Finlay PHD Thesis The Risk Assessment of Slope

THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF SLOPES
by
Peter J. Finlay B.E. (Civil) Hons
A thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Volume 1
UNIVERSITY OF NSW
SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
1996
liNIVBR~ITY OP NBW ~0\rrH WAlA,
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TillS SHEBT IS TO BBOLUBD TO TIIB INSIDB PRONT COVBR OPTIIB TIIBSIS
Peter J. Finlay, PhD (UNSW)
The Risk Assessment of Slopes
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or
written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been
accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other
institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the
text.
Peter J. Finlay
The Risk Assessment of Slopes 11
ABSTRACT
A landslide risk assessment framework is developed for Hong Kong using

base landslide statistics of over 3,000 landslides spanning a 10 year period. A
method of assessing the probability of failure of an individual slope is developed
using these, and accounting for other factors. Statistical models are developed
for predicting runout distance onto near horizontal slopes from landslides in
man-modified slopes in Hong Kong, based on over 1,100 landslide records.
These can be utilised elsewhere in similar situations. The vulnerability of
persons, vehicles and buildings is analysed. A person is found to be very
vulnerable in the event of burial by landslide debris. Recommended
vulnerability values for persons in various landslide situations are given.
A study of rainfall and landsliding using five minute rainfall records for all
rainfall gauges in Hong Kong over a ten year period is presented. Analysis of
data gives threshold rainfall values causing landsliding. The results indicate
that rainfall of shorter duration than the traditional one day rainfall is
important, and antecedent rainfall also has some influence. Models predicting
the number of landslides near a specific rain gauge are developed, and extreme
rainfall recurrence intervals and distributions are examined. These are utilised
in the prediction of the number oflandslides caused by an extreme storm event
over a substantial area covered by a number of rain gauges. Thus the number of
landslides can be approximately predicted using only rainfall data.
A study of landslide risk perception for ten groups of respondents in
Australia and Hong Kong is presented. Data is gained on general views of
landsliding, cognitive structure of perception of selected hazards, and
quantitative results of acceptable landslide risk to life and property. Landsliding
is viewed as an involuntary hazard, with respondents requiring a very low
acceptable landslide risk of about 10- 5 to 10- 6 per annum.
The approaches used in assessing landslide probability utilising historic
data, linking rainfall and landsliding, assessing the vulnerability of persons and
property from landslide records, and surveying landslide risk perception and
acceptance are applicable in any area of the world where landslides are, or can
be, recorded.
The Risk Assessmen~ of Slopes iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is indebted to his supervisor, Professor Robin Fell, for his
invaluable guidance on research and technical matters, many stimulating
discussions, and provision of challenging research areas and issues. Mr Garry
Mostyn co-supervised the author's work with helpful reviews and comments.
The author was financially supported in his studies through a scholarship,
the Australian Postgraduate Award, awarded by the University of NSW. The
author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of Lillydale Shire,
Melbourne, Australia, in carrying out landslide risk perception and risk
assessment research in its jurisdiction. The Geotechnical Engineering Office of
the Hong Kong Government generously sponsored the landslide risk
assessment work in Hong Kong, and provided numerous valuable databases for
analysis.
The assistance of Mr P. K. Maguire in the extraction and manipulation of
the Hong Kong rainfall data is acknowledged. The Hong Kong CHASE data was
redigitised by Messrs P. K. Maguire, L. O'Keefe and P. Gwynne. The advice of Dr
Adams from the School of Psychology during the development of the landslide
risk perception questionnaire was helpful, as were the comments received from
Drs G. Syme and B. Bishop, psychologists with the CSIRO. Thanks goes also to
Mr P. Taylor for his proof-reading of the entire thesis.
Finally the author gratefully acknowledges the great support and healing
presence of his wife and friends, who encouraged him and enabled him to
complete his work in spite of the many resource, support, system and attitude
difficulties encountered.
The Risk Assessment of Slopes IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
LIST OF SYMBOLS ............................................. xxxv
Latin Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxv
Greek Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xl
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xli
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background to Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Objectives and Research Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.4 Layout of Thesis .. :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 General Risk Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Introduction to Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Overview of Definitions Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2.1 United Nations (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2.2 The Royal Society (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2.3 The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk
Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2.4 Canadian Risk Analysis Requirements and
Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2.5 The NSW Department of Planning Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper No 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2.6 Definitions Related to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2.7 Definitions Used by Scientists and Engineers . . . . . 12
2.1.2.8 Social Scientists Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3 Risk Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.3.2 Main Issues and Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.3.3 Risk Management in the Chemical and Nuclear
Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.3.4 The Value of Risk Management Systems.......... 18
2.1.3.5 Limitations and Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.4 Hazard Identification and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.4.1 Hazard Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.4.2 Assessment of Hazard Magnitude.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.4.3 Assessment of the Probability of Hazard
Occurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.5 Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1.5.1 Measures of Risk............................... 30
2.1.5.2 Vulnerability of Elements at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Risk Assessment of Slopes v
2.1.5.3 Methods of Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Risk Evaluation..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.6 33
Decision Making and Risk Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1. 7 33
2.1.7.1 Risk-Based Decision Making and Decision
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1.7.2 Risk Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.1.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Risk Management Systems in Geotechnical Engineering . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2.1 General Publications Dealing with Geotechnical Risk . . . . . 36
2.2.2 Risk Assessment of Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2.1 General Landslide Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2.3 Methods of Landslide Hazard Identification and
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.2.4 Landslide Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.2.5 Landslide Risk Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.3 Risk Assessment of Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.3.1 Definitions of Terms Used in Dam Risk Assessment 54
2.2.3.2 Dam Hazard Identification, Assessment and Risk
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2.4 Risk Assessment of Groundwater Pollution and Waste
Disposal Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSLIDE RISK MANAGEMENT . . 61

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 A Generic Landslide Risk Management Framework.............. 61
3.3 A Generic Framework for Landslide Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.1 Element at Risk (E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.2 Magnitude (M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.3 Hazard (If) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.4 Probability (P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.5 Vulnerability (V) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.6 Specific Risk (R8 ) • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . • . . 64
3.3. 7 Total Risk CRt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.8 Acceptable Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.8.1 Socially Acceptable Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.8.2 Individual Risk Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.8.3 Societal Risk Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 A Landslide Risk Assessment Framework for Hong Kong . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.1 Assessment of Risk from Individual Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.1.1 Assessment of Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.1.2 Assessment of Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.1.3 Assessment of Risk...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.2 Assessment of Risk for a Large Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The Risk Assessment of Slopes vi
4 DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS . . . . . . . 69

4.1 The Hong Kong Landslide Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.1 Background and Initial Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.2 Study Objectives and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.2.1 Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.2.2 Available Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.3 Methods of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 The Lillydale Shire (Melbourne) Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1.1 The Setting of Lillydale Shire, Melbourne . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1.2 Landslide Hazard Zoning in Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . 82
4.2.1.3 The Montrose Debris Flow Hazard Zoning Study . . 83
4.2.1.4 The Public Awareness Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.1.5 Development Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 Study Scope and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 Method of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3.1 Montrose Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3.2 Kalorama Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 The Study of Landslide Risk Perception in Australia and
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.3 Development of the Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.4 The Structure of the Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.4.1 Qualitative Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.4.2 Quantitative Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.5 The Lillydale Shire Risk Perception Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.5.1 History of the Study............................ 102
4.3.5.2 Description of the Groups of Respondents . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.6 Survey of Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department's Staff 104
4.3. 7 Method of Questionnaire Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3.8 Survey Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.9 Summary of Survey Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.10 Method of Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5 PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

5.1 Detailed Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.2 Probabilistic Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.1 Overview Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.2 Concepts in F!-obabilistic Slope Design . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.3 Factors Affecting the Probability of Failure . . . . . . . 115
5.1.2.4 Probabilistic Modelling of Soil Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.1.2.5 Methods of Probabilistic Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1.2.6 Determination of Parameters Required for Probabilistic
Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.1.3 Rainfall and the Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
The Risk Assessment of Slopes vii
5.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

5.2 Statistics of Landsliding in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2.1 The Total Number of Slopes in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2.2 Recorded Landsliding and Consequences of Landsliding in
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2.3 Annual Probabilities of Landsliding, and Casualties from
Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.3.1 Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.3.2 Probability of Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3 Review of Hong Kong Databases and Earlier Studies for Information
to Assist in the Assessment of Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3.1 Analysis of the CHASE Cut Slope Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3.1.2 Background of the CHASE Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3.1.3 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1.4 DA and Its Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1.5 1981-82 Analyses of the CHASE Data . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.3.1.6 The Author's DA Analyses of the CHASE Data . . . . 14 7
5.3.1. 7 DA Application Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.2 Effect of Geology and Geomorphology on
Landslide Incidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.2.1 Geology (Table 5.10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.2.2 Terrain Code (Table 5.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2.3 Slope Gradient (Table 5.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2.4 GLUM Classification (Table 5.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.3 Review of Major Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3.3.1 Discussion of Factors Causing Landslides . . . . . . . . . 173
5.3.3.2 Discussion of Runout, Damage and Loss of Life . . . 174
5.3.4 Stage 1 Reports and the Ranking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.3.5 Registered Slope Stage 1 Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.3.5.1 Review of Registered Slope Stage 1 Study
Outcomes and Slope Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.3.5.2 Review of Registered Slope Incidence, Consequence
Scores Versus Slope Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.3.6 Survey of GEO Senior Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.4 Proposed Method of Calculating the Probability of Failure for Hong
Kong Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.4.1 Method Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.4.2 Calculation of Individual Cut Slope Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.4.2.1 Estimation of F'c for Cut Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.4.2.2 Estimation of F"c for Cut Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.4.3 Example of Risk Calculation for a Cut Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4.4 Calculation of Individual Retaining Wall Factors . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4.4.1 Overall Considerations for Maximum and Minimum
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4.4.2 Estimation of F'w for Retaining Walls . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.4.4.3 Estimation of F"w for Retaining Walls... . . . . . . . . . 210
5.4.5 Example of Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall......... 210
5.4.6 Calculation of Individual Fill Slope Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
The Risk Assessment of Slopes viii
5.4.6.2 Estimation ofF( for fill slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

5.4.6.3 Estimation ofF'( for Fill Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.4. 7 Example of Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.5 Sub-Zoning of the Kalorama Area in Lillydale Shire Using
Geomorphology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1 Geomorphological Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.1 Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.2 Geomorphology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.3 Water Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.1.4 Sink Holes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.1.5 Slide Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.2 Historical Record of Landsliding... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.3 Description of Sub-Zoning Areas....................... 221
5.5.4 Calculation of Landslide Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
5.5.5 Comparison of Calculated Probabilities With the System
Proposed by Fell et al (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.6.1.1 Probability of Slope Failure in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . 233
5.6.1.2 Probability of Slope Failure in Kalorama,
Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
5.6.2 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
6 VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

6.1 Review of Literature on Landslide Movement and Runout . . . . . . . . 235
6.1.1 Types of Landslide Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
6.1.2 Landslide Movement Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.1.2.1 Single Body Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.1.2.2 Continuum Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.1.2.3 Discreet Element Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
6.1.2.4 Mud Flow and Debris Flow Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
6.1.2.5 Rock Avalanches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.1.2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.1.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.2 Analysis of the Hong Kong Landslide Database for Runout
Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7
6.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.2.2 Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7
6.2.3 Establishment of the Landslide Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.1 Data Sources and Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.2 Database Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.3 Classification into Different Situations or Scenarios 258
6.2.3.4 Accuracy of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4 Analyses and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4.1 Overview of Landslide Database Statistics . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4.2 F=HIL Versus V Plots for Hong Kong and
Comparison to Other Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6.2.4.5 Application of the Simple Sled Model to
Cut Slope Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
The Risk Assessment of Slopes ix
6.2.4.6
Runout Distance Prediction for Hong Kong Slopes
Using Multiple Regression Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
6.3 Vulnerability of Persons And Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.2 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.3 Assessment of Vulnerability of Persons from Fatal
Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.3.1 Well Documented Multiple Fatality Landslides . . . . 297
6.3.3.2 Single Fatality Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
6.3.3.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
6.3.3.4 Summary and Recommended Vulnerability Values
for Loss of Life in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.4 Vulnerability of Property In Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.4.1 Data Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.5 Vulnerability of Persons and Property in Lillydale Shire . . 320
6.4 Assessment of Temporal Probability vt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
6.4.1 Simple Risk Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
6.4.2 Consequential Risk Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
6.5.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.5.1.1 Literature Review.............................. 327
6.5.1.2 Runout Distance Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.5.1.3 Vulnerability of Persons and Property . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
6.5.1.4 Temporal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
7 CALCULATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
7.2 Risk Assessments of Areas in Melbourne's Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . . 332
7.2.1 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Montrose Study Area . . . 332
7.2.1.1 Loss of Property Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
7.2.1.2 Loss of Life Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
7.2.1.3 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Montrose . . . . 337
7.2.2 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Kalorama Study Area . . 340
7.2.2.1 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
7.2.2.2 Calculation of Total Risk Rt to Buildings . . . . . . . . . 341
7.2.2.3 Notes on Loss of Life Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
7.2.2.4 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Kalorama.... 343
7.3 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire Due To Landsliding . . 343
7.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
7.3.2 Loss of Real Estate Value Due to Specific Landslide
Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
7.3.2.1 Situation 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
7.3.2.2 Situation 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
7.3.2.3 Situation 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
7.3.2.4 Situation 4 347
7.3.2.5 Situation 5 348
7.3.2.6 Situation 6 349
The Risk Assessment of Slopes X
7 .3.3 General Effect of Landslide Zoning .................... . 350

7 .3.4 Effects of Landslide Debris Flow Zoning on House Values . 350
7.3.5 How Long the Loss of Real Estate Value Remains ....... . 350
7.3.6 How the Costs for Landslide Damage Repair Compare
With Ordinary Repair/Construction Costs .............. . 350
7.3.7 At What Level of Landslide Damage a House Would
Have To Be Condemned .............................. . 351
7 .3.8 Discussion .......................................... . 351
7.4 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong .................. . 352
7.4.1 Example of Calculation of Annual Fatality Risk for
a Cut Slope .......................................... . 352
7.4.1.1 Data ......................................... . 352
7.4.1.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Pre ............ . 353
7.4.1.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V for a Pedestrian ... . 354
7.4.1.4 Calculation of Annual Specific Risk ............. . 355
7.4.1.5 Discussion on Individual Risks to Life ........... . 355
7.4.1.6 Vulnerabilities ................................ . 355
7 .4.2 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall ...... . 357
7.4.2.1 Data ......................................... . 357
7.4.2.2 Calculation of failure probability Prw ............ . 357
7 .4.2.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V for a Pedestrian ... . 358
7.4.2.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life ........... . 358
7.4.2.5 Discussion on Individual Risk to Life and
Societal Risk ................................. . 359
7.4.2.6 Other Vulnerabilities .......................... . 359
7 .4.3 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope ........... . 359
7 .4.3.1 Data ......................................... . 359
7.4.3.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Prr ............ . 360
7.4.3.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V of a Pedestrian .... . 360
7.4.3.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life ........... . 361
7.4.3.5 Calculation of Societal Risk .................... . 361
7.4.3.6 Other Vulnerabilities .......................... . 361
7.4.4 Comments on Calculated Risks to Life ................. . 361
7.5 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................... . 362
7.5.1 Conclusions ......................................... . 362
7.5.1.1 Risk Assessments in Lillydale Shire ............. . 362
7.5.1.2 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire
Due To Landsliding ........................... . 364
7.5.1.3 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong .... . 365
7.5.2 Recommendations ................................... . 366
8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RAINFALL AND
LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
8.1 Detailed Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
8.1.1 Relationship of Rainfall to Pore Pressures and Groundwater
Flow................................................. 367
8.1.2 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . 369
8.1.2.1 Rainfall and Landslides in Natural Slopes . . . . . . . . 369
8.1.2.2 Rainfall and Landslides in Man-Modified Slopes . 376
8.1.2.3 Rainfall- Landslide Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xi
8.1.3 Statistical Analysis of Rainfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

8.1.3.1 Frequency Analysis of Extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
8.1.3.2 Fitting Frequency Curves to Extreme Rainfall Data 386
8.1.3.3 Appropriate Frequency Curves for Rainfall
Extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7
8.1.3.4 Regional or Spatial Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . 390
8.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
8.2 The Study of Rainfall and Landsliding in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . 391
8.2.1 Introduction and Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
8.2.2 Extraction of Raw Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
8.2.2.1 Rainfall Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
8.2.2.2 Landslide Incident Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
8.2.3 Definition of Study Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.3.1 Spatial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.3.2 Temporal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.4 Selection of Rainfall Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.5 Establishment of the Combined Rainfall/Landslide
Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.1 Establishment of Landslide Incident Database With
Date and Nearest Rain Gauge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.2 Calculation of Rainfall Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.3 Definition and Calculation of Rainfall Events . . . . . 401
8.2.5.4 The Combined Rainfall Event and Landslide Incident
Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
8.2. 7 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
8.2. 7.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding
(Component 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
8.2. 7.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain
Gauge
(Study Component 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
8.2. 7.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . . 417
8.2. 7.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding . . . . . 43 7
8.3.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
8.3.1.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding . . . . . . . . . 460
8.3.1.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain
Gauge ........................................ 461
8.3.1.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . . 461
8.3.1.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding . . . . . 462
9 ACCEPTABLE RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION

(THE EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
9.1 Detailed Literature Review.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
9.1.1 General Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
9.1.1.1 Institutional Approaches to Acceptable Risk . . . . . . 466
9.1.1.2 Institutional Guidelines to Acceptable Risk . . . . . . . 469
9.1.1.3 Comparisons of Risk Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 71
9.1.2 Historical Landslide Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xii
9.1.2.1 World-Wide Landslide Losses................... 481

9.1.2.2 Average Annual Landslide Death Rates . . . . . . . . . . 491
9.1.2.3 Major Landslide Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
9.1.2.4 Consequences of Landslide Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
9.1.3 Legal Implications of Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
9.1.3.1 Legal Implications of Landslide Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . 497
9.1.3.2 Legal Implications of Landslide Damages . . . . . . . . . 499
9.1.4 The Psychology of Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
9.1.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
9.1.4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
9.1.4.3 Risks People are Concerned About . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
9.1.4.4 Revealed and Expressed Acceptable Risks . . . . . . . . 504
9.1.4.5 Investigation of the Cognitive Structure of Risk
Perception Using Factor Analyses................ 509
9.1.4.6 Social and Cultural Approaches to Risk Perception 509
9.1.4.7 The Role of Accidents and Disasters in Amplifying Risk
Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
9.1.4.8 Acceptability of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
9.1.4.9 Risk Perception by Civil Engineers in Australia . . . 514
9.1.4.10 Risk Perception of Dam Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
9.1.5 Literature Review Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2 Survey of Landslide Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.1 Context of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.2 Description of Methods and Target Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.3 Results and Discussion of Frequency Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . 519
9.2.3.1 General Views of and Concerns with Landsliding.. 519
9.2.3.2 Views on Limits to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
9.2.3.3 Ranking of Landsliding Relative to Other Hazards 536
9.2.3.4 Cognitive Structure of Perception of Selected
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
9.2.3.5 Perception of Annual Loss of Life Frequency . . . . . . 54 7
9.2.3.6 Relative Ranking of Landslide Situations . . . . . . . . . 54 7
9.2.3. 7 Acceptable Probabilities of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . 553
9.2.3.8 Comments on Maximum Acceptable Probabilities of
Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
9.2.3.9 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
9.2.4 Results and Discussion of Factor Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
9.2.4.1 Overview of Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
9.3 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
9.3.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
9.3.1.1 General Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
9.3.1.3 Quantitative Results Regarding Landslide Risk
Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
9.3.1.4 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xiii
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE

RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1.1 Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1.1.2 Probability of Slope Failure in Kalorama, Lillydale Shire
596
10.1.2 Vulnerability to Landsliding.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1.3 Calculation of Landslide Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
10.1.3.1 Risk Assessments in Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
10.1.4 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landsliding
in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
10.1.5 Acceptable Risk and Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
10.2 Recommendations for Future Research......................... 604
11 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
APPENDIX SERIES A
DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS . . . . . 635
Appendix A1
Examples of Hong Kong Landslide Incident Reports and Cards . . . 636
AppendixA2
Hong Kong Landslide Risk Perception Survey Questionnaire 640
APPENDIX SERIES B
PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
Appendix B1
Listing of All Chase Numeric Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
Appendix B2
Listing of Discriminant Scores for DF D3 for All CHASE Slopes . . . 676
Appendix B3
Listing of Failed Registered Features in the Landslide Database 681
APPENDIX SERIES C
VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
Appendix C1
Definitions of Situations in the Landslide Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
Appendix C2
Regressional Goodness of Fit Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709
Appendix C3
Statistical Details of Runout Distance Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
Appendix C4
Cross-sections ofWell Documented Fatal Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . 723
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XIV
APPENDIX SERIES D
LANDSLIDE RISK CALCULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
Appendix Dl
Montrose Risk Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743
Appendix D2
Kalorama Risk Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750
APPENDIX SERIES E
RAINFALL AND LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 755
Appendix El
Listing of Landslide Incident Failure Dates and Nearest
Two Rain Gauge Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756
Appendix E2
Preliminary Exploratory Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773
Appendix E3
Flow Chart of Study Method Identifying Data Streams,
Analyses and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 784
Appendix E4
Rainfall Threshold Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
Appendix E5
Estimation of The Number of Features Per Each Rain Gauge
on Hong Kong Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Appendix E6
Prediction of Number of Landslides Per Rain Gauge
(1989-92 Period) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Appendix E7
Details of Statistical Models Predicting Rainfall Extremes . . . . . . . . 826
Appendix E8
Significant Storm Events in Hong Kong During 1984-93 . . . . . . . . 830
APPENDIX SERIES F
ACCEPTABLE RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION (THE
EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Appendix Fl
Raw Questionnaire Response Frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Appendix F2
Results of Correlation Cross-Tabulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Appendix F3
Results of Factor Analyses of Questionnaire Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
The Risk Assessment of Slopes ;.,:v
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 The components of a risk management system and the
corresponding quantities measured (based on Fell, 1994). 15
Table 2.2 Comparison of nine landslide classifications (after Hansen,
1984)................................................. 44
Table 2.3 The landslide classification of Varnes (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 4.1 Summary of Hong Kong landslide data sources (based on Finlay
and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.2 Summary of Hong Kong data sources, processing, analysis, and
contribution of results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Table 4.3 Geology, terrain and known landslides in Lillydale Shire COlds
and Wilson, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Table 4.4 Landslide "risk" zones for Lillydale Shire COlds and Wilson,
1992; Coffey Partners International, 1990a). . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 4.5 Summary of Montrose catchment debris flow "risk" ranking
factors and assessments (Moon et al, 1992; Coffey Partners
International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Table 4.6 Description of the 15 debris flow "risk" zones (Moon et al, 1992;
Coffey Partners 'International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Table 4.7 Assumed recurrence interval ranges for the four debris flow
hazard zones (Shire of Lillydale, 1993; Coffey Partners
International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table 4.8 Lillydale Shire data sources, processing, analysis, and
Table 4.9 Questionnaire sections and the corresponding
study objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 4.10 Summary of survey group information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table 5.1 Total number of constructed slopes in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . 135
Table 5.2 Landslides recorded by the GEO during 1984-93
for all slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Table 5.3 Landslides recorded by the GEO during 1984-93 for registered
slopes. The second column contains incidents greater than
50m 3 (major incidents). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 5.4 Landslide fatalities (injuries) recorded by the GEO during
1984-93. Zero entries are omitted for clarity. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 5.5 GEO records of facilities affected by sliding during
1984-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Table 5.6 Annual average probability of landsliding recorded by GEO for
1984-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Table 5.7 Statistics of landslide casualties (deaths and injuries) derived
from fire services records (before 1982) and GEO records (1982
and after). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Table 5.8 CHASE study - significant variables selected by DA of the
entire CHASE variable set (List 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
easily determined variable sub-set (List 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Table 5.10 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related to geology. 159
Table 5.11 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related
to terrain unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Table 5.12 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landslip related
to slope gradient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Table 5.13 The GLUM classification system
(Hansen and Styles, 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xvi
Table 5.14 Hong Kong- Occurrence of landslip related

to GLUM class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Table 5.15 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - factors causing
landsliding for cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
landsliding for fill slopes and retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
landsliding for natural slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table 5.18 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - runout, damage and
loss of life from cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
loss of life from fill slopes and retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . 171
loss of life from natural slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Table 5.21 Summary of Hong Kong major case study flow distances and
slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Table 5.22 Hong Kong stage 1 report data 1985-88. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Table 5.23 Summary of Hong Kong stage 1 report outcomes 1985-88. 180
Table 5.24 Hong Kong stage 1 reports - number of no further actions (n)
correctly assessed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Table 5.25 Rank versus Hong Kong stage 1 report outcome. . . . . . . . . . 181
Table 5.26 Summary of Hong Kong cut slope and retaining wall incidents,
1989-1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Table 5.27 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register- summary of overall
status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Table 5.28 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register- breakdown of
outcomes following a Stage 1 no further action
recommendation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Table 5.29 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register- breakdown of
outcomes following a Stage 2 study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Table 5.30 Status of registered Hong Kong cut slopes in the database which
failed during 1992-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Table 5.31 GEO staff opinion - assessment of factors affecting the
probability of sliding for cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
probability of failure for retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
probability of failure for fill slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Table 5.34 Average annual probability of sliding Pain Hong Kong. . . . 191
Table 5.35 Multiplying factor Fe for evidence of instability and history of
instability in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Table 5.36 Listing of factors influencing Hong Kong cut slope failure
probabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Table 5.37 Values of F'c2 for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Table 5.38 Values of F~3 for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Table 5.39 Proportions of angles above slope for Hong Kong registered and
failed cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Table 5.40 Values of F~4 for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Table 5.41 Values of F'cs for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Table 5.42 Values of F"cl for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Table 5.43 F"c3 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Table 5.44 Listing of factors influencing Hong Kong retaining wall failure
probabilities (based on Table 5.32). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xvii
Table 5.45 Factors F'wl, F'w2 and F'ws for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Table 5.46 F'w3 factor for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Table 5.47 Slope angle above for Hong Kong retaining walls. . . . . . . . . 209
Table 5.49 F'w6 values for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Table 5.50 Listing of factors influencing Hong Kong fill slope failure
Table 5.51 F'fl, F(2 and Fj3 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Table 5.52 F(4 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Table 5.53 Values of F(s for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Table 5.54 F(6 values for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Table 5.55 Description of Kalorama study sub-zone areas. . . . . . . . . . . 224
Table 5.56 Details of the Kalorama geomorphological sub-zoning of the
high landslide hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Table 5.57 Probabilities of landsliding adopted for the Kalorama study
area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Table 5.58 Assessed probabilities of landsliding for the Kalorama area
under the system proposed by Fell et al (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Table 6.1 Suggested landslide velocity classes (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI,
1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Table 6.2 Suggested landslide velocity classes
(Dong and Wang, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Table 6.3 Comparative velocity profiles for rheological models of idealised
mass-movement materials subject to free-surface,
simple-shear gravity flow (Iverson, 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Table 6.4 Sample extract from the Hong Kong landslide database. . . 259
Table 6.5 S_um~ary of Hong Kong landslide database numbers by
situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Table 6.6 Distribution of Hong Kong landslide volumes V (m 3 ) for
different situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Table 6.7 Distribution of Hong Kong slope angles Al (degrees) for
Table 6.8 Distribution of depth of Hong Kong failures D (m) for different
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Table 6.9 Distribution of width of sliding WI (m) for different Hong Kong
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Table 6.10 Distribution of height of failure H (from head of scarp to toe
debris, in metres) for different Hong Kong situations. . . . . . 263
Table 6.11 Distribution ofrunout distance L (measured horizontally from
head of scarp to toe debris, in metres) for different Hong Kong
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Table 6.12 Distribution of coefficient of apparent friction F=H/L for
different Hong Kong situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Table 6.13 Failure type description and data sources for
F versus V plots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Table 6.14 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1. . . . . . . . . . 285
Table 6.15 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1C. . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.16 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1A. . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.17 Multiple linear regression results for Situations
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Table 6.18 List of independent variables passing the selection criteria of
R 2 >0.50 (R 2 >0.40 as an absolute limit). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xviii
Table 6.19 Equations for Hong Kong runout distance models. . . . . . . . 291
Table 6.20 Suggested first estimates for independent variables in equations
for Hong Kong runout distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Table 6.21 Range of predictive variables for Hong Kong runout distance
models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Table 6.22 Predicted debris profile values for Hl =lOrn, Al =60°. . . . . 293
Table 6.23 Locations of the head of the failure scarp for Hong Kong cut
slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Table 6.24 Well documented multiple fatality landslide incidents. 300
Table 6.25 Rockfalls injuring people in Hong Kong in open space. 306
Table 6.26 Rockfall onto building causing injuries in Hong Kong. 306
Table 6.27 Soil/rock debris causing injuries in open space
in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Table 6.28 Buildings on landslides in Hong Kong whose destruction
resulted in injuries or fatalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Table 6.29 Summary of Hong Kong vulnerability ranges, and recommended
values for death from landslide debris in similar situations. 308
Table 6.30 Summary of table numbers, Hong Kong landslide incident
classes by failure type and affected element(s). . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Table 6.31 Rock falls onto vehicles - Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Table 6.32 Soil/rock debris causing vehicle damage in open space - Hong
Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Table 6.33 Rock fall onto buildings in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Table 6.34 Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey residential buildings in
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Table 6.35 Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey non -residential
buildings in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Table 6.36 Soil/rock debris flowing onto multistorey residential buildings in
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Table 6.37 Soil/rock debris flowing onto multistorey non-residential
Table 6.38 Hong Kong buildings undermined by landslides. . . . . . . . . . 317
Table 6.39 Summary of building vulnerability to undermining by landslide
-Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Table 7.1 Montrose debris flow average building vulnerabilities Vz. . . 333
Table 7.2 Montrose debris flow average vulnerabilities of persons Vz. 334
Table 7.3 IRR values for risk reduction scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Table 7.4 Vulnerabilities of buildings in the Kalorama study area. . . . 342
Table 7.5 Loss of real estate value for situation 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
Table 7.7 Loss of real estate value for situation 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7
Table 7.11 General effect on real estate values due to landslide zoning. 350
Table 8.1 Values of the maximum hourly rainfall (in mm) at four locations
(based on 15 minute 20 year data) for various recurrence
intervals (extracted from Peart, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Table 8.2 Pearson's frequency curves (Elderton and Johnson, 1969). 385
Table 8.3 Gumbel's extreme frequency curves (based on Haan, 1977). 386
Table 8.4 Plotting positions (Haan, 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XIX
Table 8.5 Properties of Pearson frequency curves (Cornish, 1970). . . 389

Table 8.6 Example of the raw decompressed five minute rainfall data for
22 rain gauges, HO 1-H22, for the 1989-92 study period. . 393
Table 8.7 Percentage of rainfall data missing per gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Table 8.8 Example of landslide incident listing from
the annual report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Table 8.9 An example of a rainfall event at five minute intervals bounded
by at least fifteen minutes of zero rainfall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Table 8.10 An extract from the rainfall events database for gauge HOl. 402
Table 8.11 Summary of study components, stages, data sources, analyses
and results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
Table 8.12 Rainfall threshold sets 1, 2 and 3, based on percentiles of the
distributions of rainfall variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
Table 8.13 Trial point score values used in thresholds. Point score P3 was
obtained from a Simplex optimisation technique. . . . . . . . . . 407
Table 8.14 Trial combinations of rainfall threshold values required to be
exceeded in order for the threshold to be deemed
to be exceeded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Table 8.15 Result Set 1 - Results of Threshold Trials on Combined
Database 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Table 8.18 Recommended rainfall threshold values for Hong Kong.... 410
Table 8.19 Results for multiple linear regression analyses for models
through the origin for the 1984-93 study period. . . . . . . . . . 416
Table 8.20 Summary of regression curve fitting results to 1984-93 data
using H3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
Table 8.21 Base statistics of rainfall maxima values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Table 8.22 Base statistics of logarithms of rainfall maxima values. . . . 429
Table 8.23 Regression results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
Table 8.24 Predicted rainfall extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Table 8.25 Results of regression analyses of database SD2. . . . . . . . . . . 445
Table 8.26 Peak rainfall values recorded during the 4-5 November 1993
storm on Lantau Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Table 8.27 Predicted numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for a 1 in
100 year AEP event (Method 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
Table 8.28 Results for Method 2 stepwise linear regression models through
the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Table 8.29 Calculation of the number of landslides for individual rain
gauges using fixed variable values across the whole island. 452
Table 8.30 Calculation of landslides on Hong Kong Island from individual
rain gauge models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
Table 8.32 Calculated numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for 1 in
100 AEP and 4-5 November 1993 Lantau island
storm events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Table 9.1 Comparison of individual risk levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74
Table 9.2 Sources for Table 9.1................................... 476
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XX
Table 9.3 Various individual risks in NSW, Australia (New South Wales
Department of Planning, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77
Table 9.4 Individual risks (UK) expressed in terms of loss of life
expectancy. (The Royal Society, 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78
Table 9.5 Travel deaths per 10 9 km travelled in the United Kingdom
(The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78
Table 9.6 Death rates associated with medical procedures in the United
Kingdom per 10 6 cases (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . 479
Table 9.7 Accidental death rates attributed to sporting activities in the
UK and the USA (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Table 9.8 Death rates for various activities in the UK in terms of the FAR
(number of deaths per 108 hours of involvement) (The Royal
Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Table 9.9 Reduction of slope failures following the introduction of the
building grading code in Los Angeles, California (Schuster,
1994)................................................. 482
t;~~a8fs!~~~:.l.l~~~~l~~~ -~e.~t~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~...........

Table 9.10
491
Table 9.11 Summary of Deaths For Selected Developed Countries Due to
Landsliding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
Table 9.12 Major Landslide Disasters in the European Alps Since the 13th
Century (Schuster, 1995; Eisbacher and Clague, 1984). . . . 493
Table 9.13 Landslides in China that have killed at least 100 people (Li
Tianchi, 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
Table 9.14 Losses Due to Major Landslide Disasters in Japan, 1938-81
(Ministry of Construction (Japan) 1983; Schuster, 1995; Fuyita,
1985)................................................. 495
Table 9.15 Deaths in Japan from 1967 to 1982 due to floods and landslides.
(Ministry of Construction (Japan), 1983; Schuster and Fleming,
1986)................................................. 496
Table 9.16 Summary of landslide disaster consequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Table 9.17 Some negative characteristics of hazards influencing risk
perception (Otway and von Winterfeld, 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
Table 9.18 Derived Australian civil engineers' perception of tolerable risks
(from Ingles, 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Table 9.20 Relative ranking of risks from several selected hazards by the
various survey groups (section 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
Table 9.21 Comparison of hazard ranking and actual fatality rates for
Australian data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
Table 9.22 Cognitive factors for the "traffic accident while driving a car"
hazard (section 3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
Table 9.23 Cognitive factors for the "being involved in a landslide" hazard
(question 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Table 9.24 Cognitive factors for the "being involved in a petrochemical
plant accident" hazard (question 5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
Table 9.25 Perception of annual life loss frequencies due to an unspecified
hazard (section 6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Table 9.26 Relative ranking of landslide situations (question 7). . . . . . 552
Table 9.27 Multiplying factors for converting respondents' raw
probabilities to annual risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Table 9.28 Raw acceptable probabilities of landsliding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Table 9.29 Acceptable annual landslide risks for property damage. . . . 565
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxi
Table 9.30 Acceptable annual landslide risks for loss of life. . . . . . . . . . 566
Table 9.31 Summary of correlations between responses to sections 6, 8 and
9, and cognitive variables for the landslide hazard
(section 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Table 9.32 Demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
Table 9.33 Scale types and ranges for the demographic variables tested for
risk aversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
Table 9.34 The questionnaire income scales and the corresponding values
of these as percentages ofthe GDP per person. . . . . . . . . . . . 572
Table 9.35 Summary of correlations between responses to section 6 and
demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
Table 9.36 Summary of correlations between responses to sections 8, 9 (for
property damage) and demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
loss of life) and demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
Table 9.38 Percentage of data variance explained by two factors across all
survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
Table 9.39 Percentage of data variance explained by three factors across all
survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
Table 9.40 Fold-out questionnaire summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
Table Bl.l Listing of all numeric CHASE variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
Table B2.1 Listing of discriminant scores for DF D3 for
all CHASE slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
Table B3.1 Listing of failed registered features in the
landslide database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
Table Dl.l Montrose study area risk calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 744
Table D2.1 Kalorama study area risk calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
Table ELl Listing of reported landslide failure dates and nearest two rain
gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756
Table E2.1 List oflandslide incidents used in the author's preliminary
analyses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773
Table E2.2 Threshold values derived from 40 incidents with known dates,
times and nearest gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783
Table E4.1 Threshold Set 1
Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived from 40 incidents with
known dates, times and nearest gauges
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
Table E4.2 Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for all rainfall events having
an individual landslide incident reported on the event date
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
Table E4.3 Threshold Set 2.
Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for rainfall events of the
longest duration having only one landslide reported on that date
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
longest duration having more than one landslide reported on
that date (1984-93 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798
Table E4.5 Sources of Threshold Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799
Table E4.6 Trial rainfall values used in thresholds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799
Table E4.7 Example of rainfall events at gauge H17 on 7-10/5/1992 in the
combined database (CD). The bracketed values indicate events
which exceeded the specified threshold combination shown at
the top of the file. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXII
Table E4.8 Example of a trial threshold run file showing the selection
criteria, the output of dates and events, and the prediction
statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Table E4.9 Trial combinations of rainfall threshold values required to be
to be exceeded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Table E4.10 Trial point score values used in thresholds. Point score P3 was
Table E4.11 Result Set 1
Summary of results of threshold trials on Combined
Database 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Table E4.12 Result Set 2.
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Table E4.14 Threshold rainfall values (in mm) for events with more than one
failure on a particular date (1984-93 study period). . . . . . . 806
Table E4.15 Threshold rainfall values (in mm) for all events (1984-93 study
period). . .. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Table E5.1 Zones of development together with the estimated relative
density of features in each. The adjusted factors were used in
the study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Table E5.2 GEO estimates of the number of features on Hong Kong Island
per type of feature (Finlay and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Table E5.3 Estimates of features per each 1:5,000 map of Hong Kong
Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Table E5.4 Calculation of modified areas per each 1:5,000 map of Hong
Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Table E5.5 Calculation of features per each gauge on
Hong Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Table E6.1 Results of multiple linear regression analyses of major storm
datasets for models through the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Table E6.2 Summary of regression curve fits (R 20 values) using HI (or
derivatives) as the only independent variable. The 1989 dataset
is included for comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Table E7.1 Details of Gumbel linear regression models predicting rainfall
extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Table E7.2 Details of Pearson linear regression models predicting rainfall
extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Table E8.1 Significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93. . . 830
Table F1.1 Raw questionnaire response percentage frequencies for
section 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Table F1.2 Raw questionnaire response frequencies for section 2. . ... 836
Table Fl.3 Questionnaire response percentage frequencies for
sections 3 to 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Table F2.1 Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic variables
and question 6, group 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxiii

Table F2. 7 Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic variables
and question 6, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
and question 8 and 9, group 1, property damage. . . . . . . . . . 853
and question 8 and 9, group 1, loss of life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
and question 8 and 9, group 10, property damage. . . . . . . . . 859
and question 8 and 9, group 10, loss of life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Table F2.31 Pearson correlation coefficients between question 4 and
question 6, group 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
The Risk Assessment of Slopes x."Xiv

question 6, group 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Table F2.41 R between q4 and q8, 9, group 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Table F2.50 R between q4 and q8, 9, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Table F3.1 PC Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Table F3.2 PC Analysis, EQUAMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Table F3.3 PC Analysis, QUARTIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Table F3.4 PC Analysis, OBLIMIN Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Table F3.5 ULS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Table F3.6 GLS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Table F3.7 ML Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Table F3.8 PAF Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Table F3.9 ALPHA Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Table F3.10 PC Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation........................ 874
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXV
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Age-standardised annual deaths per 100,000 in Australia
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1992). . . . . . 6
Figure 2.2 Risks of dying at age 35-69 in UK
(The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2.3 Natural disaster losses 1960-1989 in constant 1990 US
dollars (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 2.4 A comparison of some risk management systems as outlined
by Krewski and Birkwood (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 2.5 The process of risk management as described by the Royal
Society (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 2.6 Graph of individual risk against distance from the risk source,
assuming an uniform wind distribution (Health and Safety
Executive, 1989b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 2.7 Contours of individual risk overlaid onto maps of an area
(Health and Safety Executive, 1989b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 2.8 Procedure for selecting expert judgement techniques.
(Roberds, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 2.9 An example of a portion of an event tree for a dam and
spillway (Nielsen et al, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 2.10 Illustration ofthe basic root-like structure of the fault tree
(Reid, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Figure 2.11 Outline fault tree for a hazard survey (Lees, 1980). . . . . . 30
Figure 2.12 Societal risk (FN) curve for some human-caused risks in the
USA (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). . . . . . . 32
Figure 2.13 An example of land system mapping
(Jones and Lee, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.1 Framework for landslide risk management systems,
developed from Krewski and Birkwood (1986). . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 4.1 Location and geology map of Lillydale Shire (Olds and Wilson,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Figure 4.2 The Montrose debris flow study area plan and slope profile
along the 1891 debris flow path (Moon et al, 1992). . . . . . 84
Figure 4.3 Extract from the debris flow "risk" zoning map (Moon et al,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Figure 4.4 The debris flow "risk" zoning map of Montrose used for
development controls (Shire of Lillydale, 1993). . . . . . . . . 90
Figure 4.5 The Montrose risk assessment study area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 4.6 The Kalorama risk assessment study area. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure 4.7 Locations oflandslide risk perception surveys. . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 5.1 A graphical interpretation of the Conventional Reliability
Index j3 (Li, 1987). . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . 113
Figure 5.2 Definition of Hasofer and Lind's reliability index f3HL (Li,
1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Figure 5.3 Variation of a soil property k(t) with location t for the
different soil types (Li and White, 1987b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Figure 5.4 Categories of uncertainty in soil properties (Christian et al,
1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Figure 5.5 Plot of D1 versus height (GCO, 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Figure 5.7 Frequency distribution of the chunam condition (V4 6)
CHASE data variable ........................... .-:. . . 152
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXVI
Figure 5.8 Frequency distribution of the number of berms (VlO _8)

CHASE data variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Figure 5.9 Frequency distribution of the material type in top layer
(V6_15_1) CHASE data variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 5.10 Cumulative frequency distributions of natural angle above
slope (Vl 0 9) CHASE data variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 5.11 Cumulative frequency distributions of D3 scores for the
CHASE data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Figure 5.12 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence plus
consequence scores for registered Hong Kong
cuts and walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Figure 5.13 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence times
cuts and walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Figure 5.14 Cumulative frequencies of Hong Kong cut slope angles for the
register of slopes and landslide database slope data. . . . . 196
Figure 5.15 Plot of CFr!CFf for the Hong Kong register of slopes and
landslide database cut slope angle data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Figure 5.16 Plot of CF8 , CFr for the CHASE cut slope angles. . . . . . . . 197
Figure 5.17 Cumulative frequency of Hong Kong cut slope heights for the
Figure 5.18 Plot of CFt!CFr for the Hong Kong register of slopes and
landslide database cut slope height data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Figure 5.19 Plot of CF8 , CFr for the CHASE cut slope heights. . . . . . . 198
Figure 5.20 Factors influencing groundwater conditions
for cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Figure 5.21 Ratio of CF8 /CFr for DF discriminant scores D3 for the
CHASE data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Figure 5.22 Ratio of CFr!CFr for Hong Kong cut slope I + C scores. . 204
Figure 5.23 Ratio of CFr!CFr for Hong Kong cut slope I X C scores. . 204
Figure 5.24 Cumulative frequency plots for Hong Kong retaining wall
heights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
landslide database retaining wall height data. . . . . . . . . . 208
Figure 5.26 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in retaining
walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure 5.27 Cumulative frequencies for Hong Kong fill slope angles. 214
landslide database fill slope angle data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Figure 5.29 Cumulative frequency of Hong Kong fill slope height. . . 215
landslide database fill slope height data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Figure 5.31 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in fills. . . . . 218
Figure 5.32 The base geomorphology map of the Kalorama high landslide
hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Figure 5.33 The sub-zones of the Kalorama high landslide
hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Figure 6.1 The sliding sled model (Aydan et al, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Figure 6.2 The sliding sled model (Scheidegger, 1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Figure 6.3 The sled on rolling cylinders model (Aydan et al, 1992). . 240
Figure 6.4 The idealised long, shallow landslide of Savage and Smith
(1986).............................................. 243
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxvii
Figure 6.5 Comparison of velocity profiles for different debris

depositional models (Van Gassen and Cruden, 1989). 24 7
Figure 6.6 Definitions of rock avalanche dimensions (Eisbacher and
Clague, 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Figure 6.7 Relationship between the excessive travel distance Le and the
rock avalanche volume V (Hsu, 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Figure 6.8 The mobility of extraterrestrial rock avalanches, one from
Mars and two from the Moon (Melosh, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . 249
Figure 6.9 Comparison of extraterrestrial and terrestrial rock avalanche
mobility based on weight and volume (Lucchita, 1979). . 250
mobility based on potential energy and volume (Lucchita,
1978). 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 251
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 6.11 Results from four runout distance models used to assess the
rock avalanche risk at Plati, Italy (Nicoletti, 1992). . . . . . 252
Figure 6.12 Comparison of the mobility of chalk, coal mine waste and
kaolinised granite failures and rock avalanches (Hutchinson,
1988) ... 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 253
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 6.13 Comparison of Japanese landslide and rock avalanche

mobility (Sassa, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Figure 6.14 Mudslide slope (average) versus mudslide length
(Hutchinson, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Figure 6.15 Landslide model with two apparent friction angles (Sassa,
1992). 0 0 ••••••••• 0 •••• 0 0 0 • 0 255
•••• 0 0 ••••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0
Figure 6.16 The mobility of waste dump failures (Golder Associates,

1992) ................................ 00........... . 255
Figure 6.17 Definition of variable F = H/L for a cut slope following
Scheidegger (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Figure 6.18 Definition of variable FX = HX/LX, based on the centre of
gravity of the failed mass, for a cut slope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Figure 6.19 The approximate equality ofF and FX for cut slopes. . . . 265
Figure 6.20 Correlation between H and L for Hong Kong cuts,
R 2 =0.64. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Figure 6.21 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong cuts,
R 2 =0.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Figure 6.22 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts including
outlier, R 2 =0.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Figure 6.23 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts without
outlier, R 2 =0.84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Figure 6.24 Correlation between H and L for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Figure 6.25 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Figure 6.26 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Figure 6.27 Correlation between H and L for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Figure 6.28 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong retaining
walls, R 2 =0.28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Figure 6.29 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Figure 6.30 Plot ofF versus V for all Hong Kong cut slopes (situations 1,
1A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxviii
Figure 6.31 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong fill slopes
(situations 7, 7A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Figure 6.32 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong retaining walls
(situations 6, 6A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Figure 6.33 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong cut slopes with A2>0. 273
Figure 6.34 Plot ofF versus logV for various landslides. . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Figure 6.35 Plot of logF versus logV for various landslides. . . . . . . . . . 276
Figure 6.36 Definition of a simple sled model for a cut slope. . . . . . . . 278
Figure 6.37 Lack of correlation between HX and Ll for Hong Kong cut
slopes, R 2 =0.27. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Figure 6.38 Explanation of box plot features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Figure 6.39 Plot of the distribution ofF = H/L for different material types
- Hong Kong cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Figure 6.40 Plot of the distribution ofF = HIL for different failure causes
Figure 6.41 Cumulative frequencies for the values of the apparent friction
angle F for Hong Kong cut slope failures where the slope
below was zero (A2=0) and non zero (A2>0). . . . . . . . . . . 290
Figure 6.42 Prob.leJ? definition for a cut slope runout distance
prediction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Figure 6.43 Example prediction of debris profile for a cut with HI= lOrn,
A1=60° . ........................................... 294
Figure 6.44 Plot of deaths versus volume, and deaths versus proximity -
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Figure 6.45 Plot of deaths versus landslide height, and deaths versus
landslide runout - Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Figure 6.46 Plot of deaths versus apparent coefficient of friction, and the
apparent coefficient of friction versus landslide volume -
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Figure 6.47 Vehicle damage in Hong Kong from landslide debris versus
landslide volume. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Figure 6.48 Squatter hut damage versus landslide volume
- Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Figure 6.49 1-2 storey residential building damage versus landslide
volume- Hong Kong................................ 317
Figure 6.50 1-2 storey non -residential building damage versus landslide
volume - Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Figure 6.51 Multistorey residential building damage versus landslide
volume- Hong Kong................................ 319
Figure 6.52 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road cut. . 321
Figure 6.53 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road fill. . 321
Figure 6.54 Factors influencing temporal probability for a retaining wall
above a road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
below a road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Figure 6.56 Factors influencing temporal probability for a footpath. . 323
Figure 6.57 Factors influencing temporal probability for a
bus shelter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Figure 6.58 Factors influencing temporal probability of persons in a
building under a cut. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
building under a retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXIX
Figure 6.60 Natural hillside debris flow initiated by

minor development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Figure 6.61 Failure initiated by excavation or sliding in natural slope
causes further sliding onto buildings, resulting in collapse (eg
Highland Towers in Malaysia, Po Shan Rd in
Hong Kong). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Figure 6.62 Overflow resulting from blocked drainage caused by a small
slide causes a debris flow in the road fill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Figure 7.1 Comparison of the Montrose study area societal risk with
various industrial and dam societal risk curves compiled in
Finlay and Fell, (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Figure 7.2 Upper and lower bound IRR rates for a 100 year period for
differing costs of saving a life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Figure 7.3 Landslide situation 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Figure 7.6 Landslide situation 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7
Figure 7.9 Estimated debris profile for a cut slope failure. . . . . . . . . 356
Figure 8.1 Relationship between area slipped and rainfall excess
(Crozier, 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Figure 8.2 Caine's rainfall intensity and duration threshold for shallow
landslides (Sidle et al, 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Figure 8.3 Rainfall intensity-duration -frequency curves for Reefton,
New Zealand, compared with intensity-duration
combinations required for soil mantle saturation under
various antecedent moisture conditions
(Sidle et al,1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Figure 8.4 Triggering thresholds derived from daily rainfall and
antecedent water status for Wellington City (Crozier and
Eyles, 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Figure 8.5 Rainfall threshold for various numbers of landslides in Hong
Kong (Lumb, 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Figure 8.6 Probability of rainy days producing landslides in the Otago
Peninsula (Crozier and Eyles, 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Figure 8.7 Relationship between rainfall and number of landslides in
Korea (Kim et al, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Figure 8.8 Relation for rainfall intensity-duration and landslides from
records at La Honda occurring after 280 mm antecedent
rainfall has been exceeded (Wieczorek, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . 375
Figure 8.9 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil (Howard et al,
1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Figure 8.10 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil
(Ellen, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
Figure 8.11 Kay and Chen's (1994) plot of minor, severe and disastrous
landslide events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
Figure 8.12 Landslide warning system instruction sheet (Premchitt,
1985b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Figure 8.13 Various intensity- duration thresholds for debris flow
triggering (Keefer et al, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
Figure 8.14 Earthquake magnitudes plotted on Gumbel extremal
probability paper (Gumbel, 1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXX
Figure 8.15 Regions in f3 1. /3z plane for various Pearson distributions

(Raudkivi, 1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Figure 8.16 Locations of rain gauges in the Territory of Hong Kong. 396
Figure 8.17 Example of the 1993 landslide incident location map for a
portion of Hong Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
Figure 8.18 Intensity-duration plot for all the gauges and all storms in
the 1984-93 study period, showing the proportion of slopes
failing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
Figure 8.19 Cumulative rainfall over 31 days for rain gauge H03, and the
corresponding number of landslides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Figure 8.20 Quadratic model for the number of landslides near a rain
gauge, R 20 =0.55. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Figure 8.21 Quadratic model without outliers for the number of landslides
near a rain gauge, R 20 =0.81. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Figure 8.22 Cubic model for the number of landslides near a rain gauge,
R 20 =0.56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Figure 8.23 Cubic model without outliers for the number of landslides
Figure 8.24 Comparison of the 1983-93 maxima series (11 year period)
values with the equivalent return periods based on Peart
(1993).............................................. 421
Figure 8.25 Example of a Gumbel Type I rainfall maxima plot for gauge
H01 ............................................... 422
Figure 8.26 Error bar plot of Ml5 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. 423
Figure 8.27 A typical box plot and its features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Figure 8.28 Box plot of Ml5 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 424
Figure 8.29 Box plot of H 1 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . . 425
Figure 8.30 Box plot of H3 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . . 425
Figure 8.31 Box plot of Hl2 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 426
Figure 8.32 Box plot of H24 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 426
Figure 8.33 Box plot of D3 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . . 427
Figure 8.35 Box plot of Dl5 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. 428
Figure 8.36 Box plot of D30 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 428
Figure 8.37 Goodness of fit values for various models and
weightings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Figure 8.38 Box plots comparing predicted rainfall extremes with those of
Peart (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Figure 8.39 Box plot of the distribution of the number of landslides in and
outside the storm database SDl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Figure 8.40 24 hour isohyets for the 28-29 May 1982 storm
(Tang, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
(Siu, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Figure 8.42 24 hour isohyets for the 8 May 1992 storm
(Evans, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
Figure 8.43 24 hour isohyets for the 4-5 November 1993 storm (GEO,
1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
Figure 8.44 Linear model, R 20 =0.26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
Figure 8.45 Quadratic model, R 20 =0.73. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Figure 8.46 Cubic model, R 20 =0.86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Figure 8.47 Prediction curves for number of landslides on Hong Kong
Island (Method 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxi
Figure 8.48 4-5 November 1993 Lantau storm transposed onto Hong
Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Figure 8.49 Example of a quadratic model curve for the number of
landslides near gauge HOl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
Figure 8.50 Correlation between H3 and H24, R 20 =0.78. . . . . . . . . . . 455
Figure 8.51 Correlation between H12 and H24, R 20 =0.93. . . . . . . . . . 455
Figure 8.52 Correlation between DIS and H24, R 20 =0.72. . . . . . . . . . 456
Figure 9.1 Regions of acceptable, unacceptable and tolerable (ALARP)
risk (Melchers, 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Figure 9.2 An example of a FN curve (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . 468
Figure 9.3 Some historical geotechnical risk levels
(Whitman, 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Figure 9.4 An illustration of the ALARP region on a FN curve (Hong
Kong Government Planning Department, 1994). . . . . . . . 4 70
Figure 9.5 Comparison of proposed individual and societal risk criteria
and risk criteria used in the Netherlands, United Kingdom
Hong Kong and Australia (Finlay and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . 472
Figure 9.6 Relationship between judged and statistically estimated
fatality rates in the USA (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . 507
Figure 9.7 Location of 81 hazards on factors 1 and 2 derived from the
relationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each factor is
made up of a combination of the characteristics as shown in
the lower portion of the diagram (Slavic, 198 7). . . . . . . . . 511
Figure 9.8 The social amplification of risk perception (The Royal Society,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
Figure 9.9 Rohrmann's (1995b) structural model of the subjective
evaluation of the acceptability of risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Figure 9.10 Responses to question 1.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Figure 9.13 Response from HKCED groups to question 1.4. . . . . . . . . 524
Figure 9.15 Response from Lillydale Shire groups to question 1.4. 525
Figure 9.18 Response from Lillydale Shire groups to question 1. 7. 52 7
Figure 9.19 Responses to the first part of section 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
Figure 9.20 Responses to section 10 by Hong Kong survey groups. . . 529
Figure 9.21 Responses to section 10 by Australian survey groups. . . . 530
Figure 9.22 Response by Hong Kong survey groups to section 11. . . . 531
Figure 9.28 A diagrammatic explanation of how one frequency histogram
is condensed into a frequency strip. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
Figure 9.29 Sample simplified frequency plot for one cognitive factor for
all survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
Figure 9.30 Landslide situations used in sections 7, 8 and 9. . . . . . . . 549
Figure 9.31 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for
House A ............................................ 555
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxii

House B............................................ 556
House C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Figure 9.34 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding if this was
your house and you just found out about the landsliding. 558
House D............................................ 559
House E ............................................ 560
House F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
House G............................................ 562
Figure 9.39 Age of respondents (question 14.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
Figure 9.40 The sex of respondents (question 14.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Figure 9.41 The proportion of smokers among the respondents (question
14.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Figure 9.42 The length of time respondents have been living in their
dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
Figure 9.43 The length of time respondents intend to stay living in their
current dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Figure 9.44 The number of children living in the respondents'
dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
Figure 9.45 The proportion of Hong Kong respondents who own a flat
(question 14.4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
Figure 9.46 The proportion of Hong Kong flat-owning respondents who
live in the flat they own (question 14.5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
Figure 9.47 The nature of work of respondents in the Hong Kong survey
groups (question 14.11a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
groups (question 14.11b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
Figure 9.49 The level of education of respondents in the Hong Kong
survey groups (question 14.9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Figure 9.50 The monthly household income of respondents in the Hong
Kong survey groups (question 14.10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Figure 9.51 The education level of Australian survey groups'
respondents ........................................ 586
Figure 9.52 The income level of Australian survey groups'
respondents ........................................ 586
Figure A1.1 An example of a Hong Kong landslide incident report
(page 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
Figure Al.2 An example of a Hong Kong landslide incident report
(page 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638
Figure Al.3 An example of a Hong Kong landslide card. . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
Figure C1.1 Situation 1 - Cut slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
Figure C1.2 Situation 1A - Cut slope failure affecting a house. . . . . . 688
Figure Cl.3 Situation 1C - Cut slope with two slope angles. . . . . . . . 689
Figure C1.4 Situation 1-5A - Natural slope failure affecting
a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
Figure C1.5 Situation 1CA- Cut slope with two angles
affecting a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxiii
Figure Cl.6 Situation 1D - Cut slope with two angles and berm, failing in
the top portion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
Figure Cl.7 Situation 3 - Boulder fall from a cut slope; Situation 3A -
boulder fall from a cut slope onto a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
Figure Cl.8 Situation 4 - Cut slope failure above retaining wall. . . . 694
Figure C1.9 Situation 4B - Cut slope failure above retaining wall. . . 695
Figure C 1.10 Situation 4D - Fill or cut slope failure above
retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696
Figure Cl.11 Situation 5 - Natural slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697
Figure Cl.12 Situation 5A - Natural slope failure above cut. . . . . . . . . 698
Figure C1.13 Situation 5H - Natural slope failure above cut affecting a
house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
Figure C 1.14 Situation 6 - Retaining wall failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
Figure C1.15 Situation 6A- Retaining wall failure affecting house. . . 701
Figure Cl.16 Situation 6B - Failure under a retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . 702
Figure Cl.1 7 Situation 7 - Fill slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
Figure Cl.18 Situation 7A - Fill slope failure affecting house. . . . . . . . 704
Figure C 1.19 Situation 7B - Fill slope failure becoming a debris flow. 705
Figure C1.20 Situation 8 - Large failure under retaining walls. . . . . . 706
Figure C 1.21 Situation SA - Large failure through retaining wall. . . . 707
Figure Cl.22 Situation 9- Blocked catch water, slope below scoured. . 708
Figure C2.1 The concept of regressional goodness of fit. . . . . . . . . . . . . 710
Figure C2.2 Regre~s~onal goodness of fit for a model through
the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 712
Figure C3.1 Statistical model details for situation 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 714
Figure C3.2 Statistical model details for situation 1 (continued). . . . . 715
Figure C4.1 Kennedy Rd (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
Figure C4.2 Cheung Shan (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725
Figure C4.3 Kwun Lung Lau (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
Figure C4.4 Aberfan (1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
Figure C4.5 Po Shan Rd (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
Figure C4.6 Sau Mau Ping (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
Figure C4.8 Baguio Villas (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
Figure C4.9 Highland Towers (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Figure C4.10 NT/8/8 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Figure C4.11 4/11SWB (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Figure C4.12 ME87/7/20 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Figure C4.13 2/11NWA (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . 732
Figure C4.14 14/11SWC (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
Figure C4.15 K60 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
Figure C4.16 24/79 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxiv
Figure C4.1 7 K31A (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734

Figure C4.18 K14 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
Figure C4.19 NT/8/7 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
Figure C4.20 NT/8/27 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
Figure C4.21 K30 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
Figure C4.22 K45 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 738
Figure C4.23 K13 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 738
Figure C4.24 HK2 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 739
Figure C4.25 HK85/6/2 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
Figure C4.26 MW92/7/9 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
Figure C4.27 K87/9/4 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
Figure E2.1 1989 cumulative rainfall data for 30 days preceding failure for
incidents with known failure time and nearest
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 777
1incidents with known failure time and nearest
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 778
incidents with known failure time and nearest rain gauge ....
779
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780
Figure E2.5 Box plot of rainfall data for all 88 incidents with dates, times
and nearest rain gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781
Figure E2.6 Box plot of rainfall data excluding the large 89, 92 event
incidents. There are 40 incidents in this subset. . . . . . . . 781
Figure E2.7 Box plot of rainfall data for the 89 event incidents. There are
19 incidents in this subset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 782
Figure E3.1 Flowchart of study methods identifying data streams,
analyses and outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 785
Figure E5.1 Zoning of levels of development on Hong Kong Island
(map 11SE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
(map 11SW). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
(map 15NE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
(map 15NW). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Figure E6.1 Quadratic model through the origin, R 20 =0.60. . . . . . . . . 822
Figure E6.2 Quadratic model through the origin, data without outliers,
R 20 =0.75........................................... 823
Figure E6.3 Cubic model through the origin, R 20 =0.61. . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Figure E6.4 Cubic model through the origin, data without outliers,
R 20 =0.75........................................... 824
Figure E6.5 Cumulative frequency distributions for Hl for the two major
storm events in the 1989-92 study period. . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Figure F3.1 Sample derivation of 3 factor table for group 6 from raw
output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
LIST OF SYMBOLS
Latin Symbols
Symbol Description Section

ao ... an Coefficients 5.3.1
A Empirical constant 6.1.2.2
Al Cut slope angle 6.2.4.5
6.2.4.6
A2 The angle below the slope 6.2.4
AVSTREN Average material strength 5.3.1
B1, B2, ... Bn A set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive events 2.1.4.3
c A constant 6.2.4.5
c' A constant 6.2.4.5
c' Effective cohesion 5.1.2
8.1.1
Cu The undrained strength 5.1.2
c Consequence score 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
7.4
Cv Coefficient of variation 8.1.3.2
1\
C(h) The moment estimator of the ACF of a soil property

measured at uniform intervals of distance along one
dimension 5.1.2
CFu Cumulative frequency of unfailed slopes 5.4.2.1
CFr Cumulative frequency of failed slopes 5.4.2.1
D Discriminant score 5.3.1
D Depth of failure 6.2.4.6
10.1
D Number of deaths 6.3.3.3
D Storm duration 8.1.2
D3 Rainfall over 3 days 8.2
E Element(s) at risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
EL Energy loss 6.2.4.5
f The average coefficient of friction 6.1.2.1
f(M) Values taken at point M of a geometrical field 5.1.2
f(M+h) Values taken at point M +h of a geometrical field 5.1.2
F Coefficient of apparent friction 6.2.4
6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxvi

F Probability modification factor 5.4
7.4
F' Primary modification factor 5.4
7.4
F" Secondary modification factor 5.4
7.4
F Factor of Safety 5.1.2
F'c Primary modification factor for a cut slope 5.4.2.1
7.4
F"c Secondary modification factor for a cut slope 5.4.2.2
7.4
Fe Factor for evidence and history of instability 5.4
7.4
F{ Primary modification factor for a fill slope 5.4.6.2
7.4
F'{ Secondary modification factor for a fill slopes 5.4.6
Fo Central Safety Factor 5.1.2
F'w Primary modification factor for a retaining wall 5.4.4.2
7.4
F"w Secondary modification factor for a retaining wall 5.4.4
FX Coefficient of apparent friction based on the centre
of gravity of the failed mass 6.2.4
g Acceleration due to gravity 6.2.4.5
g(t) A trend component 5.1.2
g(X) A trend component 5.1.2
G(JLS) Systems performance function 5.1.2
h Lag distance 5.1.2
h Total vertical height of the path of the landslide 6.1.2.1
H Natural hazard 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
H Vertical distance from the head of the scarp to the 6.1.2.5
debris toe 6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
HI Hourly rainfall 8.2
H3 3 hourly rainfall 8.2
HI Slope height 6.2.4.6
H4 Depth of debris at the toe of the slope 6.2.4.6
H4 Debris depth at the base of the cut 6.2.4.6
Hg Vertical drop of the failed mass centre 6.1.2.1
HX Vertical distance from the head of the scarp to the
debris toe based on the centre of gravity of the failed
mass 6.2.4
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxvii

I Number of injuries 6.3.3.3
I Incidence score 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
7.4
I Average gradient of the transportation zone 6.1.2.4
I Mean storm intensity 8.1.2
IRR Internal Rate of Return 7.2.1.3
10.1
k(X) The soil property 5.1.2
Ks Uniform saturated hydraulic conductivity 8.1.1
Kr A frequency factor 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
L Horizontal distance from the head of the scarp to 6.1.2.5
the debris toe 6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
L1 Distance travelled by the mass along the horizontal
deposition zone 6.2.4.5
L3 Horizontal distance between the centre of gravity of
the mass in its initial position and the toe of the
slope 6.2.4.5
L' Debris flow deposition length 6.1.2.4
Ld Horizontal length of the deposited material 6.1.2.5
Le Excessive travel length 6.1.2.5
Lg Horizontal travel distance of the failed mass centre 6.1.2.1
LS Distance travelled by the mass along the cut slope 6.2.4.5
LX Horizontal distance from the head of the scarp to
the debris toe based on the centre of gravity of the
failed mass 6.2.4
m The failed mass 6.2.4.5
m The rank of a particular point 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
m The number of underlying cognitive factors 9.2.4
m The number of common factors for a factor analysis 9.2.4
M Magnitude 3.3
M5 5 minute rainfall 8.2
n Number of variables 5.1.2
n The total number of data points 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
N(h) The number of sample pairs 5.1.2
NATANG The natural angle above the slope 5.3.1
p The number of cognitive variables 9.2.4
Po Value ofpx(x) at the mode 8.1.3.1
Px(x) A general Pearson extreme frequency distribution 8.1.3.1
' Peter J. Finlay, PhD (UNSW)
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxviii

p Proximity 6.3.3.3
p Probability that a particular landslide(s) will occur 3.3
within a specified time frame (generally a year) 5.3.4
5.5.4
P(AjB) The conditional probability of A occurring given B
occurs 2.1.4.3
P(AnB) The probability that both events A and B occur 2.1.4.3
P(B) Probability of event B 2.1.4.3
P(Bj) Prior probability j 2.1.4.3
P(Bj IAJ Posterior probability given new information A 2.1.4.3
PDI The annual probability of loss of life to an individual 2.2.2.2
Pa Average annual probability of sliding 5.4
7.4
Pr The probability of the individual slope failing 5.1.2
5.4
7.4
Pre The probability of a cut slope failure 5.4
7.4
Prr The probability of a fill slope failure 5.4
7.4
Prw The probability of a retaining wall failure 5.4
7.4
PH Probability relating to human activities 3.3
PR Probability relating to rainfall 3.3
Ps Probability relating to seismic activities 3.3
P(H) The annual probability of the hazardous event 2.2.2.2
P(LjT) Probability of loss of life of an individual occupant 2.2.2.2
P(SjH) The probability of spatial impact 2.2.2.2
P(TISJ The probability of temporal impact 2.2.2.2
P[R(X),S(XJJ Joint probability function 5.1.2
R Reliability 5.1.2
R Pearson's correlation coefficient 9.2.3.8
Rs Specific risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
7.2
7.4
Rt Total risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
7.2
R2 Coefficient of determination for a model with a con- 5.3.1
stant 6.2.4
8.2.7.2
8.2.7.4
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxix

R2o Coefficient of determination for a model through the 6.2.4
on gin 8.2.7.2
8.2.7.4
R(XJ Resistance of the structure 5.1.2
S(XJ Imposed loading 5.1.2
SORANG Original cut slope angle 5.3.1
STACAT Standardised catchment area 5.3.1
t Independent variable 8.1.3.1
t_ A point in space 5.1.2
Vo An initial velocity 6.1.2.1
v A geometrical field 5.1.2
v Landslide volume in m 3 6.1.2.5
10.1
v Vulnerability 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
5.3.4
6.3.4
6.4
6.5
7.4
Vz Probability of loss of life or portion of element value 3.3
6.3
6.3.4
6.4
7.2
9.2.3.7
Vs Probability of spatial impact of a landslide on an ele- 3.3
ment 6.4
Vs The sediment volume in m 3 6.1.2.4
vt Probability of temporal impact 3.3
6.4
V4 6 Chunam condition 5.3.1.6
7 .4.1.2
VlO 8 Number of berms 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
V6 15 1 Top layer material type 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
V10 9 Slope angle above 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
X Total horizontal reach of the landslide 6.1.2.1
~ Basic random variables 5.1.2
Xr The magnitude of the event having a return period
T 8.1.3.2
XJ ... Xn Raw values of variables 5.3.1
X The matrix of coordinates of the sample properties 5.1.2
Yi The soil property being measured 5.1.2
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xl

z A standardised parameter 5.1.2
Z(Xi) Sample values at points Xi 5.1.2
Z(X;_ +h) Sample values at point)(;_ +h 5.1.2
Greek Symbols

a Empirical constant 6.1.2.2
8.1.3.1
[3 Reliability Index 5.1.2
[3 Local slope angle 6.1.2.1
fJI Coefficient of skewness 8.1.3.2
f32 Coefficient of kurtosis 8.1.3.2
f3o to f3n Coefficients 8.1.3.1
f3HL Hasofer and Lind (1974) invariant definition of the
reliability index 5.1.2
0 Mode ofpx(x) 8.1.3.1
E(t) A random component 5.1.2
E(X) A random component 5.1.2
¢ Angle of internal friction 6.1.2.1
¢' Effective friction angle 5.1.2
6.1.2.5
8.1.1
y(h) A semivariogram function 5.1.2
T(1J) The gamma distribution 8.1.3.1
1] Pore-water pressure coefficient 6.1.2.1
f1 Coefficient of friction 6.1.2.5
6.2.4
/11 Uniform coefficient of friction on a cut slope 6.2.4.5
/12 Uniform coefficient of friction on the horizontal
/1G Mean of the performance function G(R.S) 5.1.2
flr Rolling friction coefficient 6.1.2.1
fls Coefficient of sliding friction 6.1.2.1
e A varying slope angle 6.2.4.5
Oc Standard deviation of the performance function
G(R.S) 5.1.2
Q A measured quantity 6.1.2.2
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xli
Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description Section

ACF Autocorrelation Function 5.1.2
ADRI Antecedent Daily Rainfall Index 8.1.2.1
AEP Annual Exceedance Probability 3.3
8.2.6
8.2.7.4
8.3.1
9.1.1
9.2.3.7
10.1
AGS Australian Geomechanics Society 5.5
10.1
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable 9.1.1
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable 7.2
9.1.1
9.2
9.3
10.1
AN COLD Australian National Committee on Large Dams 2.1.3.3
2.2.3
7.2
9.1.1
9.2
10.1
API Aerial Photographic Interpretation 5.3.1
AR Stationary Autoregressive process 5.1.2
ARIMA Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average model 5.1.2
ARMA Autoregressive Moving Average model 5.1.2
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers 2.1.3.3
2.2.1
2.2.3
BC Hydro British Columbia Hydro 2.2.3
c a Cut failure 6.3.4.2
CHASE Cut Slopes in Hong Kong- Assessment of Stability 4.1.2
by Empiricism 5.3.1
5.4.2
10.1
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (Australia) 4.3.3
CD Combined Database 8.2.7.4
D Decision level 8.1.2.3
DA Discriminant Analysis 5.3.1
DF Discriminant Function 5.3.1
EGM Engineering Geology Map 4.1.2
EM Erosion Map 4.1.2
F a Fill failure 6.3.4.2
The Risk Assessment of Slc~pes xlii

FAR Fatal Accident Rate 2.1.5.1
9.1.1
FEMA US Federal Emergency Management Agency 2.2.3
FN curve Frequency (or probability) versus Number of fa- 2.1.3.3
tali ties 2.2.1
9.1.1.1
9.1.1
FOSM First Order, Second Moment Method 5.1.2
GASP Geotechnical Areas Studies Program 4.1.2
GCO Geotechnical Control Office (former name of the 4.1.2
GEO) 5.2.1
5.3.1
5.3.4
GDP Gross Domestic Product 9.2.3.9
GEO Geotechnical Engineering Office, Civil Engineer- 3.4
ing Department, Hong Kong 4.1.1
5.2.1
5.3.6
6.2.3
6.3
7.4
8.2
8.2. 7.4
9.2
10.1
GEOTECS Computer generated maps 4.1.2
5.3.2
GLEAM Generalised Limitations and Engineering Apprais-
alMap 4.1.2
GLUM Geotechnical Land Use Map 3.4
4.1.2
5.3.2
5.4.2.1
GPS Generalised Procedure of Slices 5.1.2
HKCED Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department 4.3.3
9.2
9.3
10.1
IAEG/ International Association of Engineering Geology
CLOMMS Commission on Landslides and Other Mass Move-
ments on Slopes 2.2.2.2
ICASP International Conferences on Application of Stat-
istics and Probability in Civil and Structural En-
gineering 5.1.2
I COLD International Committee on Large Dams 9.1.1
ICOSSAR International Conferences on Structural Safety
and Reliability 5.1.2
ICTC Interdepartmental Committee on Toxic Chemi-
cals 2.1.3
IDSR Individual Discrimination Success Rate(%) 5.3.1
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xliii

IGSUNESCO/ International Geotechnical Societies' UNESCO 3.2
WPWLI Working Party on World Landslide Inventory 6.1.1
L Landslip level 8.1.2.3
LCI Lower 95% Confidence Interval 8.2.7.4
LM Landform Map 4.1.2
LNS Least Normal Squares 5.1.2
LPM Landslide Preventative Measures 5.3.5
MA Moving Average process 5.1.2
MAUT Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 2.2.3
MIPS Millions of Instructions Per Second 8.2.5.2
N a Natural slope failure 6.3.4.2
NFA No Further Action recommendation 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
ODSR Overall Discrimination Success Rate(%) 5.3.1
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 5.1.2
Pl Point score set 1 8.2
P2 Point score set 2 8.2
PAR Population At Risk 6.3.3.3
PCM Physical Constraints Map 4.1.2
PEM Point Estimate Method 5.1.2
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 2.1.4.3
PHI Potentially Hazardous Installation 2.1.3.3
9.1.1
PMRM Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method 2.2.3
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 2.1.4.3
2.2.3
PSA Probabilistic Slope (stability) Analysis 5.1.2
QRA Quantified Risk Assessment 2.1.4.3
R a Retaining wall failure 6.3.4.2
RMA Reduced Major Axis 5.1.2
RSSG The Royal Society Study Group 2.1.3
RO Royal Observatory 4.1.3
RV Regionalised Variable 5.1.2
SlR Stage One Reports (carried out by the GEO's Plan-
ning Division) 4.1.2
SCOPE Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environ-
ment 2.1.3
SD Storm Database 8.2.7.4
SDA Stepwise Discriminant Analysis 5.3.1
SOSM Second Order Second Moment Method 5.1.2
SRV Single Random Variable approach 5.1.2
SWT Surrogate Worth Trade-Off method 2.2.3
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xliv
Abbreviation Description ~:.

Section
TCM Terrain Classification Map 4.1.2
UCI Upper 95% Confidence Interval 8.2.7.4
UNSW University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 4.1.1
8.2.7.3
USBR US Bureau of Reclamation 2.2.3
US NRC US National Research Council 2.1.3
uw Unweighted regression model 8.2.7.3
8.2.7.4
WA Regression model weighted by the Thiessen poly- 8.2.7.3
gon area 8.2.7.4
WF Regression model weighted by the number of fea- 8.2.7.3
tures nearest to a rain gauge 8.2.7.4
WHO World Health Organisation 2.1.3
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to Research

Risk assessment is a broad and growing field, applied in many areas. Over
the past two decades or so, risk assessment concepts and techniques have begun
to permeate into geotechnical engineering. Their entry has been a gradual one
due a combination of factors such as the well accepted and widely used
deterministic methods of slope stability analysis, and the often imprecise nature
of geotechnical engineering. Risk concepts are, one might say, somew hat foreign
to many geotechnical engineers. Note that only subaerial slopes are
considered in the authors work.
The motivation for the author's study of the risk assessment of slopes was
the substantial benefits that can arise from the application of risk- based
methodologies to the analysis of slopes. These include a better allocation of
resources for the reduction of landslide risk, and highlighting and better
quantifying the important factors which influence slope stability. The author
perceives the area of slope risk assessment as a new, "cutting-edge" field within
geotechnical engineering, wherein he could make a significant contribution to
existing knowledge.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

The risk assessment of slopes is currently a new field, with no generic risk
assessment framework available. Even though some publications present
examples of slope risk assessment, no published, systematic application of risk
assessment to slopes arising from a generic risk assessment framework exists to
the author's knowledge.
The author sought to overcome this situation through his work on the risk
assessment of slopes. The objectives of the work are outlined below.
1.3 Objectives and Research Scope

The main objective of the study was to outline a broad generic risk
management framework, develop a generic landslide risk assessment
framework, and apply framework components to landslide problems in Hong
Kong and Australia.
With the above in mind the following specific objectives were set for this
thesis:
o Review the general risk literature, and literature on geotechnical
risk.
o Outline a broad, generic risk management framework.
o Outline a generic landslide risk assessment framework.

o Develop means of assessing the probability of landsliding in Hong
Kong using historical data, and means of modifying the probability
based on other available databases.
o Quantify and refine landslide probabilities through
geomorphological mapping and historical landslide records in study
areas of Melbourne, Australia.
o Review major landslide case studies in the literature with a view to
extracting information on vulnerability, and on major government
policy changes following large landslide disasters.
o Develop models for predicting runout distance for man-modified
slopes in Hong Kong. This is a part of the assessment of vulnerability
in Hong Kong.
o Discuss and develop representative temporal probability scenarios.
o Analyse the Vlilnerability of persons and property in Hong Kong and
selected study areas of Melbourne, Australia.
o Calculate landslide risks (specific and total) for study areas in
Melbourne, Australia. Assess the indicative loss of real estate values
in these areas.
o Develop a framework for landslide risk calculation in Hong Kong,
illustrating it with sample calculations.
o Review literature on the relationship between rainfall and
landsliding. For Hong Kong, develop rainfall thresholds causing
landsliding, develop a model for the prediction of the number of
landslides near a specific rain gauge, analyse rainfall recurrence
intervals and distributions, analyse the effect of spatial rainfall
distribution on landslides, and develop models predicting the number
of landslides over a large area from extreme storm events.
o Conduct a detailed review of acceptable risk and risk perception
literature. Collect and analyse detailed data on landslide risk
perception and acceptable landslide risk from respondent groups in
Hong Kong and Australia that are subject to various landslide risks.
o Draw conclusions from the study, and recommend future research
directions.
1.4 Layout of Thesis
The layout of the thesis follows the objectives outlined above. The thesis is
divided into thematically homogenous chapters. Each chapter presents the
detailed literature review (where appropriate), objectives, methods, analyses,
results and conclusions for each research area. The chapters are described
below. (Note that Chapter 1 is this introduction).
Chapter 2 contains the general literature review of risk, and a detailed
review of risk management systems in geotechnical engineering.
Chapter 3 outlines a generic risk management framework and a generic
landslide risk assessment framework. The generic landslide risk assessment
framework is developed further for application to Hong Kong landslide risk
assessment.
Chapter 4 discusses the data sources for the study, the detailed study scope,
gives the methods of analysis and highlights areas where significant
contributions to existing knowledge are made.
Chapter 5 addresses the probability oflandsliding. The detailed literature
is reviewed. Calculations oflandslide probabilities are developed for Hong Kong
using base landslide statistics of over 3,000 landslides spanning a 10 year period.
A system of modifying the Hong Kong base landslide probabilities is developed
using numerous available databases. For the Kalorama study area in
Melbourne, Australia, landslide probabilities are quantified and refined using
geomorphology and limited past site investigation and historical landslide data.
This approach illustrates the quantification of landslide probabilities in the
absence of sufficient statistical landslide data and any other databases.
Chapter 6 focuses on the vulnerability of elements to landsliding. A
detailed literature review oflandslide movement and runout distance is carried
out. Major landslide disasters documented in the literature and the
corresponding government policy changes following these are discussed, as this
is an indication of unacceptable societal landslide risk. Statistical models are
developed for predicting landslide runout distance for man-modified slopes in
Hong Kong based on over 1,100 landslide records. The vulnerability of persons,
vehicles and buildings is analysed using Hong Kong landslide data, and data
from study areas in Melbourne, Australia. Representative temporal probability
scenarios are developed and discussed in a general sense.
Chapter 7 presents calculations of landslide risk. Landslide risk
assessments are carried out in residential study areas subject to landslide risk in
Melbourne, Australia. These cover loss oflife as well as loss of property. Sample
calculations for landslide risk from cuts, fill and retaining walls in Hong Kong
are given, utilising the findings of Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 8 discusses the relationship between rainfall and landsliding. The
literature is reviewed in detail. A study of rainfall and landsliding, using
detailed, five minute rainfall records for all rainfall gauges in the Territory over
a ten year period, is presented. The analysis of five minute rainfall records over
the ten year period for 22 gauges for the determination of threshold rainfall
values causing landsliding is given first. Models for the prediction of the number
oflandslides near a specific rain gauge are then developed. The third component
examines the extreme rainfall recurrence intervals and distributions. These are
utilised in the fourth component, which predicts the number of landslides
caused by an extreme storm event over a substantial area covered by a number of
rain gauges.
Chapter 9 details acceptable risk and risk perception. The detailed
literature on acceptable risk and risk perception is reviewed. This is followed by
the study of landslide risk perception for ten groups of respondents in Australia
and Hong Kong. Useful data on a number of facets of acceptable landslide risk
and landslide risk perception is gained.
Chapter 10 contains the main conclusions arising from the work of the
author presented in Chapters 5 to 9. Recommendations for future research
directions in the risk assessment of slopes are made.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of literature pertaining to the risk assessment of slopes is

presented in two sections. The first covers a review of general risk literature,
and the second focuses on risk management in geotechnical engineering.
2.1 General Risk Literature Review

The first section of the literature review, after a brief introduction, looks at
the various definitions of terms used in the area of risk, risk management
systems, hazard identification and assessment, risk assessment, risk
evaluation, and decision making and risk communication.
2.1.1 Introduction to Risk

Risk today is a very ambiguous and often negative word for many people
and organisations. It is often associated with emotional outbursts on behalf of
the public and activist groups, tight-lipped defensiveness from institutions/
organisations, and detailed technical modelling and predictions by scientists
and engineers. These almost stereotyped roles are today played out in many
different situations using different words, but with many common traits. Risk is
often at the centre or part of decisions about projects affecting many lives and
utilising a large amount of resources, and hence invariably becomes embroiled
in the negotiations and conflicts inherent in such a process.
Despite the fact that the overall death rates and risks of dying to an
individual in the Western society are continually decreasing, as illustrated in
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the overall losses from natural disasters have increased in
the period 1960-1969 (Figure 2.3). People also perceive that risks from
technology have increased considerably (The Royal Society, 1992). In short, in
spite oflower risks of dying and a longer life expectancy today, many individuals
feel that life today is far more risky than at the turn of the century, say (The
Royal Society, 1992). This perception makes risk management more difficult
and complex.
It helps to realise that risk management forms part of complex social
processes involving varied issues in the modern society (The Royal Society,
1992). Hence conflict, negotiation, lack of clarity and consensus will always be
present. Another way of putting this is to say that the questions are sometimes
more important than the answers, ie the process of conflict, negotiation and
compromise is ongoing and at times of greater significance than the issues at
stake. Whether current social processes are perceived as "political processes of
truth formation" (McDonell, 1991) or any other of the group process theories
2000
1800
1600
0 1400
0
0
c)
0 1200
.....
(j)
0.. 1000
!/)
..c
Cii 800
(j)
0
600
400
200
0
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Year

(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1992).
available from the social scientists, they dominate the role of risk. As they are
changing so the importance of risk management grows or diminishes
accordingly. Nevertheless, risk management techniques are being developed
and refined around the globe in many areas, in order that understanding and
sometimes the control of risk can be improved.
2.1.2 Overview of Definitions Used

