Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Technological Forecasting & Social Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techfore

Timing is everything: A technology transition framework for regulatory and T

market readiness levels
⁎
Peter H. Kobos , Leonard A. Malczynski, La Tonya N. Walker, David J. Borns, Geoffrey T. Klise
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Meeting technology-based policy goals without sufficient lead time may present several technology, regulatory
Technology adoption and market-based challenges due to the speed of technological adoption in existing and emerging markets.
Technological progress Installing incremental amounts of technologies, e.g., cleaner fossil, renewable or transformative energy tech-
Regulatory feedback nologies throughout the coming decades, may prove to be a more attainable goal than a radical and immediate
Market adoption
change the year before a policy goal is set to be in place. This notion of steady installation growth over acute
Innovation
Market diffusion
installations of technology to meet policy goals is the core topic of discussion for this research. This research
operationalizes this notion by developing the theoretical underpinnings of regulatory and market acceptance
delays by building upon the common Technology Readiness Level (TRL) framework and offers two new addi-
tions to the research community. The Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL) and Market Readiness Level (MRL)
frameworks were developed. These components, collectively called the Technology, Regulatory and Market
(TRM) readiness level framework allow one to build new constraints into existing Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs). A system dynamics model was developed to illustrate the TRM framework. The framework helps identify
the factors, and specifically the rate at which we must support technology development, necessary to meet our
desired technical and policy goals in the coming decades.

1. Introduction and market factors required to reach a meaningful market penetration

Market penetration modeling for new technologies can be a chal-
lenge in the face of changing or uncertain parameters. Including reg-
ulatory barriers in an engineering-regulatory-market framework may
offer a unique and insightful approach to account for several of these
uncertainties, yet finding the appropriate balance of variables to in-
clude for any given technology can prove challenging. Without the
proper market or regulatory signals, the time required for a new energy
(or other general) technology to reach the market and make an impact
can extend far beyond initial estimates. Where this becomes a challenge
is how to address these time delays for energy technology market pe-
netration scenarios in the decades to come.
To adequately quantify and develop a method to incorporate time
delays due the integration of technology development, regulatory bar-
riers and market adoption, the Technology, Regulatory and Market
readiness level framework (TRM) describes the technology, regulatory
level and within a given timeframe. With this level, the technology's
attributes, such as lower CO2 emissions can then be applied to energy
security and CO2 management goals in the coming decades.
A system dynamics model was developed to illustrate the TRM
framework using a stylized example. This example builds upon the
theoretical, literature-based components first described in Sections 2, 3
and 4 of this paper for the technology readiness, regulatory readiness
and market readiness levels, respectively. The paper then proceeds into
section 5 to combine these levels of the TRM framework into one
system dynamics model. Sections 6 and 7 then describe the implications
and potential further applications of the TRM framework.
1.1. Assessing technology transitions
The TRM framework brings a new capability to Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs) because it explicitly includes both

