judge Leonard even verbally declared at

T199 that she understood Maravelias’s argument that relying upon his protected
speech-acts as grounds to extend the order is unconstitutional:

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 “I mean, I understand you’re saying you have a First Amendment right
… And I understand that’s your position,”
(Judge Leonard to Maravelias concerning his online political speech)
(T199)

7. This trial court admission catastrophically destroys this dishonest

Court’s false assertion of insufficient issue preservation. The trial court’s comment
at T199 even predated its 3/8/19 extension order and Maravelias’s motion for
reconsideration thereof, wherein he further developed said First Amendment issue
to give the trial court yet a second opportunity to consider this argument.

8. This Court overlooked Judge Leonard’s assurance to Maravelias, “I’m

basically ordering that you have preserved the issues … for purposes of any sort of
appeal that you want to take.” (T21)

9. Amazingly, on one hand, this Court accused Maravelias of not further

“developing” his amply-developed facial challenge after wrongly constraining him
to a 9,500 word limit; however, where he did use his space to “develop” the as-
applied challenge, this Court gaslighted Maravelias by asserting the mere further
“developed” nature, further developed from his original 10-page-constrained trial
court briefing (A199-200), somehow caused it to become “a different argument”.
Order at 4.

10. This Court should reconsider leaving this Final Order intact with its
poorly concealed mental gaslighting tactics, patently unreasonable double-
standards, and malicious psychological terrorism.1,2

1 This Court should not give Maravelias the satisfaction of validating his intuitive
foresight to the trial court, months before docketing this appeal, that he “has zero-chance
of winning any appeal whatsoever before such biased activist-tyrants” “no matter how
irrefutably correct his legal arguments are”. (A205)
2 Despite this Court’s predictable – and indeed already-realized

(https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/finalorders/2019/) – self-censoring of the Final

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 11. This Court also overlooked the point of law that, in the absence of any
rule or past holding otherwise, incorporation by reference of trial court pleadings is
not lawful grounds to ignore arguments where presented through past pleadings of
appellate-level robustness.3 Maravelias has violated neither the principles 1) of
affording the trial court an opportunity to rightly decide the issue, nor 2) that
appellate arguments brought hereto must be sufficiently developed. Cf. Bean v. Red
Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004) (issues not argued to
trial court waived on appeal); Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499, 543 A.2d 1379
(1988) (“off-hand invocation” of constitutional rights insufficient).

12. This Court’s nonsensical gaslighting is a cowardly excuse to evade its

duty to adjudicate Maravelias’s preserved constitutional challenges. It is a tacit
admission that reversal would be the doubtless result thereof. This Court’s
abandonment of duty is in violation of N.H. CONST, Pt. I, Art. 2, 8, and 14, U.S.
CONST. Amend XIV., RSA 490:4, and 18 U.S.C. § 242.

III. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO PLAIN-ERROR ADJUDICATION

OF HIS AS-APPLIED FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE.

13. Appellant has shown there was error and it affected substantial rights.
Brief at 47 - 52. Further, the error was plain because 1) First-Amendment
jurisprudence is a well-settled area of law, 2) Maravelias’s alleged comment was

Order in this case from publication, Maravelias intends to show it to the New Hampshire
legal community and reveal this Court’s conduct, if not corrected.
3 Although some state appellate courts have addressed and forbidden this practice, e.g.,

Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840 (D.E. 2013), Anchorage Nissan, Inc. v. State, 941 P.2d 1229,
1240 (A.K. 1997), this Court has never done so. Such negative extrajurisdictional
holdings have generally cited the grounds that appellate brief incorporation of lower-
court pleadings fails to address said lower-court’s subsequent reasoning for its negative
decision. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 623–24 (10th Cir.
1998). But here, the trial court did not give any reasoning whatsoever for rejecting
Maravelias’s facial constitutional challenge, preventing any harm. In such an instance,
requiring a litigant to copy-and-paste his trial court pleading into his appellate brief
would constitute an apparent exercise of absurd futility.
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
political speech criticizing a governmental determination, and 3) because the trial
court itself recognized Maravelias’s argument said speech was constitutionally
protected (T199). The trial court’s error tarnished the public reputation of judicial
proceedings for the reasons Maravelias explained to it at A199.

14. As such, even the Court’s own self-professed standards for applying
Plain Error are satisfied. See State v. Thomas, 168 N.H. 589, 604 (2016).