A large number of definitions, perceptions and meanings for terms
associated with risk exists, the number of these increasing in the last few
decades. The apparent confusion seen in the literature is often a result of not
only different, but also loosely defined and loosely used terms such as hazard,
risk, danger, and so on. The terminology depends on the user, and what purpose
the risk language is given. Various definitions, terminology and methods are
used in the following areas, with notable overlap (The Royal Society, 1992):
Business
o insurance/actuarial,
o commercial decision making eg cost/benefit studies,
o valuations/loss adjustments, and
o information technology.
Government/Politics
o decision making,
o environmental management, and
o disaster/catastrophe relief.
Industry
o nuclear,
o chemical (including petroleum),
o transport,
o electricity supply,
o waste disposal and management, and
o construction.
Occupational Health & Safety Area
o injury prevention, and
o rehabilitation.
Activist/Interest Groups
Public
MALE FEMALE
35
23% 21%
20%
17%
14%
11%
3o/o
196519751985 1995 1965197519851995
....-----. . - - - - Total risk of dying
~ Attributed to smoking
KEY: ~
~~~ Would have died anyway
Figure 2.2 Risks of dying at age 35-69 in UK (The Royal Society, 1992).
A Total economic losses

(1990 values)
20 A. Total insured losses

(1990 values)
.... 10
(/)
::::>
c
~
:0
.S
"'
Ql
"'
.3"'
1960 1965 1970 1975 , 980 1985 1989
Frequency of great natural disasters

[ITJ Num~r of earthquake disaatera
• Number of other natural disasters
Figure 2.3 Natural disaster losses 1960-1989 in constant 1990 US dollars (The
Royal Society, 1992).
The inconsistencies in the definitions of risk reflect different frames of

reference, social context, values and priorities underlying the conflicts
(McDonell, 1991). Kaplan (1991) highlights the difficulty that technologists
have in attempting to define risk consistently:
" .. .in 1981 the Society for Risk Analysis established a committee to
define risk. After about three or four years of work, the committee
published a list of fourteen candidate definitions and reported that it
could not reach agreement. They recommended that a single
definition of risk could not be established, but that everyone be free to
define it as appropriate to their work."
A selection of reasonably representative definitions in the main areas is given

below, intending to be a broad- brush sketch, but is far from exhaustive.
2.1.2.1 United Nations (1991)

The United Nations (1991), following Varnes and the IAEG/CLOMMS
(1984) define the terms used for risk assessment as follows:
A) Natural Hazard (H)

Natural hazard (H) is the probability of occurrence, within a specific period
of time in a given area, of a potentially damaging natural phenomenon.
B) Vulnerability (V)
Vulnerability (V) is the degree ofloss to a given element at risk or set of such
elements resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given
magnitude, and expressed on a scale from 0 (no damage) to 1 (total loss).
C) Elements at Risk (E)

Elements at risk (E) are the population, buildings and civil engineering
works, economic activities, public services, utilities and infrastructure, etc., at
risk in a given area.
D) Specific Risk <Rs)

Specific risk (R8 ) is the expected degree of loss due to a particular natural
phenomenon, and is a function of both the natural hazard and vulnerability.
E) Risk (lit)
Risk (Rt) is the expected number of lives lost, persons injured, damage to
property and disruption of economic activity due to a particular natural
phenomenon, and consequently the product of specific risk and elements at risk.
Thus
Rt; = ~ (E) (R8 ) = (E) (H X V) 2.1
for different categories of elements at risk (E) combined. The United Nations
note that while risk is "the estimate of total expected losses for a given area",
specific risk is the expected degree ofloss to a given category of elements at risk.
2.1.2.2 The Royal Society (1992)
A) Hazard
Hazard is the situation that in particular circumstances could lead to
harm.
B) Damage
Damage is the loss of inherent quality suffered by an entity (physical and
biological).
C) Harm
Harm is the loss to a human being (or population) consequent on damage.
D) Risk
Risk is the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a
stated period of time. All risks are conditional. Risk assessment is seen as the
study of decisions subject to uncertain consequences, divided into risk
estimation and risk evaluation. Risk estimation is the identification of
outcomes, estimation of outcome consequences, and the estimation of outcome
probabilities. Risk evaluation is "a complex process of determining the
significance or value of identified hazards and estimated risks to those
concerned or affected by the decision". Risk evaluation includes the study of risk
perception and a trade-offbetween perceived risks and perceived benefits. The
Royal Society (1992) also quotes other definitions including those ofthe British
Standard 4778 (1991), definitions related to finance and social scientists'
definitions.
2.1.2.3 The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management

The Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360: 1995 is a generic risk
management standard (Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand,
1995). The key definitions are reproduced below.
A) Hazard
A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss (any
negative consequence, financial or otherwise).
B) Risk
The chance of something happening that will have an impact upon
objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.
C) Risk Analysis
A systematic use of available information to determine how often specified
events may occur, and the magnitude of their likely consequences.
D) Risk Assessment
The process used to determine risk management priorities by evaluating
and comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk
levels and other criteria.
2.1.2.4 Canadian Risk Analysis Requirements and Guidelines

The Canadian Risk Analysis Requirements and Guidelines
CAN/CSA-Q634-M91 is a generic standard for the risk analysis of primarily
technological standards (Canadian Standards Association, 1991). The main
definitions are reproduced below.
A) Hazard
A condition with the potential for causing an undesirable consequence.
B) Risk
A measure of probability and severity of an adverse effect to health,
property, or the environment.
C) Risk Analysis
The use of available information to estimate the risk to individuals and
populations, property or the environment, from hazards. The steps are scope
definition, hazard identification and risk estimation.
D) Risk Assessment
The process of risk analysis and risk evaluation.
E) Risk Evaluation
The stage at which values and judgements enter the decision process,
explicitly or implicitly, by including consideration of the importance of the
estimated risks and the associated social, environmental and economic
consequences, in order to identify a range of alternatives for managing the risks.
F) Risk Management
The complete process of risk assessment and risk control.
2.1.2.5 The NSW Department of Planning Hazardous Industry

Planning Advisory Paper No 4
The NSW Department of Planning (1991) defines risk as the likelihood of
an adverse outcome. No further explicit definitions are given as the paper is
advising local councils, development proponents and the community on
assessing land use safety implications.
2.1.2.6 Definitions Related to Finance

The study of economic risks is perhaps the oldest of all risk assessments
(The Royal Society, 1992). Economic risks are almost always expressed in
monetary terms such as loss of profit, loss ofvalue, etc, and discussion of their
definitions is beyond the scope of the literature review. The Royal Society (1992)
offers further reading material references on this topic.
2.1.2. 7 Definitions Used by Scientists and Engineers

The Royal Society (1992) quotes the British Standard 4 778 (1991), which
defines terms in availability, reliability and maintainability (ARM). The
definitions therein are of a more specialised nature, and the main ones are
reproduced below.
A) Hazard
Hazard is a situation that could occur during the lifetime of a product,
system or plant that has a potential for human injury, damage to property,
damage to the environment or economic loss.
B) Risk
Risk is a combination of the probability or frequency of occurrence of a
defined hazard, and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence.
C) Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the integrated analysis of the risks inherent in a
product, system or plant and their significance in an appropriate context.
D) Risk Management
Risk management is the process whereby decisions are made to accept a
known or assessed risk, and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the
consequences or probability of occurrence.
2.1.2.8 Social Scientists Definitions

Social scientists do not agree with the definitions and terms discussed
above (The Royal Society, 1992). The reasons for this are summarised below.
o Social scientists view attempts to reduce risk to a one-dimensional
"objective concept" as fraught with difficulties, as risk is "socially
constructed" and hence all risk assessments are conditional on the
social and institutional assumptions underpinning them.
o The partitioning and specialisation of risk studies has resulted in
many approaches and terminologies - this fragmentation is referred
to by some authors as the "risk archipelago".
o Risk management is not a "single-seated", "goal-orientated" but
rather a multi -faceted process.
o A diversity of opinion exists about the principles that should be used

to govern the identification, measurement and regulation of risk.
Further discussion regarding the various criticisms of risk management
systems takes place in section 2.1.3.5.
The above brief and far from exhaustive examples of various definitions
indicate the diversity of risk terminology, and highlight the fact that one must
always clearly define one's terms in any risk-related work. The definitions
used in this thesis are given in section 3.3.
2.1.3 Risk Management Systems

Risk management systems are discussed in this component. The main
issues and approaches, risk management in the chemical and nuclear industries,
the value of risk management systems together with their limitations and
criticisms are reviewed successively.
2.1.3.1 Introduction
Major institutions are tending to use risk management systems more and
more, attempting to deal with risks in a more complete and equitable fashion
(The Royal Society, 1992). A good overview of risk management systems in the
health and environmental arenas is given by Krewski and Birkwood (1986). The
following institutions' models are reviewed:
o Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) -
1980.
o US National Research Council (USNRC) - 1983.
o The Royal Society Study Group (RSSG)- 1983.
o Interdepartmental Committee on Toxic Chemicals (ICTC) - 1984.
o World Health Organisation (WHO) - 1985.
The systems all have similar frameworks, but differ in the delineation of steps
and the level of detail. The basic steps in the framework are:
1/ Hazard identification,
2/ Risk estimation,
3/ Risk evaluation, and
4/ Risk management.
The steps and the corresponding quantities measured are summarised m
Table 2.1. The differences in the institutions' models are contrasted m
Figure 2.4.
~~
SCOPE (1980) NRC/EPA (1983/84) ROYAL SOCIETY (1983) ICIC (1984) WHO (1985) (1) ~
-· ...,
~
.'Tj
"'~ ......
I RESEARCH I
~ RISK
IDENTIFICATION
1 HAZARD
I HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
J I HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
I ~ [
"' P>
i); ~
IDENTIFICATION RISK
"' "'
a ::r
g tJ
..... ..--,
ESTIMATION
. . . cz
0
~(/)
I RISK I DOSE-RESPONSE
ASSESSMENT I RISK I RISK .g
(1)
"'
~
'-"
ESTIMATION
I EXPOSURE
ASSESSMENT
I ESTIMATION ESTIMATION
I RISK
CHARACTERISATION
I
I RISK
EVALUATION
I DEVELOPMENT
OF REGULATORY
RISK
EVALUATION
DEVELOPMENT
OF ALTERNATIVE
RISK
EVALUATION
OPTIONS COURSES OF ACTION
I EVALUATION OF
OPTIONS
DECISION
ANALYSIS
I RISK I DECISIONS RISK I IMPLEMENTATION I RISK

MANAGEMENT I AND ACTIONS MANAGEMENT
~ MONITORING I MANAGEMENT
AND EVALUATION
L~E:VIEIJV' J
......
Figure 2.4 A comparison of some risk management systems as outlined by Krewski and Birkwood (1986). ~

corresponding quantities measured (based on Fell, 1994).
RISK MANAGEMENT
Com- Hazard Risk
Risk Risk
po- Identification and Communica-
Assessment Evaluation
nents Assessment tion
Quanti- Vulnerability (V) Risk
Proba-
ties Magnitude Perception,
bility Spatial Loss Temporal
Mea- (M) (P)
Acceptable
sured (Vs) ( lt'f) (Vr) Risk
2.1.3.2 Main Issues and Approaches

Even though the science of risk may be said to be maturing (The Royal
Society, 1992 and 1983), risk management as a complete organisational/
institutional system can still be seen to be evolving (Health and Safety
Executive, 1989a and b). While many guidelines, regulations and procedures
have been laid down by legislatures, regulatory agencies, industries and
individual companies, most are based on experience and reactions to public
attitudes in an ad hoc manner (The Royal Society, 1992). In short, a risk culture
does not yet underlie every aspect of organisational life. According to the Royal
Society, risk management is the making of decisions concerning risks and their
subsequent implementation, and flows from risk estimation and risk evaluation
as shown in Figure 2.5.
r-------------------,
I RISK ASSESSMENT I
iI /' i
I
RISK ESTIMATION RISK EVALUATION
~------~--~------J
RISK MANAGEMENT
Figure 2.5 The process of risk management as described by the Royal Society
(1992).
Risk management issues are covered in a broad range of papers edited by

Lave (1987). They give a useful overview of the main issues in risk management,
and highlight development and application of risk assessment methods for a
broad range of mainly environmental risk applications.
The most developed procedures that may be viewed as risk management
systems can be found in the nuclear industry, followed by the chemical industry.
Both are discussed in below.
2.1.3.3 Risk Management in the Chemical and Nuclear Industries
Bodies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in the United States, the United Kingdom's Atomic Energy
Authority and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate have developed what
one may generically class as risk management systems. This may well be due to
the great public opposition to nuclear energy, and the tremendous pressure on
nuclear reactor safety in the wake of accidents such as Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl (see for example Health and Safety Commission, 1988).
Because of its perceived high danger and negative impacts, especially after
the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, the nuclear industry is subject
to the most advanced and rigorous risk assessment techniques (The Royal
Society, 1992). Commencing with the nuclear reactor safety study in the United
States (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975), the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has carried out extensive research and development of
applied risk assessment techniques. An indication of some of the risk issues
dealt with in the nuclear industry can be found in proceedings of international
seminars (eg ASCE, 1977) and numerous publications (eg Bernreuter et al,
1989).
The Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom released a draft
report on the tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations (Health and Safety
Executive, 1988), which received many comments (Health and Safety
Commission, 1988). A detailed discussion on the tolerability of risk is contained
in the revised document (Health and Safety Executive, 1992). This highlights
the many issues pertaining to nuclear power generation.
In Australia, nuclear safety assessment criteria have also been published
(Higson, 1990). They are similar to those used internationally, closely following
the criteria developed in the united States and United Kingdom. The Australian
nuclear safety assessment criteria are compared by Higson (1989) to other risks
experienced by individuals in Australia, and are found to be much lower.
The other area of highly developed risk management systems (in a generic
sense) is the chemical industry. An excellent overview of risk management in the
chemical industries on a world -wide basis is given by Lees (1980). This detailed
text covers hazard, accident and loss, legislation, economics and insurance, risk
management systems and reliability engineering. Lees reviews pertinent
technical risk assessment topics in detail. For the chemical industries, the
output of a risk assessment is presented in one of the following three forms
(Health and Safety Executive, 1989a):
o Graphs of individual risk against distance from the risk source,
assuming an uniform wind distribution (see Figure 2.6),
o Contours of individual risk overlaid onto maps of an area, taking into
account the actual, non -uniform wind direction and weather
conditions, as shown in Figure 2. 7, and
o Societal risk in the form of FN curve. FN curves are discussed in
detail in section 9.1.1.1.
A useful overview text for the British perspective on risk in chemical industries
are the risk criteria for land -use planning in the vicinity of major industrial
hazards (Health and Safety Executive, 1989b). These cover the types of risk, and
discuss individual and social risk criteria at length. A similar, but much briefer,
publication was written in Australia on the same theme by the NSW
Department of Planning (1992). Specific individual risk criteria for fatality and
injury risk levels are given, while societal risk is discussed in a qualitative sense
only. Rohrmann (1993) details the management of environmental risk form an
Australian perspective by the setting of specific risk standards at length.
The management of Potentially Hazardous Installations (PHis) in Hong
Kong is overviewed by Wrigley and Tromp (1995), and set down in detail by the
Hong Kong Planning Department (1994). The guidelines include quantitative
individual and societal risk guidelines. In Canada, risk analysis requirements
and guidelines are given in Canadian Standard CAN/CSA-Q634-M91
(Canadian Standards Association, 1991) in a generic format, and are mainly
aimed at technological hazards. In the United States, a recent publication by the
Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants details current
approaches in this arena, gives strategies for improving risk assessment and
outlines the implementation of the findings (US National Research Council,
1994).
Many organisations have methods that encompass hazard identification,
hazard assessment and risk assessment, but do not provide complete risk
management systems. For a listing of such organisations refer to ANCOLD
(1994). Several engineering organisations that fall into this category are noted
in Section 9.1.1.2.
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Executive, 1989b).
2.1.3.4 The Value of Risk Management Systems

Risk management is being used more and more extensively in a formal
manner (The Royal Society, 1992). However, the fact remains that most
decisions substantially affecting lives, property and the environment include
the assessment of risk, and the vast majority of these are made informally, even
unawares. The persons involved in the process may not realise that what they
are doing is risk management, but they are still making decisions regarding
options following an evaluation of alternatives, which of course includes an
assessment of risk. One of the main reasons why use of formal risk management
has increased so dramatically in recent years is precisely due to the fact that
decisions were being made about significant projects with wide-ranging

impacts using an implied, informal risk management system. It is perceived by
many that formal risk management can introduce more consistency and
documentation to such decision making processes (Health and Safety Executive,
1989b). The potential advantages of a formal, rigorous risk management
include:
o a wider scope of consideration of issues and alternatives,
o clearer, de-mythified and documented decision making processes,
o increased public participation and input, and
o inclusion of different perspectives and frames of reference.
Housing tB!l
Industrial D
hazard V7777A
site l::'fifLA
\
Major hazard •
store area
Figure 2.7 Contours of individual risk overlaid onto maps of an area (Health
and Safety Executive, 1989b)
Whether the potential advantages are realised or not hinges heavily on the
control the initiating group has over the breadth and scope of the analysis, other
groups' involvement in the process and degree of awareness of the limitations
and criticisms of risk management systems.
2.1.3.5 Limitations and Criticisms
In the controversy over risk management, several "stakeholder" groups

can be identified on either side (Ronge ,1982). The pro-risk management
groups invariably include governments, institutions, industry, business and
technocrats such as engineers and scientists. The anti-risk management
groups often comprise of environmental and political activist groups. The
general public appears to be more of a "fence sitter, pulled in both directions by
the various groups", argues Ronge. It is probably fair to say that the public is at
least vary or suspicious of formal risk analyses.
The proponents of risk management systems have developed specific
procedures for the evaluation of risks and as an aid in decision making. A fairly
general overview of these can be found in the book "Acceptable Risk" by
Fischhoff et al (1981), who broadly classify risk management into three
approaches:
o professional judgement (experts devise solutions, ie expert systems),
o bootstrapping (historical precedents), and
o formal analysis (theory- based procedures).
The opponents of risk management systems are many. The Royal Society (1992)
identifies the key issues fought over as control of the decision making process
(which risk assessment is often part of), risk perception and acceptable risk, and
the sociological/cultural context of risk analysis.
A majority of the criticism form part of the social processes of
conflict/negotiation/compromise and hence are a means to an end rather than
honest criticisms of risk management (Douglas, 1985). In broad terms,
according to the Royal Society (1992), some of the limitations of risk
management systems are:
o being part of a social/cultural context and hence used as a means to an
end,
o limited understanding of the particular technology in question,
o limited scope of analysis necessary to make it quantifiable, and
o underlying uncertainties, judgments and assumptions.
In spite of these criticisms the author is of the view that risk management can be
a useful tool if the users are aware of its limitations.
2.1.4 Hazard Identification and Assessment

Having reviewed the literature relevant to risk management systems in
the previous component, this component proceeds to examine publications
regarding hazard identification, assessment of hazard magnitude and the
probability of occurrence of the hazard.
2.1.4.1 Hazard Identification

Many varied techniques are in existence, depending on the area of focus.
Some techniques of estimating engineering hazards include (The Royal Society,
1992):
o safety audits,
o hazard surveys,
o hazard indices, and
o hazard and operability studies.
For a more detailed listing and discussion of hazard identification techniques in
the process industries the interested leader is referred to Lees (1980). Section
2.2 of the review discusses the identification of geotechnical engineering
hazards with a focus on landslides and dams.
2.1.4.2 Assessment of Hazard Magnitude

The assessment of the hazard's magnitude can be drawn out during the
identification phase outlined above (The Royal Society, 1992). Often smaller
magnitudes can readily be identified from past experience or historical records.
This step can be difficult for newer or larger magnitude hazards for which an
adequate historical database may not be available. In these instances
hypothetical scenarios and situations must be modelled.
At this point it is worthwhile to note that some hazards have a relatively
low magnitude but seem to occur more frequently while others of a high
magnitude are more rare (Waller and Covello, 1984). A useful paper by
Thompson and Parkinson (1984) outlines different approaches used to
distinguish between frequent hazards of low magnitude and rare hazards of
high (catastrophic) magnitude. Again only a hypothetical assessment of the
"worst possible" hazards can be made as they have not yet, by definition,
occurred (Waller and Covello eds., 1984). Examples of high probability, low
consequence events are natural events such as storms and small rock falls, and
man -made events such as automobile accidents. Their annual probabilities are
suggested to lie in the range of 10- 1 to 10- 3. According to Waller and Covello,
low probability, high consequence events in the natural realm include include
floods, fires and large earthquakes, and in the man -made realm, nuclear
reactor meltdowns, explosions in chemical complexes and wars. The annual

probabilities may range from 10- 4 down.
2.1.4.3 Assessment of the Probability of Hazard Occurrence

This component on the probability of occurrence of the hazard, following
the introductory remarks, discusses the three main methods in the literature
apart from standard statistical procedures. These are expert judgement, Bayes
theorem and reliability and failure analysis, and publications pertaining to each
are discussed in sequence.
The area of hazard frequencies or probabilities of occurrence has been
widely and continually researched on many fronts and in a vast number of fields
(The Royal Society, 1992). For Quantified Risk Assessments (QRAs), sometimes
known as Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), this component is a crucial
element as the assessment of hazard involves the combination of magnitude and
probability of occurrence. Calculations of probabilities can be performed
through one of the following broad approaches (Health and Safety Executive,
1989b): .
o statistical analysis (classical or extreme event theory),
o expert judgement,
o combining statistics and expert judgement (Bayes theorem), and
o reliability and failure analysis.
The boundaries between these are somewhat arbitrary and used to illustrate a
point. Of course a reliability and failure analysis may well incorporate
statistical, judgmental and Bayesian probabilities. Expert judgement, Bayes
theorem and reliability and failure analysis are elaborated on further below.
A) Expert Judgement
General guidelines for the use of expert opinion for the estimation of
probabilities are difficult to define as the use is very problem-specific (Health
and Safety Executive, 1988). The basic steps of eliciting experts' opinions and
their aggregation can be found in all the methods, with varying details. Otway
and von Winterfeld (1992) outline some of the pitfalls in the use of expert
judgement. A brief summary of the methods of expert estimate elicitation from
Roberds (1990) is given in a condensed format below.
i) Self Assessment
The analyst does not use expert opinion but interprets the available
information himself/herself. The method suffers from poor quantification of
uncertainty, uncorrected biases or unspecified assumptions, imprecision and
potential lack of credibility.
ii) Informal Solicitation of Expert Opinion

The analyst asks the expert to analyse the data. The method suffers from
the same problems as self assessment except that estimates are enhanced by the
credibility of the expert.
iii) Calibrated Assessment

In this method the expert's biases are identified and calibrated, and the
assessments corrected for such biases.
iv) Probability Encoding

The method uses analysts trained in probability theory to train the expert
on uncertainty, identification and minimisation of bias, and definition of the
item to be assessed in an unambiguous manner. The analysts elicit and
document the rationale of the expert's approach and his assessment of checks.
The process is repeated if necessary. This method is thorough but costly.
v) Means of Obtaining Consensus

If consensus rather than aggregates of estimates are desired, the following
processes can be used to develop consensus (Roberds, 1990):
o open forum,
o del phi panel,
o group probability encoding, or
o formal group evaluation.
The procedure for selecting one of the techniques is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
The aggregation of individual expert probability estimates can be
performed by a simple average or a weighting of individual estimates. An
example of a complex formal procedure is the use of expert panels by the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the characterisation of seismic hazard to
nuclear plants in Eastern USA (Bernreuter et al, 1989). Two panels were
formed, one of ground motion experts, and a second of seismicity experts. A
thorough procedure, designed to identify and eliminate biases, was followed to
arrive at the final estimate. Another author, Vick (1992), differentiates between
judgmental and statistical probability, and gives guidelines for judgmental
probability practice.
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(low)
Figure 2.8 Procedure for selecting expert judgement techniques. (Roberds,

1990).
Apostolakis (1989) noted the following points regarding the use of expert
estimates of probability:
o Avoid a direct estimation of moments or parameters of distribution as
their meaning is difficult to comprehend fully.
o Intuitive estimates of the mode or median of a distribution are fairly
accurate. Estimates of the mean are biased towards the median,
hence Apostolakis suggests that a 'best estimate' is in fact a median
value.
o Experts produce probability distributions that are too "tight"
compared to their actual state of knowledge ie experts are
overconfident about the level of uncertainty in their knowledge
o Formal methods of probability estimates improve the estimates.
o Low probability estimates have little meaning ie low probabilities
cannot be estimated directly.
One way to circumvent the problem of low probability estimates is to decompose
a complex low probability, high consequence event using event trees or fault
trees, estimate and then combine the individual event probabilities. This is
because it is easier to estimate simple event probabilities in a range say 1.0 to 0.1
than low probabilities, say less than 10- 3 (Vick 1992, Apostolakis 1989). The
use of event trees and fault trees incorporates a large amount of both statistical
and expert estimation of probabilities. Event trees and fault trees are discussed
further below under Reliability and Failure Analysis.
B) Bayes Theorem
Bayes theorem is used to assess available data and incorporate prior
information such as expert opinion into the calculated probabilities (Reid, 1991;
Benjamin and Cornell, 1970; Ang and Tang, 1975). For a simple case of two
intersecting events A and B, the conditional probability of event A given that
event B has occurred is:
P(A lBJ = P(AnB)/P(B) 2.2
where P(A) is the probability of event A, P(B) is the probability of event B,

P(A IB) is the conditional probability ofA occurring given B occurs, and P(A nB)
is the probability that both events A and B occur. According to the Total
Probability theorem, given a set of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive events B1, B2, ... Bn, the Probability P(A) of another event can be
expressed as (Reid, 1991):
P(A) = P(AnB1) + P(AnB2) + .......... P(AnBnJ

= L P(AnBiJ
2.3
Bayes theorem follows on from the Total Probability theorem. It states that the
conditional probability Bj given the event A is (Reid, 1991):
P(Bj IAJ= P(Bj nAJ/P(AJ

= P(AnBj)/P(A)
P(AlB)PCB)
= =:---_.:;___.:;___
_IP(AlB)PCB) 2.4
Bayes theorem allows updating of prior probabilities P(Bj) to yield posterior

probabilities P(Bj IAJ given new information A (Reid, 1991).
Decision analysis based on statistical decision theory can be used to
identify decisions which would maximise the benefits according to utilitarian
theory. Reid (1991) points out that Bayes theorem can be used the expected
value of further information relevant to a decision - this is known as
"preposterior analysis". Reid notes that the methods of decision analysis and
preposterior analysis are described in standard texts such as Benjamin and
Cornell (1970).
C) Reliability and Failure Analysis

Reliability and failure analysis is generally applied to systems consisting of
many interrelated components (Lees, 1980). The system needs to be able be
broken down into components and their relationships or dependencies need to
be modelled. The failure of one or more components may lead to the failure of
the system as a whole. The analysis techniques include Quantitative Risk
Assessments (QRAs), sometimes known as Probabilistic Risk Assessments
(PRAs).
QRAs are based on a system of analysis and reliability engineering
techniques. The techniques are applicable for use on complex systems of
discreet components which perform specific functions, and can fail. Detailed
discussions of these techniques can be found in texts such as Lees (1980). The
text by Henley and Kumamoto (1992) on PRA sees risk assessment being carried
out in the following three stages:
o Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA),
o Identification of accident sequences using event trees and fault trees,
and
o consequence analysis.
A more detailed QRA methodology is given by Reid (1991) as follows:
o identification of risk-generating hazards (natural and man-made),
o identification of system components,
o analysis of the functional relationships between the system
components,
o identification of potential system failure modes or sequences,
o estimation of the probability or rate of occurrence of a system failure
for each failure mode, and
o analysis of the consequences of system failures.
The Health and Safety Executive (1989b) looks at the strength and limitations
of QRA. A review of sixteen decisions in UK case studies employing QRA reveals
the diverse applications and limited impact of QRAs in decision making. The
main point is that QRAs vary in purpose and detail, are site and proposition
specific and hence not directly comparable. The Health and Safety Executive
notes that while individual risks can be benchmarked numerically, albeit with
qualifications, this is impossible to do with societal risk. Appendix 1 of the
document lists factors affecting the "acceptability" of societal risk. Other
authors such as Linnerooth-Bayer and Walhstrom (1991) also note the

difficulty of comparisons of risks derived from different QRAs. In contrast Iman
and Helton (1991) argue that complex QRA's are repeatable. It is worthwhile to
note that the main concerns with the application of QRA are the completeness of
evaluation of all hazards and their repeatability.
The main elements of QRAs are event trees and fault trees. These enable
the estimation of low probabilities by estimating individual component failure
probabilities and combining these to give the overall system failure probability.
This is due to the fact that it is easier to estimate probabilities in the range 1.0 to
0.1 rather than lower values (Vick, 1992; Apostolakis, 1989). Each is described
in sequence below.
i) Event Tree
An event tree represents possible consequences of events involving the
success or failure of discreet system components (or sub-systems) which are
intended to perform specific functions (Reid, 1991). An event tree grows from an
initiating event and it branches wherever a system component acting in a chain
of events might either succeed or fail in the performance of its intended function.
Figure 2.9 shows a portion of an event tree for a dam and spillway.
Conditional probabilities are assigned to each event, and hence the
combined probability of undesirable events can be calculated. In the chemical,
nuclear, and transport industries a set of initiating events can be used to
determine the risks due to all the possible outcomes and hence the risk due to a
part of the industry or the industry in its entirety. The basic problems that are
encountered are the accuracy of estimates of conditional probabilities assigned
to different events and the completeness of the set of initiating events. The
transportation industry has a lot of historical data for both, whereas the
chemical and nuclear industries have to rely heavily on models of situations to
augment the limited data on probabilities (Reid,1991).
ii) Fault Tree

A fault tree represents the combinations and sequences of events
(sub-system failures) which could cause a particular system failure (Lees,
1980). A fault tree is traced back from a particular system failure event (referred
to as the 'top event') and it spreads down through lower level events until it
reaches the basic failure events (ie the basic causes of the system failure
including human errors). A fault tree has a branching structure defined by logic
gates located at branch intersections. The logic gates (AND gates and OR gates)
define the causal relationships between lower level and higher level events. The
basic root-like structure of the fault tree is shown in Figure 2.10. A fault tree
can be used to derive an estimate of the probability of occurrence of the top event
from estimates of the probabilities of the basic events. An example of an outline
fault tree for a hazard survey is illustrated in Figure 2.11.
This component concludes the review of general literature on hazard
identification and hazard assessment. The following section looks at the next
step - risk assessment.
Figure 2.9 An example of a portion of an event tree for a dam and spillway
(Nielsen et al, 1994).
SYSTEM TOP
EVENTS
LOWER
SUBSYSTEM 1 SUBSYSTEM 2 SUBSYSTEM 3 EVENTS
FAILURE FAILURE
OF BASIC OF BASIC BASIC
COMPONENT COMPONENT EVENTS
2
Figure 2.10 Illustration of the basic root-like structure of the fault tree (Reid,
1991).
Figure 2.11 Outline fault tree for a hazard survey (Lees, 1980).
2.1.5 Risk Assessment

Having discussed hazard identification and assessment in the previous
component, this component reviews the literature pertaining to risk
assessment. As discussed previously, risk assessment comprises of the
evaluation oflosses resulting from the occurrence of a hazard. It is pertinent to
first discuss the measures of risk used in risk assessments. Secondly, literature
covering the vulnerability of elements at risk and its calculation is reviewed.
The third component covers methods of risk assessment.
2.1.5.1 Measures of Risk

Risks can be measured using a wide variety of indicators (Health and
Safety Executive, 1989a). The three broad categories, discussed below, are
human risks, economic risks and environmental risks.
A) Risks to Humans
These risks are expressed either as specific (individual) or total (societal)
risks. Specific risks to humans usually take one of the following forms (The
Royal Society, 1992):
o Mortality rate- per entire population or a designated sub-group, eg
a housing estate near a chemical plant.
o Death per unit measure of activity - eg passenger deaths per

passenger hours. For occupational risk the Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)
is commonly used.
o Loss of life expectancy - eg in years per person.
The specific risks will vary depending on the group under consideration. For
example the specific risk of injury from chemical plant accidents averaged over
the whole population will be lower than for an individual living in the vicinity of
such a plant.
Total risks are commonly expressed as FN or Farmer curves indicating, for
a particular hazard, the cumulative frequency (F) of the hazard killing N or
more people (N) (Health and Safety Executive, 1989a). Figure 2.12 is an
example of a FN or Farmer curve. Further examples can be found in section
9 .1.1.2. These curves are based on a combination of actuarial lines (from actual
events) combined with the results of risk assessments (potential events) (The
Royal Society, 1992). Some European countries have used data from major
natural disasters and man-made accidents as a basis of deriving a total risk
acceptability curve, notes the NSW Department of Planning (1992). However,
the NSW Department of Planning also lists the following difficulties with using
the FN curve approach to total risk:
o the shape of the curve is totally governed by the largest event,
o such a curve is difficult to interpret,
o society's aversion to events with multiple fatalities is not accounted
for,
o injuries and illness are not accounted for, and
o fates "worse than death" are not accounted for.
As a result, FN curves are used with caution (NSW Department of Planning,
1992), and qualitative measures of societal risk are often employed (Health and
Safety Executive, 1989a). Knowledge of current specific risks of death, disease
or injury borne by society is an essential input to the evaluation of risk
assessment results. The quantitative data on numerous specific and societal
risks are discussed in detail in sections 9.1.1.1 and 9.1.1.2.
B) Economic Risks
The study of economic risks is perhaps the oldest of all risk assessments
(The Royal Society; 1992), and will not be elaborated upon. Economic risks are
almost always expressed in monetary terms such as loss of profit, loss of value,
etc, and are beyond the scope of the literature review. The Royal Society (1992)
offers further reading material references on this topic.
10
Fatalities, x
Figure 2.12 Societal risk (FN) curve for some human-caused risks in the USA
(US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975).
C) Environmental Risks
Environmental risks are also expressed in a multitude of terms such as the
amount of pollutants in air, water or in the ground, percentage loss of soil
fertility, and so on. These measures will also not be elaborated further in this
review. Toxicology is the specialist science that deals with the investigation of
substances in the environment that are harmful to humans. Once again, The
Royal Society (1992) offers further references.
2.1.5.2 Vulnerability of Elements at Risk
The assessment of the vulnerability of the elements at risk is a crucial step in

any risk assessment. The author has reviewed the literature and researched this
aspect in some detail in regards to landsliding. The review of vulnerability
literature in section 6.1 addresses landslide runout distance and related issues.
2.1.5.3 Methods of Risk Assessment

Various methods of risk assessment exist, obviously depending on the
hazards being analysed. A general exhaustive listing of all available methods
would itself almost be a thesis document in itself, and is beyond the scope of this
literature review. The various institutional approaches to the risk assessment of
slopes are outlined in section 2.2.2.
2.1.6 Risk Evaluation

The results of risk assessments need to be evaluated. Different examples of
risk evaluation paradigms are presented in an overview paper by Rowe (1989).
For risk assessments of existing facilities, the evaluation that follows needs to
determine whether the risks are acceptable, and if not, what should be done to
lower them. For risk assessments of new facilities, the evaluation needs to
determine the "best" possible site or option, and whether the safeguards are
sufficient. These evaluations directly influence decisions regarding the
allocation of substantial resources and are not made lightly. As the public is also
directly affected the whole evaluation process involves conflict, negotiation and
compromise (McDonell, 1991). The whole area of risk perception and acceptable
risk impacts on the process.
The general concepts of acceptable and tolerable risk, historical landslide
risks, the legal implications oflandsliding and the psychology of risk perception
are reviewed in section 9.1.
2.1.7 Decision Making and Risk Communication

This brief part of the literature review firstly outlines the basic references
for the interested reader's follow-up of general decision making theories and
organisational structuring, which are beyond the scope of this thesis. Secondly a
brief discussion on risk communication gives an insight into the art this field has
become.
2.1.7.1 Risk-Based Decision Making and Decision Analysis

There is a very large (and rapidly growing) body of literature on decision
making and decision analysis per se. However, applications using a risk- based
framework are relatively new. AN COLD (1994) gives a succinct and yet quite
detailed overview of the chronology of the emergence of the basic decision
making theories such as the Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 194 7), the Allais paradox CAllais, 1953), Multi-Attribute Utility
Theory (Raiffa, 1968), Surrogate Worth Trade-Off method (Haimes and Hall,
1974), and the Risk- Bearing Theory (Arrow, 1974). A report by Kates (1976)
specifically addresses responses to risk in decision making. This is only a brief
sketch of the body of publications pertaining to decision making and decision
analysis. The interested reader is referred to ANCOLD (1994) and The Royal
Society (1992) for further details.
2.1. 7.2 Risk Communication
Risk communication brings the general literature review of risk

management systems to a close. Risk communication has become an art and a
field in itself (viz the Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, 1989).
It is central to public risk controversies. A risk communication framework with
quite a comprehensive coverage of issues such as gaps and uncertainties in
knowledge, scientific judgement and errors in judgement and influence of
human values on knowledge about risk is given by the Committee on Risk
Perception and Communication. Conflicts about hazards and risks are
discussed from a risk communication perspective.
Fischhoff et al (1993) discuss risk communication from a public health
perspective. They note that risk communication is a "complicated business",
and treat the issues of selecting which risk information to communicate,
formatting of the information and the evaluation of communication in their
paper. Renn (1992) reviews the literature on the three main functions of risk
communication: message recognition, inducement of attitude and behavioural
changes, and resolution of risk-related conflicts. The paper also discusses the
structure of the communication process from a descriptive and a normative
point of view, and draws on studies about risk perception and communication to
develop some guidelines for successful risk communication.
Rohrmann (1995c) focuses on comprehension, acceptance of messages and
the link between knowledge and actual behaviour in bushfire emergencies in his
paper on a conceptual risk communication framework for bushfire risk.
Rohrmann ends his analysis with suggestions for the design and distribution of
fire hazard information to the public, and enhancement of commitment and
preparedness. Rohrmann also recommends integrated risk evaluation research
as part of the further development of risk communication. Goldstein et al (1992)
suggest that using the comparison of risk to groundlings from aircraft accidents
can make a contribution toward effective risk comparison with chemical and
physical hazards in the environment, while noting that this will not solve all
difficult risk communication "dilemma".
An example of a public relations exercise in risk communication relevant to
hazardous waste sites is given by O'Connor and Bord (1991). The authors
clearly demonstrate the influence of ways of presenting risk information on its
public acceptability. Fisher (1991) argues that risk communication is made
difficult by the fact that the public has a bi-modal risk perception, either
ignoring risks or strongly protesting against them.
2.1.8 Summary
The review of the general risk literature has highlighted the fact that
varying definitions of risk-related terms are in use, with no consensus even for
important terms such as risk, hazard and so on. Consequently, definitions of
risk need to be clearly stated at the beginning of any risk- based study or work.
The review of publications on risk management systems showed the basic
underlying similarity of the various systems in use. Risk management can be
basically seen to consists of four broad components: hazard identification and
assessment, risk assessment, risk evaluation and decision making and risk
communication. The engineering input to the process is mainly applied in the
first two components. The main issues and approaches, the value of risk
management systems, and their limitations and criticisms were reviewed. Risk
management systems in the chemical and nuclear industries were discussed, as
they are the most developed systems in the risk arena.
The hazard identification and assessment literature review component
described the findings of the literature review regarding hazard identification,
assessment of hazard magnitude and assessment of the probability of
occurrence of the hazard. It was shown that the approaches and techniques used
depend on the area of application. Numerous methods of assessing the
probability of occurrence exist, and appropriate usage is again governed by the
area of application, the availability of resources and relevant data.
Literature regarding risk assessment is varied and broad. The numerous
measures of risk were overviewed. Means of assessing the vulnerability of
elements at risk are not covered in the literature. Methods of risk assessment
were not exhaustively reviewed, however, the main techniques used in various
areas were discussed. Risk assessment methods for slopes are reviewed in
section 2.2.2. Similarly, the process of risk evaluation, which covers acceptable
risk, tolerable risk and the psychology of landslide risk perception is reviewed in
section 9.1. A brief overview of the complex areas of risk- based decision making
and risk communication completed the general risk literature review.
The review of risk management systems in geotechnical engineering
follows.
2.2 Risk Management Systems in Geotechnical Engineering

From the author's review of the literature there appear to be no complete
"generic" geotechnical risk management systems per se. However, risk
assessments have spread extensively into the field of geotechnical engineering
in various degrees of detail and sophistication (Whitman, 1984), reflecting the
trends in risk assessments generally, which were discussed in Section 2.1.5. This
section commences with a general review of publications regarding geotechnical
risk management systems. The second and third components review literature
specific to risk assessments of landslides and dams respectively. A brief fourth
section indicates the current issues in risk assessment of groundwater pollution
and waste disposal sites, the detailed review of which is beyond the scope of this
literature review. A summary component brings the section to a close.
2.2.1 General Publications Dealing with Geotechnical Risk

A number of overview papers on geotechnical risk have emerged during the
literature search. The following is a reasonably representative selection, though
by no means exhaustive. The interested reader is referred to these papers if
further details other than those presented in this necessarily brief review are
required.
One of the most recent publications on managing geotechnical risk is that
of Morgenstern (1995a). Morgenstern outlines risk assessment concepts,
discusses acceptable risk, uncertainty, risk assessment and risk management,
concluding that risk analysis is only one of the inputs to risk management
decision making.
A good overview of risk assessment in geotechnical engineering can be
found in Whitman's 1984 paper. Basic geotechnical engineering concepts and
their uses in geotechnical risk assessments are illustrated. Whitman also
produced a FN curve, presumably to be used for the evaluation of total (societal)
risks for selected engineering projects. It is reproduced in Figure 9.3 in section
9.1.1.1.
Olshansky (1990) looks specifically at landslide case studies from a
planning and policy development point of view. His book appears to be one of
very few publications in the literature dealing with risk management issues on a
broad policy basis. It is interesting to note the contrast made by Olshansky
between using engineering or planning as a means of controlling landslide risk.

He concludes with a proposal for a coordinated approach to reduce landslide
"damage" (risk in this author's definitions) with short-term and long-term
strategies for compensation and control.
Haimes and Stakhiv (1987) edited the proceedings from an American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) conference titled "Risk Analysis and
Management ofNatural and Man-Made Hazards". The papers within address
a variety of issues pertaining to the management of risk in engineering.
Keaton and Eckhoff (1990) apply a value-engineering approach to the
management of geologic hazards. Keaton and Eckhoff analyse the following five
response alternatives to geologic hazards:
o continue current practice (the "do nothing" option),
o modify the hazard,
o modify the element at risk,
0 modify the operation/procedure, or
0 avoid the hazard.
A risk-based framework of alternatives using probabilistic evaluation, event
trees and the value engineering approach is outlined. Keaton and Eckhoff note
that this approach requires a multi -disciplinary effort (and a large database,
the author would add) in order to succeed. Hungr at al (1992) also discuss the
reduction of the cost of natural hazard damages.
A general discussion and comparison of risk models for slope stability is
given by Chowdhury and Tang (1987). Yen (1989) offers another overview of risk
and reliability in engineering. The Institution of Engineers, Australia, (1993)
has also recently published a booklet on dealing with risk, which contributes to
the debate about the roles of engineers in risk management. Vick (1992) looks at
risk in geotechnical practice in a general sense, encouraging practitioners to use
probabilistic methods in risk assessment. An overview of the applicability of
some reliability and probabilistic methods is given by Lacasse (1994).
Probabilistic methods in geotechnical engineering are also discussed by the
National Research Council (1995). These examples are by no means exhaustive
but rather serve to give the reader a perspective on the thinking on risk
management in various geotechnical engineering communities.
The following components look at risk assessments of landsliding, dams,
groundwater pollution and waste dumps, as these are currently the main areas
for application of risk assessments in geotechnical engineering.
2.2.2 Risk Assessment of Landslides

Landsliding has been subject to numerous studies striving to recognise,
characterise and understand the hazards associated with it and the risks arising
from it. The first component reviews general publications dealing with
geotechnical risk. The second component highlights the great diversity in
definitions and terms used in landslide risk assessment. The third component
examines the means of identifying and assessing landslide hazards. The fourth
component looks at various landslide risk assessment procedures. The fifth
component discusses landslide risk evaluation.
2.2.2.1 General Landslide Texts

Numerous general texts describing landslides and their control exist. A
commonly referenced text is "Landslides and Their Control" by Zaruba and
Mend (1982). Zaruba and Mend describe the factors causing mass movements,
classification, failure mechanics, methods of landslide investigation, stability
analyses, corrective measures and urban planning. Another frequent reference
is "Landslides: Analysis and Control", edited by Schuster and Krizek (1978).
Other texts include Brusden and Prior (1984), Crozier (1986), Anderson and
Richards eds. (1987), Walker and Fell eds. (1987), Nieuwenhuis (1991) and Veder
(1981). More specific publications describe landslides in particular countries (eg
Jones and Lee, 1994, for landslides in the United Kingdom), or focus on certain
landslide types such as, for example, debris flows (Costa and Wieczorek eds.,
1987) or landslide dams (Costa and Schuster, 1991).
Current topis in landslide risk are elaborated in international landslide
symposia (see Bonnard ed., 1988; Bell ed. 1992 and 1995) and specialty
conferences (ASCE, 1992; Utah Water research Laboratory, 1985; The Erosion
Control Engineering Society, 1985; The Institution of Engineers (UK), 1991;
The Institution of Engineers (Australia), 1988; The Institution of Engineers
(New Zealand), 1992).
2.2.2.2 Definitions
There are no generally accepted definitions in landslide risk terminology,
resulting in a wide, overlapping range of usage to the point where one author's
understanding of the term risk equates to another's of the term hazard, and so
on. A useful review of definitions is given by Fell (1994). The main authors
reviewed include Varnes and the International Association of Engineering
Geology Commission on Landslides and Other Mass Movements on Slopes
(Varnes and IAEG/CLOMMS, 1984), Hunt (1984) Einstein (1988), and Morgan
et al (1992). A mention of the definition of the Australian Geomechanics Society
Sydney Group (Walker et al, 1985) is also made. Salient points of the review are
noted below.
A) Varnes and IAEG/CLOMMS (1984)
Varnes and IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) reviewed the principles and practice of

landslide zonation and proposed the use of the following office of the United
Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) and UNESCO definitions:
Natural Hazard (H)
Natural hazard means the probability of occurrence of a potentially
damaging phenomenon within a specified period of time and within a given
area.
Vulnerability (V)
The degree of loss of a given element(s) at risk resulting from the
occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude. It is expressed
on a scale from 0 (no damage) to 1 (total loss).
Specific Risk (Jls)
The expected degree ofloss due to a particular natural phenomenon, hence
Rs =H XV.
Element(s) at Risk (E)
The population, properties, economic activities, etc at risk in a given area.
Total Risk <Rt)
The expected number of lives lost, persons injured, damage to property or
disruption of economic activity due to a particular natural phenomenon,
hence Rt = E X R 8 , and Rt = E X H X V.
Fell (1994) noted that Varnes and the IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) does not define the
commonly used terms in slope stability zoning such as "high", "medium" or
"low" risk etc.
B) Hunt (1984)
Hunt (1984) gives the following definitions:
Hazard
The slope failure itself in terms of its potential magnitude and probability
of occurrence.
Risk
The consequences of failure on human activities.
These are consistent with Varnes and the IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) definitions.
C) Einstein (1988)
Einstein (1988) in his special lecture on landslide risk used the following
terms:
Danger
The description of the geometry and classification of landslide.
Hazard
The probability that a particular danger occurs within a given period of
time.
Risk
The product of hazard and potential loss. Loss can involve loss of life and
injuries, capital loss or environmental effects.
Einstein (1988) also discusses some other definitions of risk.
D) Morgan et al (1992)
Morgan et al (1992) when assessing risk from debris flows in British
Columbia defined risk in terms of the annual probability of loss of life to an
individual (PDI) and suggested it could be calculated from:
PDI = P(H) x P(SIHJ x P(TISJ x P(LITJ 2.5
where P(H) is the annual probability of the hazardous event, P(S IH) is the
probability of spatial impact (ie on a house) given the event, P(T IS) is the
probability of temporal impact (ie house occupancy) given the spatial impact,
and P(L IT) is the probability of loss of life of an individual occupant. Morgan et
al (1992) termed the product of the last three probabilities "severity", hence
PDI = P(H) x Severity 2.6
where
Severity= P(SIHJ x P(TISJ x P(LITJ. 2.7
E) Walker et al (1985)
The Sydney group of the Australian Geomechanics Society developed a risk
classification in which the terms were a mixture of the probability of occurrence,
the consequences of failure and the method of assessing the evidence of
instability (Walker et al, 1985). The scheme contained mixed terminology, and
used the terms risk and hazard interchangeably. Following years of practical
usage the paper's shortcomings were revealed, and it is currently under review
by a sub-committee of the Australian Geomechanics Society, chaired by B. F.
Walker (Fell, 1992). The sub-committee is working towards a quantified
landslide risk assessment procedure. pnor to the formation of the

sub-committee and this work, the definitions of Varnes and the
IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) were developed further by Fell (1994). Fell also
proposed a more specific and detailed definition of terms and calculation of
landslide risk, with vulnerability being modelled similarly to Morgan et al
(1992).
Fell (1992) argues for a standardisation of terms and approaches in
landslide hazard assessment. Part of this step is a proposed method of assessing
the probability oflandsliding, primarily based on geomorphology, and described
by Fell et al (1996).
2.2.2.3 Methods of Landslide Hazard Identification and Assessment

As a major natural hazard with large potential consequences, landsliding
has given rise to a number of methods of hazard identification and assessment.
Landslides, apart from the basic mechanisms of sliding, are completely location
dependent and vary in size, shape and rate of sliding. Authors from different
countries have developed models and risk assessment procedures to various
degrees of detail and sophistication (Einstein,1988). Before a discussion of the
main methods oflandslide hazard identification and risk assessment a brieflook
at the factors influencing landsliding is worthwhile. A good overview of factors
influencing landsliding is that of Hutchinson (1995, see also 1988). According to
Hutchinson, the factors influencing landsliding can be grouped into the
following 13 groups:
o bedrock geology,
0 quaternary geology,
0 geomorphology,
0 weathering,
0 erosion and deposition,
0 climate,
0 vegetation and pedology,
0 hydrology,
0 geotechnical factors,
0 volcanic activity,
o neotectonics and seismicity,
o natural dams, and
o human activity and land use.
The predominant methods of identifying and assessmg landslide hazards
consist of classification, mapping, relationship to rainfall, and probabilistic
slope analysis. They are discussed successively below.
A) Landslide Classification
Landslide hazard classification is part of landslide hazard identification
and assessment. Various classifications are available. The classifications are
based on various attributes, which Hansen (1984) notes include:
o climate,
o type of material moved (including coherence of material),
o size of material,
o geology,
o type of movement,
o speed of movement,
o water/air/ice content,
o triggering mechanism, and
o morphological attributes.
The brief summaries by Hansen (1984) of nine main classification systems are
reproduced below. The information is summarised in Table 2.2. From Table 2.2
it can be seen that most of the classifications are based on the type of movement.
A brief description of each, based on the discussion by Hansen, follows.
Hansen notes that the morphological attributes used by Blong (1973a,
1973b) may be used for statistical separation into sub-groups in order to
provide uniformity. Coates (1977) allows for transitional groups in his
classification system. Measures of tenuity, dilation and fluidity all show inverse
relationships with a deptMength index in the classification used by Crozier
(1973). The classification of Hutchinson (1968) includes creep and frozen
ground phenomena. Geology dominates the classification developed by Ladd
(1935). Hansen (1984) notes that no recognition is given to shearing surfaces in
this classification, although "structural" slides are present. The classification
system of Sharpe (1938) is more complicated than that ofLadd (1935), but has no
complex landslide category. The system developed by Varnes (1978) has clear
illustrations, gives emphasis to particle size, and includes a complex landslide
category. Ward (1945) separates the types of movement by their depth, and does
not use flow in his categories. The system developed by ZarubaandMencl (1969)
emphasises the type of material moved and its coherence rather than the
resulting type of movement. Surfaces of movement are used as differentiators.
Each of the above classification systems has its advantages and disadvantages,
Hansen (1984) points out, and users need to be specific in which classification
system is adopted in their work.
Hutchinson (1988) presents a classification of sub-aerial slope
movements based primarily on the morphology of the slope movement, with
consideration given to failure mechanism, material and movement rate. The
consideration given to failure mechanism, material and movement rate. The

classification has been developed from Hutchinson (1968) and is influenced by
Varnes (1978). A basic outline of the classification is as follows:
0 rebound,
0 creep,
0 sagging of mountain slopes,
0 landslides,
0 topples
0 falls, and
0 complex slope movements
Each of the above main categories, with numerous sub- categories, is
described in detail, relating each category to their controlling geological and
hydrological features. A lengthy discussion of this classification system is
included and many examples are given. This classification system is very
complex and may be too detailed for easy application to landslide risk
assessment.
The factors used for landslide classifications are quite different to the
factors used in other fields. For example, the earth scientists classify movements
based on rheological behaviour, as outlined by Pierson and Costa (1987), for
example. Flows are located in a two-dimensional matrix based on the mean
velocity and sediment concentration, with the composition of the mixture
remaining constant. Sediment concentration increases from 0% (clear water) to
100% (dry sediment). Pierson and Costa identify three major rheological
boundaries as the acquisition of a yield strength, an abrupt increase in yield
strength (the onset of liquefaction) and the loss of the ability to liquefy (the
transition to granular flow). The rheological classification, while covering all
types of landslides, is not of direct use to the geotechnical engineer.
The classification system ofVarnes (1978) is adopted by the author in his
work as it is widely used. This classification is shown in Table 2.3.
The Risk Assessment of Slopes 43A
B) Landslide Hazard Mapping

A useful overview of landslide hazard mapping is given by Hutchinson
(1995, 1988). Hutchinson (1995) emphasises the value of an interdisciplinary
approach to landslide hazard identification and assessment, including inputs
from geology and geomorphology. Hutchinson groups the various landslide
hazard mapping techniques into:
o primarily cartographic methods (mainly geomorphology-oriented
landslide maps),
o combined approaches (eg geomorphology, geometry and material
properties),
o terrain evaluation (a joint geomorphological/engineering geology
approach), and
o indirect factor mapping and numerical methods.
Hutchinson gives examples of each, discussing the reliability oflandslide hazard
maps, and the effect of human activity on these.
Einstein (1988) also details landslide hazard identification and assessment
through what he terms a "risk- mapping" framework. Here different
definitions create some apparent confusion. Einstein's paper is useful as it notes
the authorities that use various mapping procedures to identify and assess
landslide hazards. He also points out that few authors or authorities have made
attempts to perform the following step of risk assessment, and discusses those
that have in detail. Einstein's paper outlines the following five levels of risk
assessment, evaluation and management:
o State of nature mapping- basically maps of the land "as is",
o Danger maps - identify existing and potential slope instabilities,
o Hazard maps - combine potential events and their probabilities of
occurrence,
Table 2.2 Comparison of nine landslide classifications (after Hansen, 1984). ~~
~ c;
~ .....
..... <-<
"' .
:>;""Tj
~[
Materi- Coher- Size of Speed of Water/air/ Triggering Morphologi- Contains a "'
~ ~
Pol
Author Ciimate al Geol- Type of
ence of materi- move- ice in rna- mecha- cal attrib- complex
ogy movement a
"' '"0
::r
moved material al ment terial nism utes group g tj
..... ,.......
0 c
Blong (1973a, ,....,z
1973b) + 0 xo X Yes o ~CIJ
.g
~.._,
~
Coates (1977) X + xo + No "'

Crozier (1973) X X No
Hutchinson
+ X No
(1968)
Ladd (1935) X + No
Sharpe (1938) + X + X No
Varnes (1978) X X + + Yes
Ward (1945) + + X + No
Zaruba and No
Mencl (1969) X X + +
Notes: x Main factor

+ Secondary factor
o Factor used in comparative classification
t:
Table 2.3 The landslide classification of Varnes (1978). ;l ~
(1) ct
~
.....
....
c...,
"'~ .'Tj
TYPE OF MATERIAL
TYPE OF MOVEMENT
~ [
Engineering Soils "' Ill
'<
Bedrock
Predominantly coarse 1 Predominantly fine "'"'
(1)
a .,::r
~
FIRM BEDDED ROCK

g tl
..... ,.......
Rock fall . . . cz
0
~Cil
.g :E
(1)~
"'
FALLS Debris fall Earth fall
Debris topple
TOPPLES Earth topple
... continued
.j:o
VI
Table 2.3 (continued) The landslide classification of Varnes (1978). ;1~
(I> ct
TYPE OF MATERIAL ~
...........
....,
TYPE OF MOVEMENT Engineering Soils "' .

~'T'j
Bedrock ;;,-§.:
Predominantly coarse Predominantly fine
"' Pl
Earth slump
"'
(I>
.
'<
Rock slump "'s '""

::r
g tJ
;e
. . . , :z:
~(/l
Rotational Few units Debris slump .g ~
(I> .........,
"'
Rock block slide Debris block slide
SLIDES I Translational I Few Units Earth block slide
Rock slide
Earth slide
Translational I Many units
... continued 1~
Table 2.3 (continued) The landslide classification of Varnes (1978). ;1 ~
(I> ~
TYPE OF MATERIAL
-·
:;d ...,
"'~ .......
.'"rj
TYPE OF MOVEMENT
Bedrock
Engineering Soils
Predominantly coarse I Predominantly fine '[
"'
"'(I> '<
.
!:»
s"' ::r '""

Rock spread Debris spread Earth spread g tl
;c
... z
~CIJ
LATERAL SPREADS .g(I> ~
"--'
"'
Debris flow
Earth flow
FLOWS Rock flow (deep creep)
Combination of two or more principal types of movement

COMPLEX
+:-
-...)
o Risk map - document consequences of a potential event becoming

realised in terms of threat to life, economic or environmental effects,
and
o Landslide management - is a result of decisions based on danger,
hazard or risk maps, maps and procedures controlling and regulating
development eg zoning maps or requirements for different permits
for different areas.
Crozier (1984) presents information on the field assessment of slope instability
based on geomorphology. He looks at stability criteria, the recognition of
instability and the identification ofpotential instability. Examples of landslide
hazard maps which give information needed to judge the impact on people and
structures at risk from Italy, France, Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan and the
United States are given by Brabb (1984). A methodology for landslide hazard
mapping for the Rhondda Valley in the United Kingdom is developed by Siddle et
al (1991). Thayalan (1994) outlines the landslides hazard mapping in Sri Lanka.
Jones and Lee (1994) outline land system mapping based on
geomorphology. An example of such mapping is given in Figure 2.13. Jones and
Lee note that land systems mapping has potential for rapid preliminary
assessment of slope instability, particularly in remote or difficult areas.
The use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for landslide hazard
mapping is becoming increasingly common. Papers outlining the application of
GIS techniques to landslide hazard mapping include Guzzetti (1993), Carraraet
al (1992), Carrara et al (1991) and Kingsbury et al (1992). Auer and Shakoor
(1989) analyse drainage basin stability with respect to debris avalanches by
testing soils from a population of drainage basins, and statistically testing for a
significant difference between stable and unstable basins. The results indicated
that soils in unstable basins were predominantly silty sands, whereas soils in
stable basins were low plasticity silts. Furthermore, soils in unstable basins
were thinner, had lower moisture content, plasticity indices and densities, and
higher porosities and void ratios. These results make intuitive sense. The
approach of Auer and Shakoor is useful for area- specific characterisation of
stability, but the considerable expenditure required for soil testing is a factor
limiting its application.
C) Relationship Between Rainfall and Landsliding

By relating landsliding to rainfall and the probability of the rainfall
occurring one can indirectly assign landslide probabilities. The author has
examined the detailed literature on the relationship between rainfall and
landsliding in section 8.1.
LAND SYSTEM
Gentle hills with terraced river valleys
2. Minor valley
I
4. Major valley
~~
LAND ELEMENTS
i i
3a. Surface 4b. River 1c. Gully floor 1a. Slope
3b. Bluff
2b. Stream
2a. Valley Floor 4c. Floodplain
j 1 b. Gully side
1d. Stream
4a. Abandoned channel
Figure 2.13 An example of land system mapping (Jones and Lee, 1994).
D) Probabilistic Slope Analysis

Probabilistic slope analysis can be used to determine the probability of
failure (and landslide magnitude in some cases) for well documented and
investigated slopes. The literature on probabilistic slope analysis is reviewed in
detail in section 5.1. The role of analysis in the evaluation of slope stability (as
succinctly reviewed by Morgenstern, 1995b) is thus limited to large, individual
slopes by the need to obtain parameter values for stability analysis, and hence
the need for site investigation. Other approaches to landslide hazard
assessment are more relevant to the bulk appraisal of landslide risk from all
slopes in a certain area (Morgenstern, 1995a; Finlay and Fell, 1995; Fell et al,
1996a).
It can be seen from the above discussion that landslide hazard
identification and assessment is area-specific. The same holds for landslide
risk assessment outlined in the next component.
2.2.2.4 Landslide Risk Assessment

The review of this component is in four parts. The first describes general
landslide loss reduction publications of a policy nature. The second details
papers on landslide risk assessment. The third focuses on area -specific
landslide risk appraisals. The fourth part summarises the main points.
A) General Landslide Loss Reduction Publications of a Policy

Nature
Various policy-type publications on landslide loss reduction are available.
The broadest one is the document on the mitigation of natural disasters
published by the United Nations (1991). The document contains substantial
sections on policy frameworks, government administration for risk reduction,
risk assessment, planning and decision making, the natural disaster
phenomena, their effects and options for risk reduction. The phenomena
covered by the United Nations are hydrological hazards (floods and cyclones)
and geologic hazards (earthquakes, volcanoes and landslides). Of note are the
techniques listed for landslide risk reduction. These include:
o discouraging new development in hazardous areas,
o removing or converting existing development in hazardous areas,
o providing financial incentives or disincentives,
o regulating new development, and
o protecting existing development.
An international symposium looking in depth at these issues is published by the
University of Quebec (1986).
The structure of long-term landslide hazard mitigation programs is
outlined by Swanston and Schuster (1989). 11 nations were chosen on the basis
of the considerable progress made in landslide mitigation programs, and also
because the researches in the chosen countries were known to Swanston and
Schuster. These countries are Canada, Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland,
Norway, Sweden, Japan, the former Soviet Union, Hong Kong and New Zealand.
The paper is a useful overview of the development and status of landslide
mitigation programs in these countries.
In the United States a guide for landslide loss reduction is available for
state and local government planning from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (1989). The guide describes the causes and types of landslides, hazard
identification, landslide loss reduction techniques, and the steps in preparing
and reviewing a state landslide loss reduction plan. Case studies in planning and
policy development in the United States are given Olshansky (1990). Schuster
(1991) discusses landslides hazard management in the United States,
illustrating the following mitigative approaches:
o restriction of development in landslide-prone areas,
o excavation, grading, landscaping and construction codes,
o use of physical preventative or controlling measures, and
o landslide warning systems.
Schuster concludes by commenting on the proposed national landslide hazard
reduction program (Committee on Ground Failure Hazards, 1985).
B) Papers on Landslide Risk Assessment

Landslide risk assessment is described at length by Fell (1994). Fell looks
at various definitions available, discusses the principles of risk assessment as
applied to landsliding, reviews acceptable risk at length, comments on the
assessment of the probability of landsliding and vulnerability, and proposes
descriptive terminology for landslide risk assessment.
In their general report on the assessment of landslide risk Hartlen and
Viberg (1988) present different methods of risk assessment and case studies
from all over the world. Hazard, risk and vulnerability are defined similarly to
Varnes and the IAEG/CLOMMS (1984). The paper indicates the inherently
different methodologies adopted in different parts of the world, and is an useful
overview and summary. Hartlen and Viberg (1988) note that generally risk
assessment of landslides is carried out via ranking methods of varied detail and
sophistication. The following authors are examples of the technique in the
literature.
Brand (1988) looks at risk assessment by a simple ranking system based on
terrain classification, geotechnical land use maps and potential developable
land maps. The system is based on:
o an instability score representing probability of failure,
o a consequence score representing the severity of consequence of
failure in terms of harm to people, and damage to property, and
o a total score, being the sum of the above two scores,
and has been used in Hong Kong since 1980.
Berggren et al (1992) discuss the assessment of landslide risk in Sweden.
The basic method adopted is mapping of slope stability conditions followed by
risk evaluation through ranking. Risk definitions by Varnes and the
IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) are adopted. Landslide probability and consequence are

both evaluated. The "risk-objects" include human life, property and the
environment. Another simple risk ranking method, based mainly on visual
inspection, is given by Sinclair (1992). Moon et al (1992) describe a relatively
simple risk ranking approach useful in producing landslide risk maps in areas
where little landslide historical data is available. The definitions therein are
inconsistent with Varnes (1984) but conform with local practice. Hearn (1992)
also illustrates a simple rating system for producing hazard and risk maps using
Varnes and the IAEG/CLOMMS (1984) definition of terms. Many
developmental systems such as that of Griva and Reagan (1988) have been
drafted, but appear not to be further developed and hence of limited practical
significance.
Viggiani (1994) looks at the mitigation of landslide hazard and risk,
illustrating his exposition of the general concepts with numerous examples from
Italy.
Morgan (1991) discusses the quantification of risks from slope hazards.
Morgan suggests ways of allocating the probability of rarely occurring events
which are useful, however, the author finds it difficult to agree with Morgan's
assertion that "landslides are rarely occurring events, and standard statistical
methods do not apply to their prediction". The author is of the view that both
standard and extreme event statistics are applicable in various areas oflandslide
risk assessment.
A specific approach for the evaluation of total risk from large debris flows
to affected communities is presented by Morgan et al (1992). The structure of
the basic approach is similar to that used by the author in his landslide risk
assessments (see chapters 3 and 7), even though the terminology is different.
The total risk concept advocated by Morgan et al is useful for a rational
evaluation of landslide risks to entire communities.
Sobkowicz (1996), building further on the work of Morgan (1991), Morgan
et al (1992) and Hungr et al (1993), discusses the application of various
risk-based methods to the assessment of natural hazard risks for groups of
people. Sobkowicz (1996) describes a developmental landslide risk acceptability
criterion, and proposes landslide societal risk curves for residential and
recreational land use, based on data from Eisbacher and Clague (1984).
However, Sobkowicz (1996) presents insufficient detail of the calculation of the
curves, and does not address the issues and limitations of the proposed curves
(see The Royal Society, 1992; Slovic, 1987).
C) Area- Specific Landslide Risk Appraisals

A number of papers deal with landslide risk assessment is specific study
areas. A selection is given below.
Complete landslide hazard and risk assessment studies of landslide
problem areas have been carried out. An example is the study of coastal
landsliding at the Isle of Wight Undercliff, Ventnor, United Kingdom (Lee at al,
1991; Geotechnical Services Ltd, 1991). The study was carried out between
1988 and 1991, and involved a review of available records, geomorphological and
geological mapping, analytical photogrammetry, a survey of damage caused by
ground movement, a land use survey and a review oflocal building practices (Lee
et al, 1991). Lee et al outline a range of approaches for managing the Ventnor
landslide problem. The Ventnor study serves as an example of an area- specific
landslide risk assessment system.
Bernknopf et al (1988) present a study of landslide mitigation rules in the
United States. Through a spatial representation of physical landslide
parameters and man -related development, the spatial probability of
landsliding was estimated for a specific area, and different mitigation programs
were then evaluated.
Most of the area-specific studies use zoning and relative risk measures
rather than directly estimating landslide probabilities and vulnerabilities.
D) Summary
From the review of the above literature, it was found that the main issues
in landslide risk assessment are:
o assessing the probability of landsliding,
o assessing the vulnerability of risk,
o calculating specific and total risks,
o defining acceptable and tolerable total risks,
o dealing with landslide catastrophes, and
o landslide insurance.
The review ofliterature regarding the vulnerability of elements to landsliding is
presented in section 6.1. Examples of landslide risk calculations are given in
chapter 7.
2.2.2.5 Landslide Risk Evaluation

The next step of risk evaluation, including the consideration of acceptable
landslide risk was found not to be documented in the literature by the author. A
review of literature regarding acceptable risk and risk perception is presented in
section 9.1. Section 9.2 details the author's contribution in this research area.
The literature review component following looks at publications concerning the

risk assessment of dams.
2.2.3 Risk Assessment of Dams
Dams are a complex combination of man-made hazard influenced greatly

by the natural hazards such as floods and earthquakes, some of which such as
floods they are attempting to control (ANCOLD, 1994). An overview of design
decisions with practical significance relating to embankment dams is given by
De Mello (1977). Dams have arguably the most complex and thorough risk
assessment methods and procedures in the geotechnical field. A brief historical
perspective, drawn from ANCOLD (1994) is given here.
The Surrogate Worth Trade-Off(SWT) method was published by Haimes
and Hall (1974). Asbeck and Haimes (1984) presented the Partitioned
Multiobjective Risk Method (PMRM). This method accounts for society's
aversion to low probability, high consequence risks by applying weighting
factors. In 1985 the following two US bodies published guidelines on risk
analysis of dams: the US National Research Council (1985) and the US Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (McCann et al, 1985). They were
followed by the US Army Corps of Engineers (1986) and the US Bureau of
Reclamation (USER) (1986), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE, 1988),
USER's revised guidelines (USER, 1989), the Australian National Committee
on Large Dams interim guidelines (ANCOLD, 1991) and ANCOLD's reviewed
guidelines (1994). Even from this brief sketch the exponential explosion of
formal risk assessment techniques in dam engineering is apparent.
The review of dam risk assessment literature first discusses the definitions
used in this area, and then details dam hazard identification and assessment,
and dam risk assessment.
2.2.3.1 Definitions of Terms Used in Dam Risk Assessment
There appears to be more consensus in the dams area on the definition of

terms used in risk assessment, undoubtedly influenced by international bodies
such as the International Committee on Large Dams (ICOLD) and and their
member national organisations. The author's review of ICOLD documents
found no explicit definitions of risk terms.
As discussed by AN COLD (1994), the USER's understanding of risk is that
it is the summation, over all possible failure modes, of the probability of failure
multiplied by the consequences of failure. Risk analysis, according to USER, is a
comparison of expected damages (downstream damages multiplied by the
probability of occurrence) and the cost that would be incurred in order to carry
them out.
The Federal Emergency Management Authority (McCann et al, 1985)
defines the following terms. Risk is the likelihood of occurrence of adverse
consequences. Fragility curve is a function that defines the probabilities of
failure as a function of an applied load level. Fragility curves are an important
and frequently used concept in dam safety engineering (ANCOLD, 1994).
AN COLD (1994) define hazard as that which has the potential for creating
adverse consequences. Risk is the likelihood or probability of adverse
consequences; the downside of a gamble. Risk assessment is the total process of
risk analysis which embraces the identification of risks, the estimation of their
likelihood of occurrence, and the evaluation of the social acceptability of risk.
It can be seen that these definitions differ substantially from the author's;
particularly ANCOLD's definition of risk is similar to the author's definition of
hazard. The next component discusses different methods of hazard
identification, assessment, and risk assessment, which tend to be one process in
the dams arena (ANCOLD, 1994), one by one rather than contrasting the
individual parts of the risk management framework.
2.2.3.2 Dam Hazard Identification, Assessment and Risk

Assessment
The following more detailed discussions will be restricted to five of the
main methods incorporating hazard identification, hazard assessment and risk
assessment as performed by each body. These are:
o BC Hydro,
o USBR,
o FEMA,
o MAUT,
o PMRM, and
o ANCOLD.
It is worthwhile noting that these methods are heavily slanted towards flooding,
overtopping and seismic hazards, with only limited attention given to static
slope stability and piping failures (AN COLD, 1994). A representative selection
of other published papers will be presented in closing.
A) BCHydro
In British Columbia (BC), Canada, the dam authority (BC Hydro) is using
risk assessment techniques on dams under its jurisdiction (Nielsen et al, 1994;
Nielsen, 1993). Nielsenet al outline the application ofPRA by BC Hydro, discuss

the use of event trees, and illustrate the procedure with examples. The
consequence-based dam risk criteria used by BC Hydro were proposed by
Salmon and von Hehn (1993). The PRA methodology employed includes
(Nielsen et al, 1994):
o review of field performance,
o dam site inspection,
o failure mode identification,
o event tree construction,
o probability assessment,
o interpretation of the results, and
o iteration (where required).
BC Hydro currently assumes that the accuracy of any calculated overall
probability of dam failure is within an order of magnitude for a first-order
analysis.
B) US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)

The USBR procedure forms part of an overall dam safety assessment
procedure (USBR, 1989) and is quite comprehensive. Eight basic steps are
identified:
1/ Identification of modes of failure,
2/ Determination of inundated areas,
3/ Assessment of threat to life for dam safety studies,
4/ Preliminary assessment of monetary losses,
5/ Definition of recurrence intervals for hydrologic events,
6/ Determination and use of recurrence data for seismic events,
7/ Economic damage assessment and risk assessment, and
8/ Determination of environmental impacts.
The failure modes considered are static, seismic and hydrologic. Dam breach
routing methods are used to determine the damages for each of the events.
Quantified risks include economic damage, threat to life and environmental
damage, and are calculated relative to a baseline impact which would still occur
without a dam in place. A detailed manual describes the application of all the
steps, illustrating them with examples. The method is quite easy to understand
and apply.
C) US Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA or

Stanford) Procedure
The procedure is described by McCann et al (1985). It also looks at the same
possible failure modes as the USBR procedure, and its preliminary risk
assessment consists of the following broad steps:
1/ identify events that can cause dam failure,
2/ determine the frequency of occurrence of the loading conditions in 1,
3/ determine the conditional probability of dam failure due to each
loading condition,
4/ find the consequences of each failure mode, and
5/ calculate the risk by combining the results of steps 2, 3 and 4.
Dam breach routing methods are used in a similar manner as those in USBR
procedures. The method is more subjective, however, as it uses subjective
interpretation of evaluation scales to determine risks associated with particular
failure modes. Bayesian updating is employed to refine risk estimates.
D) Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)

MAUT was proposed by Syme et al (1989) for dam safety assessments. It
models the decision making process by incorporating a set of alternative
management policies and objectives into a quantitative model. This is done by
identifying significant attributes (components), determining trade-offs,
assigning weighting and combining mathematically for an overall evaluation.
The method is still considered developmental (ANCOLD, 1994).
E) Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method (PMRM)

This method addresses the shortcomings of calculating the expected value
of risk by combining low probability, high consequence and high probability, low
consequence events. The theoretical framework is given by Petrakian et al
(1987), and is comprehensively summarised inANCOLD (1994). The Surrogate
Worth Trade-Off (SWT) method is used as the multi-objective optimisation
procedure for evaluation of the options.
F) Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD)

ANCOLD's (1994) guidelines on risk analysis basically follow USER's
procedures, adding the domain analysis of the PMRM method and applying the
SWT analysis to the results. A number of qualifying guidelines can also be found
regarding the use of numerical values determined from the darn risk
assessment. A proposal for the integration of risk procedures by AN COLD is
expounded by Murley (1995). The legal issues of darn risk management are
discussed by Charnpness (1993) and Wensley (1993). These include:
o cost of losses,
o procedures for risk management planning,
o the duty of care in building and owning dams,
o damages in tort,
o strict liability, and
o statute law.
A case study in dam hazard assessment using ANCOLD's guidelines is
presented by Heinrichs and Lee (1993).
G) Selected Other Publications

The publications listed here are certainly not exhaustive, but are used to
illustrate the scope of publications on dam risk assessment. An overview of how
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry of the Republic of South Africa
carries out risk-based dam safety analyses is presented in Oosthuizen et al
(1991). The method is not as broad as those discussed above. Results are
summarised in Hazard Level plots - a form of FN curve, and Risk Level plots
where loss of life and economic loss are the two axes. Vick and Bromwell (1989)
address the risk assessment of a dam design in karst. Lafitte (1993) highlights
the value and limits of QRA.s of large dams. Seismic risk assessment of earth
dams is scrutinised by Yegian et al (1991). Rezendiz-Carillo (1990) has
developed a risk-based framework for the selection of "socially optimal" dam
safety goals as part of his doctoral work at Carnegie-Mellon University.

Disposal Sites
The entire area of public health, pollution control, waste disposal and other
environmental engineering matters includes, among many other disciplines, a
considerable amount of geotechnical knowledge and expertise. A vast array of
problems are being addressed through highly multi -disciplinary approaches. A
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this literature review. Several
publications are mentioned below to give the interested reader a direction for
further follow-up.
General issues in water resources can be highlighted from a look at the
proceedings of conferences such as "Risk- Based Decision Making in Water
Resources IV" (Haimes and Stakhiv eds, 1989) and "Risk- Based Decision
Making in Water Resources V" (Haimes et al eds, 1991). The issues range from
the general theory of quantitative risk assessment to risk communication. A
more focused look at groundwater pollution risks can be found in The Ground
Water Risk Assessment Task Committee for the Water Pollution Management
Committee of the ASCE Environmental Engineering Division (1990), where

Walsh (1990) elaborates the use of risk assessment in groundwater pollution
control. In the area of waste disposal sites, Elliott and Read (1990a and 1990b)
outline a demonstration project of performance-based risk analysis for a solid
waste land fill. Elliott and Hager (1991) argue against the current US
zero-exceedance legislation for contaminated site rehabilitation in favour of
performance- based risk management system.
2.2.5 Summary
The review of literature regarding risk management systems in

geotechnical engineering showed that there is no published generic geotechnical
risk management system. Risk assessments have spread into the geotechnical
field to various levels of sophistication. A number of publications overview
geotechnical risk from a broad perspective. Similarly, various texts review
landsliding at a general level. There are no universally accepted definitions of
risk terms used in landsliding. Different authors define terms quite differently,
hence defining one's terms is an indispensable part of any risk-based work.
Methods of landslide hazard assessment include various types of landslide
classification, landslide hazard mapping and probabilistic slope analysis.
Landslide classification and hazard mapping has application to areal studies of
large extent, whereas probabilistic slope analysis tends to be restricted to well
documented and investigated slopes due to the need for parameter estimation.
Numerous publications discuss landslide risk assessment. These are
grouped into general landslide loss reduction publications of a policy nature,
landslide risk assessment papers and area -specific landslide risk appraisals.
The landslide loss reduction publications deal with policy frameworks, planning
and decision making at a national/government level. Countries with long-term
significant landslide problems such as Japan have well developed landslide
mitigation policies. Published landslide risk assessment papers generally deal
with concepts and methods of landslide risk assessment rather than specific
applications or case studies. Several landslide risk assessment papers appear to
be in a developmental stage. A number of landslide risk appraisals for specific
areas (such as the Ventnor study on the Isle of Wight) have also been published.
These studies employ a multi-disciplinary approach, culminating in a set of
planning and land -use guidelines and controls. It is noteworthy that the
area -specific studies the author is aware of do not explicitly quantify
probability, vulnerability and risk; instead they use relative scoring systems and
hazard zoning.
In the area of landslide risk evaluation the author found no publications

dealing with landslide risk perception, acceptance and tolerability.
Dams have probably the most developed risk assessment systems in the
geotechnical field. These systems include formal risk assessment techniques
such as PRA. More consensus is apparent in the usage and definition of risk
terms in this area. A number of dam authorities have developed their own dam
risk assessment systems. The leading authorities in the field appear to be BC
Hydro and ANCOLD. Some of the dam risk assessment techniques could be
utilised in landslide risk assessment.
The author briefly touched on the environmental risk assessment field
with specific reference to groundwater and waste disposal sites. However, a
detailed literature review of environmental risk assessment is beyond the scope
of work of the author.
2.3 Concluding Remarks

The author's review of the general risk literature established the broad
background of risk issues. The review of risk management in geotechnical
engineering found no complete generic geotechnical risk management systems
per se. However, a general review of publications on geotechnical risk
management systems found that risk assessments have spread extensively into
the field of geotechnical engineering in various degrees of detail and
sophistication. Literature specific to risk assessments of landslides and dams
was reviewed. A brief component concluded by indicating the current issues in
risk assessment of groundwater pollution and waste disposal sites.
From his review of general and geotechnical risk literature the author
gained a background in risk assessment, overviewed the state of landslide risk
assessment, and thus arrived at an informed position from which he carried out
his study of the risk assessment of slopes.
3 FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSLIDE RISK

MANAGEMENT
3.1 Introduction
Following the author's review of the general literature on risk and risk
management in Chapter 2, frameworks for landslide risk management were
developed by the author. These are a generic framework for landslide risk
management, a generic landslide risk assessment framework, and a specific
landslide risk assessment framework developed by the author and his
supervisor, Professor R. Fell, for Hong Kong. These are successively detailed
below.
3.2 A Generic Landslide Risk Management Framework

The broad framework of a generic landslide risk management system has
been developed by the author from the framework discussed by Krewski and
Birkwood (1986). It consists of the following four broad steps:
Step 1 - Hazard Identification and Assessment
This step is the beginning of the process and consists of:
o identification of landslide hazards (defining what the nature of the
landslide is, its classification and so on),
o determining the magnitude of the landslide, and
o determining the probability (or frequency) of occurrence.
Step 2 - Risk Assessment
The word assessment is used in preference to analysis. Risk assessment focuses
on probability and the consequences of a hazard eventuating, incorporating the
losses that will occur. The loss can be for a specific element at risk or summed
over an area to give total risk.
Step 3 - Risk Evaluation
The evaluation of the risk assessment outcomes in step 2 can be quite a difficult
task. Here the whole areas of tolerable risk, acceptable risk and risk perception
come to bear heavily. The results of the assessment need to be weighed against
many factors including social, political and policy considerations. Some
recommendations may result, forming an input to decision making and risk
communication.
Step 4 - Decision Making and Risk Communication
Although not necessarily restricted to this step, the main decisions are made
after steps 1, 2 and 3 are completed. These may be a decision to review other
alternatives, to expand the scope of the study, to do nothing, and so on. Some of
these decisions may be communicated to the public, which is a whole art on its
own.
The entire process is illustrated schematically in Figure 3.1. The author
perceives risk management as enveloping and permeating the entire process
outlined in the steps.
RISK MANAGEMENT
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
AND ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK EVALUATION
DECISION MAKING AND

RISK COMMUNICATION
Figure 3.1 Framework for landslide risk management systems, developed from
Krewski and Birkwood (1986).
The definitions of basic landslide terms follow those proposed by the

International Geotechnical Societies' UNESCO Working Party on World
Landslide Inventory (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI). A simple definition of a landslide
as "the movement of a mass of rock, earth or debris down a slope" is adopted
following Cruden (1991). The author uses the nomenclature suggested for
landslides by the IGSUNESCO/WPWLI (199Gb). The suggested method for a

landslide summary (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI and Cruden, 1991), the suggested
method for describing the activity of a landslide (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI, 1993),
and the suggested method for reporting of a landslide (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI,
1990a) are also used by the author.
3.3 A Generic Framework for Landslide Risk Assessment
A generic framework for landslide risk management was used by the

author. This framework is detailed with a discussion of the definitions used. For
the purposes of this study the following definitions listed below, which are based
on Fell (1994), have been used by the author.
3.3.1 Element at Risk (E)
The building, road, or other structure or equipment which may be

damaged by the landslide, or person or persons who may be killed (or injured) by
the landslide.
3.3.2 Magnitude (M)
Volume of the source landslide (m 3).
3.3.3 Hazard (H)
A description of magnitude and probability of occurrence of landsliding,

broadly H = M x P.
3.3.4 Probability (P)
Probability that a particular landslide(s) will occur within a specified time

frame (generally a year). It can be assessed as an individual value, or the sum of
individual probabilities of the causative effects. For example,
3.1
where PR, Ps and PH represent the probability relating to rainfall, seismic and
human activities respectively.
Probability is expressed as the Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP), and
expressed as a 1 in Y terminology, eg. anAEP of 1 in 1,000. It is sometimes useful
to express probabilities in terms of the life of the structure or some other period.
In this case the probability is expressed as theY -year Exceedance Probability
(EP); for example, the 50 year Exceedance Probability may be 1 in 100.
3.3.5 Vulnerability (V)

On a scale of0-1, the vulnerability is the degree ofloss of a given element
within the area affected by landsliding, calculated as
3.2
where, on a scale of 0-1, Vs is the probability of spatial impact of a landslide on

an element, yt is the probability of temporal impact ie that the element is
occupied during impact, and Vz is the probability of loss of life or portion of
element value.
3.3.6 Specific Risk <Rs)

The specific risk to an element is the probability multiplied by the
vulnerability, ie
R8 =P XV 3.3
3.3.7 Total Risk (lit)

The total risk for the entire area affected by landsliding, expressed as one of
the following:
o expected number of lives lost or injured,
o damage to property,
o loss of economic activity, or
o loss of environment.
It is the product of specific risk Rs and elements at risk E summed over all
landslides and potential landslides in the study area, hence
Rt = L (E X Rs) = L (E X P X V) 3.4
3.3.8 Acceptable Risk

For acceptable risk the following definitions taken from ANCOLD (1994)
have been adopted.
3.3.8.1 Socially Acceptable Risk

That low level of risk that society finds tolerable so that expenditure would
not normally be directed to its reduction.
3.3.8.2 Individual Risk Criterion

The socially acceptable level of risk to a particular individual.
3.3.8.3 Societal Risk Criterion

The socially acceptable level of risk in terms of events that impact on
society at a community, regional or national level.
3.4 A Landslide Risk Assessment Framework for Hong Kong

The Hong Kong landslide risk assessment framework was developed by the
author and Professor R. Fell during the study of landslide risk assessment
project for the Geotechnical Engineering Office (GEO) of the Hong Kong
Government (Finlay and Fell, 1995). It represents a significant development
and application of risk assessment for landsliding using one of the largest and
most detailed databases on landsliding available.
In the Hong Kong context, risk assessment techniques may be used to
assess risk from individual slopes, ega cut, fill, retaining wall or natural slope;
the risk from landsliding from a major rainfall event, which might involve a
large number of landslides; and the average annual risk on, for example, a
territory wide basis. Each will have its uses in planning purposes. For example,
the risk from an individual slope may be used to assess whether remedial work is
required to that slope. The risk from large rain events, and the average annual
risk, may be used to assess whether overall standards of slope stability are
acceptable compared to risks from other hazards. These two forms of risk
assessment are detailed below.
3.4.1 Assessment of Risk from Individual Slopes

For individual slopes the risks to be assessed are:
o Specific risk Rs using equation 3.2 and 3.3. For property or
equipment, Vz is the proportion of the property value lost, and vt = 1
for buildings and fixed equipment. For persons Vz = 1 (their life) and
vt < 1. For the person most at risk, the maximum value of vt is used.
o Total risk Rt using equation 3.4.
o Societal risk, which is assessed by considering the probability of the
slope failing versus the total number oflives lost in the event the slope
fails.
Hence, in all cases, one needs to assess the probability of landsliding and the
vulnerability of the elements at risk.
3.4.1.1 Assessment of Probability

The assessment of the probability oflandsliding is influenced by a number
of factors which include:
(a) type of slope, eg. cut, fill, retaining wall,
(b) geometry of slope, eg. height, slope angle,

(c) geology, eg. rock type, weathering grade, presence of colluvium, joint
orientation and spacing,
(d) geomorphology, eg. on a planar, concave or convex slope,
(e) history of instability,
(f) evidence of instability on the slope or in adjacent slopes,
(g) drainage and potential for infiltration upslope and on the slope, and
evidence of groundwater,
(h) rainfall, eg. intensity, duration, antecedent rain, and
(i) maintenance condition.
The magnitude of landsliding is also influenced by a number of these factors
including (a), (b), (c) and probably (d), (e), (£), (g), (h) and (i).
A) Assessment of Average Annual Probabilities

The assessment of average annual probabilities can be done from the
records of landsliding. These are in the form of:
o incident reports and annual reports from 1984,
o landslide record cards, which mainly cover the period 1978 to the
present,
o reports on individual major landslides which resulted in large
numbers of casualties, and
o other published information on landslide casualties.
These give the number of landslides and casualties, and by combining with the
total number of slopes, the annual average number of slope failures, or number
of casualties per annum can be calculated.
B) Assessment of the Probability of Sliding of an Individual Slope (P)

The method proposed for assessing the probability of sliding of an
individual slope is to:
o Determine the average annual probability of sliding (Pa) from the
approach outlined in sections 5.2 and 5.4.
o Determine a probability modification factor (F) by which Pa should be
multiplied to assess the probability of the individual slope failing.
Hence
P= PaX F 3.5
For slopes which are less likely than the average to fail, F will be less
than 1.0, and for slopes which are more likely than the average to fail,
F will be greater than 1. 0.
Since cuts, fills, retaining walls and natural slopes will behave differently,
subscripts will be used as follows:
Cut c eg. Pc
Fill f eg. Pr
Wall w eg.Pw
Natural slope n eg.Pn
The determination of the individual slope factor F is given in section 5.4.
3.4.1.2 Assessment of Vulnerability

The vulnerability will be dependent on factors (a) to G) listed in section
3.4.1.1 above, and also on:
(j) runout distance,
(k) the volume and velocity of sliding,
(l) the elements at risk (buildings and other structures), their nature
and their proximity to the slide, eg. type of building (multistorey -
squatter house), immediately adjacent slope or some distance away,
etc, and
(m) the elements at risk (persons), their proximity to the slide, the nature
of the building/road they are in, and where they are in the building, on
the road, etc.
Hong Kong is virtually unique in the world in the detailed records which have
been kept oflandsliding and its consequences, and of the detailed studies which
have been carried out on slopes. In preparing for the study, it became apparent
that much could be done to quantify the probability and vulnerability by using
the studies which had been done previously, so the study was extended beyond
the original concept of being based on the incident reports only to include:
o landslide record cards,
o detailed case studies on individual features,
o the CHASE study, which involved a detailed investigation of 177 cut
slopes, approximately half of which had failed,
o topographic, geomorphological, geological and land use (GLUM)
maps,
o the Master Ranking list of all registered cut slopes and retaining
walls, and
o rainfall data for Hong Kong Island, and its relation to landsliding.
The data sources used in the Hong Kong landslide risk assessment study are
detailed in section 4.1.2.2.
The proposed method for assessing vulnerability for property or loss of life
IS:
o Determine the slope geometry and elements at risk (property,
persons).
o Estimate the location of the slide on the slope, its magnitude, and
runout distance using the procedures in section 6.2.4.6.
o Estimate temporal probability Vt using the procedures in section 6.4.
o Estimate the vulnerability of the element at risk to the slide, given its
magnitude, proximity, the runout distance and nature of the slide (eg.
rapid or slow), nature of the structure, materials and workmanship of
the element at risk and the nature of the element at risk using the
procedures given in section 6.3. Then
V=VtxVz 3.6
as Vs = 1 when the debris reaches the element.
3.4.1.3 Assessment of Risk

Assess the specific risk (R8 ) from equation 3.3 and the total risk (Rt) from
equation 3.4.
3.4.2 Assessment of Risk for a Large Area

Since the number of landslides over an area is related to rainfall, and the
relationship is not linear, a second approach has also been developed, where the
number oflandslides is related to rainfall, and rainfall with long return periods
(more than 100 years) is used to estimate the number of landslides from an
extreme storm event. This is discussed in section 8.2.
3.5 Summary
The author has developed a broad framework for a generic landslide risk
management system, outlined the generic framework for landslide risk
assessment used in his work, and detailed a specific landslide risk assessment
framework developed and applied in Hong Kong. The frameworks at. these three
levels provided a comprehensive approach and structure to the work of the
author.
4 DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS
4.1 The Hong Kong Landslide Risk Assessment Study
4.1.1 Background and Initial Objectives
In 1994 the Geotechnical Engineering Office, Civil Engineering

Department, Hong Kong (GEO) and the Department of Geotechnical
Engineering at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia (UNSW)
agreed to cooperate to undertake a research study of landslide risk assessment
for Hong Kong. A proposal from UNSW was forwarded to GEO on 22nd
December 1993, and after some discussion, resulted in signing of Consultancy
Agreement No. CE 6/94 in April 1994. The agreement described the main
objectives of the study at that time as:
"The objective of this study is to assess and review the landslide risk
of Hong Kong through an evaluation of the landslide incident reports
in the Geotechnical Engineering Office using probabilistic
assessment techniques. The study will also review and report on the
acceptable landslides risk for Hong Kong on the basis of the
international experience."
Landslide incident reports are written in Hong Kong for every slope failure, no
matter how small. As stated in the Consultancy Agreement, the original work
scope and study areas of this study included the following:
o An assessment of the risk of landslide damage for various kinds of
slopes and retaining walls in Hong Kong shall be carried out. A
computerised database containing the landslide incidents reported in
the Annual Rainfall and Landslide Reports shall be established for
the analysis. Ways of improving the prediction of probability of
sliding shall be developed taken account of the circumstances of the
local conditions, rainfall and planned or existing construction.
o An establishment of criteria to estimate the likely magnitude of
landsliding based on geological conditions, topography,
geomorphology and the existing or proposed construction.
o An establishment of criteria to assess the vulnerability ofthe element
at risk (element is defined herein as structures, population,
properties and economic activities) to the landsliding, based on the
magnitude of the landslide, the nature of the landslide materials,
proximity of the element at risk to the landslide, and local topography.
o A full evaluation of risk for various types of incident (eg. natural

hazard, travel and other accidents, occupation hazard) and
comparison to international data shall be carried out.
o A review and discussion shall be carried out to evaluate the acceptable
risk for landslides on the basis of international experience.
Mter some preparatory work, Professor Robin Fell and the author visited Hong
Kong from 26 June to 18 and 22 July 1994 respectively to discuss the project, and
to collect data. Following this visit, an Inception Report was submitted to GEO
in July 1994. As far more data relevant to landslide risk assessment became
available than was initially envisaged, the study objectives and scope were
substantially expanded. Work continued on the project in Sydney, and a
progress report on components of the study was forwarded to GEO before a
second visit to Hong Kong by Professor Fell and the author from 5-9 December
1994. During this visit progress on the study was discussed with GEO staff,
allowing completion of the work on the project in Australia in December 1994-
March 1995, and submission of the final report in March 1995.
4.1.2 Study Objectives and Scope
4.1.2.1 Study Objectives
The main objective of the study became the development of a landslide risk
assessment system for Hong Kong, utilising the various available data sets. The
system comprised of an overall framework and its detailed components. The
main achievements were developments of methods for assessing the probability
P of landsliding and the vulnerability V of elements to landsliding. More than
one method was developed in each case. The overall landslide risk assessment
system developed for Hong Kong is detailed in sections 3.4, 5.4, 6.3 and 7.4.
While the numbers and factors outlined therein were developed for Hong Kong
slopes, the various assessment approaches and methodologies can be used
wherever similar databases are available or are generated, appropriate for the
conditions being assessed.
The various datasets available for the Hong Kong study are given in section
4.1.2.2 below.
4.1.2.2 Available Data Sets
The available data sets for the Hong Kong study, together with the
information they provide, are listed in Table 4.1. They are described in detail
below.
Table 4.1 Summary of Hong Kong landslide data sources (based on Finlay and Fell, 1995). ~ ~
('D (;"
::0 ....,
..........
HONG KONG LANDSLIDE DATA SOURCE "'~'"Tj.
GEO's ~[
TYPE OF Mas- MAPS
Land- GEO's "'
~
j:>)
DATA Detailed S1R ter Rain- Lantau ':;<:

Debris
PROVIDED
Annual Incident
Reports Reports
slide
Record
Case Re- Rank-
CHASE
Study Topo-
Geo-
Geol-
GASP
Study
fall land-
Flow
s"'g ::r"'t1
Studies ports lng morpho Data slide ..... ,---.._
Cards graphic ogy Study
List logy study
.0. . cz
~Cil
Slope Type e e e e e e e e (e) 0 ~
(e) ~"-'
Slope Geometry e e e e e e e e "'
Geology 0 0 e e 0 e e e (0)
Geomor-
phology
0 0 0 e e (0)
History of
Instability
0 e 0 (e)
Evidence of
Instability
0 0 e e 0 0
Drainage/
Infiltration
0 e e e e
Rainfall 0 0 e e e (e)
Magnitude e e e e e (e) (e)
Runout (e) (e)
distance
e e e
Velocity of 0 (e)
sliding
Elements at
Risk (Buildings)
0 0 0 e e
Elements at
Risk (People)
0 0 0 e
' -- ----- ------ ----------~ -----~--
L___
KEY: e Major source of data o Minor source of data ( ) Not available for study .._J
.......
A) Annual Landsliding and Rainfall Reports

The annuallandsliding and rainfall reports are published by the GEO and
contain a listing of all landslides reported to the G EO that year. The listing
includes the landslide reference number, its location, a brief description, the
volume of failure and consequences (if any). Summary statistics on the year's
landslides and rainfall events are given. Individual cases worthy of more
attention (eg fatal landslides or landslides oflarge volume) are discussed in more
detail.
B) Landslide Incident Reports

Each reported landslide has a written report produced and filed for it since
1984. At the simplest level these reports include:
o failure location,
o who reported the incident,
o who is responsible for the maintenance of the slope,
o date of inspection and name of inspecting officer,
o date and time of failure,
o type of material,
o type of failure,
o volume of failure,
o affected areas,
o consequences,
o possible causes,
o immediate advice and follow-up action required, and
o landslide details, including a plan and section.
A sample copy of an incident report is shown in Appendix Al. For a small
landslide (say less than 10 m 3) this will consist only of two A4 pages. The larger
landslides may have more details, including photographs. The quality of the
landslide incident reports varies greatly, depending on the author, the landslide
and the weather and time constraints at the time of inspection.
Over 3,000 incident reports covering the 1984-93 study period were
available to the author. All reports were scanned by the author or Professor Fell,
and those selected were included in the author's landslide database. The
database consists of data entered from landslide incident reports ("minor"
incidents as categorised by the GEO) and landslide data cards ("major"
incidents as categorised by the GEO) selected in Hong Kong from annual
landslide records covering the period 1984 to 1993 inclusive. Some 1978/79
incidents were also selected. The selection criteria were as follows:
o Any incident resulting in a fatality or injury.
o Any incident with volume greater than 50m3 (ie a "major" landslide).
o Any incident which had a consequence statement in the annual
report, except minor road blockage or temporary evacuation of
squatter huts.
o Any incidents which appeared to be 'near misses' of property damage
or loss of life.
o All failures with volume greater than 10m3 , plus a representative
selection of those with a lower volume, where good geometry and
location data are available.
Out of a total of some 3,000 incident reports covering the study period, over
1,100 were entered into the database. This is approximately one third of the
data, and is reasonably representative. The incidents not included had such
poor quality data or missing data that their inclusion would not have improved
the prediction. Also, the great majority of the incidents not included were small
volume failures (less than 10m3).
C) Landslide Record Cards

Landslide record cards are available from 1978 onwards. These record
similar information to a landslide incidents report, but in a more condensed
format. They are also of better quality. A sample landslide record card can be
found in Appendix Al. About 800 of these were available. For the period
1978-83 landslide record cards were used for all reported landslides, and also
included some large pre-1978 failures. From 1984 onwards the landslide
record cards were replaced by landslide incident reports, and were only
produced for landslides with volumes greater than 50m3 ("major" landslides).
More than half of the landslide record cards (over 400) were entered into the
landslide database.
D) Detailed Case Studies

A review of 32 detailed landsliding reports was undertaken by Professor
Fell with input by the author to look at factors causing landsliding and runout
distance, speed of travel, damage and loss of life. The detailed reports were all
compiled by GEO staff for significant landslides and were a valuable source of
information. The relevant information was tabulated and salient conclusions
drawn out.
E) Stage One Reports (SIR) by the Planning Division

Stage One Reports (SIR) were carried out by the GEO's Planning Division
using the system devised by Binnie and Partners and the then Geotechnical
Control Office (GCO) in 1979 to rank slopes in terms oflikelihood of failure and
the resulting risk (Koirala and Watkins, 1988). These reports either
recommended further investigation and/or remedial action, or no further
action. To assess whether the outcomes of SIR reports were a good indicator of
the likelihood of slope failure between 20 and 30 reports from each year 1985,
1986, 1987 and 1988 were read (scanned) by Professor Fell and an assessment
was made of the report's conclusion on the probability of failure. A tabulation
was then used by the author to analyse the outcomes.
F) Master Ranking List

The ranking system was devised by Binnie and Partners and the then
Geotechnical Control Office (GCO) in 1979 to rank slopes in terms oflikelihood
of failure and the resulting risk (Koirala and Watkins, 1988). The rankings of
registered slopes were tabulated with actual performance to see if the slope
ranking was a good indicator of potential slope instability. A link to the S1R
report outcomes was also analysed.
G) The CHASE Data

The Cut Slopes in Hong Kong- Assessment of Stability by Empiricism
(CHASE) data was a study of 177 cut slopes performed by the then GCO in the
early 1980s. About half of the slopes had failed. It involved detailed
investigations of each slope, with over 300 variables being recorded for each
slope. The CHASE data was re-digitised at the School of Civil Engineering,
UNSW, andre-analysed by the author to see which variables were important in
distinguishing between the stable and failed slopes in the data set. Functions
were then developed that enabled the classification of other slopes built under
similar conditions into stable or potentially stable.
H) Maps
Topographic (1:1,000 and 1:2,500); geomorphological (1:2,500 and
1:20,000) and geology (1:20,000) maps of the entireTerritoryofHong Kong were
made available to the author. The GEO staff plotted 135landslides with volume
greater than 50m3 ("major" landslides) that occurred during 1984-93 onto
overlay maps of 1:20,000 scale. These were used to determine the slope
classification (slope gradient and a geomorphological terrain code used by the
GEO) and geology from the appropriate maps. The percentage of these in each
class were then tabulated against the corresponding percentage area covered by
each class to see if an over-representation or under-representation occurred.
I) Geotechnical Areas Studies Program (GASP)

A general regional geotechnical assessment of the Territory of Hong Kong
was carried out during the Geotechnical Areas Studies Program (GASP)
between 1979 and 1987. It comprises eleven regional study reports (GASP
reports I to XI), and is summarised in the twelfth report (Styles and Hansen,
1989). The GASP study was based mainly on aerial photo interpretation (API)
coupled with examination of existing records and limited field reconnaissance.
The object of the study was to produce maps for the assessment of engineering
feasibility and development planning. The entire territory was studied on a
1:20,000 scale, with selected critical areas mapped at 1:2,500. Different types of
maps were produced. These include:
o Terrain Classification Map (TCM),
o Landform Map (LM),
o Erosion Map (EM),
o Geotechnical Land Use Map (GLUM),
o Physical Constraints Map (PCM),
o Engineering Geology Map (EGM),
o Generalised Limitations and Engineering Appraisal Map (GLEAM),
and
o Computer generated (GEOTECS) maps.
The twelfth report of the GASP study (Styles and Hansen, 1989) contains
excellent overview documentation. In the author's study the GLUM class was
evaluated for its usefulness of prediction of likelihood of failure by tabulating its
percentages of total area versus the percentages of 135 failed "major" slopes,