Abbreviations: CAFE, Corporate Average Fuel Economy; CCS, CO2 capture and storage; CLD, causal loop diagram; CO2, carbon dioxide; DoD, Department of Defense;
IAM, Integrated Assessment Model; MRL, Market Readiness Level; NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; NIMBY, not in my backyard; NOx, nitrous
oxides; TRL, Technology Readiness Level; TRM, Technology, Regulatory and Market readiness level framework; RD&D, research, development and demonstration; R
&D, research and development; RRL, Regulatory Readiness Level; SD, system dynamics; SOx, sulfur oxides; U.S., United States; USD, United States Dollars
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: phkobos@sandia.gov (P.H. Kobos).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.07.052
Received 13 October 2014; Received in revised form 2 June 2018; Accepted 20 July 2018
Available online 19 August 2018
0040-1625/ © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
P.H. Kobos et al.
regulatory and market constraints when assessing technology devel-
opment and rates of market penetration. Previous techniques that use
an ‘S-shaped’ curve to represent technology transitions and market
adoption over time often include technology adoption across the ac-
celeration, valley of death, and possibly takeoff phases (Frankl, 2012;
Sood et al., 2012; Weyant, 2011).1 The TRM framework adds to this
body of work by explicitly modeling the factors required before tech-
nologies may enter the market as well as those during the early stages of
market adoption (Kobos et al., 2003, 2006, 2013). The technical ap-
proach develops in three distinct stages by addressing technological,
regulatory and market factors built upon the research progress frame-
work of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) method.
Additionally, the Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL) and Market
Readiness Level (MRL) for existing and new electricity technologies
build upon the TRL method. Are CO2 capture and storage (CCS) tech-
nologies technically mature enough to deploy to the field? This is a TRL
question. The RRL will address questions such as; Do the current elec-
tricity markets provide a favorable environment to adopt new tech-
nologies on existing plants such as CCS on fossil fuel plants, or develop
new ones (e.g., install large numbers of natural gas-fired turbines)? If
not, where on the RRL spectrum is the set of regulations, and how long
might it take to change the regulations to allow the market to adopt
new electricity technologies? The MRL addresses questions such as;
Does the manufacturing base for power plant technologies exist to
support several orders of magnitude of growth over the next couple of
decades?
Finally, synthesizing all of these efforts within a system dynamics
framework allows the analysis to illustrate the TRM framework. The
integration of time delays, TRLs and systems insight modeling provides
a unique platform unexplored in the current research community. This
approach builds on existing techniques because (1) classic optimization
or general equilibrium models may benefit from this type of flexible
methodology and application to integrate TRLs and (2) adopting TRLs
for technology is not new, but utilizing the TRM framework to explore
regulatory and manufacturing constraints is a completely new concept.
This concept will help identify the value of timeliness and inter-
connectedness when modeling them in an IAM in the face of upcoming
technical and policy goals (Joffe-Walt, 2008; Joskow, 2010; Komiyama
and Fujii, 2014; Stern, 2007; USCCSP, 2007; USEPA, 2013; Wicke et al.,
2009).
1.2. Applying technology transition methods in energy systems analysis
To provide additional context, many energy supply and demand
forecasting models exist today, and some of them to try to incorporate
the limitations and subsequent time delays for regulatory and market
forces present when modeling technology manufacturing and adoption
(Andersen and Andersen, 2014; Brown and Chandler, 2008; Colladay,
1987; EMF, 2011; Iyer et al., 2015; Roberts, 1964).
More recently, much has been written on the topics of lowering the
CO2 profile for global energy supplies. Increasing the share of natural
gas fuels, installing CO2 capture and storage (CCS) technologies on coal-
fired power plants, and increasing the share of nuclear and biofuel-
based power have all been suggested as potential methods to reduce
CO2 emissions (USCCSP, 2007). Coal-based fuels represent the majority
share of CO2 emissions from the electricity sectors at both the global
level (72%) and in the United States (79%) (IEA, 2012). This represents
a large opportunity to decrease CO2 emissions through fuel switching
combined with CCS. The challenge with these types of forecasting
1
Interested readers may find mathematical formulations and applications for
‘S-shaped’ curves that describe the common logistic curve, Bass Diffusion
Model, and the Gompertz curve to name a few throughout the salient literature
(Islam and Meade, 1997; Kobos et al., 2003; Maier, 1998; Martino, 2003; Meade
and Islam, 2006, 2015; Sood et al., 2012).
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
scenarios lies in the rate of capital turnover, the stage of the techno-
logy's development level (TRL), current and projected costs, and the
regulatory support and market demand to accept these technologies
(Herzog, 2011; Kobos et al., 2011; Roach et al., 2014; Rubin, 2012;
Rubin et al., 2007, 2012).
The classic drivers of innovation may include several ‘technology-
push’ and ‘demand-pull’ instruments including R&D investments and
meeting regulatory obligations, respectively that apply to both sta-
tionary and transportation energy systems (Cheah and Heywood, 2011;
Kobos et al., 2006; Mafakheri and Nasiri, 2014; Taylor et al., 2005). In
the United States, changes in the last several years to the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) vehicle fuel standard is an illustrative
example of the regulatory framework helping technology meet policy
(fuel economy) goals. The technology, engineering and timing strate-
gies, arguably, were ready or just about ready to deploy across the
vehicle fleet (Cheah and Heywood, 2011).
Similarly, electricity sector technologies in the U.S. work within the
constraints of the regulatory guidance of the day. Without favorable
regulatory integration factors, new stationary energy technologies such
as enhanced installations of coal-fired power plants with CO2 man-
agement or other environmentally-focused technologies may never
reach their full market potential due to recent large-scale, low cost
domestic supplies of natural gas available in the U.S. Technologies may
take years or decades to reach the installations necessary to meet policy
goals even without these drivers (such as reduced mercury emissions
criteria for coal-fired power plants, limited licensing for new nuclear
power plants in the face of increasing retirements, and potential CO2
management goals). The sooner they are being installed, the sooner
these installation goals can be met. Therefore, the timing is everything
for technology transitions in the marketplace.
It is important to incorporate the necessary granularity and tech-
nology-specific detail required to evaluate the scale-up potential for
electricity generation and infrastructure technologies when analyzing
how a technology moves from one TRL level to the next. The technol-
ogies may take from several years (natural gas) to several decades
(nuclear) to build enough installations to meet their installed GWh or
reduced CO2 emissions goals. For example, Freeman and Bhown (2011)
determined most post-combustion CO2 technologies (on coal plants)
were in the TRL spectrum of 1–7 so they are not ready for full system
operations and/or ready for commercial application at large magni-
tudes. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2011) estimates it
takes four years to construct a new coal-based power plant, one to three
years for renewables, seven years for a new nuclear power plant, and up
to three years for natural gas power plants. Herzog (2011) highlights
