LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS.

AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have
a cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and
law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.

3 .In orders that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.

4. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.
 In re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180)
October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180

Saturnino Bermudez, petitioner

FACTS:

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify
exactly who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution.
Said provision reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."

ISSUE:

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President
Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos
and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino?

HELD:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:
1. petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
2. petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
3. although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against
incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her
incumbency;
4. it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question -- that the
aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations,
and all eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land
under her government; and
5. the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective
control of the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law
a de jure government.

De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one that exercises
power as if legally constituted even though it is not formally recognized. De jure means "by
right" or something that is based on laws or actions of the State.
IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO [A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June
29, 1992]

Facts:

Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter
dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority
ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate
justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was
reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be
a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought
about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee
was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her
legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being
the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he
now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to
the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the
change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because
the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue:

Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that
would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held:

The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was
created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow
of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it
as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it
is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct
exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of
Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602

Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay
dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986
signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo
signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,
1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in
efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII,
sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.
Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has
been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon
to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
267 SCRA 402 February 1997 En Banc

FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in
September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to
the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein
petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner
matched the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check
worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the
manager’s check.
One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September
1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling
the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the
matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is
complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court
En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by
the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said
hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and
controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s
cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted
as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the
State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified
Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are
qualified, too.
JUAN DOMINO v. COMELEC, GR No. 134015, 1999-07-19
Facts:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for... one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where
he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the... cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct
No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks
the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of... the House of
Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not
yet become... final and executory.
The result of the election,... shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of
Sarangani.
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner
as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole
world, including the Commission on Elections.
Ruling:
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the
said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false...
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include,
among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings
as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within
its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency
requirement.