described in H) above.
J) Rainfall Data
The rainfall data from the whole of Hong Kong was supplied to the author
in two batches. The first batch consisted of 73 disks of compressed five minute
rainfall records for all45 GEO rain gauges in the Territory of Hong Kong from
January 1989 to June 1994 inclusive, and was available at the end of the author's
July 1994 visit to Hong Kong's GEO. A decompression program (called raina)
was also supplied by the GEO. The data was decompressed for Hong Kong Island
one month at a time and stored for analysis. The second batch consisted of 14
nine-track magnetic tapes of binary 15 minute rainfall data for the GEO and
Royal Observatory rain gauges in the Territory, and was received in October
1994. This data was transferred onto modern magnetic tapes using a program
written by the School of Civil Engineering's P.K. Maguire, and subsequently
used in analysis.
K) Lantau Island Study and Planning Division Debris Flow Study

The studies of landslides on Lantau Island caused by the 4-5 November
1993 storm and the planning Division's debris flow study were under way
during the course ofthe author's study. Valuable data on runout distances and
the probability of landsliding on natural slopes was contained in these, but not
made available to the author during the course of his study.
4.1.3 Methods of Analysis

The analysis methods and processing techniques used by the author
consisted of data extraction, processing, and a variety of statistical analyses.
These are summarised in Table 4.2 below, together with the resulting
contributions to existing knowledge. Further details can be found in individual
chapters.
contribution of results.
RAW DATA PROCESSING ANALYSIS RESULT/CONTRIBUTION

GASP Study Probability
Extract relative Tabulate per- Probability of landsliding with re-
Maps numbers of fail- centages and spect to:
(Topography, geo- ures in each likelihood factors - geology
morphology and class for each class - geomorphology
geology) - GLUM class
Annual Reports
Incident Reports Establish
Landslide Record classes, count Probability
Cards numbers in each Plot frequencies Probability of failure related to
class, establish ranking
Detailed Case
probabilities
Studies
Ranking System
Landslide Data- Extract all regis- Compare sum-
base tered slopes mary statistics Probability
from the Land- and relative fre- Determine modification factors
Ranking System slide Database quencies
Probability
Determination of important factors
Summary stat-
for assessing likelihood of slope
istics
CHASE Study Re-digitise failure
Discriminant
Functions to distinguish between
analyses
stable and potentially unstable
slopes
Relative ranking
Probability
Survey of GEO of factors in-
Weighting of each factor for differ-
Senior Staff fluencing land-
ent slope types
sliding
Probability
Factors causing landslides
Detailed Case Tabulation and examination of in-
Vulnerability
Studies formation
Runout distance
Damage/Loss of life
... continued
Table 4.2 (continued) Hong Kong data sources, processing, analysis, and
contribution of results.
RAW DATA PROCESSING ANALYSIS RESULT/CONTRIBUTION

Browse 20-30
S1R Reports reports for each Correlate out- Probability
year 1985, come of S1 R Correlation of Pwith S1 R
1986, 1987 and with outcome, Vulnerability
Ranking System 1988, rank and risk Correlation of Vwith S1 R
Assign P, V
Annual Reports Probability

Temporal probability
Summary stat-
Incident Reports Vulnerability
Enter onto istics
Magnitude
spreadsheet Multiple regres-
Landslide Record Runout distance
(Landslide sions
Cards Depth of failure
Database) Simple sled
Vulnerability of persons
Detailed Case model analysis
Vulnerability of vehicles
Studies Vulnerability of buildings
Rainfall Extract from bi- Probability

(RO 1982-88 data) nary files Rainfall thres-
holds causing
Generate rainfall Combine data- landsliding
Extract using events database bases Number of land-
(GEO 1989-93 GEOprogram
slides near a
data) (from binary file
Summary stat- rain gauge
for 1993)
is tics Annual Excee-
Multiple regres- dance Probabili-
Extract incidents sions ties of rain
with locations, Curve fitting Number of land-
Generate inci-
Annual Reports dates (and time slides over an
dent database
where available) area given a
of failure rainfall event
Note: RO The Royal Observatory in Hong Kong
4.2 The Lillydale Shire (Melbourne) Risk Assessment Study
4.2.1 Background
4.2.1.1 The Setting of Lillydale Shire, Melbourne
A) General
Lillydale Shire encompasses an area of approximately 398 km 2 of varied
land use on the eastern edge of suburban Melbourne, Australia. Figure 4.1
shows the location and the main geological areas of the Shire. The land uses are
residential, commercial, agricultural, light industrial and grazing. A part of the
Shire is a national forest. An increase in development during recent decades is
gradually changing the essentially rural area.
-~-
:;·:; Qc QUAT£RNARY COLLUVIUM
"'v T"" OLDfR VOLCANICS
..._ 0..- KAL.ORAMA RHYOOACITC
"" O..f t'I!:RNY CR£1!:1< RHYODACIT[
• AR[AS 01" KNOWN L.ARG[ L.ANDSLI~S
SHIRf IIOUNOARY
0 4 I I 10
Note: Silurian and alluvial zones not shown.
Figure 4.1 Location and geology map of Lillydale Shire (Oids and Wilson,
1992).
The terrain vanes from broad nver flats along the Yarra Valley to steep
mountainous slopes rising over 600 m above sea level in the Dandenong Ranges
(Olds and Wilson, 1992). Rolling hills of a moderate nature are a feature of much
of the Shire. Annual rainfall ranges from 800 to 1,500 mm.
B) Geology
The geology of Lillydale Shire is summarised by Olds and Wilson (1992),
and described in detail by Coffey Partners International (1990). The nine main
geological units of Lillydale Shire are summarised in Table 4.3. The detailed
description below is drawn from Coffey Partners International (1990).
iii) Silurian-Devonian Sedimentary Rocks

This unit includes a thick sequence of folded and occasionally faulted
interbedded mudstones, siltstones and sandstones. These rocks outcrop in a
broad band extending from Croydon North through Wonga Park to Coldstream
and Gruyere, and south -east to include Seville and Woori Yallock.
iv) Devonian Acid Volcanic Rocks

This unit includes rhyolites, rhyodacites, ignimbrites and tuffs. It can be
divided into two distinct groups.
The lower group includes the layered dense Coldstream Rhyolite and the
overlying ignimbritic flows of the Mt Evelyn Rhyodacite. This lower group
outcrops on the western slopes of the Dandenongs and to the north to include the
area broadly bounded by Montrose, Lilydale and Mt Evelyn. Typically, the
natural terrain is steep to very steep forest covered slopes with a variable but
often thin soil cover over rock. Typically the soil cover includes components
which are colluvial and residual in origin, and may grade sharply to high
strength rock within 1m to 2m of the natural ground surface. Observed mass
movements in this group of rocks is mostly limited to shallow creep and local cut
batter failures. However, the Montrose debris flows probably originated on the
weathered mantle of this group of rocks. The soil cover is deeper in the less
steep, lower slopes, and 3-15m deep in the valley floors.
The upper group includes two thin fine-grained tuff beds underlying and
overlying the Kalorama Rhyodacite, overlain in turn by the Ferny Creek
Rhyodacite. This group of rocks outcrops on the crestal and eastern slopes of the
Dandenongs, between Kalorama in the north and Ferntree Gully and the Patch
in the south. Typically, the natural terrain is moderate to very steep forest
covered slopes with a variable but often thick soil cover over rock. The
sub-surface profile within these geological units can vary considerably.
Commonly the profile includes 1m to 2m of fine-grained soils of
colluvial/residual origin, overlying extremely weathered rock with boulder
"floaters". Less weathered rock may occur at greater depth. Less commonly a
thin colluvial/residual soil profile overlies high strength rock beneath the crest
of some ridges and spurs. The landslides occurring in the Kalorama area as well
as other documented slides in the Shire of Sherbrooke occur on this group of
rocks.
v) Devonian Acid Intrusive Rocks

This unit is mostly grandiorite in composition, and occurs in several small
isolated localities in the north-west and the north-east corners of the shire.
The natural terrain consists of steep tree-covered slopes with a variable but
mostly thin soil cover over rock. Creep and turf mats are the only mass
movement identified in these areas.
vi) Tertiary Alluvium

This unit predates the Tertiary Volcanic rocks and underlies the volcanics
in some areas. The alluvium is thin, rarely more than 3 m thick, and varies in
composition to include gravel, sand and clay. The significance of this unit relates
to its potential to act as an aquifer (possibly confined) and hence adversely
influence pore pressures beneath the Tertiary Volcanics.
vii) Tertiary Basaltic Rocks

The rocks in this unit are commonly weathered to soil and occur between
Chirnside Park and Mooroolbark to the west of Lilydale, and in a large area to
the east of the Silvan reservoir including Silvan, Wandin Yallock, Forest Hill,
Wandin East and Burleigh. In general, the terrain in these areas consists of
developed rolling slopes, often with a thick red soil cover overlying variably
weathered rock at depth. Instability in this geological unit includes landslides at
Mooroolbark, Silvan, Wandin, Lewis Hill, Burleigh and Forest Hill. These slips
are all related to the reactivation of ancient landslides.
viii) Quaternary Colluvium and Alluvium

This unit mostly occurs as alluvium in the form of thick sand, silt, clay and
gravel deposits in and adjacent to the flood plains of the Yarra River and its
tributaries. Due to the very flat slopes in the alluvium they have no landslide
activity except for slumping of river banks caused by erosion.
Locally extensive colluvium, mapped as ancient debris fan, hill slump and
hill wash debris is present on the western foot slopes of the Dandenongs and
elsewhere in the Lillydale Shire. The terrain encompassed by the alluvium is
mostly flat to very gently sloping farmland, whereas that of the colluvium is
moderately steep to steep tree covered foot slopes of the hills surrounding the
alluvial plains.
Landslides identified in the areas mapped as colluvium include the debris
from the Montrose debris flow as well as small scale cut failures. The published
maps often fail to identify all colluvium (Coffey Partners International, 1990).
Table 4.3 Geology, terrain and known landslides in Lillydale Shire (Olds and Wilson, 1992). ~ ~
(1> (t
...."'
:;d ....
.......
.'Tj
'
X"
"'(1> '<[~
Sym-
bol
I(maximum
Name
known thickness)
Typical description Terrain
Known landslides in natural
ground
"'"' ~"1:;
a ::T
g t:J
Quaternary alluvium ~lluviu.m associated with existing rna- . None except river bank col-
Qa
(15m) JOr dram age courses Flat to very gently slopmg flood plain lapses.
;''2
... z
~Cil
None known on the foot
Fan debris including boulders hill Moderate to steep foot slopes of the slopes.
.g(1>'-'
~
Quaternary colluvium
Qc
(< 5 m) slump and hill wash deposits ' Dandenong Ranges and the hill sys- Reactivation of landslide de- "'
tems
bris.
Interbedded basalt, pyroclastics and Active slumps up to 10 ha in
Tvo Tertiary volcanics
interbedded materials, commonly Rolling hills with a thick red soil cover area. Larger ancient ones
(36m)
completely weathered known.
Tertiary alluvium
Tew Gravel, sand and clay Rarely outcrops None known.
(3m)
Devonian acid igneous intrusions Isolated grandiorite and porphyrite in- Isolated steep tree covered slopes with Small turf slides only.
Di
(?) trusions a variable but mostly thin cover on rock
Moderate to very steep forest covered One major debris flow plus nu-
Devonian Ferny Creek rhyodacite Poorly layered blue-black high
Dvf slopes with a variable but often thick merous slumps in soil and
(1 km?) strength recrystallised rhyodacite
soil cover on weathered rock rock.
Dvk
Devonian Kalorama rhyodacite
(0.4 km) strength rhyodactte
I
wash cover on weathered rock wash cover.
I
Dark greenish-wey porphoritic high ~~g:~a~o~~Y ~~~P a f~i~s~o~~~~~~~ Several slumps in soil/slope-
Includes up to 400 m of rhyolite over- Steep forest covered slopes with a

Devonian volcanics, undifferentiated
Dvu lain by interbedded ash flows, agglom- variable but often thin soil cover on I None known.
(1.4 km)
erates, lavas and ash fall deposits weathered rock1
Paleozoic sedimentary rocks, undiffer- Sequence of folded and occasionally Moderate to steep tree covered ridges
SOu I entiated faulted interbedded mudstones, silt- and gullies with up to 2 m of soil cover I Small turf slides only
(several km) stones and sandstones on weathered rock 1
00
Notes: 1. Large areas cleared for residential development. ~
4.2.1.2 Landslide Hazard Zoning in Lillydale Shire

Knowledge of past landsliding in Lillydale Shire within the geotechnical
community was virtually non- existent until various studies were carried out in
the 1980s and early 1990s. These studies are outlined in Olds and Wilson (1992)
and Moon et al (1992). A summary is given below.
In the Plantes Hill area of the Shire landslides associated with
development of school grounds and a residential subdivision occurred in early to
mid 1980s COlds and Wilson, 1992). Investigations showed that this area has
been subject to past landsliding, and led to the relocation of a 8.6ML water tank
and a school. In 1988 the Upper Yarra Valley and Dandenong Ranges Authority,
the regional planning authority, commissioned a study oflandsliding within the
four Shires in its jurisdiction, including Lillydale Shire (Upper Yarra Valley and
Dandenong Ranges Authority, 1988). The study consisted of mainly air photo
interpretation, some research of historical information, and limited field
checking. A three tier landslide hazard zoning system (based on the five tier
system developed by the Sydney branch of the Australian Geomechanics society,
viz Walker et al, 1985) was adopted due to the preliminary nature of the study.
The three hazard levels (termed risk in the study) were Low, Medium and High.
As the planning controls indicated that land should not be developed if it was
subject to landsliding and subsidence, the Shire was advised that even land
zoned Low "risk" could be interpreted to be subject to landsliding and therefore
unsuitable to development. Planning and building permits could hence not be
granted until a clearer zoning was available.
Owing to this undesirable situation the Shire commissioned a more
detailed study oflandslide hazard within its boundaries. This study was carried
out by Coffey Partners International (1990a). The zoning scheme is consistently
called a landslide "risk zoning" scheme, even though it is in fact a landslide
hazard zoning scheme as no consequences oflandsliding are incorporated into it
other than implicitly, ie that damage may occur to houses if sliding occurs. The
scheme is based on geology, topography and terrain type. The three tier system
of Low, Medium and High was retained, but subdivisions were made within the
Low and Medium zones on the basis of geology, and flat areas along flood plains
were classified as exempt. The zoning scheme and primary development
controls adopted are shown in Table 4.4. Generally, the "risk" zoning was
related to the probability of landsliding on or close to the area under
consideration. However, the area of Montrose was subsequently separately
zoned on the basis of debris flow hazard after the historical review had identified
that a 30,000 m 3 debris flow occurred on the western slopes ofMt Dandenongin
1891, travelling over 2 km. The Montrose debris flow hazard zoning is described
in section 4.2.1.3 below.
The Lillydale Shire Planning Scheme was amended to incorporate the
zoning scheme (Olds and Wilson, 1992). Further amendments removed the
ambiguous phrase "subject to landslip" which it contained originally. During
the implementation of the landslide hazard zoning scheme the objections by a
single resident to the amendment resulted in a delay of several months.
4.2.1.3 The Montrose Debris Flow Hazard Zoning Study

In 1891 a 30,000 m 3 debris flow occurred on the western slopes of Mt
Dandenong, travelling over 2 km (Danvers- Powers, 1892). Parts of the
semi -rural area have since been developed as a residential housing area, known
as Montrose. Should another such event occur, there would be a real probability
of injury or death, and property damage. Considering these facts Lillydale Shire
decided to develop a separate debris flow hazard zoning for the area (Coffey
Partners International, 1991a). The study is described by Moon et al (1992) and
the salient points are highlighted below. One should note that the phrase "risk
zoning" is used in this study, where in fact the hazard maps detail potential
debris flow paths and the associated probabilities of occurrence.
Mt Dandenong is part of the Dandenong Ranges which form a prominent
ridge with steep, forest-covered north western slopes (Moon et al, 1992). The
ridge consists of weathered volcanic rocks overlain by thin layers of residual
soils. Colluvium of up to 5 m thickness is found in the lower parts of the slopes
and in fan deposits at the base of gullies. Lower rounded foothills occur to the
north -west of the Dandenong Ranges. The valley floors are underlain by
alluvium generally 3-15 m thick.
For the purpose of the debris flow hazard zoning study the north -western
slopes of Mt Dandenong were divided into 26 labelled catchments by Coffey
Partners International (1991a). 58 landslides were mapped on the steep slopes
in the study area. Most of the slides occur on slopes underlain by Ferny Creek
Rhyodacite steeper than 26.6°. Deposits from the 1891 event were mapped on
the lower slopes and traced back to the precursor landslide. The study area plan
and slope profile along the 1891 debris flow path are shown in Figure 4.2. Even
though many other landslides occur on the steep slopes, the investigations
concluded that no other similar sized debris flows occurred in the study area
during the Holocene period, ie the last 10,000 years.
Seven factors which may be related to the relative probability of
landsliding or debris flow were identified. These are summarised in Table 4.5
together with the "risk ranking" assessments made for each catchment. Design
SECTION ALONG 1891 DEBRIS FLOW
1891 LANOSliO( 110 INroll"'-l'IOH

I... IYATt LMOOI A' AL.
Col
Qll.LY COOOFIOI(O soo
ll(f'O~IT
---
LsMtfflfLD llllAO
SCAlf
PLAN OF MONTROSE LANDSLIDES AND DEBRIS FLOWS
1 1691 DEBRIS FLOW

GULLY CONFINED
l
DEPOSITS
1691 DEBRIS FLOW

MAIN DEPOSIT AREA-
DEBRIS NOT
GULLY CONFINED
LEGEND
__..-··- HVDY ARU IOUMDAU
~
-
--- H4
.... ' CATCHMENT IOUMOARY A RtrER(N(( NUMI[R
ION ST([P MORTM W(STEAM SlGP(SI
lOvER CNOATH V(~T(AMt IOUNVA•Y

or TN( r(.NY C•t[K RMYODACIT(
1. . 1 DEIR IS rlGW PATM
UN( 01" SlOP( PROI"Il( DOWOI

11•1 D(IRIS l'l.Ow f'ATH
SCAlf
Figure 4.2 The Montrose debris flow study area plan and slope profile along
the 1891 debris flow path (Moon et al, 1992).
volumes and depositional areas were developed based on the 1891 debris flow as
little other information was available. The assumed recurrence intervals were
developed using judgement. This was done using an expert panel approach
involving three geotechnical engineers and two engineering geologists. Account
was taken of the history of landsliding and debris flow, the geomorphological
characteristics of the landslides in the source area, changes in vegetation in the
source area since 1891 and rainfall records (Fell, 1996, personal
communication). Ranges were given for the assumed recurrence intervals to
highlight the uncertainty.
Five classes of relative hazard zoning were developed based on the assumed
recurrence intervals and design debris flow volumes for a particular area: High
X (X), High (H), Medium (M), Low (L) and Very Low (VL). These are listed for
each catchment in Table 4.5. These were finally developed into 15 debris flow
"risk" zones and are described in Table 4.6. The final debris flow hazard zoning
on 1:2,500 scale maps was made available to the author by Lillydale Shire for his
study. A sample extract from one of these maps is reproduced in Figure 4.3.
For planning purposes the 15 debris flow "risk" zones were reduced to four
categories: High, Medium Low and Very Low debris flow "risk" zones (Shire of
Lillydale, 1993). The assumed recurrence interval ranges for these are shown in
Table 4. 7. A hazard zoning map of the Montrose area incorporating these four
zones is shown in Figure 4.4.
The report by Coffey Partners International (1991a) and reviewers
(Stapled on and Fell) included warning of potential for loss oflife in the event of a
debris flow. This was the first time such potential for loss of life had been
included in a landslide hazard zoning scheme in Australia (Fell, 1992).
4.2.1.4 The Public Awareness Campaign
Following the completion of the hazard zoning studies the Shire held a
concerted landslide and debris flow hazard public awareness campaign. A
resident information guide for development in areas of possible slope instability
was released by the Shire, and all residents received a copy (Shire of Lillydale,
1993). The campaign for residents in the Montrose debris flow areas was more
extensive. It included the mailing out of reports on the zoning to affected
residents, a public meeting in December 1992, warning on the possibility ofloss
of life from debris flow, and the availability of landslide experts and Shire staff
for discussion with individual residents if they so desired. Such an extensive
effort was deemed to be necessary by the Shire as many residents were unaware
of the landslide risks they were living with. This campaign resulted in probably
the most informed group of residents on landslide risk anywhere in Australia.
Table 4.4 Landslide "risk" zones for Lillydale Shire (Olds and Wilson, 1992; Coffey Partners International, 1990a). ~ri'
(1) Cb
-·
::0 ....
.......
"'?;""'Tj
Landslide "Risk" Zone Ex L Lb M1 M2 H ~§.:
"' t:>l
'<!
-
(1)
Flat land, Some risk of "'
Zone Description
exempt
A landslide is very unlikely A landslide is unlikely
landsllding exists s"'
£l
"'t:l
::r
Slopes in each geo- Qa < 5% 5-20% NA NA NA NA
logical unit where Qc < 5% 5-20% NA NA > 205 NU .~'2
... z
~CI.l
"risk" category is Tvo NA NA < 15% NA > 15% NU
applicable Tew NA < 20% NA NA > 20% NU ~(1) ' -~" '
Di NA < 20% NA 20-40% >40% NU "'
Dvf NA < 20% NA NA 20-50% NU
Dvk NA < 20% NA NA 20-50% NU
Dvu NA < 20% NA 20-40% >40% NU
Sdu NA < 20% NA 20-40% >40% NU
Development controls Good engineering prac- Confirmation of "risk" classification by Shire Slope stability assess- Slope stability assess-
tice using geotechnical information submitted to ment by an exper- ment by an exper-
classify the site for soil reactivity ienced geotechnical ienced geotechnical
practitioner practitioner
+ good hillside +slope sta- + good hillside
practice bility assess- practice + additional geotechni- + additional geotechni-
ment by an cal investigation where cal investigation
experienced considered necessary
geotechnical + adoption of hillside
practitioner + good hillside practice practices to reduce the
with site and project "risk" to an acceptable
+good hill- specific controls where level
side practice applicable
~L- ---- ------ L...- ------ ~- ~ ~--- - ~---
Notes: Tew Tertiary alluvium Dvk Devonian Kalorama Sdu Paleozoic sedimentary rocks
Qa Quaternary alluvium Di Devonian acid igneous Rhyodacite (undifferentiated)
Qc Quaternary intrusions Dvu Devonian volcanics
colluvium Dvf Devonian Ferny Creek (undifferentiated) NA Not applicable
Tvo Tertiary volcanics Rhyodacite
NU All known landslides and areas of similar terrain are mapped as high "risk" areas, but follow-up studies in the Montrose area advise all slopes
greater than 50% in Ferny Creek and Kalorama are to be treated as high "risk" 00
a,
~ ;1~
CATCHMENT REFERENCE NUMBER 11> (t
-------- -- -- - -- - 2: ~ ....
~ ............
CATCHMENT RISK AI Al 81 Bl BJ c Dl D:l OJ E Fl Fl Gl 02 HI H2 Hl H4 l 11 l2 Jl 14 Kl 10 0 .
"'?;"'Tj
'[
.l;o.
RANKING FACTOR 11 Xll
Ot
1 Topography (spur or gully)
• • • • . • . •
• • • . • "'
"'11>
Pol
'<
~
2 Relative amount of outcrop

• • • • • . • . . . • • • • • • • • . • • • . • 1-'-
\Q
=
~
c:
r;r, "'s
11>
"1:i
::r
t:l
3 Height of stoep slope Ol .• . • • • . . • • • • . . . \Q
1-'-
~
c. 3
~
3
....
::l ,--..
. . c::z
.0~Cil
4 Proportion of !ileep slope . • . • • • . . . . • . . . '-' 'I)
'I)
~
~
"'1
~
. . . . . '< 0
'I)
. • • • • • • 'I)
~'--'
S Size of roll uvial fan
• • • • • • • • 3 0......,
"'
6 Number of Modem l.and.slipa . . . . . • • • . . . ~
= 0~
.....
. . . • . =
'I)
......_ .....
7 Volume of Modem landslips
• • ~
0
"'1
0
'I)
CATCHMENT RISK
RANKING ASSESSMENT 1' 1
0
= , ~
~ ,
~
.....
i Very large debris flow L L L L M L L L M M M X X H L L L L M L L L L L M L ~ :r'
~- 3
ii Small or large debris flow H H 1-'- ~
iii Debris torrent in gully H H H H H II H H H

\Q
\Q
J~
=
.....
L _ __
-
c.
~
NOTES: \i C"
0 :t
(I) Factors I to 4 apply to that part of the catchment underlain by the Ferny Creek Rhyodacite.
~
'I)
(2) The size of the dot indicates the relative influence of the risk factor (large dots "high", small dots "medium· and no dots "low"). '< 0
0
(3) Steep refers to those slopes greater than 50~ (26.6°). ~ ~
(4) The symbols X, H, M, L (and VL applied to other parts of the study area) refer to the relative risk as follows:- ..,..... ..,
~
Symbol Assumed recurrence int.:rval (su Section 4.4) Assumed probability of occurrence in 50 year p.:riod = -·~
-
Term ~
'I)
"'1
years % 'I)
"'1
X High X I in 100 to I in 300 15 to 39 =
.....=
~
H High I in 100 to I in 1000 5 to 39 ~
=
"'1 c.
~ =
M Medium I in 1000 to I in 10000 0.5 to 5
IJtl
L Low greater than I in 10000 less than 0.5 c;· S'
,_ VL Very Low greater than I in 100000 less than 0.05
= ,
e?.. .....
-------- ------- ---- --- -- -------- ------------
.., 0
'I) too
-...1
Coffey Partners International, 199la).
Zone "Risk"
Zone Description
No. Category
Steep slopes where landslides may occur, some of which may become deb-
1 High ris flows. Initiation zone for a high "risk" design debris flow (High "Risk"
Event).
Subdivision of Zone 1 to include Modern (post European) disturbed ground
1X High X of 1o,ooom 3 or greater. Initiation and transportation zone for a High X "risk"
design debris flow (High X "Risk" Event) originating from disturbed ground.
Likely extent of deposition area of a High "Risk" Event originating in Zone
2 High
1.
Subdivision of Zone 2 to indicate likely extent of deposition area of a High
2X High X
X "Risk" Event originating in Zone 1X.
Gullies downstream of Zone 2 where debris may be deposited by the High
2C High "Risk" Event. Large parts of Zone 2C will also be affected by a High X "Risk"
Event.
Gullies where part of the gully floor are steep (greater than 40%), and parts
3 High of the immediate catchment are very steep (greater than 50% slope). Deb-
ris torrents may affect the sections of gully covered by Zone 3.
4 Medium Medium "risk" equivalent of Zone 1.
5 Medium Medium "risk" equivalent of Zone 2.
sc Medium Medium "risk" equivalent of Zone 2C.
Marginal area to Zone 2 and 2C. Medium risk because of difficulty of pre-
dieting extent of deposits resulting from High "Risk" Events. The difficulty
includes the uncertainty associated with assessing the proportion of debris
SM Medium
flowing down particular gullies and with assessing the extent of the fringe
area. Zone 5M also takes into account the medium risk of larger than design
debris flows occurring in Zone 1 or Zone 1X areas.
6 Low Low "risk" equivalent of Zone 1.
Low "risk" equivalent of Zone 2. Extended to include all areas of flatter
7 Low slopes in which deposits of colluvium or alluvium derived from the steep
slopes could occur.
SA Low Foothills not included in Zone 7 containing steeper slopes.
88 Very Low Foothills or alluvial flats not included in Zone 7 or BA.
9 Very Low Crestal ridge of the Dandenong Ranges
Table 4.7 Assumed recurrence interval ranges for the four debris flow hazard
zones (Shire of Lillydale, 1993; Coffey Partners International,
1991a).
Debris Flow Hazard Zone Recurrence Interval

High 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 100
Medium 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 10,000
Low 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000
Very Low greater than 1 in 100,000
88
N 7
' 88
6 1
0 500m
SCALE
Figure 4.3 Extract from the debris flow "risk" zoning map (Moon et al, 1992).
KEY:
~ Debris Fl01o1 Low Risk
~l[~~j Debris Flew Medium Risk
B Debris Flow High Risk
development controls (Shire of Lillydale, 1993).
Peter J. Finlay; PhD (UNSW)
4.2.1.5 Development Controls

Specific, detailed guidelines and development restrictions were given by
the Shire for both the landslide and debris flow hazard zones (Shire of Lillydale,
1993). They are summarised below.
A) Development Controls in Areas Subject to Landslide Hazard

For areas designated Lor M1, development is generally permitted without
a specific geotechnical assessment unless the slope exceeds 40%. A geotechnical
assessment consists of a site visit and brief study without site investigation.
For Lb and M2 areas a geotechnical assessment and possibly a geotechnical
investigation will be required. A geotechnical investigation includes a
geotechnical assessment plus site investigations and possibly stability analyses.
In areas designated H no further development is permitted without a
comprehensive geotechnical investigation combined with any necessary
remedial work.
The Shire's guide presents details of good hillside engineering practices for
areas subject to landslide hazard. Olds and Wilson (1992) note that since the
Planning Scheme amendment was passed most sites classified M2 have been
granted planning and building permits. Some high risk sites have also been
granted approval following investigations of the conditions in and around the
sites. Overall, the residents and builders in the Shire now understand the need
for good hillside development practice, and the landslide hazard zoning scheme
is reasonably accepted.
B) Development Controls in Areas Subject to Debris Flow Hazard

The Shire's guide (Shire of Lillydale, 1993) also discusses the debris flow
"risk" zoning. It describes debris flows, their implications and details the
development controls in debris flow hazard zones. These are in addition to the
development controls imposed by the landslide hazard zoning:
No further development is permitted in areas designated Very High or
High debris flow "risk" unless extensive geotechnical studies and/or
protection works are undertaken to justify the downgrading of the
assigned "risk" grading. This would have to be done on an area -wide basis
due to the high costs involved, and thus this regulation has effectively
precluded further development in these areas.
Development within Medium debris flow "risk" areas is permitted subject

to any restrictions imposed by the general landslide hazard zoning. The
nature of the development is likely to adversely alter the High debris flow
"risk" boundary where the development is near such a boundary.
For development in the Low and Very Low debris flow "risk" areas no
additional development restrictions are imposed.
The Shire's guide includes some guidelines for residents already living in debris
flow hazard areas. A monitoring program is continuing in the debris flow source
landslide areas. Based on the description of the 1891 debris flow, which occurred
after heavy rain and flooding, and was preceded by a "loud rumbling noise"
(Danvers- Powers, 1892; Lundy- Clarke, 1975) the Shire advised residents to
(Shire of Lillydale, 1993):
"Give consideration" to evacuation if the creeks are flowing
"substantially".
"Give consideration" to evacuation if "torrential rain" follows a

"generally wet period".
Residents in the High debris flow "risk" areas to "immediately

evacuate to areas with a lesser debris flow "risk" zoning" if a "loud
rumbling noise or similar is heard during flood or intense rainfall
events".
To the author's knowledge no- one has done this, and the residents of Montrose
remain sceptical of the "apparent" dangers of debris flows.
4.2.2 Study Scope and Objectives

The objective of the author's study was to assess the total landslide risk of
property damage, Rt, to selected study areas of Montrose and Kalorama in order
to illustrate the methodology and the difficulties involved. For the Montrose
study area individual and societal risks to life were also assessed. The Montrose
study area comprises 151 houses and 173 properties, and is shown in Figure 4.5.
The Kalorama study area comprises 91 houses and 115 properties, and is shown
in Figure 4.6.
4.2.3 Method of Analysis
4.2.3.1 Montrose Study Area

For the Montrose study area the Shire's debris flow hazard zoning with its
probabilities of debris flow was used as the base zoning data by the author (see
Moon et al, 1992). The position of the buildings on the blocks of land was
determined by the author from site plans, and cross-checked by a visual
inspection of each lot. For critical buildings (near zoning boundaries) copies of
the house plans and sections were obtained from the Shire's records. These were
used to aid in the assessment of the particular building's vulnerability. The

assessed value of the land and the buildings were also obtained. The value of the
land, buildings and their vulnerability were entered onto a spreadsheet,
together with the debris flow zoning and its corresponding probabilities of
debris flow. Rt was then calculated from the formula Rt = 2: E X P x V, where E
is the element value (in this case the building value), Pis the probability of debris
flow and Vis the assessed vulnerability of the building.
4.2.3.2 Kalorama Study Area

The Kalorama area is located on the side of Mt Dandenong, below the
crestal ridge of Mt Dandenong. It is a steep (average slopes of 15 o to 25 o)
residential area. The geology of the area consists primarily of colluvium of
varying depth (ranging from 1m to over 10m) overlying Devonian Rhyodacite
and other volcanics (Olds and Wilson, 1992; Moon et al, 1992; Coffey Partners
International, 1990a, 1990b, 1991b). The volcanic soil gives rise to
slow-moving landslides, which are well documented in the history of the area
(Lundy-Clarke, 1975). Geomorphologically the area exhibits "benching"
(steepening and flattening of hill slopes) in a number of locations and other
evidence of past landsliding. A large portion of this area has been zoned as high
landslide "risk" (viz Olds and Wilson, 1992; Coffey Partners International,
1990a),
A sub-zoning of the Kalorama high landslide risk area was first carried
out, as the Coffey Partners International (1990a) zoning was too coarse to
permit a reasonable risk assessment. This sub-zoning is described in detail in
section 5.5. Each sub-zone was assigned a probability of landsliding based on
historicallandsliding in the area and the author's judgement. Following the
sub-zoning, the position of the buildings in the study area was obtained by the
author from site plans, and cross-checked by a visual inspection of each lot. The
assessed value of the land and the buildings were also obtained. The value of the
land, buildings and their vulnerability were entered onto a spreadsheet,
together with the landslide zoning and its corresponding probabilities of
landsliding. Rt was then calculated from the formula Rt = 2: E X P X V similar to
the Montrose area calculations.
4.2.4 Results and Discussion
The details of the Kalorama study area sub-zoning are given in section
5.5. The results and discussion of the landslide risk assessment of the Montrose
and Kalorama areas can be found in chapter 7.
.. N
0 200 400 600m

Study
area Scale
boundary
Figure 4.5 The Montrose risk assessment study area.

. N
0 50 100 160 200m
Scale
Study
area
boundary
Creek
Figure 4.6 The Kalorama risk assessment study area.

Table 4.8 Lillydale Shire data sources, processing, analysis, and contribution
of results.
DATA RESULT/
RAW DATA ANALYSIS
PROCESSING CONTRIBUTION
Kalorama topographic Sub-zone area

map Mark signs of land- using geomorphol- Probability
sliding on topo- ogy, historical data Estimates of probability
graphic map and field observa- of landsliding
Field inspection tions
Kalorama probability
of landsliding esti-
mates Total Risk (R1)
Enter onto Calculate risk for
Total risk for Kalorama
Kalorama building spreadsheet each element
study area
and property valu-
at ions
Montrose probability
of landsliding esti- Total Risk (R1)
mates Enter onto Calculate risk for
Total risk for Montrose
spreadsheet each element
Montrose building and study area
property valuations
4.3 The Study of Landslide Risk Perception in Australia and Hong

Kong
4.3.1 Introduction
The author is not aware of any surveys oflandslide risk perception having
been carried out anywhere in the world. The author saw the survey oflandslide
risk perception as an important component of his study of the risk assessment of
slopes, in order to be able to compare and contrast the expressed views of
landsliding to historical landslide risks, and also to the expert's estimation of
landslide risk in specific situations. Furthermore the differences and
similarities in landslide risk perception between various groups of respondents
could be evaluated, thereby providing valuable insights into the important
social factors influencing landslide risk perception. The comparison of the
landslide hazard to other hazards is useful as well.
4.3.2 Study Scope and Objectives

The main objective of the survey oflandslide risk perception was to obtain
qualitative and quantitative data on a persons expressed views oflandslide risk.
While it is true that a person's expressed views may not be consistent with their
actions, ie their revealed preferences (viz section 9.1 and Slovic, 1987), they are
nevertheless a crucial component in the evaluation of landslide risk. Without

any input from the public on their views and feelings the decision makers are left
"in the dark", and can be seen to be making assumptions on behalf of the public
without any consultation. The need for public opinion and consultation was
highlighted in the author's review of the literature pertaining to risk evaluation
in section 2.1.6. Thus the second objective of a risk perception study is one of
public consultation, and should form part of any risk management system.
The following qualitative points of landslide risk perception were
identified as important by the author in consultation with others (viz section
4.3.3):
o general views of landsliding,
o cognitive factors associated with the following three hazards:
- being involved in a traffic accident,
- being involved in a landslide,
- being involved in a petrochemical plant accident,
o viewson
- limits to development,
- landslide stabilisation,
- cost of new regulations,
- cost of remedial works,
o ranking of landsliding relative to other hazards, and
o ranking of various landslide situations to each other.
The following quantitative data on landslide risk was elicited:
o the perception of specific annual death rates from an unspecified
hazard, and
o the maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding (for property
damage and loss of life separately) in various landslide situations.
The development of the questionnaire is discussed in section following.
4.3.3 Development of the Questionnaire
The survey questionnaire was initially aimed at surveying groups of

residents in the Lillydale Shire of Melbourne. Later it was also administered to
the staff of the Lillydale Shire, staff of Hong Kong's Civil Engineering
Department (HKCED) and Australian landslide experts when opportunities to
do so arose. The questionnaire was developed in several stages. These were:
o initial draft,
o pilot survey in Newport, Sydney,
o revision of questionnaire,
o full- scale trial survey in Werrington, Sydney,
o final questionnaire revision, and

o administering of questionnaire to the various survey groups.
The initial draft of the questionnaire was compiled in line with the desired study
objectives outlined in section The draft was developed in close consultation with
Dr Austin Adams of the School of Psychology at the University of New South
Wales, and with Drs Brian Bishop and Geoff Syme of the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Division of Water
Resources, Perth, to whom the author is indebted for their invaluable
comments. Dr Adams provided comments, suggestions and criticisms of a
general psychological nature in terms of phrasing of the questions and the
construction of the graphical scales. Drs Bishops and Syme were previously
involved in a number of risk perception studies and community consultations in
the dam safety arena, and were able to provide the author with specific
comments on the detailed content of the questionnaire.
The initial draft questionnaire was administered as a pilot survey in the
suburb of Newport, Sydney. This area was selected as parts of Newport are
landslide-prone, with a number of houses destroyed or damaged by landslides
in recent years. The residents were likely to show an active interest in the
questionnaire as the landsliding occurred in their area. The pilot survey was run
over a weekend, as more residents were at home. The author door- knocked a
number of houses, and obtained the resident's permission and agreement to
administer the questionnaire. The author then sat down with each respondent
and watched as they filled out the questionnaire, answering any questions as
they arose. This was understandably a slow procedure, taking about an hour per
questionnaire. Thus only eight completed questionnaires were obtained at the
end of a weekend's work.
Several problems in the phrasing and presentation of the questionnaire
were brought out during the pilot survey. This led to the revision of the
questionnaire in consultation with Drs Adams, Bishop and Syme. The revised
questionnaire was then administered in a full- scale trial to the residents in the
suburb ofWerrington, Sydney. This area was chosen as it was easily accessible to
the author. Being a flat, urban area it has no history of landsliding, and so
became group with no landslide experience, to be compared to subsequent
surveys of residents in landslide affected areas. The method of questionnaire
administration in Werrington was by door- knocking by the author over several
weekends. When a resident answered the door, the author explained the reason
for the survey and obtained a commitment to fill out the questionnaire from the
person before leaving the questionnaire with them. A pre-paid, addressed
envelope was also left with the resident. The residents who had not returned the
questionnaires by mail within the requested time period were followed up with a
telephone call. 70 questionaries out of 120 were returned. This represents a
high return rate of 58%. A high return rate is important for small survey
populations in critical areas to ensure a sufficient return to make statistical
analysis meaningful. The Werrington survey group is labelled as group 9 in the
survey results (section 9.2).
Some minor changes ar1smg from the Werrington survey were
incorporated into the final version of the questionnaire. While this was being
done the author had the opportunity to survey a group of Australian landslide
experts gathered in Sydney for a seminar on landslide risk assessment. From
the 26 persons present at the seminar 20 questionnaires were returned to the
author. The group of Australian landslide experts is labelled as group 10 in the
survey results (section 9.2).
The final version of the questionnaire was thus completed, and followed by
its administration to groups of residents in the Lillydale Shire of Melbourne
(groups 4 to 7), the staff of the Lillydale Shire (group 8), and subsequently the
staff of the Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department (HKCED).
4.3.4 The Structure of the Questionnaire

A copy of the questionnaire version used in Hong Kong can be found in
Appendix A2 and is briefly summarised herein. There were only minor
differences between the questionnaire versions used in Australia and Hong
Kong, and most of these were in the demographic section. The question
numbers quoted herein refer to the Hong Kong version.
The broad structure of the questionnaire is as follows. The questionnaire
is split into 14 sections. The qualitative views of landsliding are covered by
sections 1 to 5, 7, and 10 to 13. The quantitative responses are elicited in sections
6, 8 and 9. Section 14 gathers demographic information on each respondent,
such as age, sex, whether they smoke or not, the number of children living in the
house, education, income and the length of stay (current and intended) in their
present dwelling. The demographic factors were included as they may influence
the respondent's perception of risk. The questionnaire sections and the
corresponding study objectives covered by each are given in Table 4.9.
4.3.4.1 Qualitative Factors

The general views of landsliding are covered in the first section in three
questions common to all survey groups. These enquire how often the
respondent has thought about landsliding affecting his or her life (1.1), how
worried they are about landsliding (1.2) and where they obtain their
information on landsliding from (1.3). Some additional questions were asked of

certain groups where relevant. These are detailed in section 9.2.3.1. Section 10
covers the views on limits to development for areas affected by landsliding.
Section 11 asks who should pay for the cost oflandslide stabilisation. Section 12
addresses the payment for the cost of new landslide regulations. Section 13
raises the issue of the cost of remedial works required when a landslide risk is
discovered after development is complete. This is a situation faced by several
groups of respondents in Australia, and was added after the Werrington full
scale trial survey. Hence the Werrington and Australian landslide survey groups
(groups 9 and 10) did not have this question in their questionnaires.
Table 4.9 Questionnaire sections and the corresponding study objectives.
Study Objective Component Section

general views of fandsliding
cognitive factors associated with the traffic accident while driving a car hazard 3
cognitive factors associated with being involved in a landslide hazard 4
cognitive factors associated with being involved in a petrochemical plant accident 5
views on limits to development 10
views on landslide stabilisation 11
views on cost of new regulations 12
views on cost of remedial works 13
ranking of landsfiding relative to other hazards 2
ranking of various landslide situations to each other 7
the perception of specific annual death rates from an unspecified hazard 6
the maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding in various landslide situations 8, 9
demographics 14
Section 2 compares the relative ranking of the landslide hazard to other

hazards via a paired comparison, where two hazards are presented together and
the respondent selects one that is perceived as the worst of the two. Other
hazards selected apart from landsliding were:
o an occupational hazard (the respondent's job),
o an industrial hazard (petrochemical plant accident),
o a health hazard (smoking),
o three travel hazards,
- traffic accident while driving a car,
- pedestrian being struck by a car, and
- plane travel.
These hazards were selected as they are diverse. Most have historical fatality
rates available, to which the relative position of the landslide hazard can be
compared.
Section 7 compares the relative ranking of various landslide situations in
terms of danger to life. These include natural landslides of small up to large
magnitudes, a cliff failure, debris flow failure and a retaining wall failure. Thus
a large range oflandslide scenarios is covered. The situations from section 7 are
used later on in sections 8 and 9 to obtain quantitative landslide probabilities.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 look at the cognitive factors associated with three
selected hazards. These are traffic accident while driving a car, being involved in
a landslide and being involved in a petrochemical plant accident respectively.
The respondents are asked to rate the hazard for five cognitive factors which are
given as seven point scales on the following extremes:
o new/old,
o voluntary/involuntary,
o common/dread,
o controllable/uncontrollable, and
o fatal/not fatal.
These cognitive factors were selected by the author following his detailed
literature review (see section 9.1) and discussions with Dr Adams as the most
important factors directly influencing the acceptable probabilities of a hazard.
They also indicate how each respondent feels about each particular hazard. The
author is primarily interested in the landslide hazard. The other two hazards
were used for checking the consistency and validity of the responses for the
landslide hazard as they have already been the subject of numerous other
studies (cf Rohrmann 1995a and 1995b).
4.3.4.2 Quantitative Factors

Section 6 asks the respondent to rate the annual fatality rates from an
unspecified hazard. The annual fatality rates range in logarithmic steps from 1
in 2 to 1 in 1 million. The descriptive scale of risk has six possible responses:
extremely high, very high, medium, low and very low risk. The section elicits the
annual fatality rate which the respondent feels is low and therefore can be
inferred to be acceptable.
Section 8 and 9 requires a choice of a specific acceptable probability of
landsliding for each of the landslide situations introduced in section 7.
Responses are required separately for property damage and loss of life. As well
as the diagrams given in section 7 which are reproduced, each landslide situation
has a description of what would happen if the landslide occurred - in terms of
time frame, destruction of property and the chance of the occupant(s) being
killed. The probabilities range logarithmically in seven steps from 1 in 1 to 1 in 1
million. The landslide situations in section 8 all assume that the respondent
knows about the level oflandslide risk before the house is purchased. Section 9
turns the situation around to ask how the acceptable probability of landsliding
would change for one selected situation (house C) if the respondent found out
about landslide risk after he/she was already living in the house. These sections
enable the direct expressed acceptable probabilities of landslide risk to be
obtained for property damage and loss of life.
4.3.5 The Lillydale Shire Risk Perception Study
4.3.5.1 History of the Study

The idea of using a survey of residents in various areas affected by different
types of landsliding was first discussed by the author and his supervisors,
Professor Robin Fell and Mr Garry Mostyn, in 1993. This took place after a
favourable response for supporting a survey of landslide risk perception among
its residents was received from Melbourne's Lillydale Shire. Lillydale Shire had
just recently completed a full zoning of the area of its jurisdiction for landslide
and debris flow hazard, as parts of the Shire are affected by these hazards. The
zoning study is detailed in section 4.2. The zoning study was followed by an
extensive public awareness campaign, which aimed at informing residents,
particularly those at risk, of the levels of landslide risks present in the Shire.
The campaign included the mailing out of reports on the zoning to affected
residents, a public meeting in December 1992 and the availability of landslide
experts and Shire staff for discussion with individual residents if they so desired.
Such an extensive effort was deemed to be necessary by the Shire as many
residents were unaware of the landslide risks they were living with. This
campaign resulted in probably the most informed group of residents on
landslide risk anywhere in Australia. The Lillydale Shire staff were interested
to learn whether the public awareness campaign had had any effect on the
perception of landslide risk by residents in affected areas.
When the opportunity to survey residents in affected areas, as well as those
in an unaffected area and the Shire staff arose, it was taken up by the author.
The survey was carried out by the author from November 1993 to January 1994
with the assistance of the Lillydale Shire. The raw data was processed and
summarised by May 1994.
4.3.5.2 Description of the Groups of Respondents

The five groups of respondents in the Lillydale Shire were Montrose,
Kalorama, a rural area (comprising Silvan, parts of Wandin and other areas),
Mooroolbark and the Shire staff.
The Montrose area is a semi -rural area on the slopes and colluvial fans of
Mt Dandenong, west of Melbourne. The area is subject to an infrequent but
potentially devastating debris flow hazard (Moon et al, 1992). The last debris
flow occurred over 100 years ago in 1891. Some residents in this area live with an
annual probability of occurrence of a debris flow event estimated by Moon et al
(1992) to be 15-39%. This was the critical group of respondents in the Shire, as
no residents have relocated when they were made aware of the debris flow risks
through the public awareness campaign, It was of great interest to the author to
then study this group's perception oflandslide risk. The group (labelled group 4)
is a mixture of wealthy and middle-class retirees and families, most of whom
have lived in the area for considerable periods of time.
The Kalorama area (containing respondents of group 5) is located on the
side of Mt Dandenong. The geology of the area consists primarily of Devonian
rhyodacite and other volcanics COlds and Wilson, 1992; Moon et al, 1992). The
volcanic soil gives rise to slow-moving landslides, which are well documented in
the history of the area (Lundy- Clarke, 1975). A large portion of this area has
been zoned as high landslide risk (viz Olds and Wilson, 1992), and again it was of
interest of the author to study the perception oflandslide risk by this group. The
Kalorama area is semi -rural, with a middle-aged and older population of
mainly middle-class with some wealthy families.
The rural area (group 6) is in gently undulating basaltic terrain to the west
of Mt Dandenong, and covers most of Silvan and Wandin. This area has also
experienced slow-moving landslides (Moon et al, 1992), and the author was
interested in testing the landslide risk perception of the residents, particularly
looking for any differences when compared to the Kalorama group. The rural
area consists oflower middle class, well established families, many of which have
resided in the area for a long time.
Mooroolbark (group 7) is the control group for Lillydale Shire. It is a flat,
urban area with no history or experience of landsliding. The population mainly
consists of established middle class families. The author was interested in
learning about the risk perception of the residents with no experience of or
information on landsliding, and to see whether it differed from that of the more
informed and/or experienced groups.
The Lillydale Shire staff (group 8) was a valuable survey group. The staff
had participated in the entire landslide and debris flow zoning of the Shire as
well as the public awareness campaign, and hence were a very well informed
group. On item of interest to the author was whether familiarity with the
landslide from continual exposure at work had altered the risk perception of the
landslide hazard to that of a lower risk than the other survey groups.
4.3.6 Survey of Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department's Staff

The opportunity to survey the perception of landslide risk by the staff of
the Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department (HKCED) occurred during the
author's work on the landslide risk assessment project for the Geotechnical
Engineering Office (GEO), which is a part of the HKCED. This project is
described in section 4.1. and in Finlay and Fell (1995). The questionnaire was
administered by the staff of the G EO using the internal mail system. There were
three groups of respondents:
o professional staff (engineers, engineering geologists, geologists, and
so on),
o technical staff, and
o other staff not falling into the previous two categories.
These survey groups were labelled 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The data was entered
onto a spreadsheet by the GEO staff and sent to the author for analysis.
4.3. 7 Method of Questionnaire Administration

Three methods of questionnaire administration to the respondents were
used by the author. Method 1 was used for the critical target groups in Montrose
(group 4). It consisted of the author personally knocking on the doors of the
residents in the survey area during times when residents were most likely to be
home. This meant door knocking in the evenings and on weekends. The purpose
of the survey was explained to each resident, and their cooperation requested. If
the resident agreed to complete the questionnaire, they were given the
questionnaire and the author agreed a time and a date to come and collect it.
This method was understandably very time-consuming but resulted in the
highest questionnaire return rate. The other advantage of this method was that
the author had the opportunity to query any unexpected responses and check
the individual's understanding of the questions.
Method 2 was similar to Method 1 in that the author again personally spoke
to the respondents, explained about the survey and left the questionnaire with
the person only if they agreed to complete it. The person was also given a
pre-paid, addressed envelope in which to return the completed questionnaire
free of charge to the author. Those who did not mail the questionnaire back
within two weeks were reminded by a follow-up telephone call or letter. This
method was less time consuming than Method 1, but of course had a lower
return rate. It was used during the Werrington full scale trial (group 9) and with
the group of Australian landslide experts (group 10).
Method 3 used mailing for both the distribution and the return of the
questionnaire. A covering letter explaining the survey and a pre-paid,
addressed envelope were included with the blank questionnaire. This method
was the least time- consuming of all three, and the low return rate was offset by
sending out more questionnaires so that the number of completed
questionnaires received was more than sufficient for statistical analysis. The
method was applied to areas with a large enough population. These were the
survey groups in the HKCED (groups 1, 2 and 3) and groups 5 to 8 in Lillydale
Shire.
4.3.8 Survey Databases

The raw questionnillre data was entered into a spreadsheet format on an
IBM compatible PC for analysis. The author entered the data from the
Australian survey groups (groups 4 to 10) himself. The data from the Hong Kong
survey groups (groups 1, 2 and 3) was entered by GEO staff.
4.3.9 Summary of Survey Group Information

The locations of the landslide risk perception surveys are shown in Figure
4.7. The salient survey group information is summarised in Table 4.10.
4.3.10 Method of Data Analysis

The method of data analysis comprised of summary statistics such as
distribution plots, calculations of means, medians and modes, frequency
analyses and cross-tabulation of correlations. Factor analyses were carried out
on the cognitive variables to see if these could be reduced to a lesser number of
underlying factors (see section 9.2.4 for details).
4.3.11 Results and Discussion

The results are presented and discussed in sections 9.2.3 and 9.2.4.
EUROPE
HONG KONG
AFRICA
SYDNEY
~
I"IJ f
MELBOURNE
Figure 4.7 Locations of landslide risk perception surveys.

Table 4.10 Summary of survey group information. ;~
~ Cb
~
.........."'1
"' .
:>;">Tj
Group Method of Return
Group
Country City Type
Type of Predominant
Geomorphology Admin Is- Rate
Number of ~[
Number Landslldlng Geology Respondents "'
~ :;<:
l'l
or Area tratlon (%)
"'
9 "'0
::r
1 HK HK Deeply weathered
3 33 g ti
00 00 HKCED Steep slopes and Not ..... ,.-..
2
NN NN
Various granite, tuff and 3 32 0 c:::
staff flat colluvial plains known '""Z
3 GG GG rhyolite 3 20 ~CIJ
:
.g
~'-'
~
L Rhyodacite slopes Steep side
4 I Montrose Infrequent
with slopes, gentle 1 69 84 "'
L residents debris flows
colluvium fans
M L
E y Kalorama Slow
5 Rhyodacite Steep side slopes 3 31 42
L D residents landslides
A B A
Rural area
6 u 0 L
residents
Slow
Basalt
Gentle
3 35 59
s u E
(Silvan, Wandin)
landslides undulating hills
T R
7
R N s Mooroolbark
None Alluvium Flat 3 35 74
A E H residents
L I
I R Lillydale
8 Various NA NA 3 100 26
A E Shire staff
9
s Warrington
None
Clay alluvium,
Flat 2 58 70
y residents shale
D
N Australian
10 E landslide Various NA NA 2 77 20
y experts
NA Not applicable
>-'
0
-....!
5 PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING
5.1 Detailed Review of Literature
5.1.1 Introduction
The assessment of the probability of landsliding is a necessary component
of landslide risk assessment. Several approaches to developing probabilities of
landsliding are available. These are reviewed by Fell et al (1996), and include:
o Use of historic data for the particular landslide under consideration.
o Use of historic data for a population of slides in the vicinity of the area
being studied, subject to consideration of topography, geology,
construction activity, and so on. By relating rainfall to the historic
data, statistics of rainfall can be used to quantify landslide
probabilities.
o Relating piezometric levels to rainfall and the factor of safety. The
method is outlined in Fell et al (1991), Hanenberg (1991) and
Okinushi and Okumura (1987). Examples of the methods are
attractive in principle for larger, single landslides for which detailed
investigation and monitoring is available. However, they are of
limited accuracy because of the heterogeneity of landslides and the
complex infiltration and drainage characteristics of landslides.
Several years may be required to calibrate the methods.
o Use of geomorphological information for the site, and a judgemental
approach to assigning probability. This may be calibrated by historic
data.
o Probabilistic slope stability analysis, as reviewed by Mostyn and Li
(1993a).
While this chapter details the author's work on the probability of landsliding
using historical data and the geomorphological approach, the literature of
probabilistic slope stability analysis is reviewed herein, as probabilistic slope
stability analysis is able to directly quantify failure probabilities.
This chapter presents the author's work on the assessment of the
probability of landsliding. The first section is a detailed literature review of
publications pertaining to the probability of landsliding, namely probabilistic
slope analysis. The statistics of landsliding on Hong Kong are evaluated in the
second section. The third section reviews various Hong Kong databases and
earlier studies, and describes how these are used in assessing or modifying the
probability of landsliding. The proposed method of calculating landslide
probabilities in Hong Kong is detailed in the fourth section. The fifth section
describes the author's work on the sub- zoning of the Kalorama area in Lillydale
Shire, used for refining the relative failure probabilities. The concluding sixth
section brings the chapter to a close.
5.1.2 Probabilistic Slope Analysis

The author's literature review discusses overview papers, the concepts
used in probabilistic slope analysis, factors affecting the probability of slope
failure, the probabilistic modelling of soil profiles, methods of probabilistic slope
analysis, and the determination of parameters required for probabilistic slope
analysis in successive components.
5.1.2.1 Overview Papers

Mostyn and Li (1993a) and Carter (1992) are useful overview papers
discussing Probabilistic Slope (stability) Analysis (PSA). Mostyn and Li (1993a)
treat sources of uncertainty, variability in slope engineering, the indices of
stability, probabilistic modelling of soil and rock, determination of reliability,
factors affecting the probability of failure, and recent developments in PSA.
5.1.2.2 Concepts in Probabilistic Slope Design

This component commences with a discussion of the levels of
sophistication of probabilistic slope design, which forms a rational framework
for the subsequent review ofliterature pertaining to reliability theory. Further
on a detailed review of publications focused on the most common concept in use,
that of the reliability index, closes this component.
A) Levels of Sophistication
A concise way in which a review of probabilistic design can be undertaken
is to categorise it into levels of statistical sophistication (viz Lumb, 1991). At the
lowest level of sophistication (Level 0) one finds the basic factor of safety
approach:
F = R(KJ 5.1
S(KJ
where F is the safety factor, R(XJ the resistance of the structure and S(XJ the
imposed loading. The vector X will be defined further below. This is the
traditional from of the safety factor used by engineers throughout the world.
Here the loads and resistance are treated as deterministic, with appropriate
levels of conservatism built in during their estimation. The implicit assumption
is that as long as the factor of safety is greater than unity the structure will not
fail; conversely failure is implied if the factor of safety is less than unity
However. a factor of safety significantly greater than one is usually applied in
practice to cover uncertainty in the material properties, pore pressures,
geometry of sliding and analysis method.
Of course the probability of failure can never be zero, but can only be
reduced to a tolerably low value (Lumb, 1991). This is recognised at the next
level of sophistication (Levell). Reid (1991) notes that at this level R(}D and
S(XJ are known as state variables and can be recognised to be functions of the
basic random variables X;_ (eg loads, material properties, dimensions and
modelling errors), ie
5.2
and all engineers are faced with the at times difficult choice as to which values of
R(XJ and S(XJ will produce a tolerably low enough probability of failure.
Commonly the design values selected correspond, according to Lumb (1991), to
percentiles of the distribution functions of R(XJ and S(XJ, and a 10% value is
used for resistance and a 90% value for loads. Lumb also notes that this really
implies a bilinear utility function, and that the failure probability Pr is
indeterminate.
The next level of sophistication (Level 2) contains assumptions about the
joint distribution of R(XJ and S(XJ. The joint probability function P[R(XJ,S(XJ]
is commonly assumed to be a hi -normal distribution, or some transform such as
lnR(XJ and lnS(XJ enabling easy integration (Lumb, 1991). Often the Central
Safety Factor Fo is used, where
Fa=-=
R 5.3
s
defined in terms of the means R and S. This leads to the derivation of the
Reliability Index f3 which can be thought of as the probabilistic equivalent of the
Factor of Safety F. Reliability theory and calculations of the Reliability Index f3
are detailed further on the following pages. At this point it is sufficient to note
that the Reliability Index f3 depends on the variability of the resistance and the
loads, and hence exposes the weakness in the Level 0 approach which uses a fixed
Factor of Safety F regardless of how variable the resistance and the loads are
(Lumb, 1991). Note that different probabilities can exist for the same fixed
Central Factor of Safety Fo. A fixed Central Factor of Safety F0 offers no real
security against failure (Li, 1987).
Level 3, the highest level of sophistication, considers the probability

density functions of all variable involved in the design equation and evaluates
the probability of failure Pr directly by multiple integration (Lumb,1991). As
R(X) and SQ{) are themselves functions of random variables the integration is
very complicated. Lumb notes that it is helpful to have a good working
knowledge of Level 3 methods before the simpler Level 2 methods can be used
with confidence.
Extensive literature on probabilistic design can be found (eg Leporati,
1979), however, mainly with a structural engineering focus. According to Lumb
(1991) there are no comparative books for geotechnical engineers. Many of the
geotechnical and structural journals contain occasional papers. The ICASP
(International Conferences on Application of Statistics and Probability in Civil
and Structural Engineering) and ICOSSAR (International Conferences on
Structural Safety and Reliability) conference series are useful, also the
Structural Safety and Technometrics journals are worthwhile for perusal of
literature pertaining to probabilistic design.
B) Reliability Theory
The concepts of reliability and reliability theory have been used for some
time in structural engineering, but are only slowly being accepted in the field of
geotechnical engineering. Reid (Lecture 2, 1991) defines the reliability R of a
structure as the probability that it will not fail, ie
R = 1- Pr 5.4
where Pris the probability of failure. For a geotechnical system exactly the same
definition is used. The system under consideration has a performance function,
G(R..S.J, formulated to indicate the system limit states such that
G(R,S) > 0 indicates the system is safe,
G(R..S.J = 0 the limit state is reached, and
G(R,S) < 0 indicates system failure.
This is analogous to the Factor of Safety F, except that 1 rather than 0 is used for
the factor of safety to define the limit state, ie
F > 1 indicates the system is safe,
F = 1 the limit state is reached, and
F<l indicates system failure.
Following on from the concept of a performance function, the probability of
failure, Pr, is defined as
Pr = P [ G(R.S) < 0 ]. 5.5

The performance function can be defined in various ways, discussed in Li (198 7),
as follows:
i) Safety margin formulation

G(R.SJ = R(XJ- S(Y) 5.6
ii) Implicit factor of safety formulation
G(R.SJ = R(KJ - 1
S(X) 5.7
iii) Explicit factor of safety formulation
G(XJ= F-1 5.8
The latter two formats are far more common in the literature due to their
similarity to the existing and widely used factor of safety approach.
C) Level 2 Analyses - Reliability Index

In practice most probabilistic designs use Level 2 analyses because of the
assumptions usually made to lessen the number of calculations that would be
required for a full Level 3 analysis (Lumb, 1991). Level 2 analysis uses the
Reliability Index fJ as a measure of probability of failure. This is usually
interpreted as the "distance" from the mean value point of G(JLS) to the critical
point where G(I1S)=O. The higher the value of {3, the safer the system.
According to Li (1987), an approximate Level 2 analysis can also be
performed using:
surrogate distributions for G(JLS) when its exact distribution is not known,
- normal tail approximations, and
- finite element methods.
Limit state design methods, which are based on partial factors, with many
parallels to current structural design methods, are generally deemed to be an
improvement on Level 1 methods but fall short of Level 2 analyses (Li et al,
1993). Li et al provide a useful and detailed description oflimit state design in
geotechnical engineering.
i) Conventional Reliability Index fJ

The definition of the Conventional Reliability Index fJ is based on the
mean, f.la, and standard deviation, Oa, of the performance function G(JLS)
respectively. Hence
5.9
f3can be interpreted graphically as the distance CA when G(R.S) is shown

plotted on the R(XJ and S(XJ axes below, and interpreted as how far Cis from the
limit state boundary (viz Figure 5.1). Li (1991) notes that{3 is a variant index of
reliability as it depends on the format ofG(R.S). Different but equivalent values
can lead to different values of {3 .
t Irs)
RS I
Probability density function

of R & S
R>S
or G(R,S) >0
s Safety R"gion
volume= P1
R=S
R<S or G(R,S) =0
or G(R,S)<O Limit State Boundary
Failure Region
( 0 )
Probability
contours
R= S
s R<S
Figure 5.1 A graphical interpretation of the Conventional Reliability Index f3

(Li, 1987).
ii) Calculation of f3 - Method of Moments

The performance function G(IL.S.J is commonly expanded by Taylor series
approximations about the mean values of its input random variables, where the
random variables are characterised by their first and second statistical
moments. The Taylor series is a first-order expansion, hence the method is
called the first order, second moment (FOSM) method.
iii) Hasofer and Lind (1974) Reliability Index/3HL

To overcome the limitations of the variant Conventional Reliability Index
f3 Hasofer and Lind (1974) proposed an invariant definition of the reliability
index denoted /3HL· This is achieved by transforming G(IL.S.J to a standardised
parameter Z such that the transformed variables become uncorrelated with
each other, and each has a variance of 1, as discussed in Li (1991). The definition
of /3HL is the smallest distance between the limit state surface defined by
G(JLS)=O and the origin of space Z. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Li (1991)
notes that f3 is much easier to compute than/3HL although it lacks the property of
invariance. When the performance function is reasonably linear f3 and /3HL are
close in magnitude and f3 can be used in analysis because of its simplicity.
iv) Point Estimate Methods

Li (1991) notes methods which require the knowledge of G(R...S) only at a
specific set of points for the calculation of f3. These are called Point Estimate
Methods (PEMs). A different PEM was developed by Rosenblueth (197 5) for the
calculation of the mean and variance. According to Li (1991) this method
requires a total of 2n evaluations of the performance function for the evaluation
of/3, where n is the number of variables, and becomes impractical with a large
number of variations. Li (1991) developed a new PEM within the framework of
second-order-second-moment (SOSM) methods which requires only
(n 2 +3n+2)/2 evaluations ofG(R.S) for the same order of accuracy. Yu extended
Li's PEM to include the effect of both autocorelation and cross-correlation of
strength parameters in space (Yu and Mostyn, 1996).
v) Single Random Variable Approach

Li (1991) also critiques the Single Random Variable (SRV) approach used
by a number of researchers in conjunction with Rosenblueth's method.
According to numerous authors listed by Li the approach is erroneous and
results in a gross underestimation of the reliability index of slopes. Li advocates
the use of the random field model for the statistical modelling of soil profiles,
noting that the model is now regarded as a standard method of statistical soil
modelling. This model is outlined further in this section.
z,
volume= Ff
Figure 5.2 Definition of Hasofer and Lind's reliability index fJHL (Li, 1987)
5.1.2.3 Factors Mfecting the Probability of Failure

There are a number of factors that influence the actual value of probability
of failure for a particular slope significantly. A number are detailed by Mostyn
and Li (1993a). The more important ones are:
o the probability density function assumed for the probability of
failure,
o the type of deterministic model used,
o human and gross errors,
o effects of various forms of correlation,
o effects of anomalies, and
o effects of progressive slope failure.
Each of these is discussed in turn below.
A) Probability Density Functions

Many of the methods of evaluating the probability of failure rely on first
determining the moments of the distribution of G(RSJ. Even if the mean and
standard deviation of G(RSJ are known, the simple choice between various
probability density functions to model G(R.S) can lead to large variations in the
estimated probability of failure, according to Mostyn and Li (1993a). Mostyn
and Li give examples illustrating this case.
B) Choice of Deterministic Model

The effect of the choice of the deterministic model on the estimated
probability of failure is described below, drawn from Mostyn and Li (1993a). Say
a slope has been analysed using a Monte Carlo simulation with an extremely
high number of simulations. Many such simulations, based on the ordinary
method of slices, may well result in a distribution of the factor of safety
approximately normally distributed, with a mean of 1.1 and a standard
deviation of 0.2, giving an estimated probability of failure of about 30%. If a
slightly more complicated deterministic model is used, say Bishop's simplified
method, this will, in general, give higher factors of safety. It is likely that the
mean factor of safety will be higher (say 1.3), but the standard deviation and
distribution are unlikely to change significantly. In this case the estimated
probability of failure would be about 7%.
If an appropriate three-dimensional model and adequate computing
resources were available, the computed mean factor of safety may well be 1.6
with a standard deviation and distribution similar to the above cases. This is
because two dimensional limit equilibrium models are conservative when
compared with equivalent three-dimensional models (Mostyn and Li, 1993a).
In this case the estimated probability of failure would be 0.1 %.
It can be seen that a change in the deterministic model leading to a 30%
reduction in the factor of safety has led to a 300% increase in the estimated
probability of failure. The variation on the factor of safety is not really a problem
because the acceptable factor of safety is to a large extent conditioned by the
choice of the deterministic model. However, there is insufficient experience at
present to do this with the probabilities of failure.
C) Human and Gross Errors

Structures such as bridges and dams are generally well designed using
accepted methods and detailed site investigations, yet research indicates that
these still have a probability of failure of about 10- 3 (ANCOLD, 1994).
According to Mostyn and Li (1993a), this is due to human or gross error. One
would presume this component of the probability of failure to be even larger for
slopes. Many probabilistic models do not include this component, and thus
Mostyn and Li conclude that it is meaningless to talk about probabilities of
failure much less than 10- 3 . This may well be correct for natural slopes where
various types of uncertainties are substantial. For man -modified or man made
slopes such as dams probabilities of failure lower by orders of magnitude are still
meaningful as the control exerted over the construction reduces the variability
significantly.
D) Effects of Various Forms of Correlation

Several forms of correlation can affect the probability of failure of a slope.
These include:
o correlation between parameters (cross-correlation),
o correlation between failure surfaces, and
o correlation of a parameter with itself in space (autocovariance,
autocorrelation).
Each is discussed in turn below.
i) System Reliability of Slopes (Correlation Between Failure

Surfaces)
When probabilistic slope analysis is performed through limit equilibrium
methods, commonly only a single failure surface is analysed (Tang, 1993).
Analysis of this surface will give a particular failure probability. Tang notes that
the questions then emerges: What is the total failure probability of the entire
slope system due to all possible failure surfaces? Do other failure surfaces with
lower failure probabilities contribute to the total failure probability and if so,
how much? These questions are ones of system reliability of the slope under
consideration versus a single possible failure mode, which usually is the critical
failure surface. Tang notes that it is difficult to consider contributions from all
potential failure surfaces to the total probability of failure because of the varying
degrees of correlation among the loads and the soil resistance. Perfect
correlation of the failure surfaces, Tang notes, results in an unconservative or
lower bound estimate of the true failure probability. Oka and Wu (1990) also
looked at this problem, but modelled the soil as a single random variable rather
than a random field. Oka and Wu's preliminary findings support the intuitive
assumptions of other researchers. When the slip surfaces all passed through the
same material the system probability of failure was close to the probability of
failure given by the critical failure surface, but if the failure surfaces cut two
distinct layers the system probability of failure was up to twice the probability of
failure given by the critical failure surface. Mostyn and Li (1993a) note that the
failure surface with the minimum factor of safety may not be the failure surface
with the maximum probability of failure.
ii) Correlation Between Strength Parameters

According to Mostyn and Li (1993a), many researchers have based their
probabilistic method on the assumption that the shear strength parameters c',
fjJ' are independent. This assumption is often made to simplify the analysis. The
evidence offered by Alonso (1976) is not strong, but indicates a weak negative
correlation for unsaturated residual soils. A- Grivas and Harrop- Williams
(1979) state that cohesion and friction angle are negatively correlated (ie a
higher angle of friction is associated with a low cohesion), and provide one
example. One would indeed expect that for any set of strength data for a
particular soil, the values of cohesion and friction angle would be negatively
correlated. This can be illustrated by the fact that in practice, for a given set of
soil and test data, adoption of a particular value of c' limits the engineer's choice
of the range of values offjJ' which can be adopted. Recent work by Yu and Mostyn
(1994) has indicated that the degree of conservatism in ignoring this correlation
may be too high for such an elaborate method.
iii) Correlation of a Parameter With Itself in Space

Autocovariance
Autocovariance is the covariance of a particular soil or rock property with
the measurement of the same property at another point in space. The distance
between any two measurements of the property is called the lag h. Davis (1986)
notes that conventionally the autocovariance is calculated for lags h from 0 to
about n/4 (where n is the number of measurements), and the resulting values
can be displayed as an autocovariogram or autocovariance function plot.
Autocorrelation
The autocorrelation of a soil property between two points at lag h apart
gives the correlation of the soil property with itself (Li, 1987). Conceptually it
indicates how similar to a measurement another measurement at lag h may be.
Li notes that if the measurements are similar for a long distance the
autocorrelation of the soil property is said to be high, and conversely, if
measurements at close spacing bear no resemblance to each other, the property
is said to be a purely random variable. Yu and Mostyn (1994), Lumb (1991) and
Li (1987) argue strongly that the properties of real soils lie between these two
extremes. That is, soil properties are correlated for a distance and once this
distance is exceeded they become uncorrelated. The distance is referred to as the
scale of fluctuation (Vanmarcke, 1977b). The random field model was originally
developed by Vanmarcke on this basis.
It is intuitively obvious that many geotechnical properties are spatially
autocorrelated. For example, the cohesion of a certain material at a point is
likely to be more similar to the cohesion at a nearby point than to the cohesion at
a distant point. Mostyn and Li (1993a) point out that in spite of this most
probabilistic models have assumed that each soil property is perfectly correlated
with itself for an infinite distance, thus treating it as a single random variable
which applies uniformly throughout the entire soil mass. Mostyn and Li also
note that autocorrelation is quite difficult to take into account in probabilistic
models. Probabilistic models including autocorrelation in one, two or three
dimensions have been described by many writers, listed in Mostyn and Li
(1993a). Yu and Mostyn (1993b) provide a summary of approaches adopted for
the modelling rock joints.
To analyse the autocorrelation of a geotechnical material property requires
more data than is normally collected even in detailed site investigations.
Analysis of autocorrelation is therefore usually based on assumptions regarding
the autocorrelation structure of the soil. Typical values of the autocorrelation
distance (the distance for which the soil property is correlated) are given by Li
and White (1987a), and by Yu and Mostyn (1993b) for rock joints. Typical
correlation distances for the vertical direction are in the range of 0.1-5 m, and
2-30 m for the horizontal direction. If autocorrelation is ignored, the value of
the probability of failure may be overestimated by up to three orders of
magnitude (Mostyn and Li, 1993a).
E) Effects of Anomalies
Pockets and thin layers of softer or stronger material may be present
within an otherwise reasonably uniform soil matrix. The presence of a "soft
spot" may significantly affect the stability of a slope. Halim and Tang (1991)
have considered the influence of the presence of anomalies on the reliability of
slopes, illustrating how the probability of slope failure increases with various
conditional probabilities and probability assumption made about the location of
the anomaly.
F) Effect of a Progressive Slope Failure

Research into progressive slope failure has continued over the past decades
(Chowdhury, 1992; Chowdhury and A-Grivas, 1982; Chowdhury and Derooy,
1985). However, Li (1991a and 1991b) points out that many of the current
probabilistic approaches to slope failure contain some fundamental flaws. This
is an important area ofresearch as most slopes fail progressively. Yield zones can
occur in a portion of a slope with an overall satisfactory factor of safety.

According to Mostyn and Li (1993a), some fundamental improvements to
current methods are needed before one can confidently use a probabilistic
approach for analysing progressive slope failure. These improvements include
the introduction of some form of transition probabilities, and also address the
adequacy of mechanistic models for use in probabilistic analyses.
5.1.2.4 Probabilistic Modelling of Soil Profiles
A) Introduction
This component turns to publications concerning the probabilistic
modelling of soil profiles. When one goes to the effort of performing a
probabilistic slope design, care needs to be taken in modelling the soil properties
correctly. Mention has already been made of the inadequacy of the Single
Random Variable (SRV) approach (Li, 1987). The reasons behind this are
outlined below.
Soil is a continuum. While the fact that different soil layers will have
different properties such as strength is readily accepted, the variability of a
property within a so-called "homogenous and uniform" soil profile is less
readily understood. All geotechnical engineers are familiar with the fact that
repeated tests of the same soil property (eg strength) never yield the same
results. In practice a suitably conservative value (eg lower bound, lower
quartile) is selected as the basis for design. Some researchers have modelled soil
profiles using the SRV approach, ie with a single mean and standard deviation
(Li, 1987). Li notes that this implies that all soil properties are perfectly
correlated over the entire soil mass, which is not a realistic model of real soils as
it ignores spatial correlation, and results in very conservative analytical results.
According to Li the three main methods that can be used for the
probabilistic modelling of soil profiles are time series analysis, geostatistics and
random fields. Each of these is briefly described below.
B) Time Series Analysis

The concepts of autocovariance, autocorrelation and cross-correlation
were detailed above. The following is a brief look at time series· analysis of
dependent observations.
An entire area of time series analysis of dependent observations exists,
detailed in texts such as Box and Jenkins (1976), and is mentioned here briefly as
some researchers have applied time series analysis to geotechnical problems (viz
Li, 1987, for some examples). Box and Jenkins (1976) discuss autocovariance
and autocorrelation functions of dependent time series in great statistical detail.
The three basic models of dependent processes that are outlined by Box and
Jenkins (1976) are the Moving Average (MA) process, Stationary Autoregressive
(AR) process, and combined models. The combined models include the
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model, and the autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) model.
C) Geostatistics
The second way to model soil properties in a probabilistic manner is using
geostatistics. Geostatistics was originally developed by George Matheron in
Fontainebleau, France, and is an abstract theory of statistical behaviour used in
estimating changes in the ore grade in a mine (Davis, 1986). The key concept of
geostatistics is seen by Davis to be that of a regionalised variable (RV), which has
properties between a deterministic and a truly random variable. Regionalised
variables are functions describing spatial distributions of physical properties, eg
mine ore grades or soil· strength, and are spatially continuous. They are
estimated through a limited number of samples. The size, shape, orientation
and spatial orientation of these samples constitute what is known as the support
of the regionalised variable, and changes in any of these will result in the RV
having different characteristics. Geostatistics involves estimating the form of
the RV in one, two or three dimensions through a process called kriging. Kriging
is discussed in detail in standard texts such as Journel and Huijbregts (1978).
The semivariogram is one of the basic statistical measures in geostatistics,
measuring the degree of spatial dependence between samples along a particular
support (Davis, 1986). Procedures involved in estimating the semivariogram
are similar to those in time series analysis. The semivariogram is simply the plot
of the semivariances for all values of h. The semivariogram starts from zero and
approaches the sample variance around the average value. The distance at
which the semivariogram approaches the variance is referred to as the range,
range of influence or sometimes span, of the RV (Davis, 1986). Davis points out
that this distance is not the same as the autocorrelation distance; it defines a
neighbourhood where properties at all locations within the neighbourhood are
related to one another.
Structural analysis, as used in geostatistics, refers to the simultaneous
process of trying to identify the drift and the semivariogram from geostatistical
data (Davis, 1986). It will not be detailed herein (for a full discussion, see Davis,
1986; Journel and Huiibregts, 1978).
D) Random Fields
Li (1987) comments that the study of random spatial processes has not
been one of mainstream orthodox statistics. Although a spatial random process,
which will from now on be called a random field (Vanmarcke, 1977b) resembles a
time series in some respects, there are notable differences between the two. Li's
(1987) description is succinct and worth reproducing:
"A spatial random process deals with the variation of random

quantities within a spatial domain or field. There is no such
distinction of past and future and the dependence of soil properties
extends in all three directions. In consequence, some of the classical
theories of time series are not applicable to spatial processes."
Li notes that in specifying a random variable statisticians tend to specify the

model and then generate the mean and covariance, whereas mining and
geotechnical engineers "tend to specify directly the autocorrelation function or
semivariogram without going through the procedure of model building". Li also
states the following regarding the engineer's somewhat pragmatic choice of the
Autocorrelation Function (ACF):
"The choice of the ACF is based on convenience and also guided by

experimental results. The underlying model for the ACF is seldom of
interest to soil engineers. Provided that the assumed function is an
admissible ACF and fits well to the experimental ACF, it would be a
good ACF from an engineers point of view."
There are also many similarities between random field theory and geostatistics.
Li regards the major difference as the fact that the correlation structure of the
random spatial process is described by the ACF, but geostatistics uses the
semivariogram.
The author's discussion of physical soil property modelling by random
fields draws heavily on the excellent summary of Li and White's (1987b)
"Probabilistic Characterisation of Soil Profiles" research report, to which the
interested reader is referred to for a more thorough coverage. Denote the value
of a soil property at a point t = (x, y, z) by k(t). Generally k(t) is decomposed into a
trend componentg(t) and a random component e(t) with zero mean value. Hence
k(t) = g(t) + e(t) 5.10
Li and White note that the trend component can be expressed as a polynomial
which can be estimated using the method of least squares from test results at
various locations t. in the field. For example one can use
Li and White write the expression as

5.12
where Xj are the terms Xo = 1, X1 =x, ~ =y, )4 =z, and so on, for convenience. The
variability of soil properties can be classified into three main types: Type I, Type
II and Type III, as shown in Figure 5.3. These types can be modelled as
homogenous random fields in which the variation of k(t) is described by the first
and second order statistical moments (Vanmarcke, 1977 a and b) of expected
value, variance and covariance. One should note that the description of a
random field as homogenous has completely different implications to the usual
engineering concept of homogenous.
The performance of geotechnical systems is dominated by spatial averages
rather than properties at a single point (Li, 1987). Li states that spatially
averaged soil properties, such as cohesion, are pertinent to a slope stability
analysis. Mostyn and Li (1993a) advocate the abandonment of models not
accounting for spatial correlation.
5.1.2.5 Methods of Probabilistic Slope Analysis
Several recent state-of-the-art papers are available, giving an overview

of current research advances in the arena of probabilistic slope analysis and
general geotechnical reliability. Tang (1993) has a broad discussion on
geotechnical reliability. A thorough and comprehensive "state-of-play" is
given in Mostyn and Li (1993a). Limit state design in geotechnical engineering
is detailed with particular reference to piles in Li et al (1993). Tang et al (1988)
consider Bayesian updating for locating geological anomalies on a site.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and general probabilistic slope analysis
solution scheme is presented by Li (1987). Li develops a Generalised Procedure
of Slices (GPS) through the application of the FOSM formulation to the
Morgenstern-Price method, modelling soils as random fields. The method is
shown to incorporate Spencer's, Sarma's, Bishop's Simplified and Janbu's
methods as special sub-cases of the GPS. Further details on this method are
also given in Li and White (1987a) and Li and White (1987c). The importance of
the correlation structure of soil properties and its influence on the calculated
probabilities of failure is highlighted. The analysis program (designated
PROBSN) was subsequently used by Waddell (1988) to investigate the effects of
autocorrelation on the calculated probabilities of failure for various case studies
reported in the literature.
Santamarina et al (1992) calculate the theoretical reliability of slopes, and
then "correct" it using qualitative statements modelled by fuzzy sets. Some data
from sociological studies of risk is presented and translated into fuzzy functions.
The approach has been computerised onto developmental software.
Type I
A constant mean trend and a random compo-
nent with constant statistical properties.
r------...,rr-:---K Type II
• A non--constant mean trend and a random
component with constant statistical properties.
Type Ill
A non--constant mean trend and a random component with non--constant
statistical properties - in this case with an increasing coefficient of variation.
Figure 5.3 Variation of a soil property k(V with location l for the different soil
types (Li and White, 1987b).
A) Soil Slopes
Li's (1987) and Li and White's (1987a) development of GPS method is
mentioned above. Vanmarcke (1980) presented a three dimensional
probabilistic analysis of long earth slopes. More recent three dimensional
probabilistic slope analysis models include that of Bergado et al (1988), who
looks at embankment failures on soft ground. Field vane shear test results were
used in a random field model with autocorrelation in two dimensions and
inclusion of model error. High probabilities of failure were obtained. An earlier
paper by Bergado et al (1987) is in the same vein; failure of a test embankment is
contrasted with model predictions. Slip failure, occurrence of sand and silt
lenses and settlement are all analysed probabilistically.
A short-term three dimensional slope stability model accounting for
spatial variability is presented by Yucemen and Al- Homoud (1986). Oka and
Wu (1990) demonstrate the correlation between various failure surfaces, and its
influence on the probability of failure, by first assuming independence of shear
strengths and then allowing a degree of dependence. A theoretical slope stability
model using the principle of maximum entropy is outlined by Read and Harr
(1988).
B) Rock Slopes
The above-mentioned models concern soil slopes. Several authors have
developed probabilistic slope analysis models for rock slopes. A brief illustrative
selection is presented below.
A PhD thesis by Yu (1996) focuses on the effect of inherent variation on the
probabilistic analysis of rock slope stability. Li's (1987) point estimate method is
extended and then used to calculate the probability of failure using random field
modelling. The reliability of a jointed rock slope is modelled by combining a
deterministic method (multiple wedge analysis) and a probabilistic method
(random field model). This model is in the form of a user-friendly computer
program. Yu notes that neglect of the spatial variation of the strength
parameters results in an overestimation of the probability of failure.
A detailed method of "Probabilistic Analysis of Fractured Rock Masses" is
given in Savely's PhD thesis (1987) from the University of Arizona. Savely
modelled rock masses as composed of small, discreet blocks, and considered the
following four components of failure:
o sliding between blocks,
o shearing through blocks,
o rolling blocks in a shear zone, and
o crushing of rock blocks.
Clastic mechanics and progressive failure were applied in the model. Stability of
each component of the rock mass was calculated separately using demand-
capacity reliability. Savely combined the results as a series- connected system,
and concluded with examples of criteria for rock mass failure potential
recognition.
Another reference is a MS thesis abstract from the University of Nevada,
Reno, entitled "Comparison of Deterministic, Probabilistic and Rock Mass
Classification Methods for Slope Stability Analysis at Bald Mountain Mine,
Nevada" by Morrison (1990). Morrison's abstract in Dissertations Abstracts
International noted that both deterministic and probabilistic slope analyses
were performed on the mine pit walls, and concluded that the probabilistic slope
analyses gave a better indication of what he termed the "inherent" risk of
failure.
Low and Einstein (1988) offer a simplified reliability analysis for wedge
mechanisms in rock slopes. Cherubini et al (1992) discuss probabilistic analysis
of rock slopes using Monte Carlo simulation. Oboni and Egger (1985) carry out a
probabilistic analysis of the Vajont landslide assuming uniformly distributed
rock mass strength parameters and not mentioning autocorrelation, which is an
over-conservative approach according to Li (1987).
C) Probabilistic Slope Analysis of Landslides
Mainly doctoral works, with a sprinkling of MS and MEngSci works were

found by the author in this area of research. The author's search of
Dissertations Abstracts International found the following theses, described
below, relating to the probabilistic slope analysis of landslides.
A PhD thesis on "Slope Stability Under Uncertainty: A First Order
Stochastic Approach" by Luckman (1987) of the University of California,
Berkeley, uses first order structural reliability theory and system theory to
evaluate time dependent slope reliability with randomly varying pore pressures.
Luckman evaluates the time dependent reliability using extreme value theory,
and applies his model to Hong Kong, English and New Zealand case studies. The
method appears promising but has not been developed past the doctoral level to
this author's knowledge. "A Probabilistic Analysis of Porewater Predictions for
Unsteady Groundwater Flow on a Sloping Bed" is outlined by Ohio State
University's Lee in his 1986 PhD thesis abstract. Lee develops a groundwater
flow model based on kriging and combines it with random field theory to produce
a one dimensional stochastic numerical model for the prediction of the
groundwater surface. He applies the model to Alaskan hill slopes and concludes
that spatial variations of aquifer parameters affect the variation of the

groundwater surface significantly.
A PhD thesis from Utah State University by Pack (1986) performs a
"Multivariate Analysis of Relative Landslide Susceptibility in Davis County,
Utah" according to the abstract. Four variables strongly related to landsliding
were used in a simple multinomial classification model, and Pack achieved a
reported accuracy of 88% in being able to discriminate between landslide sites
and stable sites through landslide susceptibility mapping. The abstract from
Jibson's 1985 PhD thesis from Stanford University outlines another application
of landslide susceptibility mapping, this time to landslides caused by the
1811-1812 New Madrid earthquakes in the Mississippi valley. Jibson also
performed statistical analyses of the spatial distribution of historic landslides
and concluded that future earthquakes will probably cause landslides
throughout the area again. The final example of work in this area is the abstract
of a MS thesis from the University of Nevada, Reno, by Alvarez-Ayesta (1987).
Alvarez- Ayesta performed a probabilistic analysis of the Emerald Bay rock
slide in California after analysing field and laboratory test data. The analysis
included a geostatistical evaluation of rock mass properties. He found that his
probabilistic analysis (of which details are not given in the abstract) indicated
the likely failure of the slide.
As none of the above abstracts was found to overlap with the author's
research on landslide risk, the full thesis documents were not procured.
D) Probabilistic Slope Analysis of Dams

Once again mainly doctoral works, with a sprinkling of MS and MEngSci
works were found by the author in this area of research. The author's search of
Dissertations Abstracts International found the following theses, described
below, relating to the probabilistic slope analysis of dams.
The most relevant PhD thesis abstract found was that by Wolff entitled
"Analysis and Design of Embankment Dam Slopes: A Probabilistic Approach"
from Purdue University (1985). Following a review of existing probabilistic
slope analysis methods applied to dams Wolff developed an analysis procedure
that accommodates skewed strength distributions, the correlation between
strength parameters c' and if>', multiple soil layers and failure surfaces of a
general shape. Wolff used the developed model to perform a number of
parametric studies on Cannon Dam and Shelbyville Dam, and found that
different loading conditions with similar factors of safety have greatly differing
failure probabilities, and the probability of failure is strongly dependent on
strength parameter correlation and somewhat dependent on parameter
skewness. As discussed in the component on cross-correlation, these results

were subsequently confirmed by other researchers such as Li (1987) and Yu and
Mostyn (1994).
A PhD thesis abstract entitled "Development of a Model for Probabilistic
Slope Stability Analysis and Application to a Tailings Dam" was published in
Dissertations Abstracts International by Sharp of Utah State University (1982).
Sharp notes that his pseudo three dimensional probabilistic slope analysis
model treats shear strength as a random variable. As a copy of the thesis was not
obtained, the author suspects, but cannot be certain, that Sharp may have used
the single random variable (SRV) approach critiqued by Li (1987) and others.
Sharp uses autocorrelation functions to describe the spatial correlation of the
strength parameters c' and cp' and included model error. He found that soil
strength variance reduction for a tailings dam can be high, and that model error
was the dominant source of uncertainty in the tailings dam he analysed.
The third and final relevant PhD thesis abstract located was concerning
"The Safety and Reliability of Rockfill Embankments" by Barbarosa Levy of
Texas A&M University (1987). Barbarosa Levy used a critical acceleration
factor as the criteria for stability in a limit equilibrium method of analysis. He
then applied a structural reliability approach in a second moment format to
compute the probability of failure of a rockfill embankment. Barbarosa Levy
then concluded by producing design curves and examples for what he termed
was the "entire spectrum of practical combinations of geometries and strength
parameters".
As was the case with probabilistic slope analysis of landslides, none of the
above abstracts were found to overlap with the author's research, hence the full
thesis documents were not procured.
E) Mistakes in And Misuses of Probabilistic Slope Analysis

As mentioned previously, many authors have used inappropriate or
oversimplified probabilistic models in slope analysis and generated high
probabilities of failure for slopes that do not fail in reality, discouraging
practitioners from applying the methods (Li, 1987). Li presents an excellent
critique of common mistakes in the probabilistic analysis of slopes. The most
common inadequacy, according to Li, is the use of the SRV approach which gives
high probabilities of failure for stable slopes due to the inadequacy of the model
in accounting for variance reduction over a finite failure surface. This approach
is unfortunately abundant in the literature. Li lists numerous authors that have
used it. The author of this thesis has found many more in this literature review,
examples being Lahlaf and Marciano (1988), Resheidat (1988), Nowatzki and
Kidd (1992) and Steiner and Marr (1992).
F) Uncertainty, Errors and Biases in Analysis

This component looks at how good probabilistic slope analyses can be
expected to be given the various influencing factors outlined below.
i) Human Factors
As Day (1993) points out, human factors or gross errors are the most
neglected and yet most influential factors in probabilistic slope analysis.
Omissions, choice of inappropriate models and poor input data are but some of
the examples given by Day. Day also notes that these may only be able to be
quantified from historical data. Mostyn and Li (1993a) offer an interesting
discussion on the choice of "design points" in engineering, which contributes
significantly to human factors or gross errors.
ii) Model Errors

Each model has its own limitations and inadequacies, and it is important
that these are recognised by those using the models for analysis (Christian et al,
1992). Often geotechnical predictions based on sophisticated models are no
better than those based on simple calculations (Li and Lee, 1991). Li and Lee
argue that model uncertainty arises from the departure of model idealisation
from reality. Similarly to human factors, model errors are seldom included
directly in analyses. At best results from various analyses based on different
models are compared, conclude Li and Lee.
iii) Uncertainty in Soil Properties

Christian et al (1992) categorise the uncertainty in soil profiles into data
scatter and systematic errors. These can be further sub-divided as follows:
o Scatter in the data due to real spatial variability within the soil
profile.
o Scatter in the data due to random testing errors or noise.
o A systematic error in the computed mean value of the property due to
the limited number of tests performed, leading to statistical
uncertainty.
o An error in the mean due to the bias in the measurement, such as that
known to occur in field vane testing.
These categories are illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Having reviewed the literature on probabilistic slope analysis methods, the
publications relating to the determination of the various parameters required in
these analyses are the subject of the next section.
Uncertainty in Soil Properties
I
I I
Data Scatter Systematic Error
I I
-~
I I I
Real Random Statistical Bias in
Spatial Testing Error in the Measurement
Variation Errors mean Procedures
Figure 5.4 Categories of uncertainty in soil properties (Christian et al, 1992)

Slope Analysis
The input parameters required for a probabilistic slope analysis depend

totally on the type of analysis. The following discussion focuses on the
parameters required for a probabilistic slope analysis using the random field
model and FOSM methods, as these are most relevant. The parameters can be
categorised into the following groups:
0 geometry,
0 failure surface(s),
0 external loading,
0 soil properties,
0 pore pressures, and
o uncertainty, errors and biases in analysis.
The papers pertaining to statistical parameters required for probabilistic slope
analysis using the random field model and FOSM methods are reviewed in the
first component. The second and third review components focus on
autocorrelation and parameter cross-correlation, as this is a growing area of
research which deserves a more detailed discussion.
A) Soil Properties - Standard Statistical Parameters

The characterisation of soil properties includes:
o standard statistical parameters such as the mean, variance, skewness
and kurtosis,
o an autocorrelation model, and
o means of handling cross-correlation between the parameters.
This component briefly reviews publications related to standard statistical
parameters frequently used in probabilistic analysis.
i) Undrained Analysis
Undrained analysis requires a single strength parameter as the measure of
resistance of the slope - the undrained strength Cu. Typically this is determined
through discreet tests (such as field vane shear tests) or continuous profiling
(cone penetrometer) or a combination of both. For the discreet case the mean,
variance, skewness and kurtosis are determined by standard statistical methods
(Benjamin and Cornell, 1970). For the continuous case the profile can either be
discretised into statistically homogenous layers using appropriate techniques
(Li, 1987) or smoothed by some moving average process such as those described
by Box and Jenkins (1976). The latter, however, is seldom done (Tang, 1993).
ii) Drained Analysis

Drained analysis requires a strength envelope. The two commonly used
parameters, soil cohesion c' and the soil friction angle¢' bring additional levels
of statistical complexity. The basic statistical description is performed through
various forms of regression of data either in c ', ¢' or p ', q' form.
iii) Regression Analysis and Curve Fitting

Regression analysis is the most common statistical tool used to analyse soil
strength data (Li, 1987). A concise overview can be found in Chapters 7 and 8 of
"Use and Abuse of Statistical Methods in the Earth Sciences" edited by W B.
Size (1987). A good text on applied linear regression is Weisberg (1985). Fitting
by eye, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Normal Squares (LNS) and
Reduced Major Axis (RMA) are all discussed. As Weisberg notes, regression
analysis is useful for summarising data into a single regression equation,
prediction of values, comparison of data groups and identifying causal
relationships. The following recommendations on using regression analysis are
condensed from Weisberg (1985) and Size (1987):
o look at the data,
o transform it if appropriate,
o select the type of curve to satisfy your requirements,

o fit the curve, and
o check the fit by examining the residuals.
Selection of variable is crucial in regression analysis as most regression
techniques assume independence of variables (Li and White, 1993). Hence
selecting variable not dependent on other variables or each other is important.
Li and White also recommend avoiding the effect of autocorrelated bias, for
example such as dominance of sampling from weak zones only resulting in an
under-representation of strong material data. One also needs to check whether
the manipulation of regression equations is valid in the sense of satisfYing
regression properties.
B) Use of Autocorrelation
The experimental autocorrelation of a soil property can be determined in a
number of different ways. Following the literature search the author found that
these can be conveniently grouped into:
o autocorrelation functions using traditional moment estimators,
o autocorrelation functions using maximum likelihood methods, and
o sem1varwgrams.
Each is briefly looked at in turn.
i) Traditional Moment Estimators

The moment estimator of the ACF of a soil property measured at uniform
intervals of distance along one dimension is as follows (DeGroot and Baecher,
1993):
n-h
" 1 '\:""' 5.13
C(h) = n - h L (Yi- my)(Yi+h - my)
i=l
in which m
Y
= .l'Yi,
n
Yi is the soil property being measured, h is the lag distance
between pairs of observations and n- his the number of data points separated by
h. At h = 0 this equation reduces to the variance of the data set. Usually the form
of the ACF is selected by fitting a function to the above moment estimate by
inspection. The scale of fluctuation is then taken from the fitted function.
ii) Maximum Likelihood Methods

The following description of the determination of autocorrelation
functions by maximum likelihood methods is drawn primarily from the useful
details given by DeGroot and Baecher (1993) and Mardia and Marshall (1984).
Similarly to Li (1987), DeGroot and Baecher (1993) commence by decomposing
the soil property k(X) into a trend component g(X) and a residual - a random
component E(X) with zero mean value, viz
k(XJ = g(XJ + c(X) 5.14
where X is the matrix of coordinates of the sample properties, and note that in
practice the trend function is estimated by regression analysis. Both the trend
and residual need to be estimated, and DeGroot and Baecher list various
methods of approaching the maximum likelihood estimation of autocorrelation
functions problem. DeGroot and Baecher (1993) go on to illustrate the methods
of fitting by trial and error various estimates of the parameters of the maximum
likelihood models described above to theoretical asymptotic autocovariance
distributions. The interested reader is referred to their paper for further details.
iii) Scale of Fluctuation Using a Semivariogram

The continuity of spatial data was modelled by Matheron (1963) as cited by
Miller (1979) by a semivariogram function y(h)
y(h) = 2lv IIt [f(M +h)- f(MJJ'dv 5.15
where f(M) and f(M +h) are the values taken at points M and M +h of the
geometrical field V (usually area or volume) respectively, and h is the lag
between the points in a specified direction. In general the semivariogram
increases with lag h. Without working out the integration Miller (1979)
estimated the semivariogram in one direction by
N(h)
y(h) = 2~(h) _I
z=J
[Z(Xi) - Z(Xi + h)] 2 5.16
where h is the lag in the assumed direction, Z(X;) and Z(X;_ +h) are sample values
at points X;_ and X;_ +h respectively, and N(h) the number of sample pairs
separated by lag h. Again curve fitting is applied to determine the scale of
fluctuation or range of influence. If the semivariogram does not reach a sill or
constant value, the data will need to be checked for stationarity and so on using
the previously described methods of geostatistics.
C) Finding the Cross- Correlation of Parameters

Most researchers assume independence of the statistical parameters used
in probabilistic slope analysis, as noted by Yu and Mostyn (1994). Yu and Mostyn
note that while this is a convenient assumption, it may result _in
overconservatism if not true. Often the degree of dependence of the statistical
parameters may be difficult to determine, or not incorporated into the analytical

model used. Lack of data is another problem according to Yu and Mostyn. If
sufficient data is at hand for two random variables, the correlation parameter
can be determined using standard statistical formulas (see for example, Box and
Jenkins, 1976; Benjamin and Cornell, 1970). As was mentioned previously, Yu
and Mostyn have now developed a probabilistic slope analysis model
incorporating autocorrelation and cross-correlation of the strength
parameters c' and¢' into an analytical computer program based on random field
theory, and demonstrated the great influence of autocorrelation and
cross-correlation on the calculated probability of failure.
5.1.3 Rainfall and the Probability of Landsliding

The literature on rainfall and landsliding is reviewed in section 8.1, being
thematically consistent with chapter 8.
5.1.4 Summary
This section presented a review of probabilistic slope analysis as gleaned
from the pertinent literature. First the concepts in probabilistic slope design
were outlined, and the various indicators of slope stability were discussed.
Secondly, factors affecting the probability of failure were reviewed. A look at the
methods of probabilistic modelling of soil profiles followed. Examples of
methods of probabilistic slope analysis were given further. The final segment
closed with a literature review of the means of determining the parameters
required for probabilistic slope analysis.
Probabilistic slope analysis is a developing field with various models
including different effects. A complete model for probabilistic analysis is still
not finalised, and probably less so for rock slopes. Nevertheless, even an
imperfect probabilistic slope analysis can add valuable information to guide the
slope designer in decision making.
5.2 Statistics of Landsliding in Hong Kong

The total numbers of slopes in Kong Kong, the recorded landslides together
with their consequences, and the annual probabilities of landsliding and
casualties are detailed herein.
5.2.1 The Total Number of Slopes in Hong Kong

The GEO has a catalogue of slopes comprising of two lists, the list of cut
slopes and retaining walls, and the list of fill slopes. They consist mainly of
slopes inspected and registered by Binnie and Partners from 1977 to 1978
(Binnie and Partners, 1977 and 1978) together with other slopes registered since
then. Cuts and walls higher than 3 m, and fills higher than 5 m, are eligible for
registration (Wong and Premchitt, 1994). There are, however, more
unregistered eligible slopes than are registered. Wong and Premchitt indicate
that there are 27,000 unregistered slopes, and that a large portion (over 50%) of
the unregistered slopes predate the establishment of the GCO (now the GEO) in
1977. Mr. H. N. Wong, GEO Special Projects, in consultation with other persons
from the GEO, has estimated the total number of slopes in Hong Kong as those
shown in Table 5.1. This does not include natural slopes.
Table 5.1 Total number of constructed slopes in Hong Kong.
Cut Retaining Fill Total

Type Wall
Registered 6,500 2,900 3,000 12,400
Unregistered 14,000 5,000 8,000 27,000
Total 20,500 7,900 11,000 39,400

Hong Kong
The systematic recording of landsliding in Hong Kong began in 1978, and
the records were kept as landslide record cards. Record cards were, and still are,
prepared for "major" landslides, generally exceeding 50m3 in volume
(magnitude). Cards were also prepared for many larger landslides predating
1978, often based on limited data, eg. air photographs. Since 1984 landslide
incident reports have been prepared for all landslides which are notified to the
GEO. This includes many small landslides, down to single boulders or 1m3
slides. It is not known what proportion of all landslides are recorded in this way,
but the records are probably fairly complete. These records were described in
section 4.1.2.2.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 summarises the number of landslides which have been
recorded from 1984 to 1993, differentiated by the category of type of slope. It will
be seen that the number oflandslides varies considerably from year to year. This
can be related to the rainfall, as discussed in section 8.2. Based on the 10 years of
>-j '"d
Table 5.2 Landslides recorded by the GEO during 1984-93 for all slopes. The second column contains incidents greater than ::r ('D
('D (t
50m3 (major incidents). ::0 "1
"'-· .'-<
:>;"" 'Tj
~ s·
"'-
"' Pol
~ ~
Year Cut Retaining Wall Fill Natural slope Rock Fall Others 1 Overall Total Total2 s"'
'"d
::r
1984 70 4 11 0 14 1 4 1 7 14 0 120 6 102 5
g tJ
0
1985 145 4 25 3 13 1 10 1 17 0 44 1 254 10 200 8 ~~
~(/)
1986 115 6 26 0 18 3 9 2 29 0 36 0 233 11 188 9 .g
(0'--'
~
1987 193 7 27 0 14 1 14 0 28 0 31 1 307 9 252 9 "'

1988 73 3 14 0 15 1 7 1 22 0 26 0 157 5 124 4
1989 435 39 41 9 22 5 25 1 30 2 67 0 620 56 528 55
1990 41 1 5 0 12 2 8 2 9 0 24 1 99 6 67 3
1991 49 2 5 0 9 1 9 0 13 0 3 1 88 4 79 3
1992 439 14 44 3 55 6 51 2 40 1 12 0 641 26 578 24
1993 617 71 25 0 38 10 94 11 41 0 12 1 827 93 721 81
Total 2,117 151 223 15 210 31 231 21 236 3 269 5 3,346 226 2,836 200
Avg 217.70 15.10 22.30 1.50 21.00 3.10 23.10 2.10 23.60 0.30 26.90 0.50 334.60 22.60 283.60 20.00
Notes: 1. Other failure types include subsidence, tree fall, washout, etc.
2. Totals for cuts, fills, retaining walls and rock falls.
3. Sourced from GEO annual Rainfall and Landslides reports.
......
w
0'\
slopes. The second column contains incidents greater than 50 m 3
(major incidents).
Year Cut Retaining wall Fill Natural slope TotaJ1

1984 14 3 1 0 3 1 1 0 19 4
1985 24 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 24 3
1986 5 4 3 0 0 1 0 1 8 6
1987 14 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 4
1988 4 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 2
1989 14 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 15 4
1990 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1
1991 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 1
1992 223 10 5 0 8 3 5 0 241 13
1993 108 11 2 0 4 6 6 0 120 17
Total 422 41 13 1 19 12 12 1 466 55
Avg 42.20 4.10 1:30 0.10 1.90 1.20 1.20 0.10 46.60 5.50
Notes: 1. Totals for cuts, fills, retaining walls and rock falls.
records, the annual average number of slides and of "major" slides has been
calculated. It will be seen that major slides (greater than 50 m 3 ) represent only
about 7% of the total.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarise the number of casualties resulting from
landslides, and what facilities were affected.

1984-93. Zero entries are omitted for clarity.
By location By cause
Year Retaining Natural Rock Total
Building Squatters Road Cut Fill Other1
wall slope fall
1984 (1) (1)
1985 (4) (3) (3) (2) (2) (7)
1986 (1) (1) (1)
1987 (3) (3) (1) (3) (1) (3) (7)
1988 (1) (1) (1)
1989 2 (5) (3) 2 (3) 2 (5)
1990 0
1991 (1) (1) (1)
1992 2 (5) 1 2 (5) 1 (1) 3 (5)
1993 1 1 (5) (1) 1 (6)
Total 2 {15) 2 {4) 1 {14) 2 {8) 1 2 {3) (4) {6) 6 {36)
Notes: 1. Other failure types include subsidence, tree fall, washout, etc.
Table 5.5 GEO records of facilities affected by sliding during 1984-93. o-3 'i:l
::r (1l
(1l ct
::tl ....
-· '-<
Cll•
1993 (to ;>;""" 'Tl

Type of Affected 29 May 17 June
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 > s·
Facility 1982 1983 Oct)
Cll-
Cll
(1l
~
'<!
Cll ~
113 62 19 37 36 51 38 67 15 19 94 29 Cll 'i:l

Buildings 3 ::r
(22%) (40%) (16%) (15%) (15%) (17%) (24%) (11%) (14%) (22%) (15%) (12%) g 0
~e
Squatters
266 48 60 139 119 128 68 227 44 19 82 58 .~Ul
... z
(52%) (31%) (50%) (55%) (51%) (42%) (43%) (37%) (42%) (22%) (13%) (24%) 0 ~
131 48 33 64 79 112 48 217 43 42 356 134
'R---
Cil
Roads
(26%) (31%) (28%) (25%) (34%) (36%) (31%) (35%) (41%) (48%) (56%) (55%)
14 16 27 24 15 18 12 109 10 16 173 65
Others
(3%) (10%) (23%) (9%) (6%) (6%) (8%) (18%) (10%) (18%) (27%) (27%
Total Number of Land- 157 641 245
510 155 120 254 233 307 620 105 88
slides Reported to GEO
Notes: 1. Total percentages may exceed 100% as a failure may affect more than one type of land or structure.
2. Source is Wong and Premchitt (1994).
......
UJ
00

Landsliding
5.2.3.1 Probability of Landsliding

Table 5.6 presents annual totals and calculated probabilities oflandsliding
for cuts, retaining walls, fills, and overall totals. These are calculated using the
data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. It will be seen that:
o cut slopes are more likely to fail than retaining walls and fills,
o about 0. 7% (or 1 in 140) of all slopes fail each year, and 0.05% or
1 in 2,000 result in major failures each year,
o registered slopes are similarly likely to fail as unregistered slopes, and
o sliding of natural slopes accounts for 0.6% of the totallandsliding.

1984-93.
Retaining
(A) ALL SLOPES Cut1 Fill Total
Wall
'
Total Number 20,500 7,900 11,000 39,400
Annual Average Landslides 242 22 21 284
Annual Average Probability All 1 in 85 1 in 360 1 in 525 1 in 140
Annual Average Major Landslides 15.5 1.5 3 20
Annual Average Probability Major 1 in 1,330 1 in 5,250 1 in 3,500 1 in 1,970
Retaining
(B) REGISTERED SLOPES Cut1 Fill Total
Wall
Total Number 6,500 2,900 3,000 12,400
Annual Average Landslides 42.2 1.3 1.9 45.4
Annual Average Probability All 1 in 154 1 in 2,230 1 in 1,580 · 1 in 275
Annual Average Major Landslides 4.1 0.1 1.2 5.4
Retaining
(C) UNREGISTERED SLOPES Cut1 Fill Total
Wall
Total Number 14,000 5,000 8,000 27,000
Annual Average Landslides 200 20.7 19.1 239.8
Annual Average Probability All 1 in 70 1 in 240 1 in 420 1 in 115
Annual Average Major Landslides 11.4 1.4 1.8 14.6
Notes: 1. Includes rock falls in Table 5.2.

5.2.3.2 Probability of Casualties
From Table 5.4, the average annual casualties for 1984-1993 were 0.6
deaths, and 3.4 injuries per annum. The average population of Hong Kong over
this period was about 5, 700,000 (from Hong Kong Monthly Digest statistics).
Hence the average annual probabilities of death or injury over the period
1984-93 were:
Death 1 in 9,500,000
Injury 1 in 1,650,000
However, these figures need to be considered in the context that in 1994 there
were 6 deaths due to landsliding, including 5 in one incident. This would double
the average annual probability of death.