how forecasting the cost for the ‘first of a kind’ new technology or that
same technology several decades into the future (the ‘Nth of a kind’)
can prove to be challenging. Additionally, uncertainty within the leg-
islation and the potential for regulation is driving great uncertainty as
to which fossil fuel-based technology may develop the fastest (e.g.,
lower initial cost vs. increased efficiency) (Figueroa et al., 2008;
McJeon et al., 2011).
1.3. Replacement and turnover time
Technology transitions take time; up to 50+ years for a full re-
placement of an energy technology when transitioning from, for ex-
ample, wood to coal, from coal to petroleum, from petroleum to natural
gas and nuclear, from natural gas to large-scale renewables (EPRI,
2011; Grubler, 1998; Grubler et al., 1999; Nakata et al., 2011;
Nakicenovic, 1997). The current capability development effort is a new
research frontier because it will incorporate time delays, technology
readiness and non-technical barriers such as the integration with ex-
isting regulations and market-related infrastructure. Prioritizing energy
technology deployment goals according to a tiered structure gives the
interested systems analysis modeler the ability to compare market dif-
fusion across technologies within a given market using both traditional
P.H. Kobos et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

Table 1
Technology Readiness Levels summary by NASA.
(Adapted from Mankins, 1995)
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Description

TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported

TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment (ground or space)
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration (ground or space)
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations

metrics (e.g., $/MWh, tonnes/CO2 emissions, market share) with non-
traditional ones (e.g., political capital and social acceptability as they
relate to time delays for deployment).
2. Developing a Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Department of Defense (DoD) and many other interested agencies and
institutes use a metric known as the Technology Readiness Level (TRL).
They use this metric to assess the maturity of a technology within the
research spectrum from the conceptual stage to being application-
ready. NASA largely pioneered the concept of quantifying the maturity
‘stage’ of a technology to assess how ready any new technology (or
systems) may be for field deployment (Clay et al., 2007; Colladay,
1987; Mankins, 1995; Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell and Bailey, 2006).
Table 1 introduces one of the earlier versions of the TRL.
Much of the technological innovation literature points towards re-
search, development and demonstration (RD&D) (or research and de-
velopment (R&D)) funds as the driving force behind the innovation
engine.2 Several approaches model the direct, or often indirect (e.g.,
through another sector of the economy or result of feed in tariffs or
similar mechanisms) influences of energy technology RD&D (del Rio
and Bleda, 2012; Kobos et al., 2006; Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006;
Taylor et al., 2005).
Without funding, having a meaningful impact for change (e.g., to
reduce CO2 emissions) in the scientific and subsequent public com-
munity may be difficult. Therefore, RD&D funding will be used as the
underlying driving force to move a technology from one TRL level to
the next. It is important to note that moving from one TRL level to the
next may not require a constant set of criteria. For example, in a hy-
pothetical case, moving from a TRL of 1 to 2 may require $10 million
and 2 years, but moving from a TRL of 2 to 3 may require $20 million
and 3 years and so on. The specific funding level and timeline required
to progress between the levels within the TRL framework should be
technology-specific and adjustable according to the cost, time and
performance-related criteria.
3. Developing a Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL)
A technology with the highest TRL level possible may still not be
able to enter the market without regulatory support. This is due to the
2
The authors acknowledge the difference between research, development
and demonstration (RD&D) and research and development (R&D) in the lit-
erature, and in applied areas. For the sake of the TRL and related modeling
discussed in this analysis, they will be considered to be interchangeable since
development and demonstration could be considered similar in spirit up to a
point as they relate to the goal and terminal TRL level of 9 representing a
successful and operational technology. Additionally, much of the innovation-
related literature used the term R&D until approximately the 1990s when RD&D
became a more descriptive term applied in the similar literature (Kobos et al.,
2006).
technology's access to the regulatory process, security of regulatory
support (e.g., political capital), the effectiveness of that regulatory
support to deliver meaningful legislation to support the technology
(e.g., writing supporting legislation), the idea of ‘do no harm’ by in-
troducing the technology in terms of environmental, cost or security,
and finally the ability to pass legislation (or reduce resistance). These
factors represent the core factors underlying the Regulatory Readiness
Level (RRL).
It is important to also note that not all technologies can or will
follow this pathway towards larger market adoption. Technologies that
require high amounts of upfront capital (financial, human, physical,
etc.) and game-changing, fundamental RD&D for invention to produce
the first item may take many more years to climb the initial technology
readiness levels than a less capital-intensive innovation (e.g., developing
hardware vs. software-based systems) (Chang, 2010; Mutula and van
Brakel, 2006; Westjohn et al., 2009).
Without the regulatory push, many technologies may not be
adopted in the marketplace due to higher costs relative to not adopting
those technologies. The Sulfur Oxide (SOx) and Nitrous Oxide (NOx) air
regulations of the 1970s and 1980s, for example, progressed largely in
parallel to the technology development such that by the time the SOx
and NOx scrubber technology was ready to deploy to the marketplace
(e.g., existing coal-fired power plants) the regulations were starting to
enforce the change to lower emissions (Rubin, 2012; Rubin et al., 2012;
Taylor et al., 2005). Thus, the regulations helped the technology find a
secure market, and the technology helped the regulations meet its
policy goals – to reduce certain types of pollution.
These lessons can also be extended to potential CO2 management
policies on existing fossil fuel-based power plants. A substantial chal-
lenge to developing a meaningful regulatory readiness level is to ac-
count for the uncertainty associated with CO2 management policies
throughout countries and regions looking to plan, manage, and ulti-
mately reduce their CO2 emissions (Markusson and Haszeldine, 2009).
The central point here is to highlight how energy technology spillover
and adoption are often strongly guided by the substantial oversight and
regulation pertaining to the application of the technology (Cowan and
Daim, 2011). It is for this very reason that in addition to technology
readiness levels, there is a need to develop a regulatory readiness level
to help quantify these factors.
3.1. Access to and understanding of the regulatory process
Throughout the last several decades in many developed countries of
the world, the focus of energy technology policy changed from energy
access, to affordable energy, to low SOx and NOx emissions, to the post-
Kyoto Protocol negotiations transition with a focus on lowering CO2
emissions. These transitions were either led by, or followed, salient
energy regulations or interests to institute the change. During the
transition periods just before, and after these policy goals changed
(mandatory or voluntary), a large degree of regulatory uncertainty tried
to focus on the ‘best’ manner to approach, address directly, or address

