Tongol v.

Tongol
G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007

FACTS:

Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union,
they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma. Cecilia. On May 13, 1994,
Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando alleged that Filipinas was
unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their
constant quarrel. In her answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation
have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed
because it is Orlando`s insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man. Both parties underwent a
psychological exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological
insufficiency.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of
Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol.
Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological
examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of
their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses’ psychological
examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own
testimony.

On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
on appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC. Hence, herein petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a
finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.

RULING:

The Court cannot see how respondent’s personality disorder would render her unaware of the
essential marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos Case, “to be truly in cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.” What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of
inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to
assume some of her obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him.
However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a
“refusal” or”neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. There is
no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony
did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterizes respondent’s inadequate personality
disorder as permanent or incurable.

The psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of petitioner
and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses’ differences and
misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. In addition, it is true that the marital
obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual
responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which
means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and
expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the
other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground
to declare a marriage null and void.
Marital obligation includes not only a spouse’s obligation to the other spouse but also one’s
obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that
respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in
Article 220 of the Family Code.
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January
1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then
parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena
on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped
in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most
of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

Case Digest TING vs TING

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ TING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution
in CAG. R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu
City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. At first, they resided at Benjamins
family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. When their second child was born, the couple
decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City. In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations.

In 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of
its active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer. On October 21, 1993,
after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was
only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the

following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr.
Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the
latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed
to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial courts
ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
and his Profession may ground null and void ab intio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Held:

The petitioner denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she
already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any preexisting psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be
incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that
there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater
weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins
deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with
Benjamins brothers. Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling

problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such
a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV
No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Najera v. Najera

G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal separation, with Appliction for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon,
Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the (United States of America). They were married
but are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to
find a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman,
was respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did
not give petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and
falsely accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking
marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without
provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after
the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings, and
abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year
are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family
Code.
SUAZO v. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:

Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk.
Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after
their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom
he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating
she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her
psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment
and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval)
and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink
and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have
failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it
is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise
that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of
the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.
The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that
the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility
which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced
into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article
36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage
with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The

psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner –
she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave
rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence
showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had

difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part
of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Republic v. Galang

G.R. No. 168335, 6 June 2011

FACTS:

In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. In August 1999, Nestor filed with
the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging the latter’s
psychological incapacity to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as the same was a
kleptomaniac, gambler and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity,
distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child” basing
these allegations on Juvy’s unwillingness to prepare breakfast and the incident where Juvy almost lost
their son in the market. He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be
incurable.”

Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted psychological
test on the former. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the findings on couple, stating
that the husband is psychologically mature while his wife is not, without citing the tests conducted and
the reason for the wife’s incapacity.

RTC ruled on the nullity of the marriage which was affirmed by the CA, citing that the facts presented
satisfied the Santos doctrine.

ISSUE:

Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.

RULING:

None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the
psychologist, and the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must
be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos v. CA]

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos v. Marcos]

Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straight jacket; it forced
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te v. Yu-Te] In Ting v
Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.

In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. There was no showing
that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed to prove the gravity
or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and
how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically state
the particular type of personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s
condition. The report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to change” and that her mental
incapacity “appears incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar
under Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
Mendoza v. Republic
G.R. No. 157649; November 12, 2012FACTS:
Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New
Guinea. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy led to her pregnancy. They
got married 8 months after on June 24, 1991. Being one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the
family’s expenses. Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends. In
September 1994, she discovered his illicit affair with his co-employee and they started to sleep in separate
rooms affecting their sexual relationship. Dominic eventually got fired from his employment and was
criminally charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and estafa.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code?

HELD:
The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that the petitioner harbored
against Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness; that such findings were
one-sided and that he did not participate in the proceedings. The findings and conclusions on his
psychological profile were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions of him by the
petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality of evidence adduced by the petitioner insufficient
to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit. Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s
psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence, and incurability could not stand
scrutiny. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse did not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. The court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that decision of the Court
of Appeals.
CASE DIGEST: ENRICO V. HEIRS

Published by bigboy on January 12, 2014 | Leave a response

Enrico vs. Heirs

G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein
respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a
marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the
Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To
further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:

No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of
the order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.