Table 5. 7 shows the statistics of landslide casualties from 1963 onwards.
Note that many of the casualties have been squatters, who were living in high
risk (high probability, high vulnerability) situations. Most of these squatter
areas have now been cleared. There have also been some instances of major loss
of life, such as at Po Shan and Sau Mau Ping. Since then, the standards of
geotechnical engineering of slopes has improved with the establishment of the
GEO in 1977, but one would expect that occasional incidents with larger
numbers of casualties are still possible, so the longer term averages are likely to
be higher than for the 1984-93 period.
5.3 Review of Hong Kong Databases and Earlier Studies for

Information to Assist in the Assessment of Probability of
Landsliding
As part of the study, several existing databases and earlier studies were
investigated to ascertain their use in:
o differentiating between slopes with higher and lower probability of
failure than the average, and
o giving guidance on assessment of vulnerability, including damage to
property, and loss of life.
This chapter outlines what was done, and presents the results. The successive
components of this section are:
o analysis of the CHASE cut slope data,
o effect of geology and geomorphology on landslide incidence,
o review of major case studies,
o stage 1 reports and the ranking system,
o registered slope stage 1 study outcomes and slope performance, and
o survey of GEO senior staff.
Table 5. 7 Statistics of landslide casualties (deaths and injuries) derived from

fire services records (before 1982) and GEO records (1982 and
after).
Landslide Casualties
Number of Deaths (Injuries)
YEAR TOTAL
Road
Building Squatters
Vehicle Footway Bus stop
1963 - - - - - -
1964 9 (15) 24 (37) - - - 33 (52)
1965 (4) - - - - (4)
1966 1 (6) 20 (18) 2 (1) 5 8 (16) 36 (41)
1967 - 1 - (1) - 1 (1)
1968 - 22 (9) - - - 22 (9)
1969 1 - - 1 - 2
1970 - 1 - - - 1
1971 2 3 (1) - - - 5 (1)
1972 142 (1 02) 1 7 (1) - (1) - 149 (104)
1973 1 (1) - - - - 1 (1)
1974 - (1) - - - (1)
1975 - 2 (3) - - - 2 (3)
1976 18 (24) 2 8 (7) - (1) - 26 (32)
1977 - - - - - -
1978 (2) 2 (3) - - - 2 (5)
1979 - 1 (1) - - - 1 (1)
1980 - - - - - -
1981 - 1 - 1 (2) - 2 (2)
1982 4 23 (29) - - - 27 (29)
1983 - 1 (12) - - - 1 (12)
1984 - (1) - - - (1)
1985 - (4) - (3) - (7)
1986 - (1) - - - (1)
1987 (3) (3) - (1) - (7)
1988 - (1) - - - (1)
1989 - 2 (5) - - - 2 (5)
1990 - - - - - -
1991 (1) - - - - (1)
1992 2 (5) - 1 - - 3 (5)
1993 - - - - 1(5) 1(5)
1994 - - 1 (17) 5(3) - 6 (20)
Notes: 1. Sau Mau Ping and Po Shan

2. Sau Mau Ping
5.3.1 Analysis of the CHASE Cut Slope Data
The estimation of the probability of failure of individual slopes is necessary
for the application of quantitative risk assessment techniques. Various paths to
such an estimation are possible. By collecting information on slopes that have
failed and slopes that are still standing, models using discriminant functions can
be developed which classify a new slope as either stable or potentially unstable.
The discriminant functions may also identify the slope parameters which are
important in distinguishing between stable and failed slopes. This approach has
been applied in two phases to data from about 180 cut slopes in Hong Kong. In
the first phase, performed by the Geotechnical Control Office, discriminant
analyses were performed using groups of variables with a strong intuitive link to
physical theory. Reasonable discrimination success rates were achieved, and the
results were subsequently used to assist in performing stability assessments of
several hundred new slopes. In the second phase, performed by the author, more
than 300 variables were initially considered on equal merit. Higher
discrimination success rates of more 80% were achieved for groups of less than
20 variables, and 73% for a group of only four variables. This approach is
applicable for modifying the assessed probability of slope failure where slope
registers and landsliding records are kept.
5.3.1.2 Background of the CHASE Data

The Cut Slopes in Hong Kong - Assessment of Stability by Empiricism
(CHASE) study was an extensive cut slope and data collection exercise. Data
collection began in May 1981, with the entire study completed by December
1982, by the then Geotechnical Control Office (GCO) of the Hong Kong
Government. A summary of the study is given by Brand and Hudson (1982).
One of the principal objectives of the 1981-82 study was to investigate the
possibility of developing empirical design rules for cut slope design in Hong
Kong, given that a significant number of cut slopes in Hong Kong had remained
stable for many years but had conventional factors of safety less than one.
Conventional limit equilibrium analysis using a non- circular analytical
method, with measured piezometric surfaces and representative material shear
strengths often gave the anomalous results of a factor of safety less than unity
for steep, high existing cuts when soil suction was neglected.
The CHASE study is fully described in GCO report 5/82 (GCO, 1982). 177
cut slopes were selected for data collection. These were selected as a
representative sub-set of the Hong Kong cut slopes in all respects, except for
the original slope angle. Steep slopes were deliberately selected so as to

represent the upper range of the slope angle range, and thus form an upper
bound for any empirical design rules that would result from the study. The data
collection included substantial research into the history of each slope, including
collation of previous ground investigation and soil testing data (where
applicable), together with new topographic survey, limited ground investigation
and soil testing. Over 300 numeric variables were measured. They describe the
various aspects of the slopes and are grouped in the following 13 broad groups
following the original CHASE variable numbering:
1. General
2. Vegetation
3. Drainage
4. Slope protection and remedial works
5. Adjacent structures
6. Materials
7. Instability
8. Miscellaneous
10. Slope geometry
11. Drainage - presence of piezometer
12. Original slope geometry at failure location
13. Details of drains on slope
15. Additional items, including a Factor of Safety
5.3.1.3 Data Source

The CHASE study data was made available by the GEO in a computer
printout format, and was redigitised following this format. The data consists of
eight text and 329 numeric variables. The variables describe various aspects of
the CHASE study cut slopes and consist broadly of the 13 groups listed above.
The full listing and description of the CHASE data variables used in the present
study can be found in Appendix Bl.
5.3.1.4 DA and Its Application
A) Basic Features of DA
Discriminant analysis (DA) is a multivariate statistical technique used to
develop functions of independent variables that provide the best separation of
distinct sets of observations, and allocate new observations to previously defined
groups (Johnson and Wichern, 1982). Each such set is often termed a class.
When applied to the quantitative risk assessment of slopes at the simplest level,
two such classes can be produced, namely stable and failed slopes. Where
representative data sets recording pertinent geotechnical variables are

available for both stable and failed slopes, DA can be used for the identification
of important variables that distinguish between stable and failed slopes, and for
the evaluation of a new slope as to whether it is potentially stable or unstable,
based on these variables.
DAis the main statistical technique commonly employed to "discriminate"
between two or more classes (subsets) in a data set. In theory a large number of·
variables (up to about the number of observations) can be analysed.
Discriminant analyses produce discriminant functions. For two classes a single
discriminant function (DF) can provide the optimum separation. The DF is
commonly a linear combination of the variables, but quadratic forms are
sometimes used. The DF, determined from the original data set, is then used to
classify new observations (ie slopes not in the original database). The values of
the DF are determined for all classes, and the discriminant score determines the
class to which the new observation is assigned.
Stepwise Discriminant Analysis (SDA) is a particular form ofDA wherein a
subset of variables is stepwise selected to produce a good discrimination between
classes. The model starts with no variables, and at each step selects a variable
that contributes most to the model's discriminatory power, or removes a
variable that no longer satisfies the discriminatory criterion. The analysis stops
when no more variables can be added or removed from the model. A simple
measure of the success of the model is the overall correct classification rate
expressed as a percentage, ie. the percentage of slopes in the original database
whose actual classes (failed or stable) are the same as those determined by the
DF. It is desirable to achieve a rate as close to 100% as possible with the
minimum number of variables. The DA and SDA techniques are well
documented in texts on applied multivariate statistics such as Johnson and
Wichern (1982) and Haan (1977), and will not be detailed herein.
B) Literature on the DA of Slopes

Very little recent work on the application of DA to the risk assessment of
slopes was found in the literature. Most papers aiming to separate or classify
slopes as stable or potentially unstable are studies of landslides on natural
slopes, focused on landslide categorisation and identification of potentially
unstable areas. These often employ Geographical Information Systems (GIS)
and/or Aerial Photographic Interpretation (API) techniques. Such studies are
commented upon by GCO (1982). Early published examples of DA applied to
slopes can befoundinArmstrongetal (1974),Jonesetal (1961), Neuland (1976)
and Tsurumi (1973). Recently Corominas et al (1992) detailed statistical
analyses of a landslide inventory (database) on natural slopes. A part of the

analyses was the application of DA using 23 variables to a landslide database.
The variables were related to the shape of the failure zone, slope characteristics,
lithology and reach of the failure mass. Corominas et al used DA to verify the
accuracy of the field classification of movement types. TheDA showed that over
73% of movements were correctly classified. Corominas et al also performed
frequency, factorial and regression analyses to conclude that larger run-out
distances travelled by the failed mass are achieved in areas with larger
catchments, and that instability and reach of the slide mass is strongly volume
dependent. Apart from these papers no other work on the application of DA to
the risk assessment of slopes was found in the literature.
C) Application ofDA to Slope Data

For slope data sets containing information on both unfailed and failed
slopes, DA can be applied in two stages, first in order to select discriminating
variables (using SDA), second to develop a DF which uses the selected variables
to classify other slopes not in the database as stable or potentially unstable.
Great care in the selection of the variables must be exercised to ensure that the
variables are intuitively and physically meaningful, otherwise spurious results
may be obtained. For the group of failed slopes in the data set to be analysed it is
important to assess the pre-failure geometry and other relevant variables. The
most appropriate DF (a linear function) can be expressed as
5.17
where D is the discriminant score, ao to a,. coefficients and X1 to Xn the raw

values of the important variables discriminating between stable and failed
slopes. A convenient form of DF can be developed so than D < 0 for failed slopes
and D > 0 for unfailed slopes.
5.3.1.5 1981-82 Analyses of the CHASE Data

The main emphasis during the 1981-82 analyses was to select variables
that had a strong intuitive link to physical theory (geometry, effects of water,
strength of slope-forming materials, and so on) as well as being statistically
significant. Following the intensive data collection the following types of
analyses were carried out by the GCO:
o single variable analyses,
o height versus angle plots,
o average slope factor approach, and
o discriminant analyses.
The following is a summary of the findings.

The single variable analyses indicated that the original slope angle,
upslope natural angle, catchment area, slope height, material type,
discontinuities and groundwater conditions all aided the separation between
stable and unstable slopes, but no single variable could fully explain the
observed differences between stable and unstable slopes. The height versus
angle plots showed that there is no simple distinction between stability and
failure in the CHASE data on the basis of slope height and angle alone.
The average slope factor approach involved trial combinations of slope
variables that might be expected to have different values for stable and unstable
slopes, plotted against slope height. The plots were examined for the degree of
separation. Charts for the preliminary assessment of slopes not in the CHASE
data set were derived from these analyses.
Discriminant analyses of the CHASE data were performed using two
groups of variables seleCted by the study team on the basis that they were
important to physical theory, stability analysis and design as well as being
indicated as significant in the above-mentioned analyses. Group A contained
four variables representing the standardised catchment area (STACAT),
average material strength (AVSTREN), original cut slope angle (SORANG) and
the natural angle above the slope (NATANG). Group B contained the four
variables from group A plus two more based on the ratio of the length of the
weakest soil layers to the total slope length and groundwater height to the total
slope height. The STACAT, AVSTREN and additional Group B variables were
aggregated from the raw CHASE data variables (GCO, 1982).
A hierarchical approach to analysis of classes and subsets seeking optimum
discrimination was adopted. Starting with all failed and all stable slopes DAs
were performed using the selected variables. The numbers of slopes in the
analysis were then reduced on the basis of geometry, failure type, material type,
groundwater influence, and whether the failures were joint- controlled or not.
The overall levels of correct separation between stable and failed slopes in the
database using variable groups A and B were in the range of 60-65%. Higher
separation rates approaching 80% were reported if DA was carried out only on
failures in the top portion of the slope. Three DFs from variable group A were
plotted against height, being applicable to cut slopes above the zone of influence
of groundwater and where failure is unlikely to be joint-controlled. The first
two DFs (D1 and D2) are listed below. D1 is applicable to the assessment of
general instability in cut slopes excluding joint- controlled failures and slopes
where groundwater and/or perched water are recorded above slope toe. D2 was
derived by also excluding failures restricted to the head of the cut slopes, hence
the variable NATANG does not appear. This DF is applicable to assessment of

the likelihood of face failures within the main body of the cut slopes.
D1 = -5.2677 +0.08068 SORANG +0.02195 STACAT

+0.02048 NATANG -0.00009148 AVSTREN 5.18
D2 = -5.3140 +0.08905 SORANG +0.02655 STACAT

-0.0001054 AVSTREN 5.19
The values of D1 versus slope height are plotted in Figure 5.5, and values of D2
versus slope height in Figure 5.6. These charts were subsequently used between
1984-90 for about 400 preliminary GCO cut slope assessments to assist in
determining the need for more detailed stability studies (Woods, 1985). The
three zones marked on each chart are arbitrary subdivisions to indicate that the
likelihood of instability increases from low to high with increasing discriminant
scores.
5.3.1.6 The Author's DA Analyses of the CHASE Data
A) Objectives of the Present Study

The study objective was to select those CHASE cut slope variables which
were important in distinguishing between the failed and unfailed slopes in the
database. These variables and the corresponding discriminant functions were
identified, thus potentially making possible the evaluation of any cut slope in
Hong Kong as to whether it is more or less likely to fail than the average.
B) Data Extraction
The CHASE raw data was re-digitised from computer print-outs for
further analyses carried out between August and December 1994 as part of an
overall study oflandslide risk assessment for Hong Kong (Finlay and Fell, 1995).
The approach taken in this second phase is labelled "reductionist" to highlight
the fact that all the CHASE variables were considered on equal merit as
potential discriminators between stable and failed slopes. This approach is in
contrast with the "selective" approach of the 1981-82 study described above,
where a selective approach to using variables closely linked to physical theory
was applied, and aggregated variables were employed in DA analyses. The
recent study used only the raw CHASE data variables and the complete classes
of all failed and all stable slopes, ie. no smaller subsets of slopes were analysed.
so .---------------~n-r-------r---------------------------~
STABLE SLOPE
LOW MODEF<ATE HIGH
FAiLED SLOPE
•o
f
s 0 0 055 += 0 195 {- =0 71.
30
E
...r
L)
w
r ..
20
8
.. 0
10 .....
! ••
'\o
o So
0
-l. 00 -200 000 200
DISCRIMINANT SCORES
Figure 5.5 Plot of D1 versus height (GCO, 1982).
50
STABLE SLOPE
' FAILED SLOPE
LO
LOW RA HIGH
{ :O.OLO {:0.172 + :0.500
30 . 0
• 0
0
20 ... ... ~
0
10 ....
•
. ...~ 8o•
•a a,
0
oo& •
...0
000
0
•
_, 00 -2.00 o.oo 2-00
DISCRIMINANT SCORES
Figure 5.6 Plot ofD2 versus height (GCO, 1982).

C) Data Reduction
The first problem tackled was the reduction of the large number of
variables to practically useable numbers. This was desirable from both practical
and statistical points of view. From the statistical point of view, the original data
matrix of 177 observations (rows) and 329 variables (columns) had too many
variables to be used directly in DA. Furthermore, over half of the variables
consisted mostly of missing data. Thus the original data matrix was too large
and ill- conditioned for DA to be applied to it. From a practical view point it was
also desirable to select only a small number of variables (say 5-15) that are
easily determined and can be subsequently used for the routine assessment of
cut slopes without the need for additional site investigations.
The data reduction carried out in the recent analyses generated two lists of
variables which were statistically important in discriminating between stable
and unstable slopes. The first list was derived from the reduction of the total set
of 329 numeric CHASE variables. The reduction steps were as follows:
1. Remove variables with more than 50% total missing data, as these
would cause spurious discrimination based on a very limited number
of observations.
2. Remove failure variables which were only recorded for unstable
slopes, and again would cause spurious discrimination.
3. Carry out SDA on the remaining variable to select the statistically
important variables.
Mter steps one and two 107 out of the original329 variables remained. SDA of
these 107 variables (step three) selected 18 variables that were statistically
significant for discrimination. These variables (List 1), together with their
partial coefficients of determination (partial R2) and individual discrimination
success rates (IDSRs) are listed in Table 5.8 in order of decreasing contribution
to overall discrimination. It can be seen that a number of these variables are
related to infiltration, drainage, material type and strength. Some make
physical as well as statistical sense intuitively (eg top layer material type,
V6_15_1) while others do not (eg the presence of retaining structures, V4_3).
One can note that neither slope height nor angle were selected as statistically
significant for discrimination. Quite a few of the selected variables are not easily
measured in practice without the need for site investigation. Hence DFs for
assessment of other slopes were not generated for List 1.
If aDA using all18 variables in List 1 is carried out on the CHASE data, the
overall discrimination success rate (ODSR) is 86%. That is, 86% of the 177 cut
slopes are correctly classified as either stable or unstable. If a lesser number of
variables is selected, than the ODSR will drop correspondingly. For example,
ODSR=81% if the top 10 variables are used, 79% if the top 5 variables are used,
and 64% if variable V4_6 only is used. Hence the ODSR range for List 1 is
64-87%, depending on the number of variables used. This ODSR is certainly
better than the range 60-65% achieved during the 1981-82 study period,
however, it does not mean that all the variables in List 1 are necessarily useful in
a practical sense. The main problem that has frequently been encountered in
the 1981-82 and recent analyses is that the coefficients of the DF sometimes
have the opposite sign to that expected by logic. For example, the coefficient for
the chunam condition variable (chunam is a protective cover placed over the cut
slope surface to eliminate slope erosion and face infiltration) may incorrectly
indicate that slopes with chunam in a poorer condition (with cracks, etc) are
more stable than those with chunam in a good condition. This is contrary to
logic, and if it was the case the variable would have to be discarded as it could not
be used in practice, and the DAre-run on the remaining variables in the list.
Thus a process of elimination by trial and error would be necessary to remove
the variables with incorrect loadings before the DFs could be used in practice.
Table 5.8 CHASE study - significant variables selected by DA of the entire

CHASE variable set (List 1).
Variable Partial R 2 IDSR (%)

V4_6 Chunam condition 0.1291 64
V13_2H Depth of cross-slope drain 0.1321 61
V6_15_1 Top layer material type 0.0611 64
V11_1 Piezometer near slope (1=yes, 2=no) 0.0376 55
V13_2L Number of bored drains 0.0349 52
V13_2C Number of downslope drains 0.0307 59
V4_4 Revegetation (1=yes, 2=no) 0.0302 52
V4_3 Retaining structures (1=yes, 2=no) 0.0419 55
V6_22_1 Hand penetrometer strength (top layer) in kN/m 2 0.0294 57
V6_11_1 Top layer length (along section line) 0.0339 51
V6_14_2 Jointing pattern (layer 2) 0.0261 50 .
V6_4 Number of material layers in profile 0.0379 61
V6_22_2 Hand penetrometer strength (layer 2) in kNfm2 0.0415 55
V6_20_1 'L' Type Schmidt hammer value (top layer) 0.0208 53
V3_4 Upslope drainage type 0.0163 52
V13_28 Depth of cut-off drain 0.0138 54
V6_16_2A % fines in layer 2 0.0162 54
V1_10E Upslope TCM- hydrology 0.0167 51
In order to obtain a list of statistically significant variables easily

determined in practice and so obviate the need for site investigation on every
slope during its preliminary assessment, a sub-set of CHASE variables not

requiring site investigation was selected. There were 50 selected variables,
covering areas such as geometry, geomorphology, drainage, material and
decomposition types, presence and type of joints, and slope age. The steps taken
to reduce this subset to a second list of statistically significant variables were
the same as those used to produce List 1. Mter steps one and two 42 variables
remained. SDA of the remaining 42 variables (step three) selected nine
variables as statistically significant (List 2). These are listed in Table 5.9
following the format of Table 5.8. With all List 2 variables DA achieves an ODSR
of 76%. The ODSR range is thus 64-76%. The coefficients of the DF are also all
correct and logical, and the variables all make physical sense (except for the
presence of retaining structures, variable V4_3). With further DA of List 2 it was
found that the top four variables gave an ODSR= 73% and all the DF coefficients
were also correct. The frequency distributions of these four variables are shown
in Figures 5.7 to 5.10. The DF D3 is listed below.
D3 = -1.777-0.2356(V4_6)+0.4323(V10_8)
+ 1.044(V6_15_1)-0.03056(V10_9) 5.20
Table 5.9 CHASE study - significant variables selected by DA of the easily

determined variable sub-set (List 2).
Partial IDSR
Variable R2 (%)
V4_6 Chunam condition 0.1291 64
V10_8 Number of berms 0.1128 62
V6_15_1 Top layer material type 0.0700 64
V10_9 Slope angle above 0.0337 60
AGE Slope age 0.0243 58
V10_3 Slope length 0.0368 48
V10_6 Toe width 0.0270 60
V4_3 Retaining structures (1 =yes, 2=no) 0.0198 55
V12_2 Original slope height 0.0136 58
The slope is indicated to be potentially unstable when D3 < 0 and stable

when D3 > 0. Figure 5.11 shows the overlap between the frequency distributions
of the discriminant scores from D3 for the stable and failed slopes in the CHASE
data set. It can be seen that greater confidence can be allocated to the
discrimination if the absolute value of the discriminant function is high. The
ODSR can be improved by including more statistically significant variables to
the DF.
- Failed slopes
~ Stable slopes
;g
~
>-
() 50
z
w
::J
a 40
w
0:
u_
GOOD POOR
NOCHUNAM AVERAGE BAD
Figure 5. 7 Frequency distribution of the chunam condition (V4 6) CHASE data

variable.
70~----------------------------------------------~
- Failed slopes
60+-----------------------~
~ Stable slopes
>-
()
zw
::J
a
w
0:
u_
0 1 2 3
Figure 5.8 Frequency distribution of the number of berms (Vl 0_8) CHASE
data variable.
100,---------------------------------------------~
90+-------------------------~ Failed slopes

Stable slopes
>-
()
zw
:::::>
a
w
a:
LL
COLLUVIUM IN-SITU OTHER
Figure 5.9 Frequency distribution of the material type in top layer (V6_15_1) ·
CHASE data variable.
100 f.---'
90
.~I
~, (
;;? ,
~ 80 ,
>-
()
z
w 70 ' J
:::::>
~
' _./
aw 60 ' I
a:
LL
w 50 -'
'
I
>
~ 40 '
,
j
_J ,
/
~
:::::> ,
::2: ,
30 , Failed slopes I-
:::::>
()
20 ~
~
,
I ---- Stable slopes -
10
, __./
~
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
NATURAL ANGLE ABOVE (degrees)
Figure 5.10 Cumulative frequency distributions of natural angle above slope

(Vl 0_9) CHASE data variable.
100 , ~
90
( ,
,
,
..1 ,
80 /
,I
,
~
~ 70 f I
~
()
z
LU 60 / ,
,
I
=>
0
LU
a: 50
I
l.L.
LU
40
( ,
I
>
~
_j
=>
~
30
v
I ,
,
I
=> ,
() 20 I I t--
I I
Failed slopes
10
,
-- - - Stable slopes t--
0 -- -
/- - ~ --
,
,
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Ds
Figure 5.11 Cumulative frequency distributions of D3 scores for the CHASE

data.
Alternately the same analysis can be used in the following manner. If D3 >
1.5 (say) the slope is highly likely to be stable and no further investigation is
required. If D3 < -1.5 then it is highly likely to be potentially unstable and
immediate investigation of the need for preventive works is required. For
-1.5 <D3 < 1. 5 the slope stability is less easily assessed, and further action will
depend on the consequences of failure and available resources. This approach is
analogous to the zoning in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
D) Discussion
The results of the author's "reductionist" DA analyses cannot be compared
directly to the results of the 1981-82 DA analyses based on the "selective"
approach because of the different methodologies employed.
The analyses indicate that four easily measured variables give an
ODSR= 73%. The four variables are the chunam condition (chunam is a surface
soil/cement cover commonly applied to cut slopes in Hong Kong), the number of
berms, the material type in the top layer and the natural slope angle above the
cut. While these variables are shown as statistically significant, they are not
variables commonly used in stability analyses and design. This may be due to
the fact that the construction process of the slopes in the CHASE data set
provided broadly similar levels of safety by taking into account physical factors
such as past instability, groundwater, geometry and material strength, hence
reducing the effectiveness of these variables for discrimination between stable
and failed slopes. The 1981-82 analyses indicated that some geometrical
factors such as original slope angle were reasonable discriminators. However, in
the recent analyses these variables fell below the statistical significance level of
the SDA and were not selected.
Approaches to variable selection other than statistical methods (eg. SDA)
can also be used. For example, variables can be selected on the basis of geometry
alone, on factors involved in conventional stability analysis, and so on, prior to
carrying out DAs and ascertaining the corresponding ODSRs. This would be a
trial and error process to obtain an acceptable discrimination rate. For example,
the researchers involved in the recent analyses have tried a group of geometric
variables using the original slope height, original slope angle and slope toe
width. These three variables give an ODSR=61 %. If a morphological variable
characterising the upslope area is added, the ODSR increases to 63%. A hybrid
combination of geometry and cut slope surface protection variables was also
tried. By using the original slope height, the number of berms (which is related
to the overall cut slope angle), slope toe width and the chunam condition the
ODSR=71%.
From this brief example it can be seen that variables selected by other than
statistical means can give significant discrimination success rates. Selection of
variables by SDA may not always be the best from a practical or engineering
point of view as the variables may not make physical sense. Thus various
approaches to variable selection are possible, of which SDA is one. In practice a
number of approaches to variable selection can be tried and the results
compared.
5.3.1. 7 DA Application Elsewhere

The DA technique is one of several useful tools in assessing the probability .
of failure of cut slopes, together with other information such as observation and
stability analyses (Fell et al, 1996; Finlay and Fell, 1995). TheDA technique can
be applied to any slope data set (natural or man -modified), provided that the
same variables are recorded for both stable and failed slopes. Various
approaches to variable selection exist. If SDA is used to select the statistically
significant variables, these need to be checked to see if they have physical
meaning and are readily useable in practice. Once appropriate variables are
selected by whatever means, DA can be applied to determine the DF which best
separates the stable and failed slopes in the data set. The coefficients of the
variables in the DF need to be checked to see if their sign is in accordance with

geotechnical theory. If these checks are satisfactory, the DF can be applied to
slopes in the study area outside the data set in order to classifY them as stable or
potentially unstable. Other types of data, such as historical failure records, can
then be used together with the discriminant scores to assess the relative
likelihood of failure of the potentially unstable slopes, as outlined in Finlay and
Fell (1995) and Fell et al (1996).
5.3.2 Effect of Geology and Geomorphology on Landslide

Incidence
As part of the study to develop methods for landslide risk assessment, the
effect of geomorphology and geology on the probability of landsliding has been
assessed by Professor R. Fell, the author's supervisor. This was done by plotting
the location of about 135 major landslides which occurred over the period
1984-1993 onto map overlays. These were used to determine the terrain
classification (slope gradient and terrain code) and geology from maps. The
slope gradient and terrain code were combined to determine the Geotechnical
Land Use Map (GLUM) classification.
The Geotechnical Area Studies Program GASP Report XII (Styles and
Hansen, 1989), and the GEO's GEOTECS computer database provide data on
the percentage of the area of Hong Kong in each slope gradient, terrain code,
GLUM class and geological unit. They also include data on land use versus slope
gradient and GLUM class. Using this information, Tables 5.10 to 5.14 have been
prepared. Ratios between the percentage of the recorded landslides which fall
into each category have been compared to land area percentages for geology and
terrain unit (NB in Tables 5.10 and 5.11), and to land area percentages under
residential building, business, public buildings or road and rail development for
slope gradient and GLUM class (NC in Tables 5.12 and 5.14). In these tables, if
the landslides were evenly distributed in regard to each classification, NB and
NC = 1. If NB and NC are less than 1.0, landsliding is less likely than on
average, and where it is greater than 1.0, it is more likely. From these tables the
following conclusions are drawn.
5.3.2.1 Geology (Table 5.10)

Landsliding is less likely in alluvium (not surprising, since these areas are
likely to be flat). Sliding is twice as likely in areas underlain by granite, than
volcanics, with debris flow deposits between these. Table B11 in the GASP XII
report gives the following information relating area instability index to rock
types:
Colluvium 0.15-0.19
Volcanics 0.28-0.41
Granite 0.23-0.31
Hence if anything, this would indicate volcanics are more susceptible to sliding
than granite and both more susceptible than colluvium (equivalent to debris
flow deposits). The cut slope ranking system described in Koirala and Watkins
(1988) ranks slope materials in a different decreasing order of susceptibility as
colluvium, thick volcanic soil, thick granitic soil and sound (massive) rock.
These apparent discrepancies can be attributed to the way debris flow
deposits are determined for the geology map. It is understood they are only so
defined when significant thicknesses are present, whereas sliding may be in
colluvium in an area where the colluvium is quite thin.
5.3.2.2 Terrain Code (Table 5.11)

The main differences here relate to cut slopes and fills, which is not in itself
a useful predictor when attempting to refine the assessment of probability of
sliding. There is an indication that footslopes and rock outcrops are somewhat
more likely to experience sliding than sideslopes, and that "generally disturbed
terrain" is more likely to experience landsliding. Overall, however, one would
conclude that the terrain unit alone is not a useful way of discriminating the
probability of individual slopes failing.
5.3.2.3 Slope Gradient (Table 5.12)

The most useful figures here are the A/C values which allow for land use. It
can be seen that:
o slopes on 0-5° gradient are much less likely to experience instability,
o slopes on 5-15° gradient are about average,
o slopes on 15-30° gradient are about twice as likely to experience
instability as the average, and
o slopes on 30-40° gradient are significantly more likely to experience
instability, and those on >40° gradient much more likely.
5.3.2.4 GLUM Classification (Table 5.14)

The Geotechnical Land Use Map (GLUM) classification combines the slope
gradient and terrain code. It is described in detail by Styles and Hansen (1989).
The GLUM class is derived from the Terrain Classification Map (TCM), which
records the general nature of the geological material (in-situ, colluvial,
alluvial), slope angle, terrain component, erosion and instability. The TCM map
is produced by aerial photograph interpretation and field work. The GLUM
classification system is described in Table 5.13, delineates the general level of

geotechnical limitation associated with the terrain at a scale of 1:20,000, and is
designed for non -technical users who require general information relating to
the geotechnical difficulty of the terrain for development planning.
The second part of Table 5.14 shows that there is a significant contrast
between the different GLUM classes when the area is properly corrected for land
use (only counting those areas under housing, business, industrial, public
buildings, roads and railways). It can be seen that slopes in GLUM classes I and
II are about half the average likelihood of failure, those in GLUM class III two to
three times more likely than average, and those in class N around five to six
times the average. It should be noted that the sample on which this analysis is
done is quite small, particularly the number of retaining walls. Overall, there
seems to be some value in using GLUM classification or slope gradient to
differentiate between individual slopes. Because the GLUM class includes slope
gradient, it would be inappropriate to include both in any system to differentiate
the probability of sliding. Since slope gradient is easiest to obtain, and is
probably dominating the GLUM classification, it may be better just to use the
slope gradient.
5.3.3 Review of Major Case Studies

As part of the Hong Kong Landslide Risk Assessment study (Finlay and
Fell, 1995), 32 detailed reports relating to landsliding of cut slopes were
reviewed by Professor R. Fell. These consisted of 21 reports for cuts, eight
reports for fills and retaining walls, and three reports for natural slopes.
Information from the reports was tabulated to see if any insights could be gained
in regard to the factors which contribute to the initiation of sliding, the distance
and speed at which the resulting slide debris travels, and the subsequent
damage and loss of life or injury. Tables 5.15 to 5.20 list the information
obtained, with the slopes categorised into cuts, fills and retaining walls, and
natural slopes.
It will be seen that the landslides in the tables are mostly relatively large,
and not representative of the many hundreds of smaller (less than 50m3)
landslides which occur in Hong Kong from time to time. Hence, one is more
likely to be able to draw conclusions which are relevant to these larger slides. No
attempt was made to consider shear strengths or factors of safety, as this is
beyond the scope of the present study.
Table 5.10 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related to geology. ;2
(1)
~
...,.
:;o (1)...,
Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total
"'-· .'-<
?;"" "r:l
Total B
Geology
No %(A) A/B No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB (%) "'> ::r
"'
......
P>
(1) '<
Alluvium 1 1%
"'"' ~'"d
0.11 0 0% 0.00 1 10% 0.74 0 0% 0.00 1 1% 0.07 13.60% 3 ::r
Debris flow g t1
16 24% 1.63
~~
2 9% 0.60 1 10% 0.69 5 23% 1.58 23 20% 1.41 14.40%
deposits
Volcanics 20 29% 0.75 9 39% 1.00 4 40% 1.02 8 36% 0.93 37 33% 0.83 39.30% S!2CI'J
.g(])'--"
~
Granite 29 43% 1.93 11 48% 2.16 3 30% 1.36 9 41% 1.85 49 43% 1.96 22.10% "'
Other 2 3% 0.28 1 4% 0.41 1 10% 0.94 0 0% 0.00 3 3% 0.25 10.60%
Total 68 100%
~---~
- 23
--···--·-
100%
L _____ -- ---- -----
- -~~
10 ,__100%
-~-
- _L
22 100% - 113 100% - 100%
Notes: A is the percentage of failures in each geology class.

B is the percentage of land in Hong Kong in each geology class.
Table 5.11 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related to terrain unit.
Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total

Code Description Total I
No %(A) A/B No %(A) A/B No %(A) AlB No %(A) A/B No %(A) A/B %B
A Hill crest or ridge 3 6% 1.58 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 3 3% 0.85 3.80% i
B Straight 0 0% 0 0% 1 13% 0 0% 1 1%
Side-
c slope
Concave 7 14% 0.64 4 18% 0.65 2 25% 0.89 5 38% 1.24 18 19% 0.75 55.90%
D Convex 11 22% 4 18% 1 13% 4 31% 20 22%
E Straight 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Foot-
F Concave 5 10% 1.94 1 5% 1.26 2 25% 3.47 1 8% 1.07 9 10% 1.79 7.20%
slope
G Convex 2 4% :___
1
_____
5% 0 0% 0 0% 3 3%
L _ _ _ ___ ~
...
- - -- --- -- ------- ----- ----------- -- --
......
~------------
--~-
~ -~-
... continued Ul
\0
I
Table 5.11 (continued) Hong Kong- Occurrence of landsliding related to terrain unit.
Code Description
Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total Total
,.., "'d
::r
~
:;r:l
..... '-<
"'~
-
~
~
....
.'T1
No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB %B
~ s·
H Drainage plain 6 12% 1.71 1 5% 0.65 0 0% 0.00 1 8% 1.10 8 9% 1.23 7.00% "'-
"' 1:1>
~ ';.<
I Flood plain 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 5.00% a
"' "'d
::r
g 0
K
L
Coastal plain
Littoral zone
0
0
0%
0%
0.00
0.00
0
0
0%
0%
0.00
0.00
0
0
0%
0%
0.00
0.00
0
0
0%
0%
0.00
0.00
0
0
0%
0%
0.00
0.00
0.00%
1.30%
;-a
.....,z
~(I)
M Rock outcrop 1 2% 0.95 3 14% 6.49 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 4 4% 2.05 2.10%. .g
~
~
..__,
Cll
N Straight 8 16% 8 36% 1 13% ·0 0% 17 18% i
0 Cut Concave 0 0% 7.50 0 0% 15.15 0 0% 5.21 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 8.06 2.40%

p Convex 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
R Straight 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%
s Fill Concave 0 0% 8.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 4.30 0.50%
T Convex 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
General disturbed
v terrain
4 8% 16.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 1 8% 15.38 5 5% 10.75 0.50%
w Work cut platform 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0.10%

X Alluvial plain 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 3.50%
z Reclamation 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 1 13% 3.68 1 8% 2.26 2 2% 0.63 3.40%
Other 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 0 0% 0.00 7.30%
Total 50 100% - 22 100% - 8 100% - 13 100% - 93 100% - 100%
Notes: A is the percentage of failures in each terrain unit class.

B is the percentage of land in Hong Kong in each terrain unit class.
......
0\
0
Table 5.12 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landslip related to slope gradient. ;1~
~ 0
:;tj '"1
-·
til •'--<
?;'" 'Tj
Based on total land area (area B). >- s·

til -
til Ill
~ '-<:
Co Gradient Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total Total B
til
til
~
"0
de (degrees} (%} 3 ::r-
No %(A} AlB No %(A} AlB No %(A} AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A} A/B g tJ
1 0-0 3 6% 0.24 1 5% 0.18 1 13% 0.50 1 8% 0.31 6 6% 0.26 24.80% ~~
S!2CI:l
2 5-15 10 20% 1.61 3 14% 1.10 2 25% 2.02 1 8% 0.62 16 17% 1.39 12.40% .g ~
~ '-'
3 15-30 18 36% 1.07 6 27% 0.81 3 38% 1.12 5 38% 1.15 32 34% 1.03 33.50% til
4 30-40 13 26% 1.00 12 55% 2.10 1 13% 0.48 6 46% 1.78 32 34% 1.32 26.00%
5 40-60 4 8% 2.67 0 0% - 1 13% 4.17 0 0% - 5 5% 1.79 3.00%
6 > 60 2 4% 13.33 0 0% - 0 0% - 0 0% - 2 2% 7.17 0.30%
Total 50 100% - 22 100% c __
-
- ---
8 100%
-- --
- --
13
--
100% -
--------- - - - -
93
L___-
100%
--
- 100%
Based on land area under residential, business, public buildings, roads and rail development (area C).
Co Gradient Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total Total C
de (degrees} No %(A) AIC No %(A) AIC No %(A) AIC No %(A) A/C No %(A) A/C (%}
1 0-0 3 6% 0.10 1 5% 0.08 1 13% 0.21 1 8% 0.13 6 6% 0.11 58.30%
2 5-15 10 20% 1.03 3 14% 0.70 2 25% 1.29 1 8% 0.40 16 17% 0.89 19.40%
3 15-30 18 36% 2.13 6 27% 1.61 3 38% 2.22 5 38% 2.28 32 34% 2.04 16.90%
4 30-40 13 26% 5.00 12 55% 10.49 1 13% 2.40 6 46% 8.88 32 34% 6.62 5.20%
5 40-60 4 8% 40.00 0 0% - 1 13% 62.50 0 0% - 5 5% 21.68 0.20%
6 > 60 2 4% 133.33 0 0% - 0 0% - 0 0% - 2 2% 71.68 0.03%
Total
-
50
-----
100%
- ---
-
-----
22 100% - 8 100% - 13 100% - 93 100% - 100%
Notes: A is the percentage of failures in each slope gradient class.

B is the percentage of total land area in each slope gradient class. .......
0\
C is the percentage of land area under residential, business, public buildings, roads and rail development in each slope gradient class. .......
Table 5.13 The GLUM classification system (Hansen and Styles, 1989). o-3 "'tt
::r n>
n> ct
:;d ....
"'-· .......
:>;"'Tj
? s·
Characteristics of GLUM classes Class I Class II Subclass liS Class Ill Class IV "'"'~ -
~
'::"=
sg
"' "'tt
::r
tJ
Geotechnical limitations Low Moderate High Extreme
~~
~(/.)
Suitability for development High Moderate Moderate-low Low Probably unsuitable .gn> ~
'-"
Engineering costs for development Low Normal Normal-+ligh High Very High
"'
Intensity of site investigation required Normal Normal Intensive Very Intensive
Typical terrain characteristics Gentle slopes and in- Flat to moderate Flood plain subject to Steep slopes Combination of char-
situ soils. slopes periodic flooding and acteristics such as
(Some, but not necessarily all of the Colluvial and in-situ
inundation. steep to very steep
stated characteristics will occur in the re- Minor erosion of Colluvial soils show- soils showing evi-
slopes, general insta-
spective class) flatter slopes ing evidence of minor dence of severe ero-
bility on colluvium, se-
erosion. sian.
Undisturbed terrain vere erosion, poor
(minor cut and fill In-situ soils which Poor drainage. drainage, high cut and
only). may be eroded. fill slopes.
Cut and fill slopes of
Reclamation. moderate height.
Rock outcrops.
Poor drainage.
Cut and fill slopes of
low height.
......
0\
N
Table 5.14 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landslip related to GLUM class. >-3 '"C
::r"(1>
(1> .....
(1>
Based on total land area (area B).

-· ......
::0
en
:>;"
'"I
•
'"Tj
:> s·
en-
Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total en ~
GLUM Total B I ~ ';;<
Class (%} en '"C
No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB No %(A) AlB 8 ::r"
g tJ
I 2 4% 0.74 1 5% 0.84 0 0% - 1 8% 1.42 4 4% 0.80 5.4% ..... ,-..._
II 14 28% 0.69 7 32% 0.78 4 50% 1.23 3 23% 0.57 28 30% 0.74 40.7% . . , ez
o
~Vl
Ill 29 58% 2.03 10 45% 1.59 4 50% 1.75 5 38% 1.34 48 52% 1.80 28.6% .g
(1>
~
'-"
en
IV 5 10% 0.54 4 18% 0.98 0 0% - 4 31% 1.65 13 14% 0.75 18.6%
Total 50 100% - 22 100% - 8
L _ _ __ .. _
100%
'---------- L_ _ _
-
-----
13
~------------
100%
-------
-
- - -
93
-----~
100%
L__
- 93.3%
-
Based on land area under residential, business, public buildings, roads and rail development (area C).
GLUM Cuts Fills Retaining walls Natural slopes Total
Total C I
Class No %(A) AIC No %(A) A/C No %(A) A/C No %(A) A/C No %(A) A/C (%}
I 2 4% 0.45 1 5% 0.57 0 0% - 1 8% 0.91 4 4% 0.45 8.8%
II 14 28% 0.46 7 32% 0.53 4 50% 0.82 3 23% 0.38 28 30% 0.49 60.8%
Ill 29 58% 2.75 10 45% 2.13 4 50% 2.37 5 38% 1.80 48 52% 2.46 21.1%
IV 5 10% 3.85 4 18% 6.90 0 0% - 4 31% 11.90 13 14% 5.38 2.6%
Total 50 100% - 22 100% - 8 100% - 13 100% - 93 100% - 93.3%
Notes: A is the percentage of failures in each slope gradient class.

B is the percentage of total land area in each slope gradient class.
C is the percentage of land area under residential, business, public buildings, roads and rail development in each slope gradient class.
.......
0\
w
Table 5.15 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - factors causing land sliding for cut slopes. ;a
(1)
~
(t
::0 .,
...... ......
(ll •
X' 'Tl
Landslide
;;;- [
Time of (ll r->
Sliding Construction Catchment Geology Surface (1) :.<
Report No. Groundwater Ob-
(ll
Cover Previous Other Contribu- (ll
'i:l
Name Date Year constructed servation Joint Con- Over Cut Sliding tory Factors s ::r
Time Year modified Lgth(m) Cover Rock Weathering troi Slope
(1)
....
~ tl
,......._
Registered slope number
0 c:::
1925 Volcanic '""Z
SPR16/92 18.6.72 No detailed data Road Bitumen and Tempo- 1971,72 Construction ~Vl
1963, 71-72 0
Po Shan Rd 2050 under construe- Pipes in colluvium ~200m Natural 5m-10m
IV,V Some rary plas-
tic Several Excavation "d
(1)..._,
:E
tion colluvium (ll
Significant
SPR2/83
29.5.82 1950 pressure. Natural and Volcanic Closely jointed,
Chai Wan Rd 30m construction and 6m col- IV Minor Chunam None occasional kaolin
0300 1961 Natural pipes in site luvium
11-SED/C26 in fill
colluvium
Squatter
SPR3/83 31.5.82 1964 Rose 4m on day area 2.5m VI over
40m Granite Significant Chunam None Kaolin filled joints
Junk Bay Rd 1300 None of failure (high in- V,IV
filtration)
SPR4/83 30.5.82
Pre
Chung Hom Kok Rd Before None evident Nil Natural Granite Vover IV Min~r None None Microfracturing
1949
15NE-C/77 evening
SPR5/83 29.5.82
South Bay 1982 None
and Springs at base Major
80m Natural Volcanic under None (1964 Existing slide
Close Under construe- IV and V
17.8.82 of pre-existing slide (shear) construe- adjacent) (called thrust fault)
tion
15NE-A/CR10 tion
0705
-
SPR6/83
29.5.82 1976 Sedage 7m above Dyke, sub-parallel
roa (perched) 150m Natural Granite IV and V Significant Chunam None
Tuen Mun Highway to slope
SPR9/83 V plus
May Perched and Granite Major
1982 1979 50m Natural core- Grass None Possible old slide
Tsing Yi(1) base vary with rain (altered) (photo)
stones
SPR10/83 August Late 1960s
Positive measured. Highly micro-frac-
1973,74? In via colluvium 300m Natural Granite IV Major Chunam 1973,75,76
Tsing Yi(2) 1982 tured
1977,78
......
... continued 0\
+:>.
Table 5.15 (continued) Review of Hong Kong major case studies- factors causing landsliding for cut slopes. 9~
C1> (t
::0 ....
Landslide
Report No.
Time of
Sliding
Construction Catchment Geology Surface "':;>;" '-<
.....
.'Tj
Groundwater Ob- Cover Previous Other Contribu-
Year constructed tory Factors
Name Date servation Joint Con- Over Cut Sliding
Year modified Lgth(m) Cover Rock Weathering
Registered slope number Time trol Slope '
"'
~ §.:
PJ
':;<
24.8.82 5 days after rain, sg

"' 'i;j
~
0
SPR11/83 1963-1972 Se~age after failure ground-water
0600 ?Om Natural Granite IV Minor Chunam 1972173 ..-+ ,......_
Ching Cheung Rd
approx
197213 on yke eonded on dykes.
ooks like old slide
0 c
.....,z
~(I)
SPR2/84
Sept.
1983 1974 High piezometric Volcanics Minor (top-
Chunam
lower
1975 during
construction Remobilisation of
.g ~
600m Natural v (!>'---'
Tuen Mun Highway pre 1976 pressures measured /Granite piing) Grass (steeper
slope)
construction failure "'
23.9.83 upper
12-13/10/
SPR3/84 83 1963 Seepage at base of Significant Chunam/ 1964,1967,19 Shear zones pres-
colluvium. Catch- >100m Natural Volcanic Vto II to minor concrete 68, pre 1979 ent
Tin Wan Hill Rd to 1967,79 water may contribute
18.10.83
APR19/87 1986 Volcanic, Major Grass soil,
Assumed high at fail- 1986 May,
Tsuen Wan Service Res- 12.8.86 Under construe- ure
300m Natural 2-3m v (relic under con-
June, July
Relic jointing
ervoir tion colluvium joints) struction
SPR3/88 Downpipe broken

30.7.87 Building/
Cho Yiu Estate 197&-78 Perched Nil Granite V to IV? Major Chunam None supplying surface
0210 road water
11NW-AIC140
SPR4/88 26.6.86 Sedimen- Major(?) 1974,78, Mudstone in silt-

1973 Not observed (low?) 20m Natural tary V,VI (bedding) Chunam stone, sandstone
Wu Kau Tang 10.8.86 84,87
31.8.88
SPR4/89 800
1924 Seepage~ 1m below 1967,72,88 Hydrothermal al-
Island Rd School 1145 1949, 1952 surface 30m ? Volcanics v Major(?) ?
28.6.88 upper !oration, rolic joints
11 SW-D/CR52 main
slide
SPR6/91
28.1.91 1963 Blast induced, on
Shau Kei Wan Dry Not relevant Granite 11,111 Major None None joint shear
1317 1987,88 upslope
Old quarry
... continued
.......
0\
VI
Table 5.15 (continued) Review of Hong Kong major case studies- factors causing landsliding for cut slopes. ;2~
~ ~
Landslide llme of Catchment Geology
:;a ....
Construction Surface
Report No. Sliding -·
~ '--<
Groundwater Ob- Cover Previous Other Contribu- P';">-rj
Year constructed tory Factors
~ ~
Name Date servation Joint Con- Over Cut Sliding
Year modified Lgth(m) Cover Rock Weathering trol Slope ~ Pl
Registered slope number Time
~
~
':<
~
SPR3/93 1949 before '"d
3m-9m above rock constructed 8 ::r
~
Siu Sai Wan Estate 1989
(air photos Could be re-ac- ~ Cl
16.4.92 (assumed 2m for 150m Natural Volcanics Vand IV Minor Chunam tivation of old slide ...... ,--...
11 SE-D/C 182 and 11 SE- 1991 design) hummocky) 0 c::::
D/C183 1989 natural
,..., z
~Cil
HA019
Colluvium
0
"0 ~
~ '-"
(FHB Consultants) 16.6.93 /CW vot- ~
Siu Sai Wan Estate 1400

1987 Perched water table 35m Natural Volcanic v canics Chunam None Drains blocked
11 SE-D/SSW2 interface
ADR10/93 1924 No. Only

16.6.93 None described. Granodio- Over-
Cheung Shan Estate 1976, 1982 (Chu- 50m Natural rite and 1m Not available colluvium grown None Loose colluvium
1225 Surface infiltration
7SW-C/C128 nam) colluvium slide vegetation
SPR15/93
27.9.93 1963F33 Nil. Possible seep- Chunam None. Earlier stu~ in
Cornwall St age from 1983 said actor
10m Natural Granite V,IV Some (some Some signs
11 NW-BIC 146 and 0430 1967-73 C146 of Safety too low
old water course cracking) of movement
11NW-BIF33
ADR5/94 250m None. Old Catchwater had
27.9.93 1976-78 Seepage noted in Significant
Allway Gardens 20m to tension cracks in it which
1986,87 Natural Volcanic VI,V? (relic Chunam may have given
0545 1984 (Chunam) catch- joints) cracks found
6SE-D/CR87 water after slide base ground water
-~---
L _ _ ____ --- ------ -- - - ----------
.._.
0\
0\
Table 5.16 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - factors causing landsliding for fill slopes and retaining walls. ~ ~
~ ct
~ ....,
..... ~
Landslide Time of Slid- Year Constructed Catchment Geology Surface

Previ-
"'
;.;- 'T1
Report Name lng Initial

Groundwater Cover
ous
Other Contribu- ~ [
Observation We a- Over Fill tory Factors "' PJ
Date, lime Lgth(m) Cover Rock Fill Sliding ~ ::<
Registered Number Modification thering Slope
Interim Re- s"'"' '"0
::r
port 18.6.72 1964 Turf, stone ~
::l tJ
Sau Mau Ping 1972
Surface infiltra-
Road
Bitu-
Granite
Decomposed
hitching None Loose fill ..... ,......_
Commis- 1310 1965--68 tion men granite
ower 0 c:::
......,'Z
sian Inquiry
~Cil
Binnie and
Partners
Sau Mau Ping 1976 25.8.76 1963--64 Surface infiltra- Road Bitu-
Granite
Decomposed
Turf None Loose fill
.g
~
~
..._.,
SMP6 1012 1965 tion Market men granite
Dec 1976 "'
Pre 1939 Water level in
Bitu- Decomposed Natural on
SPR7/83 Dragon Beach 29.5.82 Pond opposite pre pond over road Road Granite None Loose fill
men granite fill
1954 rose significantly
Not described. Vol- Inflow into small
Peak Rd, opposite No. 17.6.83 canic None. ~it initiated slide,
1875-95 Broken sewer, Bitu- Decomposed Natural on
RC049230 40 Road and IVtoV 1966 ad- rake pipes. Ru-
0750(1)0810(2 water pipes men volcanics fill
1945,49, 1966 collu- jacent noff from road
11SW-D/FR133 ) caused debris
flow vium contributed
1867
Square St retaining Borehole (wash
6.9.85 1966--69, Bitu- Decomposed Rubble re-
SPR3/86 wall boring) just Road Granite V,VI None
1840 men granite taining wall
Not registered 1981 redevelop- drilled
ment begun
Not stated, pre None
Peak Rd retaining (identi-
wall/fill 1949 Bitu- Vol- Natural on Access track cut
SPR3/90 29.7.89 Not available Road Ill Volcanics? lied for just before failure
1989 under re- men canics fill
11SW-D/F33 remedial
medial work work)
SPRB/92 Runoff over top

Baguio Villas fill/retain- Paved/ of wall eroded
8.5.92 Pre 1924 (1880?) Vol- Not
and ing wall None given 20m un- Volcanics? None front of wall and
1400 to 1510 1988-92 canics given
APR26/92 Not registered paved pressurised rear
of wall
Kennedy Rd 1930--49 Not discussed. Roofs,

8.5.92 Decomposed Natural on
ADR27/92 Surface infiltra- 20m? play- Granite ? None Loose fill
11 SW-D/CR403 0810 1967--68 granite fill
~on____ ground
---~~-- ------- L.___ _ _ ----- . - -- ------ ---- '--------- L _ _ _ _
.....
0\
-..!
Table 5.17 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - factors causing landsliding for natural slopes. >-3 ~
::r ....
C1> C1>
:;d ...,
...........
Report
No. Landslide
Time of Sliding
Date Modification Groundwater
Observation
Catchment Geology
Previous Slid-
ing
Other Contributory Fac-
tors
,e:
"'
.
"'X"'Tj
~ ':;<
llJ
lime Lgth(m) Cover Rock Weathering
8"' ::r
"1:1
TN4/91 Tsing Shan

11.9.90 Footpath constructed in Springs noted
350m Natural Granite ill None
Small footpath could have g
.... tl
,---....
1989 and soil pipes initiated sliding
. . . cz
0230 to 0300
0
Cheung Chan Granite V Granite
ADR13/91 Service Reser- 8.6.90
Service Reservoir over-
None 5m and vol-
Rinse water from reservoir ~Cil
? None
voir
flow?
canics IV Volcanics discharged onto slope .g
(1>....__,
~
DSR3/92
Pak lin Pa Sau
19.2.92 - None available 40m Natural Granite?
II?
None recorded No apparent major trigger
"'
Tsuen (boulder)
·--------- --------· ------ -· '-····· ~--------------·-
Table 5.18 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - runout, damage and loss of life from cut slopes.
Run Out Details Nature of Runout Material Damage and Loss of Life
Report No. Vol- Distance Velocity of
ume Slope of Elements Loss of Comments
Landslide Name from toe Maximum Movement Occu- Damage to Prop-
ml of slide runout Depth (m) Classification Fluidity Life and
area at Risk pancy erty
(m) Injuries
15 storey Occupied Total destruct-ion 67 dead

SPR16/92 40,00 ~100 14° av Not Colluvium. class Medium to building Not occu- 15 storey building, (a) (a) includes 19 of
0 known Rapid V,IV volcanics high pied? house, part dam- asphyxia
Po Shan Rd +100 21° av House 19 in-
age to unoccupied
2 roads Not occu- jured
pied? building
I
31anes road I
SPR2/83 blocked. Some
~1000 ~22 0°-10° 6 N/A Colluvium. volcanics N/A 4 lane road N/A None
Chai Wan Rd construction
equipment buried I
SPR3/83 N/A, Road blocked,
oo Road, mini closed 4 months. None
1300 ~25 "'10 N/A Class V,VI granite N/A
Junk Bay Rd bus bus empty Bus destroyed I ......
----- ~-- ----
0\
... continued 00
"'0
9 {1)
......
Table 5.18 (continued) Review of Hong Kong major case studies- runout, damage and loss of life from cut slopes. {1) {1)
....
Run Out Details Nature of Runout Material Damage and Loss of Life ~
(/) ~
Report No. Vol-
ume Distance Slope of
Velocity of
Elements Loss of Comments
;>;"
::n
'
Maximum Occu- Damage to Proper- ::l
Landslide Name mJ from toe of runout Movement Classification Fluidity Life and
~
Depth (m) at Risk pancy ty (/)
slide (m) area Injuries {1)
(/)
(/)
"'0
SPR4/83
70 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Class IV and V gran-
ite N/A
Road (low
volume) N/A None None a ;:r
Chung Hom Kok Rd {1)
::l 0
...... /""-.
SPRS/83
3800 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Class V and IV vol-
N/A
Construction Works not
None None
Loss of life could
have been much . ,., cz
0
South Bay Close canics site yet on site worse if slide oc- ~C/1
0
curred later in day "0
{1)
_§
SPR6/83
~soo 20 oo N/A N/A Granite IV and V N/A
4 lane high-
N/A None None "'
Tuen Mun Highway way
SPR9/83 ~10,0 Road (low

1 N/A N/A Very slow Class V granite Very low N/A None None Did not flow
Tsing Yi(1) 00 volume)
SPR10/83 N/A (slide Only minor rockfall

~1500 1 N/A Very slow Class IV granite Very low Road N/A None Did not flow
Tsing Yi(2) max 4m) to road
SPR11/83 Low (dry, 4 lanes blocked,

N/A (could 4 lane high-
~2500 ~25 ~oo N/A Class IV granite did not N/A road closed for 2 None
Ching Cheung Rd be 10m) way
flow) months
SPR2/84 Volcanics and gran-

~60,0 ite, 4 houses de-
2 N/A N/A Very slow Very low ~6 houses Occupied None
Tuen Mun Highway 00 stroyed
class V
SPR3/84 14,00
0
6-10 oo Not known Not known N/A (some boulders) N/A Road N/A Road partly closed None
Tin Wan Hill Rd
APR19/87 Reservoir
oo Work-
Tsuen Wan Service 1500 ~3 ~1-2 Slow? Volcanics class V Low under con- None None Did not flow
men?
Reservoir struction
SPR3/88
12 upper
road
oo 5
Rapid
Two roads Roads blocked. Fortunate building
("sudden", Granite class V, foundations did not
1200 30°-50° Medium? below. Block Not known Flats evacuated None
Cho Yiu Estate 50 to <1 "large boulders
, 40° av flats upslope temporarily collapse
lower road noise")
SPR4/88 Road Minor

1600 3 0 1.5 Slow Soil, boulders Very low (minor) traffic Nil None
Wu Kau Tang -------·- ·---
... continued
.....
0\
'-0
Table 5.18 (continued) Review of Hong Kong major case studies- runout, damage and loss of life from cut slopes. ;
(1>
~
ft
Run Out Details Nature of Runout Material Damage and Loss of Life :;d ....
Report No. Vol· Distance
Slope of Velocity of Loss of
"'......
?i"'"I'j
......
.
ume from toe Maximum Elements Occu- Damage to Prop- Comments
landslide Name ma of slide
runout
area
Depth (m)
Movement Classification Fluidity
at Risk pancy erty
Life and
Injuries
~ [
(m) "' 1>0
~ '.:::
SPR4/89
800 30 oo Not
Rapid Class V volcanics Medium
School Not occu-
Screen wall,
windows dam- None
Slide occurred 1
day before school
s"'g '"C
P"'
t)
Island Road School known building pied
Not
aged term started
;-c
... z
SPR6/91 6 container One Offices located at ~C/)
known
2000 35 oo =5 Rapid Boulders, rock Low offices Offices, vehicles
damaged
slightly toe of rock fall run- 0 ~
Shau Kei Wan
4 vehicles Some oc-
cupied
injured out "g'-'
Slow rate may re-
"'
SPR3/93 2 (did not Slow, inter- Housing N/A (work late to remob11isa-
=7000 flow) NIA N/A mitten! with Class V,IV volcanics Very low block under
continued) None None lion of old slide,
Siu Sai Wan Estate rainfall construction
and local geology
HA019 30°
(FHB Consultants) (50m) Boulders, cobbles in Medium? Drain water in-
500 85 ? N/A Street N/A None reported None creases fluidity
soil matrix to High?
Siu Sai Wan Estate 50°
ADR10/93
30 50° Soil, rock, concrete Bus shelter, Bus trav- Bus shelter demo!- 1 dead Shelter at base of
35 2 Rapid Medium?
Cheung Shan Es-
tate +7 oo channel bus ellers ished bus? 5 injured steep slope
Road Road at top. Some injuries/ loss

5 3 Soil, boulders
SPR15/93 slot Rapid sur- Medium Temporary N/A Footpath lost Nil of life possible if
Cornwall St
2600 +40 oo 0.15 ~es over 2
ours
Soil
High?
housrnJ
cleare for 2 Nil Lane closed Nil
not cleared. Had
taken 10 years to
+170 so 2
months clear
Occu- Flats halfway
ADR5/94 200--2 32 42° Rapid (loud N/A pied? 3--5m 3 into bed-
3 Soil and rock Flats, road None down slope on
Allway Gardens 50 +15 oo noise) (Med?) (0545 rooms two flats
side
··-------- .. ~
L__ _________ - ~
Jime)
......
-....)
0
Table 5.19 Review of Hong Kong major case studies - run out, damage and loss of life from fill slopes and retaining walls.
.....:j '"C
::r
0
0
.....
0
~ ....
-· '-<
(Jl•
:>;" 'Tj
Run Out Details Nature of Runout Material Damage and Loss of Life >- ::r
(Jl-
(JlP>
Report No. Distance Slope Maxi- Velocity of 0 '-<!
Volume m3 Elements Occu- Damage to Prop- Loss of Comments (Jl "
from toe of run- mum
Landslide Name
of slide out Depth
Movement Classification Fluidity
at Risk pancy erty
Life and
Injuries
a ;'"C. ;·
(Jl
(m) area (m) g tJ

Interim Report
Commission of In-
oo +
2m Huts at 394 reg-
71
deaths
ze
. . ., z
90 Decomposed base (with- Total destruct-ion (a) (a) 66 of 71 deaths ~\/)
~11000 drop istered
quiry
+150
3° to
~2-3 Rapid granite Very in 50m of residents
huts
60 in-
included asphyxia .gO'--'
~
Sau Mau Ping fill)
1972 SE jured (/)
(1) Described as
18 same as child slid-
Binnie and dead
Partners Dec 1976 3-4 (1.5 Decomposed Medium- Multistoref Damage to lower ing on play-
22m to oo Medium residentia
~2000 min cot- Occupied 24 seri- ground slide
Sau Mau Ping building fast (1) granite high (2) floor
fee shop) building ously
1976 injured (2) Water did not
flow from it
Road at top
SPR7/83 First aid
~700 1 N/A N/A Very slow Granitic fill Very low N/A None None Did not flow
Dragon Beach building
Toilets
RC049230 110 32° Depletion Minor? Runout affected by

Volcanics class V Taxi and Taxi slid down-
Accu- Road injuries surface runoff from
Peak Rd, opposite ~7000 +70 22 Rapid Very high 3 persons slope, one lane
mulation (soil, cobbles) (main) only (no road flowing over
No. 40 in it road lost
+120 13° up to 2m death) slide area
SPR3/86 None
,.s oo (building None (ev- Some signs of failure
SquareSt 250? ~5 Rapid Rubble wall, soil Medium None
under reno- acuated) None preceded collapse
retaining wall vation)
SPR3/90 Not Cracks to road,
Road, re- known wall, half-lane
Peak Rd 500 -=0.1 N/A ~2 Very slow Volcanic fill Very low taining wall Nil Did not flow
(main blocked
Retaining wall/fill road)
Block of
SPR8/92 and 1000 200 33° av- 2-3m on Volcanic fill, collu- flats at side
APR20/92 Main slide Podium slab col- Early slides had not
(preceded by erage podium vium on Very high halfway N/A lapsed, some 2 dead
20 (photo very rapid down, and flowed
Baguio Villas fill/re-
taining wall
250, 45°) plus
1500 from gully Podium oo estimate) slope block at damage to flats
bottom ,.....
... continued ,.....
-.I
5.3.3.1 Discussion of Factors Causing Landslides

The following points can be made for the slopes studied:
o Most of the landslides can be related to periods of high intensity
rainfall, particularly over 15 minutes, 1 hour and 24 hours. However,
delayed failures can occur (eg. SPR11/83, Ching Cheung Rd, which
occurred 5 days after heavy rain.
o Construction activity is relevant to a number of slides, giving some
indication that there is an increased chance of sliding during
construction.
o Groundwater is usually present in cut slope failures. Significant rises
in piezometric pressures have been observed over short periods.
Natural "pipes" in colluvium, and groundwater feeding from old
colluvium into cuts are important in some cases.
o Fill slopes become saturated mainly by surface infiltration,
sometimes exacerbated by diversion of water onto the slope from
surface drains.
o Most of the cut slope cases had natural vegetation (trees, grass) on the
area upslope. This seems to indicate that this promotes infiltration
and sliding (and may be considered a factor contributing to higher
risk).
o Volcanic and granitic rocks seem to be almost equally represented
overall, with slightly more volcanics than granite for cuts, and the
opposite for fills. The natural slope failures (only 3) were in granite.
o In both cases, the sliding was generally in class IV and V (sometimes
VI) weathering, ie. highly to completely weathered, sometimes
residual soil (and colluvium).
o Adversely oriented joints, often relic joints, had some influence on
almost all cut slope failures. In more than half of these, jointing was
the major contributing cause. In a number of cases microfracturing
and/or the presence of kaolin filled joints was noted. Unfortunately
the presence or absence of such joints is difficult to determine,
particularly where a slope is covered by chunam or concrete.
o About half the cut slopes had a previous history of sliding. (This is
probably biased compared to the overall population of slopes, because
the method of selection of slopes for detailed study probably included
whether the slopes had failed repeatedly).
o On the other hand, none of the fill slopes and retaining walls, or
natural slopes had exhibited failure before.
o Loose fill was a common feature of fill and retaining wall failure.
o The case of boulder sliding (DSR3/92, Pak Tin Pa Sau Tsuen) did not
appear to have a significant "trigger" rainfall.
5.3.3.2 Discussion of Runout, Damage and Loss of Life
The following points can be made:

o There is no pattern to the time of sliding, ie. during any day. There
have been a number of cases where small changes in the time of
sliding could have led to greater loss of life, eg. SPR4/89, Island Rd
School.
o A number of slides have flowed over steep slopes before stopping on
flatter slopes below. This can provide a useful guide to the critical
slope. The cases are shown in Table 5.21.
o From this, it would appear that for slopes greater than around 35°,
the slide material will continue to flow until it reaches a flatter area.
For large slides, and slides with a large water runoff into the slide, the
slide material will continue to flow over flatter slopes (eg. about
20°-22°). Accumulation/deposition is likely to always occur when
slopes are flatter than about 14°.
o Sliding is often rapid, particularly for fill slopes, retaining walls and
natural slopes. A relatively high number of the cut slopes studied
were sliding slowly and did not flow, but this is not typical. There
were a number of cases where the sliding was so rapid as to be
accompanied by a loud noise.
o The slide material was often fluid, even if not very wet. This is
constant with a collapse mechanism, particularly for the (loose
saturated) fills.
o There is insufficient data to draw general conclusions on damage.
One needs to be aware that major buildings can collapse totally with
slide debris piling against the building (as in Po Shan), and that it will
flow into multistorey buildings (as in Sau Mau Ping and Baguio
Villas).
o Even small slides can cause deaths, eg. ADR27/92, Kennedy Rd,
50m3 , and ADR0/93, Cheung Shan Estate, 35m 3 .
o A high proportion of those who are casualties in sliding die (71/131
SauMauPing 1972; 18/42 SauMauPing1976; 67/86 Po Shan). Many
of these deaths are from asphyxiation.
o There was often some warning by smaller slides of large landsliding
leading to the major deaths, eg. Po Shan, Baguio Villas. On the other
hand, there was no warning of the large fill failures at Sau Mau Ping
in 1972, 1976.
o The large slide in natural slopes at Tsing Shan (TN4/91), as well as
those more recently on Lantau Island, are a warning that large, rapid
(and, hence, dangerous to life and property) slides can be expected of
the steep natural slopes in the colony. These slides will often flow
large distances onto flatter land below.
Table 5.21 Summary of Hong Kong major case study flow distances and slopes.
Report No. Slide Volume Slope Over Which Flow

m3 Occurred/Distance
Cut Slopes
SPR16/92 40,000 14°/110m

21°/110m
SPR3/88 1200 0°/12m
30°-50°/SOml. 3
HA019 500 30°/SOm
50°/35m 1
ADR5/94 200-250 42°/32m 1
Fill Slopes
RC049230 7000 32°/11 Om 1· 2
22°/70m 1· 2
13°/200m2
SPRS/92 1000 33°1200m
ADR27/92 500 42°/25 1
Natural Slopes
TN4/91 22,000 36°/340m1

22°/220m 1
14°/375m
4°/100m
ADR13/91 700 30°/90m 1
26°/30m
Notes:
1 Little deposit or depletion occurred
2 Surface water contributed a lot to fluidity of slide material
3 Significant accumulation on the 30° slope
5.3.4 Stage 1 Reports and the Ranking System

The stage 1 report outcomes form an indirect basis for assessing whether
the system for ranking cut slopes and retaining walls devised jointly by Binnie
and Partners and the GCO in 1979 (Koirala and Watkins, 1988; Irfan, 1988)
would assist in identifying slopes which are more or less likely to fail and the
risk. To assess this, between 20 and 30 stage 1 reports from each of1985, 86,87
and 88 were read (scanned) and from the description in the report, and plans and
photographs in the report, an assessment was made of the report's conclusion on
probability of failure, and vulnerability by Professor R. Fell. Each was assigned
high, medium or low (some were assigned intermediate values). Also recorded
was the slope rank, the year of construction of the cut or retaining wall, whether
there was recorded evidence of instability, and the recommended outcome of the
report. The results are presented in Table 5.22. Also shown are two calculations
of risk. The first is calculated by assessing risk as probability times vulnerability
(P X V), where high, medium and low probability and vulnerability are assigned
values of 3, 2, and 1 respectively. This definition is consistent with that used for
this study. The second is based on P + V, which is consistent with the approach
used for the ranking scheme.
Table 5.22 Hong Kong stage 1 report data 1985-88.
1985
Rank p v Year built Evidence of Out- PxV P+V
(19XX) instability come
56 h hr 63 ? 2m 9 6
113 h hm 56 e 2d 7.5 5.5
96 ? (h) h 63 ? nr 9 6
163 m lm 67 ? 2 3 3
105 I mh 49/80 ? r 2.5 3.5
67 I mh 63 ? 2 2.5 3.5
143 h mh 45 72/73 2d 7.5 5.5
160 I m 63 ? n 2 3
197 m l(mh) 64/76 ? n 5 4.5
151 I h 67 ? n 3 4
118 mh h 63 ? 2 7.5 5.5
100 m h 63 ? 2d 6 5
269 I m 49/70 ? m 2 3
58 mh hr 62 ? 2 7.5 5.5
247 h hr 77 ? 2m 9 6
39 h mh 62/76 ? 2 7.5 5.5
230 I h 62 e n 3 4
253 h hr 64 me 2 9 6
280 h hr 67 82 2m 9 6
... contmued
Table 5.22 (continued) Hong Kong stage 1 report data 1985-88.

Rank p v Year built Evidence of Out- PxV P+V
(19XX) instability come
15 h hr 62 81 2 9 6
258 h hr 24 me 2 9 6
245 h h 69 70 2 9 6
250 I h 71 ? n 3 4
120 I mh 54 e1985 2 2.5 3.5
344 I m 64 me n 2 3
227 h hr 73 76 2 9 6
231 I h 76 ? n 3 4
218 I h 72 63/67 n 3 4
257 h h 63 e 2 9 6
1986
44 h hr 62 70 2m 9 6
294 I lr 60 ? n 1 2
286 h hr(m) 64 66 2 6 5
272 I m(hm) 69 ? n 2.5 3.5
182 I lm 76 ? n 1.5 2.5
183 m hm 45 ? 2 5 4.5
154 I lr(m) 60 ? nr 1.5 2.5
256 h h 45 e 2d 9 6
157 h h 63 63 2 9 6
296 h hr 49 e 2m 9 6
187 I h 45 ? n 3 4
199 lm h 63 ? 2r 4.5 4.5
343 hm hm 64 ? n 6 5
271 h hr 72 72 2m 9 6
114 h hr 45/78 72 2 9 6
139 h hr 46/45 82 2 9 6
312 h hr 63 e 2d 9 6
301 I mh 74 ? n 2.5 3.5
328 I h 50 em n 3 4
176 h hr 47 49/83 2 9 6
136 h hr 47 ? 2 9 6
366 I lm 64 ? n 1.5 2.5
330 I mh 66 ? n 2.5 3.5
363 h hr 63/54 ? 2d 9 6
336 l{h) h 63 e 2 9 6
91 I mh 42 ? n 1 2.5
141 h mh 66 e 2 7.5 5.5
332 I mh 63 ? n 2.5 3.5
1987
730 I lm 56 ? n 1.5 2.5
513 h h 24 me 2m 9 6
545 h hr 61 72 g 9 6
531 I h 45 ? n 3 4
... contmued

p v Year built Evidence of Out- PxV P+V
Rank (19XX) instability come
610 I m 24 ? n 2 3
509 I m 57 ? n 2 3
603 I mh 76 ? n 2.5 3.5
702 I lm 78 ? n 1.5 2.5
529 I lm 78 ? n 1.5 2.5
600 lm lr 60 70 n 1.5 2.5
553 lm h 70 ? n 4.5 4.5
612 I m 45 ? n 2 3
601 h hr(mh) 64 e g 7.5 5.5
599 h hr(mh) 64 e1985 g 7.5 5.5
657 I m 69 74 nr 2 3
604 h lr 64 e/me n 3 4
693 I m 24 me n 2 3
639 I lm 54 ? n 1.5 2.5
682 mh mhr(m) 63 ? 2 5 4.5
629 I mh 40 ? n 2.5 3.5
740 I h 58 ? n 3 4
691 l(m) mh 59 ? n 5 4.5
607 h hr 45 ? 2 9 6
408 h mh 59 ? 2 7.5 5
589 h hr 73 86 2 9 6
652 h hr 32 me 2 9 6
689 I lm 61 me n 1.5 2.5
1298 I mh 39 ? n 2.5 3.5
688 h hr 63 ? n 9 6
835 lm lr(m) 63 ? 2 3 3.5
904 lm mh 49 93 n 4 4
653 h hr 45 81 n 9 6
709 h hr 71 ? 2 9 6
3443 h hr 72 72 n 9 6
645 I h 53 76 2 3 4
679 I h 53 76 2m 3 4
660 I h 53 76 n 3 4
686 I m 57 85 n 2 3
1988
881 I hr 45/63 ? n 3 4
918 h hr 40/60 e g 9 6
889 I h 45 ? n 3 4
938 h m 45/71 e g 6 5
1149 I h 67 ? n 3 4
1049 I I 61 ? n 1 2
1818 ml m 74/79 ? n 3 3.5
1052 m hr 63 e n 6 5
916 h mh 45/61 e1985 2 7.5 5.5
... contmued

p v Year built Evidence of Out- P+V
Rank (19XX) Instability come PxV
951 I h 75/76 ? g 3 4
5 ? ? 75176 ? n
726 I m 59 ? n 2 3
819 m hr 45 E 2 6 5
875 h h 45 e 2 9 6
1048 ml ml 45 ? n 2 3
1066 mh m 64 e 2 5 4.5
981 m lr 63 57/me n 2 3
1143 h hr 68/73 me 2 9 6
927 I lm 24 me n 1.5 2.5
905 h lm 24 e 2 4.5 4.5
999 I lr 45 ? n 1 2
807 I lr 45 ? n 1 2
1344 I lr 69/88 73 n 1 2
1482 h mh 84/73 e1985/73 gm 7.5 5.5
1035 m hr 63 ? 2 6 5
868 I m 72 ? n 2 3
984 mh hr 56 e gm 7.5 5.5
988 I m 72 72 n 2 3
1068 h h 45 me 2 9 6
1115 h hr 73 e/63 gm 9 6
1098 I lm 78 ? n 1.5 2.5
913 I I 45 ? n 1 2
945 I lm 79 e n 1.5 2.5
1045 I lm 24 ? n 1.5 2.5
1113 I hm 78 ? n 2.5 3.5
1127 I m 64 ? n 2 3
1192 hm mh 68/79 ? 2 6 5
1521 I h 63 ? n 3 4
LEGEND:
Probability h=high (3) Outcome 2=Stage 2 report
and m=medium (2) requested
Vulnerability l=low (1) m=LPM
r=remediated
Evidence e=evidence of instability noted
d=D-Notice
of 72173=instability in 1972/73
n=no further study
Instability me=minor evidence of instability
?=no evidence of instability noted g=GCO action
To see whether vulnerability, or either (or both) of the two risk definitions
were a good predictor of recommended outcome Table 5.23 was prepared. One
would expect that for a good predictor, most, if not all the no further action (n)
entries should have low values. It can be seen by scanning the results that
vulnerability alone does not do this.
Table 5.23 Summary of Hong Kong stage 1 report outcomes 1985-88.
Outcome Outcome
n I 2 d m g r n I 2 d m g r
1985 1987
Vulnerability Vulnerability
H (3) 6 8 3 H (3) 7 5 0 2 1 0
MH (2.5 1 3 2 1 Mh (2.5) 5 1 2
M (2) 2 M (2) 6 2
LM (1.5 LM (1.5) 5
L (1) L (1) 2
Risk (P X V) Risk (P X V)
H (:?!:8) 6 3 H (:?!:8) 3 4 1
MH (6-7.5) 3 3 MH (6-7.5) 1 2
M (4-5.5 1 M (4-5.5) 3 1
LM (2-3.5) 7 3 LM (2-3.5 13 2
L (<2) L (<2) 6
Risk (P+ V) Risk (P + V)
H (:<!:5) 9 3 3 H (:?!:5) 3 5 3
MH (:?!:4) 5 H (:?!:4 7 2
M (:?!:3) 3 3 M (:?!:3) 8
LM (:<!:2) LM (:?!: 2) 6
L (<2) L (<2)
1986 1988
Vulnerability Vulnerability
H (3) 2 7 3 3 H (3) 5 5 2 2
MH (2.5) 6 2 MH (2.5) 1 2
M (2) 1 M (2) 5 1
LM (1.5) 2 LM (1.5) I5
L (1) 1 L (1) 6
Risk (P X V) Risk (P X V)
H (:?!:8) 6 3 3 H (:<!:8) 3 1 1
MH (6-7.5) 2 MH (6-7.5) 1 4 2
M (4-5.5) 2 M (4-5.5) 2
LM (2-3.5) 7 LM (2-3.5) 11 1
L (<2) 4 L (<2) 8
Risk (P+ V) Risk (P + V)
H (:?!:5) 8 3 3 H (:?!:5) 1 7 5
MH (:?!:4) 1 2 H (:?!:4 4 2
M (:?!:3) 5 LM (:?!:2) 9
LM (:?!:2) 5 L (<2)
L (<2)
LEGEND:
2=Stage 2 report n=no further study
requested g=GCO action
m=LPM
r=remediated
d=D-Notice
To assess whether either of the definitions of risk are good predictors,

cutoff values of 4 for P x V, and 3 and 4 for P + V were considered. The results
are shown in Table 5.24. It will be seen that risk as defined by the author (P X V)
gives a good prediction of outcome, whereas risk as defined by P + Vis not so
good. It should be noted that some low P X V (and P + V) values are assigned to
cases where the outcome was further study, this being a problem for P + V < 4.
One would expect the low ranking number slopes more likely to be judged
to be requiring further study or remedial work. This was tested by tabulating
rank numbers and the percentage of no further action in Table 5.25. It can be
seen that at the low numbers there is some correlation, but for higher rank
numbers the outcome is less predictable.
A review of Table 5.22 shows that evidence of instability often results in
probability being assessed as high (about 70%), indicating that those doing the
studies were greatly influenced by evidence of instability (not unreasonably).
The stage 1 reports reviewed mostly included a calculation of factor of
safety. Some consideration might be given to including this as an index of the
probability of instability (a low factor of safety implying high probability).
However, it has not been practicable to include this in the study.
The question of whether Stage 1 report outcome is a good predictor of slope
performance is discussed further in section 5.3.5.2, as is whether a P x V
definition for risk is better than a P + V using the ranking study factors.
correctly assessed.
Year Risk (P X V) Risk (P + V) Risk (P+ V)

<4 <4 <3
1985 7/9 3/8 0/8
1986 11/12 10/12 5/12
1987 19/25 14/24 6/24
1988 19/20 17/22 9/22
Overall 85% 67% 30%
Table 5.25 Rank versus Hong Kong stage 1 report outcome.
Year Rank 1 %n %Other

1985 100-250 31 69
1986 150-350 43 57
1987 550-700 66 34
1988 800-1200 59 41
Notes: 1. For most slopes studied that year.

5.3.5 Registered Slope Stage 1 Studies
5.3.5.1 Review of Registered Slope Stage 1 Study Outcomes and

Slope Performance
The majority of registered cut slopes and retaining walls have had a stage 1
study carried out on them. This results in a recommendation of no further
action, or for further study, or for remedial work, either through the Landslide
Preventative Measures (LPM) program or by advice to the owner to take action.
Where completed, the stage 1 study outcome is a basis for assessment of whether
the slope is more or less likely to fail than the average. To assess whether the
stage 1 study outcome can be used in this way, the following work has been
carried out by the author with Professor R. Fell's assistance:
(a) All failed registered slopes in the landslide database have been
identified, and information on the landsliding, ranking, failure date,
stage 1 report and status determined. This information is contained
in Appendix B3.
(b) Since only about 33% of landslide incidents have been entered into
the database, the annual reports from 1989-93 have been
summarised in Table 5.26 to show those which have been entered into
the database and those which have not. It can be seen that 27% of
incidents on registered slopes were entered into the database, so the
outcomes from the database can be taken as representative of the
population of slopes, at least for the more significant failures.
(c) The register of cuts and retaining walls as of July 1994, was assessed
to determine the status of slopes and outcomes. This information is
summarised in Tables 5.27 to 5.29.
Table 5.26 Summary of Hong Kong cut slope and retaining waH incidents,
1989-1993.
Incidents in Database Total Incidents

Year
Registered Non Registered Registered Non Registered
1989 11 150 14 462
1990 1 15 2 44
1991 3 10 14 40
1992 36 112 228 255
1993 52 131 110 532
1992-93 88 243 338 787
Total
Table 5.27 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register - summary of overall
status.
Classification Number %of Total

Reconstructed/removed 236 2.52
LMP 627 6.69
LPM study 1,608 17.16
D Notice 46 0.49
Stage 2 no further action2 77 0.82
Stage 2 other2 70 0.75
Stage 1 immediate action 4 0.04
Stage 1 further study recommended 374 3.99
Stage 1 no further action 1 3,818 40.75
Checked by district 193 2.06
Other study recommended no
36 0.38
further action
Yet to be studied 2,280 24.34
Total 9,369 100.00
Notes: 1. The total number of Stage 1 no further action recommendations is 4,989. A

proportion of these are in the LPM and LPM study numbers. For a breakdown of
actual outcomes see Table 5.28.
2. The total number of Stage 2 studies is 238. For a breakdown of actual outcomes
see Table 5.29.
Table 5.28 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register- breakdown of outcomes
following a Stage 1 no further action recommendation.

LPM 39 0.42
LPM + LPM study 34 0.36
LPM + Stage 2 study 4 0.04
LPM study + Stage 2 study 7 0.07
LPM study 1,097 11.71
Stage 2 only 0 0.00
D notice 3 0.03
Advisory letter 5 0.05
Checked by district 14 0.15
No further action 3,873 41.34
Total 4,989 53.25
Table 5.29 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register - breakdown of outcomes
following a Stage 2 study.

LPM 45 0.48
D notice 32 0.34
Advisory letter 42 0.45
LPM study 47 0.50
No further action 71 0.76
Total 238 2.54
It can be seen that:

o of the order of 80% (41.3/53.5) of slopes studied for stage 1 reports
resulted in no further action recommendations in the report,
o subsequent to the report, other factors led to the No Further Action
(NFA) recommendation being overruled in a large number of cases,
leaving 77% (40.8/53.3) as NFA, and
o 50% (1.28/2 .54) of slopes for which stage 2 reports were recommended
a half resulted in remedial action being taken or recommended.
From Table 5.26 it can be determined that in the period 1992-93 there were a
total of 88 registered slopes in the database which failed. Table 5.30 summarises
the status of these slopes in the register of slopes. From this information the
following conclusions can be drawn for the period 1992-93:
o The annual probability of both registered and non registered slopes
failing was about 1 in 40, ie. each set of slopes behaved similarly.
However, this conclusion assumes the annual reports included
correct identification of registration of all slopes, and the outcome is
biased to an extent by the extensive sliding in unregistered slopes in
Lantau in 1993. For 1992, which may be more representative, the
probability of registered slopes failing was 1 in 30 (6,500 cuts, 218
failures), and for unregistered slopes, 1 in 60. On balance, one might
conclude registered and unregistered slopes behave similarly.
o From Tables 5.27 to 5.29 and 5.30 it can be determined that in
1992-93 the annual probability of failure of slopes for which stage 1
and 2 studies had been completed were:
Stage 1, NFA 1 in 43
Stage 2 Report 1 in 40
Stage 2, NFA 1 in 15
This assumes that if the data in Appendix B3 is typical of the population of

registered slopes. The latter figure, however, is based on a small number of
failure so may be misleading. These figures may be compared to the average
probability of cut slope failure in 1992-93, ie. 1 in 28. From this it may be
considered that the stage 1 and stage 2 report outcomes separate slopes to a
certain extent, ie. slopes categorised as no further action in the stage 1 report are
about two thirds of the average probability of failing. It is important to note that
the decision for no further action is based on the consequences of failure, as well
as the probability, so the stage 1 report outcome would be a better predictor of
probability of failure than these figures infer.
failed during 1992-93.
Classification Number %
Stage 1, NFA 62 71
Stage 2, NFA 3 3
Stage 2, Reconstruction recommended 12 14
Stage 2, Pending 1
Other 10 11
Total 88 100
Note that not all registered slope failures may have been identified.
5.3.5.2 Review of Registered Slope Incidence, Consequence Scores

Versus Slope Performance
The stage 1 studies have been carried out in a priority based on a ranking
system which includes an incidence score (I), and a consequence score (C)
(Koirala and Watkins, 1988). To assess whether this score assists in identifying
slopes which are more likely to fail, the scores for the slopes in Appendix B3 were
determined by the author, and compared to the distribution of scores for all
registered slopes. The outcome is shown in Figure 5.12. It can be seen that for
scores greater than 160, the failed slopes were over-represented in the plots.
For example, slopes with a score of 200 or more are twice as likely than the
average to fail.
100
90
Registered
80 Walls
~
!!......
>-
() 70
zw Failed
::J 60 Cuts
0
w
0:
u.. 50
w
>
~
_J
40
Registered
:::> Cuts
~ 30
:::>
()
20
10
0
0 100 200 300 400 500
Figure 5.12 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence plus consequence

scores for registered Hong Kong cuts and walls.
To test whether the incidence score times consequence score would be a

better predictor, Figure 5.13 was prepared. This yields the failed slopes
over-represented virtually throughout the range, although more so at the
higher scores. It would not appear to be much better than the summation as a
discriminant.
100
90
Registered
Walls
80
~
~
~
() 70
zw
:::> 60
a Registered
w
a: Cuts
LL 50
w
>
~
_J
40
:::>
::::2: 30
:::>
()
20 Failed
Cuts
10
0
100 1000 10000 100000
I XC
Figure 5.13 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence times consequence

scores for registered Hong Kong cuts and walls.
5.3.6 Survey of GEO Senior Staff

To assist in assessing which factors are the most important in affecting the
probability of failure, opinions as to the importance of the different factors were
obtained from a limited survey of three GEO professional staff. Their opinions
are summarised in Tables 5.31 to 5.33 for cuts, retaining walls and fills. Also
shown for comparison is a qualitative assessment of the effect of the factors as
assessed from the CHASE study, study of major slopes, geology/ geomorphology,
the ranking system (as appropriate), and the stage 1 manual for retaining walls.
It will be seen that there is a lot of consistency in the data.
Table 5.31 GEO staff opinion - assessment of factors affecting the probability of sliding for cuts. ~~
(t
('1)
:;d ....
..... ~
"':>';" .'"rj
Data Set Study GEO Staff
FACTOR Conclude
CHASE Major Geomorphology Ranking System 1 2:l 3 ~2:
"' Ill
Large slope height A - - VH H A H H-A ~ ';.<
Slope angle >50° H - - H H H H s

"' '"t:l
::r'
>60° H - - VH H
? VH VH g
.....
0
,.-...
Slope age A - - - A - A A . . . c:z
0
~U)
Chunam% Cover None H VH VH
50%
VH - - H
T1 ? H H .g
('1)
~
'-"
Drain condition (poor) A - - H T A VH H-A "'

Drain condition (blocked) - - - - T H VH H-VH
Vegetation - Grass H (H) H H H
- None L
H - (L) H
- VH H !
Number of berms L - - - A L A A-L

Groundwater present - VH - H T VH VH VH
Geology - Rock type (from geology - A V>G>C C>V>G A
- C>V>G A
- Weathering (IV,V) - H - - H L A
Unfavourable joints present Ll VH - A-H VH VH VH VH
Presence of colluvium in cut L L? - - - VH 3 H H3
Terrain class - - A - - H A A
Slope angle above :5:20° H-A - A A A A A-L
Cut 20°-30° H-A - A-H A-H - ?4 - A-H
~30° H-A - H H H A H
~40° A - VH VH H H HV
GLUM Class III,IV - VH - - - H H
Construction activity - H - - T H H H
Previous history of sliding - H - - H VH VH VH
Associated wall
~----------~--- --- -- ---
-
--- --- ----
- -----~----
-- - VH - A A A
LEGEND Probability of Sliding: Notes:
VH = Very high 1. T Trigger, must be present at time or failure will not occur
H = High 2. Comments given for? cases
A = Average 3. Only the most recent colluvium is troublesome
L = Low 4. Cannot generalise. Flat slope may be result of troublesome geology. ......
00
VL = Very Low Not part of this data set/study 00
Table 5.32 GEO staff opinion - assessment of factors affecting the probability of failure for retaining walls. ;J ~
~ cv
~ ....
...... .....
"'~ ."T1
Data Set/Study GEO Staff Conclude
'~
Factor
' Ranking System Stage 1 Manual 1 2 3 "' '::<
~
~
~Wall Type "'
3 'i:i
:::r
Masonry (VH) VH A H H g 0
Gravity Concrete
Counterfort
- A-L A ? L A-L 0''2
....,z
A-L A ? L A-L SQC/.l
Cantilever A-L A ? L A-L .g ~
Anchored A-L A ? L A-L ~ '-'
"'
Wall Age
Pre War (VH) ? ? H H
Post War pre 1977 - (A-L) ? ? H H
Post 1977 (A-L) ? VL VL L
Construction Activity VH
Wall Height VH A (H/B = VH) VH H H H
Angle of Slope Above Wall A-VH H H VH H H
Type of Material Retained (Geology)
Fill A H H A H H-A
Natural In-situ H A A A A A-L I
Vegetation Upslope
Yes H - H A H H-A
No (paved, buildings) A A A A A-L !
I
Groundwater Present (yes) H-VH H-VH H A H H

Groundwater High Above Wall Base VH By implication only H H VH VH-H
Weepholes/Drainage Present - A A A A
Service Pipes Behind Wall H-A - H H-VH H-VH
Condition of Wall (signs of distress) ~------ ~-~-H_-~--- L___
(H-VH?) H VH H-VH VH-H
......
00
\D
Table 5.33 GEO staff opinion - assessment of factors affecting the probability of failure for fill slopes. ~;c
(1) (t
;;o ...
...... .......
"'?;"" .t-r:l
Data set/study GEO Staff ~ [
Factor Conclude "'
(1) '-<:
l=>l
Major Case Studies Ranking System 1 2 3 "' ~
Fill Height ? H H VH H H a"'

g] ti
"'
::r
Fill Angle
<26° L
VH
A
VH
L
VH
L
VH
L
VH
z-a
... z
>35°?? ~C/l
H H H H H 0 ~
26-35° ].___;
Angle of Natural Slope - - A H A A-H "'
Slope A~e
re 1977(?) VH VH VH VH H VH
Post 1977(?) A-L A-L A A-L L A-L
Type of Fill
Completely weathered, residual, colluvium - - A H A A-H
Highly weathered and fresher rock - - A L L A-L
Compaction of Fill
Not compacted VH VH VH VH VH VH
Well compacted L L L L VL L
Surface Infiltration (on fill)
Vegetation VH VH VH VH H VH
Bare Earth VH VH VH H VH VH
Chunam (Cement) Paving L L L L A L I
Number of Berms - - - L A A I
Drain Condition/Capacity Poor VH H H H VH H-VH

Drain Blockage - H H H VH H-VH
Observed Seepage - H H VH VH VH-H
Service Pipes in Fill H-VH H-A VH VH H-VH H-VH
Paving Condition of Flat Above Fill - H A L VH A-H
Previous History of Instability A - H VH VH VH
Vegetation Upslope of Fill Area (Infiltration) - - H A H H-A
Geology A A A L A A
Construction Activity H-VH - H H H H
.....
£U!_!r'!__f'.J~tural ~ater ~ourse___ ---- ----- ---- L __
- H-A
---- - L__
A
------- '-----A H A-H \0
0
5.4 Proposed Method of Calculating the Probability of Failure for

Hong Kong Slopes
This section presents the proposed method of calculating the probabilities
of slope failure in Hong Kong. The method overview is presented first, followed
successively by the details of calculation of individual slope factors for cuts,
retaining walls and fills.
5.4.1 Method Overview

The proposed method for assessing the probability of sliding of an
individual slope is to:
(a) Determine the average annual probability of sliding CPa) from
Table 5.34. The approach used in determining these is outlined in
section 5.2.
(b) Determine a factor (F) by which Pa should be multiplied to assess the
probability of the individual slope failing. F may be greater than or
less than one. Hence Pr = Pa X F.
Table 5.34 Average annual probability of sliding Pa in Hong Kong.
Cuts Fills Retaining Walls Total

1 in 85 1 in 525 1 in 360 1 in 140
Subscripts are used for the failure probabilities of cuts (Pre), fills (Prr), and
retaining walls (Prw). F is determined from two parallel streams of factors
labelled F' and F". F' is the primary modification factor, and is estimated from
slope geometry, age, cover, presence of groundwater, geology and
geomorphology. F" is the secondary modification factor, and is based on the
discriminant analysis of CHASE (for cuts only), the Master Ranking System
study and Stage 1 report outcomes. F" has a much smaller backup database, and
is based on other (non -fundamental) information. Hence F" has been taken to
be less significant than F'. Details of the calculation ofF' and F" are described
for each type of feature further in sections 5.4.2 to 5.4.6. F' is adjusted using F".
F is then calculated from F' evidence and history of instability. This step
requires the judgement of persons experienced in slope stability assessment.
The steps in the calculation of probability then are as follows:
(a) Determine the average probability of failure CPa) from Table 5.34.
(b) Calculate F' and F" as described in sections 5.4.2 to 5.4.6.

(c) Adjust the F' value using F" as a guide. IfF" is greater than one and
all the F" components less than one, adjust the F' value downwards
by a significant amount. If the reverse is true, adjust F' upwards by a
significant amount. If the F" components are giving conflicting
information, assess whether F' needs adjusting.
(d) Calculate F from F' and F" by multiplying by the factor Fe from Table
5.35, ie. F=Fe X F'. Table 5.35 has been determined by judgement
taking into account the views of GEO staff, the results of assessment
of major case studies, and review of Stage 1 reports.
(e) Calculate the probability of failure (Pr) for the slope under
consideration; Pr =Pa X F
The Pr value may need to be adjusted (up or down) if the slope is under
construction. This needs to be addressed on a site by site basis using engineering
judgement, as the influence of the construction activity on the probability of
slope failure depends on factors such as the type of construction, the design of
the slope, the construction materials used, and so on.

instability in Hong Kong.
Evidence of Instability
Major distress, eg. Some signs of distress, No evidence
slumping, large cracks eg. minor cracking of Instability
History of Yes 10 3 1.5
Instability 1 No 6 2 0.5
Limits to Pmax 1.0 0.1-1.0 0.1-1.0
Probability
Values 2 Pmin 0.1 No limit No limit
Notes: 1. Consider only the time since slope modification (if the slope was rebuilt to
engineering standards), otherwise consider the whole slope history.
2. If Pt>Pmax assign Pt = Pmax
If Pt<Pmin assign Pt =Pmin
The maximum and minimum factors were calibrated to achieve reasonable

maximum and minimum probabilities of failure. The probability obtained for
the worst case (using all maximum factors) was set to be in the range of 1 in 1 to 3
in 1. The best case probability was set to be of the order of 1 in 10,000, about 120
times less than the average of 1 in 85. Adjustment of the factors from the
original data was made to meet the criteria for worst and best case probabilities.
The relative importance of the factors was preserved in their relative
magnitudes.
5.4.2 Calculation of Individual Cut Slope Factors
5.4.2.1 Estimation of F'c for Cut Slopes

For cut slopes there are five factors (assumed to be independent even
though this may not be strictly correct) for age, geology, geometry,
geomorphology and groundwater. Their dependent components (together with
their relative importance, extracted from Table 5.31) are shown in Table 5.36.
The overall cut slope F'c factor value is obtained by multiplying all the individual
factors together, ie.
F'c = F'c1 X F'c2 X F~3 X F'c4 X F'cs 5.21
The maximum and minimum values of the factors were chosen so that the
average value of the factor across the entire population of slopes was one. To do
this, the author made approximate estimates of the proportion of slopes in each
factor sub-class, and then adjusted the maximum and minimum factor values
accordingly. The calculation of the individual F'c values, together with the data
source(s) where applicable, is now discussed.
probabilities.
Factor Maxi- Mini- Independent Relative Importance

Factor Component
Label mum mum Factor (Maximum)
F'ct 1.25 0.25 Age Age High
Unfavourable joints Very high
F'c2 4.0 0.9 Geology
Recent colluvium High
Slope angle Very High
F'c;3 2.0 0.1 Geometry
Slope height High-Average
Geomorphol-
F'c;4 4.0 0.1 Angle above slope Very High
ogy
Groundwater Very High
% chunam cover Very High
F'cs 4.0 0.5 Groundwater Drain condition High-Average
Drain blockage Very High
Vegetation upslope High
A) Age (F'c1)
If the slope is pre-GEO designed, use F'c1 = 1.25, otherwise use= 0.25.
The CHASE data indicated that older cut slopes are more likely to fail, which is
consistent with the experience in Hong Kong. The data indicated that slopes
older than twenty years were 1.4 times as likely to fail as those younger than
twenty years. Based on discussions with GEO staff, the authors decided that a
more appropriate measure of age was whether the slope was designed with GEO
involvement or not.
B) Geology (F'c2)
As can be seen from Table 5.31, rock type and the degree of weathering had
inconsistencies in indicating a slope being more or less susceptible to failure, and
hence are not included in this factor. The two significant geological variables to
emerge were the presence of unfavourable/adversely oriented joints (CHASE
data, review of major case studies and the ranking system), and the presence of
colluvium in the cut (from CHASE and review of major case studies). The
presence of either or both of these increases the likelihood of failure of the cut
slope. The factor F~2 is derived in Table 5.37. Adversely oriented joints are one
or more joint sets in the slope material, oriented so as to make possible a planar,
wedge or toppling failure at the particular cut slope face angle and orientation.
Note that if condition 4 and one of conditions 1-3 are both present, use the
higher value of F'c2.
Table 5.37 Values of F~2 for Hong Kong.
Condition F'c2
Continuous adversely oriented joints, sufficient to cause a landslide of signifi-
1 4
cant magnitude
Extensive discontinuous adversely oriented joints, sufficient to cause a land-
2 3
slide of significant magnitude.
Some discontinuous adversely oriented joints, sufficient to cause a landslide
3 2
of significant magnitude
Recent colluvium of greater than 1m depth present, sufficient to cause a
4 2
landslide of significant magnitude
5 Otherwise use 0.9
C) Geometry (F'c3)
The two significant geometry variables were the slope angle (discussed in
the comparison of the register of slopes and the landslide database) and slope
height (highlighted by the ranking system and the register of slopes/landslide
database comparison).
The landslide database, slopes register and the CHASE data both indicate
that a higher slope angle increases the likelihood of failure. This becomes
apparent when the angles of cuts in the register of slopes are compared to those
in the landslide database by dividing the cumulative frequency of the registered
slopes (CFr) by the cumulative frequency of the failed slopes (CFr). The values of
CFr (from the cuts in the slopes register) and CFr (from the failed registered
slopes in the author's landslide database) are plotted in Figure 5.14. Their ratio
is shown in Figure 5.15. The CHASE data set has two variables for the cut slope
angle, the original, pre-failure cut slope angle (V12_3) and the cut slope angle
(V10_2). For this analysis the pre-failure cut slope angle (V12 3) is
appropriate, as the rebuilt cut slope angle (VI 0 _2), if misinterpreted, would
indicate that steep slopes are less likely to fail (Figure 5.16).
A higher slope height is shown to decrease the likelihood of failure when
the heights in the register of slopes are compared to those in the database of
failures (Figure 5.17), whereas the ranking system implies the reverse. The
ratio of CFr to CFr is plotted in Figure 5.18. The CHASE data set again has two
variables for the cut slope height, the original, pre-failure cut slope height
(V12_2) and the cut slope height (VlO _1). For this analysis the pre-failure cut
slope height (V12 _2) is appropriate, although the rebuilt cut slope height
(Vl 0_1) also indicates that higher slopes are less likely to fail (Figure 5.19). Thus
F'c3 should decrease somewhat with increasing slope height. The author
believes that higher cut slopes are likely to be better/more conservatively
designed or engineered and this may explain why they are less likely to fail than
smaller cuts. However, the effect of the slope angle remains the most dominant.
Table 5.38 lists the values of F~c3. The maximum and minimum values of the
factors were chosen so that the average value of the factor across the entire
population of slopes was one. The intermediate values were obtained from the
ratios of CFr and CFr. adjusted to fit between the maximum and minimum
values.
Slope Angle (degrees)

F'c3
<50 50-60 >60
<5 0.7 1.1 2.0
Slope 5-10 0.5 1.0 1.8
Height
(m) 10-20 0.4 0.85 1.6
> 20 0.3 0.7 1.2
100
~
90 ,J
~
80
,-;J
~ I
'
>- 70 I - -
()
I--
Failed
zUJ - -',_)
::> 60 I-- - - - -- Registered
a
UJ
a:
LL 50 .ld
UJ
> 40
~
--
r
__J
:::::> 30
~
:::::> I--
() 20
10
~--j
, :_:;/
r- ' /
0 -
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SLOPE ANGLE (degrees)
register of slopes and landslide database slope data.
1.5
~
1.0
_../
~ \ \....
CF,
CF1
0.5 ""
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CUT SLOPE ANGLE (degrees)
Figure 5.15 Plot of CFr!CFJ for the Hong Kong register of slopes and landslide
database cut slope angle data.
_____.,
100
90 Pre-faLe < ~I
/-
-
geometry ~, ,''/\!
~ 80
) ,,,,
~
>-
0
z 70
,,,, A '\
w
:::J
aw 60
If/ ~
Post-failure
a:
LL 50 J jf geometry
w
>
~ 40
( !/
_J
:::J
::2 30 I fl ~
Failed r--
I
:::J
0
20 /t ---- Stable r--
10
I),))
0
~ ,LJ
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 5.16 Plot of CFs, CFj for the CHASE cut slope angles.
100
_,..,... ~ ,-,-- ---- ...
90 -- -
/__,-·'
,
>-
0
zw
80
I
v , I
,
70
J
I
:::J I
a
w 60
I
a: ) II
LL
w 50
> ) .~·
~:::J 40 Failed
::2 30
// -- --- Registered
:::J
0
20
)/
10
}/
0
)·'
( 10 20 30 40 50
CUT SLOPE HEIGHT (m)
register of slopes and landslide database slope data.
2.0
1.5
CF,
CF,
1.0
~ _____; v\v \
0.5 ~
- I
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
CUT SLOPE HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.18 Plot of CFjiCFr for the Hong Kong register of slopes and landslide
database cut slope height data.
100
--
==~ :::r --
90 ~
~ 80 ~~ '
//.,/~
~
>-
0
z 70 _ Pre-failure
w
::>
geometry
/ /,~
a
w
a:
l..L..
60
"~ ,.-
Js
........
Post-failure
>
w
~
50
40
Li_--/ geometry
_J
::>
~ 30
vj,J
I
::>
0
20
) ),/ I--
Failed
10
/!;./ -- - - Stable I--
0
V;' I
0 10 20 30 40 50
SLOPE HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.19 Plot of CFs, CFJ for the CHASE cut slope heights.
D) Geomorphology (F'c4)
The significant geomorphology factors pertaining to a cut slope are the
ground slope above the cut, ie. general terrain gradient (indicated by the CHASE
data, review of geomorphology and the ranking system) and the GLUM class
(indicated by the review of geomorphology). All the data sets consistently show
that a higher terrain gradient (or GLUM class) increases the likelihood of
failure. The terrain gradient and the GLUM class are not independent as the
GLUM class is partly derived from the terrain gradient. Since the
geomorphology is most readily characterised by the terrain gradient, it was
chosen as the factor representing geomorphology.
Table 5.39 shows the proportions of angles above for registered and failed
cuts, and the ratios of these. The angle above can be assumed (not
unreasonably) to represent the terrain gradient also. The ratios in Table 5.39
are similar to those in Table 5.12, increasing with increasing terrain gradient.
Table 5.40 shows the adopted F~4 values, primarily based on Table 5.12.
failed cuts.
Angle 1 2 3 Cutoff
Above All Registered Failed Regis- All Failed Cuts Values
Slope for Ratio Ratio
Cuts (C,CR) tered Cuts in Database (1 /2) 1 (1/3)1
(de- Angle
grees) No % No % No 0
/o Above
>44 89 1.5 0 - 59 5.5 >44 - 5.5
35-44 644 11.1 20 18.0 125 2.1 >35 1.4 2.1
20-35 2,320 40.2 59 53.2 234 1.1 >20 1.3 1.1
<20 2,728 47.2 32 28.8 289 0.9 <20 0.6 2 6.9
Totals 5,781 100.0 111 100.0 707 100.0 - - -
Notes: 1. The ratio is worked out by calculating the percentage of slopes above the class
cutoff value, and dividing the failed slope percentage by the unfailed slope
percentage.
2. Based on percentage below.
Terrain Gradient
F'c4
(degrees)
0-5 0.1
5-15 1.0
15-30 1.1
30-40 1.3
40-60 2.0
>60 4.0
E) Groundwater (F'c5)
The most significant factor influencing groundwater is the presence of
groundwater itself (indicated by the review of the major case studies, the
ranking system and GEO staff), and is given the most weighting. The next most
significant factor was the percentage/condition of the chunam cover on the slope
(indicated by the CHASE data and the ranking system). The ranking system
indicated that more chunam cover decreased the likelihood of failure by limiting
infiltration into the slope. The CHASE data showed that slopes with chunam in
good condition are less likely to fail. Based on this a decreasing likelihood of
failure with increasing chunam cover was adopted.
Other less significant factors influencing infiltration indicated by CHASE
and the GEO staff were the condition, number and blockage of drains (a poor
drain condition or blockage increasing the failure likelihood) and the type of
vegetation upslope. The review of the major case studies, the ranking system
and the GEO staff also indicated the type of vegetation upslope as significant,
with failure likelihood decreasing with more vegetation. Higher values of F'cs
are given for less vegetation cover upslope. Table 5.41 presents the F'cs value,
and includes the presence of service pipes, which can cause problems ifleaking.
GROUNDWATER PRESENCE
Water exiting Water exiting
F'cs slope In the slope In the No visible
upper two thirds lower third of the seepage
of the cut height cut height
0-25 4.0 3.0 2.0
25-50 3.7 2.7 1.7
% Chunam Cover
50-80 3.4 2.4 1.4
80-100 3.0 2.0 1.0
Drain Condition, Poor Add 0.25
Discharge Fair No adjustment
Capacity Good Subtract 0.25
Drain Yes Add 0.25
Blockage No No adjustment
None/grass Add 0.25
Vegetation Shrubs/Trees No adjustment
Upslope
Paved Subtract 0.25
Present, leaking Add 1.0
Service Present, not
Add 0.5
Pipes leaking
Upslope Present Add 0.25
Not present No adjustment
Check final F'cs value.

If F~s>4.0, assign F~s=4.0.
If F~s<0.5, assign F~s=0.5.
Figure 5.20 shows diagrammatically factors influencing groundwater

conditions for cut slopes.
DOWN PIPES
..1..1..1..1..1..1..1..1
SLOPE ABOVE
~~a
..1..1..1..1..1..1..1..1
Natural surface?
Paved? ~rga
Building?
CHANNEL DRAINS Backfill?

Discharge capacity? Checked Leakage?
Fully lined? Recent work?
Blockage? Placed in fill?
CHUNAM
%cover?
Cracks?
Grass or vegetation?
SEEPAGE
DRAIN HOLES
Maintenance?
Monitoring?
PIEZOMETER
How many?
How high pressure?
Maximum recorded?
Figure 5.20 Factors influencing groundwater conditions for cut slopes.

5.4.2.2 Estimation of F"c for Cut Slopes

For cut slopes F"c can be calculated based on three components, namely the
CHASE discriminant scores (F"c1 ), the Stage 1 study (S1R) outcome (F"c2) and
the ranking system (F'~3). However, these components are not independent
and, hence, the factors cannot be simply multiplied together. Rather the three
factors need to be compared to the F'c value determined in accordance with
section 5.4.2.1.
A) CHASE Discriminant Score (F'~1)
The values F"c1 are established from the cumulative frequency

distributions of the CHASE discriminant scores shown in Figure 5.11 by
calculating the ratio of the cumulative frequency of stable slopes (denoted
CF8 )to the cumulative frequency of failed slopes (denoted CFr) This ratio is
plotted in Figure 5.21. One can see that the ratio peaks at a value of 16 at
D3 = -1.5, and then decreases rapidly to a value of 1 at D3 = 2. According to the
CHASE data analysis, below D3 =- 2 a slope is almost certain to fail, a grey zone
exists for 2 < D3 < 2, and the slope is almost certain to be stable above D3 =2 (see
section 5.3.1.6). But since the CHASE data set is small and limited, the author
reduced the values of F'~1 to fall between 2 and 0.5. The value of a maximum of2
for the F"c1 factor is not large, reflecting the relatively small CHASE data set
compared to the total number of cut slopes in Hong Kong. This value and its
accuracy could be improved by further research collecting and analysing
information on, say, several hundred failed and stable cut slope discriminant
variable values.
To find the factor F"c1, it is necessary to determine the values of the
following variables for the cut slope in question:
V4 6 Chunam condition
V10 8 Number of berms
V6 15 1 Top layer material type
V10 9 Slope angle above
The CHASE discriminant score is then calculated from the discriminant
function D3 (equation 5.20). The value of F"cl is selected from Table 5.42
accordingly.
Table 5.42 Values of F'~1 for Hong Kong.
Discriminant Score D3 F'~ 1
03 < 0.5 2
0.5 < 03 < 2 1
03 > 2 0.5
20
18
16
I
14
12
v
CFs
CF1 10 I
8 \
6 \
4
\M
2
0
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1
~
0
.............
--
2 3 4 5
Figure 5.21 Ratio of CF5 /CFj for DF discriminant scores D3 for the CHASE data.
B) Stage 1 Study (SIR) Outcome (F"c2)

As can be seen from section 5.3.5, an analysis of the SIR outcomes revealed
that a No Further Action (NFA) recommendation decreased the probability of
failure by two-thirds. Based on this analysis F"c2 can be assigned as 0.7 when
the SIR outcome is NFA, otherwise use 1.2.
C) Cut Slope Ranking System (F"c3>
The values of F"c3 factors were derived from the distributions of the
incidence score plus consequence score (I+ C) for all registered cut slopes and
failed slopes (registered cut slopes listed in the landslide database), shown in
Figure 5.I2. Figure 5.I3 showed similar plots for the distributions of the
incidence score times the consequence score (I X C). It can be seen that the
failed slopes are overrepresented for higher values off+ C and! X C. The values
of the F"c3 factor were derived from Figures 5.22 and 5.23, which simply divide
the cumulative percentage of higher scores of the registered slopes CFr by the
cumulative percentage of higher scores of failed slopes CFr for a specific X axis
value.
IV\ V1
v
2
CF,
r/'
CF1
L'"" ...... ......,_

I
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Figure 5.22 Ratio of CFr!CFJ for Hong Kong cut slope I + C scores.
CF,
CF1
0+----.--.--..-. ..n~---.--.-. .-.. ..r----.--.-.-..-rrrl

100 1000 10000 100000
I XC
Figure 5.23 Ratio of CF,.!CFt for Hong Kong cut slope I X C scores.
The recommended F"c3 factors are listed in Table 5.43. I is the incidence
score and C is the consequence score from the Master Ranking System. The
scores can either be added together (as in the present system, to give the total
score) or multiplied together (as discussed in section 5.3.5.2).
Table 5.43 F'~3 factors for Hong Kong.
I XC F"c3
<150 1500 0.8
150-250 1500-10,000 1.5
>250 >10,000 2
5.4.3 Example of Risk Calculation for a Cut Slope

An example of risk calculation for a cut slope using the above system can be
found in section 7.4.1.
5.4.4 Calculation of Individual Retaining Wall Factors
5.4.4.1 Overall Considerations for Maximum and Minimum Factors

times less than the average of 1 in 360. These include the adjustment for the
history and evidence of instability. Adjustment of the factors from the original
data was made to meet the criteria for worst and best case probabilities. The
relative importance of the factors was preserved in their relative magnitudes.
The maximum and minimum values of the factors were also chosen so that
the average value of the factor across the entire population of slopes was one. To
do this, the author made approximate estimates of the proportion of slopes in
each factor sub-class, and then adjusted the maximum and minimum factor
values accordingly.
5.4.4.2 Estimation of F'w for Retaining Walls

A total of six F'w factors (assumed to be independent even though this may
not be strictly correct) were developed for retaining walls. These cover wall type
(F'wi), wall age (F'w2), wall height (F'wJ), angle above wall (F'w4), the type of
material retained (F'ws) and groundwater (F'w6). Their dependent components
(together with their relative importance, extracted from Table 5.32) are shown
in Table 5.44. The maximum and minimum values of the factors were chosen so
that the average value of the factor across the entire population of slopes was
one. To do this, the author made approximate estimates of the proportion of
slopes in each factor sub-class, and then adjusted the maximum and minimum
factor values accordingly.
probabilities (based on Table 5.32).
Relative lm-
Factor Maxi- Mini- Independent
Factor Component portance
Label mum mum Factor
(Maximum)
F'w1 1.25 0.25 Type Age High
F'w2 1.25 0.25 Age Age High
F'1
w3 1.2 0.5 Height Slope height High
F'1
w4 5.0 0.8 Geomorphology Angle above slope Very High
Type of material
F'ws 1.25 0.25 Type of material retained High-Average
retained
Groundwater Very High
Weepholes/drains Average
F'w6 4.0 0.5 Groundwater
Service pipes HighNery High
Vegetation upslope High
Notes: 1. Indicates that data was available for factor estimation, otherwise factors are
estimated using judgement and knowledge of overall populations.
The overall retaining wall F'w factor value is obtained by multiplying all
the individual factors together, ie.
F'w =F'wl X F'w2 X F'w3 X F'w4 X F'w5 X F'w6 5.22
The calculation of the individual F'w values, together with data sources (where
applicable) is now discussed.
A) Factors F'wl' F'w2 and F'w5

The values for F'w1, F'w2 and F'ws (which only have two possible values)
are shown in Table 5.45. The wall type (F'wl) is simply divided into masonry and
other, as GEO experience has shown that the masonry walls have a higher
failure rate. The wall age (F'w2) is divided into pre-GEO and post-GEO
construction, as walls constructed after the establishment of the GEO have had
proper engineering input. The type of material retained (F'ws) is split into fill
and natural/in- situ materials, as walls retaining fill are, again from experience,
more likely to fail than those retaining natural/in-situ materials. The
maximum and minimum values for theF'wi, F'w2 andF'ws factors were adjusted
for the estimated population in the various classes so that the average factor
would remain as one, and hence do not necessarily reflect the real relative failure
probabilities.
Table 5.45 Factors F'wb F'w2 and F'ws for Hong Kong
Factor Maximum Minimum

Fw1 Wall type Masonry 1.25 Other 0.25
Fw2 Wall age Pre GEO 1.25 Post GEO 0.25
F'ws Type of material retained Fill 1.25 Natural/In-situ 0.25
B) Wall Height (F'w3)

From the comparison of registered retaining wall heights and the failed (ie.
those in the landslide database) retaining wall heights in Figure 5.24, and it can
be seen that lower retaining walls are more likely to fail. This is a similar trend
to that for the cut slopes, and probably due to the fact that lower retaining walls
tend to have less engineering design input and may be designed less
conservatively. The ratio of CFr to CFr is plotted in Figure 5.25. The F'w3 factors
are given in Table 5.46.
Table 5.46 F'w3 factor for Hong Kong.
Wall Height (m) F' 3

<5 1.2
5-10 1.1
>10 0.5
C) Angle Above Wall (F'w4)

The retaining walls register has four broad classes for the angle above the
wall, less than 20°, 20°-35°, 35°-44°, and greater than 44°. This enables a
broad comparison with the landslide database. Such a comparison is carried out
in Table 5.4 7. It shows that walls with a higher slope angle above them are more
likely to fail. The F'w4 factors, based on Table 5.47, are given in Table 5.48.
100
~~
_____ ... "
80
__./'_ ~
,
,
~ , ,
Ll
~
>- ,
() ,,
z ,
,
w ,
~
60 /
aw ,
,
a:
lL
w
> ) ,
,
,
,
, ,
,
~
_J
~
::2
~
()
40
I
v I
I
I
I
I
I
,
Failed
V_
I
20
,,
, - ---- Registered
, ,,
,
,,
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
RETAINING WALL HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.24 Cumulative frequency plots for Hong Kong retaining wall heights.
1.5
1.0
CF,
CF,
0.5
~
---- - ~ .......
.,......... v ~
\
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RETAINING WALL HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.25 Plot of CFJ!CFr for the Hong Kong register of slopes and landslide
database retaining wall height data.
Table 5.47 Slope angle above for Hong Kong retaining walls.
1 2
Angle Cutoff Values
All Registered Walls All Failed Walls in Ratio of column
Above Wall/ for Angle
Slope
(R) Database
Above
1 to 21
No % No 0
/o
>44 94 3.5 11 17.2 >44 4.9
35-44 267 10.0 2 3.1 >35 1.5
20-35 723 27.2 7 10.9 >20 0.8
<20 1,574 59.2 44 68.8 <20 1.2
Totals 2,658 100.0 64 100.0 - -
Notes: 1. The ratio is worked out by calculating the percentage of slopes above the class cutoff
value, and dividing the failed slope percentage by the unfailed slope percentage.
Table 5.48 F'w4 factor for Hong Kong.
Angle Above Wall

(Degrees) F'w4
>44 5
35-44 2
20-35 1.5
<20 0.8
D) Groundwater (F'w6>
groundwater itself(indicated by the review of the major case studies, GEO staff
and the ranking system), and is given the most weighting. The next most
significant factor was the presence of service pipes (especially water mains and
drain pipes) behind the wall. Service pipes, from experience, are a significant
contributory factor to the failure of retaining walls (when they leak).
Other less significant factors influencing infiltration and water build -up
behind the wall include the presence of weepholes/drains, whether these are
blocked or not, and whether the upslope area is vegetated or paved. Table 5.49
presents the F'w6 values. Figure 5.26 shows diagrammatically the factors
influencing groundwater conditions in retaining walls.
Table 5.49 F'w6 values for Hong Kong.
Groundwater Presence
Water exiting Water exiting
F'w6 No visible seep-
slope In the upper slope In the lower
age or signs of
two thirds of the third of the wall
seepage
wall height height
Service pipes Yes 4.0 2.5 1.0
present in fill No 3.7 2.2 0.7
Weepholes/ Absent Add 0.25
drains Present No adjustment
Yes Add 0.25
Drain blockage
No No adjustment
Vegetation ups- Yes Add 0.25
lope No (paved) No adjustment
Check final F'w6 value:

If F'w6 > 4.0, assign F'w6 = 4.0
If F'w6 < 0.5, assign F'w6 = 0.5
5.4.4.3 Estimation of F"w for Retaining Walls

Very little data is available for the establishment of F"w factors for
retaining walls, and hence these are not developed.
5.4.5 Example of Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall

An example of risk calculation for a retaining wall using the above system
can be found in section 7.4.2.
5.4.6 Calculation of Individual Fill Slope Factors
5.4.6.1 Overall Considerations for Maximum and Minimum Factors

times less than the average of 1 in 525. Adjustment of the factors from the
original data was made to meet the criteria for worst and best case probabilities.
The relative importance of the factors was preserved in their relative
magnitudes.
DOWNPIPES
SLOPE ABOVE
Natural surface?
Paved?
Building?
SERVICE PIPES
Backfill?
Checked Leakage?
SEEPAGE
Recent work?
Stains?
Placed in fill?
How high?
TYPE OF FILL
WEEPHOLES
Maintenance?
Monitoring?
Blockage?
/
DRAIN
Discharge capacity?
Blockage?
Figure 5.26 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in retaining walls.

5.4.6.2 Estimation ofF( for fill slopes

For fill slopes there are six factors (assumed to be independent even though
this may not be strictly correct) for age, type of fill, compaction, geometry,
geomorphology and groundwater. Their dependent components (together with
their relative importance, extracted from Table 5.33) are shown in Table 5.50.
The overall fill slope F{ factor value is obtained by multiplying all the individual
factors together, ie.
F(=F{l X F(2 X F(3 X F{4 X F{s X F{6 5.23
The maximum and minimum values of the factors were chosen so that the
average value of the factor across the entire population of slopes was one. To do
this, the author made approximate estimates of the proportion of slopes in each
factor sub-class, and then adjusted the maximum and minimum factor values
accordingly. The calculation of the individual F(values, together with the data
source(s) where applicable, is now discussed.
probabilities (based on Table 5.33).
Factor Maxi- Mini- Independent Relative Import-

Factor Component
Label mum mum Factor ance (Maximum)
F(t 1.25 0.25 Age Age Very High
F(z 1.1 0.25 Type of fill Type of fill Average-High
F(3 1.25 0.25 Compaction Compaction Very High
Height High
F(4 1 4.0 0.3 Geometry
Slope Very High
F(s 2.0 0.8 Geomorphology Angle of natural slope Average-High
Service pipes
High-Very High
Drain condition
High-Very High
Drain capacity/blockage
Ff6 5.0 0.5 Groundwater High-Very High
Upslope area paving
Average-High
Fill in natural water
Average-High
course
Notes: 1. Indicates that data was available for factor estimation, otherwise factors are
estimated using judgement and knowledge of overall populations.
A) F(l, F(2 andF{3 Factors

The F{1, F(2 and F[3 factors are listed in Table 5 .51. The fill age (F[1) is
divided into pre-GEO and post-GEO construction, as fills constructed after
the establishment of the GEO have had proper compaction and design. The fill
type (F/2) factor is divided into two classes. The first includes materials more
likely to fail such as completely weathered materials, residual soil and

colluvium. The second contains highly weathered or fresher rock materials
which have a lower chance of failure. The compaction (F{3) factor is again
broken up into no or good compaction. The documentary evidence for the lack of
fill compaction as a major contributing factor to failures is substantial (cf. the
SauMau Ping fill failures). The maximum and minimum values fortheF(1 , F[2
and F(J factors were adjusted for the estimated population in the various classes
so that the average factor would remain as one, and hence do not reflect the real
relative failure probabilities.
Table 5.51 F'p, F'p and F'p factors for Hong Kong.
Factor Maximum Minimum

F(t Age Pre GEO 1.25 Post GEO 0.25
F(2 Type CW, residual, colluvium 1.10 HW or fresher rock 0.25
F(J Compaction None 1.25 Good 0.25
B) Geometry (F't4)
The two significant geometry variables indicated in Table 5.33 were the
slope angle and slope height. Referring to Figures 5.27 and 5.28, one can see that
a higher fill slope angle has a much higher chance offailure- up to 50 times for fill
slopes over 50°. The fill slope height is measured from the toe of the fill to the
crest of the hill. A higher fill slope height (Figure 5.29) is shown to decrease the
likelihood of failure. The ratio of CFr to CFr is plotted in Figure 5.30. The
apparent increase for heights over 20 metres should not be considered as the
numbers in this range of the sample are very small and likely to be not
representative. The effect of the slope angle remains the most dominant. Table
5.52 lists the values of F[2.
Table 5.52 F'j4 factors for Hong Kong.
Slope Angle (Degrees)

F(4
<26 26-35 35-40 >40
Slope <10 0.5 1.1 2.0 4.0
Height 10-20 0.4 1.0 1.5 3.0
(m) >20 0.3 0.9 1.2 2.0
-- ---
--
100
90
,
,
'
I
v
v----
~
80 ,
,
- ~
~
>-
() 70
,
I I
I
I
z I
w I
::J 60
0 I
./
w I
a: 50
I
LL
w
> 40
I
I j
~ :r
,
::J 30
~ , I
::J ,
() 20 Failed r--
10
:V ----- Registered r--
,
-, , -, ,
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 5.27 Cumulative frequencies for Hong Kong fill slope angles.
60
50 -
40 I
CF,
CF1
30 I
20 J
10 r-
I
0
l_rl
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
FILL SLOPE ANGLE (degrees)
Figure 5.28 Plot of CFr!CFt for the Hong Kong register of slopes and landslide
database fiJI slope angle data.
100
--
,
--
, -
90
--
80
v
/ ,,
, , ,
, ,
~ , , ,
,
~ J
>- 70 ,
0
z / --
w
:::>
0
w
a:
60
50
;.-
LL
w
(.II
> 40
~
....J
:::> 30
//I 1---
~
:::>
0 20 / IIII ---- -
Failed
Registered
1---
10 II
0
/_,-'1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
SLOPE HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.29 Cumulative frequency of Hong Kong fill slope height.
2.0
1.5
v /
CF,
CF, 1.0
v
/
~~
0.5 ~ ~
lJ
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
FILL SLOPE HEIGHT (m)
Figure 5.30 Plot of CFJ!CFr for the Hong Kong register of slopes and landslide
database fill slope height data.
C) Geomorphology (F{5)
The significant geomorphological factor applying to a fill slope is the
general terrain gradient. Table 5.4 7 showed that there is no information on fill
geomorphology in the register of fill slopes, so no hard data are available for
comparison with the failed fill slope geomorphology distribution. However, the
author recommends the F{s factors in Table 5.53, which increase the failure
probability estimates for a steeper terrain gradient. This is consistent with the
results for cuts and retaining walls as well as geotechnical theory.
Table 5.53 Values of Fjs for Hong Kong.
Terrain Gradient Fully Drained Low Permeability

(Degrees) Rock Fill Soil Fill
>40 2 4
20-40 1.1-1.7 1 1.5--2.51
<20 0.8 0.7
Notes: 1. The exact value depends on the type of fill, its permeability
and friction angle (of fill and underlying material).
D) Groundwater (F{6)
groundwater itself (indicated by the review of the major case studies, GEO staff
and the ranking system), and is given the most weighting. The next most
significant factor was the presence of service pipes (especially water mains and
drain pipes behind the wall. Service pipes, from experience, are a significant
contributor factor to the failure of fills (when they leak).
Other less significant factors influencing infiltration and water build -up
in the fill include the surface infiltration, capacity of drains and their condition,
blockage, whether the upslope is vegetated, and whether the fill is in a natural
water course. Table 5.54 presents the F{6 values. Figure 5.31 shows
diagrammatically factors influencing groundwater in fills.
Table 5.54 F/6 values for Hong Kong.
Groundwater Presence
Water exiting slope Water exiting
F't6 in the upper two slope in the No visible
thirds of the wall lower third of seepage
height the wall height
Service pipes pres- Yes 6.0 3.0 0.9
ent in fill No 5.0 2.0 0.5
Yes Add 0.5
Fill surface infiltration
No Subtract 0.25
Inadequate Add 0.5
Drain capacity
Adequate No adjustment
Yes Add 0.25
Vegetation upslope
No (paved) Subtract 0.25
Fill in natural water Yes Add 0.5
course No No adjustment
Check final F't6 value

If F(6 > 4.0, assign F(6 = 4.0
If F(6 < 0.5, assign F(6 = 0.5
5.4.6.3 Estimation of F''r for Fill Slopes

Very little data is available for the establishment ofF'( factors for fill
slopes, and hence these are not developed.
5.4.7 Example of Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope

An example of risk calculation for a fill slope using the above system can be
found in section 7.4.3.
DOWN PIPES
SLOPE ABOVE
Natural suriace?
Paved?
Building?
SERVICE PIPES
CHANNEL DRAINS Backfill?
Discharge capacity? Checked Leakage?
Fully lined? Recent work?
Blockage? Placed in fill?
CHUNAM
%cover?
Cracks?
Grass or vegetation?
SEEPAGE FILL MATERIAL

Type?
Filled in natural water course?
PIEZOMETER
How many?
How high pressure?
Maximum recorded?
Figure 5.31 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in fills.


Geomorphology
The high hazard zone of the Kalorama area of Melbourne's Lillydale Shire
(Coffey Partners International, 1990a), which was described in section 4.2.1.2,
was sub-zoned using geomorphology and historical records of instability in
order to enable the risk assessment study of the area to be carried out. The object
of the sub-zoning was to trial and demonstrate the use of such information to
better determine relative and absolute probabilities of sliding in the sub- zones,
and thus enable the calculations of risk for the Kalorama study area.
This section presents the author's geomorphological mapping of the
Kalorama study area first. Secondly, the historical record of landsliding is
reviewed. The description of the sub-zone areas is the third component,
followed by the calculation of landslide probabilities as the fourth. The