213
P.H. Kobos et al.
after the fact from the perspectives of the technology adopters or sup-
pliers. A key challenge is to understand ‘the rules of the game’ such that
the formal and informal institutions with a society and its respective
market conditions are well understood to the point of reducing these
uncertainties (Mitchell and Woodman, 2010; Negro et al., 2012;
Rehman et al., 2012).
3.2. Security of policy certainty
Uncertainty in the future greenhouse gas management policy may
lead to a ‘risk premium’ in the electricity markets. This premium may
increase electricity prices for coal and natural gas-based power systems
on the order of 5–35% (or more) in the face of potential CO2 capture
and storage (CCS) policies (Blyth et al., 2007). Similarly, a risk pre-
mium may be demanded of the consumers in an effort to pass through
the cost of supply or smart grid or other new technology's return on
investment in the face of additional regulatory uncertainty (Agrell
et al., 2013; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). The degree to which the pre-
mium passes to potential consumers is, however, highly dependent
upon country-specific innovation systems. That is, in some countries the
premium is absorbed via governmental-support for high-risk, high-re-
ward energy systems, whereas in other countries this may not be the
case (Vasudeva, 2009).
3.3. Policy effectiveness
To determine how effective a policy may be before implementing it
can prove challenging. While the desired effect of a policy may be borne
out in time, there can be substantial unintended consequences or ele-
ments contributing to the ineffectiveness of the policy in the years
following implementation.
The ability of ‘market pull’-type of policies, such as production tax
credits (PTCs) strive to increase demand in the marketplace for new
technologies and provide incentives for users to adopt them. These
policies are often compared to ‘technology push’ policies such as gov-
ernmental or private RD&D funding to ultimately provide the supply of
technology to the marketplace. Policies that may be considered ‘tech-
nology-push’ include government demonstration grants, public RD&D,
grants, investment subsidies, private RD&D, tax breaks for en-
trepreneurs or investors, incubators, government investment in private
venture capital, soft measures of support and government venture ca-
pital funds (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009). Policies that may be con-
sidered ‘market-pull’ include feed-in tariffs, reduction of fossil-fuel
subsidies, technology performance standards, residential and commer-
cial tax credits, renewable fuel standards, CO2 trading, public pro-
curement, production tax credit, CO2 tax, renewable portfolio stan-
dards, renewable certificate trading and clean development
mechanisms (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009). These types of policies
strive to move the technology past the ‘valley of death’ where tech-
nologies may not progress successfully from the laboratory to the
marketplace (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009; Grubb, 2004; Weyant,
2011).
The effectiveness of a policy to support a given technology can be
very region specific. For example, renewable portfolio standards (RPSs)
in states across the U.S. may be very successful due to a supportive
legislative and economic climate (e.g., Texas deployed 915 megawatts
(MW) of wind in 2001 alone, doubling the projected RPS for that year)
or challenged due to less favorable installation conditions (Carley,
2009). The success of the RPS may be determined based on whether the
region has an investor-owned or public utility (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011) or in other instances, if a favorable regulatory environ-
ment or ‘innovation system’ exists (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). In
these instances, the installed megawatts or power produced per policy
is a key metric of success. In other instances, the cost of the policy
instrument relative to the return on the energy project's lifetime impact
may be the key metric of success (Lund, 2007).
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
Reducing the cost of energy systems can present an undesirable
effect. When the cost of energy (and other types of resources) decreases,
there may be a trend to use more energy due to its then lower cost. This
type of ‘rebound effect’, also known as the Jevons paradox, can mitigate
energy policies seeking to reduce CO2 emissions, fuel consumption or
increase efficiency (Bertoldi et al., 2013; Jevons, 1866; Stepp et al.,
2009). This, along with a potential mismatch between the challenges
associated with adopting a policy and its perceived effectiveness pre-
sents a policy dilemma when looking to convince others to adopt ef-
fective policy tools (Wiener and Koontz, 2012). This discussion leads
into the notion that policies should, at the very least, strive to ‘do no
harm’.
3.4. Do no harm
Developing a successful energy technology policy must account for
the appropriate incentives and recognize measures of success. For ex-
ample, some energy policies focus on increasing the efficiency levels of
the technologies (e.g., end use technologies by the consumer). The in-
itial effect of this type of policy is to reduce the energy used by the
consumer. However, the Jevons Paradox may occur where more end
uses, including additional driving with a more efficient vehicle or using
more electricity across more end use technologies, has the net effect of
increasing energy consumption (Bertoldi et al., 2013). Modifying the
incentive structure to both increase the efficiency of the technologies,
while also suggesting to the consumers to modify their behavior such as
driving less or using less electricity overall may be achieved by using
additional policy mechanisms. These mechanisms may include feed-in
tariffs that are directly tied to the amount of electricity (or energy)
generated rather than the end use technology itself (Bertoldi et al.,
2013). By not accounting for the Jevons Paradox, some energy policies'
goals to reduce energy use could increase it over time.
Policies focusing on RD&D, climate change mitigation and market
price management are areas where targeting the ‘optimal’ policy fra-
mework may not be attainable, thereby leaving many interested parties
worse off than before the policy took affect (de Bruin and Dellink,
2011). This may be due to a focus on reducing the shorter-term costs of
electricity via deregulation, for example, rather than investing in new,
more efficient technologies with more appropriate metrics (e.g., do-
mestic, scale-appropriate and/or renewable sources of energy in the
longer term) seen by a reduction in RD&D spending or an incorrect
measurement of the research's impact metrics (Dooley, 1998; Kostoff
and Geisler, 2007). Similarly, rate structure policies in the electricity
sector provide a rich area to illustrate price-cap, feed-in tariff, the ef-
fects of deregulation within the U.S. electricity sector, and perfor-
mance-based regulation among many as to the desired versus observed
(or forecasted) unintended consequences (Seeto et al., 2001).
An effect (or possibly cause in some cases) of these counter-
productive results in one policy goal may be due to successes in another
area. The lack of overarching policy goal integration between atmo-
spheric emissions, water, land use, and other resources may contribute
to policies failing to meet their goals, or achieving a lower possible
success level than otherwise they might have (Delshad et al., 2010;
Murray, 2013). Balancing these systems within a comprehensive (or
more easily integrated) suite of policy tools may help meet several
desired goals.
The often cited ‘not in my backyard’ or ‘NIMBY’ influence towards
citing new energy technologies (e.g., wind) may help or hurt the de-
ployment levels for the technology. A key challenge is to address ‘lock-
in’ not only from the technological perspective, but the ways of thinking
towards accepting new or innovative technologies (Wolsink, 2012).
3.5. Political (& social) acceptability
A necessary factor to include in most energy development projects is
the social and therefore political acceptability of the project.
P.H. Kobos et al.
Externalities, cost overruns and unforeseen intergenerational effects are
not typically included in the overall system's costs for energy-related
projects (Carrera and Mack, 2010). One key finding focused on how
most experts found smaller-scale technologies such as photovoltaics and
fuel cells to be viewed more positively due to their smaller ecological
and societal footprint and compatibility with current infrastructure
relative to larger-scale systems such as nuclear and coal power.
Through cases such as these, as well as other energy projects that
may meet resistance from local or regional populations, it may follow
that the political opposition (actors in the local or regional government)
would in many instances also reflect this resistance (choice) of the
people.
4. Developing a Market Readiness Level (MRL)
A key challenge for any new technology to achieve substantial
market share is to secure timely and sizable market adoption. After a
technology moves through the TRL levels of 1–9, and successfully re-
ceives the regulatory permissions to enter the application space, the
ability of the market to receive this technology hinges on its value,
utility relative to other technologies, and lessons from market actor
behavioral characteristics. The value can come in a variety of forms.
The value of any product can, arguably, be transferred to the customer
or entity that receives the technology. This can be in the form of higher
performance, lower resource use, or lower costs. The challenge when
moving from an ‘early adopter’ phase to a larger level of market pe-
netration is to settle several characteristics of the technology and the
market in which it is to compete Jeffrey et al. (2013).
Similar studies investigated the correlations between the life-cycle
for a material and how energy technologies utilize specific materials as
they transition between the key stages of market diffusion (Connelly
and Sekhar, 2012). Additional characteristics include the ability to in-
tegrate or challenge market behavioral characteristics such as lock-in,
innovation surprises, address other multi-actor (agent) network inter-
actions at the individual and organizational levels and bounded ra-
tionality in the face of making technology adoption decisions
(Cunningham and van der Lei, 2009; Ford and Sterman, 1998; Gazheli
et al., 2015; Geels, 2002; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2011; Potts
et al., 2008; Rochecouste et al., 2015; Sierzchula et al., 2014; Winkler
et al., 2015).
4.1. Access to market base
In order for a technology to be successful in a given market setting,
the technology must have access to the market base and its respective
applications. There are instances, however, that must be acknowledged
where visionary businesses develop, in some respects, their own mar-
kets through superior utility to actors in the marketplace. A good dis-
cussion on the limits of theories and additional factors to consider in
modeling market diffusion can be found in Sarin and Mohr (2008). The
research presented here focuses on energy technologies that often must
compete in century-old markets that while evolving, may have more
constraints on the speed of market diffusion in many instances. For
example, relatively expensive and capital-intensive electricity technol-
ogies that reduce CO2 emissions such as coal-fired power plants with
CO2 capture and storage, new photovoltaic installations in areas
without the supporting industry and infrastructure, and ultra-
supercritical coal technologies may produce less environmental emis-
sions, but may be unattainable to regions with limited funds to support
existing or new energy infrastructure.
The market's rules also may inhibit or promote access to broader
technologies. In the U.S. natural gas industry, a substantial shift to-
wards more open market access occurred in the 1980s (De Vany and
Walls, 1994). Additionally, technological lock-in due to large infra-
structure requirements may also inhibit new technology from entering
the marketplace (van der Vooren et al., 2012).
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
4.2. Security of financial capital
As energy, and most other technologies mature through the TRL
spectrum, it is paramount that demonstration cases prove their viability
and showcase their expected performance to attract the attention of
those institutions that finance and regulate power plants (Rubin, 2012;
Rubin et al., 2012). Similarly, larger policy-driven approaches also re-
quire energy technologies to pass a set of performance criteria to attract
and retain industrial partners working within a regulatory framework
to support new and innovative energy technologies. For example, po-
licies in select European countries may become valuable by reducing
the administrative process to install new wind technologies. Alter-
natively, in the U.S., similarly attractive policy measures may focus on
improving the regulations for grid access and on the income per kWh
based on total production (Alic et al., 2003). RD&D funding, market
diffusion and institutional learning however are all required in differing
amounts within select market environments given regional and
country-specific requirements (Luthi and Prassler, 2011; Nemet, 2012;
Winskel et al., 2014). Additionally, policies and regulations that en-
hance or curtail the ability to finance or outright purchase installations
of photovoltaics, for example, will drive the scale at which these
technologies may be installed (Klise et al., 2013).
4.3. Manufacturability & market cost competitive
The ability of the existing industry to manufacture a technology will
affect how quickly the industry's supply chain can meet potential de-
mand. Without sufficient manufacturing capability in the face of strong
demand, a shortage may develop that could drive prices up in the
marketplace. However, if an industry (or single firm) can increase
production within a timeframe commensurate with the growth in
market demand then the technology may be able to meet demand. This
may then secure a more positive influence on the technology's inertia
from the consumer's perspective to address their given quantity de-
manded at a point in time. For example, meeting manufacturability
deadlines for select defense systems may take precedence over low costs
in the short run (GAO, 2002). In the long run, the ability of a firm or
industry to increase manufacturing capacity to a level required to meet
market demand will help stabilize the technology's cost envelope and
offer a competitive advantage in the marketplace relative to competing
technologies offering the same (or similar) service. To this end, new or
competing energy technologies have a higher likelihood of adoption if
they have a cost (or other value (e.g., a security or sustainability pre-
mium)) to those technologies currently in the marketplace.
4.4. Consumer utility
Understanding the most valuable timeline for the technology
adopters is the key component to its value or utility. The consumer may
like to understand how this new technology or innovation will reduce
costs or increase their overall welfare. The standard expected utility
model specifies a discount rate to account for various actors' time
preferences that ultimately affect whether to invest in each service,
activity or action in the present or future (Frederick et al., 2002). Re-
cent research highlights a few challenges to the notion of a single (or
fully informed) discount rate by actors within market systems, and
thereby challenge the notion of adopting new technologies based on
standard market theory. Gowdy et al. (2013), for example, offer several
insights into differences across decisions that have a long-term time
horizon involved such as climate change, biodiversity preservation, and
choice of energy technologies such as select nuclear power.
The purpose of the TRM framework is to highlight the tiered nature
of technology adoption such that technology, regulatory and market
readiness levels that require assumptions about exogenous parameters
to drive the technology throughout these tiers. This, by implication,
includes the debate on whether to include a specific discount rate in the
P.H. Kobos et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