IV. BY IMPROPERLY REFUSING TO REACH THE MERITS OF

APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, THIS COURT
IS IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW.

15. This Court overlooked that “[s]tate appellate courts must apply their
rules governing appellate review in a way that provides ‘a fair opportunity to obtain
an adjudication on the merits of [an] appeal.’” Branch v. Turner, 37 F.3d 371 (8th
Cir. 1994), quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985).

16. This unprofessionally emotional Court has singled-out Maravelias for

particularly unjust and dismissive treatment given its subjective frustration with
Maravelias. Maravelias is currently suing this Court for its unrelated pecuniary
fraud4 in Maravelias v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, et al.; 19-CV-00487-JL
(D.N.H. 2019). This Court has allowed its dishonorable anger to violate
Maravelias’s right to equal protection under the law. See Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). Maravelias has a federal right to fair appellate recourse
without arbitrary, capricious, or retaliatory acts by state judicial actors. Maravelias
has a federal Equal Protection right to be treated by this Court in the way it treats
similarly situated litigants.

4 In the context of that controversy, Maravelias discussed objective facts demonstrating

this Court’s subjective bias and retaliatory acts against him in Pages 7 – 11 of his Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis,
No. 19-34. (http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
34/107026/20190705145822331_20190705-145442-95746845-00000139.pdf)
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 17. For example, in Thompson v. D’Errico, 163 N.H. 20, 22 (2011), this
Court adjudicated a pro se appellant’s as-applied First Amendment challenge to a
protective order even where he failed to provide a transcript and to preserve issues
in the trial court. Here, Maravelias has provided a transcript and extensively argued
the same First Amendment challenge in the trial court which he now brings on
appeal (A199-200). This Court’s dismissive attitude towards properly presented
constitutional claims in this case is therefore inconsistent.

18. For another example, this emotional Court overturned the trial court
judgment in Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Mark Acciard (2018-
0465) where the pro se appellant neither preserved nor even argued anywhere the
issue of legal error upon which the Court reversed. The Court granted this appellant
a plain-error sua sponte reversal where only a monetary small claims judgment was
at stake. In comparison, the instant restraining order violates Maravelias’s
fundamental constitutional liberties – an error much more destructive to the
reputation of judicial proceedings – yet this Court has failed even to adjudicate the
merits of a properly preserved-and-briefed challenge under the First Amendment.

19. Another example, Brittany Hession v. Blake Douglas (2017-0698) (a

self-censored, hidden “Other Final Order” affirming an insane DV protective order
from Derry District Court) exposes this Court’s inconsistent and differential
treatment of Maravelias in violation of the 14th Amendment. Where the lawyer-
represented appellant in that appeal argued Judge Leonard’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to continue constituted reversible error just as Maravelias
argued here that Judge Leonard’s similar denial required the same, this Court
substantively engaged the argument in its Final Order in Hession (2017-0698).

20. In Hession, the Court discussed the balance of equities, prejudice

suffered, factual circumstances, etc. surrounding the denial of the motion to
continue. However, when a pro se appellant deployed the same argument in this
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
appeal, with far more compelling factual circumstances than in Hession, in the same
type of case, and even from the same trial court judge, from the same time-period,
this Court simply ignored the merits. This Court merely quipped one of its
characteristic one-sentence bald assertions, giving no explanation why “the
defendant has not met his burden.” Order at 3.

21. This Court further disclosed its biased, inconsistent treatment of

litigants in Abigail Hidden v. James Hidden (2018-0343). It appears, from
undersigned appellant’s extensive and laborious research, that Hidden was the
single civil DV/Stalking reversal this Court dispensed in the entire 2018 annum.5

22. Defendant-Appellant James Hidden 1) was lawyer-represented and 2)

openly admitted in the “Questions Presented” section of his brief that he did not
preserve his sufficiency of the evidence argument. Yet, this Court’s hidden 10/26/18
Final Order in Hidden willingly adjudicated this question and reversed the DV Final
Order of Protection with absolutely no mention of “issue preservation” whatsoever.
This Court automatically granted an ingratiated lawyer’s request that the Court
apply Plain Error because his client had been pro se during the original proceedings.

