LAKPUE DRUG v. MA. LOURDES BELGA, GR NO.
166379, 2005-10-20 Tropical terminated Belga on the following grounds: (1) Absence
Facts:
Petitioner Tropical Biological Phils., Inc. (Tropical), a subsidiary of
Lakpue Group of Companies, hired on March 1, 1995 respondent Ma.
Lourdes Belga (Belga) as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as
assistant cashier. On March 19, 2001, Belga brought her daughter to
the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of broncho-
pneumonia. On her way to the hospital, Belga dropped by the house
of Marylinda O. Vegafria, Technical Manager of Tropical, to hand over
the documents she worked on over the weekend and to give notice
of her emergency... leave.
While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains
and gave birth on the same day.
two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for
work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her
situation.
Tropical sent Belga another memorandum ordering her to report for
work and also informing her of the clarificatory conference scheduled
on April 2, 2001.
Belga requested that the conference be moved to April 4, 2001 as her
newborn was scheduled for check-up on April 2,... 2001. When Belga
attended the clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was
informed of her dismissal effective that day.
Grounds for dismissal by the Er.
without official leave for 16 days; (2) Dishonesty, for deliberately
concealing her pregnancy; (3) Insubordination, for her deliberate
refusal to heed and comply with the memoranda sent by the
Personnel Department on March 21 and 30, 2001 respectively.
Issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
Ruling:
the alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the situation
contemplated by the law. Her absence for 16 days was justified
considering that she had just delivered a child, which can hardly be
considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty; much less... does it
imply wrongful intent on the part of Belga. Tropical harps on the
alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument,
however, begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term
pregnancy. We agree with respondent's position that it can hardly
escape... notice how she grows bigger each day.
While there may be instances where the pregnancy may be
inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that
Belga's case is such.
The charge of disobedience for Belga's failure to comply with the
memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just cause for
termination, must be willful or intentional. Willfulness is
characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering
the employee's act... inconsistent with proper subordination.[11] In
the instant case, the memoranda were given to Belga two days after
she had given birth. It was thus physically impossible for Belga to
report for work and explain her a
The charge of disobedience for Belga's failure to comply with the
memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just cause for
termination, must be willful or intentional. Willfulness is
characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering
the employee's act... inconsistent with proper subordination.[11] In
the instant case, the memoranda were given to Belga two days after
she had given birth. It was thus physically impossible for Belga to
report for work and explain her absence, as ordered.
In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained
of must be "work-related" such as would show the employee
concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
More importantly, the loss... of trust and confidence must be based
on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his
employer. A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished... from an act done carelessly,... thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two
elements must concur: (1) the employees assailed conduct must
have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
In Lakpue Drug Inc. v. Belga, willfulness was described as
“characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude
rendering the employees act inconsistent with proper
subordination.” The fact that respondent refused to provide
overtime work despite his knowledge that there is a production
deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset
machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his
wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness.
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired
Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”,
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again
invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went
on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19,
1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a
probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150
days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage
a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in
the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally
dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her
status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as in bad faith
as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted
to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not be a
ground to terminate her services.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a
female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and
by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s
ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature
adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.”
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind
of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment
and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving
a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The
kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be
prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only
for order but also imperatively required.
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE
WESTGROVE, GR No. 187226, 2015-01-28
Facts:
petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW),
a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel,
engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant out of
wedlock... married the father of her child,... and was dismissed by
SSCW, in that order.
petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao...
advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In
response, the petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not
resign from her employment just because she got pregnant... without
the benefit of marriage.[
. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why
she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to
serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of a
Catholic school.
In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel,
maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two
consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered
a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which...
are grounds for the termination of employmen... petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal
Issues:
The validity of the petitioner's dismissal hinges on the determination
of whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic
educational institution is a cause for the termination of her
employment.
The
Ruling:
The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more,
is not enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful
or immoral.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital
sexual relations and, consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral
The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged
to be... disgraceful or immoral must be assessed... against the
prevailing norms of conduct.
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-
vis the... prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally
considers moral and respectable.
the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution.
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and
secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription
against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must
necessarily... refer to public and secular morality.
May an employer dismiss an employee on the ground that the latter
got pregnant out of wedlock? What if the employer is a strict Catholic
school that imposes strict religious regulations, will this alone
validate the dismissal made to the erring employee?
This situation has been raised many times before the Supreme Court,
including this 2015 case concerning a well known Catholic school for
girls.
In this case entitled Cheryll Leus vs St. Scholastica's College
Westgrove, Cheryll Santos Leus was hired by St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove (SSCW) as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay
Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate on May 2001.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child
out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy,
Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to
file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her
employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of
marriage.
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to
explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in
pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof,
which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an
employee of a Catholic school.