Technology Readiness Level (1-9) Regulatory Readiness Level (1-5) Market Readiness (1-5) Level
‘Can we build it?’ ‘Can we accept it?’ ‘Will they adopt it?’
Fig. 1. Technical Readiness Level (TRL), Market Readiness Level (MRL) and Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL).

threshold ratio for

progress for a specific
technology
-
money invested +
in R&D

+
R&D activities for ratio of actual to expectd
development of a progress for a specific
technology technology
+ -

+ progress on TRL for a

specific technology expected progress for a
specific technology
(appraisal optimism)

Fig. 2. Technical Readiness Level (TRL) causal loop diagram illustrating the core driving force (USD invested in R&D).

market adopter's time preference (e.g., value the good, service or action
now or in the long-term future) and by assuming a given rate, this
implies the time preference and utility model chosen that underpins the
latter components of the market readiness level (e.g., invest in manu-
facturing the technology now, in the future or never). While the full
extent of the debate is beyond the scope of this work, it is truly im-
portant to highlight when using the TRM framework in combination
with standard (or alternative) utility theory whether to include a dis-
count rate, understand what that implies for the market adopter's time
preference, and whether such a rate is inclusive enough for the utility
preferences across generations.
5. Combining technology, regulatory and market readiness levels
To illustrate the new TRM framework a model framework was de-
veloped using system dynamics (SD).3 By developing causal loop dia-
grams, along with a technology-agnostic working model, the frame-
work presents the relative strength of select drivers underlying the
3
The model framework developed in such a manner that it can be used in
other modeling efforts where appropriate such as those described in Pickard
et al., 2009; Malczynski, 2011; Kobos et al., 2003, 2006, 2011, 2013, 2014.

216
P.H. Kobos et al.
development of
regulations for a
+ technology
regulatory support
of a technology
- +
ratio in expected
progress on RRL for a
technology
threshold ratio for RRL
progress for a specific
technology
Fig. 3. Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL) causal loop diagram illustrating the core driving force (traction unit).
proposed TRM framework. Using the system dynamics platform, among
others, allows future modelers the ability to adopt the core components
and overarching theoretical framework into their technology analyses.
The core components can then be integrated into other Integrated As-
sessment Models (IAMs) regardless of the technology under con-
sideration, and to fully account for dynamic time delays seen in the
development, regulation and market adoption of new technologies.
Each of the three readiness levels (technology, regulatory and
market) has their own specific metrics to measure progress. First, the
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) uses funding levels to drive progress
from lower to higher levels of the TRL. Conceptually, this represents
funding that helps a technology progress from the idea stage all the way
to an operational example. Second, the Regulatory Readiness Level
(RRL) uses a political traction unit to drive the technology from the
lowest levels of regulatory acceptance (e.g., at the beginning stages in
the regulatory process overseeing the application or working para-
meters of the technology). This is a transparent method to try and
quantify the time delays that may be present in the regulatory process
as applied to the technology's application. Third, the Market Readiness
Level (MRL) uses investment units to quantify the ability of an industry
to scale up production and maintain profitability to meet market de-
mand.
More formally, the readiness levels are represented for the tech-
nology, regulatory and market via the relationship,
l, n
ρi = ∬ (αi,j − βi,j ) dt
1, 1 (1)
where ρi is the readiness level type i where i = TRL, RRL, MRL, αi,j is the
rate of increase for i where j represents the readiness level type-specific
driving units for the TRL, RRL and MRL of United States Dollars (USD)
per year, political traction unit per year, and investment unit per year,
respectively. Additionally, βi,j represents the rate of decrease for i given
j, l represents the number of levels, and n represents the number of
technologies in the TRM framework at any given time. The latter
variable n allows one to compare numerous technologies to one another
at the same time within the TRM framework. This allows for a side-by-
side comparison of technologies vying for a similar market space, which
ones may achieve market acceptance before the others, or by a given
time that the technology may address the aspects of a policy goal (e.g.,
to have technology be ‘market ready’ by a given year).
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
+
progress on RRL
for a technology
-
+ expected progress on RRL
for a technology (appraisal
optimism)
Fig. 1 illustrates the underlying theoretical framework presented in
Eq. (1) of the new TRM framework using the familiar pyramid design of
the TRL framework. The technology readiness level, for example, is
based on standard methods utilized in the research community to assess
the maturity of a given technology. The regulatory and market readi-
ness levels adopt this format to help quantify the factors that influence
whether or not a given technology, even at the highest and most mature
stage of the TRL, will have the political (regulatory) capital and ap-
propriate market acceptance criteria available to become a commercial
and/or widely applicable success.
5.1. Readiness level modeling description
Moving the TRM framework from the theoretical to operational
stage in a SD model, the framework development begins with a causal
loop diagram (CLD) to set the direction of the influential drivers for
each readiness level. Similar approaches have been used for technology
adoption and policy analysis by Stepp et al. (2009) and Kumar et al.
(2010). The TRM framework uses a standard logistic growth curve or ‘S-
shaped’ curve as one of the bases of the underlying driving equations.
However, the parameters dictating the amplitude, duration and initial
starting value are all derived from the endogenously-driven readiness
level. Each level within the readiness levels (TRL, RRL, MRL) represents
a type of stock account. To move from one level to the next, a core
driver for each readiness level must flow into these stocks. The flow for
the TRL, RRL and MRL is USD per year, political traction units per year,
and market units per year, respectively.
The TRM framework differs from the Bass Diffusion Model, for
context to other classic growth model formulations, by using the re-
duction to the logistic equation when the coefficient of innovation
parameter p is zero.4 The TRM framework contributes a set of guiding
parameters to the underlying logistic equation through the three
readiness levels in the numerator of the logistic growth curve.
Eq. (2) illustrates the base logistic modifiers as well as the readiness
level maximum (Mi).
4 f (t )
The Bass Diffusion Model: 1 − F (t ) = p + qF (t ) Where p represents the
coefficient of innovation, q the coefficient of imitation, F(t) the probability of
adoption by time t, and f(t) the probability density function (Bass, 1969; Kijek
and Kijek, 2010).
217
P.H. Kobos et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