23. Similarly, in this case, Maravelias was pro se during the original 2017
stalking petition hearing and then lawyer-represented on his appeal thereof (2017-
0139). However, in 2017-0139, this inconsistent and unjust Court cited insufficient
issue preservation as grounds for its refusal to reach the merits of Maravelias’s
arguments. It then denied his appellate lawyer’s invitation to adjudicate them under
Plain Error.

24. There was therefore no distinguishing justification for this Court’s

fickle, unfair dispensations in analogous Abigail Hidden v. James Hidden (2018-

5 This bone-chilling statistic uncovers this Court’s obstinate failure to do justice, given
the whopping 6,038 civil DV/Stalking Petitions filed in New Hampshire courts in 2018.
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/cio/2018-Petitions-and-Temp-Orders.pdf
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
0343) compared to Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias, 2017-0139, 2018-
0483, and 2019-0306, wherein this Court cited insufficient “issue preservation” of
constitutional issues at each turn, and falsely so in both 2018-0483 and 2019-0306,
as a way of further abusing Appellant Paul Maravelias.

25. Accordingly, even if Maravelias had failed to preserve his First

Amendment challenge, federal constitutional Equal Protection law requires this
Court to reconsider and adjudicate his argument under Rule 16-A (“Plain Error”).
If it does not, the cases above prove this Court is unequally treating similarly
situated litigants by dispensing the blessing of Plain Error adjudication according to
the whims of its lawyer-favoritism and anti-pro-se bias, combined with its personal
distaste for the undersigned appellant.

V. THE TRIAL COURT’S BAIT-AND-SWITCH LIMITATION OF

PARAGRAPHS IS AN OBJECTIVE MATTER OF FACT, NOT
SUBJECTIVE “INTERPRETATION”.

26. This Court overlooked the fact that Judge Leonard said she cited the
paragraphs because she “wanted the hearing to be focused on what allegations were
pertinent for the Court’s consideration”. (T25)

27. This Court overlooked the fact that the stated purpose of Maravelias’s
granted pre-trial motion was to “inform a more focused, productive Hearing”.
(A239)

28. There is no “interpretation” involved, contrary to this Court’s poorly

concealed strivings of dismissive sophistry. Order at 3.

29. Any well-behaving defendant in Maravelias’s shoes would have

likewise limited his self-defense in respectful, betrayed trust the trial court would
confine its consideration to these paragraphs.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 30. This Court must reconsider and reverse where its current Final Order
is predicated upon patent, verifiable rejection of reality, as manifested in Judge
Leonard’s plain transcribed words spoken at the 2/12/19 Hearing.

VI. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED

TO DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW OF LEGAL QUESTIONS.

31. Whether the evidence of a public YouTube discussion comment is

sufficient to constitute a threat to the “safety and well-being” of a third-person is a
question of law involving interpretation of RSA 633:3-a, III-c and the trial court’s
3/8/19 order. See State v. Lantagne, 165 N.H. 774, 777 (2013) (statutory
interpretation requires de novo review); In Re Langenfeld, 993 A.2d 232 (2010)
(interpretation of court order is question of law requiring de novo review); In the
Matter of Alexander and Evans, 147 N.H. 441 (2002) (recognizing even undisputed
acts of criminal harassment under RSA 644:4 not necessarily controlling in civil
protective order relief if the harassment does not also evince credible threat to
personal safety); Brief at 43 - 44.

32. Hoping nobody would notice, this trickster Court swept this key
question of law into the lesser “a-reasonable-person-in-the-trial-court’s-shoes-
could-have-found” standard of review properly applied only to factual findings.

33. As the restraining order extension is fundamental error depriving

Appellant of constitutional liberties comparable to criminal felony punishments, this
Court violates U.S. CONST., Amend I, II, and XIV to affirm by relying upon the
improper standard of review cited at Order, 2.

VII. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED ALL POINTS OF FACT AND LAW

WITHIN, AND WILLFULLY NEGLECTED TO ADJUDICATE,
APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS CLAIMS.

34. This Court overlooked its statutory duty per RSA 490:4 to act as an
appellate court when it utterly failed to offer a single reason for disposing of

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Maravelias’s arguments. The Court’s bald assertion, “Based upon our review of the
record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has not met his burden”,
given with zero supporting legal argumentation or law/fact citations, upheaves
Maravelias’s mandatory right to appeal and reduces it to a nullity.