comparison of the author's calculated landslide probabilities with those
calculated under the proposed Australian Geomechanics Society (AGS) system
are given in the fifth component.
5.5.1 Geomorphological Mapping

The geomorphological features of the area such as the shape of the land
(convex, concave or uniform slopes in plan and section), slope angles, changes of
grade, hummocky or uneven ground and springs, were mapped by the author in
the field. This map was at 1:2,500 scale and was checked by Professor Fell. This
map is shown as the base map in Figure 5.32, and was subsequently used in the
development of hazard sub-zones. During the mapping exercise the author
observed the following indicators of potential instability in the area.
5.5.1.1 Soil
Most of the area is covered by colluvium of varying depth (ranging from
1 m to over 10 m), ie boulders in a soil matrix. Drill data in the vicinity of Myra
Ct indicates the presence of colluvium over 4 m deep. The colluvium is debris
from past instability, and may again become unstable under the right conditions.
The depth of soil over rock was not available to the author.
5.5.1.2 Geomorphology
"Benching", or steepening and flattening of hill slopes, in a number of
locations, is judged to be evidence of past landsliding. Several features which are
likely to be old landslide scarps were identified. The overall slope of the terrain
was also used, together with the shape of the land (concave or convex in plan and
section). Experience in landslide areas has shown that water accumulates and
infiltrates more on slopes concave in plan, leading to a higher probability of

sliding, whereas runoff is higher on slopes convex in plan, leading to a lower
probability of sliding. In section, concave slopes also tend to have higher
accumulation of water and thus higher infiltration and probability of
landsliding, whereas the opposite is true for slopes convex in plan.
5.5.1.3 Water Table

The presence of a high water table in a number of the gullies (and hence
high pore water pressures which can cause landsliding) is indicated by springs
mapped in the field.
5.5.1.4 Sink Holes

The presence of two sinkholes in the study area (near Link Rd and Olinda
Creek Rd), covering several square metres, is significant. They may drain
through coarse material· at the base of depositions from old, large landslide
debris flows.
5.5.1.5 Slide Planes

The presence of shallow (about 1.5m deep), slide planes in and near
Dougherty's Road again indicates past instability. These do not preclude the
existence of a deeper slide plane under a part of or the entire study area.
5.5.2 Historical Record of Landsliding

Details of historical evidence oflandsliding, though not always reliable, are
found in Lundy-Clarke's book "The Mountain of Struggle" (1975), which
describes the pioneering history of Mt Dandenong. A number of general
references to landslides are made in the text. He refers to "ancient landslides" in
the Kalorama area (p. 14), describing a "cyclonic storm" in the 1850's which
caused "a great crack to appear across the hillside about half-way to the top of
the spur" (p. 34). In the "great storms" of 1891 the great crack opened again,
being "one foot wide, with the lower edge six inches below the upper one, ...
several feet deep with a large mass of soft wet soil filling the bottom" (p. 45). A
small landslide blocked a creek (p. 46).
The presence of significant groundwater mentioned in the text ("water
below the surface", p. 36) also points to historical instability. These include a
"small spring in the outfall of an ancient landslide" (p. 41) and a "spring on the
surface" (p.49). Springs were also mapped by the author in the area.
One specific landslide area described in the text is around Prices Rd. This
is labelled area Xl in Figure 5.32. In 1891 there was a small landslide along the
southern boundary (p. 60). Dunbar's Lot 20 (in the area of Dunbar Ave) is
described to be in the area of the landslide (pp. 79-80). The author found
several references to landslides on these pages. The text describes a "series of
landslides", and "five benches on six acres, each one the result of a separate
landslide". Lundy-Clarke notes that this was a "dangerous area to live in" and
had "permanent springs". The "formation of the basin is allied to the landslide
area that stretches downhill" (p. 122).
Another area "subject to slides" (p. 91) is Dougherty's Rd (labelled areaX2
in Figure 5.32). The "lots consist of steep slopes varied with bench outfalls from
ancient landslips" (p. 91). This type of geomorphology was also mapped by the
author in this area. In 1934 Dougherty's Rd was destroyed by a landslide (p. 92),
and it was some time before it was re-opened.
The area around Link Rd and south of Barbers Rd (labelled area X3 in
Figure 5.32) is the "outfall of a large landslide high up the valley side" from Lots
22, 23 and 24 (p. 93). The "land drops into a sink" (p.97) and the "waters ... drain
away under the floaters and mullock from the ancient landslides on Lots 20 and
21" (pp. 97-98). The sink holes in this area were also mapped by the author.
These historical indicators of past landsliding activity were used by the
author in conjunction with the geomorphology base map in developing the
landslide hazard sub-zones.
5.5.3 Description of Sub-Zoning Areas
One of the highest risk areas within the study is area A, on both sides of
Dunbar Ave. This was originally Dunbar's Lot 20. The area lies in a steep gully
feature. Road cuts in the gully show colluvial materials. The gully has a lot of
seepage, evidenced by springs emerging from the cut where the gully traverses
Barbers Road, and dense, lush growth on the cut in Prices Road. The gully
drains into sinkhole feature 81 beside Link Road. Historical evidence oflandslip
can be found in Lundy- Clarke's book for Lots 20 and 189, which correspond to
the gully area A. Lot 20 is described as being "part of a series of landslips" (p
101). The geomorphology certainly reflects this record, with successive changes
of grade apparent as one follows the gully down, and "benching" typical of old
landslips. Lundy-Clarke also mentions the springs in Barbers Rd (p 77, 101)
and the realignment of Prices Rd necessitated by the landslip. A recent slope
stability assessment also highlighted some of these problems (Coffey Partners
International, 1991b).
The surrounding area A' is a transition zone from this high landslide
hazard area. Sub-zones B and C have uniform slopes of 14°-18° and 25°
respectively. The upslope areas D, E and F have uniform slopes of 21°-22°.
Below areas A, A', B and C are a number of flatter areas with slopes of
12°-14°. These include areas C', H', I, K and L. Area G (to the left ofF and B)
has a uniform slope of 16°. J is a spur to the north of gully H, and the spur side
area is J'. A flattening and steepening of slope occurs below area H, which is a
gully draining into sinkhole 81. Area H again suggests old slides. The historical
record records a small spring in R. L. Logan's lot (p 101) which corresponds to
area H. The above evidence indicates that the flatter areas C', H', I, K and L may
be depositions from either a series of past landslides or a single, large and
fast-flowing landslide. This conclusion is also supported by the presence of sink
holes 81 and 82, which appear to drain the large catchments above without the
need for culverts under the nearby roads. This drainage capacity can be
explained by the presence oflarge colluvial boulders from past sliding at the base
of the deposited material, through which a large amount of water can freely
drain.
The southern side of the spur which divides the study area in half (spur D,
C, C') is more complex. An uneven feature, area W, could be a result of past
instability, with benching again apparent. A cut in area W, however, appears to
display a weathered profile rather than colluvium. Also the surrounding areas V,
U, W' and D have uniform slopes. Hence the possibility of a past landslip in area
W must remain conjectural at this stage without access to private property to
enable closer investigation.
In the vicinity of Prices Road colluvium appears in the road cuts. A flatter
area T again suggests a past landslip but the evidence is inconclusive. Below
Prices Road a long change of slope exists above areas 0, T' and R'. Another
change of slope is found above flatter areas P, Q and R. Area P contains several
changes of slope, with some slopes as flat as 10°. Just above the junction of
Dougherty's Road and Ernest Road another flat area appears. This seem to be
the edge of a large, old slide, supported by historical evidence of Dougherty's
Road being destroyed by a slide in 1931 (Dougherty's Lot 22, p. 91). Shallow
slide planes, sub-parallel to the surface and approximately 1.5 m deep, were
located here. These appear quite old from the degree of cementation on them.
They separate relatively fresh colluvium with slightly weathered boulders on
top from old colluvium with extremely weathered boulders below. Area 0 is a
uniform, steeper area below area P and Dougherty's Rd, and is assessed to be of a
lesser hazard.
Area R is located below a steep gully feature R', which in turn lies below the
flatter area T. Area R is also highly suspect, being somewhat irregular, with deep
colluvium uncovered during recent site investigations (Coffey Partners
International, 1990b). Two apparent old landslide scarps appear in the gully,
one above area Rand another above areaS (near the junction of Ernest Road and
Outlook Drive). These lead towards the very flat areaL, which is inferred to be
the accumulated debris from the landslide. The gully continues as areas Land L'
and drains into sinkhole feature 82. Areas N, M and M' are located below areas
0, P, Q, and L, and are of a lesser hazard.
At the junction of Barbers Road and Dougherty's Road several old slide
scarps appear between areas M and M'. These follow a gully- type feature which
drains into a farm dam on Lot 3, Olinda Creek Road. The dam appears to leak
significantly, with the seepage flowing under Olinda Creek Road. Area L'
appears to be an irregular slope, and may be part of the landslide debris from
areas M and L.
The sub-zoned areas are geomorphologically different areas, based on the
author's geomorphology base map in Figure 5.32. The sub-zone boundaries are
shown in Figure 5.33. The Coffey Partners International (1991a) high landslide
hazard zoning boundary is also shown for comparison. A summary description
of the areas of sub-zoning can be found in Table 5.55.
5.5.4 Calculation of Landslide Probabilities

The calculation of the landslide probabilities for the Kalorama risk
assessment was performed in two stages. First the relative probabilities of
landsliding in each sub-zone were determined based on a number of readily
observable factors. Then absolute landslide probabilities were derived from
historical records of landsliding in the area. The following factors were used in
assessing the relative susceptibility of the sub-zones to landsliding:
o historicallandsliding in the sub-zone,
o the presence of slide planes,
o shape of the land (scarps/benching, uneven ground, shape in plan),
o groundwater presence, and
o man's activity (clearing and reshaping of the land).
These factors were available to the author following his geomorphological
mapping of the area. A simple point system was devised to allow for the
contribution of each factor to the relative probabilities of sub-zone landsliding.
A total of 19 points were available. The breakdown of the points for each
sub-zone is given in Table 5.56. One can see that the highest scoring area is A
with 14 points, followed by P with 12. The scores reflect the historical sliding in
these areas and the adverse geomorphological conditions present.
Table 5.55 Description ofKalorama study sub-zone areas.
Area Description
A Wet gully with scarps and benches crossing Prices Rd. Historical record of sliding.
A' Area surrounding A.
8 Uniform slopes north of A.
C Smooth spur south of A.
C' Lower, flatter part of spur C.
D Uniform slope above spur C.
E Uniform slope above Rosemont Cr.
F Uniform slope above Rosemont Cr.
G Uniform slope crossing Barbers Rd.
H Gully feature draining to sinkhole S1, exhibiting benching.
H' Bench area between B and H.
I Bottom of spur C.
J Spur north of gully H.
J' Steep gully north of spur J.
K Flat area below I.
K' Steep uniform slope on north side of gully containing sinkhole S2.
L Very flat area on Barbers Rd.
L' Irregular slope draining to sinkhole S2.
M Steep, mostly uniform slope.
M' Flatter area below M.
N Steep uniform slope below east end of Dougherty's Rd. Below area with historical re-
cord of sliding.
0 Steep uniform slope below Dougherty's Rd area with slide history.
P Flat, reshaped area with scarps and benches, likely location of 1934 slide which de-
stroyed Dougherty's Rd.
Q Flat, reshaped area with benches and shallow (1.5m deep) ancient slide planes.
R Irregular area with scarps and benching north of Myra Ct.
R' Steep gully west of R.
S Uneven and hummocky area with scarps and benching below R.
T Flatter area with benching and possible scarps, in part above the gully in R'.
T' Uniform slope below T and U, above the changes in grade in P.
U Uniform convex slope between Warwick Rd and Prices Rd.
V Steep, wet gully crossing Dougherty's Rd.
W Localised irregular area with benching - possible past instability.
W' Uniform concave slope between Warwick Rd and Prices Rd.
. N
0 50 100 150 200m
Scale
Legend
~ CONCAVE SLOPE
~ CONVEX SLOPE
--....... UNIFORM SLOPE

16
- - - - SLOPE ANGLE IN
DEGREES
GRADUAL CHANGE OF
GRADE TO STEEPER
SLOPE (CONVEX)
GRADUAL CHANGE OF
GRADE TO LESS
STEEP SLOPE
(CONCAVE)
SPRING
SOIL EXPOSURE
RESIDUAL SOIL
EXPOSURE
@sc BOULDER COLLUVIUM

EXPOSURE
SLIDE PLANE
SINK 1
Areas of
X1 }
X2
'y FL~ )_
historic
X3? instability
(/~'
·,
~0
.
----/·
\. /
/
\ \ \
,.,,·,
j,,...
hazard area.
. N
//~~~ -\\-- --~ ...
<:.
\ \
\)
E
F
""' 0 60 100
Scale
160 200m
--......., ... _ ~
r==-~,~~~
Legend
GEOMORPHOLOGICAL BOUNDARY
, / SUB-ZONING BOUNDARY
\ v COFFEY PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL

u (1991) HIGH "RISK'' ZONING BOUNDARY
\
\_
Figure 5.33 The sub-zones of the Kalorama high landslide hazard area.
The starting point for the calculation of absolute landslide probabilities was the
historical landslide record of Lundy-Clarke (1975). It indicated large
landslides taking place in the 1850s, 1891 and 1934. Since the location of these
slides is not very specific, the average frequency of these is thus about 1 in 40
years. During this period the land was cleared, which is highly likely to have had
a contribution to the landslide frequencies recorded by reducing transpiration,
leading to greater piezometric levels. From 1934 until now no major landslides
have been recorded (a period of about 60 years). The area has revegetated, which
probably reduces the frequency of landsliding compared to the cleared
condition. However, since the 1970s it has also been developed into a
semi -rural housing area, with corresponding earthworks and drainage
alterations. These may increase the landslide frequency.
At this point the author found it necessary to differentiate between large
and small landslides, as small landslides are considered likely to occur more
frequently than larger ones. A small landslide is defined as a cut or fill failure of
up to lOrn width. A large landslide is notionally 50 m by 50 m square, with a
nominal depth of about 1.5 m (viz Coffey Partners International, 1990 and
1991b). The assumed volume range is thus 3,500-4,000 m 3. The landslide will
involve the natural slope materials, though it may be initiated by destabilising
earthworks.
The frequencies assigned by the author were based on judgement. The 1 in
20 frequency was used as the upper bound of probability for small landslides.
Given the general steepness and presence of colluvium in the area it was
assessed that the minimum probability was 1 in 200 years. The upper bound of
probability of a large slide adopted was 1 in 50 years, taking into account the
historical records and the adverse conditions in the higher hazard sub- zones.
The minimum probability of a large landslide adopted was 1 in 1,000 years in the
absence of any further sub- surface information. Probabilities were then
adopted for each point score range. These are listed in Table 5.57.
Table 5.56 Details of the Kalorama geomorphological sub-zoning of the high landslide hazard area. ;1~
0 (t
~...,
en •
-· '-<
COMPONENTS OF ZONING ;>;""Tj
HISTORICAL SLIDE GROUND- ;;;-

en
2:
LANDSLIDES PLANES SHAPE OF THE LAND MAN'S ACTIVITY ~
PJ
WATER en
';.<
'"d
SUB-
TOTAL Uneven Shape in a ::r
ZONE Scarps/Benching Clearing Earthworks g ~
AREA
SCORE
YeS=4
Present=2 Scarps and benching=3
ground plan
Springs=2 ;-c
... z
Maybe=2 Con- Moist=1 Cleared=2 Reshaped ~c:tl
Absent=O Yes=2
No=O Scarps=2
Maybe=1
cave=2 Dry=O Lightly vege- significantly=2 0
]---
::e
Benching=1 Uniform=1 tated=1 Reshaped=1 en
No-0
Otherwise=O Convex=o Vegetated=O Untouched=O
A 14 4 0 3 1 2 1 1 2
A' 10 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 2
B 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
c 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
C' 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1
D 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
E 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
F 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
G 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
H 8 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1
H' 5 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
I 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
J 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
J' 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1
K 5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
K' 7 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1
N
... continued N
00
Table 5.56(contlnued) Details of the Kalorama geomorphological sub-zoning of the high landslide hazard area. 9
~
~
ct
...,
HISTORICAL SLIDE
COMPONENTS OF ZONING
-·
~
......
"'?;"'"rj
GROUND-
SHAPE OF THE LAND MAN'S ACTIVITY ~ 2:
LANDSLIDES PLANES WATER I "'~ ~
'<
SUB-
ZONE
TOTAL Scarps/Benching
Uneven Shape in
Clearing Earthworks
"'"'
'ij
3 ::r
-
SCORE ground plan g tJ
AREA Yes=4 Springs=2
Maybe=2 Present=2 Scarps and benching=3 Con- Cleared=2 Reshaped ;''2
Absent=O Yes=2 Moist=1 ,. ., z
No=O Scarps=2 cave=2 Dry=O Lightly vege- significantly=2
Maybe=1 ~Cil
Benching=1 Uniform=1 tated=1 Reshaped=1 0 ~
No-0 ],_,
Otherwise=O Convex=O Vegetated=O Untouched=O
L 6 (8) 0 (2) 0
"'
1 1 1 0 2 1
L' 8 0 0 1 2 0 2 2 1
M 8 2 0 1 1 1 0 2 1
M' 7 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 0
N 10 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 6 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
p 12 2 0 3 2 1 0 2 2
a 7 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
R 10 0 2 3 1 2 0 1 1
R' 5 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1
s 10 (12) 0 (2) 0 3 2 1 1 2 1
T 9 0 0 2 2 1 1 2 1
T' 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2
u 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
v 4 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
w 7 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 1
W' 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1
N
N
Numbers in brackets indicate possible historicallandsliding in the sub-zone. \0
Table 5.57 Probabilities of landsliding adopted for the Kalorama study area.
SUB-ZONE PROBABILITY
POINT
SCORE Small landsliding Large landsliding
14 1 in 20 1 in 50
12 1 in 30 1 in 100
9, 10 1 in 40 1 in 200
7,8 1 in 50 1 in 400
5,6 1 in 80 1 in 600
3,4 1 in 100 1 in 800
<3 1 in 200 1 in 1,000
5.5.5 Comparison .of Calculated Probabilities With the System

Proposed by Fell et al (1996)
The system of assessing landslide probabilities proposed by Fell et al (1996)
is described in section 2.2.2.2E). The system recommends the calculation of
landslide risk where historical records exist. In the absence of historical records
the probability is determined based on geomorphology, material, geology,
groundwater and man's activity in the area. Table 5.58 lists landslide
probabilities as assessed under the system of Fell et al (1996). One can see that
the author's assessed probabilities of landsliding for the Kalorama risk
assessment study area are similar to those assessed under the proposed system.
The author's adopted lower bound probability values are the same as those in
the Fell et al system in the absence of any evidence of landsliding.
Table 5.58 Assessed probabilities of land sliding for the Kalorama area under the system proposed by Fell et al (1996). ; ri'
(l ~
~ ....
.....
........
"';.o;"'Tj
Proposed Fell et a/ system Table 5.57
~[
Sub- Historical Geomorphologi- Geological/ Test Pits "'
(l !:»
'<
zone Sliding Nature of Soil Development Assessed Small Large "' ~
cal evidence Groundwater /Exposures
area probability land- land- s"' '"0
::r
YIN p As- p As- p p Sco g ti
YIN YIN p p range slide slide ..... ,--..
sess sess -re 0 c
.....,z
strong ~C/l
A y 0.02 -very 0.1-Q.02 N/A - y 0.1-Q.05 y 0.1-0.05 3 0.1 0.1-0.05 0.0500 0.0200 .g
(l.._,
~
strong "'
A' M 0.02 strong 0.1-0.02 N/A - y 0.1-0.05 - - 3 0.1 0.1-0.05 0.0250 0.0050
subtle I
B N - -none
0.05-.01 c 0.05-0.01 y 0.05-0.01 c 0.02-Q.005 1 0.005 0.01-0.005 0.0100 0.0013 :
c N - - <0.005 c 0.005 N <0.005 c 0.02-0.005 3 0.02-0.01 0.01-0.005 0.0100 0.0013
subtle
C' N -
-none
0.2-Q.02 c 0.2-0.02 N 0.02-0.005 - - 3 0.02-Q.005 0.02-0.005 0.0100 0.0013
D N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 1 <0.005 <0.005 0.0050 0.0010
E N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 1 <0.005 <0.005 0.0050 0.0010
F N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 0 <0.005 <0.005 0.0050 0.0010
G N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 2 <0.005 <0.005 0.0100 0.0013
H N - subtle 0.1-0.05 N/A - y 0.1-0.05 - - 3 0.1 0.1-0.05 0.0200 0.0025
H' N - subtle 0.1-0.05 N/A - y 0.1-0.05 - - 2 0.05 0.1-0.05 0.0125 0.0017
I N - - 0.05-0.01 c <0.005 y 0.05-0.02 - - 4 0.05-0.02 0.05-0.02 0.0125 0.0017
J N - - <0.005 c <0.005 N <0.005 - - 2 0.005 <0.005 0.0050 0.0010
J' N - - <0.005 c <0.005 y <0.005 - - 2 0.005 <0.005 0.0100 0.0013
K N - - <0.005 c <0.005 some 0.005 - - 2 0.005 0.005 0.0125 0.0017
K' N - - <0.005 c <0.005 some 0.005 - - 3 0.005 0.005 0.0200 0.0025
N
... continued VJ
.....
Table 5.58 (continued) Assessed probabilities of landslidlng for the Kalorama area under the system proposed by Fell eta/ (1996). ;1~
ft
(1)
Proposed Fell eta/ system Table 5.57 ~ ....,

..... '-<
Sub- Historical Geomorphologl- Geological/
.
"'?\"'"rj
Nature of Soil Test Pits
zone Sliding cal evidence Groundwater Development Assessed Small Large ~§:
/Exposures
area probability land- land- "' ~
'<
As- As- Sea "'
(1)
~
Y/N p
sess
p
sess
p Y/N p Y/N p
-re
p range slide slide s"' "' :::r
g.... .--..
tl
L N - subtle 0.1-Q.05 N/A - N 0.1-Q.05 - - 3 0.1 0.1-Q.05 0.0125 0.0017 0 c:::
N - N/A y
,....,z
L' subtle 0.1-0.05 - 0.2-Q.02 - - 3 0.1 0.2-Q.05 0.0200 0.0025 ~(l:l
0 ~
M M 0.02 subtle 0.2-Q.05 N/A - N 0.1-Q.05 - - 3 0.1 0.1-Q.05 0.0200 0.0025 ]'-'
N N/A y "'
M' - subtle 0.1-0.05 - 0.2-Q.02 - - 2 0.1 0.1-Q.02 0.0200 0.0025
N y 0.02 subtle 0.2-0.05 N/A - moist 0.2-Q.05 - - 0 0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0250 0.0050
0 M 0.02 subtle 0.1-Q.02 N/A - moist 0.1-Q.05 - - 0 0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0125 0.0017
p M 0.02 strong 0.1-0.05 N/A - N o.1-o.o5 - - 4 0.1 0.1-Q.05 0.0333 0.0100
a M 0.02 subtle 0.1-Q.02 N/A - N 0.1-Q.02 - - 3 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0200 0.0025
R N - strong 0.1-Q.05 NIA - N 0.1-Q.05 y 0.1 2 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0250 0.0050
R' N - subtle 0.1-0.02 N/A - y 0.1-Q.02 - - 2 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0125 0.0017
s N - strong 0.1-0.02 N/A - moist 0.1-Q.02 - - 3 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0250 0.0050
T N - strong 0.1-0.02 N/A - moist 0.1-Q.02 - - 3 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0250 0.0050
T' N - subtle 0.1-0.02 N/A - N 0.1-0.02 - - 3 0.1-0.05 0.1-0.05 0.0125 0.0017
u N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 1 <0.005 <0.005 0.0050 0.0010
v N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 y 0.02-Q.005 - - 0 <0.005 0.01-0.005 0.0100 0.0013
w N - subtle 0.1-0.02 N/A - N 0.1-Q.02 - - 3 0.1-0.05 0.1-Q.05 0.0200 0.0025
W' N - - <0.005 ? <0.005 N <0.005 - - 3 0.005 <0.005 0.0125 0.0017
Notes: Y Yes N No M Maybe
N
w
N
5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
5.6.1 Conclusions
5.6.1.1 Probability of Slope Failure in Hong Kong
In the first part of this chapter the author has applied a generic landslide
risk assessment framework to the determination of the probability of
landsliding for man -modified slopes in Hong Kong, thereby illustrating the
methods as applied in a specific area. The statistics oflandsliding in Hong Kong
were first reviewed, and the average annual probabilities of failure for cuts,
retaining walls and fills were found to be 1 in 85, 1 in 360 and 1 in 525
respectively.
Once the average annual probabilities of failure were found, factors used to
adjust the probability of failure of a specific slope up or down were required.
These were ascertained through a review of information in existing Hong Kong
databases and earlier studies. These comprised of the CHASE cut slope data,
information on geology and geomorphology, major case studies, stage 1 reports
and the ranking system, the outcomes of stage 1 studies for registered slopes and
their performance, plus a limited survey of senior GEO staff.
Data gleaned from these databases was processed with a significant
amount of engineering judgement in order to compile the proposed method of
assessing the probability of a slope failure in Hong Kong. Primary (F') and
secondary (F") probability modification factors were developed for each slope
type using engineering judgement, based on the available data. For cuts, the
primary factors were based on age, geology, geometry, geomorphology and
groundwater conditions, while the secondary factors stemmed from the CHASE
discriminant scores, stage 1 study outcomes and the cut slope ranking system.
For retaining walls and fills, only the primary modification factors were
developed due to a lack of information for the development of secondary
probability modification factors. The primary factors for retaining walls are the
type of retaining wall, age, height, geomorphology, type of retained material and
groundwater conditions. The primary factors for fills are similar, being slope
age, type of fill, compaction, slope geometry, geomorphology and groundwater
conditions. The factors were tabulated for each slope type by the author.
Note that the author was unable to consider the spatial effects of
landsliding based on historic data because the landslide incident reports and
incident cards produced by the GEO do not give the coordinates of failure
locations. If these were recorded, one would expect spatial groupings of areas
prone (or not prone) to particular types of landsliding to emerge given the
history of sliding, common geological and groundwater conditions.
The author's proposed method of assessing the probability of a slope failure
in Hong Kong needs trialing and further refinement in order for it to become a
workable component of the landslide risk assessment system in Hong Kong.
The general approach, however, can be applied wherever records of landsliding
are kept. Thus similar systems can be established to aid in assessing the
probability of a slope failure in other landslide problem areas of the world.

The second part of the chapter, the geomorphology- based sub-zoning of
the Kalorama study area, continued the theme of the determination of failure
probabilities. The sub-zoning, coupled with historic landslide records, was
used to refine relative and assign absolute probabilities of failure to the
sub-zone areas. These probabilities were compared with the system proposed
by Fell et al (1996), and were found to be similar, but having a much narrower
range than those obtained under the system proposed by Fell et al. This is not
unexpected, as the author's probabilities incorporate more detailed
site- specific information than that found in the proposed system. The proposed
system of assessing the probabilities of failure can be used as the first means of
determining the failure probabilities in a specific area. If the resulting
probability ranges are too broad, they can be refined (as was done by the author)
at the cost of applying more resources.
5.6.2 Recommendations
5.6.2.1 Specific Recommendations

The detailed landslide databases in Hong Kong have enabled the author to
study the probability of slope failure in some detail, and devise a detailed method
for the assessment of the probability of slope failure in this area. The recording
of the following additional information in Hong Kong databases is
recommended:
o Coordinates of failures would allow more detail analyses on the basis
of area- specific parameters such as geology, geomorphology and
groundwater conditions.
o A trial of the proposed method needs to be carried out with the results
recorded into the existing databases for the landslides studied. This
would allow refinement and calibration of the method.
The Risk Assessment of Slopes 234A
5.6.2.2. General Recommendations

In broader terms, not necessarily arising directly from the author's work,
but based on insights gained from the author's study of the probability of
landsliding, the following general recommendations for landslide risk
management systems are made:
o That databases of landslide information be reviewed for information
relevant to the probability oflandsliding for specific landslide areas in
the world.
o That the author's proposed method for Hong Kong be trialled
elsewhere.
o That area- specific methods of calculating the probabilities of failure
be developed.
The author feels that the implementation of the above recommendations will not
only help build databases for future research on the probability of landsliding,
but also greatly contribute to the entire process of landslide risk management.
6 VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING
Once a landslide has occurred, its movement needs to be analysed in order

to determine which elements are at risk, and their vulnerability. This chapter is
concerned with the vulnerability of elements to landsliding, and is divided into
five sections.
The first section reviews the literature on landslide movement. The second
section reports the author's study ofrunout distance from failed man -modified
slopes in Hong Kong. The third section analyses the vulnerability of persons and
property in Hong Kong. The fourth section discusses temporal probabilities.
The conclusions and recommendations arising from this work are in the final,
fifth section.
6.1 Review of Literature on Landslide Movement and Runout
The author has already noted Varnes' (1978) classification of landslides

based on the type ofmovement and the type of material (section 2.2.2.3). The
analysis of landslide movement also differs for different types of landslides, as
different models need to be employed. The author has conducted a detailed
review of the literature on landslide movement. The review is presented in two
sections. The first discusses the types of landslide movements, and the second
the various landslide movement models available.
6.1.1 Types of Landslide Movement
Various types of landslide movement exist. These may be broken up into

falls, topples, slides, lateral spreads, flows and complex movements according to
Varnes (1978). The author has found broad, summary descriptions of some of
these movements in Eisbacher and Clague (1984). Eisbacher and Clague
overview mountain torrents and debris flows from surficial deposits and
bedrock failures. Further attention is then given to mass movements on
volcanoes, mass movements related to glaciers, rock falls and avalanches.
Bannard (1994) noted that prediction of landslide movement is often uncertain,
and that there are three main ways of obtaining information necessary to
describe and model any type of landslide movement. These are:
o observation of natural phenomena (eg accurate measurements of
surficial and/or deep movements),
o determination of mechanical characteristics of relevant materials (eg
friction coefficient, kinematic viscosity, hydrologic data), and
o small scale model studies or in -situ tests.
Before discussing the various landslide models it is worthwhile to look at

landslide movement rates. The International Geotechnical Societies' UNESCO
Working Party on the World Landslide Inventory (IGSUNESCO!WPWLI) has
suggested a method for describing the rate of movement of a landslide
(IGSUNESCOIWPWLI, 1995). The rate of movement can range from extremely
slow (less than 16 mm/year) to extremely rapid (over 5 m/second). The
IGSUNESCO/WPWLI suggests five intermediate classes between these
extremes, each two orders of magnitude apart. The entire scale spans ten orders
of magnitude. The classes were developed based on Varnes' (1978) movement
classes. The seven classes of maximum recorded velocity during an exceptional
behaviour phase correspond to the following situations and damage
(IGSUNESCO/WPWLI, 1995):
Class Description of Damage
7. Catastrophe of major violence. Exposed buildings totally destroyed
and population killed by impact of displaced material, or by
disaggregation of the displaced mass.
6. Some lives lost, as the landslide velocity is too great to permit all
persons to escape, major destruction.
5. Escape/evacuation possible. Structures, possessions and equipment
destroyed by the displaced mass.
4. Insensitive structures can be maintained if they are located a short
distance in front of toe of the displaced mass; structures located on
the displaced mass are extensively damaged.
3. Roads and insensitive structures can be maintained with frequent
and heavy maintenance work, if the movement does not last too long
and if differential movements at the margins of the landslide are
distributed across a wide zone.
2. Some permanent structures undamaged or, if they are cracked by the
movement, can be repaired.
1. Construction in general possible, but with precautions.
The velocity classes corresponding to the above vulnerability classes are
described in Table 6.1. A major limit (5 m/s) appears to lie between the very
rapid and the extremely rapid movement, which is approximately the speed of a
running person. This limit separates rock falls and some debris-type flows
from other movements. According to the IGSUNESCO/WPWLI (1995), the
1.6 m/year boundary (between the slow and very slow classes) is one below
which some structures on the landslide are undamaged, and the 16 mm/year
upper limit of class 1 indicates the velocity below which it is possible to construct
most types of buildings safely and without cracking the walls if the foundations
are designed for movement.
Another classification of landslide movement velocities was proposed by
Dong and Wang (1992). The scale of maximum velocity is reproduced in Table
6.2. This scale has a similar range to that of the IGSUNESCO/WPWLI (1995)
scale, but is broken up into 11 classes. The author understands that the
IGSUNESCO/WPWLI (1995) velocity scale is gradually becoming more widely
accepted, as it has been compiled by the International Geotechnical Societies'
UNESCO Working Party on the World Landslide Inventory, with
representatives form numerous countries.
Table 6.1 Suggested landslide velocity classes (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI, 1995).
Velocity Value
Description Limits
Class in mm/s
Extremely
7
rapid
5 m/s 5 X 103
6 Very rapid
3m/min 50 X 10°
5 Rapid
1.8 m/hour 0.5 X 10°
4 Moderate
13m/month 5 X 10-3
3 Slow
1.6 m/year 50 X 10-Q
2 Very slow
Extremely 16 mm/year 0.5 X 10-Q
1
slow
Table 6.2 Suggested landslide velocity classes (Dong and Wang, 1992).
Maximum
Grade Order
velocity
Critical value for
15-20 m/s
debris flows
High
speed Super-high speed > 10 m/s
High speed > 5 m/s
Very rapid > 1 m/s
Rapid Rapid >0.01 m/s
Sub-rapid > 0.001 m/s
Moderate > 0.001 m/min
Moderate
Sub-moderate > 0.001 m/hour
Slow > 0.001 m/day
Slow Very slow > 0.016 m/year
Extremely slow < 0.016 m/year
6.1.2 Landslide Movement Models

Various types of landslide movement models exist. The models may
describe global or selected mechanisms, deal with different types of debris,
different velocities of movement and describe phenomena to differing levels of
detail (Bannard, 1994). There are three broad classes of models for the
prediction oflandslide runout distance and the spread of the failed mass (Aydan
et al, 1992). These are single body models, continuum flow models, and discrete
element models. Specific models have also been developed for debris flow and
rock avalanches. Each type of model is discussed in detail below.
6.1.2.1 Single Body Models

There are two basic single body models, the sliding sled model (often just
called the sled model) and the sled on rolling cylinders model.
A) Sliding Sled Model

The sliding sled model assumes that the landslide mass slides as one body
from its source to its rest. The motion will then be governed by the laws of
friction. Two derivations of the sliding sled model are available, one based on the
centre of gravity of the landslide mass (in Aydan et al, 1992) and the other
relative to the extremes of the start and end of sliding, ie from the head of the
scarp to the toe of the debris (Scheidegger, 1973).
i) Centre of Gravity Derivation

Aydan et al (1992) consider a body, initially at rest, which moves along a
path represented by two straight planes of different inclination a1 and a2 to the
horizontal. The friction coefficient Jls is assumed to be constant on both
surfaces. The free body diagram is show in Figure 6.1. One can readily derive
the relationship for the tangent of the angle between the centres of mass of the
landslide's initial position and its final position as Hg/Lg =(1-rJ)fl8 where Hg is
the vertical drop of the failed mass centre, Lg the horizontal travel distance of
the failed mass centre, rJ the pore-water pressure coefficient and fls the
coefficient of sliding friction.
ii) Derivation Based on Landslide Extreme Dimensions

Scheidegger (1973) notes that the coefficient of friction for a dry sliding
mass is close to the tangent of the angle of repose of the sliding debris, which is
equal to the angle of internal frictionifJ of the material when zero normal stress
is applied. Scheidegger points out that in a model based on friction, the total
vertical height of the path of the landslide h divided by the total horizontal reach
x represents the average coefficient of friction f if the slide started from rest.
This has first been discussed by Heim (1932). Starting with the diagram in
Figure 6.2, Scheidegger (1973) integrates the equation of motion over the total
course of the slide (assuming that the slide started from rest and ends at rest) to
obtain f=h!x=tana. This equation would need to be modified if the slide does
have an initial velocity v0 •
Plane<"
Plane 2
s
n
Figure 6.1 The sliding sled model (Aydan et al, 1992).
Figure 6.2 The sliding sled model (Scheidegger, 1973).
The rock mass, the average velocity and the local slope angle /3 all drop out
of the final equations. The characteristic parameter is the coefficient f alone.
Hence if one knows the height h, one can determine the reach x. According to
Scheidegger, one can estimate the angle of repose of the sliding material, equate
it to {and then estimate the runoutx. This method has been tested for rock falls
of up to tens of thousands of cubic metres volume Scheidegger concludes.
Scheidegger also claims that the method works well for small scree slopes, but
offers no substantiation for his claim.
B) Sled on Rolling Cylinders Model

The second simple approach for single body motion is a sled rolling down on
cylinders (Pariseau, 1979). This model was devised as the sliding sled model
could not explain the large distances travelled by big slope failures (Aydan et al,
1992). Aydan et al (1992) outline this model, noting that the moving mass in this
model theoretically does not come to rest if Newtonian mechanics is valid.
Considering a body, initially at rest, moving along two straight planes of
differing inclinations (Figure 6.3), Aydan et al introduce the rolling friction
coefficient,Ur and from the dynamic force and moment equilibrium equations for
each slice of the mass derive Hg/Lg =(1-rJ).Ur where .Ur is the rolling friction
coefficient. This expression is the same as that for the sliding sled model (based
on centres of gravity) except that a rolling friction coefficient is introduced
instead of the sliding friction coefficient.
<
s
Figure 6.3 The sled on rolling cylinders model (Aydan et al, 1992).
C) Comments on Single Body Models

The sliding sled model is the one frequently used to model motion of
various landslide types, particularly rock falls (Aydan et al, 1992). The author is
not aware of any practical applications of the the sled rolling down on cylinders
model. Note that the model of Scheidegger (1973) ignores pore water pressures,
but even if one assumes 'Y} =0 in the model of Aydan et al (1992), a different model
to that of Scheidegger (1973) is obtained from the same set of initial conditions.
6.1.2.2 Continuum Models

Continuum models are based on the solution of equilibrium equations with
the use of various viscoplastic (or rheological) constitutive laws (Aydan et al,
1992). These can be applied to slow or fast moving landslides. For example,
Voight (1989) used the simple relation .Q-a .Q"-A=O where Q is a measured
quantity such as strain, and a and A empirical constants, to describe
rate-dependent material failure under approximately constant stress and
temperature conditions. This relationship is primarily applied to soil creep and
pre-failure movement patterns (Bonnard, 1994).
A general phenomenological constitutive equation for mass movement was
derived by Iverson (1985). It was derived based on the principles of continuum
mechanics and several simplifying assumptions. The equation represents
coupled pressure-dependent plastic yield and non-linear viscous flow
deformation components. Iverson notes that straightforward laboratory and
field experiments can be used to estimate all the parameters. According to
Iverson the three-dimensional constitutive equation can be reduced to show it
embodies many other models of mass movement, including models for creeping,
slumping, sliding and flow. Iverson gives a useful overview of velocity profiles
for various rheological mass movement models of idealised materials subject to
free-surface, simple-shear gravity flow. His summary is reproduced in Table
6.3. The rheological models are also discussed by Johnson and Rodine (1984).
Savage and Smith (1986) apply the theory of Coulomb plasticity to
landslide flow, using a similar approach to that of Nye's (1951) alpine glacier
flow model. The model uses an idealised, isotropic, homogenous, inclined
half-space, which is a simplification. According to Savage and Smith it does
predict some essential features of shallow, long landslides such as regions of
extending, plug and compressive flow (Figure 6.4). A model considering the
sliding mass on a thin failure surface as a pseudo-elastic body is given by Faure
et al (1992). This model is used to evaluate landslide displacements. It
incorporates the progressive mobilisation of shear stress and assessments of
creep displacements.
6.1.2.3 Discreet Element Models
Discreet element models are generally applications of continuum models.

The domain is discretised into blocks of chosen shapes, which makes the
evaluation of slope movement possible through solving the resulting linear
equation system (Aydan et al, 1992). An example is the use of a binary mixture
continuum model of creeping flow of water-saturated soil by Vulliet and Hutter
(1988) to model natural slope movement. Vulliet and Hutter model's discretised
application to the well-monitored La Frasse landslide in Switzerland gave a
fairly good comparison (Bannard, 1994).

mass-movement materials subject to free-surface, simple-shear
gravity flow (Iverson, 1985).
Rheological
Model Velocity Profile
Parameters
Perfectly
plastic ifJ,C
(Coulomb)
Linearly
viscous
(Newtonian)
Linearly
viscoplastic
(Bingham-
Coulomb)
Nonlinearly
viscous
(Power law)
Nonlinearly
viscoplastic
Jla, D0 , n, are non-Newtonian viscous parameters

Region of plug flow
Figure 6.4 The idealised long, shallow landslide of Savage and Smith (1986).
6.1.2.4 Mud Flow and Debris Flow Models

A number of models for mud and debris flow are available. A major portion
of these were developed in Japan, which has continual heavy losses to life and
property from mud and debris flows. A comprehensive review of debris flow
models used in Japan is given by Chen (1987). These range from highly
theoretical non-Newtonian fluid models to the simple empirical relationships
of Bingham (1922) and Bagnold (1954). The models are often termed
constitutive or rheological models. Chen (1987) evaluates the models in terms of
accuracy, generality and practical usefulness. Briefly, the models include:
o Chen's (1985a, b) generalised viscoplastic fluid model, possessing
both rate-independent and rate-dependent parts, the normal stress
effect and the soil yield criterion.
o Kanatani's (1979a, b) model for slow flow of granular materials based
on the theory of polar or micropolar continua.
o Ogawa's (1978) model formulates governing equations describing the
motion of granular materials in a fully fluidised state using the theory
of multi-temperature fields.
o Daido (1979) takes a continuum mechanics approach to express the
total stress and the total normal stress in terms of the shear rate and
the pressure in a manner similar to the generalised viscoplastic fluid
model. Chen (1987) questions the adequacy ofDaido's (1979) model.
o Tsubaki et al (1982) rheological model is conceptually similar to
Bagnold (1954), except that Bagnold's relatively simple mode of
binary collision of grains is replaced by the multiple collision of
grams.
o Takahashi's (1981, 1983) model is based on Bagnold's (1954) dilatant
fluid model, except that a numerical constant is calibrated from data.
Chen (1987) notes that Takahashi's (1981, 1983) theories and

formulas are viable for modelling debris flow.
o Yamaoka (1981) and his associates proposed applying the generalised
Bingham plastic fluid model in which the yield stress is assumed to be
constant.
Chen (1987) concludes that Bagnold's (1954) dilatant fluid model is used almost
exclusively in Japan for the modelling of the non-Newtonian behaviour of
debris flows. Japanese researchers have apparently accepted Takahashi's
(1981, 1983) debris flow formulas and criteria, developed from Bagnold's
"dispersive" pressure concept. The models of Kanatani (1979a, b), Ogawa
(1978), and Tsubaki et al (1982) belong to the highly theoretical
non- Newtonian fluid models (Chen, 1987). Models ofDaido (1979), Takahashi
(1981, 1983) and Yamaoka (1981) are modified forms ofBagnold's (1954) model.
Chen (1987) claims that Bagnold's model cannot accurately model debris flows
(which vary from the quasi-static to dynamic states) as it does not have
rate-independent parts nor soil yield criteria. Chen also states that models of
Tsubaki and others (1982, 1983) and Daido (1979) appear to be more general
than Bagnold's model, but their forms are "incomplete" for the expression of the
yield stress. In his final statement Chen (1987) notes that good agreement
between Chen's (1986) theoretical velocity profiles and the experimental data of
Takahashi (1981, 1983) and Tsubaki and others (1982, 1983) support the
validity of both the generalised viscoplastic fluid model and its proposed
solution.
An empirical model for determining the area exposed to debris flow was
developed by Ikea (1981). This model was based on flow characteristics and
deposit structure, namely the start and end point of deposition, deposit length
and spread with. Subsequently Ikea (1989) gaveL'= 10(.l'\'sJ213 as the equation
for debris flow deposition length, based on Takahashi's (1981, 1983) models.
Here L' is the debris flow deposition length, I is the average gradient of the
transportation zone and Vs the sediment volume in m 3. Costa (1984) offers a
discussion on the empirical hydraulic formulas used for the evaluation of mud
and debris flows, noting that most of the formulas came from Japan and the
former Soviet Union. Hungr et al (1984) apply the models developed by
Takahashi (1981, 1983) to estimating debris flow surge velocities in British
Columbia, Canada, in order to design remedial structures to sufficiently contain
debris flows, and resist their dynamic thrust and impact. Hungr (1988) offers
further notes on the dynamic analyses of debris flows. A continuum simulation
of flow failures with a model using two viscosity coefficients and a yield stress
term, qualitatively approximating the Bingham (1922) rheology is presented by
Sousa and Voight (1992). The model parameters were adjusted by trial and error
to match observed runout distances. Ways and methods for the physical
landslide simulation are discussed by Li et al (1992). Some preliminary
experimental models that successfully describe development of earth flow
features are given by Crosta et al (1992). The general features of a debris slide
near Whitfield, Victoria, Australia, are detailed by Fell and Kim (1994). An
example of the description of the mechanism of a large landslide is given by
Wang et al (1988) in their description of the massive Xintan landslide in the
Yangtze Gorge of China. Hayashi (1992) proposes a basic equation of sliding
describing the process of tertiary creep.
A sliding-consolidation model for flow slides was proposed by Hutchinson
(1986). This model assumes debris spreading out as a uniform sheet, generating
excess pore pressures in the source area. According to Hutchinson, the leading
element moves out by basal sliding, consolidating by upward drainage. This
results in the dissipation of the pore pressure at the base, which brings the
element to rest and defines the runout distance. Hutchinson tested his model
against the observed runout properties of the 1966 flow slide at Aberfan, and
found reasonable agreement.
It should be noted that many debris flows increase in volume as they
accumulate material while travelling downslope. Examples of such cases
include the landslide at Baguio Villas, Hong Kong (Chan and Pun, 1992), a
debris slide near Whitfield, Victoria, Australia, (Fell and Kim, 1994), and several
others given in Brand (1995, 1988).
6.1.2.5 Rock Avalanches
A) Models
The upper end of the scale oflandslide volumes is held by rock avalanches,
often with volumes exceeding 106m3 (Van Gassen and Cruden, 1989). These
avalanches are extremely mobile, achieving high velocities and long runouts.
They occur not only on the Earth, but have also been observed on the Moon and
Mars (Melosh, 1987). The rock avalanches (also known as sturzstorms) pose a
major threat to life. The Elm rock fall of 1881 buried a village, killing 115 people.
More recently, the Vaiont slide of 1963 into a dam reservoir resulted in
thousands of fatalities. These large events have long been subject to the study of
momentum transfer and friction, as attempts have been made to explain their
runouts that are sometimes kilometres long. The following theories have been
proposed as explanations of the high mobility (ie longrunout distances) of rock
avalanches:
o sliding on a basal mud layer (Heim, 1932),
o dispersive grain flow (Bagnold, 1954)

o air fluidisation (Kent, 1966),
o air lubrication (Shreve, 1968),
o pore pressure fluidisation (Habib, 1975),
o mechanical fluidisation (Howard, 1973),
o frictional heating (Goguel, 1978), and
o acoustic fluidisation (Melosh, 1987).
These theories are discussed in more detail by Van Gassen and Cruden (1989)
and Melosh (1987). Melosh (1987) notes that the cause of the high mobility of
large rock avalanches is still unclear. A number of theories assume that all ofthe
displaced mass began moving instantaneously, and then stopped moving at the
same time. This is analogous to the sled model (Sassa, 1988), discussed in
section 6.1.2.1A). Van Gassen and Cruden (1989) note that the sled model
assumptions are only "first approximations" to the behaviour of rock
avalanches. Cannon and Savage (1988) proposed a more sophisticated
mass-change model which includes, besides viscous and frictional forces, the
changing mass as the debris is deposited. Van Gassen and Cruden's (1989)
model is based on this, but focuses on the frictional forces only. Van Gassen and
Cruden found that if mass is deposited during sliding, the deposition has a
significant influence on the runout distance (see Figure 6.5). This may not be
true in the case of debris flows, where mass is often accumulated during sliding
(see Fell and Kim, 1994; Chan and Pun, 1992; Brand, 1995, 1988). If one
assumes mass deposition during sliding, then according to Van Gassen and
Cruden (1989) the runout distance for a linearly decreasing mass is three times
that of the sled model, and ten times if the mass decreases exponentially. The
shape of the depositional profile also influences runout distance. Van Gassen
and Cruden conclude that:
" ... if a slide with changing mass is modelled as a sliding block with
constant mass, the runout is grossly underestimated. When the
coefficient of friction in a slide with changing mass (such as a rock
avalanche) is calculated with the formula for a sliding block with
constant mass, friction will be underestimated. For instance, when
the displacing mass is linearly decreasing and has a coefficient of
friction ,u =tan30° = 0.577 on a horizontal surface, the formula for a
sliding block with constant mass yields ,u =tan21 o = 0.385. When the
slide's mass changes exponentially, the difference between the
calculated and the actual frictional angle is even more pronounced,
the coefficient of friction estimated assuming a constant mass being
fl=tan16° =0.289."
The Van Gassen and Cruden frictional model with momentum transfer due to
deposition explains the phenomena of high rock avalanche mobility and can be
used to predict debris accumulation zones.
Regarding the runout distance of rock avalanches, Aydan et al (1992) note
that it cannot be merely estimated using the sliding friction coefficient. They
comment that the "reach angle" (tan - 1(h/x) using Scheidegger's 1973 notation)
is closely influenced by the failure mode of the rock slope, and that the problem
cannot be properly treated by considering the moving mass simply as a granular
body. According to Aydan et al (1992) the rolling friction coefficient is a more
relevant parameter than the sliding friction coefficient, even though it is hardly
used in practice.
B) Correlations
A number of authors have developed correlations (or empirical
relationships) between the various physical parameters of rock avalanches. The
most common one is the relationship between the ratio of the vertical distance
from the head of the scarp to the debris toe, H, to the horizontal distance
between the two points, L, plotted against the slide volume V. These symbols are
the ones used by the author in his study. Other researchers have used different
Exponential
mass-change model
__....-Linear mass-change
model
..,-Sliding block
Runout Distance
Figure 6.5 Comparison of velocity profiles for different debris depositional

models (Van Gassen and Cruden, 1989).
notation, as discussed above. Note that the slide volume is often the total volume
which may not reflect different episodes of sliding. These dimensions are
illustrated in Figure 6.6, as are 4I and 4. 4I is the horizontal length of the
deposited material, and 4 the excessive travel length, measured between the
debris toe and the intersection of a line drawn at 32° from the scarp head with
the base plane. 32 o is at the lower end of the range of angles of repose of rock
(30° -40 o). Scheidegger (1973) argues that the ratio H/L represents the average
coefficient of friction f over the slide surface in a sled model based on friction
only. Sheidegger states that by applying the sliding sled theory the coefficient f
should equal the angle of repose of the sliding material. For the range of
30°-40° for rock this corresponds to {=0.58-0.84.
L
Le
Figure 6.6 Definitions of rock avalanche dimensions (Eisbacher and Clague,

1984).
The ratio f=HIL has many labels in the literature, including fahrboshung,
the coefficient of friction, apparent friction and inverse mobility. For a large rock
avalanche f reduces below the angle of repose. Scheidegger (1973) found a
relationship between f and the slide volume V using regression. His regression
equation is log(H/L)= -0.567logV+0.6242. Hsu (1975) used the plot in Figure
6. 7 to calculate the excessive travel distance 4 based on a number of case
studies. Hsu gave two lines, I and II, for less and more mobile avalanches
respectively. If one uses Hsu's model, Le is obtained from Figure 6. 7 and,
knowing H, the runout Lis then calculated using L =H/tan32 o + 4. Li Tianchi 's
(1983) regression model is conceptually similar to Scheidegger's (1973), but his
regression equation (based on more data points) is log(H/L)= -0.153logV
+0.6640. Davies (1982) model is based on the regression equation

0 32
41 =9.98Vd · , and Nicoletti et al (1992) notes that the runout distance using
Davies' (1982) model can be obtained from L=H!tanr/J'+0.54J, where ifJ' is
"about 35°".
y+Sa
* muddy sturzstrom
• ,---,---
E' ,. + mobile sturzstroms
•
•
rocksllde
E,;perlmental eturzstroms
l /1
e.
Q)
x less mobile sturzstroms
A small rockfall
(tn~~lerl•l &lmulaHng elm)
® Experimental sturzatro.ms
(m•'«l•l not slmul.tlng Elm)
:
Fpt
I
+/ "<FI
0
c
ro
Ci5
12
..
~ ZT•
'6
a; 8
-1--
/ /"I
'
-~
~
/ +BI
,_ I
i v~
sn/ ~---
Q)
>
"(ij ~; ~!1
Cll •
hG:;~ ~ "
""
Q)
0
~ 2 "X
.. .A.Vl
1
... ~ ~.'i{
10 1 0
•Va
1000 10000
Rock fall volume (m3)
Figure 6.7 Relationship between the excessive travel distance 4 and the rock
avalanche volume V (Hsu, 1975).
The reduction in f with avalanche volume is not confined to Earth only.

Melosh (1987) shows that extraterrestrial points from the Moon and Mars fit
easily within the terrestrial data scatter, possibly indicating similar mechanisms
(Figure 6.8). A degree of caution is needed with extraterrestrial data, however.
Lucchita (1978, 1979) indicates that it may be better to compare interplanetary
rock avalanche data on the basis of weight (Figure 6.9) or potential energy
(Figure NO TAG) to allow for the differing gravities.
Nicolettietal (1992) illustrates usage of the Scheidegger (1973), Li Tianchi
(1983), Hsu (1975) and Davies (1982) models in comparing predicted rock
avalanche runout distances for the town of Plati in Italy (Figure 6.11).
Eisbacher and Clague (1984) also overview these runout distance models.
Further research by Nicoletti and Sorriso-Valvo (1991) showed that 4/L
was only weakly related to the landslide volume V for 40 rock avalanche cases
which they obtained from the literature. Nicoletti and Sorriso-Valvo found
that Le!L was confined mostly to the range of 0.5 -0.8, and thus the runout
distance of a rock avalanche is likely to lie between 3.2-8H for volumes of 5 to
1,600 X 106 m 3 as a first estimate. This overcomes the need for the estimation
of the avalanche volume, but the resulting predicted runout distance band is
I I
O.G.._ S t a t i c - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
• ~ } Earth dam
-
_J
I
0.4
••
•
• • • ••
•
•
• ~ } Lunar data
I
•• I • • e'
• •
Mars data
0.2- •• • <t
•• • •
•• • •
••
(
~ i
o.~~s------~~0~7------,o~a~----~,~~9------~~o~,o------~~~,~,----~10~'2~
I
Volume (m 3 )
Figure 6.8 The mobility of extraterrestrial rock avalanches, one from Mars and
two from the Moon (Melosh, 1987) .
• M19
eM IS
eM24
eM2s
~
.Mil
L•"''
e12
.E2() Key: E European Alps
II
A Alaska
=- •• ,0 M Mars
eEr9 Numbers only mean
El7. ee11
El<>•
elsewhere on earth
:ers•
ee '"
~
•: •e een13
.E12
.9
eE9 •e1o
•Ea
"I u
AS . , • • 2 Ale
6fi'E7
E6.
•e4
.,
eAZ A4 EJe
ee2
eAr El-l
I I I I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0,5
Coefficient of friction

mobility based on weight and volume (Lucchita, 1979).
Key: E European Alps

A Alaska
M Mars
Numbers only mean elsewhere on earth
>-
e>
(J) •E18
c
(J)
ct1
·.;:::::;
c
(J)
......
0
c..
.....
0
(J)
Cii
E
·.;:::::;
(/)
LU
.2 .3 .4 .5
Coefficient of friction

mobility based on potential energy and volume (Lucchita, 1978).
broad. This appears to contradict some of the previous research findings, but
Nicoletti and Sorriso-Valvo offer no possible explanation.
There is not a great deal of information to give guidance for "normal-

sized" slopes. Scheidegger (1973) indicates that the angle of repose should be
used for rock slope failures less than 100,000 m 3 . This limiting angle is
30°-40°. Individual rocks may bounce and travel longer distances.
Davies ------- ____________,

HsU Destruction zone
~--------------------------~
Li
________
Risk zone,
5 6
Figure 6.11 Results from four runout distance models used to assess the rock
avalanche risk at Plati, Italy (Nicoletti, 1992).
C) Correlation for Other Landslide Types Based on the Rock

Avalanche Approaches
Following the frequent use of HIL versus V correlation plots for rock
avalanches, other authors have used these plots for different landslide types.
For example, Hutchinson (1988) added failures in chalk, mine tailings and
kaolinised granite (Figure 6.12). It can be seen that the mobility as well as the
volume affect the HIL values of the failures. Coal mine waste (often loosely
dumped sedimentary rock, which breaks down to a soil/rock mixture) can flow
considerable distances. Hutchinson (1995) reproduces the 1988 H/L versus V
plot in the form of envelopes, but does not significantly alter it. Sassa (1992,
1988) produces aH/L versus V plot with some Japanese landslides added (Figure
6.13). These are mostly debris flows. Some have higher mobility than the rock
avalanches, others fit easily into the rock avalanche data scatter.
Hungr et al (1984) indicate that the apparent friction angle method (or H/L
versus V plots) apply to debris flows with less than 5% of silt and clay. However,
one might consider its use for debris with a somewhat higher silt and clay
content. There is little data available for materials with higher clay contents.
Experience in Hong Kong indicates that debris from weathered volcanic and
granitic rocks will deposit at an angle of repose of 10° (Kwan, 1994). Kwan
recommends the use of Van Gassen and Cruden's (1989) method with an
apparent friction angle of 10 o for fill slopes and 30 o for other slopes. In Australia
there is little data. Debris flows have occurred at Speers Point (Fell et al, 1992),
Astor St, Adamstown Heights and Bullsgarden Rd, Whitebridge. Data from
these represents an overall apparent friction angle in the range of 10° -13 o. The
first of these was a reactivation of a slide derived from sandstone, conglomerate
and claystone, the latter two loose dumped fill from ripping of conglomerate and
sandstone.
r-------.--------.-------.--------~-------.------~~ro
Chalk d•bris K~:
.'
1. •xhibiting: e Chalk foilur•s forming o talus
u-- ... 0 Chalk foiUM forming o flow slid•
'f' Flow slid• in cool mine wosr.
• Flow &lid• in kaotinist!d gronit•
20 " talus 76 Approx. 'IC!Iu• o1 H I ml
.21 ' I ormation • Mor• mobil• Alpin.c:lnd Cordihra n sturntr011111
1.2 \ IHsii 19751
46e \ ---~ Tqntative lli'Mllopq for so
chalk flows
\
~
tl 0.8 40
;
&
-a
(Abele 1975)
\ Envelopq·for Alpine b2rgstUrz12n ;S
II
z
...J
0.4
.
? \
'\ 't\
' '
\
'{Jn
g
I
',
q'f''-; .
30 <I
\~\
/ \, \\
•..... '?
Kaolinised granitq
'
'
t
m,n
1JSO'b-
........ .,. 085
""-
.,. 1380--
p -Jc
11.5 .,,
~o~3r-------~~~,-------~~~s-------~,~~-----i~~7-------~~e-------,Lo'~~
Debris volume (m3)
Figure 6.12 Comparison of the mobility of chalk, coal mine waste and kaolinised
granite failures and rock avalanches (Hutchinson, 1988).
O.Sr-------~~---------r----------,---------,--*~~moo~dy~a~t=ur=u~tr=om~------T
• mobile aturutroms
x leu mobile otunalroms
tJ. tmall rockfall
A rocltolide
Experimental tlunatroma
-
....J
I
*
0
• (material aimulatins Elm)
Experimental atur1atroma
(material not simulating Elm)
Landslide• In Japan
X
X X
Fl
•
Volume (m 3 )
Figure 6.13 Comparison of Japanese landslide and rock avalanche mobility

(Sassa, 1988).
Figure 6.14 shows mudslide lengths versus average slope from Hutchinson
(1988). Note that the intermittent movement is often seasonal, so that the final
displacements may take some time to be achieved. This plot may be of some use
in the estimation of runout distances for high clay content materials.
r----Mudslide. of breadth B
Elon ate
c~ =0. ~~ on
slip surface
C!l.
For:
Ko = 213
Ysat = 18.0kN/m3
ru = 0 /,/,
a.
0>
ea.
>
~07---~~------~--~------------------~----------------~
10 10 1()J 104
Mudslide length Llml
Figure 6.14 Mudslide slope (average) versus mudslide length (Hutchinson,

1988).
Sassa (1992, 1988) considered the apparent friction angles of debris flows.
He suggests that in some cases undrained loading may apply where the water
table is close to the surface of the deposition area. Sass a developed a high speed
ring shear device to investigate this possibility, and claims to be able to model the
behaviour of some slides this way. It appears that he is using the sled model as a
base. Recently (Sassa, 1992) reported tests which seemed to consistently give
the apparent friction angle of 5o in the horizontal deposition area, using 30° in
the steep section. In this case the landslide motion can be modelled as consisting
of two apparent friction angles ¢1 and ¢2, as shown in Figure 6.15.
Data on runout from failed waste rock dumps (primarily coal mines in
British Columbia, Canada) was presented by Golder Associates (1992). 42 clear
records were extracted from a pool of over 160 failure events. The volume of
debris ranged from 50,000 to 5 x 106 m 3 , falling at the lower end of the rock
avalanche data. The H/L versus V plot showed a lot of scatter (Figure 6.16).
Golder Associates compared the data with "dry slope movements" (rock
¢ Average apparent friction angle

ifJ1 Apparent friction angle for the steep slope
ifJ2 Apparent friction angle for the horizontal slope
Figure 6.15 Landslide model with two apparent friction angles (Sassa, 1992).
.
7
H/L
l
..
II
r
~'J i .a
i"
IS
'""'a
.
I~
14 lo
....
6-10 t~3
. . . .
112
1.5'
fl16
1,8 llJ
10
..
79
~21
9
.
158 1~
4
.
157
100 1000 10000
Volume (m 3 )
Figure 6.16 The mobility of waste dump failures (Golder Associates, 1992).
avalanches) and "wet slope movements" (debris flows). A wide range of

inconclusive outcomes was found due to the variations in the "contributing
factors". Apparently the same data is by Piteau Associates (1991),
and referenced by Dawson et al (1992). was not able to obtain a
copy of the Piteau Associates report, this e to be confirmed.
Morgenstern (1995a) notes that uations for granular fill
materials need to especially consider the evalua of the "potential rapid loss
in strength that result in collapses and subsequent flows". According to
Morgenstern, these include the assessment of:
o steady state and collapse surface behaviour,
o trigger mechanisms, and
o progressive failure.
Noting that the conventional factor of safety approach does not provide a
"conservative assessment of collapse potential", Morgenstern goes on to
describe the likely collapse mechanism for loose granular materials as follows:
"Once collapse is initiated excess pore pressures will be generated if

drainage is sufficiently impeded due to geometry of permeability.
Experience suggests that most sands and sandy gravel embankment
materials exhibit sufficiently low permeability to sustain excess pore
pressures if collapse is initiated. Undrained or partly drained failure
of loose granular materials typically exhibits strain-softening
behaviour. Triggering of localised yield zones in strain- softening
materials will cause stress redistribution that can lead to progressive
failure. If not contained, redistribution can result in overall collapse
and flow. The unbalanced potential energy then leads to flow."
Dawson and Morgenstern (1995) and Dawson et al (1992) also note that
conventional failure mechanics are not able to explain higher runouts in mine
waste material dumps, and go on to discuss recent advances in liquefaction
mechanics to explain the high runout distances of granular materials, which
involve either empirical approaches using in-situ test results, or steady state
approaches with tests results based on laboratory samples.
Hungr et al (1984) point out that snow avalanche runout distance is
calculated from momentum conservation principles, assuming that the friction
slope of the avalanche during the runout remains constant, or is a function of
velocity only. Snow avalanche models are detailed by Voellmy (1955) and Salm
(1966). Golder Associates (1992) note that the application of snow avalanche
models to soil/rock debris is difficult as the low density and large surface area of
the snow particles, which result in a significant momentum loss due to air
resistance, makes the runout distance characteristics different for snow

avalanches.
6.1.2.6 Discussion
Specific model limitations and areas of application were discussed with
each model. Generally, the various flow and runout distance models are limited
by data accuracy and scatter. It is also difficult to input data into viscous-type
models. Most models do not allow for progressive failure, nor for the landslide
occurring in several episodes rather than in one instance. A significant number
of the authors also do not clearly report the accuracy, advantages and
disadvantages of their models.
6.1.3 Summary
The literature on landslide movement models has been reviewed. The
author found that various types of landslide movement models exist. These are
single body models, continuum flow models, and discreet element models. The
models describe global or selected mechanisms, deal with different types of
debris, different velocities of movement and describe phenomena to differing
levels of detail. Specific models have also been developed for debris flow and rock
avalanches. The advantages and disadvantages of each model have been
reviewed. Depending upon the needs of the situation, a reviewer of landslide
runout distance may thus apply general or situation- specific models, based on
the required application and outcomes, and the resources available.

Distance
6.2.1 Introduction
The vulnerability of elements at risk is dependent on whether the element
is likely to be reached by the landslide debris or not, and if it is reached, how
much damage it sustains. The amount of damage is, of course, dependent on the
type of element, the amount/depth of debris and the debris momentum.
This section presents the details of the database, details appropriate
models, describes the analyses used to assess runout distance, presents the
results of these analyses and recommends suitable models.
6.2.2 Objective
The main aim of the database analyses was to allow prediction of runout
distances as a component of the predictive tools required for the assessment of
vulnerability.
6.2.3 Establishment of the Landslide Database
6.2.3.1 Data Sources and Extraction

A landslide database was compiled using the landslide information held by
the Geotechnical Engineering Office (GEO) of Hong Kong. The database
consists of data entered from landslide incident reports (minor incidents) and
incident reports plus landslide record cards (major incidents) selected from the
period 1984 to 1993 inclusive. Some 1978/79 incidents were also selected. These
data sources are described in detail in section 4.1.2.2. The specific incidents
were selected based on satisfying any of the following criteria:
o any incident with volume greater than 50 cubic metres (ie. a "major"
landslide as categorised by the GEO),
o any incident resulting in a fatality or injury,
o any incident which had a consequence statement m the annual
report, except" minor road blockage or temporary evacuation of
squatter huts,
o any incidents which appeared to be "near misses" of property damage
or loss of life, and
o all failures with volume greater than 10 cubic metres, plus a
representative selection of those with a lower volume, where good
geometry and location data are available.
Out of a total of some 3,000 incident reports covering the study period, over
1,100 were entered into the database.
6.2.3.2 Database Format

The database was initially entered in two working formats, one for minor
(less than 50 m 3) incidents and one for major incidents. Each format followed
the format of the source, eg. data entered into the minor landslide incident
database followed the order of data appearing on an incident form. The data was
entered as numeric coding. An additional geometry section then followed,
where specific geometry variables applicable to the particular situation were
entered. These databases were subsequently combined for analysis. An excerpt
from the combined database is shown in Table 6.4.
6.2.3.3 Classification into Different Situations or Scenarios

Each incident was classified into a situation or scenario type. There are 23
situations in the landslide database. These are summarised in Table 6.5. The
detailed definitions are available in Appendix C 1. While the first part of the
database is the same, geometry variables are defined differently depending on
~ ~~
0
0" ('1>
INCIDENT NO COORDS (N, E) SLOPE MAP DATE TIME VOL MATERIAL TYPE CAU AFFECTING I
;' ~ ....
....... ~
ME 91 6 1 840600 842250 3SEB/C6 3SE9A 12.6.91 1700 70 4 2, 4 4, 1 ~
:,. "'
~"Tj
HK 87 7 18 15692 30258 11SWNC286 11SW6C 31.7.87 1030 70 GVDV 7 3 4, 1 ~§:
HK 89 6 3 11SW16B 70 3 1, 4, 9 Nullah blocked "'
('1> Ill
'<
HK 87 5 10 11SED/C42 23.5.87 70 3 4,9,10 6 "' ~
r:.n "'3 ::r
'"d
ME 88 8 11 828120 846460 BSWA 13.8.88 65 7 1,3,10 6 Construction failure ~ ('1>
t:1
::s
,..... ,--...
ME 93 9 11 8NW20B,D 26.9.93 60 CDV 7 1, 4 4, 1 3 c::
ME 93 9 22 7NE21B 26.9.93 60 OV 7 2, 4 4, 1
~
;' ....,z
0
~Cil
MW 89 5 16 825505 828030 6SE19D 20.5.89 60 7 4 4, 1 ~
0 ~
MW
HK
90
92
9
5
2
44 11SW14C, 0
11.9.90
8.5.92
700 56
Weathered rock
7 3,4,6 4, 1
4, 1
.,.....~
~
]'-'
"'
2400 50 7 2, 4
MW 92 6 37 134000 174600 13.6.92 1130 50 Sand 7 2, 4, 6 4, 1 .....
r')
HK 93 9 24 11SW18B 27.9.93 930 49 CDT, R3 (Grade IV) 7 4 9 ~

0
K 93 9 7 11NE230 26.9.93 45 PN0/30 7 2 11 3
ME 93 9 31 7NE1B 45 PN0/30 7 4 4, 1 ......
::r
K 93 6 6 11NWD/C53 11NW20B 1, 4 4, 2 9 ~
16.6.83 1715 45 7
0::
0
=
~
INCIDENT NO SIT A1 A2 A3 A4 AS H1 H2 H3 H4 HS HH B1 B2 B3 51 52 D L1 l2 L3 T1 T2 T3 W1 W2 W3 QUALITY ~

ME 91 6 1 1 55 0 30 45 16 14 3 2.5 - - 9.8 1.5 1.5 2.5 - - - 40 41 - =
~
HK 87 7 18 1 60 0 30 11 - 8 7 1 2 - - - - 4.0 0.5 2 4 - 6 9 65"

HK 89 6 3 1 80 0 35 15 8 8 0 2.5 - - 1.4 1.5 1.5 6 - - 8.5 11 =
c.
c-.:
fll
HK 87 5 10 1 70 0 5 30 25 10 10 4 3.6 3.6 6 15 15 - I
ME 88 8 11 1 60 0 45 8 7.5 0 - - - 4.3 1.3 - 20 - I

~
ME 93 9 11 1 60 0 30 40 - 7 6 1 3 - - 3.5 1.5 4 20 24 - c.
~
ME 93 9 22 1 60 0 42 30 8 8 0 4 - 4.6 - 2 4 8 8 ......
~
MW 89 5 16 1 65 0 25 35 11.5 10.5 1.5 2.5 4.9 1 1.5 3 14 14 0"
~
MW 90 9 2 1 65 0 5 20 - 15 8 7 6 - - - - 3.7 0.6 2 3.5 - 14 18 - fll
HK 92 5 44 1 50 0 22 10 - 12 10 2 2 - - - 8.4 2.5 5 - - - 15 15 - !ll

MW 92 6 37 1 70 0 10 33 - 6 3.5 2.5 2.5 - 1.3 0.6 1 3 20 20 -
HK 93 9 24 1 45 0 30 25 12 9 0 1.8 9.0 0 1.51 2 0 - 15 15 0
K 93 9 7 1 50 0 14, 30 4 2 2 2 - 3.0 0 0.5\ 1 0 11 11 0
ME 93 9 31 1 52 0 231 40 20 13 7 3 - - 10.2 0 0.7i 2 - 5 5 0
N
K .... 93 ~ L__6 ____! 60 0 20! 45 -~
L___20 10 10 2 - - L _ __ _ - 5.0 1.5 1.51 3 0 - - 8 12 0 Vl
\0
the situation of the incident. The situation classes were derived during data
entry and are flagged by a label. They are limited in number to facilitate
statistical analysis while attempting to preserve the diverse range of situations
encountered. While some incidents could have been classified into an alternate
situation, they represent only a small proportion of the data and do not influence
the analyses unduly.
6.2.3.4 Accuracy of Data

Even after the selection of incidents the data quality and accuracy varies
widely, depending upon the person(s) compiling the incident report, the
conditions under which the report was compiled, eg. as some were done in
difficult conditions at night or in rain, the time available to the reporter(s), and
so on. When a lot of landslides occurred at the same time the resources were
stretched, and it appears that the quality of reporting was reduced. In
particular, the sketched sections of the failures often suffered greatly from a lack
of clarity or measurements. It is suspected that some numeric values (eg failure
widths and runout distances) may vary as much as 50% in extreme cases.
6.2.4 Analyses and Results

The landslide database statistics are overviewed first. Then the plots of
F=HIL are analysed. The fit of the cut slope data to the sled model is examined
next. Finally multiple regression analyses are carried out on all situations
amenable to statistical analysis in order to determine appropriate runout
distance models.
6.2.4.1 Overview of Landslide Database Statistics
A) Summary Statistics
Table 6.5 presents a summary of the number of incidents for each situation
in the database, and comments as to the suitability of the data for statistical
analysis on a situation by situation basis. One can see that only situations 1, lA,
1C, 3,4,5,6 and 7 are amenable to statistical analysis and of direct use to this part
of the study. Tables 6.6 to 6.12 summarise the distributions of the key database
variables. These are the volume of failure V, slope angle Al, failure depth D and
width Wl, the height offailureH, runout distance£ and the apparent angle of
friction (tan- 1H/L). The apparent angle of friction was described in section
6.1.2.5, basically being a measure of the fluidity or mobility of the debris.
Table 6.5 Summary of Hong Kong landslide database numbers by situation.
Number Amenable to
Situation Description in Statistical
Database Analysis
1 Cut slope 515 Yes
1A Cut slope affecting a house 170 Yes
c 1C Cut slope with two angles 32 Yes
u
T 1CA Cut slope with two angles above a house 7 No
Cut slope with two angles and a berm, failing in the
10 2 No
top portion
R
3 Rock fall from above cut slope 61 Yes
F
A
L 3A Rock fall from above cut slope onto house 3 No
L
N 5 Natural slope failure 67 Yes
A
T 1-SA House on natural slope 12 Possibly
s Natural slope failure
L SA 18 Possibly
0 above a cut
p
E SH Natural slope failure above a cut affecting a house 8 No
w 6 Retaining wall failure 50 Yes

A
Retaining wall failure
L 6A 12 Possibly
affecting a house
L
s 68 Failure under a retaining wall 1 No
F 7 Fill slope 68 Yes
I
L 7A Fill slope failure affecting a house 7 No
L
s 78 Fill slope failure becoming a debris flow 8 No
Cut slope failure above a retaining wall (geometry
4 30 Yes
1)
0 Cut slope failure above a retaining wall (geometry
48 19 Possibly
T 2)
H 40 Fill or cut slope failure above a retaining wall 1 No
E
R 8 Large failure under retaining walls 13 Possibly
8A Large failure through a retaining wall 6 No
9 Blocked catchwater, slope below scoured 4 No
Table 6.6 Distribution of Hong Kong landslide volumes V (m 3) for different

situations.
SITUATION MIN POS P25 MEDIAN P75 P95 MAX

1 0.5 3 10 138 46 446 7168
1A 0.7 1.5 9 71 36 350 2260
1C 3 4 20 253 98 1509 2880
3 0.02 0.1 1 4 4 20 31
4 0.9 2.5 6 57 68 242 349
5 1.85 8.05 27 129 58 565 865
6 0.43 1.09 10 42 45 144 422
7 0.81 5.52 20 161 37 800 1479
Note: P05 is the 5th percentile, P25 the 25th percentile, and so on.
Table 6.7 Distribution of Hong Kong slope angles Al (degrees) for different
situations.

30 45 55 62 70 80 90
1A 25 45 60 67 75 85 90
1C 35 50 60 72 85 90 90
3 40 40 67 71 80 85 90
4 30 34 45 52 60 80 85
5 28 30 38 47 56 70 72
6 65 73 90 88 90 90 90
7 30 30 35 45 50 80 90
Table 6.8 Distribution of depth of Hong Kong failures D (m) for different
situations.

1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.32 1.5 3 12
1A 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.04 1.3 2.5 4.5
1C 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.68 2.5 4.5 5
4 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.19 1.5 3 3.5
5 0.4 0.5 1 1.68 2.5 3.5 6
6 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.39 2 3 6
7 0.3 0.5 1.98 3 4 10
Table 6.9 Distribution of width of sliding Wl (m) for different Hong Kong
situations.
SITUATION MIN P05 P25 MEDIAN P75 P95 MAX

1 1 3 5 11 14 28 87
1A 1 2 4 8 10 20 35
1C 4 4 5 11 15 35 40
4 2 5 12 15 22 82
5 2 3.5 6 12 17 25 50
6 1.2 2 5 12 12 30 90
7 1.3 3 6 13 15 29 90
Table 6.10 Distribution of height of failure H (from head of scarp to toe debris,
in metres) for different Hong Kong situations.

1 1.50 3.00 5 10 12 22 75
1C 3.00 4.00 8 16 22 33 34
3 1.50 1.50 4 9 10 24 60
4 2.00 4.00 6 12 18 25 26
5 2.00 4.79 8 26 26 72 348
6 0.54 1.00 2 6 5 10 93
7 1.50 2.00 6 9 11 25 32
Table 6.11 Distribution of runout distance L (measured horizontally from head

of scarp to toe debris, in metres) for different Hong Kong situations.

1 0.43 1.94 4 10 12 28 180
1C 2.00 2.35 6 12 16 37 47
3 0.00 1.50 2 6 6 15 75
4 1.48 2.85 5 141 22 707 2260
5 2.55 4.62 9 37 28 92 837
6 0.40 1.00 3 7 6 11 100
7 1.00 2.30 7 18 24 45 100
Table 6.12 Distribution of coefficient of apparent friction F=H/L for different

Hong Kong situations.
1 0.22 0.59 0.85 1.19 1.37 2.33 5.00
1C 0.37 0.46 0.85 1.61 2.19 3.40 4.50
3 0.20 0.60 1.13 2.05 2.76 4.83 7.14
4 0.15 0.33 0.50 0.98 1.06 3.58 3.72
5 0.18 0.44 0.70 1.01 1.19 1.73 2.75
6 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.84 1.21 2.50 3.75
7 0.07 0.12 0.45 0.60 0.77 1.08 1.59
From Tables 6.6 to 6.12 it can be seen that the size of the failures varies, but
is generally small scale with median volumes ranging from 4 to 253 m3. The
median coefficients of apparent friction range from 0.60 (tan31 °) for fills to 2.05
(tan64 o) for rock falls. The most mobile failures (ie having the highest run out
distances) are fills, followed by retaining walls, natural slopes, cuts and rock
falls. This is because most failures involving fill had loose, granular fill material
present. This type of material tends to fail in the undrained condition given that
a collapse mechanism occurs on shearing, as pointed out by Morgenstern
(1995a) and Dawson et al (1992).
B) Relationships Between Geometric Variables

The author investigated the relationship between the basic geometric
variables H, L, F, (based on the extreme dimensions) and the corresponding
variables HX, LX and FX (based on the centres of gravity of the failed mass) for
cuts, fills and retaining walls. These are defined in Figures 6.17 and 6.18. The
Figure 6.17 Definition of variable F = H/L for a cut slope following Scheidegger
(1973).
LX
Figure 6.18 Definition of variable FX = HX!LX, based on the centre of gravity of

the failed mass, for a cut slope.
investigation was carried out as the simple sled model predicts FX=HX/LX to be
a constant value, and equal to the average coefficient of friction along the slope
surface ,u (Sassa, 1988; Scheidegger, 1973). Also it can be seen that HX/LX
(=FX) and H/L (=F) are approximately equal for cut slopes, ie. the lines shown
in Figure 6.19 below are approximately parallel. This is also true for fills and
retaining walls.
Figure 6.19 The approximate equality ofF and FX for cut slopes.
The author calculated the values of H, L, F, HX, LX and FX from the

landslide database. The correlation between Hand L, HX and LX, and F and FX
was then analysed for cuts, fills and retaining walls by generating scatter plots of
the data, plotting the regression line on the plot together with its upper and
lower 95% confidence intervals (95% UCI and 95% LCI), and visually examining
its goodness of fit as well as the R 2 value. R 2 is the coefficient of determination
for models regression models with a constant, and indicates how much of the
variance of the landslide data the model is able to explain (Montgomery and
Peck, 1982). Generally, the larger the R 2 value, the better the model fit (see
Appendix C2 for further details).
The scatter plots are shown in Figures 6.20 to 6.29. It can be seen that the
data shows that H and L, HX and LX are significantly correlated for the cuts,
with only some or low correlation for fill slopes and retaining walls. A high
correlation exists between F and FX for cuts, fills and retaining walls. This
implies that F and FX can be used interchangeably for predictive purposes,
hence while FX is derived on a theoretical basis from the simple sled model, F is
more useful for predictive applications as F predicts the debris runout distance
which greatly influences the vulnerability of elements at risk. The distributions
ofF and FX were also found to be similar.
200~--------------------------------------------~
150
L
(m) 100
•
•
•
50 95% LCI •
•
0
0 20 40 60 80
H(m)
Figure 6.20 Correlation between Hand L for Hong Kong cuts, R 2 =0.64.
200r-------------------------------------------------~
•
150
LX 100
(m}
HX (m}
Figure 6.21 Correlation between HX. and LX for Hong Kong cuts, R 2 =0.49 .
OUTLIER
F 3
0+-----------~------------,-------------~----------~
0 10 20 30 40
FX
Figure 6.22 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts including outlier,
R 2 =0.49.
4
•
•
95% LCI
2 •
o+L---------.,---------~----------~----------~--------~
0 2 4 6 8 10
FX
Figure 6.23 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts without outlier,
R 2 =0.84.
100~----------------------------------------------~----~
95%UCI
80 •
L 60
(m)
40
20
0 20 40 60 80 100
H(m)
Figure 6.24 Correlation between Hand L for Hong Kong fills, R 2 =0.36.
60~----------------------------------------------------~
95%UCI
40 •
30
LX
(m)
20 •
•
•• • •
10
• 95% LCI
0 20 40 60 80
HX(m)
Figure 6.25 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong fills, R 2 =0.21.
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
F 2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
FX
Figure 6.26 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong fills, R2=0.84.
14
12 •
10 • MEAN
L
8 •
•
(m)
6 •
•
• • •
•
4 • •
• •
• • •
2 • • • •
•
0
•
• • • •
•
'
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
H(m)
Figure 6.27 Correlation between Hand L for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.44.
6 •
4
LX
(m)
3 •
•
2
•
I
•
• • ••
0 ••
0 2 4 6 8 10
HX (m)
Figure 6.28 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.28.
95%UCI
6
4
F
0 2 4 6 8 1(
FX
Figure 6.29 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong retaining waJJs,
R 2 =0.93.
6.2.4.2 F=H/L Versus V Plots for Hong Kong and Comparison to

Other Data
The author plotted F=H/L versus V for the cuts (situations 1, 1A), fills
(situations 7, 7A) and retaining walls (situations 6, 6A) in the Hong Kong
landslide database in order to investigate correlation between the apparent
friction angle F and the magnitude V was to be found (cfScheidegger, 1973; Hsu,
1975). The plots are shown in Figures 6.30 to 6.32. First, one can see the wide
scatter in the data for all three types of slope. Indeed, the correlation coefficient
for F and V was found to be not statistically significant at the 5% significance
level for cuts, fills and retaining walls. Second, for cut slopes the mobility for
failures onto a non-horizontal slope below (A2>0) fits easily into the scatter of
the data for failures onto a horizontal slope (A2=0) below (viz Figure 6.30). A
decrease inF with an increased slope angle below A2 would be expected. There is
a hint of this apparent in Figure 6.30. When the author plotted F against A2
(Figure 6.33), a broad decreasing trend was obtained, albeit with too much
scatter to make any prediction possible. The differentiation of the mobility of
5~-------------------------------------------------------,
•
4
3 •
F •
2
•• e,.x
,.X
X • X ...
X
Jr
" X
•
0+-------~--~------~--~------~--~------~--~------~_J
.1 .5 5 10 50 100 500 1000 5000
A2>0 A2=0
•
non-horizontal slope horizontal slope
Figure 6.30 Plot ofF versus Vfor all Hong Kong cut slopes (situations 1, lA).
•
5
4
•
F 3 •
• •
•
2 • •
•
1
• •
•
• •
I ••
• • •• • • •
I • •• •
I • .•• • • • •• •
• ••• • • • • •
0 • • • •
3 5 20 40 100 300 500 2000
2 4 10 30 50 200 400 1000
V(m3)
Figure 6.31 Plot ofF versus Vfor Hong Kong fill slopes (situations 7, 7A).
4
• •
•
•
3 •
• •
•
F 2 • • •
• • •
• • • •• •
• • •
• •
•
• •
• • ••
• • •
0
.4 3 5 20 40 100
.5 2 4 10 30 50 200
V(m3)
Figure 6.32 Plot ofF versus Vfor Hong Kong retaining walls (situations 6, 6A).
5~--------------------------------------------------.
3 • •
F •
..• • ••
• • ••
•
• •
• •• •
I
• •
I •• I
• •
• • • • •
• • •
0
0 15 30 45 60 75 90
A2
Figure 6.33 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong cut slopes with A2 > 0.
fills and retaining walls based on the slope below was not statistically possible
due to the low numbers of these in the database (61 for fills and 35 for retaining
walls).
The author also compared the mobility of the Hong Kong cut, fill and
retaining wall failures against other data, discussed previously in section
6.2.4.3. The F versus logV plot is shown in Figure 6.34. The data sources and
summary are given in Table 6.13. One can note the generally decreasing trend of
F with increasing logV, as found by many researchers, is confirmed (Hutchinson,
1995 and 1988; Hsu, 1975; Scheidegger, 1973). For failure volumes less than
1,000 m 3 the data scatter increases tremendously. This is not unexpected, as
this region covers different types of failures, different materials and different
mobilities of failure materials. The data was also plotted on a logF versus logV
scale to check if any trends appeared (Figure 6.35). The data falls both below and
above the natural angle of repose range of 30 o -40 o, with no distinct trends
appearing. For failure volumes greater than 10 6 m 3, the scatter is lower as these
are primarily rock falls/avalanches. The mobility is also increased, as pointed
out in section 6.2.4.4 Hence while researchers such as Scheidegger (1973), Hsu
(1975) and Davies (1982) were able to fit a meaningful regression line through
rock avalanche data with volumes greater than 10 6 m 3 , the author was not able
to do the same for the Hong Kong data (with a volume range of0.1 to 1,000 m 3).
Even within each type of failure (eg cut slope) the mechanisms and materials
differed, resulting in a very wide scatter ofF values. F versus V plots for the
prediction ofrunout distance for the cuts, fills and retaining walls in Hong Kong
could be used directly to obtain an indicative or preliminary runout distance
estimate. The author has developed statistical models for a quantified
prediction of runout distances in Hong Kong. These are detailed in section
6.2.4.6.
Table 6.13 Failure type description and data sources for F versus V plots.
Retaining Rock Coal mine Kaolinised Ext rater-

Type Cuts Fills Chalk
walls avalanches waste rock granite restrial
Number 466 61 35 109 39 11 1 3
Source 1 1 1 2,3,4,8 5,6 6 6 7,8
Sources:
1. The author's Hong Kong landslide database
2. Sassa, 1988
3. Cruden, 1976
4. Li Tianchi, 1983
5. Golder Associates, 1992
6. Hutchinson, 1988
7. Melosh, 1987
8. Lucchita, 1978
....,
;:r
~
......
5.5 C1> C1>
+ DATA ~ ...
~· ~
~'Tj
5.0 ~ [
• Extraterrestrial "' Ill
C1> '<
(Melosh, 1987; Lucchita, en ~
en '"tl
4.5 1978) s ;:r
g t1
o Kaolinised granite ;'(3
4.0 (Hutchinson, 1988) .~(/)
... z
.g
C1>
~
'-'
3.5 . a
Chalk
(Hutchinson, 1988)
en
F 3.0 .. +
Coal mine waste rock
...
• (Golder Associates, 1992;
Hutchinson, 1988)
2.5
+
Rock avalanches
2.0
. . . 4·
. +
" (Sassa, 1988; Cruden,
1976; Li Tianchi, 1983;
Lucchita, 1978)
1.5 + .:.. >·. ~) :_·~·:.. ~ . . II H tan 40o Retaining walls
=.. ·i;~~~i:~~, '·;,.

... '.a. 4 '!-:";·•• &.f'f ... .
+
.
L=IO'
Ill
1.0
HONG
t
+
Fills
__j---
--- --v-
--- --Q-
..
--- --- --- --- KONG
0.5 ___j.__ --4 .__ __..., if. --- --.,-
~-.. "e~~~.~~e
• • +.:..- + • • Q, IJ Q
t. t. .. .. 0 • ..,t " "

. •• 11 .~- .. "....• 7 -~
• a# •j • I Cuts
...
. :a •"' " ""' ., g
e<> "
..
0.0
10-1 100 101 102 1o3 104 105 106 107 1oS 109
""
1010 1011
• •
1012 1013
V(m 3 )
N
Figure 6.34 Plot ofF versus logV for various landslides. -....)
v.
;J~
n (;"
~ '"1
+. DATA .... .......
5.0 "' .
:»"'Tj
4.0
,_+.,. " ~[
A
3.0 •A •• • +
+ ..+ • Extraterrestrial "'
n
"' '<
l=>l
J
A · A +. • (Melosh, 1987; Lucchita, ~
· ••. h .
2.0 ' • •: .A·_.~:. • .I>• ++ tan 40°
1978) s"' :::r
'i:i
g 0
.A+ . )·:·.~~.-~~: ....... -' 181
EJ Kaolinised granite ;;c
+. -• ·. ·":1t-r-.t_:f#. ., • • • •. •~
·: . t an 30° ,....,z
j--
.:,;, ··, • .-~ ...... +. (Hutchinson, 1988)
.. ""j"... ~J:.:;·:
.... ..:':+ .
~
181
~CIJ
~~-~
+.. . ..-··.4':'.~ ~--------
1.0 . .&.:.';··:~·
f--- ..;:-.. ·- ·-- -
.gn'-"
~
""'-!'·'+.•!'·;.:.
.,-+.. •. •
,..
•
-
..,.
~ ~
GJ
181
Chalk
•-:f:.!'. ;t·"t • A ••· • •• • • - Q.
!!)
~ (Hutchinson, 1988) "'
0.5 t-- - - - - ... ·+-1-+-- .,.---'-- - - - - ""CT"": - - --fh:;- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --
+.. A .+ • • \ • I!) - " - ~
0.4 ~+ + EJ 181 I e .. , e ~ i) l!fJJ>l-Jj,r.G@ ~
.o. G
0.3 +" ~ li>li>~~~~~~(!)GG • Coal mine waste rock
F •• G \') Ill li) :!:~~.E)
A
+
+ +
+
• e
e e ~ @ G ~ ~'«lli>G i> G (W'4. . .1 (Golder Associates, 1992;
Hutchinson, 1988)
0.2 - + 181. • ·~
•
li> Q
'•
~
~<!e~ e> I!> I!>
~ ~ i9
Rock avalanches
G 0
till> (Sassa, 1988; Cruden,
0.1
~ 1976; Li nanchi, 1983;
~
Q Lucchita, 1978)
li>
" Retaining walls
0.05
0.04 •
0.03
0.02 •
• + Fills HONG
KONG
Cuts
0.01
10-1 100 101 102 103 104 105 loG 107 108 109 1010 1011 1012 1013
V(m 3 )
N
-..J
Figure 6.35 Plot of logF versus logV for various landslides. a-
6.2.4.5 Application of the Simple Sled Model to Cut Slope Data
A simple sled model has been applied to the cut slopes portion of the
landslide database in order to investigate whether realistic coefficients of
friction can be obtained from the data for the surfaces on which the debris slides
on. The simple sled model assumes that the moving slide mass remains intact, ie
moves as a "sled", and thus the frictional work dissipating the energy of the
landslide depends on the coefficient offriction between the ground surface and
the sliding mass. The runout distance, which is the distance travelled by a
landslide, has been the variable commonly used by a number ofresearchers (see
Van Gassen and Cruden, 1989). Another very common variable is the apparent
or equivalent angle of friction, denoted as tan(C/Ja) (Scheidegger 1973, Sassa
1988),fle (Hsu 1975) or occasionally {(Scheidegger 1973). Although Scheidegger
(1973) defined this angle as the angle of a line stretching from the top of the
failure scarp to the debris toe, others such as Sass a (1988) use the line joining the
centres of gravity of the failed mass in its original and final position. The author
has used both definitions in his analysis of Hong Kong's cut slope landslide
database. The apparent angle of friction as used by Scheidegger (1973) is
denoted as F and the apparent angle of friction as used by Sassa (1988) and
others is denoted FX.
The sled model is the most widely used model to explain the motion of a
landslide(eg. Sassa, 1988). It is based on the simple assumption that all energy
loss during the motion of a landslide is dissipated through friction. The sled
model assumes a failed mass with potential energy mgHX moving through a
horizontal distance LX, illustrated in Figure 6.36. When a mass having
potential energy HX moves a distance LX over a varying slope angle 8, the
energy loss during motion is
EL = Jmgcos8tan¢a cos
dLXe = mgHXtan¢a 6.1
where m is the failed mass andg the acceleration due to gravity. If one assumes a
uniform coefficient of friction ,U 1 on a cut slope with angle Al, and ,u 2 on the
horizontal deposition zone, one obtains the relationship by equating the
potential energy of the mass to the loss of energy due to friction
6.2
where LS is the distance travelled by the mass along the slope, and Ll is the
distance travelled by the mass along the horizontal deposition zone. All
measurements are defined relative to the centre of gravity of the sliding mass. In
terms of horizontal distances only
6.3
where L3 is the horizontal distance between the centre of gravity of the mass in
its initial position and the toe of the slope. Three basic cases can be derived from
this equation depending on what assumptions are made regarding /1-I and f.lz.
These are:
1. /1-1 = /1-2 = 11-
2. /1-1 =0, and
3. /1-1 ¥- /1-2·
Each of these is discussed in turn.
L1 L3
LX
Figure 6.36 Definition of a simple sled model for a cut slope.
A) Case 1, /1-t = /1-2 =/1-

Equation 6.3 becomes
HX =p,
LX 6.4
or
6.5
Figure 6.21 plots HX versus LX as suggested by equation 6.4. A linear

relationship is indeed shown in the plot, with the linear model fit being high (R 20
= 0.91). The mean value ofp given by equation 6.4 is thus 0.96 (equal to tan44 °),
a high but still realistic value. The value is not impossible considering the
model's simplicity. The 5% and 95% values of Jl are 0.40 and 2.00 respectively.
The data indicates indicates that the Case 1 sled model fits the data well.
The constant c in equation 6.5 should be equal to zero. A non-linear
regression analysis with c=O solving directly for Jl gave Jl = 0. 767 with an R 20 =
0.50. The results indicate that the data fits the simple sled model withp 1 = fl 2 =
Jl reasonably well. Also the Jl value predicted is at the top end of the range
encountered in real situations, as for a friction angle range, say, of 23°-38° the
corresponding value range of Jl is 0.42-0. 78.
B) Case 2, p 1 =0
HX
Ll = P- 2
6.6
or
LX ~ (J.)H3 + ( ~ 2 )H2 + c' 6.7
Plotting HX versus Ll (from equation 6.6) in Figure 6.37 showed that there was
a large amount of scatter and no significant correlation (R2 =0.27) between
these two variables. This model gives p 2 = 1.17 (tan50°), which is unrealistic.
Hence the indication is that the data does not appear to fit the Case 2 model well
(not unexpectedly). The constant c' in equation 6.7 should be equal to zero. A
non-linear regression analysis with c'=O solving directly for p 2 gave p 2 = 2.11
with anR 2 = 0.24, also indicating that the data does not fit the simple sled Case 2
model with p 1 = 0 very well.
C) Case 3,/11 =I= /12

Ll = _(H_2_/_2_+_R_3_)_(t_an_A_l_-_f.l~
1)
P- 2 tanAl 6.8
or, using HX,
Ll = _H_X_(t_a_n_A_l_-!1-_...;1:;:._)
/1-z tanAl 6.9
A non-linear regression analysis solving directly for f£ 1 andf£ 2 gavef£ 1 = 0.377

andf£ 2 = 1.661 with anR 2 = 0.26, indicating that the simple sled model with,u 1
¥=- f£ 2 does not fit the cut slope landslide data very well. Also the f£ 1 , f£ 2 values
obtained were unrealistic.
50.------------------------------------------------
• 95%UCI
40
•
•
30
• •
L1 •
(m)
95% LCI
•
• •
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
HX (m)
Figure 6.37 Lack of correlation between HX and Ll for Hong Kong cut slopes,
R 2 =0.27.
D) Summary
By examining the results of analyses of cases 1, 2 and 3 it became clear that
the simple sled model Case 1 fits the cut slope data best.
6.2.4.6 Runout Distance Prediction for Hong Kong Slopes Using

Multiple Regression Analyses
The main objective of the multiple regression analyses of the Hong Kong
landslide database was to obtain statistical models for the prediction of runout
distance having only a few independent variables and a reasonable fit to the
data. Multiple regression analyses were performed on the eight situations with
sufficient data for statistical analysis, namely situations 1, 1A, 1C, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7. The independent variables used were those giving runout distance (variables
such as L, LX, F, and FX) and depth of debris at the toe of the slope (H4). The
dependent variables used were the remaining, mutually independent, geometry
variables. These include such variables as slope height (Hl), slope angle (Al),
magnitude of failure (V) and the depth of failure (D).
The steps in the analysis were:
1. Cross checking volumes.
2. Calculating and/or transforming dependent variables.
3. Checking normality of variables, transforming if necessary.
4. Carrying out multiple regression analyses. A simple model was tested
initially, dependent variables added and the improvement in model fit
noted.
5. Checking the contribution to model fit of each variable.
6. Checking for satisfactory residuals.
7. Checking for normality of the independent variables.
A) Situations or Scenarios Amenable to Regression Analysis

Out of23 situations available in the database and defined in Appendix C1,
eight have enough incidents from a statistical point of view for further analysis.
These are:
Situation 1 Cut slope failure
Situation 1A Cut slope failure affecting a house/hut
Situation 1C Cut slope failure with two cut face angles
Situation 3 Rock fall
Situation 4 Slope failure above a retaining wall
Situation 5 Natural slope failure
Situation 6 Retaining wall failure
Situation 7 Fill slope failure
It can be seen that these cover the vast majority of slope risk assessment
scenarios in Hong Kong. Each of the above eight situations was analysed
separately. The others are reported in a summary format, but have no direct
predictive use.
B) Available Variables
The variables available for statistical models for the prediction of runout
distance are those that are reported for most incidents in the database. These
fall into the following groups:
o one broad material variable,
o one broad causes variable, and
o
10-20 geometry variables describing the slope and failure
geometries.
The frequency distributions of the values of F=HIL versus the broad material
and causes of failure variables were analysed using box plots. Figure 6.38
explains the features of a box plot, which summarises the information about the
frequency distribution of the variable in question. Figures 6.39 and 6.40 (in box
plot format) show that for cut slopes, the distributions of F do not differ
markedly for the different material types reported (Figure 6.39) and the
reported causes of failure (Figure 6.40). Also subsequent regression analyses
revealed that the inclusion of the material and causes of failure variables did not
improve the regression model fits. Hence, the author concluded that the
material and causes of failure variables (as recorded in the incident reports) did
not influence the runout distance. This fact can be attributed to the coarse
classes available for these variables as well as the similar nature of the materials
originating from the weathering products of volcanic and granitic rocks, and the
colluvium derived from these. Thus the author proceeded with the construction
of regression models based purely on geometric variables.
90
80
- - - . - - - ..__MAXIMUM (without outliers
25% of data {
....---'---. ..__ 75%
70
60
(j) 50% of data
Q) ..__ 50% (MEDIAN)
....
Q)
Cl
Q) 50
~
UJ .____,..._ _. ..__ 25%
_J
C) 40
z
<( 25%ofdata {
UJ
a. 30
0
_J
- - - ' - - - . - - MINIMUM (without outliers)
(f)
20
OUTLIERS {
•
10 •
0
N=
Sample size
Figure 6.38 Explanation of box plot features.

4
• 72
• S2
J
•71
071
949 070
F 2 ~--
m l
I
I l
T I
I I r t
I I (
H
I
}--
l r
J I I I T
l
0
,(
·I
N• 77
Weathered
72
Decomposed
70
Decomposed
"
Soil Colluvium Rock
rock granite volcanics
MATERIAL TYPES
Figure 6.39 Plot of the distribution ofF = HIL for different material types -
Hong Kong cut slopes.
s.o
•23
4.0
••oe •n
•17 •312
•Ill
·•n
3.0
F OJ
o72
0"
2.0
BLOCKED BURST CONST- GROUND- INFILTRA- POOR

EROSION JOINTS
DRAIN MAIN RUCTION WATER TION MAINTENANCE
CAUSES OF FAILURE
Figure 6.40 Plot of the distribution ofF = H/L for different failure causes -
Hong Kong cut slopes.
C) Results and Discussion

The regression analysis results are given in Tables 6.14 to 6.17. All data
including outliers were included in the analyses. The variables in these tables
are defined as follows. All variables are lower case labels of corresponding
variables in the database. Variables including the letter X are based on a centre
of mass definition rather than distances from the edges of scarp and material.
The variables are:
If log F
lfx logFX
lta1 log (tanAl)
II log L
llx logLX
ll2 log L2
lta2 log (tanA2)
lh logH
lhx logHX
lta3 log (tanA3)
lh2 logH2
lvw1 log (V/Wl)
lh4 logH4
2
R is the coefficient of determination for regression models including a constant,
and indicates the proportion of variance of the dependent variables that can be
attributed to the model under consideration (Appendix C2). It is a measure of
the goodness of fit of the model under consideration to the data. R 2 is not
directly comparable to R 20 which is the coefficient of determination for
regression models through the origin (see Appendix C2).
It can be seen from Tables 6.14 to 6.17 that some situations have a better
overall fit than others, which is not unexpected. Generally it can be noted that
models using L have a better fit statistically than those using F=H/L. This does
not necessarily mean that L is predicted better. The main advantage in using
models predicting L is that H can then be used as an independent variable, asH
and L are often highly correlated, as discussed above. For the man- modified
slopes an initial estimate of H can be taken to be equal to the height of the slope,
whereas estimating H is difficult for natural slopes.
Table 6.14 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT R2
SITUATION
VARIABLE VARIABLES
f ta1 0.44
lta1 0.45
lta1, lvw1 0.49
If lta1, lvw1, mat 0.49
lta1, lvw1, d 0.50
lta1, lvw1 o.59t
lta1 0.55
lfx lta1, lvw1 0.58
lta1, lvw1, d 0.58
lh 0.72
lh, lta1 0.85
II
lh, lta1, lvw1 0.87
All angles 0.87
lh, lta1, lvw1, d
included
lhx 0.63
lhx, lta1 0.84
llx
lhx, lta1, lvw1 0.87
lhx, lta1, lvw1, d 0.88
h4 d,h1 0.44
lh4 lta1, lh1, ld 0.39
v, vw1, I, h, h1, ta1, d 0.02
ta4
v, vw1, f, ta2, h1, ta1, d 0.05
ld, lh, lh1, II, lta1 0.16
lta4
ld, lh1, If, lta1 0.16
lta1 0.45
If
lta1, lvw1 0.49
f ta1 0.37
a1 < 75° lta1 0.38
If
lta1, lvw1 0.43
f ta1 0.35
a1 < 70° lta1 0.36
If
lta1, lvw1 0.42
f ta1 0.24
a1 ~ 75° lta1 0.11
If
lta1, lvw1 0.09
40° < a1 < 79° f ta1 0.38
40° < a1 < 75° f ta1 0.37
40° < a1 < 70° f ta1 0.32
40° < a1 < 65° f ta1 0.27
t without outliers
Peter 1. Finlay, PhD (UNSW)
Table 6.15 Multiple linear regression results for Situation lC.
VARIABLE VARIABLES
lta1 0.23
lta1, lta3 0.26
If
lta1, lta3, lvw1 0.28
lta1, lta3, lvw1, d 0.31
lh 0.27
lh, lta1 0.40
II lh, lta1, lvw1 0.50
lh, lta1, lvw1, lta3 0.53
lh, lta1, lvw1, lta3, d 0.54
Table 6.16 Multiple linear regression results for Situation lA.
VARIABLE VARIABLES
ta1, h1, vw1 0.31
f
ta1, h1, d 0.31
lta1, lvw1 0.41
lta1, lvw1, lh1, lb1 0.55
If
lta1, lb1 0.55
lta1, lb1, lh1, ld 0.55
lh, lta1, lvw1 0.76
II
lh, lta1, lvw1, lta1, lb1 0.85
lta1, If, lh1, lvw1, lb1 0.27
lh
lta1, If, lh1, d, lb1 0.28
a4 h, v, vw1 0.01
ta4 h, v, vw1 0.02
lta1 0.05
lta4
lh, lta1, vw1, lb1 0.06
h. h1, v, vw1, ta1 0.38
h4
h, h1, v, vw1, ta1, b1 0.37
lta1, lvw1, If 0.27
lh4
lh, lh1, lvw1, lta1 0.36
Table 6.17 Multiple linear regression results for Situations 3,4,5,6 and 7.
SITUATION
VARIABLE VARIABLES
lta1 0.18
If lta1, lh2 o.3ot
Ita 1, lh2, lv 0.31
3
lh2 0.45
112 lh2, lta1 0.57
lh2, lta1, lv 0.57
lta1 0.29
lta1, d 0.32
If
lta1, d, lh4 0.34
lta1, d, lh4, lvw1 0.37
4
lh 0.19
lh,lh4 0.31
II
lh, lh4, lvw1, d 0.44
lh, lh4, lvw1, d, lta1 0.44
lta1 0.62
lta1, lvw1 0.59
If
lta1, lvw1, lta2 0.57
lta1, lvw1, lta2, d 0.53
5
lh, lta1 0.92
lh, lta1, lvw1 0.90
II
lh, lta1, lvw1, lta2 0.88
lh, lta1, lvw1, lta2, d 0.89
lh1 0.00
If
lh1, lvw1, lta2, d 0.18
6 lh 0.54
II lh, lvw1 0.64
lh, lh1, lvw1, lta2, d 0.65
d 0.17
If d, lta1 0.19
d, lta1, lvw1, lta2 0.19
lh 0.44
7
lh,lvw1 0.59
II Jh, lvw1, Jta1 0.62
lh, lvw1, lta1, lta2 0.62
lh, lvw1, lta1, lta2, d 0.63
t F=H21L2
The poor fits of some models and general data scatter can be attributed to several
factors. These include:
o approximate recording,
o erosion by water after initial failure before the failure is inspected
(this may be hours/days after the initial failure),
o different fluidity of the debris, also influenced partly by different
catchment areas for different slopes,
o differing geology to that recorded, and
o different magnitude, ie. volume of failure may gradually increase as
sliding progresses.
D) Construction of Runout Distance Models
i) Situations and independent variables for which models could be

constructed
Runout models could only be developed for those independent variables
where there was at least some fit of the model to the landslide data. The R 2
required by the author before a model was selected was an absolute minimum of
0.40, and in most cases over 0.50. Where several models for the same
independent variable passed the criteria, the one with the best fit was selected.
This particular selection criteria gives a predictive model with a reasonable
degree of confidence. The independent variables listed in Table 6.18 passed the
selection criteria. It can be seen that independent variables in situations 1, 1A,
3,5,6 and 7 passed. From a predictive viewpoint situation 1A is not useful as the
flow of the debris was obstructed by a building, and thereby the runout distance
was reduced. Hence, runout distance models were developed for situations
1,3,5,6 and 7. Situation 5 (natural slope failure) was developed for interest only,
as it does not contain the Lantau Island natural slope failure data which were
being analysed by GEO, and was not made available to the author. A proper
runout distance model for natural slopes requires far more data, evaluation of
various approaches and methodologies, and is beyond the scope of this study.
ii) Discussion of the effect of the slope below on runout distance

With the exception of situation 5 (natural slope), the runout distance
models apply to the situation where the debris runs out onto a near horizontal
slope below. This is because the landslide database used for this analysis had a
majority of cases with horizontal slope below. If the slope below (or part of it) is
sloping away from the failed slope, one would expect the actual runout distance
predicted to be greater than the runout distance for the case of the horizontal
slope below. The landslide database has some data to provide guidance for cut
slope failures. Figure 6.41 plots the cumulative frequencies for the values of the
apparent friction angle F for cut slope failures where the slope below was zero
(A2 =0) and non zero (A2 > 0). One can see that there is some difference between
the two for values ofF greater than 1.25, ie. that the runout is greater for slopes
with a non zero angle below. This is hardly a surprising result. The author
plotted F=H/L versus V for the cuts (situations 1, 1A) previously (Figure 6.30).
The mobility for failures onto a non- horizontal slope below (A2> 0) was located
within the band of the scatter of the data for failures onto a horizontal slope
(A2 =0) below. When the author plotted F against A2 (Figure 6 .33), such a broad
data scatter was obtained that no prediction was possible.

R 2 >0.50 (R 2 >0.40 as an absolute limit).
INDEPENDENT
SITUATION DESCRIPTION
VARIABLES
Cut slope failure L, (or F), H4
1A Cut slope failure L, (or F), H4
3 Boulder fall L2
5# Natural slope failure L (or F)
6 Retaining wall failure L
7 Fill slope failure L
# For interest only
Unfortunately, the landslide database does not contain enough data on

varying values of the slope below for other situations, such as fills and retaining
walls, to allow development of statistical models to take this into account.
However, one can use the models constructed for the prediction of runout
distance on a horizontal slope below, and then adjust the value (using
engineering judgement) for a non horizontal slope. Some further guidance can
also be gained from the review of major case studies (section 5.3.3). The concept
of a critical slope below, one on which the slide material will continue to flow
until it reaches a flatter slope, is explained therein. It would appear that this
slope is around 35°, ie. if the slope below the landslide is greater than 35° the
material will not stop. For large slides and slides with a large amount of water
runoff feeding into their area the debris will continue to flow over flatter slopes
(20°-22°). Accumulation/deposition is likely to occur when the slope below is
flatter than 14 o. By using these guidelines and assessing the steepness of the
slope below a landslide the engineer will be able to obtain a feel for the possible
extent of the runout distance.
100
- - -- -- --- ------
_.-,
v-:: ~ ....
, .... --
90 f - - - 12>0
~
~ 80 17 A2=0
>-
0 f..,'
z 70
w
::::>
a
w 60 I
a:
LL
w 50
,./
> ;I
~
..J
40
::::>
~ 30 J
:::::>
0
I
20 '/
10
)
,.J
0 ~
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5. 0
Figure 6.41 Cumulative frequencies for the values of the apparent friction angle
F for Hong Kong cut slope failures where the slope below was zero
(A2=0) and non zero (A2>0).
iii) Equations for runout distance

The equations for the runout distance models are summarised in Table
6.19. The equations are of the form
DV= C0 + Clxll + C2x12 6.10
where DV is the dependent variable, C0 the constant, Cl the coefficient of

independent variable 1 (11) and C2 the coefficient of independent variable 2 (12).
Three equations are given for each dependent variable, the lower 95%
confidence interval of prediction (LCI), the mean predicted value (MEAN) and
the upper 95% confidence interval of prediction (UCI). The suggested first or
initial estimates for independent variables are shown in Table 6.20. The
statistical details for each model (residual plots, normality checks and plots
supporting the initial independent variable estimates) are given in Appendix C3.
Potential users should always check the range of values in Table 6.21 and
the landslide database summary in section 6.2.4.1 to ensure that their problem
lies within the range of data before attempting to predict runout distance. Any
use outside the database range amounts to extrapolation and the loss of any
Table 6.19 Equations for Hong Kong runout distance models.
Equation
Situation DV
Co C1 11 C2 12
LCI 0.062 0.965 -0.558
log L MEAN 0.109 1.010 log H -0.506 log (tanA 1)
UCI 0.156 1.055 -0.454
1
LCI 0.453 0.525 0.0217
H4 MEAN 0.678 0.695 0 0.0537 H1
UCI 0.903 0.866 0.0858
LCI 0.041 0.515 -0.629
3 log L2 MEAN 0.253 0.703 log H2 -0.417 log (tanA 1)
UCI 0.466 0.891 -0.206
LCI 0.023 0.869 -1.067
51 log L MEAN 0.126 0.951 log H -0.892 log (tanA 1)
UCI 0.229 1.032 -0.717
LCI 0.037 0.350 0.108
6 log L MEAN 0.178 0.587 log H 0.309 log (V!W1)
UCI 0.319 0.825 0.510
LCI 0.269 0.325 0.166
7 log L MEAN 0.453 0.547 log H 0.305 log ( V!W1)
UCI 0.693 0.768 0.443
Notes: 1. Situation 5 model (natural slope) given for interest only.
Table 6.20 Suggested first estimates for independent variables in equations for
Hong Kong runout distance.
Suggested
Situation DV IV Reason
first estimate
log L log H H=H1 Very similar distributions
1
H4 0 1m Mean of data
3 log L2 log H2 H2=H1 Very similar distributions
51 log L log H H=45m Upper value in database
log H H=H1 Very similar distributions
6 log L
log (V/W1) V!W1=9m 2 Upper value in database
log H H=H1 Very similar distributions
7 log L
log (V/W1) V!W1=22m2 Upper value in database
models.
Variable Variable
Situation
Label Min Max Label Min Max
H 1.5 75 At 30 90
1
0 0.2 122 Ht 1.5 60
3 H2 1.5 60 At 40 90
H 2 348 At 28 72
51
Do not use as primary predictor
6 H 0.54 93 V!Wt 0.01 3.5
7 H 1.5 32 V!Wt 0.01 1,138

2. The 95th percentile value is 3.
prediction credibility. An example calculation for the runout distance and debris
depth for a cut slope is given in section iv) below. The use of equations in Table
6.19, first estimate values from Table 6.20 and the limitations of the prediction
are illustrated.
iv) Example of prediction of debris runout distance and depth for a

cut slope
Suppose an engineer wished to evaluate the runout distance of debris and
its depth for a cut slope for which Situation 1 is representative. For example, he
or she may wish to be able to determine how far to locate a building from the base
of a cut slope so that it is out of the reach of debris in the event of a failure, or,
more realistically, so that the debris depth on the side of the building closest to
the cut is below a maximum level.
The engineer has only the proposed geometry of the cut available, that is
the height of the cut Hl in metres, and the cut slope angle Al in degrees. The
problem definition is shown in Figure 6.42. The engineer knows that a
reasonable first estimate for the location of the top of the failure scarp is the top
of the cut slope, as this is the majority of the cases (see Table 6.23). Hence
H = Hl is a reasonable first approximation. The first estimate of D can be taken
as lm, the mean of the data (Table 6.8). By using the equations in Table 6.19 the
runout distance L and the debris depth at the base of the cut H 4 can be
calculated, together with their 95% confidence values. The results for a lOrn
high cut laid at 60° are shown in Table 6.22 and Figure 6.43.
Predicted debris profile
H:H
1
H4
L1
Figure 6.42 Problem definition for a cut slope runout distance prediction.
Table 6.22 Predicted debris profile values for H1=10m,A1=60°.
VARIABLE LCI MEAN UCI

L (m) 7.8 10.0 12.7
L 1 (m) 6.9 4.2 2.0
H4(m) 1.2 1.9 2.6
L 1 is calculated from problem geometry.
LCI is the lower confidence interval.
UCI is the upper confidence interval.
10.0m
95% confidence limits

for debris profile
2.6m
1.9m
1.2m
2.0m 5.8m
4.2m
6.9m
Figure 6.43 Example prediction of debris profile for a cut with Hl =lOrn,
AJ=60°.
Table 6.23 Locations of the head of the failure scarp for Hong Kong cut slopes. I~~
:;d ,...,
"' .
-·
l';"'Tj
<...;
~[
"' ~
'<
"'
(1)
~
I~::s..............0
"' '"1:i
CLASS I H<H1 I
H<H1
-
H2/H1 < 0.5 I H<H1
-
0.5 < H2/H1 < 1.0 I H= H1
I H> H1
I 0 c::
,...,z
~en
l,g ~
F
A
I I I I I I (1)
"'
'-'
I
L
u
R
E
T
y
p
E
PercentaJ 19% I 8% I 34% I 23% I 16%
Number 84 36 152 99 71
N
\0
Vl
6.3 Vulnerability of Persons And Property

The assessment of vulnerability of the elements at risk is an important step
in landslide risk assessment. It is the "what if?" part of the assessment- "if a
landslide of this magnitude does reach this building, how many people will be
killed? How much building damage will occur?" It enables the consequences of
the landslide hazard to be quantified, usually in terms of casualties and
damage/financial losses. The two components of this step are:
o determining the elements at risk, and
o determining the vulnerabilities of the elements at risk.
The assessment of vulnerability was carried out using two approaches. The first
approach (detailed in section 6.2) involved an assessment ofrunout distance and
debris depth for historical failures recorded in the landslide database.
Estimation of runout distance is crucial in determining whether the element
will be reached by landslide debris, and if so, to what depth it will be
buried/affected. The next step is the determination of element vulnerabilities,
which is discussed herein.
6.3.1 Objectives
The objectives of the study of the vulnerability of persons and property to
landsliding were to develop quantitative guidelines for the vulnerabilities of
persons and property in different landslide situations.
6.3.2 Data Sources

The data for the assessment of the vulnerability of persons was obtained
from well documented multiple fatality landslides in the literature. Some
details are given in section 6.3.3.1 below, others are located in the author's Hong
Kong landslide database. The data for the assessment of property damage was
obtained from the author's Hong Kong landslide database only, as no details on
property damage were found in the published articles on landslide disasters.

Landslides
The author has studied the vulnerability of persons based on fatal
landslides available to him. Unfortunately the author did not have access to
many of the landslide disasters described in section 9.1.2.1, as many are not
published. However, the author was able to compile data from 27 fatal case
studies from the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Hong Kong. This data only
represents a small proportion of the total fatal landslides occurring around the
world, and hence the results and conclusions drawn herein will be applicable
only to similar situations. The more recent landslides with multiple fatalities
have had Commissions or Tribunals of Inquiry appointed to investigate them by
the highest government level in the country. The reports of these investigations
are published and publicly available. First, the well documented multiple and
single fatality landslides are described. Second, the various factors influencing
the numbers of deaths and injuries are discussed.
6.3.3.1 Well Documented Multiple Fatality Landslides

Brief descriptions of each event are given below. The cross- sections of the
landslides can be found in Appendix C4.
A) Aberfan (United Kingdom)

The village of Aberfan is located at the base of a valley. On Friday, 21
October 1966, at about 9.15am, over 110,000 m 3 of coal mine tailings, dumped
loosely on the side of a slope above the village liquefied and swept "swiftly with a
jet-like roar down the side ofthe Merthyr Mountain ... engulfed and destroyed a
school and eighteen houses, and damaged another school and other dwellings in
the village before its onward flow substantially ceased" (Inquiry Tribunal,
1967). As a result 144 people (including 116 children) were killed and another 35
injured.
B) Highland Towers (Malaysia)

The Highland Towers condominium consisted of three 14 storey buildings.
On December 11, 1993, at approximately 1.30pm, four retrogressive slides
occurred behind Block 1 (Inquiry Committee, 1994). The debris heaped on the
car park behind the building, adding a surcharge load which propagated slide
planes around the pile foundation. These events increased the pressure on the
retaining wall in front of the building, The Inquiry Committee concluded that
"the wall and the earth behind it moved away from the front of the building,
causing the loss oflateral support and subsequent failure ofthe piles in the front
row". Further structural collapse then resulted in the building toppling and
collapsing. 49 fatalities and 2 injuries resulted.
C) Po Shan Road (Hong Kong)

A major excavation an a steep slope is a vital factor in this landslide,
described by the GEO (1992) and The Commission of Inquiry (1972b). When
four days of heavy rain commenced on 15 June 1972, the site started
experiencing numerous movements of the sheet piles that were in use, and small
landslide failures for several days prior to the main failure. However, no- one
could envisage the size or runout distance of the actual failure. Concern over
small, localised landslides was predominant. On the day of failure, cracks

appeared and widened in Po Shan Rd (above the excavation site). The major
landslide occurred at 8.50pm on 18 June 1972. Some 40,000 m 3 of debris
mobilised, demolishing first a house at 11 Kotewall Rd, then destroyed the 4
storey K. K. Sun's building and the 13 storey Kotewall Court building before
finally coming to rest. Another 12 storey building (Skyline Mansions) was also
damaged, but survived the side-longimpact. 67 deaths and 19 injuries resulted.
D) Sau Mau Ping (Hong Kong)

A loose fill slope embankment failure of about 1,100 m 3 occurred about
l.lOpm on 18 June 1972, burying or destroying a large number of huts in the Sau
Mau Ping temporary housing area (Commission of Inquiry, 1972a). 71 deaths
and 60 injuries resulted. Another fill embankment in the same area failed four
years later, on 25 August 1976. About 2,000 m 3 of debris flowed into the ground
floors of the Block 9 multistorey apartment, killing 18 and injuring 24 (Binnie
and Partners, 1976).
E) Baguio Villas (Hong Kong)

At about 3.10pm on 8 May 1992 a landslide occurred on the hillside above
the multistorey Baguio Villa apartment development (Chan and Pun, 1992).
The landslide started with the collaps~ of a masonry retaining wall and part of
the platform behind it. The debris was channelled down a natural gully to Block
44, crossing the road as it became a growing debris flow. Over 2, 000 m 3 of debris
was mobilised, coming to rest on the podium and car parking lots of Block 44. A
child within the apartment block and an engineer on the podium were killed.
F) Kwun Lung Lau (Hong Kong)

At 8.53pm on 23 July 1994 a masonry wall over 10m high collapsed
following a period of heavy rain (Morgenstern, 1994; GE0,1994a). About
1,000 m 3 of debris buried a footpath, killing five and injuring three.
G) Cheung Shan (Hong Kong)

A landslide with only 50m3 of debris occurred at a bus stop near the
Cheung Shan Estate (Pun and Li, 1993). Because a double-decker bus was
stopped in front of the bus stop at the time, the debris piled up at the bus stop,
killing a woman and injuring five others. While not a multiple fatality event, it
illustrates the lucky escape that some people had from the landslide.
6.3.3.2 Single Fatality Landslides

The yearly statistics of landslide deaths and injuries in Hong Kong were
shown in Tables 5.2 and 5. 7 previously. They were broken up into different areas
where fatalities occurred. It can be seen that before 1984 a large proportion of
landslide deaths and injuries occurred in the squatter areas. A program of
squatter relocation has subsequently reduced squatter populations and hence
the total number oflandslide fatalities. The probability of casualties is discussed
further in section 7 .4.
This section looks at the factors influencing the vulnerability of persons
from landslide debris. The author added further well documented landslides
resulting in single fatalities and injuries, or injuries only, from the Hong Kong
data to the multiple fatality data.
6.3.3.3 Results and Discussion

The data from 27 well documented fatal landslides available to the author
is presented in Table 6.24. The cross-sections are shown in Appendix C4. The
following factors influence the number of deaths and injuries resulting from a
landslide:
o the population at risk (PAR),
o magnitude of failure,
o type of failure,
o the amount of warning time available,
o proximity of person(s) to the slope,
o debris runout distance and depth,
o whether the landslide debris buries the person(s) or not (related to
proximity and debris runout distance/depth),
o whether the person(s) are in the open or enclosed in a vehicle or
building,
o whether the vehicle or building collapses when impacted by debris,
and
o the type of collapse if the vehicle or building collapses.
From Table 6.24 it can be seen that a number ofthe crucial factors, especially the
PAR and the available warning time, are lacking from virtually all cases. This is
understandable as the reports on these landslides focused on the causes and
retribution for the disaster, and did not gather information useful for a landslide
risk database. However, without such data the analysis is not as complete as it
could be.
The recorded information available to the author was the number of deaths
D and injuries I, the magnitude V, proximity P (measured from the base of the