Cheryll replied stating that her pregnancy outside of wedlock does
not amount to serious misconduct. She thereafter requested a copy
of SSCW’s policy so that she can better respond to the charge against
her. SSCW did not a have these guidelines as the guidelines handbook
was currently pending of its promulgation. It instead stated that they
follow the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private School (1992
MRPS), specifically, Sec.94, which cites “disgraceful or immoral
conduct" as a ground for dismissal, in addition to the just causes for
termination of employment under Art.282, Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter in Quezon City decided in favor of SSCW, stating
that Cheryll being pregnant out of wedlock is considered “disgraceful
and immoral conduct” taking into account that she was employed in
a Catholic institution which expect its employees to live up to the
Catholic values it teaches to the students. The NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The question now raised before the Supreme Court is this – is
Cheryll’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to
terminate her employment?
The Ruling of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that Cheryll was illegally dismissed by her
employer. Her pregnancy out of wedlock does not constitute a valid
ground to terminate her employment.
Disgraceful conduct is viewed in two ways, the “public and secular
view” and “religious view”. Our laws concern the first view.
Disgraceful conduct per se will not amount to violation of the law –
the conduct must affect or poses a danger to the conditions of
society, for example, the sanctity of marriage, right to privacy and the
like.
The Court cited Estrada vs. Escritur in the said case, stating the
following relevant explanation;
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not
ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause
complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause
for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any
fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a
document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of
dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married
to a woman other than the mother, then there is a cause for
administrative sanction against either the father or the mother. In
such a case, the “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of having
extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity of
marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly,
judicial employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with
married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the
father of her child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be
held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she
gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.
Furthermore, there was no substantial evidence to prove that
Cheryll’s pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW
and its students. Mere allegation of such will not render a judgment
in favor of the one making the allegation. It is the burden of the
employer to prove by substantial evidence that the termination of
the employment of the employee was made and failure to discharge
that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore
illegal.
The Court ordered SSCW to reinstate Cheryll. But because this is not
possible anymore due to constrained relations with SSCW, the Court
ordered the employer to pay Cheryll separation pay, full backwages
and attorney’s fees.
The Supreme Court decided:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent, St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal
dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll
Santos Leus, the following:
(a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one
(1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six
(6) months considered as one (1) whole year from the time of her
dismissal up to the finality of this Decision;
(b) full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the
finality of this Decision; and
(c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of the finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED
to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary
awards.

The Facts of the Case.
In this case, Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter)
were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants
with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. After undergoing seminars required by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for deployment
overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial
flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after
working as Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became
Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin
Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma.
Jopette) on May 16, 1990; Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah)
and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and
Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they
were separated from service on various dates in 2006. Respondents
contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they
were pregnant.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves
and demand for their resignation on its “Unified Employment
Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the
Unified Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who
becomes pregnant is rendered void. It provides:
(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be
physically fit on board to provide various services required in normal
or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside her
role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and
since she will not be able to maintain the required medical fitness
while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this
shall render her employment contract as void and she will be
terminated due to lack of medical fitness.(Emphasis supplied)
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia
and its officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary,
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift
differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits,
illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there
was an illegal dismissal of the respondents?
The Supreme Court's Decision.
Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.
The initial issue here was whether or not the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner Saudia states that the Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction and that the law that should be applied in
the instant case is Saudi Arabia law. The Court stated that this is
incorrect. The Court has jurisdiction in this case.
The Court stated in the case;
Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts
require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the
need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for
Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non
conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation.
While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata
are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a
single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to
address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule,
thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a
ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest
possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
It further stated:
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to
divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the
application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to
supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant
contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
xxx
So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly
discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As argued by respondents,
Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight
attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious,
pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women.
Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis
of no other consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present
physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of
functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it
would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so
permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of
one’s employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of
gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of
functions. However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be
such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the
complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a
living.
Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi
law does not allow the termination of employment of women who
take maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and
practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine
tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact,
(albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy
and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents
themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In
their Comment, respondents write:
Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal
and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue
of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict
[sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female
worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave,
the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto
quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment
of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on
maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)
The Court then decided:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda
J. Betia is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines,
and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral
and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the
September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly,
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
( 1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the
respective dates in which each of the respondents were illegally
terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each
of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of this
Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being
counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in th~ amount of P200,000.00 per
respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of
6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award
from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This. case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed
computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner
Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ v. BRENT HOSPITAL, GR No. 187417,
2016-02-24
Facts:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital
and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension
from employment in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed
Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock,
and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries
her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and
Damages with prayer for Reinstatement
Issues:
WON IMPREGNATION OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK IS A GROUND FOR THE
TERMINATION OF [CADIZ'S] EMPLOYMENT
ITHE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
HELD TFIAT [CADIZ'S] IMPREGNATION OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK IS A
GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF [CADIZ'S]
EMPLOYMENT[14]IITHE [NLRC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISMISSAL OF [CADIZ] ON THE
GROUND THAT THE INDEFINITE SUSPENSION WAS VALID AND
REQUIRED [CADIZ] TO FIRST ENTER INTO MARRIAGE BEFORE SHE
CAN BE ADMITTED BACK TO HER EMPLOYMENT[15]
Ruling:
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an
act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not religious.[40]
Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be
made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as
stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed because
they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not
conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian
institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral
unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards.