35. This Court overlooked the fact that, when passing civil DV/Stalking
legislation, the legislature assumed defendants would have meaningful mandatory
appeal. The legislature would not have passed RSA 633:3-a if it knew this shameful
Court would abuse its power to deploy unqualified single-sentence bald assertions
to sadistically flash-vaporize valid due process claims.

36. This Court, affirming a stalking extension in Kathleen Kristiansen v.

Glenn Erlandson (2017-0348), suggested the trial court would have failed to review
the original circumstances of the stalking order if it had forbidden defendant to enter
an evidentiary exhibit about said original circumstances. However, although
precisely the same occurred in the instant case, the Court destroys its credibility by
passing-over the issue with not a single specific word of mention in Order at 3.

VIII. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE DAUGHTER

OF DAVID DEPAMPHILIS, CHRISTINA “CHRISSY”
DEPAMPHILIS, BRAGGED ABOUT FUCKING A 21-YEAR-OLD
ADULT MAN WHEN SHE WAS BARELY 16-YEARS-OLD BY
POSTING AN INSTAGRAM PHOTO ANNOTATING, IN RED INK,
HOW FAR THE MAN’S FORCEFUL PENETRATING HER
DISPLACED THE BED FROM THE WALL (A17), RENDERING
MARAVELIAS’S PUBLIC LEGAL DISCUSSION COMMENT
THEREABOUT TRUE, NON-DEFAMATORY, AND PROTECTED
BY ABSOLUTE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.

37. This frustrated Court overlooked and did not respond to the points of
fact and law presented at Brief, 43 - 45.

38. This Court has ignored the common-law fraud exception to res
judicata and completely overlooked Maravelias’s repeated objective proofs

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Christina DePamphilis lied through her teeth and fabricated multiple dramatic
falsehoods to obtain the original restraining order and both subsequent extensions.

39. This Holy Feminist Court revealed its alarming misandrist bias by
omitting any reference to Christina DePamphilis’s documented vulgar
cyberbullying Maravelias (A15-16) she committed while, at the same time, legally
abusing him with a so-called “protective” order. This female-favoritist Court also
intentionally deprived its Final Order of any objective factual summary of 1)
Christina DePamphilis’s exposed “following” fraud scheme to falsify Maravelias
whereabouts on 10/23/18 or 2) her publicly self-documented underage sexual
activity with adult men, of crucial legal relevance to the reasonableness of
Maravelias’s online responsive comment.

40. The trial court’s order was both unsupported by the evidence and
tainted by error of law, because a truthful non-threatening comment about legal facts
in this case, the truth of which Plaintiff never once disputed, does not suggest a
circumstance where the Plaintiff’s safety and well-being would be jeopardized
without a protective order. See MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008).

41. On the contrary, Christina DePamphilis’s “safety and well-being” is

jeopardized by her wild, parentally sponsored sexual fornication with adult men.

42. This intemperate Court would greatly damage both the fortitudinous
Appellant and the fornicatrix Appellee if it fails to reverse the protective order,
jettisoning Christina DePamphilis’s criminal falsification and underage sexual
whoredom – the very fact behind this case’s pressing federal constitutional question
– into the national spectacle in the Supreme Court of the United States of America.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
WHEREFORE, Defendant-Appellant Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this
Holy Feminist Court:

A. Grant this Motion;

B. Allow Appellant an opportunity to present Oral
Argument on this Motion for Reconsideration;
C. Reconsider its 9/27/19 Final Order and adjudicate all
arguments in Appellant’s Brief, including any ones
insufficiently preserved under Rule 16(A) Plain Error;
D. Grant the relief requested in Appellant’s brief.

Dated: October 7th, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
in propria persona

By: /s/ Paul J. Maravelias

Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND RULE 22(2) COMPLIANCE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration contains 2,915 words in compliance with Rule 22(2) and is being
mailed on this day to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Appellee, Christina
DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

Dated: October 7th, 2019

________________________________
Paul Maravelias
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0306, Christina DePamphilis v. Paul

Maravelias, the court on September 27, 2019, issued the
following order:

We treat the argument by the defendant, Paul Maravelias, that he

“deserved a separate appeal this Court erroneously refused to docket” as a
motion to reconsider our July 10, 2019 order stating that his June 17, 2019
notice of mandatory appeal form had been docketed as a supplement to the
notice of appeal he filed on May 31, 2019. We deny his motion to reconsider
our July 10, 2019 order.