slope to the element) and the values of Hand L derived from cross-sections in
Appendix C4. The author classified the fatal landslides into the six following
types based on the type of elements affected:
Table 6.24 Well documented multiple fatality landslide incidents. ;J~
(1) 0
;.:o '"I
,_. .......
"' .
i';"'Tj
~ [
TYPE ELEMENT INCIDENT DATE TIME MATERIAL WT V(m 3 ) D I H(m) L (m) P(m) "'~ ~
':;<:
Buildings on Po Shan Rd 18/06/72 2050 C,WR Days (2 l 40,000 67 19 112.0 267.0 80 3"' "'0
::r
and below
Multistorey buildings,
Highland
g tj
roads, persons ...... ,--...
,..., cz
slide 11/12/93 1330 F, RS Nil 40,000 49 2 40.0 150.0 35 0
Towers
~Vl
Baguio Villas 1.5hrs (2) ~
2!05/92 1400 F, Soil 1,500 2 1 105.0 170.0 6 0
Multistorey buildings, (HK92/5/8) ~'--"
roads, persons Sau Mau
'
"'
25/08/76 1012 Loose F Nil 2,000 18 24 35.0 69.0 24
Ping 1976
Loose mine (2)
Abert an 21/10/66 0915 107,000 144 35 180.0 666.7 533
1-2 storey buildings, waste
huts, roads, persons 0330,
K45 29/05/82 F, RS ? 250 71 5 50.0 60.0 25
0830
Huts, 1-2 storey build- Sau Mau
18/06/72 1310 Loose F Nil 11,000 1 60 40.0 170.0 20
ings, persons Ping 1972
Building(s) Masonry hut (persons 650( 4)
K30 28-29/05/82 Night? C? ? 1 0 32.0 35.0 0
on slide inside)
Hut (persons inside) 14/11SWC 9/09/83 0930 RS? ? 300(4) 2 0 19.0 29.0 0
Masonry hut (persons
NT8/8 16/08/82 1030 F? ? 240 2 0 10.0 12.0 1
inside)
K14 28-29/05/82 Night? WR (IV) ? 90( 4) 2 0 12.0 10.5 1
24/79 3/8/79(1) ? WR? ? 60( 4) 1 1 6.0 8.5 0
NT8/27 17/08/82 200 C? ? 60( 4) 1 1 20.0 26.0 10
Hut (persons inside)
2111NSWA 2/08/79 0900 WR? ? 60( 4) 1 1 15.0 16.6 0
K60 29/05/82 am WR? ? 55( 4) 3 0 8.1 10.0 0
NT8/7 16/08/82 1130 C? ? 40( 4) 2 0 32.0 46.0 3
---- - '----- -------------- '~----
VJ
... continued 0
0
Table 6.24(continued) Well documented multiple fatality landslide Incidents. ;J~
0 0
TYPE ELEMENT
Food stall, 4 storey
INCIDENT DATE TIME MATERIAL WT V(m3) D I H(m) L (m) P(m)
-·
~
"' .......
:;>\'Tj
.....
Building(s) building, person

4/11SWB 17/10/78 1500 RS? ? 14 1 1 7.8 8.2 4 ~[
"' !:»
on slide ~ -;:::
Hut (person inside) ME87/7/20 30/07/87 330 WR? ? 8 1 1 4.8 5.0 0.2
s"'g '"C
::r
0
Buildings on .... ,.-.._
and below Huts (persons inside) K31A 28-29/05/82 Night? WR? ? 140 2 0 10.0 12.0 1.5 c::::
slide ....,z
0
~(/.l
0 ~
Footpath Kwun Lung
Fill, ]-._.;
Persons 23/07/94 2053 weathered Nil 1,000 5 3 11.5 19.5 2 "'
below slide Lau
volcanics
Car (person Kennedy Ad
Landslide 8/05/92 0810 Loose F Nil 500 1 0 30.0 47.0 10
inside) (HK92/5/38)
Bus, bus Cheung
shelter, per- Shan(MW93/ 16/06/93 1230 Colluvium Nil 50 1 5 17.0 24.0 1
Road below sons 6/14)
slide
MW92/7/9 18/07/92 1740 Rock Nil 4 0 1 10.0 8.0 6
Rockfall Persons HK85/6/2 25/06/85 1415 Rock Nil 3.5 0 3 8.0 7.3 2
K87/9/4 17/09/87 1555 Rock Nil 1 (3) 0 1 15.0 19.5 4.5
Buildings on K13 28-29/05/82 Night? WR? ? 700( 4) 3 7 40.0 50.0 -
Hut, persons
slide HK2 29/05/82 200 RS? ? 30(4) 1 0 15.0 15.0 -
-- ...
'···· ---- -
L _ _ _ ._ _ _
Notes:
1 Date is the inspection date; person was buried c Colluvium
2 Preceding small movements not recognised F Fill
3 Construction in progress WR Weathered rock
4 Poor quality volume data RS Residual soil
WT Warning time
v Volume (m3 )
0 Deaths
I Injuries w
p Proximity (m) 0,.....
o multistorey buildings below the slide,

o 1-2 storey buildings below the slide,
o huts below the slide,
o road/footpath below a landslide,
o road/footpath below a rock fall, and
o buildings on landslides.
The classes involve different mechanisms of landslides, and also differing
elements which of course have different vulnerabilities.
The first four of these were used to plot the graphs of deaths D versus the
other recorded variables in Figures 6.44 to 6.46. One can interpret that the
number of deaths rises rapidly when the landslide volume exceeds 1,000 m 3 .
Below this volume the number of fatalities is apparently independent of the
landslide magnitude. Thus even small volume failures (less than 100m3) can
cause one or more casualties, but for large numbers of casualties large volume
(greater than 1,000 m 3) landslides are required. Even though linear regression
models fitted very well for huts, 1-2 storey and multistorey buildings, the small
number of data points did not justify the fitting of a linear model. In fact, the
data is insufficient to statistically determine whether the trend is a linear one or
not.
The plot of D versus P shows that the proximity alone is not a good guide to
the number of deaths expected. The plot shows that the number of deaths
decreases with increasing Pup to about lOrn. This makes sense, as the further
one is away from the slope edge, the less likely one would be to be killed.
However, D rises for P> lOrn. This is because the number of deaths have
increased due to the larger landslide volume, even though the elements at risk
were further away from the base of the slope.
The plots D versus H and D versus L show a marked increase for D for
about H>35 m and L>60-70 m. This again points to larger landslides. The
plot of D versus F=H/L shows that landslides with a higher mobility (ie a lower F
value) cause far more deaths. The more mobile landslides tend to generally be
large, but the corollary is not necessarily true. Finally a plot of F=H/L versus V
confirms the general trend of decreasing values of F for larger magnitude
landslides found in the literature (eg Scheidegger, 1973, Melosh, 1987, Van
Gassen and Cruden, 1989). There is more scatter in the author's data than that
reported for larger magnitude landslides because the influence of (ailure types,
failure mechanisms and other factors on runout distance increases significantly
in the lower magnitude landslide range.
1000
~
200
0
100
0
~8 I
30
-
1/)
.c
co
20
10
•
Q)
0
~
X
0
2 0
xo
0 0 00
0 xo
•
:~
.3
.2
.1
10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
50 500 5000 50000 500000
Volume (m3 )
•
Multistorey building
0
1-2 storey building
X
Hut
0
Road or footpath
AFFECTED ELEMENTS
200
El
100
~8
0
• •
30
20
10
•
en
:5 X
co
Q)
~
0 3
2 0
X
0 0
• 0 0
:~
.3
.2
.1 n X OX X
.1 .3 .5 2 4 10 30 50 200 400
.2 .4 3 5 20 40 100 300 500
Proximity (m)
Note that zero deaths are represented by the number 0.1 on the log scale.
Figure 6.44 Plot of deaths versus volume, and deaths versus proximity - Hong
Kong.
200
0
100
~
0
• •
30
20
10
•
tJ)
.J::.
5 X
iU 4
CD 0
0 3
2 0 0 0 0
•
X 0 xo 0
:~
.3
.2
.1 0 0 ()( X _0_
4 6 B 10 20 40 60 80 100 200
Height {m)
•
Multistorey building 1-2 storey building
0 X
Hut
0
Road or footpath
AFFECTED ELEMENTS
200
[
100
*! •
0
•
30
20
10
•
(/)
.J::.
~
X
iU
Ql
0 3 0
2 00
xo
0 0
•
0 X 0
:~
.3
.2
.1 n XXI!l n x
4 10 30 50 200 400
5 20 40 100 300 500
Length {m)
Figure 6.45 Plot of deaths versus landslide height, and deaths versus landslide
runout - Hong Kong.
200
0
100
~8
0
• •
30
20
10
•
U)
.c
~
X
~
Q)
3 0
0
2 0 0
X X 0 0 0
:~
.3
.2
.1 0 X 0[1) X X
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 2
• 0 X 0
Multistorey building 1-2 storey building Hut Road or footpath

AFFECTED ELEMENTS
2~------------------------------------
apparent coefficient of friction versus landslide volume - Hong
Kong.
The author has also analysed single fatality and/or multiple injury
landslide vulnerability data from Hong Kong. This data is for rockfalls injuring
people in open space, rockfalls onto building causing injuries, soil/rock debris
causing injuries in open space, and buildings on landslides destroyed by the
movement, and is presented in Tables 6.25 to 6.28.
Table 6.25 Rockfalls injuring people in Hong Kong in open space.
INCIDENT VOLUME (m 3 ) DETAILS

HK85/6/2 3.5 3 injured
MW92/7/9 4 1 injured
K87/9/4 0.5 1 injured
Table 6.26 Rockfall onto building causing injuries in Hong Kong.
VOLUME TYPE OF
INCIDENT DETAILS
(m3) ELEMENT
HK85/2/3 1 2 injured Hut
Table 6.27 Soil/rock debris causing injuries in open space in Hong Kong.
VOLUME
INCIDENT TYPE (m3) DETAILS DEATHS INJURIES
MW93/6/14
CHEUNG SHAN
c 50 Debris flooded bus stop 1 dead 5 injuries
HK92/5/38
F 500 1 car buried 1 dead 0 injuries
KENNEDY RD
Table 6.28 Buildings on landslides in Hong Kong whose destruction resulted in

injuries or fatalities.
VOLUME TYPE OF
INCIDENT TYPE DEATHS INJURIES
(m3) BUILDING
K13 C,N 700 Hut 3 ?
K31A R,N 140 Hut 2 ?
K45 F, N 250 Hut ?
HK2 c 30 Hut 1 0
6.3.3.4 Summary and Recommended Vulnerability Values for Loss

of Life in Hong Kong
From the data in Tables 6.25 to 6.28 as well data from the multiple fatality
incidents the author has concluded the following points. A person is very
vulnerable in the event of complete or substantial burial by debris, or the
collapse of an enclosing vehicle or building. If the person is buried by debris,
death is most likely to result from asphyxia rather than crushing or impact. If
the person is not buried, injuries are much more likely than death. Multiple
fatalities are likely to occur if one or more of the following conditions are
satisfied:
o a failure oflarge magnitude (over 1,000 m 3) or a very close proximity
of a large number of persons to a small-medium failure (50 to
1,000 m 3),
o rapid landslide velocity, or
o the burial of persons by the landslide debris or the demolition of
occupied buildings.
The range of estimated vulnerabilities for various situations, and the author's
recommended values are detailed in Table 6.29.
6.3.4 Vulnerability of Property In Hong Kong

This section reviews and summarises the information on vulnerability of
property contained in the Hong Kong landslide database. The data extraction
for the assessment of vulnerability of property in Hong Kong is described, and
the raw data tabulated in a summary form. The vulnerability of vehicles and
buildings is then discussed in detail.
6.3.4.1 Data Extraction

The landslide database of over 1,100 landslide incidents was sorted by its
comments column. The initial listing contained over 400 incidents. These were
then carefully scanned to select all incidents where damage to persons or
property occurred. The final number arrived at was about 100 incidents.
Because of the method of incident selection in the original compilation of the
landslide database, these 100 or so incidents are incidents in the 1984-93 study
period (plus a selection of ones from 1978-83) that resulted in damage to
persons or property. The following incidents in the landslide database were
extracted:
o Those where fatalities and injuries occurred. Po Shan and the two
Sau Mau Ping failures were also added.
o Those where vehicles (cars or trucks) were damaged.
o Those where buildings were damaged.

values for death from landslide debris in similar situations.
VULNERABILITY OF PERSON IN OPEN SPACE

Range in Recommended
Case Comments
Data Value
0.5( 1) May be injured but unlikely

1 If struck by a rockfall 0.1-0.7
to cause death
2 If buried by debris 0.8-1.0 1.0 Death by asphyxia
3 If not buried 0.1-0.5 0.1 High chance of survival
VULNERABILITY OF PERSON IN A VEHICLE

Range in Recommended
Case Comments
Data Value
If the vehicle is buried/
1 0.9-1.0 1.0 Death is almost certain
crushed
If the vehicle is damaged
2 0-0.3 0.3 High chance of survival
only
VULNERABILITY OF PERSON IN A BUILDING

Range In Recommended
Case Comments
Data Value
1 If the building collapses 0.9-1.0 1.0 Death is almost certain
If the building is inundated
2 with debris and the per- 0.8-1.0 1.0 Death is highly likely
son buried
If the building is inundated
3 with debris and the per- 0-0.5 0.2 High chance of survival
son not buried
If the debris strikes the
4 0-0.1 0.05 Virtually no danger<1 l
building only
Notes: 1. Better considered in more detail, ie. the proximity of person to the part of
the building affected by sliding
Thus the elements at risk that were extracted were persons, vehicles and
buildings. The database does not contain information on other losses with
financial implications such as loss of business, loss of property value,
interruption of services, and so on. The extracted incidents were classified by
the type of failure (rockfall or debris flow) and the type of elements affected
(persons, vehicles, buildings, open space). These classes are summarised in
Table 6.30.
Table 6.30 Summary of table numbers, Hong Kong landslide incident classes by
failure type and affected element(s).
ELEMENTS AFFECTED
TYPE OF DEBRIS AFFECTING
Person(s) Building(s) Vehicle(s)
Open space 6.25 - 6.31
Rock fall
Buildings 6.26 6.33 -
Open space 6.27 - 6.32
1-2 storey residential 6.34
1-2 storey non residential 6.35
Soil or soil/rock debris Multistorey residential 6.36
-
Multistorey non residential 6.37
Building undermined - 6.38
Building on landslide 6.28

Tables 6.31 to 6.38 present the raw data for the vulnerability of property in
Hong Kong. Each incident is labelled as to the type offailure. Cis a cut failure, F
a fill failure, R a retaining wall failure and N a natural slope failure. Each table
presents the elements at risk, and the author's estimates of the proportion of
damage received by the elements.
A) Results for the Vulnerability of Vehicles to Landslide Damage

The vehicle damage is tabulated in Tables 6.31 and 6.32. The amount of
damage to an individual vehicle depends on the following factors:
o the amount of warning time available (for vehicles being driven)
o proximity of vehicle(s) to the slope
o magnitude of the landslide
o debris runout distance and depth.
The total amount of vehicle damage will also depend on temporal factors such as
the amount of traffic, the time of day and so on (see section 6.4).
Figure 6.4 7 plots the amount of total vehicle damage versus slide volume.
The increasing damage with increasing volume trend is apparent. Up to four
vehicles (cars and/or trucks) have been damaged in any one incident. The
proportion of individual vehicle damage was estimated, and these proportions
were added for incidents with multiple affected vehicles. The total proportion of
vehicles damaged ranges from 0.1 to 1.6, and volumes from less than 1m3 up to
almost 1000 m 3. Slides with volumes over 100m3 are likely to destroy vehicles if
their proximity is sufficiently close. However, even slides with a volume less
Table 6.31 Rock faHs onto vehicles - Hong Kong.
INCIDENT VOLUME (m3) DETAILS DAMAGE

3 cars crushed 1
MW85/2/1 0.5
1 car damaged < 0.5
1 car crushed 1
HK86/7/16 10
2 cars damaged < 0.5
MW86/7/16 2 1 car crushed 1
HK87/10/1 1 1 car damaged < 0.5
HK91/7/3 3 1 car damaged < 0.5
HK92/5/1 08 0.5 1 car damaged < 0.5
HK92/6/30 0.3 1 car damaged < 0.5
NT8/26 3 1 car crushed 1
Kong.
VOLUME ELEMENT DAM-

INCIDENT TYPE (m3) DETAILS
AGE
HK85/8/12 c 3 2 cars damaged 0.4, 0.3
8 1 truck damaged 0.3
K88/7/12 c 8 1 car damaged 0.4
550 1 car buried 0.5
HK89/5/18 c 550 Debris just missed bus stop
50 2 cars damaged 0.2, 0.3
K89/5/9 F
50 Debris flooded bus stop
K89/5/9 c 200 4 cars buried 4 X 0.5
55 1 car destroyed 1.0
ME92/5/9 R (?)
55 (washed downstream)
MW93/6/7 c 25 1 car damaged 0.3
HK93/9/15 c 0.7 1 car damaged 0.1
ME93/9/12 c 100 1 truck damaged 0.5
600 2 trucks buried 2 X 0.8
ME89/5/18 c 600 (debris also entered building)
160 1 car crushed 1.0
NT/8/33 c 160 1 car buried 0.5
than 10m3 can damage up to 40% of the affected individual vehicle. Rockfalls
are far more damaging than soil debris for the same volume - in one instance a
0.5 m 3 boulder crushed three cars and damaged another. In the 1984-93 study
period a total of 18 vehicles were affected by landslide debris and 13 by rockfalls.
These comments apply to situations where the vehicle is engulfed by the

landslide. A second situation is where a vehicle runs into a slide. In this case the
damage will depend on vehicle speed, warning time, type of slide. No specific
conclusions can be given on this point from the available data.
3.0
2.5
(/)
c:
0
t
8.
.._
0
0.
2.0 -
Q)
u
:c
Q)
>
"'0
Q)
1.5 - •
>.
e
Ci5
Q)
"'0
0
E
::I
1.0 -
(f)
• •
0.5 - -
•
0
1 10 100 1000 10000
Volume (m3 )
landslide volume.
B) Results for the Vulnerability of Buildings to Landslide Damage

The building damage is tabulated in Tables 6.33 to 6.38. The factors
affecting building damage are:
o proximity of building to the slope,
o magnitude of the landslide,
o debris runout distance and depth,
o the type of structure (eg. hut, masonry 1-2 storey, multistorey), and
o whether the structure survives the impact or collapses.

In order of increasing strength, the most flimsy structures are squatter huts and
sheds, which are easily demolished by small volume (say less than 50m3)
landslides. Then follow 1-2 storey masonry or concrete buildings such as
houses and factories. Multistorey buildings are the strongest in resisting
demolition by landsliding, requiring a large landslide such as Po Shan to cause
their failure.
The following detailed discussion highlights the damage suffered by each
type of structure. Again an inadequacy of data and documentation as to the type
of building structure and the damage experienced limits quantification. The
vulnerability of buildings can be far better quantified in the future if details of
damage are properly recorded for each incident on an ongoing basis. It will
become clear from the presentation following that the comment by the United
Nations (1991) that building vulnerability to landsliding is "either 1 or 0" is too
simplistic for landslide risk assessment purposes.
i) Squatter Huts
Due to their flimsy, unengineered nature, squatter huts are prone to
destruction by landslide debris. As Figure 6.48 shows, landslides with volume
less than 100 m 3 completely destroyed about half of the affected huts, and the
remaining huts suffered major damage. This was exacerbated by the very close
proximity of the huts to the slope. The high vulnerability of huts to landslide
debris also means that little protection is afforded to the occupants should the
landslide reach the hut.
ii) 1-2 Storey Residential Buildings

Many residential buildings in Hong Kong are of masonry construction, and
hence are more resistant to damage from landslide debris impact than squatter
huts. This is reflected in Figure 6.49, which shows that no houses collapsed due
to landslides of up to 200m 3 volume.
iii) 1-2 Storey Non-Residential Buildings

The data in Figure 6.50 combines non residential as well as residentiall- 2
storey building damage. Again the high resistance of these buildings, of
masonry or reinforced concrete construction, to debris impact is apparent. In
only one case was a small building destroyed.
iv) Multistorey Buildings

Multistorey buildings, as Figure 6.51 shows, are more resistant to
landslide debris impact than 1-2 storey buildings. This again is not surprising,
as multistorey buildings are generally larger and stronger than 1-2 storey
Table 6.33 Rock fall onto buildings in Hong Kong.
Incident Volume (m 3 ) Details Damage Type Of Element

K86/5/3 0.7 Roof damaged (sheeting) 0.1 Hut
ME86/7/15 2 Wall damaged (timber) 0.1 Hut
HK85/4/6 0.3 Masonry wall cracked 0.05 House
HK85/2/3 1 Roof damaged (concrete) 0.01 House
HK93/9/11 30 Windows broken 0.00001 Multistorey building
Hong Kong.
Volume Element Affected Debris

Incident Type Element D I
(m3) Damage Component Inflow
SMP72 F 11,000 Huts 1 Collapsed Yes 71 60
K60 C,N 55 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 3 ?
NT/8n N 40 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 2 ?
K14 N 90 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 2 ?
14/11SWC N 300 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 2 ?
Masonry
NT/8/8 R 240 1 Collapsed Yes 2 0
Hut
K30 N 650 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 1 ?
N/8/27 R,N 60 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 1 1
ME87/7/20 F 8 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 0 1
2/11SWA C,N 60 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 0 1
24/79 c 60 Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 0 1
Outdoor
ME93/6/9 c 15
toilet
1 Collapsed Yes 0 0
Hut 1 Collapsed Yes 0 0

3/11NWB C,N 60
Hut 1 Collapse Yes 0 0
4/6 R,N 40 Hut 1 Collapse Yes 0 0
Hut 0.7 Roof crushed Yes 0 0
Partly
Hut 0.6 Yes 0 0
NT207A c 80 collapsed
Partly
Hut 0.6 Yes 0 0
collapsed
Partly
NT11 N 2500 Hut 0.6 Yes 0 0
collapsed
2walls
MW93/6/27 N 15 Hut 0.5 Yes 0 0
damaged
Wall, roof
ME93/9/3 R 20 Hut 0.4 Yes 0 0
damaged
... continued
Table 6.34(continued) Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey residential buildings In
Hong Kong.
Volume Element Affected Debris
Incident Type Element D I
(m3) Damage Component Inflow
Masonry
0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
NT141B c 45 house
Hut 0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
Masonry
NT141A c 75
house
0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
K31B c 80 Hut 0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0

K31A R,N 140 Hut 0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
NT207B c 55
ME93/6/5 N 40 House 0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
NT142 c 90 Hut 0.3 Wall collapse Yes 0 0
HK89/5/10 N 45 House 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
2/11NEA CR 45 House 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
ME93/10/13 c 15 Hut 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
MW89/6/6 N 400 Hut 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
MW89/5/44 c 20 House 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
ME93/9/18 N 300 Hut 0.2 Wall damage Yes 0 0
ME93/10/18 c 200 House 0 Wall No 0 0
138/11NWA R,N 30 House 0 Wall No 0 0
ME93/6/36 c 15 House 0 Roof No 0 0
MW93/6/28 N 15 Hut 0 Wall No 0 0
Table 6.35 Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey non- residential buildings
in Hong Kong.
Volume Building Element Compo- Debris

Incident Type Element
(m3) Type Damage nent Inflow
GF
HK88/8/4 c 1000 School 2 storey RC 0.01 windows Yes
damaged
Rear
MW89/6/5 c 35 Pigsty Shed 0.1 structure Yes
damage
Wall, roof
ME92/4/6 R 10 Storage Shed 0.5 Yes
collapsed
K93/9/10 c 49 Office Masonry 1 Collapsed Yes
K93/9/12 C,N 750 Storage Wall

Masonry(?) 0.4 Yes
collapse
2 storey Awning
8/6 c 30 School
masonry
0.1
damaged
Yes
... contmued
Table 6.35(cont.) Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey non-residential buildings
In Hong Kong.
Volume Building Element Compo- Debris
(m3) Type Damage nent Inflow
2 storey Wall
ME89/5/18 c 600 Factory
masonry
0.01
impact
No
Substa- 2 storey Wall

K93/9/12 c 300
tion masonry
0.01
impact
No
ME89/5/10 1 storey Wall

1
c 20 School
masonry
0.05
impact
No
1 storey Wall
ME91/3/1 c 10 School
masonry
0.05
impact
No
MW93/11/ Wall
133
c 22 Store 2 storey RC 0.01
impact
No
2 storey Wall
9/6 c 65 Workshop
masonry
0.02
impact
No
2.5
2.0 -
•
"0
Q)
>.
....
0
(j) 1.5
Q)
"0
(j)
c
0
t
8.
....
--
0
a.
"5
1.0
- - --- -- -
-
.c
E
0
::J
(f)
0.5 -- • •
•
•••
• ••
0 -
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Volume (m3 )
Figure 6.48 Squatter hut damage versus landslide volume - Hong Kong.

Hong Kong.
Vol- Build- Affected

Ele- Element Debris
Incident Type ume ing Compo- D I
(m3) ment Damage Inflow
Type nent
4 storey
Flats 1.00 Collapsed Yes 67 19
RC
13
Flats Storey 1.00 Collapsed Yes 67 19
PO SHAN C,N 40000
RC
12
Major
Flats storey 0.30 Yes 67 19
damage
RC
Flats
6 (?)
SMP76 F 2000 (Block 0.05 GFwall Yes 18 24
storey
9)
Flats Yes 1 1
10-15 Podium
(Block 0.05
storey slab Yes 1# 0
HK92/5/8 1000 44)
R,N
(BAGUIO) -3000 Flats
(Block ? storey 0.02 GF column Yes 0 0
26)
GFwall
4/11SWB c 14 Flats 4 storey 0.00
impact
No 1# 0
GFwall
MW89/9/2 R 30 Flats ? storey 0.005 Yes 0 0
damage
ME93/6/6 c 49 Flats ? storey 0.00 Basement Yes 0 0
18/11SWD C,N 30 Flats ? storey 0.00 Car park Yes 0 0
GF Aw-
ME86/7/3 c 15 Flats ? storey 0.00
ning
No 0 0
GFwall
K87/7/25 c 120 Flats ? storey 0.00
impact
No 0 0
# Person(s) located between building and slide
Table 6.37 Soil/rock debris flowing onto multistorey non-residential buildings

in Hong Kong.
Volume Building Element Affected Debris

(m3) Type Damage Component Inflow
GFwall
HK84/9/1 c 70 Factory 5-6 storey RC 0.01
damaged
Yes
Table 6.38 Hong Kong buildings undermined by landslides.
Incident Type Volume (m 3 ) Element Damage

MW93/11/17 c 20 Hut (part collapsed) 0.7
MW93/10/2 c 3.5 Hut 0.1
HK85/6/5 F 625 Multistorey building 0
K91/6/5 F (?) 200 Multistorey building 0
4/11SWA R 100 2 storey masonry house 0
2/11SEA c 60 1 storey masonry house 0
8/11 NEA c 50 1 storey clinic 0
ME91/7/1 R 20 House 0
MW93/6/51 F 20 Masonry house 0
HK92/6/24 R 15 Playground foundation 0
MW91/6/3 R 8 Masonry house 0
0.5
0.4
"'0
0.>
>.
....0
{j)
0.>
"'0
t
(/)
c
0
0.3 --- -
8.
e
0..
Ol
c
:Q
::l
.0
0.2
- -
0
E
::l
(/)
0.1
0
10
- - 100 1000
Volume (m3)
Figure 6.49 1-2 storey residential building damage versus landslide volume -
Hong Kong.
1.6
1.2
"'0
<1>
>.
....
0
iii
<1>
"'0
(/)
•
c
0
t
0
a. 0.8
....a.
0
Cl
c
:!2
::J
..0
0 ••
E
::J
C/)
0.4 -
0
1
I
10
•• - •
100
• •
1000 10000
Volume (m3 )
Figure 6.50 1-2 storey non-residential building damage versus landslide

volume - Hong Kong.
buildings. The point of exception on the plot is the Po Shan landslide, which
demolished two multistorey buildings and damaged another. It serves as a
warning that large enough landslides can destroy even multistorey buildings
and thus cause many casualties.
v) Other Miscellaneous Cases

The landslide database contained only four recorded cases of buildings on
landslides causing injuries or deaths. These were presented in Table 6.28
previously. These were all squatter huts, and occurred before 1984. The four
incidents range in volume from 30-700 m 3 ; in each case the hut(s) were
completely destroyed, resulting in a total of seven fatalities.
Table 6.39 summarises the damage due to the undermining of buildings
from Table 6.38. Undermining usually occurred as a result of the failure of the
slope below the building. Although the number of incidents is quite small, one
can see that only huts were damaged by undermining. Again the better
foundations of the other structures prevented their damage from small to
medium volume landslides.
20 •
Po Shan Rd
'0
Q)
>. 15
e
(;)
Q)
'0
(/)
>.
Q)
.....
0
(;)
0 10
.....
Q)
..0
E
::J
c:
0
E
::J
(/)
5
0
1 10
- .- - 100 1000
••
10000 100000
Volume (m3)
Figure 6.51 Multistorey residential building damage versus landslide volume -

Hong Kong.
Table 6.39 Summary of building vulnerability to undermining by landslide -

Hong Kong.
Number of Structure Volume Range Vul nerabllity

Incidents Type (m3) Range
2 Huts 3.5-20 0.1-0.7
2 Multistorey 200-625 0
7 1-2 Storey 8-100 0
6.3.5 Vulnerability of Persons and Property in Lillydale Shire
The vulnerability of persons and property in the Lillydale Shire of

Melbourne, Australia, is discussed in Chapter 7.
6.4 Assessment of Temporal Probability Vt
The temporal probability is the likelihood of an element being present at a

particular location under assessment. The assessment of temporal probability
is required in order to assess the vulnerability of an element at risk, V, as
V= Vs X vt X Vi. This assessment is important in cases where the elements at risk
(eg persons, vehicles) are not always present and applies only to movable
elements where vt < 1. In many risk assessment situations taking vt = 1 would
result in a gross overestimation of the vulnerability of the element at risk and
hence of the actual risk. In the case of death of persons from sliding temporal
probability is important in all situations, whether the persons are in residential
or factory buildings, in bus shelters, along footpaths or in transit. Many
documented histories of sliding had low or no fatalities precisely due to the low
temporal probabilities of persons in the location; higher temporal probabilities
would have resulted in more fatalities. In the case of property, vt =1 for
permanent structures. vt needs to be estimated for vehicles and other movable
equipment.
This section focuses most on the assessment of the temporal probability of
persons, although similar principles can be applied to any movable element at
risk. Rather than giving fixed guidelines (an impossible task given the countless
variations possible), lists of factors influencing the temporal probability of
persons are given for some commonly encountered situations. The intent here is
that these diagrams can act as checklists or pointers to persons carrying out risk
assessment. The risk assessors can then compile statistics on temporal
probability for the local conditions on a situation-by-situation basis.
6.4.1 Simple Risk Situations

The diagrams of commonly encountered simple risk situations are
presented in Figures 6.52 to 6.59. They cover road cuts, road fills, retaining
walls above/below the road, footpaths, bus shelters, and persons in buildings
below cuts or retaining walls.
In all situations an effective warning system and public education may
reduce the likelihood that persons will remain in areas which show signs of
landsliding. This may be taken into account in the assessment. In assessing
total risk, the number of persons who may be involved will have to be assessed.
For individuals, one may assess average temporal probability, or the temporal
probability for persons most at risk.
Factors Influencing
temporal probability
0 traffic density
0 traffic speed
0 time of day
0 day of week
Slide 0 different for each lane
0 likelihood of traffic jam
Vehicles 0 whether vehicle impacts
debris or is impacted by
debris
Figure 6.52 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road cut.
Factors Influencing
0 traffic density
0 traffic speed
0 time of day
0 day of week
0 different for each lane
Vehicles likelihood of traffic jam
0
0 whether vehicle slides
with fill or falls into hole
ROAD \
\
',
Slide''--
Figure 6.53 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road fill.

Factors influencing
As for road cut.
Figure 6.54 Factors influencing temporal probability for a retaining wall above a
road.
Factors influencing
As for road fill.
\ ROAD
\
\ Failure
' ' ...... --

Figure 6.55 Factors influencing temporal probability for a retaining wall below a
road.
Factors influencing
4. Footpath temporal probability
o pedestrian traffic
o time of day
o day of week
o time of year
o whether it is raining or not
ROAD
Figure 6.56 Factors influencing temporal probability for a footpath.
3. Bus Shelter Factors Influencing

Bus shelter
0 size of shelter
0 number/frequency of
bus routes serviced
0 time of day
0 day of week
0 time of year
0 whether it is raining or not
ROAD
Figure 6.57 Factors influencing temporal probability for a bus shelter.

Factors influencing
0 type of building
- residential
'
\
Slide',
Building
- office
- industrial
- school, hospital
' 0
0
ground floor usage
time of day
0 day of week
0 time of year
Figure 6.58 Factors influencing temporal probability of persons in a building

under a cut.
Factors Influencing
Building
Failure
As for building under a cut.
Figure 6.59 Factors influencing temporal probability of persons in a building

under a retaining wall.
6.4.2 Consequential Risk Scenarios

Consequential risk scenarios, as opposed to simple risk scenarios, are
situations where the greatest risk is not directly related to landsliding, but is
consequential on a series of events which may lead to large numbers of fatalities.
These are not easy to assess, as the consequences must be able to be envisaged in
order to be predicted. Consequential risk scenarios are best assessed on a
purpose-specific basis. An example is all the consequential risk scenarios
resulting from cut failures in the Territory of Hong Kong. Some consequential
risk scenarios, mostly based on actual events in Hong Kong, are shown in
Figures 6.60 to 6.62. The probability of these events is obtained by multiplying
the probability of the landslide by the probability of the consequence, eg. the
landslide blocking road drains and thus causing larger failures in the road fill
below.
Major natural hillside
Minor development initiates progressive slide
. . . . . . .Debris flow
Figure 6.60 Natural hillside debris flow initiated by minor development.

Flow slide Building collapses
Building
Slide site
Figure 6.61 Failure initiated by excavation or sliding in natural slope causes

further sliding onto buildings, resulting in collapse (eg Highland
Towers in Malaysia, Po Shan Rd in Hong Kong).
ROAD
Overflow onto fill causes slide/debris flow
Inadequate drainage or
blockage by small slide
Figure 6.62 Overflow resulting from blocked drainage caused by a small slide
causes a debris flow in the road fill.
6.5.1 Conclusions
In the study of vulnerability of elements to landsliding, the author has
reviewed the literature, predicted runout distances for slopes in Hong Kong
(illustrating methods applicable to any landslide database world -wide), and
assessed the vulnerability of persons and property to landsliding. The following
conclusions are drawn from this work.
6.5.1.1 Literature Review

Various types of landslide movement models were reviewed. They are
single body models, continuum flow models, and discreet element models. The
models describe global or selected mechanisms, deal with different types of
debris, different velocities of movement and describe phenomena to differing
levels of detail. Specific models have also been developed for debris flow and rock
avalanches. The advantages and disadvantages of each model were reviewed. A
reviewer of landslide runout distance may use general or situation-specific
models, based on the required application and outcomes, and the resources
available.
6.5.1.2 Runout Distance Prediction

The author analysed the prediction of runout distance for Hong Kong
man-modified slopes. By examining the Hong Kong landslide database
statistics and investigating the relationships between the geometric variables,
the author found that the ratio of H/L was important for runout distance
prediction. By producing F versus V plots for cuts, fills and retaining walls, and
comparing these to other such published plots, it was found that these plots had
a wide scatter of runout distances. One of the main reasons for the scatter is
surely the different failure mechanisms of the landslides, which would need to
be distinguished in the data to allow better runout distance prediction.
However, the prediction of the failure mechanism for a landslide may be difficult
to carry out.
A simple sled model was applied to the cut slopes portion of the landslide
database. The simple sled model fitted the cut slope data best when the
coefficient offriction was assumed to be the same along both surfaces. The mean
value of the coefficient of friction was found to be 0.96 (tan44°).
The most mobile failures (ie having the highest runout distances) are fills,
followed by retaining walls, natural slopes, cuts and rock falls. This is because
most failures involving fill had loose, granular fill material present. This type of
material tends to fail in the undrained condition given that a collapse

mechanism occurs on shearing, as pointed out by Morgenstern (1995a) and
Dawson et al (1992). Multiple regression analyses of the database were used to
obtain statistical models for the prediction of runout distance with one or two
independent variables and a reasonable fit to the data. The material and causes
of failure variables as recorded in the incident reports were found not to be
statistically significant for the prediction of runout distance. Thus regression
models based purely on geometric variables were constructed.
The situations with enough data for the construction of statistical models
were cuts, rock falls, natural slope failures, retaining walls and fill slopes.
Equations for the mean predicted runout distance together with the lower 5%
and upper 95% confidence intervals were given. The equations for natural slope
runout distance should not be used without other methods, as the data behind
these is limited, they involve the estimation of the location of the head of the
scarp. The equations for the cut slope debris depth and runout distances for rock
falls, retaining walls and fills have quite wide confidence bands due to the
underlying data scatter. they are still useful for risk estimation, particularly for
developing risk zones for the estimation of societal risk. The runout distance
models apply to the situation where the debris runs out onto a near horizontal
slope below, as the landslide database had a majority of cases with horizontal
slope below. Some qualitative guidance on non-horizontal slopes below was
given by the author.
These methods of statistical analysis can be applied to any man- modified
slopes landslide database in the world in order to identify the important
predictive variables in the database, compare the data with other publications,
and develop database-specific models for the prediction of runout distance.
6.5.1.3 Vulnerability of Persons and Property
A) Persons
A person is very vulnerable in the event of complete or substantial burial by
debris, or the collapse of an enclosing vehicle or building. If the person is buried
by debris, death is most likely to result from asphyxia rather than crushing or
impact. If the person is not buried, injuries are much more likely than death.
The number of deaths rises rapidly when the landslide volume exceeds 1,000 m 3 .
Below this volume the number of fatalities is independent of the landslide
magnitude. Small volume failures (less than 100m3) can cause one or more
casualties, but large numbers of casualties generally result from large volume
landslides (greater than 1,000 m 3). Multiple fatalities are likely to occur in the
case of a failure oflarge magnitude (over 1,000 m 3) or a very close proximity of a
large number of persons to a small-medium failure (50 to 1,000 m 3 ) with a

rapid velocity, and from the burial of persons by the landslide debris or the
demolition of occupied buildings.
The author found that the proximity alone is not a good guide to the
number of deaths expected. Plots of deaths versus the vertical drop (H) and the
horizontal runout distance (L) have a marked increase forD for H>35 m and
£>60-70 m. This also indicates larger landslides. Landslides with a higher
mobility cause far more deaths. The author detailed the range of vulnerabilities
and his recommended values for various situations.
B) Property
While the property damage data came exclusively from Hong Kong, the
conclusions drawn below are valid for similar types of property elsewhere in the
world.
i) Vehicles
The amount of damage to an individual vehicle depends on the amount of
warning time available, proximity of vehicle(s) to the slope, magnitude of the
landslide, debris runout distance and depth, and temporal factors such as the
amount of traffic, the time of day and so on. From the plot of total vehicle
damage versus slide volume, the author found a trend ofincreasing damage with
increasing landslide volume. Landslides with volumes over 100m3 are likely to
destroy vehicles if their proximity is sufficient, but even slides with a volume less
than 10m3 can cause up to 40% damage. No specific guidance can be given from
the available data for the case when a vehicle runs into landslide debris. Rock
falls are far more damaging than soil debris for the same volume because they
fall (ie have higher kinetic energy), whereas soil debris mostly slides or flows. In
the case of the elements at risk being persons rock falls tend to strike their more
vulnerable body parts (head) whereas soil is more likely to strike less vulnerable
parts such as the torso or legs.
ii) Buildings
The inadequacy of data and documentation as to the type of building
structure and the damage experienced limited the quantification of building
damage. The vulnerability of buildings can be far better quantified in the future
if details of damage are properly recorded for each incident on an ongoing basis.
Squatter huts and sheds are the most flimsy structures , easily demolished
by small volume landslides. Landslides with volume less than 100 m 3
completely destroyed about half of the affected huts, and the remaining huts
suffered major damage. The very close proximity of the huts to the slope
contributed to the destruction. 1-2 storey masonry or concrete buildings are

stronger such as houses and factories. No houses collapsed due to landslides of
up to 200 m 3 volume. Multistorey buildings are the strongest in resisting
demolition by landsliding. Only the Po Shan landslide demolished two
multistorey buildings and damaged another. Four recorded cases of buildings on
landslides were all squatter huts, and occurred before 1984. The four incidents
range in volume from 30 to 700 m 3 ; in each case the hut(s) were completely
destroyed, resulting in a total of seven fatalities. Damage due to the
undermining of buildings usually occurred as a result of the failure of the slope
below the building. Mainly huts were damaged by undermining, with the better
foundations of the other structures preventing their damage.
6.5.1.4 Temporal Probability

Temporal probability needs to be estimated for vehicles and other movable
equipment, otherwise the risk may be grossly overestimated. The author
provided diagrams and lists of factors influencing the temporal probability of
persons for some commonly encountered situations rather than giving fixed
guidelines. They cover road cuts, road fills, retaining walls above/below the
road, footpaths, bus shelters, and persons in buildings below cuts or retaining
walls. The diagrams are checklists for persons carrying out risk assessment.
The assessors need to compile statistics on temporal probability based the local
conditions. An effective warning system and public education can reduce the
risk. The number of persons who may be exposed needs to be assessed when
calculating total risk. Some consequential risk scenarios were given as examples
by the author. The probability of these events is obtained by multiplying the
probability of the landslide by the probability of the consequence.
A number of recommendations are drawn from the author's work on
landslide vulnerability. These are divided into recommendations for future
research, and recommendations for landslide risk management systems.
Following his research, the author recommends that the following areas
landslide vulnerability be further investigated:
o Further studies evaluating the different theoretical and statistical
runout distance models are needed to compare their effectiveness and
accuracy. A database indicating which models/methods are most
applicable in various situations would be ideal.
o Virtually no information on the exact location and numbers of
persons present at the time of sliding was available in the literature,
even for major landslide disasters. Future collection of such data is

essential to enable a better quantification of this variable.
o No information was available to the author regarding the total value
of the damaged property, and only indicative information on the
amount or proportion oflandslide damage sustained. This data needs
to be recorded to improve the accuracy of the quantification.
The recommended research would significantly improve the quantification of
landslide vulnerability of persons and property, and thus enhance an important
component of the landslide risk management system.
In broader terms, not necessarily directly arising from the author's work
but based on insights gained from the author's study, the following
recommendations for landslide risk management systems are made:
o That landslide databases around the world be created/enhanced to
record vulnerability data.
o That the use of landslide vulnerability databases for establishing
landslide insurance schemes be investigated in countries where no
such schemes exist.
The implementation of the above recommendations will enable further research
on landslide vulnerability and add to the entire process of landslide risk
management.
7 CALCULATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the calculations of landslide risk in defined areas of
Melbourne's Lillydale Shire (section 7.2). The loss of real estate value in
Lillydale Shire due to landsliding is detailed (section 7.3). Sample risk
calculations for Hong Kong slopes based on the developed landslide risk
assessment system are provided (section 7.4). Conclusions, comments and
recommendations are then given (section 7.5).
7.2 Risk Assessments of Areas in Melbourne's Lillydale Shire

The Lillydale Shire landslide risk assessment study's background, scope,
data sources and objectives were detailed in sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3. The main aim
of the study was to illustrate the application of the landslide risk assessment
process where probabilities of landsliding are already determined, or are
assessable. The study illustrates the kinds of assumptions that are necessary,
and the limitations inherent in such a study.
7.2.1 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Montrose Study Area

The landslide risk assessment of the Montrose study area utilised the
probabilities and debris hazard boundaries developed during the debris flow
study by Coffey Partners International (1991a). These were discussed in section
4.2.1.3 and presented in Table 4.5. Both risk to life (individual and societal risk)
and the total risk to buildings were evaluated. The probabilities were entered
corresponding to the zones covering each building. Both lower and upper bound
probabilities were entered separately. Where more than one zone covered a
building, the lowest and highest probabilities from all the zones were selected
for the upper and lower bounds. Subsequent evaluations of vulnerabilities and
risk calculations are discussed separately for loss of property and of loss of life
below.
7.2.1.1 Loss of Property Risk Assessment

The loss of property risk assessment carried out in the Montrose area was
for damage to buildings only, as this damage was reasonably quantifiable, and
would dominate the results of other costs such as roads or services restoration
were included. The author obtained the valuations for the land and building for
each property in the study area, as well as the type of building construction, from
Lillydale Shire. The vulnerabilities of the buildings to debris flow were then
assessed. The main factors influencing building vulnerability are the velocity
and the depth of the debris. In the debris flow situation the author did not
believe the construction of the building to be greatly significant. Furthermore,
no data is available to quantify any such differences. Hence vulnerabilities were
assessed on a zone by zone basis only.
When assessing vulnerabilities, the author took into account the
vulnerability data gained from Hong Kong (section 6.3.4), the history of
landslide property damage in Sydney as well as the opinion of the author's
supervisor. Average building vulnerabilities Vi were adopted, and these are
shown in Table 7 .1. One should note that the vulnerability can be up to 1.0 in the
High and Medium debris flow hazard zones.
Table 7.1 Montrose debris flow average building vulnerabilities Jij.
DEBRIS FLOW
ZONE FACTORS v,
High velocity
High X 1.0
High depth
High-medium velocity
High 0.7
Medium depth
High-low velocity
Medium 0.4
Low depth
Medium-low velocity
Low 0.1
Low depth
These vulnerabilities were entered onto the spreadsheet and multiplied by

the building values and probabilities to obtain the specific risk R8 for each
building. The calculations are located in Appendix Dl. The total risk to
buildings in the study areaRt is $AU 2,160-24,130 per annum, or 0.02-0.22%
of the total study area building value. This is a small annual amount, but not
uncommon in property risk assessments (AN COLD, 1994). The range is due to
the range of probabilities for the various zones.
7.2.1.2 Loss of Life Risk Assessment
A) Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities of persons to the debris flow hazard were assessed on
the basis of available warning time, debris velocity and depth, and the "escape
distance", the distance to safe ground (ie a Medium or a Low hazard area). The
warning that the person is likely to receive is very little, if any. In 1891 a "loud
rumbling noise" occurred shortly before the debris flow (Danvers- Power,
1892). The person may be located inside a building or outside at the time of
debris flow. The types of building construction were not differentiated due to
insufficient recorded information on property damage to different types of
structures. The author also assumed heavy rain at the time of debris flow, and
no warning system in place. The average assessed vulnerabilities of persons Vz
are shown in Table 7.2. Theyvaryfrom 0.8in theHighXzoneto0.01 in the Low
zone. The debris in the High X zone is likely to contain air- borne trees and
boulders (viz Danvers- Power, 1892), and hence is far more dangerous. Further
downstream the High zone will carry a lot of water but less debris. These factors
plus those listed in Table 7.2 reduce the vulnerabilities in the zones
correspondingly. Vulnerability data gained from Hong Kong (section 6.3.4), the
history of landslide property damage in Sydney as well as the opinion of the
author's supervisor were again taken into account.
Table 7.2 Montrose debris flow average vulnerabilities of persons Ji.
DEBRIS FLOW
FACTORS \.'1
ZONE
High velocity
High X Little warning 0.8
Long escape distance
Mainly flooding rather than debris
High Some warning 0.5
Shorter escape distance
Medium Low depth 0.1
Low Low depth 0.01
B) Individual Risks
The individual risks were calculated by multiplying the probabilities of
debris flow for each property with a house in the study area by the corresponding
vulnerabilities. A range of individual risks at each property was thus obtained.
The calculations are detailed in Appendix D 1. The highest upper bound value of
annual individual risk to life is 0.008 or 8 x 10- 3 , which is well above the
commonly accepted limits to individual risk (see section 9.1.1.2). 10- 3 is the
upper bound of commonly used individual risk limits. In the study area there are
39 properties with an upper bound value of annual individual risk to life above
10- 3, ie in the unacceptable risk region. A further 20 properties have an upper
bound value of annual individual risk to life of 10- 4 , which is at the lower end of
commonly used individual risk limits, ie within the As Low as reasonably
Practicable (ALARP) region. The remaining 92 properties have an upper bound
value of annual individual risk to life of1o- 6, which equals the AN COLD (1994)
objective guideline for new dams, and an order of magnitude less than the 10- 5
recommended objective for existing dams (section 9.1.1.2 and ANCOLD
guideline G.13). These objective levels for individual risk are also widely
accepted world-wide (section 9.1.1.2, ANCOLD, 1994, and The Royal Society,
1992). Thus the 92 properties are in the acceptable risk region.
The situation of the 20 properties with an upper bound value of annual
individual risk to life of 10- 4 is likely to be tolerated by the Shire. The Shire has
several options regarding the 39 properties where the upper bound value of
annual individual risk to life exceeds the tolerable limit. Legally the Shire is
obliged only to warn the residents. Another option would be to buy out these
properties. This option is discussed further in section 7 .2.1.3 below.
C) Societal Risk
The average annual expected loss of life from debris flow in the Montrose
study area was calculated by the author for comparison with the societal risk of
debris flow.
i) Average Annual Expected Loss of Life

The average annual expected loss oflife due to debris flow in the Montrose
study area in 0.019 to 0.230 persons per annum if the average number of persons
per building was one (see Appendix D1). The average number of persons per
building is subject to temporal probability. The average value of one person per
building may be true during the day time, when many adults are at work and
children at school, and is the best case. The worst case would be at night, when
all are at home asleep. The author assumed 1.5 adults and 1.2 children per
building, based mainly on the demographics of his survey of landslide risk
perception in the Montrose area (section 9.2.3.9). This gives a total of 2. 7
persons per building at night. Thus the average annual expected loss oflife due
to debris flow is 0.051 to 0.621 persons. The expected losses are 0.51-6.2
persons over 10 years, 5.1 to 62 persons over 100 years, and 51-620 persons over
1,000 years. One can see that the expected losses are substantial over a number
of years. The fact that many lives are likely to be lost in a single debris flow
disaster rather than spread out over a number of years makes the situation far
more unacceptable, as discussed in section 9.1.4. The public's aversion to
disasters causing large numbers of fatalities is well documented in the literature
(see for example, Rohrmann, 1995a and 1995b, The Royal Society, 1992, and
Slavic, 1987). Thus the loss of life from a debris flow disaster needs to be
examined, as the average annual expected loss of life does not tell the full story.
ii) Loss of Life from a Debris Flow Disaster

Societal risk is commonly calculated by determining an event, the
probability of which is calculated (F), and the number oflives lost from such an
event (N), and plotting the point on a FN curve to see where it falls in relation to
the limits and objectives determined for societal risk (ANCOLD, 1994).
ANCOLD (1994) and The Royal Society (1992) point out that the FN curves are
commonly calculated in the chemical and nuclear industries from the reliability
of individual components, and may hence not be as appropriate for natural
disaster situations. Nevertheless the author felt that such a calculation for the
Montrose study area would be an useful exercise because the "natural" disaster,
having been identified, was potentially controllable through engineering, and
could thus be regarded as controllable by man. The steps in the calculation of a
societal risk value are:
o define the event,
o determine the probability of the event, F,
o determine the vulnerability of persons to the event,
o calculate the number of fatalities form the event, N, and
o plot the point on an FN curve.
Each of these is discussed below.
The assessment of loss of life from a debris flow disaster in the Montrose
study area is more difficult due to the need to define the event that will cause the
disaster. Since the debris flows are initiated by heavy storm rainfall (eg
Lundy- Clarke, 1975), the author chose to define the event as a storm event of
sufficient intensity to cause debris flows in the High X and High debris flow
hazard zones in the Montrose study area. The range of recurrence intervals of
debris flow for these zones is 1 in 100 to 1 in 1,000 years (Table 4.5). The
frequency of the storm event causing these can be assumed to be the same for the
purpose of this calculation, and is likely to tend to the lower end of the
probability range.
Given that debris flows do occur in the specified debris flow hazard zones,
the vulnerabilities of persons found on the properties are those given in
Table 7.2. There are 39 buildings in the High X and High hazard zones of the
study area. The sum of the vulnerability if only a single person was found in each
of these buildings ranges from 25.2 to 30.6 (lower and upper bounds). However,
the actual average number of persons per building was estimated as 2. 7 (see i)
above). Thus the number of persons dying from a storm event with the
probability of 1 in 100 to 1 in 1, 000 is 68 to 83 in the study area.
These values are plotted and compared with guidelines on the FN curve in
Figure 7.1. One can see that they are clearly above any industrial and dam
societal risk limits. These limits are for man -made hazards, though, whereas
debris flow may be considered to be a natural hazard. The limits may thus be
higher for natural hazards, but these fatalities may still be unacceptable. This is
indeed the difficulty with using societal risk curves, where risks from different
types of hazards are compared, ignoring other factors (cf The Royal Society,
1992). Nevertheless it would appear that the Montrose study area societal risk is
likely to be unacceptable. Since most of the residents do not believe the risk to be
real, the Shire can easily fulfil its legal obligation of warning the affected
residents.
The societal risk figures are comparable to the average annual expected
loss of life figures of 5 to 620 persons for the 1 in 100 to 1 in 1,000 years
probability range. This emphasises the fact that in this debris flow area the
fatalities are likely to stem from one storm event (egthe 1891 debris flow) rather
than be spread over time. The public's aversion to events causing large numbers
of fatalities was already raised. In the case of Montrose this aversion is also
coupled with a reluctance to recognise the debris flow risks. These two factors
may well result in no preventative works being able to be carried out until such a
disaster does occur.
7.2.1.3 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Montrose

The author investigated the economics of two possible scenarios of risk
reduction in the Montrose study area. Scenario 1 involves the buy out of the 39
properties that have individual risk levels in the unacceptable range, ie higher
than the tolerable limit of 10- 3 . These properties are responsible for over 90% of
the risk to life and buildings in the study area and correspond to properties in the
High X and High debris flow hazard zones. The total value of the land and
buildings is $AU 5.972m. The annual risk to these buildings is $AU 2,100 to
$AU 23,450. The annual risk to life for these properties is 0.0513 to 0.6156
persons per annum. If one assumes that an expenditure of $AU 500,000 is
definitely worthwhile to save a life (seeANCOLD, 1994), the annual expenditure
would be $AU 25,650 to $AU 307,800. It is thus possible to calculate the
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for these conditions for various periods, without
and with the expenditure to save lives in the calculations. The results of such
calculations are shown in Table 7.3.
Generally '\'', \
.•
accepted ••
LL range of ' ,
>-" maximum • ' \
tolerable \ ' ••
~ risk to an
Netherlands .
••
W IndividualIndustrial ' '
:::> Negligible '•
aw 1 0-4 +---------~:!- (interim)
a:
LL
•
•
••
•
.'
••
_J
<X:
•
:::>
z
z
•
' .•
<X:
••
•
'' UK Industrial
Intolerable
'
Hong
Kong
objective
'•
'•
••
'' •
10-6 +-----------r---------~~~-4r---~------~--~~--------~ '
' \.
BC Hydro
Intolerable
(proposed)
and Hong Kong
limit
''
10-7 +----------+----------~--------~----------r---------~
0·1 10 100 1,000
'
10,000
NUMBER OF FATALITIES, N
Figure 7.1 Comparison of the Montrose study area societal risk with various
industrial and dam societal risk curves compiled in Finlay and Fell,
(1995).
Table 7.3 IRR values for risk reduction scenarios.
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2
Land and
Building Value 5,972 1,265
($AU 'OOOs)
Without cost With cost Without cost With cost
Annual Risk of lives saved of lives saved of lives saved of lives saved
($AU 'OOOs) LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
2.1 23.45 27.75 331.25 0.37 6.11 5.23 92.51
100 years -oo -1.62 -1.36 5.52 -00 -1.29 -1.54 7.31
IRR 1,000 years 0.38
-0.18 0.46 5.55 -0.21 0.48 0.41 7.31
(%)
10,000 years 0.03 0.39 0.47 5.56 0.03 0.49 0.41 7.31
Notes: LB Lower bound

UB Upper bound
Scenario 2 is a less resource intensive scenario, where only all properties

containing houses partly or wholly in the High X region are bought out. There
are 11 such properties in the study area, and the combined cost of land and
buildings is $AU 1.265m. The annual risk to these buildings is $AU 370 to
$AU 6,110. The annual risk to life for these properties is 0.0097 to 0.1728
persons per annum. If one again assumes that an expenditure of$AU 500,000 is
definitely worthwhile to save a life, the annual expenditure would be $AU 4,860
to $AU 86,400. The IRR values without and with the cost of saving a life are
shown in Table 7.3.
From Table 7.3 one can see that the IRR for both scenarios without the
inclusion of the value of saving lives is negative or near zero for periods of100 to
10,000 years, indicating that the buy out could not be justified on economic
grounds only. With the cost oflives saved taken into account the IRR approaches
economically justifiable levels at the upper bounds (5.5% for scenario 1 and 7.3%
for scenario 2). The author also calculated the IRR values for both scenarios for
a 100 year period for different values of the cost of saving a life. These are
plotted in Figure 7.2. The wide range of IRR values between the upper and lower
bounds is apparent in this plot, as the IRR value is sensitive to the average
annual loss of life, which in turn depends on the probabilities of debris flow.
Figure 7.2 thus highlights the uncertainty in the estimates of debris flow
probabilities. For the upper bound the cost of saving a life required to justify an
economic return is of the order of $AU 1-2m, and greater than $AU 1Om for the
lower bound.
140
uJper
/
bound /
120 - Scenario 1 ,/
--- Scenario 2 /
/
100 / ~
~
/
/
/
v
/
80 / bound-
IRA(%)
60
/ L
40
/
/
/
20 / ~ Lower_
bound
0
/
r--
.... -
-20
0 2 4 6 8 10
Cost of Saving a Life ($AU millions)
Figure 7.2 Upper and lower bound IRR rates for a 100 year period for differing
costs of saving a life.
Costs such as the loss of roads and services, and the loss of real estate value
due to debris flow events are not included in these assessments. If they were,
they would increase the IRR values, but not by a significant amount. It is thus
clear that debris flow risk reduction measures will be difficult to justify on
economic terms alone, even over long time periods, except for high values of a life
saved. However, given the unacceptable societal risk arising from the debris
flow, the Shire faces an apparently unsolvable quandary. Ultimately the
solution to these issues will arise through the political process.
7.2.2 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Kalorama Study Area

The calculation of landslide risk in the Kalorama study area followed the
determination of the probabilities of landsliding in the study area based on
geomorphological sub-zoning, detailed in section 5.5. The vulnerabilities to
landsliding were first assessed. The total landslide risk to property (building)
was then calculated.
7.2.2.1 Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities of the buildings in the Kalorama study area were
determined for the worst case scenario for both the small and large landslides
described in section 5.5. This scenario involves the house straddling the
landslide or being downslope of the landslide, and was adopted as it was assumed
that the location of the landslide can be anywhere on the particular property.
The house will be less vulnerable if it is upslope of a landslide. Its downslope
vulnerability will vary depending on the landslide magnitude, proximity, and
runout distance. The house straddling the landslide is thus most likely to be the
worst case scenario, but the downslope house position may also govern for small
slides.
Given that the house under consideration straddles a landslide or is
downslope of it, factors that will influence its vulnerability are the slope it is
built on (which affects landslide velocity), the magnitude of the landslide (small
or large) and the type of construction. The type of construction will affect the
ductility and deformation resistance of the house in question. The location and
proximity of the landslide will also influence its vulnerability, but these remain
individually unquantifiable. They are taken into account by using average
vulnerabilities for each vulnerability class.
The adopted vulnerabilities are given in Table 7.4. The highest average
vulnerability to a large magnitude landslide is 0.9, and the lowest 0.4. On steep
slopes the type of building construction has little effect on vulnerability, as the
landslide velocity is large. One should note that the range of vulnerabilities is up
to 1.0 for a large magnitude landslide. For a small magnitude landslide the
average vulnerability ranges from 0.2 to 0.5, and the building construction type
is not significant. The vulnerabilities adopted reflect the fact that a house is
likely to survive a small magnitude landslide on all slopes, whereas it is likely to
be destroyed by a large magnitude landslide on a steep slope. The vulnerabilities
adopted are arrived at mainly through the author's judgement, based on his
study of vulnerability of persons in Hong Kong (section 6.3.3) and discussions
with the author's supervisor.
7.2.2.2 Calculation of Total Risk Rt to Buildings

The individual landslide risk to buildings for a small and large landslide in
the Kalorama study area was calculated by multiplying the value of the house by
the probability of landsliding and the building vulnerability. The probabilities
were obtained by finding the sub-zone(s) in which the house was located, and
entering their corresponding probabilities of landsliding onto a spreadsheet. A
lower and upper bound to the probability were thus obtained. These were then
multiplied by the corresponding vulnerabilities and house values, giving the

specific element risk Rs. The specific element risks were summed to give total
risks for both small and large magnitude landslides. The calculations are set out
in Appendix D2.
Table 7.4 Vulnerabilities of buildings in the Kalorama study area.
BUILDING VULNERABILITY
SLOPE CONSTRUCTION
(degrees) TYPE Small magnitude Large magnitude
landslide landslide
1
> 20 2 0.50 0.90
3
1 0.80
15--20 2 0.40 0.70
3 0.65
1 0.65
10-15 2 0.30 0.60
3 0.55
1 0.50
<10 2 0.20 0.45
3 0.40
Notes: 1. Full brick/concrete.

2. Brick veneer
3. Timber, weatherboard or other cladding on a timber frame
The total building risk from small landslides is $AU 33,600 to $AU 38,280
per annum. This represents 0.52% to 0.60% of the total value of buildings in the
study area. The building risk from large landslides is $AU 10,990 to $AU 14,020
per annum, representing 0.17% to 0.22% of the total value ofbuildings. One can
see that the building risk from small landslides is larger than that from the large
landslides. This is an expected result, as the small landslides occur more
frequently and in more locations; thus their cumulative effect is greater than
that of the less frequent but more damaging large landslides. It is probably
reasonable to add these two risk values as the risks are largely independent of
each other, although some large landslides may be initiated by small landslide.
The total building risk in the Kalorama study area is then $AU 44,590 to
$AU 52,300 per annum, representing 0.69 to 0.82% of the total value of
buildings. These percentage values are higher that those for the Montrose study
area risk to buildings. They are also have a narrower range due to the narrower
range of landslide probabilities used in the Kalorama risk assessment.
the conditions for drainage were altered, or big cuts and/or fills constructed, the
landslide probabilities would increase, thereby resulting in a higher building
risk.
7.2.2.3 Notes on Loss of Life Risk

The assessment of risk to life in the Kalorama study area was not carried
out as insufficient data was available to the author on the vulnerability of
persons to small and large landslides to permit reasonable quantification. The
author notes that the risk to life is likely be lower than that for the corresponding
debris flow situation as the buildings are less likely to suffer total destruction,
thus enabling escape, and lowering vulnerabilities. Because of this and the
nature of the landslide, a person is also less likely to be engulfed by the landslide
debris. Other data show that a person not engulfed in landslide debris has a high
chance of survival (see, for example, Finlay and Fell, 1995).
7.2.2.4 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Kalorama

A scenario for the reduction of landslide risk analysed by the author is the
buying out by the Shire of eight properties for which the upper bound of relative
risk is greater than 10 points (see Table 5.56). This represents upper bound
probabilities of small and large landsliding of 0.025 and 0.005 respectively. The
total value of the land and buildings is $AU 1.157m. The annual landslide risk to
these buildings is $AU 9,060 to $AU 12,470. The IRR for periods of 100 to
10,000 years ranged from -0.5% to 1.0%. This is again a low, economically not
feasible value, comparable to those obtained in the Montrose risk reduction
scenarios when the value of saving lives was not included. Even though the
average annual expected loss oflife due to landsliding figure is not available, it is
likely to be lower than the corresponding one for Montrose. Hence even if the
value of lives saved were added to the Kalorama IRR calculations, the author
would not expect it to be as high as those obtained for the Montrose risk
reduction scenarios. The difference between the two study areas is thus
highlighted: Montrose presents a serious risk to life, whereas in Kalorama the
risk to buildings carries more weight.
7.3 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire Due To Landsliding
7 .3.1 Introduction
During the study oflandslide risk assessment in Lillydale Shire a meeting
was held with the Shire's valuers to discuss the general issues of loss of real
estate (and therefore rateable value) of a property affected by landsliding. The
estate (and therefore rateable value) of a property affected by landsliding. The

contributors listed below responded to questions submitted to the Director,
Environment and Planning, by Professor Fell. The contributors to the survey
were all experienced valuers in the Shire. Their titles are as follows:
1. Director, Environment and Planning
2. Manager, Valuation Services
3. Assistant Valuer
4. Assistant Valuer
The issues concerning the loss of real estate value due to landsliding looked at
were:
o Loss of real estate value due to specific landslide situations.
o How long this loss remains.
o How the costs for landslide damage repair compare with ordinary
repair/construction costs.
o At what level of landslide damage would a house have to be
condemned.
Each of these is discussed below.
7.3.2 Loss of Real Estate Value Due to Specific Landslide

Situations
The estimate of the loss of real estate value (in terms of percentage loss of
original value) was requested for specific situations of landslide damage or
potential threat to a property or properties. The valuers were to assume that
remedial works are carried out but the threat of landsliding still remained.
7.3.2.1 Situation 1
Two rooms of an eight bedroom house are demolished by the slide. The
house is badly cracked and needs rebuilding after the slide is stabilised. The
situation is shown in Figure 7.3. The estimates of loss of real estate value are
given in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Loss of real estate value for situation 1.
Valuer Loss of Value

House needs to be evacuated until such time as it is fully repaired.
Some form of geotechnical report is required to state that the event
1
is now unlikely to occur following the remedial works. Possibly re-
quire indemnity.
2 30%
3 50%
4 80% (Before repair?)
Figure 7.3 Landslide situation 1.
7.3.2.2 Situation 2
A landslide occurs below the house. The slide has not damaged the house,
and can be stabilised. The situation is illustrated in Figure 7.4. The estimates of
loss of real estate value are given in Table 7.6.


People are not required to be evacuated unless weather conditions
are such that remedial works cannot be carried out straight away,
and a professional geotechnical assessment indicates concern
about future movement.
2 10-15%
3 10%
4 30% (To cover landslide rectification)
7.3.2.3 Situation 3
A cut slope behind a house collapses, damaging one or more rear rooms.
The house can then be subsequently repaired. This situation is shown in Figure
7.5. The estimates ofloss of real estate value are given in Table 7.7.
SLIDE
MATERIAL


House requires evacuation until remedial works are complete.
2 30%
3 40-50%
4 40% before repair, 5% after repair
7.3.2.4 Situation 4
The house on landslide in situation 4 moves 50mm per year with only
minor cracking. This is shown in Figure 7.6. The estimates ofloss of real estate
value are given in Table 7.8.
50mm/year
SLIDE PLANE

Require monitoring but not evacuation or taking further action un-
less geotechnical reports indicate the slide may be subject to a
sudden surge. Monitor services, fittings, structure and land move-
ment.
2 10%
3 20%
4 up to 20%
7.3.2.5 Situation 5
Landslide situation 5 is shown in Figure 7. 7. House A is demolished by
sliding. Expert advice is that house B is at risk (probability undefined). House C
is not at risk. The estimates ofloss of real estate value for each of the houses A, B
and Care given in Table 7.9.
HOUSE C
HOUSE 8 HOUSE A
1,.,.-.. . . . . . . . 't-
1 I
House Valuer Loss of Real Estate Value

1 100%
2 90%
A
3 90%
4 95%
Remaining risk should be quickly defined otherwise ev-
1
acuation will be necessary.
8 2 70%
3 70%
4 35%
1 Did not respond
2 50%
c 30%
3
4 25%
7.3.2.6 Situation 6
House B has been demolished by sliding. Geotechnical advice is that house
A is not directly affected by sliding. What is the loss of value of house A?
PLAN VIEW
EJ

1 Did not respond
2 50%
3 60%
25-35%, possibly more. Depends on severity of slide, any
4 loss of life, press coverage, etc - this may cause up to a
50% loss.
7.3.3 General Effect of Landslide Zoning
Loss of real estate value due to general landslide zoning was responded to
only by valuer 2. The estimated losses are indicated in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11 General effect on real estate values due to landslide zoning.
Landslide % Loss of Real Estate Value

Zoning With House Vacant Land
M1 0 5
M2 0 15
H 0-15 15-20
7.3.4 Effects of Landslide Debris Flow Zoning on House Values
This situation was discussed with the valuers but no direct losses were
given due to the compounding effect of the recession on house and property
prices in the area. The valuers felt that it was difficult to separate a cut in values
due to the recession from any effects the landslide debris flow zoning may have
had.
7.3.5 How Long the Loss of Real Estate Value Remains
The notes by valuer 1 indicated that for 12-18 months the event would be
high on peoples' minds and therefore would influence real estate values. After
this period people would tend to forget and the real estate values would return to
normal levels. However, valuer 1 noted that some properties zoned H for
landslide risk are difficult to sell unless the buyer is from the area and
"comfortable" with the risk. Thus properties zoned H may have a permanent
"stigma" attached, and a permanent reduction in real estate value. Valuer 1
pointed out that this would be difficult to assess as many other factors have
influenced property prices in the area.

With Ordinary Repair/Construction Costs
Valuer 1 commented that these would not be different to normal building

costs except for additional costs for:
o removal of debris and general clean-up,
o foundation repair, and
o erection of retaining walls or diversion structures.
7.3. 7 At What Level of Landslide Damage a House Would Have

To Be Condemned
The case of what damage to a house is sufficient for it to be condemned was
noted by an officer of the Building Division to be very situation dependent, with
no hard -and -fast rules. Each landslide case would be inspected by a building
inspector. If major structural damage was apparent the building would be
condemned. Otherwise the inspector would need to assess the stability of the
structure and any threat of collapse to the occupants.
7 .3.8 Discussion
Four types of losses of real estate value due to landsliding have been
identified in the above situations. A loss due to direct landslide damage is the
first case (situations 1 and 3). In this case the loss is related to the amount of
damage. Its estimates varied from 30-100%. Buildings threatened by a
landslide represent the second case (situations 2, 4, house Bin 5, and 6). The loss
of value for a house floating on a slow-moving landslide (situation 4) was only
10-20%. The estimated losses ranged from 10-30% for situation 4, but
increased to 25-70% for situation 5 (house B) and situation 6. The difference
between situation 4 and situations 5 and 6 is that a house nearby has already
been destroyed, and hence the remaining threatened buildings are substantially
devalued. This is not an unexpected result.
The third case is the loss of real estate value due to the destruction of a
nearby building by a landslide where the buildings are not subjected to landslide
hazard (house C in situation 5). In this case the estimated loss is reduced to
25-50%. The fourth and final case is the general effect of the landslide and
debris flow zoning on the real estate values. The landslide zoning was estimated
(by only one valuer) to have reduced values of properties with houses by up to
15%, and up to 20% for vacant land, for the High hazard zoning. The effects of
the debris flow zoning on the real estate values in areas subject to debris flow
hazard were difficult to separate from a drop in values due to the recession.
One can see that significant real estate losses are experienced not only to
buildings suffering the direct damage from landsliding, but also buildings
threatened by landsliding, buildings close to landslide-damaged buildings
(particularly where buildings have been destroyed), and properties in medium
and high hazard landslide and debris flow zones. Overall, the losses of real
estate value diminish with increasing distance from locations of landslide
destruction, and locations threatened by landsliding. More study on the loss of
real estate value due to landsliding is needed to enable the incorporation of lost
real estate value into the landslide risk assessment system.
7.4 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong

Illustrative examples are given on the calculation oflandslide risk in Hong
Kong for a cut slope (section 7.4.1), retaining wall (section 7.4.2) and fill slope
(section 7.4.3). The data on which these are based is given in sections 5.2 to 5.4
and section 6.3 The examples focus mainly on loss of life, but comments are
given regarding property damage also. The author stresses that the proposed
Hong Kong risk assessment system needs trialing, refining and further
development in order for it to become a workable risk management tool.
7 .4.1 Example of Calculation of Annual Fatality Risk for a Cut

Slope
7.4.1.1 Data
A) Geometry
Height 9m
Angle 55°
Angle above 25°
Angle below oo
Number of berms 0
B) History
Age Pre GEO
History of instability None
C) Evidence of Instability
Evidence of instability Minor cracking
D) Geology
Unfavourable joints None
Recent colluvium None
In-situ material Not colluvium
E) Groundwater
Visible seepage None
Chunam cover 100%
Chunam condition Average
Drainage present Yes
Drain condition Fair
Drain blockage No
Vegetation upslope Trees
F) Ranking System
Incidence score 34
Consequence score 38
Stage 1 outcome No further action
7.4.1.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Pre
A) F'c Factor
Age F'c1 = 1.25 as slope is pre GEO (section 5.4.2.1A)
Geology F~2 = 0.9 (Table 5.37)
Geometry F'c3 = 1.0 (Table 5.38)
Geomorphology F'c4 = 1.1 (Table 5.40)
Groundwater F'cs = 1.0-0.25 = 0.75 (Table 5.41)
so F'c = F'c1 X F' c2 X F~3 X F~4 X F'cs
= 1.25 X 0.9 X 1.0 X 1.1 X 0.75
F'c = 0.93
B) F"c Factor
i) CHASE Discriminant Score
V4 6 = 3 (Average chunam condition)

V10 8 = 0 (Number of berms)
V6 15 1 = 2 (In -situ slope material)
V10 9 - 20° (Angle above slope)
-1.007 (Equation 5.20)

F"c1 2.0 (Table 5.42)
ii) Stage 1 Study Outcome

F"c2 =0.7 for No Further Action (section 5.4.2.1B)
iii) Cut Slope Ranking System

I + C = 34 + 38 = 72
I X C = 34 X 38 = 1292
F"c3 = 0.8 (Table 5.43)
C) Adjustment of F'e Using F'~

F~ = 0.93, F"el = 1.0,
F"e2 = 0. 7, F"e3 = 0.8.
The F"e factors indicate that the slope is less likely to fail than average, hence the
F~ value should be adjusted downwards. Adopt F'e = 0.8.
D) Calculation of Fe
Fe = 2.0 (Table 5.35)
Fe = Fe X F'e = 2 X 0.8 = 1.6
E) Calculation of Pre
Pa = 1 in 85 (Table 5.34)
Pre =PaX Fe
=1.6/85=0.019 < 0.1-1.0 (Table 5.35)
Hence use Pre = 0.019, say 1 in 50.
7.4.1.3 Assessment of Vulnerability Vz for a Pedestrian

If the case of a pedestrian walking along below the cut is taken, one may
wish to calculate the (average) individual risk for loss of life. Three steps are
needed in order to assess this:
o estimate of runout distance
o estimate of the vulnerability of a pedestrian
o estimate of the temporal probability of a pedestrian.
These are detailed below.
A) Estimate of Runout Distance

Using section 6.2.4.6 (equations from Table 6.19 for situation 1) the debris
profile shown in Figure 7.9 is obtained.
B) Assessment of Pedestrian Vulnerability V

Section 6.3.3 gives guidance of person's vulnerabilities if buried or not
buried by the debris. The person most at risk will be the person walking right
next to the cut when it fails, and this person would almost certainly be buried
(refer to Figure 7.9).
Persons, say, at a 5 m distance from the cut slope may or may not be buried.
Table 6.29 gives Vz = 1.0 if the person is buried, and Vz = 0.1 if the person is not
buried. For the individual most at risk Vi = 1.0 is appropriate. However, the
difficult question is what the chance of being buried is, which depends on the
location of the person, the presence of buildings nearby, and so on. Use of
judgement is necessary at this point, and sensitivity to the values will also need
to be examined.
C) Estimate of the Temporal Probability of a Pedestrian Vt

Section 6.4 gives guidance on general concepts. One way to estimate Yt is to
work out the average number of persons passing the cut per day, and the
estimated average time of exposure to the landslide hazard. For example, if 1000
people pass the cut each day, and each person is exposed for thirty seconds,
v;t -- 1000 X 60 X 60 X30 24 X 365 = 9.5 X 10- 4
Hence V = vt x Vz = 0.5 x 9.5 x 10- 4 = 4.8 x 10- 4 , (using Vz = 0.5) with a

range of 9.5 x 10- 5 (Vz = 0.1) to 9.5 x 10- 4 (Vz = 1.0).
7.4.1.4 Calculation of Annual Specific Risk

For the pedestrian, on average,
R5 =Pre XV
= 0.019 X 4.8 X 10- 4
Rs = 9 x 10- 6
UsingtherangeVz =0.1-1,oneobtainsR5 intherangeofl x 10- 6 to2 x 10- 5
per annum. This is the individual risk to life.
7.4.1.5 Discussion on Individual Risks to Life

The individual risk to life would certainly appear to be in the upper
acceptable range of lo- 5 to lo- 6 (see section 9.1.1.2). One may note that if the
cut slope probability of failure was considerably higher, the individual risk to life
could be pushed into the unacceptable risk range.
7.4.1.6 Vulnerabilities
Similar steps to those described can be used to develop vulnerabilities for
persons in buildings/vehicles, and for buildings, vehicles and property
themselves. In the case of property the estimated average annual risk can be
estimated in dollar terms by multiplying the specific risk by the value of the
property under consideration.
;1 ri'
0 fP
~ ....
.....
Cll
......
•
l>i"'Tj
~ [
0Cll
Cll
'<
~
"'
s
Cll '"""0
::r
g t:J
.... ,--..
....,z
0 c:::
~CIJ
0 :E
]---
Cil
95% confidence limits
9m
....................
....................
1.9 m
....................
..........
L
~
3.5 m L
~
Figure 7.9 Estimated debris profile for a cut slope failure. w

Vl
0\
7 .4.2 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall
7.4.2.1 Data
A) General
Type Masonry
Age Pre-GEO
Type of material retained Fill
History of instability None
B) Geometry
Height 4.5m
Slope above wall 25°
Evidence of instability None
D) Groundwater
Visible seepage Water exiting in lower third of wall height
Service pipes Present
Weepholes and drains Present
Vegetation upslope No paved surface
7.4.2.2 Calculation of failure probability Pfw
A) F( Factor
Wall type F'wl = 1.25 (Table 5.45)
Wall age F'w2 = 1.25 (Table 5.45)
Type of material retained F'ws = 1.25 (Table 5.45)
Wall height F'w3 = 1.2 (Table 5.46)
Angle above wall F'w4 = 1.5 (Table 5.48)
Groundwater F'w6 = 2.5-0.25 (Table 5.49)
= 2.25
F'w = F'wl X F'w2 X F'w3 X F'w4 X F'ws X F'w6
1.25
= X 1.25 X 1.2 X 1.5 X 1.25 X 2.25
F'w 7.9
B) F'(Factor
No F"w factor is applicable for retaining walls, hence use F'w as calculated.
C) Calculation of Fr
Fe = 0.5 (Table 5.35)
Fw =Fe X F'w = 0.5 X 7.9 = 4.0
D) Calculation of Prw
Pa = 1 in 336 (Table 5.34)
Prw =4.0/336 = 0.011 < 1.0 (Table 5.35)
Use Prw = 0.011, ie. 1 in 91.
7.4.2.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V for a Pedestrian
Again the same three steps are needed as for cut slope, namely the
assessment of runout distance, vulnerability of a person and estimation of
temporal probability.

Using section 6.2.4.6 (equations from Table 6.19 for situation 6) the mean
runout distance is 7.2 m from the wall base, with the lower and upper 95%
confidence limits being 2.3 m and 22.1 m respectively. This wide range is due to
the somewhat limited data and poor model fit. As the depth of debris cannot be
estimated one can obtain no guidance on the debris profile, and hence how close
a person may need to be to the wall to be buried. However, one can see that the
runout distance is large and will affect persons in the vicinity of the wall.
B) Assessment of Pedestrian Vulnerability Vz

As discussed for cuts, given the range of vulnerabilities in section 6.3.3, and
the difficulty of predicting whether a person will or will not be buried by
landslide debris, one can simply look at the range of vulnerabilities when
assessing risk to life, ie. Vz in the range of 0.1-1. 0.
C) Estimate of the Temporal Probability of a Pedestrian V1

Using the figures from the cut slope sample calculation, Vt = 1o- 3 (rounded
to nearest multiple of10). Hence V = Vt x Vz will be in the range of1o- 3 to 10- 4 .
7.4.2.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life
For an average pedestrian,

Rs =Prw XV
= 0.011 x 10- 3 to 0.011 x 1o- 4
ie. Rs is in the range 1.1 x 10- 5 to 1.1 x 10- 6 .
7.4.2.5 Discussion on Individual Risk to Life and Societal Risk

R 5 is again in the upper portion of the acceptable risk range of 10- 5 to 10- 6
(see section 9.1.1.2). It needs to be pointed out that although the individual risk
may be acceptable, the societal risk may not. The required probabilities for
acceptable societal risk would be lower, mirroring the public's aversion to
multiple landslide fatalities such as the wall failure at Kwun Lung Lau (GEO,
1994a). The societal risk for this situation could be calculated by estimating the
possible number of people affected by a failure, and the sum of their respective
specific risks.
7.4.2.6 Other Vulnerabilities

The comments made for other vulnerabilities for the cut slope case apply
here equally.
7.4.3 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope
7.4.3.1 Data
A) General
Age Pre-GEO
Fill type Residual soil
Compaction None
History of instability Yes
B) Geometry
Height 15m
Slope angle 37°
Angle of natural slope 15°
Evidence of instability None
D) Groundwater
Seepage Water exiting in lower third of fill slope height
Service pipes Yes
Fill surface infiltration No
Drain condition Fair
Drain blockage No
Upslope area paving Yes
Fill in natural water course No
7.4.3.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Prr
A) F( Factor
Age F'fi = 1.25 (Table 5.51)
Type F{2 = 1.1 (Table 5.51)
Compaction F{s = 1.25 (Table 5.51)
Geometry F{4 = 1.5 (Table 5.52)
Geomorphology F(s = 0.8 (Table 5.53)
Groundwater F{6 = 3.0-0.25-0.25 (Table 5.54)
F{6 = 2.5 (is within 0.5-6 range)
F{ = F(1 X F{2 X F{s X F{4 X F{s X F(6
= 1.25 X 1.1 X 1.25 X 1.5 X 0.8 X 2.5
F{ = 5.2
B) F''r Factor
No F'{ factor is applicable for fill slopes, hence use F( as calculated.
C) Calculation of Fr
Fe = 1.5 (Table 5.35)
Ft = Fe X F{ = 1.5 X 5.2 = 7.8
D) Calculation of Prr
Pa = 1 in 525 (Table 5.34)
Prr = Pa X Fr
=7.8/525 = 0.015 < Pmax (Table 5.35)
Use Prr = 0.015, ie. 1 in 67.
7 .4.3.3 Assessment of vulnerability V of a pedestrian

Using the equations for situation 7 (Table 6.19) the mean runout distance
is 32m, with very large lower and upper 95% confidence values of 7.5 m and
155 m respectively. While the mean runout distance of 32 m is not
unreasonable, the large range in the confidence values is partly due to the use of
V/W1 = 22 m, which is also an upper value. A better feel for the range of runout
distances would be obtained by varying the values of H and V/W1 in the
equations.
In any case the runout distance is large, and has the potential to affect a
large number of people in a large area. Hence societal risk, as well as individual
risk, will play a large role in the assessment of risk to life.
B) Assessment of Pedestrian Vulnerability Vi

The range of vulnerability Vz of 0.1 to 1.0 will again need investigation.
However, as the runout is large, it is far more likely that persons will be buried
and so the upper end of the range, say Vz of 0.8-1.0, should be given more
weighting.
C) Estimate of Temporal Probability of a Pedestrian Vt

Again if the figure from the cut slope example is used, Vi = 10- 3 , hence V
will be in the range of 10- 3 to 10- 4 , but more likely to be 10- 3 .
7.4.3.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life

For an average pedestrian,
Rs=Prw XV
= 0.015 X 10- 3 to 0.015 X 10- 4
ie. 1.5 x 10- 5 < Rs < 1.5 x 10- 6 , and likely to be the higher figure. This value
may or may not be acceptable (see section 9.1.1.2).
7.4.3.5 Calculation of Societal Risk

One way to approach societal risk is to estimate the largest failure that will
occur and the expected number of persons it will affect. For example, if the
largest failure is taken to have the runouts listed above, and the estimate of
people affected is, say, 50 (with a probability of 10- 4 ) and an average
vulnerability of 0.5, the calculated point on the societal risk curve will be 25
fatalities (50 x 0.5) with a frequency of 1.5 x 10- 6 (Pff x 10- 4 ). When compared
with the societal risk recommended by the Hong Kong Government Planning
Department (1994), this point plots above the objective line in the ALARP
region, and hence could be regarded as acceptable. One should note that many
small failures occurring at the same time are not likely to cause large numbers of
fatalities.
7.4.3.6 Other Vulnerabilities

The comments made for cuts are also relevant for fills.
7 .4.4 Comments on Calculated Risks to Life

The values of R8 obtained for cuts, retaining walls and fills respectively are
0.2-1 x 10- 6 , 1.1-11 x 10- 6 and 1.5-15 x 10- 6 . The Rs values are in the
upper portion of the acceptable risk range of1o- 5 to 10- 6 (see section 9.1.1.2). It
needs to be pointed out that although the individual risk may be acceptable, the
societal risk may not. The required probabilities for acceptable societal risk
would be lower due to the public's aversion to landslide disasters.
One can see that the R8 values for retaining walls and fills are an order of
magnitude higher than that for cuts, indicating that retaining walls and fills are
likely to represent a higher risk to life. This has indeed been the experience in
Hong Kong, with fatal fill failures such as Sau Mau Ping (1972 and 1976) and
Baguio Villas (1992), and fatal retaining wall failures such as Kwun Lung Lau
(1994). The calculated point on the societal risk curve for a fill failure is 25
fatalities with a frequency of 1.5 x 10- 6 . When compared with the societal risk
this point plots above the objective line in the ALARP region, and hence could be
regarded as acceptable.
7.5.1 Conclusions
7.5.1.1 Risk Assessments in Lillydale Shire
A) Risk to Buildings
Vulnerabilities for building damage were developed by the author for both
the landslide and debris flow hazards. These were then used in the risk to
building calculations in the Montrose and Kalorama study areas.
The total risk to buildings in the Montrose study area is $AU 2,160-24,130
per annum, or 0.02-0.22% of the total study area building value. The range is
due to the range of probabilities for the various zones. The total building risk in
the Kalorama study area from small landslides is $AU 33,600 to $AU 38,280 per
annum. This represents 0.52% to 0.60% of the total value of buildings in the
study area. The building risk from large landslides is $AU 10,990 to $AU 14,020
per annum, representing0.17% to 0.22% of the total value ofbuildings. One can
see that the building risk from small landslides is larger than that from the large
landslides. This is an expected result, as the small landslides occur more
frequently and in more locations. It is probably reasonable to add these two risk
values as the risks are largely independent of each other, although some large
landslides may be initiated by small landslide. The total building risk in the
Kalorama study area is then $AU 44,590 to $AU 52,300 per annum,
representing 0.69 to 0.82% of the total value of buildings. These percentage
values are higher that those for the Montrose study area risk to buildings. They
are also have a narrower range due to the narrower range of landslide
probabilities used in the Kalorama risk assessment.
B) Risk to Life
Vulnerabilities of persons to debris flows were developed by the author.
These were then used in the risk to life calculations in the Montrose study area.
The highest calculated upper bound value of annual individual risk to life is
0.008, well above the commonly accepted limits to individual risk. 10- 3 is the
upper bound of commonly used individual risk limits. 39 properties in the study
area have an upper bound value of annual individual risk to life above 10- 3 , ie in
the unacceptable risk region. A further 20 properties have an upper bound value
of annual individual risk to life oflo- 4 , which is within theALARP region, egfor
dams (ANCOLD, 1994). The remaining 92 properties have an upper bound
value of annual individual risk to life of1o- 6, which equals theANCOLD (1994)
objective guideline for new dams, and an order of magnitude less than the 10- 5
recommended objective for existing dams (ANCOLD guideline G.13). These
objective levels for individual risk are also widely accepted world -wide
(AN COLD, 1994, and The Royal Society, 1992). Thus the 92 properties are in the
acceptable risk region.
The average annual expected loss oflife due to debris flow in the Montrose
study area is 0.51-6.2 persons over 10 years, 5.1 to 62 persons over 100 years,
and 51 to 620 persons over 1,000 years using the average 2. 7 persons per
building. One can see that over a number of years the expected losses are
substantial. The fact that many lives are likely to be lost in a single debris flow
disaster rather than spread out over a number of years makes the situation far
more unacceptable. The public's aversion to disasters causing large numbers of
fatalities is well documented in the literature (see for example, Rohrmann,
1995a and 1995b, The Royal Society, 1992, and Slavic, 1987).
The loss oflife from a debris flow disaster was examined by assuming that a
storm event of the same frequency as the High X and High debris flow hazard
zones will cause debris flows over the entire area covered by these zones. Given
that debris flows do occur, the number of persons dying from a storm event with
the probability of 1 in 100 to 1 in 1, 000 is 68 to 83. The fatality figures are
comparable to the average annual expected loss of life figures of 5 to 620 persons
for the 1 in 100 to 1 in 1,000 years probability range. The values were plotted and
compared with guidelines on the FN curve in Figure 7.1 They are clearly above
commonly accepted industrial and dam societal risk limits. However, these
limits are for man-made hazards, whereas debris flow is clearly a natural
hazard. The limits may thus be higher for natural hazards, but these fatalities
may still be unacceptable. This is indeed the difficulty with using societal risk
curves, where risks from different types of hazards are compared based only on
the probability of the event and the estimated number of fatalities resulting
(The Royal Society, 1992). Nevertheless it appears that the Montrose study area
societal risk is unacceptable.
C) The Economics of Risk Reduction

The economics of risk reduction in both study areas were examined by
analysing the IRR for various scenarios such as buying out all Montrose
properties that have unacceptable individual risks to life. The IRR for both
Montrose scenarios without the inclusion of the value of saving lives is negative
or near zero for periods of 100 to 10,000 years, indicating that the buy out could
not be justified on economic grounds only. With the cost oflives saved taken into
account the IRR approaches economically justifiable levels at the upper bounds.
Costs such as the loss of roads and services, and the loss of real estate value due to
debris flow events are not included in these assessments. If they were, they
would increase theiRR values, but probably not by a significant amount. Debris
flow risk reduction measures would thus be difficult to justify on economic terms
alone, even over long time periods. Given the unacceptable societal risk arising
from the debris flow the Shire is in a difficult position. The solution to these
issues will arise through the political process.
A scenario for the reduction of landslide risk in the Kalorama study area
was the buying out by the Shire of eight properties for which the upper bound of
the risk is greater than 10 points. The IRR for periods of 100 to 10,000 years
ranged from -0.5% to 1.0%. This is again a low, economically not feasible value,
comparable to those obtained in the Montrose risk reduction scenarios when the
value of saving lives was not included. Even though the average annual expected
loss of life due to landsliding figure is not available, it is likely to be lower than
the corresponding one for Montrose. Hence even if the value of lives saved were
added to the Kalorama IRR calculations, the author would not expect it to be as
high as those obtained for the Montrose risk reduction scenarios. The difference
between the two study areas is thus highlighted: Montrose presents a serious
risk to life, whereas in Kalorama the risk to buildings carries more weight.
7.5.1.2 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire Due To

Landsliding
Four types of losses of real estate value due to landsliding were identified
and the losses estimated by Lillydale Shire's valuers. A loss due to direct
landslide damage is the first case, and is related to the amount of damage. Its
estimates varied from 30-100%. Buildings threatened by a landslide represent
the second case. The estimated losses ranged from 10-70%. When a house
nearby has already been destroyed, the remaining threatened buildings are
substantially devalued. The third case is the loss of real estate value due to the
destruction of a nearby building by a landslide where the buildings are not
subjected to landslide hazard. The estimated loss is reduced to 25-50% in this
case. The fourth and final case is the general effect of the landslide and debris
flow zoning on the real estate values. The landslide zoning was estimated (by
only one valuer) to have reduced values of properties with houses by up to 15%,
and up to 20% for vacant land, for the High hazard zoning. The effects of the
debris flow zoning on the real estate values in areas subject to debris flow hazard
were difficult to separate from a drop in values due to the recession.
Significant real estate losses are experienced by buildings threatened by
landsliding, buildings close to landslide-damaged buildings and properties in
medium and high hazard landslide and debris flow zones. The losses of real
estate value decrease with increasing distance from locations of landslide
destruction, and locations threatened by landsliding.
7.5.1.3 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong

Illustrative examples of calculations of landslide risk in Hong Kong were
given for a cut, retaining wall and fill slope. The examples focused on the risk to
life. The values of Rs obtained for cuts, retaining walls and fills respectively are
0.2-1 x 10- 6 , 1.1-11 x 10- 6 and 1.5-15 x 10- 6 . The Rs values are in the
upper portion of the acceptable risk range of 10- 5 to 10- 6 . The required
probabilities for acceptable societal risk will be lower due to the public's aversion
to landslide disasters.
TheR5 values for retaining walls and fills are an order of magnitude higher
than that for cuts, indicating that retaining walls and fills are likely to represent
a higher risk to life. The experience in Hong Kong confirms this. Fatal fill
failures such as Sau Mau Ping (1972 and 1976), Baguio Villas (1992), and fatal
retaining wall failures such as Kwung Lung Lau (1994) have occurred. The
calculated sample point on the societal risk curve for a fill failure was 25
fatalities with a frequency of 1.5 X 10- 6 . When compared with the societal risk
recommended by the Hong Kong Government Planning Department (1994),
this point plotted above the objective line in the ALARP region, and hence can be
regarded as acceptable subject to the ALARP principle.
but based on insights gained from the author's calculations oflandslide risk, the
following recommendations for landslide risk management systems are made:
o Ways of allowing for the representation of the public's aversion for
landslide disasters in monetary terms need to be researched, as the
economic justification of landslide risk reduction measures may be
difficult if based on property and building losses alone.
o More study on the loss of real estate value due to landsliding is needed
to enable the incorporation oflost real estate value into the landslide
risk assessment system.
o The proposed Hong Kong landslide risk assessment system needs
trialing, refining and further development in order for it to become a
workable risk management tool.
The pursuit of the above recommendations will make further contributions to
landslide risk management systems.

LAND SLIDING
8.1 Detailed Literature Review

The presence of groundwater has a direct effect on landsliding activity,
being a de stabilising force in the stability equation. The presence of water is a
major factor for which a landslide risk assessment system must account.
Landslides are influenced by piezometric levels, which in turn are a function of
various hydrologic variables and soil properties. A concise overview of these can
be found in Walker and Mohen (1987). Rainfall is a main hydrologic variable
that is easily observable and has been recorded on a world -wide basis for some
time. Consequently a large body of literature on rainfall and landslides exists,
which has been reviewed by the author and is presented herein.
The author has divided the literature review into the following
thematically similar parts:
o relationship of rainfall to pore pressures and groundwater flow,
o world -wide review of rainfall and landsliding, and
o statistical analysis of rainfall.

Flow
The author found a substantial body of literature on the prediction of
piezometric levels by correlation with rainfall, and the subsequent prediction of
failure. The factors commonly considered in the literature are:
o infiltration,
o wetting fronts,
o runoff,
o negative pore pressures
o soil moisture variation in the unsaturated (vadose) zone,
o soil moisture deficits
o evapotranspiration, and
o changing piezometric levels due to groundwater recharge.
Fell et al (1988) predict piezometric levels in a large, deep landslide. Hanenberg
(1991) looked at piezometric levels in a shallow landslide. The response of
piezometric levels at a shallow depth is examined by Sidle (1986). In his study
Sidle found that the most influential climatological variables on groundwater
response were the total storm precipitation, maximum one hour rain intensity
and the two day antecedent moisture. Van Genuchten and de Rijke (1989)
modelled the stop- start movement of a deep landslide in the French Alps with
some success. Fukuoka (1992) also looked at a slow-moving deep slide. All
landslides in these papers were natural slope failures, in some cases aggravated
by construction activity. These authors have all developed a model based on
some or all of the above-listed factors, and then fitted it to the data from the
particular case study in question.
Anderson et al (1988) modelled cut slope hydrology for an assumed
uniform saturated hydraulic conductivity Ks and varied material properties
such as the shear strength c ', cjJ '. By calculating the factor of safety for each case
he then produced design charts incorporating these parameters. The
limitations of these charts are obvious - most soils, particularly those in the
tropics (eg. Brand, 1984), do not have uniform hydraulic conductivity due to
material variation, fissures and soil pipes which control the groundwater
regime, and they may not be saturated. The geometry as defined also limits
application to only the cases with defined geometry.
A number of papers treat groundwater seepage in relation to rainfall and
slope stability. Lee and Wu (1987) use kriging to predict the mean and the
coefficient of variation of the groundwater level. Miller (1988) analysed extreme
value statistics linked with geotechnical slope stability analyses in order to
estimate the probability of slope failure within a given time. Okunishi and
Okimura (1987) model seepage linked to precipitation via a tank model and
simulated water confined in fissures. Further papers focus specifically on
groundwater and debris flows. Wilson (1989) presents a theoretical framework
for groundwater and rainfall based on a "leaky barrel" concept. Iverson and
Major (1986) develop a Darcian seepage model of groundwater seepage and link
it to slope stability. Sitar et al (1992) model pore pressures and soil strength in
order to refine a slope stability model. Okunishi and Suwa (1985) found that
debris flows occur when the discharge of surface water exceeds a certain critical
value.
The cited papers on the prediction of piezometric levels and groundwater
seepage in relation to rainfall and slope stability are useful to various extents in
specific or individual landslide situations where sufficient information is
available on material and other parameters required by the model to make it
useful. In this case such models could be used to help assess the landslide risk of
the individual landslide situation. However, the larger scale risk assessment of
landslide areas or regions is not amenable to the application of these types of
models. In the larger scale situations one may then rely purely on models only
using rainfall as the independent variable in order to perform landslide risk
assessment. Papers relating landslides to rainfall are discussed in section 8.1.2

following.
8.1.2 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landslides

A large body ofliterature on predicting landslides using rainfall exists. It is
split into two broad sections, one on landslides in natural slopes (which is
covered extensively world -wide, particularly with respect to debris flows), and
landslides in predominantly modified slopes, which is mainly focused on slopes
in Hong Kong. Each of these sections is covered separately.
8.1.2.1 Rainfall and Landslides in Natural Slopes

The author found useful overviews of the main issues in books by Crozier
(1986) and Sidle et al (1985). Crozier (1986) discusses the climatic triggering of
landslides at length. He notes the fact that most landslides are initiated during
intense precipitation events or during lesser precipitation events associated
with prolonged wet periods. When landslides occur, they are often in areal
clusters which may or may not correspond to the locations of the heaviest
rainfall. Crozier examines thresholds triggering landslides, the effect of rainfall
intensity, the water deficit in soil and antecedent rainfall. Figure 8.1 shows a
relationship between the area of landsliding (as a percentage of the total area)
and the maximum one day excess rainfall threshold. Not surprisingly the area of
landsliding increases as the excess rainfall increases. Crozier points out that
two types of threshold may be observed. The "minimum probability threshold"
is one below which landslides never occur, and above it they may occur under
certain conditions. The "maximum probability threshold" is one above which
landsliding always occurs, and the difference between the two is labelled by
Crozier as the probability margin. Crozier found that for natural slopes within
Wellington, New Zealand, significant failures occurred when the 24 hour
rainfall reached 200-250 mm. In contrast cut and fill slopes required only
150 mm of rain. Crozier notes that studies in other areas have not produced
such definitive results, but have resulted in a wide probability margin.
Rainfall intensity is also highlighted as important by Crozier (1986). He
outlines the attempt by Caine (1980) to establish a universal threshold for the
triggering of shallow landslides and debris flows. For the 73 landslides that he
studied Caine found the relationship between the storm duration D and the
mean storm intensity I to be 1=14.82D- 0·39. A plot of landslide data with
Caine's threshold line is shown in Figure 8.2. Sidle et al (1985) also discuss
Caine's work. Sidle et al point out that Caine's threshold line is based on failures
that have occurred with "minimal" rainfall, ie. under nearly saturated
antecedent moisture conditions. Sidle et al produce Figure 8.3 showing that

frequently occurring storm intensity-duration combinations can easily exceed
Caine's threshold and yet landslides do not generally occur in such events. This
difficulty is evident in many studies of rainfall thresholds causing landsliding.
To overcome this difficulty Crozier and Eyles (1980) introduced a model
incorporating the soil water deficit. An example is given in Figure 8.4. The
model somewhat improves the rainfall thresholds, but needs to be calibrated on
an area-by-area basis.
I I
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MAXIMUM 1 DAY RAINFALL EXCESS pmnl
Figure 8.1 Relationship between area slipped and rainfall excess (Crozier,
1986).
1000
.........
..................
. ... ...............
~ 100 ... ,
..... -0.514
e ......... I =3880
>=" .............
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<
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1t April1975 storm, Mal mal, New Zealand l( --...........
+ December 1979 storm, Maimai, New Zealand "'-... -0.39
.
)(
1 0 October 1980 storm, Freshwater Bay, Alaska I = 14.820
e October 1980 storm, Trap Bay, AlasKa X
X12-, 3-, 10-, and 30·day rainfall maxima, winter 1977,
Wairarapa, New Zealand
1 min 10min 1h 12h 1d 3d 10 d 30d 90 d
RAINFALL DURATION
landslides (Sidle et al, 1985).
Rainfall duration -intensity

threshold for soil mantle saturation
given available storage of :
125 mm
Rainfall
E
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z
w
....
z
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minutes hours days
RAINFALL DURATION
Figure 8.3 Rainfall intensity-duration-frequency curves for Reefton, New

Zealand, compared with intensity-duration combinations required
for soil mantle saturation under various antecedent moisture
conditions (Sidle et a/,1985).
Crozier (1986) also discusses the effect of antecedent rainfall, which can
play an important role in landsliding. He mentions that wet rather than dry
antecedent conditions lower the rainfall threshold required to cause landslides
in some situations. The first person to examine antecedent rainfall in relation to
landsliding (based on the author's literature search) was Peter Lumb (1975).
Lumb found a relationship between the previous 15 days antecedent rainfall,
one day rainfall and the number oflandslides in Hong Kong. He plotted the one
day rainfall versus the 15 day antecedent rainfall (Figure 8.5). For example,
disasters (more than 50 landslides in one day) are predicted when the daily
rainfall exceeds 100 mm and the rainfall over the previous 15 days exceeds
LANDSLIPPING IN
WELLINGTON CITY
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O~,.Cif 801\. MOISTU"I ITO"ACI': (mmJ ANTECEDENT £1CI!"SS "AINfiiALL ('"'"'
Figure 8.4 Triggering thresholds derived from daily rainfall and antecedent
water status for Wellington City (Crozier and Eyles, 1980).
so 200 JSO
1.00 MULTIPLE EVENTS
MINOR
I SEVERE
300
0: • •• -4- Disaster (>50)
,~~w.:·;L. ____
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a.~ ,tot -~.-'oo----:s~--600-'---
t 1
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15-0AY RAINFALL mm
Figure 8.5 Rainfall threshold for various numbers of landslides in Hong Kong
(Lomb, 1975).
350 mm. Note that this model is for man -modified slopes. For further papers
on rainfall and landsliding in modified slopes refer to section 8.1.2.2. Crozier
(1986) also plotted a Lumb-style plot for landslides in natural slopes in Otago,
New Zealand. Crozier used the Antecedent Daily Rainfall Index (ADRI) as the
horizontal axis. Crozier's plot is reproduced in Figure 8.6. Kim et al (1991) also
used a Lumb-style plot for South Korean landslides, which is shown in Figure
8. 7. The horizontal axis used by Kim et al is the cumulative two day rainfall prior
to failure. Thus the various authors established overall rainfall threshold
criteria specific to their area of study. Just how important antecedent rainfall is
in triggering landslides also depends to an extent on the type oflandsliding. The
author feels that, in general, deeper landslides (which take a while to drain) may
be more influenced by antecedent rainfall than shallower slides (see also Fell et
al, 1988). This was highlighted by Brand (1984), who questioned the real
influence of antecedent rainfall in Lumb's (1975) work , which dealt with
shallow slides, when more data not conforming with Lumb's plot came to hand.
A significant proportion of studies by a number of authors look at rainfall
and landsliding in specific, relatively small areas. Examples include Polloni et al
(1991) for landslides in a region ofltaly, Pierson et al (1991) for a part ofHawaii,
and Nianxue and Zhuping (1991) for an area in China. Lascini and Versace
(1988) set up a correlation between critical rainfall values and sliding, while
Capecchi and Focardi (1988) look at the critical precipitation coefficient for parts
of Italy. Tianchi and Minghua (1985) found that shallow slides begun to occur
10-12 hours after the beginning of heavy rainfall and most deep slides took
place 28-30 hours after the beginning of heavy rainfall. Omura and Hicks
(1992) found that the average probability of landsliding increases with storm
rainfall according to a gamma curve. Omura and Hicks estimate landslide
hazard in different terrains by using gamma curves, and. construct binomial
models for assessing the impact of landslide stabilisation techniques.
Studies focusing specifically on debris flows normally look at large
numbers of flows on natural slopes in a restricted area. Wieczorek (1987)
developed an empirical model based on geology, hydrology and topography to
predict debris flow triggering by various storms once certain antecedent
thresholds and intensity-duration thresholds are exceeded. Figure 8.8 shows
Wieczorek's intensity-duration threshold for La Honda, California. The
antecedent rain required for this plot was 280 mm. Neary and Swift (1987)
detail rainfall thresholds required for triggering debris avalanches in the
Appalachian Mountains, while Church and Miles (1987) examine some case
studies of meteorological antecedents to debris flows in British Columbia.
70
60
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ANT(C£0£NT CAllY AAUHAll INO(X (mm)

Peninsula (Crozier and Eyles, 1980).
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80..------
LEGF.ND
.... 6
10 1,
Minor {<10)
~ 70 t-+-----i
D Severe (10.50)
60 • Disaster (>50) J
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-- 20
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o~------~~--------~--------~------~------
100 200 300 400
CUMULATIVE RAINFALL(mm}
Figure 8.7 Relationship between rainfall and number of landslides in Korea

(Kim et al, 1992).
1. A
EXPLANATION
1. • NO DEBRIS FLOWS
o DEBRIS FLOWS
o - ERROR BAR
~1.2
o- BEYOND RANGE
'
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-01.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CONTINUOUS DURATION (H)

records at La Honda occurring after 280 mm antecedent rainfall has
been exceeded (Wieczorek, 1987).
Complete studies have been written by teams of researchers covering the

analysis of severe storms causing many landslides. A good example is the study
oflandslides, floods and marine effects of a storm in the San Francisco Bay area
on 3-5 January 1982 (Ellen and Wieczorek, 1988). Such studies are usually
looking at natural slope failures, particularly debris flows. The above text is no
exception. The author found it useful to look at the salient methods used in such
studies, and obtained some ideas for his study of landslides on modified slopes.
In the study of the 1982 storm in the San Francisco Bay area Mark and Newman
(1988) found a significant increase in the density of damaging landslides with
seasonal pre-storm rainfall of at least 300-400 mm, storm rainfall of 250mm
and received about 30% of the mean annual precipitation during the storm.
Abundant debris flows occurred after 500-760 mm of pre-storm seasonal
rainfall and 8 hours of intense storm rainfall with intensities in the range
10-20 mm/hr (Cannon and Ellen, 1988). According to Wieczorek and
Sarmiento (1988) a. threshold of 280 mm seasonal pre-storm rainfall was
required to trigger debris flows. The study also indicated the types of materials
susceptible to debris flows. Howard et al (1988) indicate that the soils that failed
contained 30-70% sand, 20-40% silt and 10-45% clay (see Figure 8.9). Ellen
(1988) found ranges that were similar, and are shown in Figure 8.10.
No failure
50
Silt
Figure 8.9 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil (Howard et al, 1988).
8.1.2.2 Rainfall and Landslides in Man-Modified Slopes

Quite a number of publications have been produced on the relationship
between rainfall and landsliding in Hong Kong. These publications are unique
in that they primarily refer to landslides on modified slopes such as cuts, fills and
retaining walls. This has been made possible as many landslides are reported to
and recorded by the GEO. The density of development on the steep slopes of
Hong Kong has focused a large effort on the management of modified slopes.
The database of recorded landslides on modified slopes provides valuable data
on landslide risk of fatalities and property damage. These landslides are on a
controllable scale. In contrast, many studies on rainfall and landsliding on
natural slopes are not directly useful for the development of landslide risk
assessment as the landslides often do not impact on human activity, and also are
too large to make any remedial works practical. The exception are large debris
flows, which can cause a large number of fatalities. In general the studies of
rainfall and landslides on natural slopes are thus more of a scientific rather than
a risk assessment nature.
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EXPLANATION
soa ovot-
• Sandacone and mecaaa.nd•cone of lht fr1ncitc1n 0 Slfghtly cemented &and of ch.- Mau::td Fotm.•uton u.. ,.
••••m&t~Aae PlWKeN 1nd e&rly Plaiscocent}
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wh4ra ptoponiona were aabmatH
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1low movement
6 franc;iacan ahurod •ock (rnola~•l 0 Debrta flows U\al OtJgineced on cue t&opaa. &carpi of dltp-
)I( T.,,.,.,., ••dtlnenlary rock• in &ne la ~ study .,••. leacad IAindalidaa. 01 ~tgina of active slow-movN'\oQ
Son Maloo County , .., chop. 51 ah•Uow slides
X Olhor Totliary aodimon<ary toc:ka

• Unknown p.,enc rnatetteb
Figure 8.10 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil (Ellen, 1988).
Landsliding in Hong Kong is characterised by shallow rotational or

translational slides of small magnitude in residual soil, colluvium or extremely
to highly weathered rock. The presence ofjoints and/or soil pipes is often a factor
in landsliding. As is the case world-wide, large number oflandslides are often
caused by severe rainstorm events.
One of the earliest published works on the numbers oflandslides caused by
rainfall in Hong Kong was by Lo (1971), discussing the June 1966 rainstorm
which resulted in a death toll of 64. Lo noted that apart from rainfall, other
factors such as weathering of the rock in the slope also affected slope stability.
The first quantitative paper on rainfall and landslides in Hong Kong was
published by Lumb (1975). Lumb classified the number of landslides due to a
particular rainstorm into three classes; disastrous, severe and minor.
Disastrous events were ones with over fifty landslides reported over the entire
Territory in one day, severe had 10-50 and minor less than ten. Lumb found
that the number of landslides was correlated with daily and fifteen day
antecedent rainfall. His main chart was reproduced in Figure 8.5.
Subsequently, with more data of better quality, Brand (1984), Brand et al
(1984) and Brand (1995) concluded that antecedent rainfall is not a major factor,
except in the case of minor landslide events occurring under relatively low
intensity rainfalls. Brand (1984) concluded that the majority of landslides are
caused by localised short duration, high intensity rainfalls, and that the
landslides take place at about the same time as the peak hourly rainfall. Brand
also noted that an hourly intensity of about 70 mm per hour appeared to be the
threshold above which landslides occur, and that twenty-four hour rainfall of
less than 100 mm is very unlikely to result in a major landslide incident.
Premchitt (1990) confirmed Brand's (1984) threshold data, also noting that
landslides are almost certain to occur whenever the twenty-four hour rainfall
exceeds 200 mm. Pedrosa (1990), a PhD student under Premchitt's supervision,
concluded the following regarding rainfall and landslides in Hong Kong:
o the majority oflandslides occurred within four hours of the two hour
maximum peak,
o no strong correlation was found between antecedent rainfall and
landsliding, and
o the results for Pedrosas 1982-89 study period suggest that the
susceptibility to sliding is associated with the maximum hourly
rainfall.
A study of the spatial distribution of rainfall of various durations was carried out
by Peart (1993) of Hong Kong University. The study was limited to four rain
gauges, these being the Royal Observatory, Aberdeen Lower Reservoir, Kai Tak
and Tai Lam Chung. The study suggested that the rainfall recorded at the Royal
Observatory for the various return periods will be in excess of that recorded at
Aberdeen Lower Reservoir, Kai Tak and Tai Lam Chung for durations of rainfall
one day or longer. For shorter durations Peart found evidence that at Aberdeen
and Kai Tak the rainfall may exceed that at the Royal Observatory. Peart also
performed a Gumbel analysis for the four gauges using only ten years of data and
a longer (approximately twenty year) data set. His results showed some
differences between using ten years and twenty years data of over 20% for
recurrence intervals exceeding fifty years at Aberdeen Lower Reservoir, Kai Tak
and Tai Lam Chung. At the Royal Observatory the maximum difference was
around 15% at the 200 year recurrence interval.
It is interesting to peruse Table 8.1 which extracts the maximum hourly
rainfalls for various recurrence intervals from Peart's study. The 70 mm/hr
value (Brand, 1984) corresponds to a 1 in 1 year or a 1 in 2 year event, and thus
occurs rather frequently.
(based on 15 minute 20 year data) for various recurrence intervals
(extracted from Peart, 1993).
Recurrence Interval (years)

STN
2 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
1 72.6 91.7 104.3 116.4 132.1 143.8 155.6 171.0 182.7
2 69.9 96.9 114.7 131.8 154.0 170.6 187.1 209.0 225.4
3 68.7 92.2 197.8 122.7 142.0 156.5 171.0 190.0 204.4
4 62.0 81.1 93.7 105.8 121.5 133.3 145.0 160.4 172.1
1. Royal Observatory
2. Kai Tak Airport
3. Aberdeen Station
4. Tai Lam Chung
A recent paper by Kay and Chen (1994) showed a plot of maximum hourly
and the corresponding daily rainfalls for all cases where rainfall exceeded
50 mm per day. Kay and Chen (1994) obtained a fairly good separation of minor,
severe and disastrous landslides. One should note that their definitions of
minor, severe and disastrous landslides are different to that of Lumb (1975).
Kay and Chen's plot is reproduced in Figure 8.11.
Another recent paper by Premchitt et al (1994) indicated that a maximum
hourly rainfall of 70 mm/hr would cause on average 30 landslides, but the
number can range anywhere from 5 to 551. Below less than 100 mm in 24 hours
landslides are unlikely, but almost certain when 175 mm is exceeded in 24 hours.
Premchitt et al also note that most events causing a large number of landslides
are associated with a high hourly rainfall intensity. Some events caused a large
number of slides even though they had a low hourly rainfall because they had a
high 24 hour rainfall, eg. the storm of 21 May 1989.
8.1.2.3 Rainfall-Landslide Warning Systems

Some landslide warning systems based solely on rainfall have been
developed. The system currently used in Hong Kong has been developed since
the 1970's. The first landslide warning system was adopted following the
disastrous 1976 rainstorms, and was based on Lumb's (1975) plot. It took
account of the fifteen day antecedent as well as the daily rainfall, and had two
levels of warning. In 1980 a review by the then GCO and the Royal Observatory
modified the warning criterion to a simpler bilinear relationship, and revised it
again in 1983. The revisions were due to criticisms that sometimes warnings
were issued late, as well as the availability and analysis of more data.
A complete review of the landslide warning criteria and proposal for new
criteria was completed by Premchitt (1985a and 1985b). Premchitt noted that
subsequent to Lumb's (1975) work antecedent rainfall was found not to
influence the occurrence oflandslides (see, for example, Brand, 1984 and 1995).
This system, currently in use, is based solely on the rolling twenty-four hour
rainfall at the Royal Observatory, and includes two decision levels (Premchitt,
1985b). Decision level Dis reached when the twenty-four hour rainfall exceeds
100 mm, and is reached when 175 mm is reached. The criteria for the decision
levels, as well as the various warnings to be issued for each decision level are
shown in Figure 8.12.
LEGEND:.
, minor incident
700 (none or few landslides)
+severe incident
(dozens of landslides)
600
~
'-'
Zone
D disastrous incident
(hundreds of landslides)
500 6
3
t::
·a
0::400 5
>.
~
0
-o 4
~300
·g
"'
<"' 3
200
2
100
20 80 100 120 140 160

Peak Hourly Rainfall (mm)
landslide events.
LANDSLIP WARNING CRITERIA

RAINFALL CRITERIA :
175 r-- - - - - L - Landslip Level
5"E
2-.So,
I C
~-- 1001--------- 0 - Decision Level
a a
~~~
a a
a.. a::
OL--------
ISSUE LANDSLIP WARNING when :
• Level · 0' has been reached at RO and forecast is