threshold ratio for MRL

progress for a specific
technology incentives
+

-
marketing activities for + +
development of a potential demand
technology in industry
+
gap in target to
potential industry target policy
- demand + demand

+
progress on MRL
for a technology
ratio of actual to expected
progress on potential industry -
demand for a technology
expected progress for obtaining
+ industry demand for a
technology (appraisal optimism)

Fig. 4. Market Readiness Level (MRL) causal loop diagram illustrating the core driving force (investment unit).

resource limit for

technology
development securing efforts toward
+
money invested marketing activities for
regulatory support of a
in R&D technology development of a
+ technology
+

+ - -
resources remaining for - gap in readiness
technology development level
- +
+ + +
technology progress
towards required
rediness level actual readiness
+ level achieved

+ desired
readiness level

Fig. 5. Applying the TRM combined analytical framework.

Ti,0 Mi
Ti = ⎧ ρi t = 1, if ρi t − 1 = 0 and γi, j, t > γi, j ⎫
Ti,0 + (Mi − Ti,0 ) e−ri ti (2) ρi =
⎨ ρi t = 0, if ρi t − 1 ≠ 0 and γi, j, t > γi, j ⎬ (3)
⎩ ⎭
where Tt is the amount of time at time t, T0is the initial amount (time at
where ρi represents the current readiness level, ρi,t represents the cur-
zero) and r is the rate of growth when T is very small compared to M. In
rent readiness level at a given time t in the analysis' run, γi,j represents
the base case, M = (9, 5, 5), r = 0.2. It is also important to note that the
the driving unit threshold for each readiness level i using the driving
TRL, RRL and MRL develop in series such that a technology must
unit j, and γi,j,t represents the current driving unit at time t.
progress through each readiness level (technology, regulatory and
The ratio of actual readiness level achieved to the ‘appraisal opti-
market) to achieve full market penetration in the base case.
mism’5 (expected) level is represented via the relationship,
The readiness level threshold and increase for a technology to
achieve within the TRL, RRL and MRL CLDs shown in Figs. 2, 3 and 4
are represented via the relationship,

5
Term ‘appraisal optimism’ adapted from Jeffrey et al., 2013.

218
P.H. Kobos et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

Fig. 6. Illustrating the TRM base case.

Note: readiness level spectra across the top, key dates and duration in the embedded tables, cumulative stocks of the key drivers for each readiness level below that,
and finally the annual amount of additional driving flows per readiness level at the bottom relative to the appraisal optimism level (e.g., desired level) of progress
across time.

ATi, n, t technology to move from one level to the next.6 As the technology's TRL
AOi, n, t (4) increases from, 1 to 2 for example, if it meets the ‘ratio of actual to
expected progress for a specific technology’ which should decrease as
where ATi, n, t represents the actual level of the technology within the
the technology's research and is deemed to be making progress relative
TRL, RRL or MRL, AOi, n, t represents the appraisal optimism level or
to what was expected (e.g., enough breakthroughs to increase perfor-
expected level the technology should achieve within the TRL, RRL or
mance, decrease cost, etc.) then this is a reinforcing loop fed by the
MRL. Similarly, the decision to stop technology development within the
‘expected progress for a specific technology (appraisal optimism)’. An
TRM framework is driven by the relationship as,
increase in this ratio, representing good technological progress, leads to
⎧ 1, if
ATi, n, t
< desired ratioi, n, t ⎫ potentially more funding by securing additional ‘money invested in R&
AOi, n, t
stop technology development = D’ if the progress exceeds the threshold given by investors to support
⎨ 0, if ATi, n, t
≥ desired rat ioi, n, t ⎬ the R&D effort via the ‘threshold ratio for progress for a specific tech-
⎩ AOi, n, t
⎭ (5)
nology’. Ultimately, this positive feedback loop provides an increasing
Fig. 2 illustrates the CLD for the TRL. (or stable) funding source to raise the TRL from 1 to the terminal level
The TRL CLD begins with TRL level 1, the earliest stage of a tech-
nology's development. As resources such as R&D and time are devoted
to the technology (R&D activities for development of a technology) an 6
Note in each of the CLDs, that when an increase in a given variable leads to
increase in this variable will increase the progress on TRL for a specific an increase in the subsequent variable, this is denoted by a plus (+) sign.
Similarly, if an increase in a given variable leads to a decrease in the subsequent
variable, this is denoted by a minus (−) sign.