Having considered the defendant’s opening and reply briefs, the

memorandum of law filed by the plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis, and those
portions of the record that are properly before us, we conclude that oral
argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The defendant
appeals orders of the Circuit Court (Leonard, J.) extending a civil stalking final
order of protection in favor of the plaintiff for one year, see RSA 633:3-a, III-c
(Supp. 2018), and modifying the order’s terms. We affirm.

The original protective order in this matter was issued in February 2017.
We upheld that order following the defendant’s appeal of it. See DePamphilis v.
Maravelias, No. 2017-0139, 2017 WL 3468651 (N.H. July 28, 2017). In June
2018, the order was extended until February 2019. The defendant appealed
the extension, and we upheld it. See DePamphilis v. Maravelias, No. 2018-
0483 (N.H. January 16, 2019). In our order upholding the extension, we
described the defendant’s 2016 and 2017 conduct in detail. We do not repeat
that description here.

In January 2019, the plaintiff moved for a five-year extension of the

protective order based upon conduct in which the defendant allegedly engaged
in 2018, including: (1) filing criminal complaints against the plaintiff with three
municipal police departments and posting those complaints on his website; (2)
posting on YouTube excerpts of video he recorded of the hearing on the first
extension; (3) making disparaging comments about the plaintiff and her father
on the YouTube website; (4) writing a disparaging book about the plaintiff and
her father that he offers to distribute to people for free; (5) posting the plaintiff’s
social media images on his website; and (6) following the plaintiff in his vehicle
in October 2018 when she was driving to cheerleader practice.
 Following a one-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court extended the
protective order until February 2020. The defendant unsuccessfully moved for
reconsideration of the extension, and this appeal followed.

At the outset, we observe that, to the extent that the defendant has
attempted to challenge, in this appeal, the initial protective order or the first
extension thereof, he is precluded from doing so. Both the initial protective
order and the first extension thereof are final judgments. Thus, we do not
consider any arguments related to the trial court’s alleged errors in issuing
those decisions, or our alleged errors in upholding them.

The defendant first challenges the merits of the trial court’s decision to
extend the protective order for a second time, until February 2020. The trial
court has discretion to extend a civil stalking final order of protection if it finds
“good cause” for the extension. RSA 633:3-a, III-c; see MacPherson v. Weiner,
158 N.H. 6, 9 (2008). In ruling on a motion to extend a protective order, the
trial court must “review the [protective] order, and each renewal thereof and
. . . grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-
being of the plaintiff.” RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Thus, we have held that good cause
exists to extend a protective order when “the trial court determines that the
circumstances are such that, without a protective order, the plaintiff’s safety
and well-being would be in jeopardy.” MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. In
applying this standard, the trial court must assess whether the current
conditions are such that there is still concern for the safety and well-being of
the plaintiff, and in so doing, to review the circumstances of the original
petition and any violation of the protective order, taking into account any
present and reasonable fear by the plaintiff. Id.

“The trial court is in the best position to view the current circumstances,
as well as the defendant’s prior acts, and determine whether an extension is
necessary for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.” Id. at 11. We will
uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary
support or are tainted by error of law, id. at 10, mindful that it is for the trial
court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented,
and that our role is not to determine whether we would have ruled differently,
but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the
trial court based upon the same evidence, Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780
(2003); see also MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 190 (2007).

The trial court found that the defendant’s “continued efforts at

disparaging [the plaintiff] and her family by making offensive and hateful
statements in public postings on the internet” demonstrate “that he continues
to harbor hostility toward her and her family such that legitimate concerns for
[her] safety and well-being continue to exist.” The trial court’s findings are
supported by the plaintiff’s testimony and by her exhibit 2, which was admitted

2
into evidence without objection. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have
determined that, without a protective order, the plaintiff’s safety and well-being
would be in jeopardy. MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. Accordingly, the trial
court’s determination that good cause exists to extend the protective order was
neither lacking in evidentiary support nor tainted by error of law, and its
decision to extend the order was well within its discretion. Id.

The defendant next asserts that the trial court made insufficient factual
findings because it did not specify the comments it described as “offensive and
hateful.” However, to support this assertion, he relies upon case law
concerning the issuance of an initial civil stalking order of protection, rather
than case law related to extending such an order. Contrary to his assertions,
the trial court’s narrative order in this case was sufficient for appellate review.
The defendant’s argument that the trial court’s order was unconstitutional
because it failed to specify the comments it described as “offensive and hateful”
lacks merit and warrants no further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H.
321, 322 (1993).