that level · L · will be reached in the next t. hours.
• Level · L · has been reached at RO.
CONSIDER ISSUING LANDSLIP WARNING when :
• Ten or more of the automatic gouges in Hong Kong and

Kowloon satisfy one of the above criter1o
• Level ·o· has not been reached at RO. but forecast

is that level 'L' will be reached in the next 1.. hours.
• Rainfall mtensity at QQ.Y automatic gouge in Hong Kong

or Kowloon has exceeded 70 mm 1n · one hour.
• Automatic gouges in specific area of the New

Territories satisfy one of the above criteria.
(Localized Warning to be issued.)
CANCEL LANDSLIP WARNING when:
• Rainfall falls below level ·o· and forecast is for

no further rain in the next 1.. hours.
• Other factors dictate that the Warn1ng should be cancelled.
DECISIONS to issue or cancel a Landslip Warning must be

token jointly by the Principal Government Geotechnical Engineer and
the Director of Royal Observatory or their designated representatives.
CONSULTATION must always take place when level · o· has

been reached.
Figure 8.12 Landslide warning system instruction sheet (Premchitt, 1985b).

40
I
l
l
I
I
l
I
l
30 l
I
l
l
-...__
:::1
0
l
l
~
I
.s 20
.c
·u;
c
2c
10 Cannon-Ellen
Caine
----------------
oL-~~--L-~~--L-J-~~--~-L~--~-L~--L--L~--L-~
0 5 10 15 20
Duration (hour)
Figure 8.13 Various intensity-duration thresholds for debris flow triggering

(Keefer et al, 1987).
The outline of another landslide warning system which applies to the San
Francisco Bay area is discussed by Keefer et al (1987). The paper evaluated the
effectiveness of various intensity-duration curves in Figure 8.13 in predicting
landsliding. Yano and Senoo (1985) detail the determination of rainfall values to
be used for debris flow warning and evacuation.
Systems utilising rainfall as the only input to provide warning against the
onset of landsliding invariably become geared to warn of a large number of
landslides in major rainfall events. This is done in order to minimise the number
of false alarms obtained from the warning system. Such warning systems
cannot be readily used to provide accurate warnings of smaller numbers of
landslides as they do not take other factors such as geology and geometry into
account.
8.1.3 Statistical Analysis of Rainfall

Rainfall varies across time and space, and is often analysed by statistical
means so that conclusions can be drawn or predictions made. The author found
a substantial body of literature on the statistical analysis of rainfall, often
embedded in broader literature on hydrology. The author could not locate an
overview text on rainfall specifically, but found a clear and concise discussion of
statistical methods used in hydrology in Haan (1977). Haan covers a broad
range of subjects ranging from basic probability concepts to correlation,
multivariate analysis, time series analysis and stochastic models. The author
also gleaned some information from Benjamin and Cornell (1970). The main
statistical applications of the study of rainfall (apart from basic statistics) are
time series analysis, frequency analysis and multivariate analysis.
Time series analysis analyses continuous rainfall records to determine the
underlying function and trend (Haan, 1977). It is mainly used for detailed
studies of rainfall. Frequency analysis is commonly used to study rainfall
extremes (usually maxima) in order to predict return periods for extreme storm
events. Multivariate techniques such as multivariate regression, factor analysis
and canonical correlation are used for regional/spatial analysis of rain gauge
data and the prediction of rainfall variables. From a risk management point of
view, frequency analysis and multivariate techniques are most useful, as they
establish probabilities (frequencies) of occurrence of the landslide hazard and
also its magnitude. Probability and magnitude are the two components
necessary for the description of a hazard. The author deemed it unnecessary to
review literature pertaining to multivariate techniques as it is standard and well
documented in books such as Johnson and Wichern (1982). However, the
specialised literature on the frequency analysis of extremes as applicable to
rainfall is reviewed below.
8.1.3.1 Frequency Analysis of Extremes
Haan (1977) points out that there are two schools of frequency analysis of
extremes, one being that of Pearson and the other that of Gumbel. Both are
widely used. The author found the literature on the two systems somewhat
confusing as various functions are labelled by different names in various
publications. The two schools of frequency analysis of extremes are described
below.
A) Pearson's System of Frequency Curves

The author found a clear and thorough review of Pearson's system of
frequency curves in Elderton and Johnson (1969). Pearson's system of
frequency curves is a very broad system covering a wide range of frequency
curve shapes. The system has many standard frequency distribution functions
as special cases of its more general equations. Karl Pearson proposed that
frequency distributions can be represented by
Px(x) = exp
- 00
r (t+a)/(f3o + f3It + f32t 2 + ... ) dt 8.1
where tis the independent variable, a a constant and f3o to f3n coefficients.
By choosing appropriate values for the parameters equation 8.1 becomes a
large number of families of distributions including the normal, beta and gamma
distributions. The Pearson type III has found application in hydrology
especially as the distribution of rainfall maxima and flood peaks. This
distribution can be written
Px(x) =Po (1 +x/a)afb (x/a)a/0 e -x/b 8.2
with the mode at X=O. The lower bound of the distribution is X= -a . The
difference in the mean and mode is o and the value ofpx(x) at the mode isp0 . It
can be shown that the Pearson type III distribution is the same as the three
parameter gamma distribution. By shifting equation 8.2 so that the mode is at
X= and the lower bound is at X=O one obtains
Px (x) =Po e -(x-a)/b (x/a)a!b 8.3
The gamma distribution has the mode at (rJ-1}/A and the mean at rJ/A. Thus
a=(rJ-l)/A and O=rJ/A-(rJ-1)/A=l/A. The value of Px(x) at the mode for the
gamma distribution is
8.4
8.5
Substituting these quantities into 8.3 results in
8.6
which is the gamma distribution. Table 8.2 summarises all 12 of the main and
transition types of Pearson's frequency curves.
B) Gumbel's System of Frequency Curves

Gumbel's system of frequency curves is detailed in Gumbel (1958), and has
been applied by various authors since. Gumbel developed three types of
asymptotic distributions based on different (but not all) parent distributions.
The types are:
o Type I - parent distribution unbounded in the direction of the
desired extreme and all moments of the distribution exist
(exponential type distributions).
o Type II - parent distribution unbounded in the direction of the
desired extreme and all moments of the distribution do not exist
(Cauchy type distributions).
~ ;l~
No. of tyll"
UJUI\lly
l!:<(untlon to curvo in form usually ~optod ( Pearaon)
-
0"
~
?0 0
0
~
.....
ct
"'~ .'Tj
"1
......
N
adopted
(P11Arton) J-:o)ll:atlnn Orlsln ~:quatloo wllh original mean Criterion nom11rk.t ~ 2:
lL\l"N 1'YI'J::S
I y = y 0 (l+oe/u 1 )•a,(l-.c/u:)•at )lode (~ntlmode) 11
II - J/ell+.t/.ltl' •ll-z/.1 1 )ml < ncgntlve l.lmitetl ra.ngs
(-11 1 tou 1 ): <kuw;
~
~q g "'
~ ~
s
"'
j:))
'"tj
::r
....g
where (m 1 +1J/.l 1 -lm 1 +1)/.l 1 beU-~he.pud, IJ11t llliiY
al.dually
bo U-•hnped, J-•l~pc<l ur
~ CD CD tJ
IY Y- Yo(l+:<'fu1 )-m•-vlaa-':rla oa:(2na- ~)niter mean v- , 011 +(z/u- •/rl'l-m,-•tao-'(.r/<1- •/r) -.> 0 und < 1
twjjw<l J-~haped
Unlimited range; ;kew; l>cll·
C)
"1
Cll
c
s -
CD
,-...
:::::
~
,. .,., c:::z
0
....... ~r.tl
Vl Y = !loCa:-u)'h:~:-1a " be rare ltart or
curve
whare r - 2m-:!
Y ~ !/e(l+z/.i 1 )-ql(l+.t/J 1 )'1t
where (q 1 -1)/J 1 ~ (?,+1)/.1 1
.>l
•h11.ped
U nlimit•d r:.nge in one direct iou
(a to co); •l.:ew; IJell·shape<l,
=
Cll~
.......
s....... '0~ .go"-'
~
llu' "'"Y b.: J ·oh:>.po>d ~
TRANST1'ION
TYPES
~
.c.
M-
CD CD "'
2
c: 0.. :::!
"NormAl' y =- !lot-~ f"~o
1
,\lode (- mu.n) ll _ .. -rJ!!a' • - 0, (J, - 0, #,- 3 Unlimited raoga; ~ymrnrtric:.l; M-
11 ~ 0..
~urve• llclU-~he.ped ....... 0..
.Q=
rn .......
II !I - !lo(1-:r"/u 1 ) 111 )lode (- UJ~>ao) V - Yo( 1- .c:;u:)m •-O./J 1 -0,II 1 <:J Limited rn.n~e ( -·• to ,,·1: M- rn
•rmmetrlcn.l; IUu:aUy ~Jell· "1 M-
shaped, but U-;hap;:ll "h<n ~
....... "1
.......
#1 < l·o c: 0"' 0"'
~ ~
Yll Y =!loll +:a:'l••:)-m )lo.Je ( = menu) v - !loll+ rfa'J-"' K- 0, /l, ~ linJimited rango; •rtnmotu•~l;
O,p,>:l
beU-•h"P"d ·
~
~
M-
....... M-
.......
III II - !/0( 1 + :</11) ;·a,- 'lZ y ~ y.(l-..z/-!)P,-yz Cll 0 0
)lotld ':./J 1 = 6+:JP, linllmll•d r11.nge In ono direcaiou :::!
whored - (p+ 1)/Y uu )J - Y" ( -... to ::o); UJu:>.ll)' hoU· ........ rn :::!
•haped, but may h~ J-,napell t!.j -.......- 0"'
v !I- y,.-'.-yJ:< 5wt oi cun·o y - y.(1 + z{d)-p•(p-~)/(1 +.a:/ .d.) • - 1 Un.llrnited r~n~e iu ooe uiroction 0:: 0
(0 to :c); beU·•he.peu ~ ~
Ylll Y = !1•(1 +oel••>-"' Eou or curvo V - l/e(1 + Z/.i)-m < negn.tlvo; A. - 0; R.lo~e irom iruloile oruin:at< at .....
"1 :::!
5/J 1 -d/J 1 -0 DOK3tlve -u to illlil~ ordinatd oLt () (OC c 0..
irom -<~(1-mi/(~-m)
u/(2- na) will\ orlgin at mean)
til
=
c,
CD
0..
.......
IX !I ~ YoO +oe/u)nt End or cur.·e V - y.(l + z/.1) 111 < nc~•tivd; l 0; = R:>.ngr irom z- -1o1 whoc6 v = 0
= :::!
:>J1 1 -6P 1 -Il rooitlve, to:- o where 11- v.(vr irom 0.. M-
~/1 1 -3/1 1 -ll oe~Miva -a(ll&+ll/(m.,.~) to ~o~i(m.,.·l)
,.-lth orl~io n.t auo•n) ~ ~
0 CD
X Y = y_.--zla 5t.ut ol curvt ll =- v•• -rio P, ~ ~. /J, = ~ Expontotlal irom duitd oroliuato :I" 0..
at 0 (or -a with origm ~~
mean) to lnftn.lttilrual orllill;oto
~~ al; J-ihn.pe.1
=
Cll
c
.......
"1
CD
(j
XI y - !Jrt%-m b before stan V- Ve(1+zfd)-m • > l, l - 0,
~fl,-311 1 -d po.~itive
J·the.pe<i; illlJ'U 11t z - b (or
-b/(m-2) \lith orlgln at
F M-
.......
maan) "hero orJinate lJ dnlte ...... 0
XII y- !/o(a(v'(3+tl_al+ v'dtl+z)v'(ft,/(3+.ci,J) )I ..an v- y.(l+z/.i 1J"'•(l-.-/-! 1)"'• 5# 1 -6# 1 - 9 - 0 Twisted J·•llaped; £pecil.l ca.u oi
\0 :::!
Q\
is AD &IWtllatlve form whue 111 1 and rn 1 Typ.~ r \0 0......,
a{•/(:l+,:l,) v'II,J-:r
are oqu.t.l numeri.::illy and < 1 but ot "-"
M-
oppo•lto llgu ~
CD
,1,(/J,+ll' _ l~il.-3~ 1 lliOfJ 1 -t2Jl 1 -t8) 1 -fJ 1 Cfl 1 +3J'<8~a-9P 1 -t2l 0..
<- ~(~Jl •. 3,1!,)(2fJ.-3Jl, 6)'
iJ,-PIM; fl,- p,{pf, 1
<3Jl 1 -2J! 1 +6>!PM,+3> 1 +~C!fJ,-JfJ,><3fJ -tfJ,+6l CD
rn
.......
"1 \.;.)
CD 00
0.. Vt
Interest may exist in either the distribution of the largest or smallest

extreme values. Examples of parent distributions falling under the various
types are described by Haan (1977) as:
o Type I - extreme value largest - normal, lognormal, exponential,
gamma.
o Type I - extreme value smallest - normal.
o Type II - extreme value largest or smallest - Cauchy.
o Type III - extreme value smallest - beta, lognormal, exponential,
gamma.
The type II or Cauchy extreme type value distributions have found little
application in hydrology. The distribution of the largest extreme value in
hydrology generally arises as a type I extreme value largest distribution since
most hydrologic variables are unbounded to the right. The distribution of
extreme value smallest commonly found in hydrology is the type III extreme
value smallest since many hydrologic variables are bounded to the left by zero. A
summary of the Gumbel types of extreme value frequency distributions is given
in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3 Gumbel's extreme frequency curves (based on Haan, 1977).
distribution density function mean ..-ariance
extreme value exp(-y • e·r) B +0.577a 1.645 a'

type I (max) Y "'(X· 6 )/a
extreme value exp(y- er) B- 0.577a 1.645 a'

type I (min) y "'(x • B)/a
extreme value
type II
-k
u
(u)'"'
-
y
e-<..:rJ• :J >0
-
extreme value aexp{-{(x-e:)/(8-E:))4 ]

e:+(S-e:)r(l+l/a) B ·cF!f(l+2/a)· r'(t+t/a)J
type III (min) (x-e: )4"' (8-e:)a
8.1.3.2 Fitting Frequency Curves to Extreme Rainfall Data
Extreme rainfall data comes as a series, normally on an annual basis. For

example, one may have a series of maximum 24 hour annual rainfalls. This data
can be analysed by graphical or analytical means. Graphical analysis is
performed as follows (Haan, 1977):
o Rank the data from the largest to the smallest value.
o Calculate the plotting position.
o Select type of probability paper to be used.
o Plot the observations on the probability paper. If the data plots as a

straight line, the frequency distribution underlying the probability
paper used is then appropriate.
Table 8.4 list three common formulas used for the plotting position, where n is
the total number of data points and m is the rank of a particular point. The
Weibull plotting position is most commonly used (Haan, 1977). The plotting
position can be converted to a probability by subtracting it from one. An
example of a plot of earthquake data on Gumbel extremal probability paper is
given in Figure 8.14.
Table 8.4 Plotting positions (Haan, 1977).
Name Relationship
California min
Hazen (2m-1 )/2n
Weibull m'(n+ 1)
Analytical determination of appropriate frequency curves consists of

determining the "best-fitting" model to the data numerically, using, for
example, regression techniques. The data rarely has a perfect fit. Haan (1977)
notes that many frequency analyses can be reduced to the form
Xr =X(1+CvKr) 8.7
where Xr is the magnitude of the event having a return period T, Cv is the

coefficient of variation andKr is a frequency factor. Hence frequency factors can
be constructed for different types of frequency distributions, and fitted to the
data. Haan discusses such calculations for various types of frequency curves in
some detail.
8.1.3.3 Appropriate Frequency Curves for Rainfall Extremes

The primary consideration in selecting a particular analytical form for the
frequency distribution is that the distribution selected fits the data well (Haan,
1977). Often the data will fit more than one model. The author's discussions
with Dr J. Ball and Associate Professor I. Cordery of the Water Engineering
Department of the School of Civil Engineering at UNSW indicated that rainfall
extremes are commonly modelled by either Gumbel type I or III distributions, or
the log Pearson III distribution. The literature also confirmed this (cf. Haan,
1977; Water Resources Council, 1976). Furthermore, the log Pearson III
distribution is mentioned to be appropriate for rainfalls of longer duration such
as week or months (Haan, 1977).
Return Period
IC(X)IOO 10 5 2 5 10 20 50 100 200 .5((0 I
:
=
:
0
:
t:
9 ~
~
.
~
~
Cl)
0
u 8 f- /
E
v/
(/)
~
:::
~
Q/
..r:.
u 7 ,__ . >"" / -
-- ""
_,/ ~
c::
c "!
= y
6~ ,:...
~
~ ;; ~~
5
f-
,. /•
:::::~
4_
;...
=
3-
-
:::
:
=
..... llH
""' IIIII I'
UIMIII ~IIIII If I"''""" ~"""""
DC I .01 .10.20.30:40.50 .70 BO .90 .95 !J7 .9e 99 995 .9975 .9 99
Probability, F5 (s) I
I. tt' ,.t. ..•.. ! !. I "• f t L,:tle e!llft llll'lt!et!
I .Ill tltt•.l fttt:!
-2.0 -1.0 0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.6 5.0 6.0 7.0
Standard Extremal Variate, s
Figure 8.14 Earthquake magnitudes plotted on Gumbel extremal probability

paper (Gumbel, 1958).
Without any a priori presuppositions about the frequency distribution one

can use a number of indices to indicate suitable types of frequency distributions
for use. For example, Cornish (1970) used indices K and R together with the
coefficients of skewness /3 1 and kurtosis f32 to decide which Pearson curve was
most suitable in his statistical analysis of annual rainfall data. Table 8.5 shows
the ranges of these indices over various types of Pearson curves. One can also
simply plot /3 1 and /32 on a decision chart such as that shown in Figure 8.15,
which again will suggest the most appropriate Pearson frequency distribution
for use. The Water Resources Council (1976) has a detailed, standardised
analysis procedure for fitting a log Pearson III curve to data.
Table 8.5 Properties of Pearson frequency curves (Cornish, 1970).
Criteria
Curve Type Form
f31 /32 K R
I <0 Bounded, beth ends skewed
II 0 <3 0 Bounded, both ends symmetrical
Normal 0 =3 0 Unbounded symmetrical
Ill 00 1 Bounded one end
IV 0< K< 1 Unbounded, skewed
v =1 Bounded one end
VI >1 Bounded one end
VII 0 >3 0 Unbounded symmetrical
Blank entry indicates that the full range is available for the indices.
{3 1 = .u;!.u~ K = f3N32 + 3)2

4(4{32 - 3{31)(2{32 - 3{31 - 6)
R = 2{32
6- 3{31
.Un is the nth moment about the mean.
Uniform
tion
No~al 34.~--~--~~--~~~~~~~44~~
disu-ibu-
~ion
distribu-
5 distribu-
82
r::
0
...
.....
:;)
6
.....
..0
z7
....."'
"tl
...
J~ 0 1 3 4
Figure 8.15 Regions in fh~ fh plane for various Pearson distributions (Raudkivi,
1979).
8.1.3.4 Regional or Spatial Analysis of Rainfall Extremes

Regional or spatial analysis of rainfall extremes is a complex and
time-consuming task. Most such analyses have been performed on a national
level m developed countries by producing nation -wide rainfall
intensity-duration-frequency curves by analysing rainfall records from an
entire rain gauge network (Haan, 1977). Three different methods of regional
frequency analysis for floods are outlined by Haan, and at least the first two can
be applied to rainfall also (cf. Cornish, 1970). The first method postulates that a
particular analytical frequency function is applicable to the data. The
parameters of this distribution are then related to physiographic and
meteorologic factors in the area of interest, commonly termed region. By
measuring these factors at a number of points in the region, the parameters for
the frequency distribution can then be estimated and probabilities calculated.
The second method of regional frequency relationship in terms of the return
period and the ratio of the peak flow for a given return period to an index flood
for several stations in the region. The median value of this ratio is then plotted
versus the return period. The next step is to relate the index flood to watershed
characteristics. The area of the watershed is generally used along with other
geomorphic and meteorologic factors. This step is usually accomplished by
using multiple regression. The flood frequency curve for ungauged location can
then be estimated by first estimating the magnitude of the index flood and then
multiplying by the ratio read from the base frequency curve for various return
periods. The author's discussion with Dr J. Ball showed that since spatial
rainfall distribution is less affected by geography than the spatial distribution of
floods, a simple mean or median value from all the rain gauges may be sufficient.
The gauges could also be weighted by the area covered by each gauge - this is the
Thiessen polygon method used by Cornish (1970).
8.1.4 Summary
The author found that, with the exception of continued research in Hong
Kong, the vast majority of studies of rainfall and landsliding involve natural
slopes. The author notes the lack of a wider research effort examining the risks
from man-modified slopes which, in the author's opinion, needs redressing.
The risks from man-modified slope failures are of a smaller scale and hence
controllable to a far greater extent than natural slope failures.
The author found that the literature relating rainfall and pore pressures/
groundwater considers one or more of the following factors infiltration, runoff,
soil moisture variation in the unsaturated (vadose) zone, evapotranspiration,
and changing piezometric levels due to groundwater recharge. The papers on
the prediction of piezometric levels and groundwater seepage in relation to

rainfall and slope stability are useful to various extents in specific or individual
landslide situations where sufficient information is available on material and
other parameters required by the model to make it useful. In this case such
models could be used to help assess the landslide risk of the individual landslide
situation. However, the larger scale risk assessment oflandslide areas or regions
is not amenable to the application of these types of models. In those situations
one may then rely purely on models only using rainfall as the independent
variable in order to perform landslide risk assessment.
A large body ofliterature on predicting landslides using rainfall exists. The
author found useful overviews of the main issues in books by Crozier (1986) and
Sidle et al (1985). These review climatic triggering of landslides, rainfall
thresholds triggering landslides, the effect of rainfall intensity, and the water
deficit in soil and antecedent rainfall. The literature on rainfall and landsliding
is split into two broad sections, one on landslides in natural slopes (which is
covered widely around the world, particularly with respect to debris flows), and
landslides in predominantly modified slopes, which is mainly focused on slopes
in Hong Kong. Each of these sections was reviewed. Some landslide warning
systems based solely on rainfall have been developed. The system currently used
in Hong Kong has been developed since the 1970's. Another landslide warning
system based on rainfall is used in the San Francisco Bay area.
8.2 The Study of Rainfall and Landsliding in Hong Kong
8.2.1 Introduction and Study Objectives

The study of rainfall and landsliding in Hong Kong was made possible by
the reporting and systematic recording of landslides in Hong Kong since 1984.
The system was described in section 4.1.2.2. Hong Kong has a dense network of
rain gauges which record rainfall electronically at five minute intervals. These
have also been operational since 1984. The two systems of landslide reporting
and detailed recording of rainfall present what is likely to be one of the best and
most accurate data sets for the study of rainfall and landsliding world-wide.
Through his involvement with the GEO the author was able to utilise this data
to carry out a detailed study of rainfall and landsliding.
The objectives of the author's study of rainfall and landsliding were as
follows:
o Examination of rainfall thresholds causing landsliding, and the
maximisation of the prediction of dates when landsliding occurred in
the study period using various combinations of threshold rainfall
variable values.
o The prediction of the number oflandslides given a particular rainfall

event for individual rain gauges.
o Spatial statistical analysis of rainfall extremes.
o Spatial statistical analysis of the number oflandslides over an area in
order to predict the number of landslides over an area.
The numerous pieces of past research were reviewed by the au thor in section 8.1.
It will be noted that the previous studies of rainfall and landsliding in Hong
Kong utilised only the rainfall data at one location (namely the Royal
Observatory) for correlations with landsliding across the entire Territory of
Hong Kong. In view of the known spatial variability in any rainfall event the
author considered that an improvement in the relationship between rainfall and
landsliding should be possible if individual rain gauge data was used. This
section describes the author's study of rainfall and landsliding fully. The
following parts of the study are detailed in this section:
o extraction of raw data,
o definition of study bounds,
o selection of rainfall variables,
o establishment of the combined rainfall/landslide databases,
o methods of analysis, and
o results and discussion.
The conclusions and recommendations following in section 8.3 then bring the
study of rainfall and landsliding to a close.
8.2.2 Extraction of Raw Data
8.2.2.1 Rainfall Data
A) Supply and Conversion

The rainfall data from the whole of Hong Kong was supplied in two
batches. The first batch consisted of 73 discs of compressed five minute rainfall
records for all45 GEO rain gauges in the Territory from January 1989 to June
1994 inclusive, and was available at the end ofthe author's July 1994 visit to the
GEO in Hong Kong. A decompression program (called raina) was also supplied
by the GEO. The data was decompressed for Hong Kong Island one month at a
time and stored for analysis. An example of the decompressed five minute data is
shown in Table8.6. The second batch consisted of14nine-trackmagnetictapes
of binary 15 minute rainfall data for the GEO and Royal Observatory rain
gauges in the Territory, and was received in October 1994. This data was
transferred onto modern magnetic tapes using a program written by P.K.
Maguire of the School of Civil Engineering, and subsequently used in analysis.
~ ;lrii
ct
Date: 16/01/93 0" (1>
lime H01 H02

n;- :;d .....
...........
H03 H04 H05 H06 H07 HOB H09 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 H17 H18 H19 H20 H21 H22 "' .
00:05 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1,0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0,0 0.5 1.0 0.0
?0 :>;"''Tj
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 =--
00:10 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0,5 0.0 0.5 0.0 ~§.:
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 "' PJ
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B) Missing Data
During the raw data extraction, sections of the data were found to be
missing. In the first data batch such entries were denoted by an X instead of a
value in the 1989-92 study period. Some records had over 80% missing data,
but most less than 10-15%. Where the data was missing, the record was
synthesised by replacing the missing entries with entries from the nearest gauge
record for the corresponding time period. If the nearest rain gauge also had
missing data for the corresponding time period, the missing entries were
changed to zeros. However, this situation arose less than 1% of the time.
The situation was better for the 1984-1993 rainfall record. Table 8. 7
shows that overall no one gauge had over 10% missing data. It is also clear that
synthesising of the record was worthwhile, as the missing data proportion was
reduced to below 5%, a reasonable level. Over 80% of this missing record
occurred in a dry period.
A further check was carried out to remove any incidents severely affected
by missing data (more than 5 hours of continuous missing record) from the
database used for analysis. Hence the influence of missing data on the analysis
was kept below a significant level.
Table 8.7 Percentage of rainfall data missing per gauge.
HONG KONG ISLAND RAIN GAUGE

H01 H02 H03 H04 H05 H06 H07 HOB H09 H10 H11
c 8.37 4.79 4.14 4.52 10.96 5.62 5.14 6.52 9.85 7.15 4.79
A
s 3.94
E 2 3.93 3.93 3.81 3.91 3.88 4.21 3.81 4.21 4.02 3.93
HONG KONG ISLAND RAIN GAUGE

H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 H17 H18 H19 H20 H21 H22
c 1 5.82 7.47 6.44 8.83 4.37 4.40 4.43 4.44 5.45 4.11 7.17
A
s 3.77
E 2 4.63 4.63 3.95 4.03 4.03 4.06 4.06 5.01 3.77 3.78
CASES:
1 Percentage of data missing for each gauge.
2 Percentage of data missing still remaining after the nearest gauge is used to synthesise data.
Total number of five minute readings is 1,113,408 (July 1983- June 1994)
C) Corrupted Data
Some rain entries were obviously erroneous as they were far too high for
five minute rainfalls. These were corrected manually by replacement with
entries from the nearest rain gauges if these appeared reasonable. While this
method is somewhat subjective, it eliminated the incorrect data.
D) Rain Gauge Locations

The locations of rain gauges are available on plans ofup to 1:20,000 scale,
and hence are readily determined. Figure 8.16 shows the location of rain gauges
in the Territory of Hong Kong.
8.2.2.2 Landslide Incident Data
A) Landslides Included in the Study

The landslides included in the study were those reported to the GEO and
listed in their annual reports. A sample extract of the annual report landslide
incident listing is given in Table 8.8. The total number oflandslide incidents on
Hong Kong Island reported during the 1989-92 study period is 498. Of these,
474 were reported with failure dates, and 110 with failure dates and times. In
the period 1984-88, a further 354 incidents on Hong Kong Island were
reported, and 141 in 1993.
B) Spatial Location of Landslides

The locations of most landslide incidents are available on maps (generally
1:50,000 scale) in the annual reports for years 1984 to 1992 inclusive. These are
plotted on an annual basis. A sample of such a map is shown in Figure 8.17.
Specific reports are also available for major rainfall events.
C) Temporal Location of Landslides

The time of occurrence of landslide incidents is available in annual reports
to varying levels of detail. Most incidents have a recorded date of failure. Some
incidents (approximately 20% or so) also have a recorded failure time. During
data analysis the authors found that while the date of failure was generally
apparently reported accurately and often coincided with heavy rainfall periods,
the failure times were, according to GEO staff, apparently much less reliable.
The limited accuracy of times of failure forms an important constraint on the
extent and accuracy of the models being constructed.
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Hong Kong Island.
8.2.3 Definition of Study Bounds

The next part of the study was to define study boundaries, both in the
spatial as well as temporal dimensions.
8.2.3.1 Spatial
The study area was restricted to Hong Kong Island only. The reasons for
this decision are as follows:
o The area is the most densely populated and, hence, developed area in
the Territory. This means that it has a large number of landslide
incidents occurring each year, and thus ample data for analysis.
o The geology of the area includes granitic as well as volcanic and
colluvial terrain, and hence the influence of geology can ultimately be
built into the model.
o Hong Kong Island is well covered by rain gauges, providing a good
level of detail for the analysis of spatial and temporal distribution of
rainfall.
8.2.3.2 Temporal
The initial period for the study selected was 1989 to 1992 inclusive. The
reasons for this selection was that the rainfall data for this period and the
landslide incident location maps were immediately available for analysis, and
the rainfall data was in five minute rain data format. Subsequently the study
was extended to cover a full ten year period from January 1984 to December
1993 using the fifteen minute rain data.
8.2.4 Selection of Rainfall Variables

The selection of rainfall variables for analysis followed the definition of the
study boundaries. The rainfall variables selected span a wide range of
durations, from 15 minutes to one month. The variables are always maximum
values of rainfall in a given period, unless otherwise specified. For example, HI
is the maximum hourly rainfall over the preceding specified time period. The
full listing of variables used in the analysis is shown below:
M5 5 minute rainfall
MIS 15 minute rainfall
HI Hourly rainfall
H3 3 hourly rainfall
HI2 12 hourly rainfall
H24 24 hourly rainfall
D3 Rainfall over 3 days

DIS Rainfall over 15 days

Databases
The final step before analysis was the creation of a combined database of
rainfall events and landslide incidents.
8.2.5.1 Establishment of Landslide Incident Database With Date

and Nearest Rain Gauge
The dates for all incidents were extracted from the annual reports. Where
no failure date was given (about 8% of the data), the reported date (ie the date on
which the landslide was inspected by the GEO) was used where possible to select
the nearest previous rainfall event that resulted in landslide events. For the
1989-92 study period the number of incidents thus arrived at was 411. The
number ofincidents for the 1984-93 study period was 791. The incidents in the
1989-92 study period were then allocated to the nearest rain gauge on the
reported date of failure.
The rainfall representative of each landslide incident was taken as the
nearest rain gauge rainfall closest to the incident location. This may not be
completely appropriate in some cases where a physical boundary such as a hill
may impede the movement of clouds from the rain gauge towards the landslide
site, but still gives the best possible information given the data sets available.
The nearest gauges were determined by plotting the rain gauges on the incident
location maps from the annual reports, and then reading and recording the
closest gauge for each incident. Similarly the second closest gauge was
determined, for use if the nearest gauge was not functioning at the time of the
event, or the rainfall figures required verification. The lists of landslide
incidents, failure dates and nearest two gauge numbers for the entire 1984-93
study period can be found in Appendix El.
8.2.5.2 Calculation of Rainfall Variables

Running values for all the rainfall variables were calculated for the entire
study period by P.K. Maguire of the School of Civil Engineering. This was a
computationally intensive procedure. For example, the 1989-92 period took
about four days to run on a 30-40 MIPS (Millions of Instructions Per Second)
machine. First the event lengths were found from the running fifteen minute
variable values. Then the maximum values for M15 to D30 were found within
each event. These values were subsequently used in the calculation of
individual rainfall events.
8.2.5.3 Definition and Calculation of Rainfall Events

A rainfall event was defined by the author, following discussion with his
supervisor, Professor Fell, as a set of consecutive five minute rain records
bounded at each side by at least fifteen minutes of zero rain for each gauge. This
is illustrated in Table 8.9. This definition provides sufficient detail for, and
adequate separation of rainfall events, which in Hong Kong are often of high
intensity and short duration. The definition of a rainfall event generated a
number of rainfall events on a particular date, typically three to eight on days
when a significant amount of rain fell. A database of rainfall events was
established from the running values of all rainfall variables for each rain gauge.
An example is shown in Table 8.10. The rows are individual rainfall events. The
columns contain the rainfall variable values corresponding to the events. The
second column in each variable locates the maximum in time. This number
counts how many five minute readings the end of the maximum period occurs
before the end time of the event (negative values indicate before the end of the
event).
Table 8.9 An example of a rainfall event at five minute intervals bounded by at

least fifteen minutes of zero rainfall.
Time Rain
13:45 0.0
13:50 0.0
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32.0 0 32.5 0 370.0 0 396.5 0 577.5 0 t,j
24/05/89 15:30 24/05/89 15:40 0.5 0 4.0 -2
......
29.5 0 30.0 0 32.5 0 33.0 0 370.5 0 397.0 0 578.0 0 t,j
0"
24/05/89 16:05 24/05/89 16:25 1.5 -2 2.0 0 31.0 0 31.5 0 34.0 0 34.5 0 372.0 0 398.5 0 579.5 0 l)j
Vl
24/05/89 16:40 24/05/89 17:30 35.0 -5 53.0 0 84.0 -2 84.0 0 87.0 0 87.5 0 425.0 0 451.5 0 632.5 0 ~
24/05/89 17:45 24/05/89 17:55 0.5 0 53.0 -2 55.5 0 84.5 0 87.5 0 88.0 0 425.5 0 452.0 0 633.0 0 ~
'"I
25/05/89 02:1 0 25/05/89 02:25 2.5 -1 2.5 0 2.5 0 87.0 -1 90.0 0 90.5 0 397.5 0 454.5 0 635.5 0 I1Q
25/05/89 07:25 25/05/89 07:35 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 3.0 0 87.5 0 91.0 0 398.0 0 455.0 0 636.0 0
t,j
c
30/05/89 00:45 30/05/89 00:55 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 92.5 0 453.0 0 637.5 0 ~
30/05/89 06:35 30/05/89 06:45 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 2.0 0 2.0 0 2.0 0 93.0 0 453.5 0 638.0 0
30/05/89 06:55 30/05/89 07:10 1.0 -1 1.5 0 1.5 0
30/05/89 18:45 30/05/89 18:55 0.5 0 0.5 0
3.0 0 3.0 0 3.0 0 94.0 0 454.5 0 639.0 0 ==
0
......
0.5 0 1.5 -1 3.5 0 3.5 0 94.0 0 455.0 0 639.5 0
+:>.
0
N

Database
The final step involved the combination of the landslide incident database
(with dates and nearest rain gauge) and the rainfall event database for each rain
gauge into a combined database of rainfall events and landslide incidents for
each gauge. This was achieved by adding an extra column at the end of the
rainfall event database. This column is the number of landslides occurring on
the particular date near the specific gauge. The combined database was then
used in all subsequent analyses for the determination of rainfall threshold
values, the assessment of threshold rainfalls, maximising of dates when
landsliding occurred and for the prediction of the number of landslides given a
particular rainfall event.
8.2.6 Methods of Analysis

The five main components of the analysis correspond directly to the study
objectives, and are as follows:
la. Examination of rainfall thresholds causing landsliding.
lb. Maximising the prediction of dates when landsliding occurred in the
study period using various combinations of threshold rainfall
variable values.
2. The prediction of the number of landslides given a particular rainfall
event for individual rain gauges.
3. Spatial statistical analysis of rainfall extremes.
4. Spatial statistical analysis of the number oflandslides over an area in
order to predict the number of landslides over an area.
These analysis components were carried out over nine distinct study stages over
two study periods, 1989-92 and 1984-93. Stage I is the preliminary stage of
exploratory analyses for the 1989-92 study period, and is described in detail in
Appendix E2. Stages II to V use the 1989-92 rainfall data. Stages II to IV focus
on calculating the rainfall thresholds required to cause landsliding (Component
1a), and the maximisation of the prediction of dates on which landsliding
occurred in the historical combined rainfall and landslide incident database
(Component lb). Stage V looks at the prediction of the number of landslides
given a rainfall event at a particular rain gauge (Component 2).
Stages VI to IX use the full June 1983 to July 1994 rainfall data, with the
combined rainfall and landslide incident database covering the years 1984 to
1993 inclusive. This provides a larger database for analysis. Stage VI predicts
the Annual Exceedance Probabilities (AEPs) for all rainfall variables
(Component 3). Stage VII seeks to improve the maximisation of landslide

threshold prediction by calculating new rainfall thresholds using the full
1984-93 databases (Component 1a and 1b). Stage VIII aims to better quantify
the prediction of the number of landslides occurring near a rain gauge given a
rainfall event, also using this larger database (Component 2). Finally Stage IX
predicts the number oflandslides occurring over an area using spatial statistics
of the data (Component 4).
Table 8.11 provides a summary reference of study components, stages,
data sources, analysis methods result set labels. The reader is also referred to
the detailed flow chart of data streams, analyses, and outputs for each study
stage provided in Appendix E3 for more information on study methodology.
Further details of statistical analyses carried out are presented in the discussion
of the relevant study component results.
Table 8.11 Summary of study components, stages, data sources, analyses and
results.
Data
Study
Study Rainfall Description Results
Component/
Stage Landslides Combined of Analysis
Objective Raw Proce
ssed
incidents with
known failure Plots of
Preliminary I - times - cumulative Graphs
(1989 to rainfall
1992)
Statistical
1a II - CD1-4
analyses
TS1
1989
1b Ill to - Annual CD5 RS1
Analysis
1992 GEO
1b - CD6 using TS1 RS2
landslide
incident Statistical
1a
IV
- reports CD?
analyses
TS2
(1989 to
Analysis
1b - 1992) CD?
using TS2
RS3
2 v - CDB-12 RS4
3 VI R9 Annual - RS5
- GEO
1a VII CD15 TS3
June landslide
- Statistical
2 VIII 1983 incident CD16--18 RS6
analyses
to SD1 reports - RS7
1993 (1984 to
4 IX SD2 1993) - RS8
Using curve from Result Set 4 RS9
Notes: CD Combined databases

so Storm databases
R Rainfall database
TS Threshold set
RS Result set
8.2. 7 Results and Discussion
8.2.7.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding

(Component 1)
A) Preamble
The identification of rainfall thresholds used rainfall data for isolated
landslide events (ie. only a single landslide occurring near a particular gauge
during one day). The reason for using this data is that the rainfall values for the
isolated landslide events often occur outside major rainstorms, so that the
threshold values determined from the data will be sufficiently low to predict
even isolated events. Various threshold values can be selected and trialed from
this database. For example, if one chose the minimum values one would
certainly predict all the dates on which landsliding occurred, but also a large
number of dates when no landsliding occurred. On the other hand, if the
maximum values were selected only a few dates on which landsliding occurred
would be predicted. Thus the selection of threshold values requires a balance
between these two extreme options.
B) Raw Results and Discussion

The details of the supporting databases as well as a detailed analysis
method descriptions for the determination of rainfall thresholds causing
landsliding for the 1989-92 study period can be found in Appendices E3 and E4.
To enable the author to gain an insight into the actual distributions of the
threshold values, threshold rainfall values (in mm) corresponding to percentiles
were obtained from the database of rainfall values for isolated landslide events.
The threshold rainfall values corresponding to percentiles are listed in Table
8.12. The author used selected percentiles to determine the threshold sets
causing landsliding. From the threshold sets selected values corresponding to
database percentiles were trialed in various combinations. The trials used the
0% (ie. minimum) and 25% threshold values most frequently. The two basic
types of combinations trialed were:
o a selection of rainfall values that have to exceed the corresponding
threshold values, eg. HI, H24 and D3, and
o a weighting system of points for each rainfall variable.
In the weighting system the point weight values were first selected by the author
to to be larger for the rainfall variables indicated to be important by the
preliminary analyses. These are MIS, HI, andH24. In order for the threshold
combination to be exceeded a specified sum of scores had to be exceeded. This is
a less rigid system as no one specific set of rainfall variables is specified. All

distributions of rainfall variables.
Threshold Set 1
Rainfall values (mm) for percentiles
Variable
0 10 25 50 75 100
M15 0.5 0.5 2.5 7 13 26.5
H1 0.5 0.5 5.5 12 27.5 79
H3 0.5 1 9.5 19 38 120
H12 0.5 5.5 14 35 82 278.5
H24 0.5 8.5 26.5 65.5 117.5 360.5
D3 7.5 38 65.5 121.5 204.5 416
D7 13.5 56.5 92 159 285.5 440
D15 17 102 141 196.5 356.5 491.5
D30 17 138.5 190 295.5 465.5 751
Threshold Set 2
Variable
0 10 25 50 75 100
M15 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 26.5
H1 0.5 0.5 1 2 6 79
H3 0.5 0.5 1.5 6 17 120
H12 0.5 2.5 9.5 24.5 41 278.5
H24 0.5 7 21 41 86 360.5
D3 0.5 24 52 106.5 170 434
D7 0.5 43.5 80.5 152 224.5 440.5
D15 5 63 127 182.5 281.5 492.5
D30 16.5 119.5 190 270.5 375.5 751
Threshold Set 3
VAR
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
M15 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.5 6.5 8.5 10.5 13.0 16.0 21.0 40.5
H1 0.5 2.0 5.0 9.7 15.0 18.5 23.0 29.0 37.0 50.5 80.0
H3 0.5 2.5 9.0 17.2 24.2 33.0 41.3 50.4 62.4 84.0 136.5
H12 0.5 5.1 17.1 30.5 43.2 52.0 64.8 79.9 93.7 127.5 366.0
H24 0.5 7.1 30.5 48.5 68.6 90.0 107.0 126.4 149.8 188.2 367.0
D3 0.5 30.6 53.5 82.5 107.7 131.0 149.5 181.5 206.5 246.9 526.0
D7 1.0 52.9 86.6 121.5 147.9 170.8 195.1 226.9 260.4 359.0 601.5
D15 16.5 94.4 156.1 182.3 212.2 241.3 277.2 312.9 384.5 439.9 745.0
D30 22.0 151.2 206.5 266.0 310.1 368.8 423.2 483.0 539.7 625.9 764.0
Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for rainfall events of the longest duration having more than one
landslide reported on that date (1984-93 study period).
rainfall variables are potentially available for selection. Two sets of point scores,
P1 and P2, were used. These are biased towards the rainfall variables indicated
to be important. Their values were determined using trial and error. Their total
sums and the corresponding sums required to be exceeded are shown in Table
8.13.
The final step for producing the maximum percentage of "Correct
Warning" dates was to optimise both the weighting scores and the threshold
variable values using this objective. A Fortran program was written by the
School of Civil Engineering's P. K. Maguire using Neider and Mead's (1965)
Simplex method combined with Simulated Annealing (Press et al, 1992; Otten
and Van Ginneken, 1989). Point score set P3 in Table 8.13 is the result of this
procedure. One can see that H24 and H 1 are indicated to be the most important
rainfall threshold variables (ie have the highest optimised point score) in point
score set P3. Thus the optimisation program confirmed the results of the
preliminary analyses. Further details of this work are available in Appendix E4.
obtained from a Simplex optimisation technique.
Point Scores
Rainfall Variable
P1 P2 P3
M15 13 4 -17
H1 13 6 12
H3 4 6 -10
H12 5 7 0
H24 13 9 28
D3 10 8 11
D7 5 3 0
D15 0 2 0
D30 0 1 0
Total available 63 46 24
Minimum point score
21 15 22
threshold
The threshold combination trials were aimed at maximising the

proportion of dates with "Correct Warnings" obtained by running a particular
threshold combination through the rainfall event and landslide incident
database. A "Correct Warning" is a date on which the specified threshold
combination was exceeded at least near one gauge, and landsliding was also
reported on that day near the same gauge. The other categories of dates were
"False Alarms" and "No Warning". "False Alarms" are dates when the specified
threshold combination was exceeded but no landsliding was reported, whereas

days with "No Warning" had reported landsliding but the specified threshold
combination was not exceeded. The threshold values for rainfall variables
trialed were selected from the statistical percentile values of the threshold
database. They are:
Tl Minimum values from initial threshold database of 40 incidents with
known failure times and dates (Threshold Set 1),
T2 Threshold values derived by the optimisation procedure run on the
unedited date database (included in Threshold Set 1),
T3 25 percentile values from the larger threshold database of 91 single
incidents (Threshold Set 2),
incidents (Threshold Set 2), and
incidents (Threshold Set 2).
The threshold combinations are given in Table 8.14. Further details of
threshold combinations are located in Appendix E4. Result Sets 1 to 3 for the
1989-92 study period are listed in Tables 8.15 to 8.17. The objective was to
maximise the percentage of dates with "Correct Warning". It can be seen that
the best result achieved use threshold values T1, threshold combination C3 and
give 35% "Correct Warning" with 46% "False Alarm" and 18% "No Warning.
Generally one can note the following:
o point scores do not perform as well as the arbitrary combinations,
except for point score set P3 which was obtained from the
optimisation,
o the important rainfall variables are M15, Hl, H24, D3, D30, and
o lowering the threshold values does not increase the percentage of
"Correct Warning" but rather shifts percentage points from "No
Warning" to "False Alarm".
Thus a fairly poor prediction of landslide initiation is obtained using rainfall
threshold combinations alone (35% success rate for the 1989-92 study period).
This is hardly surprising given the many other factors influencing landsliding
that are not included in the model.
For the 1984-93 study period Threshold Set 3 was determined from the
total database with one or more slides on a particular date near a particular rain
gauge, and also for sub-databases with only one slide, or more than one slide.
This threshold set is also detailed in Appendix E4. It was found that Threshold
Set 3 values are not dissimilar to values from Threshold Sets 1 and 2. The
optimisation of the 1984-93 study period data was not possible within a
reasonable time and resource frame on the available School of Civil
Engineering's computer system. Even if such resources were available, the
author could not see that their employment would greatly improve the
30%-40% success rate obtained for the prediction of landsliding using the
threshold set combinations from Threshold Sets 1 and 2. Thus optimisation
using Threshold Set 3 was not pursued by the author.

exceeded in order for the threshold to be deemed to be exceeded.
Threshold Rainfall Threshold Variables

Combination M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 D3 D7 D15 D30
C1
• • • •
C2
• • • • •
C3
• • • •
C4
• • • • •
Table 8.15 Result Set 1 - Results of Threshold Trials on Combined Database 5.
Threshold Correct False No Total

Threshold
Combination Warning% Alarm% Warning% %
C1 24 30 46 100
C2 23 29 48 100
T1
C4 24 28 48 100
P2 22 61 17 100
C4 33 57 10 100
T2 P2 6 94 0 100
P3 32 45 22 100
Table 8.16 Result Set 2- Results of Threshold Trials on Combined Database 6.