219
P.H. Kobos et al.
Fig. 7. Demonstrating a 2 year versus a 10 year investor's preference for desired
TRL progress, resulting in stopped funding, research and TRL progress due to
actual technical progress underperforming desired technical progress.
of 9 (in operational use). Conversely, if sufficient progress is not made
on the technology's R&D from the perspective of the investors this cycle
becomes a negative feedback loop and the technology's funding is ter-
minated. Without additional funding, the technology's TRL level stops
progressing up the spectrum.
Fig. 3 illustrates the RRL CLD and its components. The RRL CLD uses
political traction units. These units are user defined, to represent the
political support necessary to allow a technology to enter the market-
place. Examples in the electricity sector might include certification of
the power generating technology's engineering, power purchase
agreement regulations already in place, environmental impact studies
or considerations, and many similar constraints. Increases in the U.S. in
shale gas production over the last several years represent a good ex-
ample to illustrate the regulatory hurdles that exist in some states (e.g.,
New York State's ban on hydraulic fracturing for natural gas) as com-
pared to regulations that are more favorable to the technology (e.g.,
Pennsylvania allows the use of these technologies) (Richardson et al.,
2013). Similarly, the rapid growth in the photovoltaics market in the
U.S. has been due to a number of factors, including a favorable reg-
ulatory environment employing tax credits and subsidies (Klise et al.,
2013). For perspective, from 2000 to 2013, the total installations of PV
megawatts (MW) in the U.S. grew from 4 to 4751 MW due to these
regulatory factors, as well as a steep decline in system prices due to a
robust global supply (Kann et al., 2014).
220
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
The CLD for the MRL, shown in Fig. 4, differs slightly from the TRL
and RRL. The MRL includes an additional feedback loop to include the
potential for demand in the industry to be influenced by the desire
(driven also by market incentives such as profits or regulatory decree)
of the technology consumers to see a sufficient supply in the market to
meet their demand.
Fig. 5 provides a system boundary causal loop diagram for the TRM
framework. It illustrates the dynamic loops that describe the process
where by completing a final product corresponds to achieving the
terminal readiness levels. This is achieved by meeting the ‘desired
readiness level’ in each of the readiness levels. A key component and
constraint of the CLD is the ‘resource limit for technology development’
that incorporates the drivers for each of the three readiness levels, as
well as the notion of implied time limit to achieve an ultimate ‘desired
readiness level’. The resource limit is often correlated to the difficulty of
achieving each of the readiness levels. For example, introducing a ret-
rofit technology within the existing energy infrastructure such as CCS or
more natural gas-based systems may be easier than introducing entirely
new power systems at scales unseen in the existing infrastructure. The
degree of difficulty could be embedded within the existing regulations,
standards or perceptions of the technologies by regulators. Ultimately,
these factors are trying to minimize the ‘gap in readiness level’ reflected
by the difference between the ‘actual readiness level achieved’ across
the three readiness levels and the ‘desired readiness level’.
5.2. Applying the TRM framework
A system dynamics model was developed in Powersim Studio® to
illustrate the TRM framework. Employing an illustrative, hypothetical
technology, the model develops the Technology Readiness Level,
Regulatory Readiness Level, and Market Readiness Level based on
parameter inputs including funding ($US), political units, and market
units as the drivers, respectively. Fig. 6 illustrates the base case of the
TRM model.
This case develops a hypothetical technology that receives R&D
investments over time to achieve a TRL level of 9 within 9.5 years. The
‘TRL Progress’ graph within Fig. 6 illustrates the flow of support over
time. The ‘R&D Investments’ represents the stock (cumulative level) of
funding. The ‘appraisal optimism’ within the ‘TRL Progress’ graph il-
lustrates that given the base case assumption (technical progress out-
grows the appraisal optimism within the designated period of time) the
technology continues to receive funding and eventually achieves a TRL
of 9. Similarly, the regulatory support for the technology receives po-
litical units as the driving force to achieve ‘traction’ in the regulatory
process, and the market readiness level achieves a high enough MRL by
the desired period of time to continue market investment driven by
demand. Under the base case setting, the TRM model framework runs
each of the three readiness levels in series as illustrated in Fig. 6 by the
sequential dates of completion dates aligning with the start dates.
Fig. 7 illustrates a more restrictive set of conditions under which the
TRL is expected to perform faster due to an Investor's assessment sce-
nario. This simulates a more demanding investor that begins evaluating
the progress of the research after the first two years. The investor also
expects progress to be more expeditious in the initial years of the
project as shown by using the Appraisal Optimism inflection point at a
more aggressive level of 2 years after research begins rather than 10.
The project therefore fails under these more demanding conditions, and
ends once the R&D of the TRL is in the third tier representing, ‘Research
and Development Initiated’ just beyond the basic principles and tech-
nology concept stages 1 and 2, respectively.
Similarly, regulatory and market readiness level parameters can be
adjusted to reflect new developments in the progress of a technology
from the laboratory to the applied marketplace. Within the levels of the
TRL, RRL and MRL framework, there may be more or different inter-
pretations as to the correct labels and conditions necessary to move a
given technology across these readiness levels.
P.H. Kobos et al.
Fig. 8. Accelerated political support scenario, reduces completion of RRL spectrum from 6.75 to 1.25 years.
Fig. 8 illustrates an accelerated timeline for moving a technology
through the RRL spectrum. This was done by boosting political support
from 10 political units per year to 50 thereby reducing the time it takes
for a technology to progress through the RRLs from 7 to 1.5 years.
This represents a scenario where the technology has achieved a TRL
of 9, and has broad and rapid support/navigation of the regulatory
process to reach its intended market.
Fig. 9 illustrates a scenario for the MRL representing a market
adoption goal-oriented target date. This allows one to back calculate
the required annual investment units to achieve a MRL of 5 where the
market adoption has been deemed successful. Under this aggressive
market adoption scenario, up to 40 investment units per year are re-
quired to meet the actual completion date of 2025 rather than 2030.
This represents completing the MRL spectrum in only 1.25 years rather
than 5 years.
This represents a case where a technology has regulatory support
and a viable product to sell in the market. For a multitude of reasons,
perhaps maintaining a first mover advantage over an incoming com-
petitor to the same market, a company may choose to set very ag-
gressive market penetration goals from their perspective to capture the
majority of the consumer's market adoption. Table 2 gives an overview
of the assumptions underlying the scenarios presented in Figs. 6–9.
221
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
6. Discussion
Balancing technological, economic and energy demand growth in
the coming decades will depend greatly on the policy goals under de-
velopment, or set to take effect. Demand side management (e.g., tech-
nology efficiency and consumer behavior), early adopter credits, fi-
nancial underwriting and similar catalytic measures may help with both
‘technology pull’ and ‘demand push’ strategies to introduce and in-
crease the share of less resource-intensive electricity generating tech-
nologies. Examples in the energy sector were discussed to highlight
tradeoffs in technology development and the speed of getting to market
through the technical, regulatory and market rate limiting steps. Some
of these examples include renewable energy sources and others such as
natural gas turbines that may help alleviate demand pressures on
electricity supplies in the face of limited fuels (e.g., low-sulfur and other
coal technologies, constraints on nuclear fuel in the short run, regional
constraints on natural gas supplies) given SOx, NOx, CO2 management
and energy security goals (Banales-Lopez and Norberg-Bohm, 2002). It
is essential to recognize that newer energy technologies may have
vastly different energy service characteristics that reflect ‘value’ to the
consumer. Trading one energy insecurity for another and increasing
costs (and likely price) could, in some instances, make renewables for
example, a less attractive, secure or economically-efficient solutions to
P.H. Kobos et al.
Fig. 9. Market Readiness Level growth required to meet earlier market adoption goal by 2027 rather than 2030 is 40 versus 10 investment units per year.
improving upon the cleanliness of other fuels and power options that
provide energy services from one perspective. Alternatively, renewable
energy can include additional ‘value’ such as sustainability, lower
emissions potential and fuel diversity that traditional levelized cost of
energy metrics may not account for, highlighting the need to consider
these types of values.
One of the most important factors affecting energy transition fore-
casting is the timeline of interest. Changes over the short term
(< 10 years) may be politically-tractable in some situations, whereas
the technical or ramp-up capability of an industry during this timeline
may be challenging. Over the medium term (10–30 years), many
changes can and have been implemented when faced with a substantial
environmental and technical challenge (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons (CFC)
limitations; mitigation of acid rain constituents from the power sector).
Over the long term (> 30–50+ years), much of the world's current
infrastructure, the state of and distribution of resources, and societal
preferences may change so much that forecasts once deemed plausible
become less relevant.
7. Concluding modeling implications
This analysis presents a framework to quantify the time delays ex-
plicitly due to regulatory readiness level and market readiness level
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
perspectives similar in spirit to the more commonly used technology
readiness levels. The appealing aspect of this TRL, RRL and MRL fra-
mework and subsequent illustrative TRM model framework is its wide
applicability to not only energy systems as they relate to a transitioning
energy portfolio in the electricity sector, but to many types of tech-
nologies in other sectors and applications. The research community that
develops the IAMs and other forecasting efforts may benefit from this
approach. The key benefits include integrating how ‘timing is every-
thing’ as to whether a technology will be ready for the marketplace in
time to meet an overarching policy goal (e.g., technology involving CO2
and other greenhouse gas emissions management must be ready and
deployed in a timely manner if certain levels of atmospheric greenhouse
gases will stabilize by a policy's target date). The TRM framework has
been developed and operationalized using a system dynamics model.
Future research could apply it to specific energy technologies as one
area that may benefit from the insights provided by the technology,
regulatory and market readiness level time delays seen across the
technological forecasting literature. The implications of the re-
presentative scenarios shown here include how to target the appro-
priate level of R&D (or RD&D), develop the support required to address
the regulatory process governing the technology moving into the
market, and engage the desired market adoption factors required to
achieve the desired level of market penetration.
P.H. Kobos et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225