More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish
that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral.

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the
conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of immorality. Similar to Leus,
Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal
impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral
conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008.[42] Aside
from these, the labor tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's
"indiscretion" "scandalized the Brent community" is speculative, at
most, and there is no proof adduced by Brent to support such
sweeping conclusion. Even Brent admitted that it came to know of
Cadiz's "situation" only when her pregnancy became manifest.[43]
Brent also conceded that "[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl R. Cadiz were
just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, there was no
knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that they were engaged also in
premarital sex."[44] This only goes to show that Cadiz did not flaunt
her premarital relations with her boyfriend and it was not carried on
under scandalous or disgraceful circumstances. As declared in Leus,
"there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of
her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation
contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in the
Constitution."[45] The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does
not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality
absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and
regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these
regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the
employer to abide by the same.[46]Brent, likewise, cannot resort to
the MRPS because the Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital
sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a
child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS."[47]Marriage as a condition for
reinstatementThe doctrine of management prerogative gives an
employer the right to "regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work,
work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and
discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees."[48] In this case, Brent
imposed on Cadiz the condition that she subsequently contract
marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated. According
to Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging
illicit or common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of
marriage."[49]Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting
labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment. No less than
the 1987 Constitution mandates that the "State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all."[50] The Labor Code of the Philippines,
meanwhile, provides:Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall
be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married,
a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.With particular
regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of
Women[51] protects women against discrimination in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to
choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free
and full consent.[52]Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes
apparent that Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces Cadiz to
marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to
choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an
intangible and inalienable right.[53] While a marriage or no-marriage
qualification may be justified as a "bona fide occupational
qualification," Brent must prove two factors necessitating its
imposition, viz: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that
there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.[54] Brent has not shown the presence of neither of
these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said
condition.Given the foregoing, Cadiz, therefore, is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up
to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no
longer viable as an option, separation pay should be awarded as an
alternative and as a form of financial assistance.[55] In the
computation of separation pay, the Court stresses that it should not
go beyond the date an employee was deemed to have been actually
separated from employment, or beyond the date when
reinstatement was rendered impossible.[56] In this case, the records
do not show whether Cadiz already severed her employment with
Brent or whether she is gainfully employed elsewhere; thus, the
computation of separation pay shall be pegged based on the findings
that she was employed on August 16, 2002, on her own admission in
her complaint that she was dismissed on November 17, 2006, and
that she was earning a salary of P9,108.70 per month,[57] which shall
then be computed at a rate of one (1) month salary for every year of
service,[58] as follows: Monthly salary P9,108.70 multiplied by
number of years x in service (Aug 02 to Nov 06) 4 P36,434.80 The
Court also finds that Cadiz is only entitled to limited backwages.
Generally, the computation of backwages is reckoned from the date
of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement.[59] In case separation
pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement or reinstatement is waived by
the employee, backwages is computed from the time of dismissal
until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.[60]
Jurisprudence further clarified that the period for computing the
backwages during the period of appeal should end on the date that a
higher court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal
dismissal.[61] If applied in Cadiz's case, then the computation of
backwages should be from November 17, 2006, which was the time
of her illegal dismissal, until the date of promulgation of this decision.
Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized that the constitutional
policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress
or destroy management.[62] The Court notes that at the time of
Cadiz's indefinite suspension from employment, Leus was yet to be
decided by the Court. Moreover, Brent was acting in good faith and
on its honest belief that Cadiz's pregnancy out of wedlock constituted
immorality. Thus, fairness and equity dictate that the award of
backwages shall only be equivalent to one (1) year or P109,304.40,
computed as follows: Monthly salary P9,108.70 multiplied by one
year x x or 12 months 12 P109,304.40 Finally, with regard to
Cadiz's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, the Court finds the
same without merit. A finding of illegal dismissal, by itself, does not
establish bad faith to entitle an employee to moral damages.[63]
Absent clear and convincing evidence showing that Cadiz's dismissal
from Brent's employ had been carried out in an arbitrary, capricious
and malicious manner, moral and exemplary damages cannot be
awarded. The Court nevertheless grants the award of attorney's fees
in the amount often percent (10%) of the total monetary award,
Cadiz having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of her
grievances.[64]