The defendant next contends that the trial court violated his federal and
state constitutional rights to due process because it allowed the plaintiff to
introduce evidence about, and ultimately rested its decision upon, allegations
that the court did not rely upon when granting her temporary relief. The
defendant mistakenly assumes that, when the trial court granted his request
for an evidentiary hearing, it limited the hearing’s scope to the allegations upon
which it relied when it granted the plaintiff temporary relief. We do not share
his interpretation of either the trial court’s order granting his request for an
evidentiary hearing or its statements during that hearing.

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to continue the evidentiary hearing. The trial court has broad
discretion in managing the proceedings before it. In the Matter of Sawyer &
Sawyer, 161 N.H. 11, 18 (2010). We review the trial court’s denial of the
defendant’s request to continue the hearing under our unsustainable exercise
of discretion standard. Id. Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision
unless the defendant demonstrates that it was clearly unreasonable to the
prejudice of his case. Id. Based upon our review of the record submitted on
appeal, we conclude that the defendant has not met his burden.

The defendant next asserts that the trial court failed to review the
original circumstances of the stalking order and erroneously denied his request
to submit exhibits pertinent to those circumstances. He also contends that the
trial court erroneously failed to rule upon his motion to dismiss, violated his
state constitutional right to a remedy by failing to issue timely rulings, and
improperly denied his request to videotape the proceedings. We conclude that

3
the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion or act unlawfully in
those regards.

The defendant next argues that the trial court’s order violates his First
Amendment rights because it “punish[es] [his] legitimate public discussion,”
“serves no governmental interest,” and constitutes “viewpoint discrimination.”
He asserts that the trial court’s order “openly favor[s] the ‘viewpoint’ of the
Plaintiff [and] striv[es] to ‘control content’ of [his] speech,” thus violating his
First Amendment rights.

It is a long-standing rule that parties may not have review of issues that
they did not raise in the trial court. Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H.
248, 250 (2004). It is the burden of the appealing party, here the defendant, to
demonstrate that the issues he is raising on appeal were raised in the trial
court. Id.; Sup. Ct. R. 16(3)(b). The trial court must have had the opportunity
to consider any issues asserted on appeal; thus, any issues which could not
have been presented to the trial court prior to its decision must be presented to
it in a motion for reconsideration. See N.H. Dep’t of Corrections v. Butland,
147 N.H. 676, 679 (2002).

The record submitted on appeal does not demonstrate that the defendant
made the same First Amendment argument to the trial court that he now
makes on appeal. Thus, the trial court was deprived of an opportunity to
correct its alleged error, and we decline to consider the issue for the first time
on appeal. See id.

We decline to address the merits of the defendant’s remaining appellate

arguments because he has not sufficiently developed them for our review. For
instance, in a single sentence, the defendant argues that the trial court “placed
[him] into an indiscriminate ‘class of one’ by treating him disparately compared
to similarly situated individuals,” thereby violating his constitutional right to
equal protection. A point heading in his brief states that RSA 633:3-a, III-c is
facially invalid because it is overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. However,
rather than develop this argument, the defendant merely incorporates by
reference statements he made at the evidentiary hearing in the trial court and
certain pleadings. In another section of his brief, he incorporates by reference
pages of his motion for reconsideration, but does not develop appellate
arguments related to those pages.

“Judicial review is not warranted for complaints regarding adverse

rulings without developed legal argument, and neither passing reference to
constitutional claims nor off-hand invocations of constitutional rights without
support by legal argument or authority warrants extended consideration.”
Appeal of Omega Entm’t, 156 N.H. 282, 287 (2007). Although we recognize
that the defendant was self-represented in the trial court and is self-
represented on appeal, self-represented litigants are bound by the same rules

4
that govern parties represented by counsel. In the Matter of Birmingham &
Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006).

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

Distribution:
10th N.H. Circuit Court - Derry District Division, 473-2016-CV-00124
Honorable Elizabeth M. Leonard
Honorable David D. King
Mr. Paul Maravelias
Simon R. Brown, Esquire
Attorney General
Timothy A. Gudas, Supreme Court
Allison R. Cook, Supreme Court
File