Table 2
TRL base case, investor assessment, accelerated regulatory readiness support and accelerated market adoption scenario parameters.
Parameter TRL parameter RRL parameter MRL parameter Description
value value value

Start date for technology development 1/1/2010 1/1/2010 1/1/2010 Start date for TRL
(date)
Annual driver dedicated (million $US, 10 10 (50b) 10 (40c) Constant annual funding for each TRL1–TRL9, political units (public
political units, market units) favor) for RRL1–RRL5, market units (annual demand) for
MRL1–MRL5.
Annual driver reductions/decay 0 50% over 4 years 0 Million USD/year (TRL)
Political units/year (RRL)
Investment unit/year (MRL)
Appraisal optimism Yes Yes Yes Use appraisal optimism within the formulas, or maintain no
expectations on the speed progress through the readiness levels
Stop ratio threshold for each readiness TRL1 (0.3), RRL1 (0.1), MRL1 (0.1), Ratio of actual performance/desired performance
level TRL2 (0.3), RRL2 (0.2), MRL2 (0.2),
TRL3 (0.4), RRL3 (0.3), MRL3 (0.3),
TRL4 (0.8), RRL4 (0.4), MRL4 (0.4),
TRL5 (0.8), RRL5 (0.5) MRL5 (0.5)
TRL6 (0.8),
TRL7 (0.8),
TRL8 (0.8),
TRL9 (0.8)
Year of Logistic ‘S-curve’ inflection point 2020 2020 2020 Year of Inflection point
Logistic ‘S-curve’ initiation value & slope 2.0, 0.2 2.0, 0.2 2.0, 0.2 Logistic tail (lower number is a faster start, faster (higher) slope)
Initiation to Investor Assessing TRL ratio 2.25 (2.0a) 2.25 2.25 Years

a
Investor Assessment Scenario, demanding faster TRL progress in time beginning at year 2 rather than 2.25.
b
Accelerated regulatory readiness support (broader public favor) for the technology rises from 10 to 50 political units/year.
c
Accelerated market adoption scenario, requires investment units per year to rise from 10 to 40 to meet a more aggressive completion date for the MRL from the
year 2030 to 2027.

These results can be very case-specific and could benefit from an
integrated uncertainty analysis applied throughout the framework on
the probability of meeting specific readiness levels within a given
timeframe. Generally, the TRM framework represents a new step to-
wards quantifying regulatory and market factors that could help pro-
vide a new approach for technological forecasting and policy assess-
ment efforts.
Acknowledgements
This work was sponsored by the Laboratory Directed Research and
Development program at Sandia National Laboratories. The views ex-
pressed in the article do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.
Department of Energy or the United States Government. Sandia
National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and oper-
ated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC.,
a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under
contract DE-NA-0003525.
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Peter H. Kobos is the Manager of the Water Power Technologies department at Sandia
National Laboratories. His past work included modeling technology costs, market diffu-
sion and interactions in addressing CO2 sequestration systems, energy and water systems,
renewable and transportation energy systems, hydrogen storage and country-specific
integrated assessment modeling. He holds a B.S. in Biology from Hobart College and M.S.
and Ph.D. degrees in Economics and Ecological Economics from Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, respectively.
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 211–225
Leonard A. Malczynski was a systems analyst (retired) in the Policy and Decision
Analytics Department at Sandia National Laboratories. His work generally addressed the
system dynamics of complex problems including, energy and water systems, migration,
civilian nuclear fuel cycle, and transportation energy systems. He holds a B.S.F. in
Forestry from the University of Michigan, an M.S. in Agricultural Economics from Purdue
University, an M.B.A. and an M.S. in Economic Theory from the University of New
Mexico.
La Tonya N. Walker is a Systems Research Analyst in the Energy Water Systems
Integration department at Sandia National Laboratories. Her work focuses on infra-
structure analysis, natural gas systems, hydropower and technology adoption forecasting
using tools including system dynamics and optimization. She holds a B.S. in Civil
Engineering from Prairie View A&M University and a M.S. degree in Civil Engineering
from Purdue University.
David J. Borns was the manager (retired) of the Geotechnology and Engineering
Department at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He began his
career at Sandia in 1981. He holds an AB from Dartmouth College in Earth Science, a
M.Sc. in geology from University of Otago, New Zealand, and a Ph.D. in Earth and
Planetary Science from the University of Washington.
Geoffrey T. Klise is the Manager of the Wind Energy department at Sandia National
Laboratories. His past work included being the Solar PV Market Transformation Team
Lead, both overseeing and completing technical work in a portfolio of projects that use
engineering approaches to reduce the soft costs of solar PV, in coordination with the
SunShot Initiative. Mr. Klise has a B.S. in Environmental and Engineering Geology from
Western Washington University, and a Master of Water Resources from the University of
New Mexico.