Threshold
Combination Warning% Alarm% Warning% 0
/o
C1 32 47 21 100
C2 33 45 22 100
C3 35 46 18 100
T1
C4 33 44 22 100
P1 17 82 1 100
P2 21 78 1 100
Table 8.17 Result Set 3 - Results of Threshold Trials on Combined Database 6.

Threshold
C4 22 77 1 100
T3
P2 6 94 0 100
C4 8 92 0 100
T4
P2 8 92 0 100
C4 30 30 40 100
TS
P2 16 84 0 100
C) Recommended Rainfall Thresholds for Hong Kong

The author's recommended thresholds for rainfall causing landsliding at
individual sites in Hong Kong are given in Table 8.18. When not all the rainfall
variable values (on a rolling basis) are exceeded, landsliding at individual sites is
very unlikely to occur due to rainfall. When the rainfall values fall in the range of
values indicated for all rainfall variables listed, individual landslides are likely to
occur. When all the upper values are exceeded, landslides are almost certain to
occur.
Table 8.18 Recommended rainfall threshold values for Hong Kong.
Rainfall Variable M15 H1 H24 030

Threshold (mm) 2.5--7 8-17 70-90 200-300
Even though the best percentage obtained for "Correct Warning" using the
author's recommended threshold values is only 35%, this result appears
consistent with the results of the prediction of numbers of landslides at
individual rain gauges (detailed in section 8.2. 7.2) where the proportion of total
data variance explained by the best fitting models is also of the order of
30%-38%.
D) Comparison With Other Research

It will be noted that theHl threshold value of8-17 mm!hris significantly
lower than the 70 mm/hr value noted by Brand (1984) and Premchitt et al
(1994). The H24 values of 70-90 mm is also below the 100 mm threshold
quoted by these authors as "unlikely to cause major landslide incidents". The
values are not as disparate as may seem on initial inspection. The 8-17 mmHl
value applies to an individual landslide near a particular rain gauge, which can
be caused by a localised, fairly low intensity rainfall event. Hence, even though
the upper 17 mm/hr value is exceeded near a particular rain gauge the total
number of landslides over the entire Territory of Hong Kong may not be at all
significant. On the other hand, the exceedance of the 70 mm Hi value at any
gauge is far more likely to indicate a rainstorm event which is likely to be spread
over a large portion of the Territory of Hong Kong, affecting several of the rain
gauges at once, and leading to a larger number of landslides. Hence it can be
deduced that the spatial distribution of rainfall, as well as its intensity, will play a
key role in determining the number of landslides occurring.
TheH24 range of values in Table8.18 of70-90 mmis certainly lower than
the 150 mm value found by Crozier (1986) required to trigger "significant"
failures in cut and fill slopes in Wellington, New Zealand. However, without
access to the details of slope failures studied by Crozier the author found it
difficult to determine exactly why the threshold for Hong Kong is lower, but no
doubt this includes different geological conditions and cut slope engineering
practices. Crozier's (1986) 150 mm value for H24 for cuts and fills is again lower
than his range of 200-250 mm for natural slope failures for the same area.
The author also compared the available Hong Kong data for various small
and large storm events to the threshold suggested by Caine (1980) for shallow
landslides and debris flows by producing an intensity-duration plot (Figure
8.18). The storm database used for the plot is SD 1. It contains over 2,500 sets of
data for each storm event at each rain gauge, each of which becomes a point on
the plot. The generation of the storm database is described in section 8.2. 7.4
which discusses the spatial statistical analysis of rainfall and landsliding. It can
be seen from Figure 8.18 that there is a large data scatter and also overlap
between the null events and the events causing landsliding. There appears to be
no obvious pattern or trend between the rainfall events causing a higher
proportion of slope failures and those causing a lower proportion. Given this
data, one would also expect a poor prediction from any model fitted to it.
Most of the points are above Caine's (1980) threshold line, including most
of the ones with no recorded failures. This result is consistent with the findings
of Sidle et al (1985) and Crozier (1986) who also found Caine's (1980) threshold
line to be easily exceeded by rain events which do not cause landsliding. The
author agrees with the conclusion drawn by Sidle et al (1985) - that Caine's
(1980) threshold line is based on failures that have occurred under nearly
saturated antecedent moisture conditions. In contrast, the author's data
encompasses the full range of possible antecedent moisture conditions, and this
explains why most of the points lie above Caine's (1980) threshold line. Figure
8.18 also shows that while there is an overall expected trend of rainfall with
;1~.....
(b (b
400 ::0 ....
~- ~
300
200 Author's band of threshold values I KEY '[
"''Tl
"'
~ ';.<
Ill
El"'(b ::r
'"!;
::I Cl
100 ..... ,--..
• > 10% 0
. . . cz
-......_ ......_ •
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C!l
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.g ~
:2 50 X ....J
: . " . '. :.'1', '~>i.·l'

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s 30 ......_
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.
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• •. ••• '•
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;:_1·:,, •:.,,'>1.~· ""ll.....
•
:;:.:::~»<···~7.
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• 5-10% (f)
w
~ D ~; !~;!;;:; i;~;t=:·~?'~;.,.,.
• ': · a.
.: :"'s:~l, lf~JJ!
20 1 ''J:'O~~·:~ 0
U5 ; · ~ :· ··:~ · · ··r ..:r.~wwx:)(· L X 'K •
-~
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zw "·I x'
x x.x ....J
01 • !·~·.·.OX:! ·~!;.:-!:·~f,'>f'~~ · ~ cl·
~ ,!!;*-~·1'•, ~~':'~
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•D • • •• :• • ;1< • ••
1-
z 10 + D
. r .... , ~;oa;' ·~·?x-1~\. "'
••
, ••
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~X
X@ D 1-5% u.
'~---- r--:...: ::.:. 4'::.~~:........, . .: __;._::::,.
--- --- . x' :'If' • f •
0
: ~ ··~.;,:· ~-: . L-·; .. . '·( ~- . · I
z
x, ·~~.:~ ····~·· ~.. t'·· ·'
x . ~: .:'{\:;;t;:::~~!.:•.Y;;_<~ :,' •. 0
='
.
x . 1=14.82Q-D.39
El ................. •
i=
5 •t,•~)(",,,.,,, ~ )( • (Caine, 1980) a:
"'~·:. ... ·.<-··x ... ,.;:;~"""-
'
""' o I
' ·'···-·J•
:"')( ....., . . ........
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4 ·: ..... ••• >.. . '-
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x • . • •x • ../· ·'
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3 EI • : •..: "',x .; :·
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' '' ' '

X
2 a.
X
... ~
0%
10 100 1000
' ......
10000
'
5 50 500 5000 50000
DURATION (minutes)
Figure 8.18 Intensity-duration plot for all the gauges and all storms in the 1984-93 study period, showing the proportion of slopes
failing. +>-
.......
N
higher intensity and duration to cause more landslides, this trend has notable
exceptions and is not distinct enough to enable the establishment of a
Caine-type rainfall threshold line for landslides in Hong Kong.
The band representing the author's threshold values is also plotted in
Figure 8.18. This band shows a trend similar to that of Caine's (1980) threshold
line. The band produced by the author is based on a series of rainfall variable
thresholds rather, than a single storm value as that of Caine. The position of the
author's threshold value band relative to the data points shows the fairly weak
power of these threshold values to separate null events from those causing
landslides. This is not unexpected given the low 35% correct prediction rate
found in the analysis. While all events except two causing greater than 1% slope
failures are above the lower bound of the author's threshold, the data causing
less than 1% slope failures and the null event data is found both above and below
them. Thus the thresholds do not separate rainfall events causing less than 1%
slope failures and the null events well.
8.2. 7.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain Gauge

(Study Component 2)
A) Introduction
The study of prediction of the number of landslides given a rainfall event
was carried out in Stages V (1989-92 period) and VIII (1984-93 period).
Detailed steps are available in Appendix E3.
The number oflandslides that will occur in a given area depends on, at the
simplest level, the population of features (cuts, fills and retaining walls) in the
area and the rainfall experienced by the area. This study component looked at
relationships between the proportion of failed features in an area experiencing a
rainfall event described by the rainfall variables MIS, Hl, H3, Hl2, H24, D3, D7,
Dl5 and D30. Of course, one would expect a lot of variability in the final results
given that other important variables influencing landsliding such as feature
geometry, geology, groundwater and so on are not included in the analysis.
However, even a result with substantial variability can provide useful
quantitative guidelines to analyses of societal risk from major rainfall events.
A series of plots generated initially for each gauge show the numbers of
landslides versus the rainfall variables and their values for various rainfall
events in the 1989-92 study period. An example can be found in Figure 8.19.
Each line represents an individual rainfall event, and the number is the number
of landslides caused near that gauge by the event. The X axis plots the
corresponding rainfall variable values in minutes. For example, M15 is plotted
on X=15, Hl on X=60, and so on. TheY axis plots the corresponding rainfall
values. Note that the numbers of landslides in these plots are not directly
comparable as the underlying populations of features are different for each
gauge. However, the plots showed that the shorter duration rainfall variables
such as Hl-D3 appeared higher for a larger number oflandslides. These larger
numbers oflandslides were caused by large rainfall events, hereafter referred to
as storms. Hence, it became apparent that for the prediction oflarge numbers of
landslides over an area rather than isolated incidents in specific locations, data
had to be extracted specifically for major storms.
B) Database Generation
The prediction of the number oflandslides uses landslide and rainfall data
from major storm events (ie. events causing a large number oflandslides). In the
1989-92 study period there were only two major storm events, on the 20th/21st
May 1989 and 8th May 1992. The 8th May 1992 storm had separate morning
and afternoon downpours. The early analysis was restricted because of this. In
the 1984-93 study period a further five storms causing substantial landslides
were identified, with at least six others causing landslides at two or more rain
gauges. The major storms in this period were also on 20th/21st May 1989 and
8th May 1992 (viz. Premchitt et al, 1994). It is unfortunate that rainfall data is
not available for the 1982 and 1983 major storm events in sufficient detail for
each gauge, otherwise it also could have been included in this study.
Number of landslides
600 --2
--2
500
;9/05/92 . J
E 400 --2
-
E
_ .J
_.J 300
--32
u:
z
<X: 200
a:
100
3
0
10 100 l()(X) 10000 100000
VARIABLE (minutes)
corresponding number of landslides.
The generation of the databases for analyses is detailed in Appendix E3. In

brief, the numbers of features per gauge were first estimated. The calculations
are in Appendix E5. The longest duration rainfall events for the corresponding
storms for each gauge were selected as representative of the rainfall on the day.
This is because the longest duration rainfall event on a particular date almost
invariably contains the largest values for all the rainfall variables. The author
believes that it is not unreasonable to assign the responsibility of causing the
day's landslides to the longest duration rainfall event on that date. The
proportion of failed features per each rain gauge was calculated. Thus databases
with proportions of failed features (in each gauge area) for the different storms
were obtained. The databases were statistically analysed for the best models to
predict the proportion of failed features during study stages V and VIII.
C) Analyses, Results and Discussion

The statistical analyses carried out consisted of multiple linear and
non -linear regressions. Stepwise selection of variables was used to indicate the
ones most important to prediction. Once these variables were determined,
curve-fitting techniques using quadratic and cubic curves were used to refine
the models. The results of statistical analyses of the 1989-92 storm data (study
stage V) can befoundinAppendixE6. In the analyses ofthe 1984-93 storm data
(study stage VIII) three databases were used. These are Pools 3, 4 and 5. Pool3 is
the database with only one landslide incident occurring near a particular gauge
on a particular date. Pool4 is the database with one or more landslide incidents
occurring near a particular gauge on a particular date, whereas PoolS has two or
more incidents. Pool 5 is considered by the author to be most relevant as it is
giving more than one landslide, and hence likely to be most useful in predicting
the numbers oflandslides. Pool4 is not as suitable, as it has a wide data scatter,
and contains isolated events (ie single landslides), which are not useful for
predicting numbers of landslides greater than one.
The two methods of regression used were Enter (when all rainfall variables
are modelled) and Stepwise (where the program selects variables that best
explain the data). The model curves were fitted through the origin as this makes
physical sense. The statistical measure ofregressional goodness of fit for models
through the origin is the coefficient of determination, R 20 • It ranges from 0 (no
fit) to 1 (perfect fit). The results of the multiple linear regression analyses of the
1984-93 storm data (study stage VIII) are given in Table 8.19. Note that the
models have a reasonable to good fit.
Table 8.19 Results for multiple linear regression analyses for models through
the origin for the 1984-93 study period.
Database Method Variables Selected R20 n

Enter M15, H1, H3, H12, H24, 03, 07, 015, 030 0.74
POOL3 260
Stepwise M15, 030 0.74
Enter M15, H1, H3, H12, H24, 03, 07, 015, 030 0.49
POOL4 367
Stepwise H3, H12 0.48
Enter M15, H1, H3, H12, H24, 03, 07, 015, 030 0.58
POOLS 107
Stepwise H3 0.55
The variables H3 and H12 are frequently selected in the models as the
variables best explaining most of the data variance. This is a contrast to the
1989-92 data where Hl was most frequently selected (viz. Appendix E6).
Nevertheless, the results still indicate the importance of shorter duration
rainfalls in the range of 1 hour to 12 hours, which is also consistent with the
current basis for the rainfall warning system (Premchitt, 1985a,b).
Seeing H3 was giving the best fit in Pool 5 (R 20 =0.55), a series of
polynomial curve fittings to the data was performed by the author using H3 for
models through the origin. This was similar to the curve fittings performed on
the 1989-92 data usingthevariableHl, which are detailed in Appendix E6. The
models fitted were log, inverse, quadratic and cubic curves through the origin.
The author also checked how much the model fit improved if statistical outliers
more than two standard deviations from the mean were removed from the data.
The results of curve fitting to the 1984-93 data using H3 are given in Table 8.20.
The statistical measures of regressional goodness of fit are the coefficient of
determination, R 2 for models with a constant and R 20 for models through the
origin. They both measure the amount of total variance explained by the model,
and range from 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit). Because R 2 and R 20 have different
computational formulas (see details in Appendix C2), they are not directly
comparable.
Table 8.20 Summary of regression curve fitting results to 1984-93 data using
H3.
n=107 n.:91
MODEL
R20 R20 (without outliers)
Linear 0.551 0.804
Log 0.464 0.726
Inverse 0.007 0.024
Quadratic 0.552 0.806
Cubic 0.557 0.815
The quadratic and cubic curves yield a slightly improved model fit. They
also show a non -linear increase in the number of landslides with increasing
rainfall, which makes intuitive sense. The quadratic and cubic curves resemble
the shape ofthe curve obtained by Crozier (1986) (viz Figure 8.1). Figures 8.20
to 8.23 show the quadratic and cubic models through the origin for 1984-93
data, with and without outliers located more than two standard deviations from
the mean. From these curves the author has selected the cubic curve model
(with outliers) through the origin for the prediction of landslides near a
particular rain gauge in Hong Kong (Figure 8.22). This is because the curve has
the best statistical fit. Even though the model fits improved with the removal of
outliers, as expected, insufficient data was available to the author to be able to
justify the use of models without the outlying data.
The author is not aware of any other curves predicting numbers of
landslides from rainfall variables in any of the literature reviewed by him.
8.2.7.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes
A) Introduction
As was discussed in section 8.1, the two main systems of frequency analysis
are those of Gumbel (1958) and Pearson (Elderton and Johnson, 1969). The
author's reading of the literature, and discussions with Associate Professor I.
Cordery and Dr J. Ball of the Department of Water Resources in the School of
Civil Engineering at UNSW indicated that Gumbel's curves (Type I or III) or a
log Pearson III curve are most commonly applied to rainfall extremes. The
sources also indicated that the spatial statistics can be compiled either based on
an unweighted mean of the data, or weighted by the Theissen polygon area,
whichistheareacoveredbytheraingauge(vizCornish, 1970; Haan, 1977). The
author investigated all these methods and models for predicting point rainfall
extremes on Hong Kong Island.
B) Data Extraction
The rainfall maxima were extracted for each variable for each rain gauge
on Hong Kong Island for the period 1983-93 by a program written and applied
by P.K. Maguire of the School of Civil Engineering. The maximum values were
extracted from running totals based on five minute intervals. The dates of the
maxima were also extracted, and carefully checked across all gauges by the
author to ensure that they were consistent, and corresponded to a major storm
event as reported in the GEO's annual reports on rainfall and landsliding. In
some cases the rainfall data was corrupted, giving erroneous maxima. The
corrupted data was excluded by excluding the time period containing the
0.12
•
0.10·
Ul
<I>
0.
.Q
Ul
"0
0.08
<I>
"co
.....
0 0.06
c::
0
t
0
0.
....
0 0.04
a..
0.02
0.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H3(mm)
Figure 8.20 Quadratic model for the number of landslides near a rain gauge,
R 20 =0.55.
0.12
Ul 0.10
<I>
0.
0
(j)
"'0 0.08
..!!?
~
0
c:: 0.06
0
t
0
0.
e
a.. 0.04
0.02
0.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H3(mm)
Figure 8.21 Quadratic model without outliers for the number of landslides near
a rain gauge, R 20 =0.81.
0.12
0.10
(/)
Q)
0.
0
Ci5
"0 0.08
~
:§
0 0.06
c
0
t
8.
e
0...
0.04
0.02
0.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H3(mm)
R 20 =0.56.
0.12·~----r-------,r-----r-----.------,---/r--,
(/)
Q)
0.
0
Ci5 0.08+-------r----_,_ _ _ _-+----~----~--~~
"0
~
:§
~ 0.06+------r----~~----+-----r--~--r.~--~
.Q
t:
e8. o.04+------r-----_,_____-+---~~-~~--,_-~~~
0... •
• • •
50 100 150 200 250 300
H3(mm)
Figure 8.23 Cubic model without outliers for the number of landslides near a
rain gauge, R 20 =0.82.
corrupted data from scanning by the program algorithm. About four months
total of data were excluded. Fortunately this corrupted data was not in the time
periods in which the yearly maxima occurred, and this did not affect the
analysis. Thus an 11 year series of maxima for all the rainfall variables for each
rain gauge on Hong Kong Island was obtained.
The author checked this data to see if the relatively short series was
representative of typical or average rainfall on Hong Kong Island. This was done
by checking if the 11 year maxima values fell between those predicted by Peart
(1993) for a 10 and 20 year return period, based on a 20 year record. The
1984-93 data was scanned using a computer program by P.K. Maguire of the
School of Civil Engineering to extract the annual maximum value for each
variable (MIS to D30) for each gauge (H01 to H22). These values were then
sorted in ascending order and examined to see whether the rainfall in the period
1984-93 has below average, average or above average values. To do this Peart's
(1993) study data for a 20 year record was used to calculate return periods for the
maximum values for each gauge. If these return periods were below 10 years,
the maximum was labelled "below average", if between 10 and 20 years,
"average" and if greater than 20 years then "above average". Thus three
complementary percentages were obtained. The results of these comparisons
are presented in Figure 8.24. It can be seen that maxima for most rainfall
variables except H12 are average relative to those predicted by Peart (1993).
Hence the author considers the maxima series to be a reasonably typical
representation of a 11 year period.
C) Analysis, Results and Discussion

As part of an initial exploration of the maxima series the author plotted the
individual rain gauge maxima on Gumbel probability paper. A typical such plot
is reproduced in Figure 8.25. These plots were used to obtain initial indications
on which type of extreme frequency model the data may fit. The probabilities for
plotting were calculated using the Weibull formula m/(n+ 1), which is the most
commonly used plotting position formula (Haan, 1977). The Gumbel extremal
variates was calculated from these probabilities and used in the plots. This was
done so that any data following a Gumbel extreme frequency distribution would
plot as a straight line (Type I or III as appropriate, depending on the vertical
scale used). The plots showed the data variability from gauge to gauge and
rainfall variable to rainfall variable. A number of the data points plotted as a
straight line, while others curve in a concave or convex manner.
M15 H1 H12 H24
03 07 015 030
0 Below ~Average • Above

< 10 yrs 10-20 yrs > 20 yrs
Figure 8.24 Comparison of the 1983-93 maxima series (11 year period) values
with the equivalent return periods based on Peart (1993).
The data for all gauges was then pooled, and the mean values calculated.
Error bar plots of the pooled rainfall maxima data versus Gumbel's extremal
variates were then produced. An example is shown in Figure 8.26. The top and
bottom of the error bars are the maximum and minimum values respectively.
The central point indicates the mean. To gain a better understanding of the
distributions of the pooled data, box plots on Gumbel extremal Type I paper
were generated. The typical features of a box plot are shown in Figure 8.27.
Note that all outliers were used in the analyses. The box plots on Gumbel
extremal Type I paper are shown in Figures 8.28 to 8.36. From these one can see
that MIS, HI, D3, DIS and D30 appear as straight lines on the Gumbel Type I
extremal paper, while H3, HI2, H24 and D7 are closer to straight lines when
plotted on Gumbel Type III extremal paper. Graphically the data appears to fit
the Gumbel extremal frequency models well.
Figure 8.25 Example of a Gumbel 'JYpe I rainfall maxima plot 60 ~ ~
(1> (D
for gauge HOl. ::0 .....
.............
E "';>;" .'T1
--ro
E 40
~§.:
"'
~
i:>l
c"(ij 20 "'
';.<
'ij
a: 8 ::r
g ti
.... .--..
....,z
0 c:::
0
~C/l
.g ~
s (1> '--"
"'
250 400
- 200
E "E 3oo
E..
-ro
150
--ro
E
2oo
c"(ij 100 c"(ij
a: 50 a: 100
0 0
: -2 :
s s
600 800
EE
-
-ro
400 E'
E
6oo
c
"(ij
a:
200 c"(ij-ro 400
a:
0 200
+>-
s s N
N
100
-~
80
60 -
M15
(mm) -
.........-~
40
- -~
~~
-- --
20
~
·-r:.~
r--
~
.-'-
0
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
s
Figure 8.26 Error bar plot of MlS on Gumbel'JYpe I extremal paper.
90
80
.,__ MAXIMUM (without outlier )
25% of data { .--75%
70
U) 60
Q) 50% of data
Q)
..... .,__ 50% (MEDIAN)
0>
Q)
50
~
w
_J .--25%
{
C) 40
z
<( 25% of data
w 30
a...
0_J .,__ MINIMUM (without outliers
(/)
20
10
OUTLIERS
{ •
•
0
N=
Sample size (not always shown)
Figure 8.27 A typical box plot and its features.

100~--------------------------------------------------~
•
80 •
60 •
M15
(mm)
40
20
o-r------~--------~-------r--------.-------~-------4
-2 ·1 0 2 3 4
Figure 8.28 Box plot of MlS on Gumbei'JYpe I extremal paper.
The author next proceeded with a thorough statistical analysis of the

rainfall extreme data, investigating the data fit to the models commonly used for
rainfall extremes. These are (Haan, 1977; Water Resources Commission, 1976):
o Gumbel Type I,
o Gumbel Type III,
o Pearson III, and
o log Pearson III.
All data including outliers was included in the analyses. The first step was to
calculate the unweighted base statistics of the data. These are summarised in
Tables 8.21 and 8.22 for both the raw maxima values and the logarithms of the
maxima values. Tables 8.21 and 8.22 also include the indices K and R, which one
can use for an initial indication of the most appropriate Pearson model to be used
(Cornish, 1970). As can be seen, the most appropriate Pearson models suggested
by these indices were curves of Type I, II or sometimes rv. However, Pearson
curve types I, II and IV are not commonly used for rainfall maxima (Haan, 1977;
Water Resources Commission, 1976). Even though the indices did not indicate a
Pearson III or a log Pearson III curve directly, the author proceeded to calculate
the skewness and the corresponding frequency factor Kr for each rainfall
variable, as the data can still fit Pearson III type curves well even when not
directly indicated to be the statistically "best" type of model by the indices K and
200
•
175
•
150
-E 125
.s 100
co
.....
c
'Ci'i
a: 75
50
25
•
0
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
Figure 8.29 Box plot of Hl on Gumbel 'I)'pe I extremal paper.
300-r------------------------------------------------------------~
250 •
•
200
-E
.s 150
co
.....
c
'Ci'i
a:
100
50
• •
•
0~--------~--------~--------~,---------r-----~--~------~
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
Figure 8.30 Box plot of H3 on Gumbei'I)'pe I extremal paper.

800
700 •
600 •
•
......... 500
E •
.s •
•
Cii 400
.....
c
"co
a:
300
200
100
•
0
-2 -1 0 2 4
s
Figure 8.31 Box plot of HJ2 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper.
800
•
•
700
•
600
•
500
• • • • •
......... •
E
.s 400
• •
Cii
.....
c
"co 300
a:
200
100
0
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
Figure 8.32 Box plot of H24 on Gumbel JYpe I extremal paper.

1000-r---------------------------------------------------------------,
800
•
•
600 •
E'
_§_
-Cil
c:
·co
a:
400
200
0-+----------r---------~--------~----------r---------~--------~
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
s
Figure 8.33 Box plot of D3 on Gumbel'JYpe I extremal paper.
1000-r---------------------------------------------------------------,
800
• •
•
• •
600
........
E
•
_§_ • • •
• • •
-
Cil
c:
·co
a:
400
•
200
•
•
0-+--------~r---------~---------r--------~r---------.---------~
-2 -1 0 2 3 4
Figure 8.34 Box plot of D7 on Gumbel 'JYpe I extremal paper.

1000-.------------------------------------------------------------•
•
•
800
600
'E
5
--co
c
"(ii
400
a:
200
0-+----------~-----------.------------r-----------~--------~
-2 -1 0 2 3
s
Figure 8.35 Box plot of DIS on Gumbel l)rpe I extremal paper.
1000-r------------------------------------------------------------~
800
600
.........
E
5
--co
c
"(ii 400
a: •
200
0-+----------~-----------.------------r-----------~--------~
-2 -1 0 2 3
Figure 8.36 Box plot of D30 on Gumbell)rpe I extremal paper.

R. The frequency factor Kr enables the data to plot as a straight line if it follows
a Pearson III distribution (Haan, 1977).
Table 8.21 Base statistics of rainfall maxima values.
RAINFALL VARIABLE
STATS
M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030
Minimum 15.5 27.5 42.5 69.5 93.0 115.0 132.0 185.5 262.0
Mean 28.2 63.9 105.0 173.7 219.7 289.4 328.3 430.4 563.7
Maximum 81.5 144.5 237.0 385.0 386.5 672.5 770.0 963.0 1093.0
StdDev 7.22 18.74 39.02 71.92 71.31 98.32 109.69 127.64 140.73
Skewness 2.38 0.96 1.35 1.07 0.51 1.10 1.16 1.22 0.55
Kurtosis 13.35 1.67 1.61 0.24 -0.80 0.98 1.20 1.86 0.23
f3t 0.023 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.001
/32 0.066 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.013
K -0.047 0.158 -0.054 0.125 -0.013 -0.037 -0.041 -0.070 -0.009
R 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.004
I, II IV I, II IV I, II I, II I, II I, II I, II
Appropriate Pearson models suggested by Indices
Table 8.22 Base statistics of logarithms of rainfall maxima values.
RAINFALL VARIABLE
STATS Log Log Log Log Log Log Log Log Log
M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030
Minimum 1.19 1.44 1.63 1.84 1.97 2.06 2.12 2.27 2.42
Mean 1.44 1.79 2.00 2.21 2.32 2.44 2.49 2.62 2.74
Maximum 1.91 2.16 2.37 2.59 2.59 2.83 2.89 2.98 3.04
StdDev 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11
Skewness 0.65 0.02 0.50 0.47 0.02 0.36 0.44 0.36 -0.06
Kurtosis 1.81 0.08 -0.02 -0.67 -0.87 -0.30 -0.26 0.16 -0.40
f3t 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
f3z 0.020 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.011
K -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -0.003 -0.006
R 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
I, II I, II I, II I, II II I, II, IV I, II I, II I, II
Appropriate Pearson models suggested by indices
The Gumbel Type I and III, Pearson III and log Pearson III models were
fitted to the raw, unweighted data. The unweighted models are denoted UW. In
addition models weighted by the Thiessen polygon area (denoted WA) and by the
number of features nearest to the gauge (denoted WF) were also fitted. The
results of the goodness of fit of linear regressions performed on the data are
shown through the tabulation of R 2 values in Table 8.23, and also graphically in
Figure 8.37 for a better, clearer comparison. The regression was performed on
the data unweighted (denoted UW). Weighting by the Thiessen polygon area
was also used (denoted WA), as well as by the number of features nearest to the
gauge (denoted WF). The regression analyses were used instead of comparing
goodness of fits graphically. The R 2 values are more significant in a relative
rather than absolute sense. The following comments can be made on the results:
o All models have a good statistical fit, with R 2 values greater than 0.80,
except for MIS.
o The Gumbel and Pearson models have similar goodness of fit across
all cases.
o Models with logarithms of rainfall have a better fit than those using
the raw rainfall values, particularly for MIS.
o The weighted model fits are only slightly better than the unweighted
model fits. The weighting using the Thiessen polygon area gives the
best improvement.
Table 8.23 Regression results.
WEIGHT MODEL M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030

GTI 0.698 0.828 0.808 0.835 0.828 0.848 0.862 0.853 0.805
GTIII 0.798 0.832 0.848 0.857 0.817 0.863 0.881 0.880 0.799
uw Pill 0.679 0.826 0.818 0.838 0.851
0.826 0.868 0.856 0.805
LPIII 0.803 0.843 0.841 0.847 0.831 0.853 0.868 0.875 0.821
GTI 0.765 0.809 0.806 0.829 0.825 0.858 0.899 0.877 0.826
GTIII 0.799 0.818 0.840 0.870 0.836 0.875 D.:..9.QI 0.883 0.823
WA
Pill 0.715 0.808 0.815 0.832 0.817 0.860 0.903 0.878 0.828
LPIII Qjll_Q 0.834 0.839 0.862 .o...B!Q 0.869 0.902 0.886 0.846
GTI 0.679 0.837 0.821 0.838 0.832 0.852 0.877 0.860 0.834
GTIII 0.791 0.837 ~ 0.861 0.828 0.874 0.899 ~ 0.828
WF
Pill 0.658 0.835 0.831 0.842 0.829 0.855 0.883 0.863 0.832
LPIII 0.796 0.854 0.854 0.852 0.839 0.862 0.887 0.884 0.847
Notes:
Weights UW Unweighted
WA Weighted by Thiessen polygon area
WF Weighted by number of features
Models GTI Gumbel type I
GTIII Gumbel type Ill
Pill Pearson type Ill
LPIII log Pearson type Ill
.o...a10 Greatest overall
0.803 Greatest in the class
R2 GUMBEL TYPE I GUMBEL TYPE Ill
1.00 1.00
0.95 0.95
0.90 0.90
II;~ l"'ii ~ ijll
0.85 0.85 1---
0.80 0.80
0.75 0.75
0.70 0.70
0.65 0.65
~~
0.60 0.60
0.55 0.55
0.5 0.5
M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030 M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030
RAINFALL VARIABLE RAINFALL VARIABLE
PEARSON TYPE Ill LOG PEARSON TYPE Ill
1.00 1.00
0.95 0.95
0.90 0.90
0.85 0.85
0.80
~ 0.80
~
0.75 0.75
0.70 - 0.70
0.65 0.65
0.60 0.60
0.55 0.55
0.5 0.5
~
M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030 M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030
RAINFALL VARIABLE RAINFALL VARIABLE
KEY TO WEIGHTING uw
• WA WF
Figure 8.37 Goodness of fit values for various models and weightings.
Based on these results the author selected the Gumbel Type III and the log
Pearson III models as the best models for the calculation of rainfall variables for
low annual exceedance probabilities. The return periods selected by the author
were 20, 50 and 100 years. As this involved extrapolation past the range of
available data (not an uncommon situation in hydrological analyses - see Haan,
1977), the lower and upper 95% confidence limit values were also calculated to
obtain a feel for the possible ranges of predicted values. The calculations were
performed using models weighted by the Thiessen polygon area, models
weighted by the number of features nearest to the gauge, and also unweighted
models. The steps in the calculations were:
o Obtain the extremal variate/frequency factor appropriate to the
return period.
o Calculate the mean predicted value from the linear model.
o Calculate the lower and upper 95% confidence limit values from the
linear model.
The predicted values are summarised in Table 8.24. The full model and
calculation details are given in Appendix E7. The mean predicted values are
compared to the values for the same return periods calculated for four rain
gauges in Hong Kong by Peart (1993). The values are compared as box plots in
Figure 8.38. Peart's (1993) values were calculated from a 20 year record. Peart
used Gumbel's (1958) and Jenkinson's (1977) methods in his analysis. The box
plot labels used in Figure 8.38 are:
1. Box plot for the author's Gumbel model results.
2. Box plot for Peart's Gumbel model results.
3. Box plot for the author's log Pearson III model results.
4. Box plot for Peart's Jenkinson model results.
Table 8.24 Predicted rainfall extremes.
PE· INTER- GUMBEL MODEL PEARSON MODEL

VAR RIO VAL Gill, UW Gill, WA Gill, WF LPIII, UW LPIII, WA LPIII, WF
D
LCI 43.7 43.1 43.5 42.0 41.3 41.8
20 MEAN 46.1 45.1 46.0 43.7 43.0 43.7
UCI 48.6 47.5 48.6 45.6 44.6 45.6
LCI 52.5 51.4 52.2 48.1 47.1 47.9
M15 50 MEAN 56.0 54.3 55.8 50.6 49.4 50.4
UCI 59.7 57.9 59.8 53.3 51.8 53.1
LCI 60.2 58.6 59.8 53.0 51.6 52.7
100 MEAN 64.9 62.4 64.5 56.0 54.5 55.9
UCI 69.7 67.1 69.8 59.4 57.5 59.2
... contmued
Table 8.24 (continued) Predicted rainfall extremes.

PE- GUMBEL MODEL PEARSON MODEL
VAR RIO INTER-
D VAL Gill, UW Gill, WA Gill, WF LPIII, UW LPIII, WA LPIII, WF
LCI 112.0 110.2 112.6 100.0 98.8 100.4
20 MEAN 119.2 117.5 119.7 104.4 103.3 104.7
UCI 127.0 125.4 127.4 109.0 107.8 165.3
LCI 141.9 139.1 143.2 113.4 111.9 114.2
H1 50 MEAN 153.2 150.4 154.4 119.3 117.8 119.9
UCI 165.5 162.9 166.7 125.4 123.9 190.7
LCI 169.4 165.5 171.5 123.4 121.6 124.4
100 MEAN 184.8 180.9 186.9 130.4 128.6 131.3
UCI 201.9 198.3 203.9 137.7 136.0 209.7
LCI 203.4 192.4 200.7 185.9 177.3 183.8
20 MEAN 218.1 206.3 214.6 196.2 186.9 193.5
UCI 233.6 221.2 229.4 207.4 197.1 203.8
LCI 269.6 253.1 265.7 225.5 214.1 222.9
H3 50 MEAN 293.8 275.8 288.5 240.7 228.3 237.1
UCI 319.8 300.5 313.2 257.3 243.3 252.4
LCI 333.0 310.8 327.9 258.1 244.3 254.9
100 MEAN 367.2 342.7 360.0 277.6 262.4 273.2
UCI 404.6 378.0 395.4 299.2 282.0 293.0
LCI 366.1 348.0 361.4 328.6 312.5 324.3
20 MEAN 395.1 374.7 388.8 348.9 330.9 343.9
UCI 426.9 402.3 419.3 371.1 350.5 364.7
LCI 504.8 480.1 497.3 407.9 388.3 402.0
H12 50 MEAN 554.3 525.7 544.3 438.5 415.9 431.5
UCI 609.7 573.8 597.1 472.2 445.7 463.1
LCI 642.2 611.0 631.7 474.2 451.7 467.0
100 MEAN 714.3 677.5 700.3 514.2 487.7 505.5
UCI 796.3 748.7 778.2 558.5 526.9 547.1
LCI 411.9 388.3 405.2 360.7 340.5 356.9
20 MEAN 440.8 416.0 434.7 379.3 356.7 374.9
UCI 474.0 445.7 467.5 399.8 374.7 393.8
LCI 536.9 506.2 527.6 415.5 391.8 410.9
H24 50 MEAN 584.4 551.0 575.4 440.7 413.8 435.2
UCI 639.1 599.8 629.0 468.5 438.3 460.9
LCI 654.8 617.4 643.1 456.7 430.4 451.4
100 MEAN 721.9 680.2 710.0 487.2 457.0 480.7
UCI 799.5 749.3 785.6 520.9 486.8 512.0
... continued
Table 8.24 (continued) Predicted rainfall extremes.

PE- GUMBEL MODEL PEARSON MODEL
VAR RIO INTER-
D VAL Gill, UW Gill, WA Gill, WF LPIII, UW LPIII, WA LPIII, WF
LCI 548.0 529.4 547.6 493.5 477.2 492.1
20 MEAN 583.0 562.1 581.4 518.5 499.4 516.4
UCI 619.8 597.2 617.2 543.5 523.9 541.9
LCI 717.3 697.0 718.1 585.6 568.7 584.6
03 50 MEAN 774.2 750.2 773.0 621.1 600.6 619.1
UCI 834.8 808.3 832.1 657.3 635.7 655.7
LCI 877.6 856.5 880.0 659.0 641.9 658.4
100 MEAN 957.5 931.5 957.0 703.7 682.2 701.7
UCI 1043.5 1014.1 1040.7 749.6 726.7 748.0
LCI 618.4 629.0 628.8 562.4 569.7 495.4
20 MEAN 655.3 662.7 662.4 588.0 594.0 520.0
UCI 692.7 698.1 698.4 615.1 618.0 545.9
LCI 806.9 835.3 825.9 670.5 688.0 592.7
07 50 MEAN 866.2 890.6 880.6 707.5 723.3 628.1
UCI 927.8 949.6 939.8 747.0 758.7 665.7
LCI 985.0 1033.1 1013.2 757.8 784.4 671.3
100 MEAN 1067.8 1111.5 1090.0 804.7 829.5 716.3
UCI 1154.9 1195.8 1174.0 855.0 875.1 764.3
LCI 762.8 757.4 766.4 697.3 692.8 699.5
20 MEAN 803.0 796.8 805.8 724.3 720.7 726.0
UCI 845.4 838.9 844.6 754.3 748.3 755.2
LCI 967.7 965.0 973.8 811.7 809.3 815.0
015 50 MEAN 1030.8 1027.1 1035.5 849.5 848.1 852.1
UCI 1098.1 1094.1 1097.6 891.6 887.2 893.0
LCI 1156.5 1157.1 1165.1 901.5 901.0 905.8
100 MEAN 1243.0 1242.2 1249.6 948.5 949.0 951.9
UCI 1335.9 1335.1 1335.6 1000.8 997.9 1002.6
LCI 909.5 907.0 918.7 822.4 819.9 827.6
20 MEAN 965.4 960.8 972.2 856.6 850.8 860.1
UCI 1025.0 1018.0 1023.3 892.0 882.5 891.9
LCI 1111.6 1116.4 1128.1 911.2 911.8 918.9
030 50 MEAN 1196.1 1198.1 1209.0 955.4 952.1 960.8
UCI 1287.6 1286.2 1288.5 1001.2 993.6 1002.2
LCI 1292.0 1304.5 1315.7 975.2 978.3 984.8
100 MEAN 1404.5 1413.7 1423.6 1026.9 1025.6 1033.7
UCI 1527.6 1532.6 1531.3 1080.8 1074.7 1082.6
Notes:
LCI Lower 95% confidence interval
UCI Upper 95% confidence interval
M15 H1
70-.--------.-------.-------, 200 -.--------....-------,.--------,

I 1 I 1
II'!! I@
I 2
150 -+----....1...-'--==---..___*
12
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Return Period (years) Return Period (years)
H12 H24
800 800
I I I I
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I I I I
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1. Author's Gumbel model 3. Author's log Pearson Ill model

Key:
2. Peart's Gumbel model 4. Peart's Jenkinson model
Figure 8.38 Box plots comparing predicted rainfall extremes with those of Peart
(1993).
D3 Dl
1200 1200
I I I I 1
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1. Author's Gumbel model 3. Author's log Pearson Ill model

Key:
2. Peart's Gumbel model 4. Peart's Jenkinson model
Figure 8.38 (continued) Box plots comparing predicted rainfall extremes with
those of Peart (1993).
From Table 8.24 and Figure 8.38 the following can be concluded:
o The author's models predict a much tighter band of values compared
to Peart's values as the author's models are pooled from 22 rain
gauges while Peart's models are for individual rain gauges.
o The author's Gumbel Type III model predicts higher values than the
author's log Pearson III model or both of Peart's models. The
difference is higher for longer return periods.
o The author's and Peart's Gumbel model values are similar for the 20
year return period.
o Peart's values for his Gumbel and Jenkinson models are similar for
all variables and return periods.
o With the exception of MIS and H12, Peart's values for both his
Gumbel and Jenkinson models fall between those predicted by the
author's Gumbel Type III and log Pearson III models.
It is encouraging that the author's predicted values are not vastly different from
those found by Peart (1993) for return periods of 20, 50 and 100 years, even
though the author's rainfall record used in the analysis was of a much shorter
duration (about half of Peart's). The sensitivity of the predicted values to the
type of model used is highlighted by the difference (in some cases up to 36%) in
the values predicted by the Gumbel Type III and log Pearson III models. Since
the statistical fit of both models to the data is similar, and both models are
commonly used for rainfall extremes (Haan, 1977), no single model can be said
to be better for prediction. The author recommends comparison of values from
both models when predicting rainfall extremes in Hong Kong.
8.2. 7.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding
A) Introduction
The study of the spatial statistics of rainfall and landsliding can be used to
predict the number of landslides that will occur across an area covered by a
number of rain gauges given a specific rainfall event. Such a study needs to
analyse significant storm events and the landsliding that they generate. The
author studied the spatial statistics of rainfall and landsliding on Hong Kong
Island during 1984-93, and developed models predicting the number of
landslides given a storm event. This study is described herein.
B) Data Extraction
The author extracted significant storm dates from the annual GEO reports
on rainfall and landsliding. The reported dates were those where the 24 hour
rainfall at the Royal Observatory rain gauge (which is near, but not on Hong
Kong Island) exceeded 50 mm. This value is conservatively low, but ensures that
all storm events producing significant numbers oflandslides are captured. The
author gave each storm date a number, and recorded the number of landslides
that took place across Hong Kong Island and also the entire Territory of Hong
Kong. These storm events (116 in total) and the number of landslides they
caused over the respective areas are shown in Appendix E8. By taking the list of
incidents with dates of failure and the nearest rain gauge (Appendix El) the
author extracted the number oflandslides per storm per gauge and produced the
storm database SDl. One should note that data overlap exists between the
storm database SD1 and the combined databases used to predict the number of
landslides near a particular gauge (CD8-12, CD13 and CD15). Also the
approaches and objectives of this study (study stage IX) are different compared
to study stages V and VII.
The author checked that the rainfall events that were not included in the
storm database SD1 had caused low numbers of landslides across Hong Kong
Island. This was confirmed by the fact that the maximum number of landslides
caused by a single rainfall event outside the storm database SDl was five, with
the vast majority of the remaining dates being single slides. The distributions of
the numbers oflandslides on Hong Kong Island for the storm database SD1 and
events outside it are shown in box plot format in Figure 8.39. It can be seen that
no significant numbers of landslides have been excluded from the storm
database.
C) Major Recorded Storm Events

From the point of view of societal risk major storm events (ie those causing
large numbers of landslides) are most important. Thorough rainfall records at
finer recording intervals than a calendar day have been available in Hong Kong
with a substantial spatial distribution since the 1980s. The major storm events
took place on 28-29 May 1982 (551 reported landslides), 20-21 May 1989 (340
reported landslides), 8 May 1992 (350 reported landslides) and 4-5 November
1993 (377 reported landslides). The numbers of reported landslides are for the
entire Territory of Hong Kong. These storm events also caused large numbers of
landslides on Hong Kong Island, with the exception of the 4-5 November 1993
storm, which was centred on Lantau Island. The 24 hour isohyets for these
storms are shown for the entire Territory of Hong Kong in Figures 8.40 to 8.43.
Entire range
250
•23
200
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STORMS OTHERS
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STORMS OTHERS
outside the storm database SDl.
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Figure 8.40 24 hour isohyets for the 28-29 May 1982 storm (Tang, 1993).
~-·
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t
(.)..)
D) Methods of Analysis and Results

The author used three different methods of analysis to derive models for
predicting the numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island. These were:
1. Using a curve combining all gauges from the storm data.
2. Using 22 individual curves for each rain gauge.
3. Using the curve predicting the numbers of landslides for individual
gauges (section 8.2. 7 .2) extrapolated to Hong Kong Island.
i) A Curve Combining All Rain Gauges from the Storms Data

(Method 1)
In order to produce a single curve for the prediction of number oflandslides
on Hong Kong Island the storm database SD 1 was used to generate database
SD2, which contains the rainfall values and total number of landslides on Hong
Kong Island for each storm event. These values were calculated from the
individual rain gauge values in three different ways; an unweighted mean
Oabelled UW), a mean weighted by the Thiessen polygon area (labelled WA) and
a mean weighted by the number of features near the gauge (labelled WF). Thus
the spatial distribution of rainfall across Hong Kong Island was accounted for to
some extent by the averaging process.
Linear regressions were then used on database SD2 to give initial
indications of variables that are most useful in predicting the number of
landslides on Hong Kong Island. Polynomial (quadratic and cubic) regressions
were then performed using the significant variables indicated by the linear
regressions to improve model fits. The results of the regression analyses are
presented in Table 8.25. Only models through the origin were used as they make
physical sense (zero landslides should be obtained when zero rain falls). From
Table 8.25 one can see that the most significant rainfall variable is H12. The
variable is a short-term rainfall variable, hence antecedent rainfall can be seen
not to be important in this model. MIS, H24 and D30 improved model fits in
some cases. It is clear that the weighting by Thiessen polygons or the numbers of
features per gauge did not improve the linear model fits significantly, especially
when weighting by the number of features near a gauge. Weighting in fact
reduced the model fit for the quadratic and cubic models. Based on these results
the author proceeded with models based on unweighted values.
Linear, quadratic and cubic curves predicting the number of landslides on
Hong Kong Island using the spatially averaged rainfall variable H12 (the most
significant variable) are shown in Figures 8.44 to 8.46 for the appropriate data
range. The two right-most points are the two most severe storms on Hong
Kong Island in the 1984-93 study period; those of 20-21 May 1989 and 8 May
1992. It is clear that the linear model ignores these two extreme points (hence its
poor fit), whereas the quadratic and cubic curves take them into account and
have a good fit. The best statistical fit is obtained by using the cubic curve
(R 20 =0.86).
Table 8.25 Results of regression analyses of database SD2.
Vari- R20
Weight Method abies (Models through origin)
Selected Linear Quadratic Cubic
Enter All 0.35 - -
uw Stepwise H12 0.26 0.73 0.86
Stepwise H12, 030 0.31 - -
Enter All 0.40 - -
H24,
WA Stepwise 0.33 - -
030
Enter H12 0.30 0.65 0.72
Enter All 0.36 - -
M15,
WF Stepwise 0.31 - -
H12
Enter H12 0.27 0.68 0.79
300
250
•
(/)
Q) 200
;g
(/)
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c
..!!! 150
0
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UPPEF 95%
MEAN
-
50
- • -
•
•
.• LOWER~p
0 -;...•.-..!! ., •• •
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H12 (mm)
Figure 8.44 Linear model, R~ =0.26.

300~--------.--------.---------.---------.---------.--------,
250
en
<ll
:g 200
en
"0
c
.!Q
0 150
....
<ll
.0
E
::J
z 100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H12(mm)
Figure 8.45 Quadratic model, R 20 =0.73.
300~--------.--------.---------.---------.---------.~----~
250
en
<ll
:g 200
en
"0
c
.!Q
0 150
....
<ll
.0
E
::J
z 100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H12(mm)
Figure 8.46 Cubic model, R 20 =0.86.

The rainfall values for predicting the numbers of landslides were selected
to be the mean values with a 100 year return period (ie 1 in 100 AEP). The mean
rainfall averages out the spatial and temporal rainfall highs and lows. For the
predictive variable H12 in Method 1, the mean values based on all rain gauges
range from 370 mm to 700 mm (viz Table 8.24). The author also examined the
4-5 November 1993 storm closely, as this storm, centred on Lantau Island, had
the most intense rainfalls for over a decade, and was well instrumented. Lantau
Island has five rain gauges, two operated by the GEO (N17 and N18) and three
by the Royal Observatory (R11, R12 and R33). The author only had access to the
GEO rain gauge N17 and N18 data. The maximum values for these gauges and
their estimatedAEPs based on the author's Hong Kong Island data are shown in
Table 8.26. It can be seen that N17 has AEPs equal to or approaching 1 in 100,
and the maximum value lies between the author's lowest and highest mean
values for 1 in 100 AEP. Hence the author decided to incorporate the 4-5
November 1993 storm centred on Lantau island (hereafter referred to as the
Lantau storm) into his analysis by looking at how many landslides would be
caused if this storm was to be centred on Hong Kong Island instead. A second
reason for incorporating the Lantau storm was that this storm is the worst of the
four recorded major storms (discussed previously in section C) in terms of
having the largest area of the most intense 24 hour rainfall out of the major
storms. In other words, the Lantau storm is the worst experienced so far in
Hong Kong's fairly brief 11 year electronically recorded rainfall history.
The linear, quadratic and cubic curves from Figures 8.44 to 8.46 are
replotted in Figure 8.4 7 for the H 12 range of 0 mm to 800 mm. The range for the
predicted number of landslides (the vertical axis) is 0 to 8,000, but one should
note that the physical limit is 7,452, being the total estimated number of
features on Hong Kong Island (Finlay and Fell, 1995). From Figure 8.4 7 is is
clear that:
o the models will predict well out of the available data range for the 1 in
100 AEP and Lantau storm events,
o the models will predict vastly different landslide numbers as the
shape of the predictive curves is totally governed by the 20-21 May
1989 and 8 May 1992 storm events,
o the cubic model will predict the highest numbers of landslides,
followed by the quadratic model and then the linear model, and
o the cubic model will exceed the physical limit of the number of
features on Hong Kong Island.
Table 8.26 Peak rainfall values recorded during the 4-5 November 1993 storm
on Lantau Island.
Lantau Island Rain Gauge

Variable N17 N18
Value AEP 1 Value AEP1
H3 270mm 1 in 50 195 mm 1 in 20
H12 560mm 1 in 50 to 1 in 100 295 mm < 1 in 20
H24 740mm 1 in 100 330 mm < 1 in 20
015 780mm 1 in 20 340mm « 1 in 20
Notes: 1. For models based on Hong Kong Island data.
The predicted numbers of landslides for the quadratic and cubic models,
together with the lower and upper 95% confidence limits, are shown in Table
8.27. The linear model is not included as it does not fit the data well and ignores
the extreme data points. The main comment arising is that the predicted
numbers oflandslides are totally model-dependent as insufficient major storm
data is available in the 10 year study period to determine the shapes of the
predictive curves for more extreme events. One would of course expect this
situation to improve as the length of detailed records extends with the passage of
time.
It should also be noted that the use of a single H12 value in a curve
combining data from 22 rain gauges implies applying the same rainfall across
the entire area of the island, which of course does not happen in real storms.
Even though the curve does account for the spatial distribution by averaging all
the data, the author still feels that the predicted landslide numbers are an
overestimate of the extent oflandsliding on Hong Kong Island during a 1 in 100
AEP event. The real issue here is: What is a 1 in 100 AEP event for Hong Kong
Island? Instead ofusingwhatis really a 1 in 100 AEP point rainfall value, albeit
spatially averaged, one really needs to have a prediction of a 1 in 100 AEP storm
event, with its actual spatial distribution of rainfall values. Such a prediction
would involve a lengthy and detailed meteorological study, and falls outside the
scope of this thesis. The author has, however, taken the next best step and
transposed the worst recorded storm onto Hong Kong Island. This approach is
Method 2, discussed in the following section ii).
Table 8.27 Predicted numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for a 1 in 100
year AEP event (Method 1).
H12(mm) Quadratic Cubic

model model
LCI 380 1,000
Lowest 1 in 100
370 MEAN 460 1,100
AEP mean value
UCI 540 1,250
Peak Values for LCI 950 4,100
Gauge N17 for the 560 MEAN 1,150 4,800
Lantau Storm UCI 1,300 6,500
LCI 1,500 8,700
Highest 1 in 100
700 MEAN 1,700 10,400
AEP mean value
UCI 2,000 14,900
Notes:

CUBIC
8000 --:~-~--!·
··:··{·+
7000 . .:..~ •. :. •. . ; ..•..•..•. ·······-···· .. : .
..,.. ...... ,- -- -.:--:. -~- -:-- --:--~--=-- .:-- --~-
..:...~--:- : :~:::::~::~: ::t::~::~:1:: ::t:
1000 ..~.; .. ; •• ~ ... ; •• ; .• : .• ~ ... ! .. ~ ..~.; ....

::~:j::!::t:: :j::!::t:~: ::!::~:::---:-
••'••'··' I 0 I 00 I
0
0 100 200 400 500 600 700 800
H12(mm)
Figure 8.47 Prediction curves for number of landslides on Hong Kong Island
(Method 1).
ii) Predicting the Number of Landslides Using 22 Individual Curves

for Each Rain Gauge (Method 2)
The second method of prediction of the number oflandslides on Hong Kong
Island given a rainfall event consisted of building individual models for each rain
gauge, applying the rainfall values, determining the number of landslides
occurring near each gauge and summing these for a total value. This is the next
step of increased sophistication (and complexity) following Method 1, which
carried out the analysis as far as possible without resorting to models for
individual gauges. The first part of Method 2 was to carry out regression
analyses for the individual rain gauges in the storm database SDl. Linear
regressions were first run to indicate the important variables. Once the variable
were identified polynomial (quadratic and cubic) models were fitted to see if an
improved fit resulted. The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table
8.28. Only models through the origin have a physical meaning. From Table 8.28
one can note the following:
o The most frequently selected variable was H12. Others (in order of
decreasing frequency) were H3, H24 and D15.
o The polynomial models generally had a far better fit than linear
models.
o All models for gauges H02, H03, HOB and H15 had a poor fit overall.
Again one notes the inappropriateness and poor fit of the linear model. From
this point on the author proceeded with only the quadratic and cubic models
through the origin. Quadratic and cubic curves were fitted for each gauge based
on the best appropriate rainfall variable for that gauge. An example of such a
curve can be found in Figure 8.49. Using these curves the author calculated the
number oflandslides for each gauge assuming the constant mean 1 in 100 AEP
rainfall for all gauges, as was done in Method 1. The mean rainfall averages out
the spatial and temporal rainfall highs and lows. For the Lantau storm the
maximum values for gauge N17 (listed in Table 8.26) were adopted. The
calculations are shown in Table 8.29. One can note that the calculated values are
generally lower than the corresponding ones for Method 1. One should also note
that the cubic model predicts higher numbers of landslides that the actual
number of features available for failure for gauge H20 (Lantau storm and
highest 1 in 100 AEP mean values) and for gauge H11 (highest 1 in 100 AEP
mean values). A more detailed comparison of results between all three methods
is given further on (section 8.2. 7.4E).
The author desired to properly account for the spatial distribution of
rainfall intensities within a 1 in 100 AEP storm event. To the author's
knowledge the prediction of such storms has not been published for Hong Kong
Island. The author thus used the next best available data - by transposing the
Lantau storm (which can be regarded as approximately a 1 in 100 AEP event,
and also is the heaviest storm recorded since detailed rainfall recording began)
into the "worst" position on Hong Kong Island. The "worst" position would be
one that centres the heaviest intensity rainfall onto the areas having the densest
number of features. The data available to the author were the 24 hour isohyets
(GEO, 1994) and the detailed records for rain gauges N17 and N18. Using this
data the author transposed the Lantau storm (as characterised by the 24 hour
isohyets) onto Hong Kong Island. The transposed 24 hour isohyets are shown in
Figure 8.48. One can see that the very high rainfall intensities were quite
localised.
Table 8.28 Results for Method 2 stepwise linear regression models through the
origin.
·variables R20
Gauge
(in selection order) L a c
H01 H3, M15, 015 0.27 0.79 0.88
H02 H24, H12 0.08 0.09 0.11
H03 H24,H3 0.20 0.30 0.30
H04 H3,M1~H12,H24,015 0.21 0.83 0.93
HOS H12, H3, H24 0.21 0.55 0.61
H06 H12, H3, 015 0.29 0.73 0.86
H07 H3, M15 0.27 0.62 0.69
HOB 015 0.31 0.33 0.34
H09 H3, 030, M15, H1, H3 0.29 0.83 0.89
H10 H12, H3, H24 0.26 0.71 0.81
H11 H12, H3, H24, M15 0.14 0.59 0.80
H12 H12, H3 0.14 0.29 0.46
H13 H12, 015, M15 0.30 0.46 0.46
H14 H3 0.29 0.48 0.50
H15 H24, M15 0.19 0.20 0.20
H16 H12, H3, H24 0.26 0.88 0.95
H17 H3, M15, 030 0.18 0.71 0.91
H18 H12, H3 0.28 0.57 0.67
H19 H12, H3, 015 0.33 0.87 0.91
H20 H12, H3, H24, M15 0.15 0.49 0.59
H21 H24, 030 0.29 0.55 0.56
H22 H3, M15, 015 0.16 0.79 0.94
Notes:
R2o values are for models using the first variable selected.
L Linear model
a Quadratic model
c Cubic model
Table 8.29 Calculation of the number of landslides for individual rain gauges
using fixed variable values across the whole island.
NF Peak Values for Gauge

Lowest value of Highest value of
UE N17 for the Lantau
1 in 100 AEP Means 1 in 100 AEP Means
MA Storm
G
BT H3=270 mm H3=270mm H3=360 mm
A
EU H12=370mm H12=560 mm
u RR
H12=700 mm
G H24=450mm H24=740 mm H24=720 mm
E 015=850 mm 015=780 mm 015=1,250 mm
E
OS
F a c a c a c
No. % No. o/o No. o/o No. % No. % No. OJo
H01 181 23 12.7 35 19.4 23 12.7 22 12.2 43 23.8 95 52.5
H02 277 2 0.7 10 3.6 0 0.0 70 25.3 0 0.0 65 23.5
H03 299 5 1.7 8 2.7 15 5.0 34 11.4 14 4.7 30 10.0
H04 390 17 4.4 25 6.4 17 4.4 16 4.1 31 8.0 66 16.9
H05 519 28 5.4 57 11.0 60 11.6 250 48.2 97 18.7 460 88.7
H06 494 20 4.0 35 7.1 48 9.7 172 34.8 77 15.6 330 66.8
H07 587 17 2.9 27 4.6 17 2.9 18 3.1 32 5.4 74 12.6
HOB 493 3 0.6 6 1.2 2 0.4 4 0.8 7 1.4 16 3.2
H09 274 16 5.8 24 8.8 16 5.8 16 5.8 30 10.9 62 22.6
H10 88 5 5.7 6 6.8 14 15.9 33 37.6 22 25.0 60 68.3
H11 157 10 6.4 20 12.7 25 15.9 105 66.8 40 25.4 205 130.3
H12 449 2 0.4 3 0.7 4 0.9 17 3.8 6 1.3 34 7.6
H13 318 4 1.3 2 0.6 5 1.6 5 1.6 8 2.5 6 1.9
H14 494 10 2.0 20 4.1 10 2.0 19 3.8 17 3.4 49 9.9
H15 632 5 0.8 5 0.8 11 1.7 22 3.5 10 1.6 21 3.3
H16 235 30 12.8 40 17.0 72 30.7 161 68.6 117 49.8 335 142.7
H17 292 37 12.7 75 25.7 37 12.7 75 25.7 70 24.0 212 72.7
H18 203 7 3.5 12 5.9 15 7.4 50 24.7 25 12.3 113 55.8
H19 262 20 7.6 25 9.5 45 17.2 85 32.5 72 27.5 170 64.9
H20 198 35 17.7 92 46.6 90 45.6 380 192.4 140 70.9 800 405.1
H21 327 18 5.5 26 8.0 53 16.2 107 32.7 50 15.3 100 30.6
H22 285 22 7.7 36 12.6 22 7.7 36 12.6 43 15.1 100 35.1
Total 7,452 336 4.5 589 7.9 601 8.1 1,697 22.8 951 12.8 3,403 45.7
Notes:
a Quadratic model
C Cubic model
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0 100 200 300 400 500
H3(mm)
Figure 8.49 Example of a quadratic model curve for the number of landslides
near gauge HOl.
Since some of the models for the prediction of the number of landslides
near individual rain gauges used rainfall variables other than H24 (namely H3,
Hl2 and Dl5), the author correlated these with H24. The longer duration
variables normally contain the shorter duration variables within their range (eg
H24 would include the H3 event), and hence some correlation would be
expected. This is not a difficulty here as the correlations are simply used to
establish a means of converting the H24 values from the transposed Lantau
storm into corresponding model input values. The correlations are plotted in
Figures 8.51 to 8.52 for variables H3, Hl2 and Dl5 respectively, and they are
indeed high.
The number of landslides was then calculated for each gauge using both
the quadratic and cubic models. These landslide numbers for individual rain
gauges were then summed to give the total predicted number of landslides on
Hong Kong Island. The calculations are presented in Table 8.30. From Table
8.30 one can see that the calculated number oflandslides are about half of those
calculated when the maximum rainfall values were assumed constant across the
entire island. This is the effect of the spatial distribution of rainfall within a
major storm event. A detailed comparison of results between all three methods
is given in the next section.
_500+---------~----------~--~~--~+---~----~----------~
E
E
~ 400+---------~~------~~--~--~~+----------4----------~
100
0 100 200 300 400 500

H3(mm)
Figure 8.50 Correlation between H3 and H24, R 20 =0. 78.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

H12 (mm)
Figure 8.51 Correlation between H12 and H24, R 20 =0.93.

400+-------~----~------_,-------+--~~-+-----=~------~
"'~"
~
300+-------~~~wyr-----~~~~-+~~---+----~~------~
100
200 400 600 BOO 1000 1200 1400

015 {mm)
Figure 8.52 Correlation between D15 and H24, R 20 =0.72.
iii) Using the Curve Predicting the Numbers of Landslides for

Individual Gauges (section 8.2. 7.2) Extrapolated to Hong Kong
Island (Method 3)
The third method used by the author was to take the curves for predicting
the number of landslides near an individual rain gauge, and by using a single
rainfall variable fixed across the entire island predicting the number of
landslides across the entire island. This is in effect an extrapolation of the curve,
and provides another set of predicted landslide numbers for comparison with
Methods 1 and 2. The quadratic curve in Figure 8.45 and the cubic curve in
Figure 8.46 were used for the prediction in this method. The predictive rainfall
variable for these curves is H3. The predictions were carried out for the mean,
lower and upper 95% values for the lowest and highest 1 in 100 AEP H3 values,
and for the maximum Lantau storm values for H3. The mean rainfall averages
out the spatial and temporal rainfall highs and lows. The results of the
prediction are tabulated in Table 8.31. They are lower than those obtained by
Method 1. The comparison of the results for all three methods follows.
Table 8.30 Calculation of landslides on Hong Kong Island from individual rain
gauge models.
NUM- NUMBER OF SLIDES

VARI-
BER H24 MODEL
ABLE QUADRATIC CUBIC
GAUGE OF VALUE VARI- MODEL
VALUE MODEL
FEA- (mm) ABLE
TURES
(mm) No. 0
/o No. 0
/o
H01 181 500 H3 220 15 8.3 17 9.4
H02* 277 600 H24 600 o· o.o· 32. 11.6.
H03* 299 500 H24 500 7" 2.3· 1o· 3.3·
H04 390 700 H3 320 24 6.2 45 11.5
H05 519 500 H12 380 26 5.0 60 11.6
H06 494 600 H12 460 33 6.7 80 16.2
H07 587 600 H3 270 17 2.9 28 4.8
1060 s· 1.0· 9
. 1.8·
HOB* 493 500 015
H09 274 400 H3 180 6 2.2 6 2.2
H10 88 700 H12 530 12 13.7 23 26.2
H11 157 700 H12 530 22 14.0 75 47.7
H12* 449 700 H12 530 3. of 12. 2f
H13 318 700 H12 530 6 1.9 4 1.3

H14 494 400 H3 180 4 0.8 5 1.0
H15* 632 300 H24 300 3. o.s· .
3 o.s·
H16 235 600 H12 460 46 19.6 82 34.9
H17 292 700 H3 320 52 17.8 140 48.0
H18 203 400 H12 300 5 2.5 5 2.5
H19 262 400 H12 300 10 3.8 12 4.6
H20 198 500 H12 380 40 20.3 100 50.6
H21 327 400 H24 400 15 4.6 18 5.5
H22 285 700 H3 320 32 11.2 65 22.8
TOTAL 7452 TOTAL 383 5.1 831 11.2
*denotes model of poor fit (R20 <0.4)

Table 8.31 Predicted numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for a 1 in 100
year AEP event (Method 3).
Quadratic Cubic
H3(mm)
model model
LCI 190 280
Lowest
1 in 100 270 MEAN 320 520
AEP Mean UCI 420 780
Maximum LCI 210 310
Values for
Gauge N17 300 MEAN 350 720
for the Lan-
tau Storm UCI 490 1130
LCI 250 390
Highest
1 in 100 360 MEAN 460 1200
AEP Mean UCI 660 2000
Notes:

E) Comparison of Results
The mean values predicted by all three models as well as those for the
Lantau storm are compared in Table 8.32. The numbers of landslides as well as
their percentage of the total number of features on Hong Kong Island are given.
The following points arise:
o The cubic models predict about twice as many landslides as the
corresponding quadratic models.
o The predicted numbers for the highest 1 in 100 AEP mean rainfall
values (applied as constant across the entire island) are two to three
times higher than the corresponding numbers for the same models
for the lowest 1 in 100 AEP mean rainfall values. The mean rainfall
averages out the spatial and temporal rainfall highs and lows.
o The predicted numbers for the maximum Lantau storm rainfall
values (applied as constant across the entire island) are between
those predicted by the lowest and highest 1 in 100 AEP mean rainfall
values.
o Method 1 predicts the highest number of landslides in all cases,
followed by Method 2, and then Method 3.
o When the actual spatial distribution of rainfall in the Lantau storm is
applied using Method 2, the predicted number oflandslides is reduced
by about a half of that predicted when the maximum rainfall value is

applied as constant across the entire island.
Method 2 is the only method in which the actual spatial distribution of rainfall
values can be incorporated.
It is clear that when rainfall values are applied uniformly across all rain
gauges on Hong Kong Island, the total number oflandslides is overestimated by
all three methods, even though Methods 1 and 3 take some account of spatial
factors by averaging the values. Thus the spatial averaging, although a common
technique (Haan, 1977), is insufficient to fully eliminate the overestimation of
the predicted number of landslides. The numbers of landslides could be
overestimated by a factor of two or more. The author concludes that the best
prediction of the number oflandslides on Hong Kong Island from a 1 in 100 AEP
storm event is obtained by transposing the Lantau storm (an approximate 1 in
100 AEP storm event) onto the worst position on Hong Kong Island, and
calculating the number ·of landslides near individual rain gauges (ie using
Method 2) with the actual spatial storm rainfall distribution. The predicted
number of failures obtained using this approach is between 5-11% of the total
number of features (about 370 to 820 landslides). This range is certainly larger
than the recorded numbers oflandslides on Hong Kong Island from major storm
events since the systematic recording oflandslides commenced in 1984 (239 on 8
May 1992).
Table 8.32 Calculated numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for 1 in 100
AEP and 4-5 November 1993 Lantau island storm events.
METHOD 1 METHOD2 METHOD3

CALCULATION
POINTS Quadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
model model model model model model
Lowest No 460 1,100 336 589 320 520
1 in 100 AEP
Mean % 6.2 14.8 4.5 7.9 4.3 7.0
Maximum
Values for Gauge No 1,150 4,800 601 1,697 350 720
N17 for the Lan- % 15.4 64.4 8.1 22.8 4.7 9.7
tau Storm
Incorporating
actual 383 831 No
spatial distribution 5.1 11.2 o;o
of the Lantau storm
Highest No 1,700 10,400 951 3,403 460 1,200
1 in 100 AEP
Mean % 22.8 137.8 12.8 45.1 6.2 16.1
8.3.1 Conclusions
In the study of rainfall and landsliding the author has reviewed the
world -wide literature, and extensively studied the relationship between
rainfall and landsliding in Hong Kong. The following conclusions for each study
component are drawn from this work.
8.3.1.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding
The identification of rainfall thresholds used rainfall data for isolated

landslide events. The author's recommended thresholds for rainfall causing
landsliding at individual sites in Hong Kong are given in Table 8.18. When not
all the rainfall variable values (on a rolling basis) are exceeded, landsliding at
individual sites is very unlikely to occur due to rainfall. When all the rainfall
values fall in the range of values indicated, individual landslides are likely to
occur. When all the upper values are exceeded, landslides are almost certain to
occur. Even though the best percentage obtained for "Correct Warning" using
the author's recommended threshold values is only 35%, this result is consistent
with the results of the prediction of numbers of landslides at individual rain
gauges where the proportion of total data variance explained by the best fitting
models is also of the order of 30%-38%.
The Hl threshold value of 8-17 mm/hr is significantly lower than the
70 mm/hr value noted by Brand (1984) and Premchitt et al (1994). The H24
values of 70-90 mm is also below the 100 mm threshold quoted by these
authors as "unlikely to cause major landslide incidents". However, the
8-17 mm Hl value applies to an individual landslide near a particular rain
gauge, which can be caused by a localised, fairly low intensity rainfall event.
Hence, even though the upper 17 mm/hr value is exceeded near a particular rain
gauge the total number oflandslides over the entire Territory of Hong Kong may
be low. The exceedance of the 70 mm Hl value at any gauge is far more likely to
indicate a rainstorm affecting several of the rain gauges at once, leading to a
larger number of landslides. The spatial distribution of rainfall, as well as its
intensity, is important in determining the number of landslides occurring. The
H24 range of values in Table 8.18 of 70-90 mm is certainly lower than the
150mm value found by Crozier (1986) required to trigger "significant" failures
in cut and fill slopes in Wellington, New Zealand. Crozier's 150 mm value for
H24 for cuts and fills is also lower than his range of 200-250 mm for natural
slope failures for the same area.
The author also compared the available Hong Kong data for various small
and large storm events to the threshold suggested by Caine (1980) for shallow
landslides and debris flows by producing an intensity-duration plot. There is a
large data scatter and also overlap between the null events and the events
causing landsliding. No obvious pattern or trend between the rainfall events
causing a higher proportion of slope failures and those causing a lower
proportion, appears to exist. Given the nature of the data, one would also expect
a poor prediction from any model fitted to it. Indeed, most of the points are above
Caine's (1980) threshold line, including most of the ones with no recorded
failures. The band representing the author's threshold values showed a trend
similar to Caine's (1980) threshold line. The position of the author's threshold
value band relative to the data points shows also a fairly poor capacity to
separate null events from those causing landslides of these threshold values.
This is not unexpected given the low 35% correct prediction rate found in the
analysis.
8.3.1.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain Gauge

The study looked at relationships between the proportion of failed features
in an area experiencing a rainfall event described by the rainfall variables M15,
Hl, H3, H12, H24, D3, D7, D15 and D30. The results indicated that the
variables H3 and H12 were the variable best explaining most of the data
variance. The results indicate the importance of shorter duration rainfalls in
the range of one hour to twelve hours, which is consistent with the current basis
for the rainfall warning system (Premchitt, 1985a and 1985b).
A series of polynomial curve fittings showed that quadratic and cubic
curves yield improved fit compared to linear models, as well as showing a
non -linear increase in the number oflandslides with increasing rainfall. From
these curves the author has selected the cubic curve model with outliers through
the origin for the prediction of landslides near a particular rain gauge in Hong
Kong, as the curve has the best statistical fit.
8.3.1.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes

The author investigated methods and models for predicting point rainfall
extremes on Hong Kong Island. The most statistically appropriate Pearson
models suggested by indices were Pearson curves of Type I, II or sometimes rv,
which are not commonly used for the analyses of rainfall maxima (Haan, 1977;
Water Resources Commission, 1976). The author investigated the data fit to the
models commonly used for rainfall extremes (Gumbel Types I and III, and
Pearson III and log Pearson III curves). Each model was fitted to the unweighted
data. In addition models weighted by the Thiessen polygon area and by the
number of features nearest to the gauge were also fitted. The results showed
that the Gumbel and Pearson models have similar levels of good fit across all
cases. and the weighted model fits are only slightly better than the unweighted
model fits.
Based on these results the author selected the Gumbel Type III and the log
Pearson III models as the best models for the calculation of rainfall variables for
low annual exceedance probabilities. The return periods selected by the author
were 20, 50 and 100 years. The lower and upper 95% confidence limit values as
well as mean values were calculated for these return periods. The author's
predicted values are not vastly different from those found by Peart (1993) for
return periods of20, 50 and 100 years. The predicted values are sensitive to the
type of model used. The author recommends comparison of values from both
models when predicting rainfall extremes in Hong Kong, but more study on this
aspect is needed.
8.3.1.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding
Three different methods of analysis were used to derive models for

predicting the numbers oflandslides on Hong Kong Island. These were a curve
combining all gauges from the storm data (Method 1), using 22 individual curves
for each rain gauge (Method 2), and using the curve predicting the numbers of
landslides for individual gauges extrapolated to Hong Kong Island (Method 3).
In Method 1, a database containing the rainfall values and total number of
landslides on Hong Kong Island for each storm event was generated in order to
produce a single curve for the prediction of number oflandslides on Hong Kong
Island. The spatial distribution of rainfall across Hong Kong Island was
accounted for by averaging. Quadratic and cubic regressions were then
performed using the significant variables indicated by the linear regressions to
improve model fits. The most significant rainfall variable isH12, but M 15, H24
and D30 also improved model fits in some cases. Weighting did not improve the
linear model fits significantly. Thus models based on unweighted values were
used. The predicted numbers of landslides for the quadratic and cubic models,
together with the lower and upper 95% confidence limits, are shown in Table
8.27. The predicted numbers are model- dependent as insufficient major storm
data is available in the 10 year study period to determine the shapes of the
predictive curves for more extreme events.
Island given a rainfall event consisted ofbuilding individual models for each rain
occurring near each gauge and summing these for a total value. Quadratic and
cubic curves were fitted for each gauge based on the best appropriate rainfall
variable for that gauge. Using these curves the author calculated the number of
landslides for each gauge assuming a constant mean 1 in 100 AEP rainfall value
for all gauges, and also using the maximum values for gauge N17 for the Lantau
storm. The calculated values are generally lower than the corresponding ones
for Method 1. In order to properly account for the spatial distribution of rainfall
intensities within a 1 in 100 AEP storm event, the Lantau storm (which can be
regarded as approximately a 1 in 100 AEP event) into the "worst" position on
Hong Kong Island. The "worst" position is one centring the heaviest intensity
rainfall onto the areas with the densest number of features. The number of
landslides was calculated for each gauge using both the quadratic and cubic
models, and these were summed to give the total predicted number oflandslides
on Hong Kong Island. The calculated number oflandslides is about half of those
calculated when the maximum rainfall values were assumed constant across the
entire island. This is because of the effect of the spatial distribution of rainfall
within a major storm event.
The third method took the curves for predicting the number of landslides
near an individual rain gauge and used a single rainfall variable fixed across the
entire island to predicting the number of landslides. The quadratic curve in
Figure 8.45 and the cubic curve in Figure 8.46 were used for the prediction in
this method. The predictive rainfall variable was H3. The predictions are lower
than those obtained by Method 1.
Comparing the mean values predicted by all three models has shown that
the cubic models predict about twice as many landslides as the corresponding
quadratic models. Method 1 predicts the highest number of landslides in all
cases, followed by Method 2, and then Method 3. The predicted numbers for the
highest 1 in 100 AEP mean rainfall values (applied as constant across the entire
island) are two to three times higher than the corresponding numbers for the
same models for the lowest 1 in 100 AEP mean rainfall values. The predicted
numbers for the maximum Lantau storm rainfall values (applied as constant
across the entire island) are between those predicted by the lowest and highest 1
in 100 AEP mean rainfall values. When the actual spatial distribution of rainfall
in the Lantau storm is applied using Method 2, the predicted number of
landslides is reduced by about a half of that predicted when the maximum
rainfall value is applied as constant across the entire island.
Spatial averaging is thus insufficient to fully eliminate the overestimation
of the predicted number of landslides when a constant mean rainfall value is
applied over an area. The numbers of landslides could be overestimated by a
factor of two or more. The author concludes that the best method for the
prediction of the number oflandslides on Hong Kong Island from a 1 in 100 AEP
storm event is obtained by transposing an approximate 1 in 100 AEP storm
event onto the worst position on Hong Kong Island, and calculating the number
of landslides near individual rain gauges using the actual spatial storm rainfall
distribution. The predicted number of failures obtained using this approach is
between 5-11% of the total number of features (about 370 to 820 landslides),
which is more than the maximum of 239 landslides recorded in 8 May 1992 since
the systematic recording of landslides commenced in 1984.
A number of recommendations are drawn from the author's work on

rainfall and landsliding. These are divided into recommendations for future
research, and recommendations for landslide risk management systems.
Following the author's research the author recommends that the following
areas of rainfall and landsliding be further investigated:
o Investigation of the inclusion of other variables such as slope,
material strengths, and so on, as well as rainfall in spatial models
predicting the numbers of landslides, in order to improve and refine
such models.
o More research is required in the meteorological arena in order to
better define quantify extreme storm events in spatial terms. The
prediction of extreme storm events in spatial terms could then feed
into spatial models predicting the numbers of landslides, and hence
the calculation of societal landslide risks.
o Development and/or investigation of the best spatial and temporal
models for linking rainfall, possibly other variables and landsliding.
The recommended research would significantly improve the quantified
prediction of landslide risk, notably in spatial terms, and hence provide
important inputs for societal risk and into the entire landslide risk management
system.
but based on insights gained from the author's study of rainfall and landsliding,
the following recommendations for landslide risk management systems are
made:
o That detailed rainfall data is collected for all significant landslides, at
continuous intervals not exceeding 15 minutes in length.
o That detailed individual landslide spatial location data is collected
and entered onto a spatial computer system (ega GIS system).
o That detailed individual landslide temporal (ie time and date of

failure) data is collected.
o That detailed spatial storm data is collected for major storm events at
the same accuracy as that for individual landslides, and entered onto
a spatial computer system.
The author feels that the implementation of the above recommendations will
not only help build databases for future research on rainfall and landsliding, but
also greatly contribute to the entire process of landslide risk management.
THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF SLOPES
by
Peter J. Finlay B.E. (Civil) Hons
A thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Volu1ne 2
UNIVERSITY OF NSW
SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
1996
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or
written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been
accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other
institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the
text.
Peter J. Finlay
The Risk Assessment of Slopes II
ABSTRACT
A landslide risk assessment framework is developed for Hong Kong using

base landslide statistics of over 3,000 landslides spanning a 10 year period. A
method of assessing the probability of failure of an individual slope is developed
using these, and accounting for other factors. Statistical models are developed
for predicting runout distance onto near horizontal slopes from landslides in
man-modified slopes in Hong Kong, based on over 1,100 landslide records.
These can be utilised elsewhere in similar situations. The vulnerability of
persons, vehicles and buildings is analysed. A person is found to be very
vulnerable in the event of burial by landslide debris. Recommended
vulnerability values for persons in various landslide situations are given.
A study of rainfall and landsliding using five minute rainfall records for all
rainfall gauges in Hong Kong over a ten year period is presented. Analysis of
data gives threshold rainfall values causing landsliding. The results indicate
that rainfall of shorter duration than the traditional one day rainfall is
important, and antecedent rainfall also has some influence. Models predicting
the number of landslides near a specific rain gauge are developed, and extreme
rainfall recurrence intervals and distributions are examined. These are utilised
in the prediction ofthe number of landslides caused by an extreme storm event
over a substantial area covered by a number of rain gauges. Thus the number of
landslides can be approximately predicted using only rainfall data.
A study of landslide risk perception for ten groups of respondents in
Australia and Hong Kong is presented. Data is gained on general views of
landsliding, cognitive structure of perception of selected hazards, and
quantitative results of acceptable landslide risk to life and property. Landsliding
is viewed as an involuntary hazard, with respondents requiring a very low
acceptable landslide risk of about 10- 5 to 10- 6 per annum.
The approaches used in assessing landslide probability utilising historic
data, linking rainfall and landsliding, assessing the vulnerability of persons and
property from landslide records, and surveying landslide risk perception and
acceptance are applicable in any area of the world where landslides are, or can
be, recorded.
The Risk Assessment of Slopes Ill
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is indebted to his supervisor, Professor Robin Fell, for his
invaluable guidance on research and technical matters, many stimulating
discussions, and provision of challenging research areas and issues. Mr Garry
Mostyn co-supervised the author's work with helpful reviews and comments.
The author was financially supported in his studies through a scholarship,
the Australian Postgraduate Award, awarded by the University of NSW The
author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of Lillydale Shire,
Melbourne, Australia, in carrying out landslide risk perception and risk
assessment research in its jurisdiction. The Geotechnical Engineering Office of
the Hong Kong Government generously sponsored the landslide risk
assessment work in Hong Kong, and provided numerous valuable databases for
analysis.
The assistance of Mr P. K. Maguire in the extraction and manipulation of
the Hong Kong rainfall data is acknowledged. The Hong Kong CHASE data was
redigitised by Messrs P. K. Maguire, L. O'Keefe and P. Gwynne. The advice of Dr
Adams from the School of Psychology during the development of the landslide
risk perception questionnaire was helpful, as were the comments received from
Drs G. Syme and B. Bishop, psychologists with the CSIRO. Thanks goes also to
Mr P. Taylor for his proof -reading of the entire thesis.
Finally the author gratefully acknowledges the great support and healing
presence of his wife and friends, who encouraged him and enabled him to
complete his work in spite of the many resource, support, system and attitude
difficulties encountered.
Peter Jo Finlay, PhD (UNSW)
The Risk Assessment of Slopes iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ABSTRACT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 m
TABLE OF CONTENTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1v
LIST OF TABLES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xv
LIST OF FIGURES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xxv
LIST OF SYMBOLS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xxxv
Latin Symbols 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xxxv
Greek Symbols 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xl
Abbreviations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 xli
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background to Research 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1.3 Objectives and Research Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1.4 Layout of Thesis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
201 General Risk Literature Review 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Introduction to Risk
2.1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 5
Overview of Definitions Used

201.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
United Nations
2ol.2o1 (1991) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
The Royal Society

201.202 (1992) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk

2010203
Management 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Canadian Risk Analysis Requirements and

201.2.4
Guidelines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
The NSW Department of Planning Hazardous Industry

201.205
Planning Advisory Paper No 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Definitions Related to Finance

201.206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 11
Definitions Used by Scientists and Engineers

201.207 0 0 0 0 0 12
Social Scientists Definitions

201.208 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Risk Management Systems

201.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Introduction
201.301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Main Issues and Approaches

201.3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Risk Management in the Chemical and Nuclear

2.1.3.3
Industries 0 0. 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 •• 0 •••••• 0...... • • • • 16
The Value of Risk Management Systems

2.1.3.4 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 18
Limitations and Criticisms

2.1.3.5 0 0 •••• 0 •• 0 0 • 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 0 0 20
Hazard Identification and Assessment

2.1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 21
Hazard Identification
2.1.4.1 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 0 ••• 0 21
Assessment of Hazard Magnitude

2.1.4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 21
Assessment of the Probability of Hazard

2.1.4.3
Occurrence . 0 • 0 0 0 ••• 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 ••• 0 • 22
Risk Assessment
2.1.5 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0. 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 30
Measures of Risk ..
2.1.5.1 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 ••••• 0 0 0. 30
Vulnerability of Elements at Risk

2.1.5.2 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 33
Peter Jo Finlay, PhD (UNSW)
The Risk Assessment of Slopes v
201.503 Methods of Risk Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33

201.6 Risk Evaluation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
201.7 Decision Making and Risk Communication 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
201.701 Risk-Based Decision Making and Decision
Analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
2.1.702 Risk Communication 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34
201.8 Summary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
202 Risk Management Systems in Geotechnical Engineering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
2.201 General Publications Dealing with Geotechnical Risk 0 0 0 0 0 36
2.2.2 Risk Assessment of Landslides 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
202.2.1 General Landslide Texts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
202.2.2 Definitions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
2020203 Methods of Landslide Hazard Identification and
Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
202.2.4 Landslide Risk Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
2020205 Landslide Risk Evaluation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53
2.2.3 Risk Assessment of Dams 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54
202.301 Definitions of Terms Used in Dam Risk Assessment 54
2.2.302 Dam Hazard Identification, Assessment and Risk
Assessment 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 •• 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
Disposal Sites 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58
2.205 Summary 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59
203 Concluding Remarks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60
3 FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSLIDE RISK MANAGEMENT . . 61

301 Introduction 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61
3.2 A Generic Landslide Risk Management Framework 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61
303 A Generic Framework for Landslide Risk Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 63
3.3.1 Element at Risk (E) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 63
30302 Magnitude (M) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ••• 0 . 0 63
3.3.3 Hazard (H) 0 0 0 0 . 0 •. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
303.4 Probability (P) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
3.305 Vulnerability (V) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
3.306 Specific Risk (R8 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
3.3. 7 Total Risk CRt) .. 0 •• 0. 0 0 0 0 0 •.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0. 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 . 64
303.8 Acceptable Risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 64
303.801 Socially Acceptable Risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
3.30802 Individual Risk Criterion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
3.3.8.3 Societal Risk Criterion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
3.4 A Landslide Risk Assessment Framework for Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
3.4.1 Assessment of Risk from Individual Slopes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 65
3.401.1 Assessment of Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 65
3.4.1.2 Assessment of Vulnerability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67
3.401.3 Assessment of Risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
3.4.2 Assessment of Risk for a Large Area 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 68
The Risk Assessment of Slopes vi
4 DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS . . . . . . . 69

4.1 The Hong Kong Landslide Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.1 Background and Initial Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.2 Study Objectives and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.2.1 Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.2.2 Available Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 The Lillydale Shire (Melbourne) Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1.1 The Setting of Lillydale Shire, Melbourne . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1.2 Landslide Hazard Zoning in Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . 82
4.2.1.3 The Montrose Debris Flow Hazard Zoning Study . . 83
4.2.1.4 The Public Awareness Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.1.5 Development Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.3 Method of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3.1 Montrose Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3.2 Kalorama Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 The Study of Landslide Risk Perception in Australia and
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.3 Development of the Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.4 The Structure of the Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.4.1 Qualitative Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.4.2 Quantitative Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.5 The Lillydale Shire Risk Perception Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.5.1 History of the Study.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.5.2 Description of the Groups of Respondents . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.6 Survey of Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department's Staff 104
4.3. 7 Method of Questionnaire Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3.8 Survey Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.9 Summary of Survey Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.10 Method of Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5 PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

5.1 Detailed Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.2 Probabilistic Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.1 Overview Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.2 Concepts in Probabilistic Slope Design . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.2.3 Factors Affecting the Probability of Failure . . . . . . . 115
5.1.2.4 Probabilistic Modelling of Soil Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.1.2.5 Methods of Probabilistic Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 123
Slope Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.1.3 Rainfall and the Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
The Risk Assessment of Slopes Vll
5.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

5.2 Statistics of Landsliding in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2.1 The Total Number of Slopes in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.3.1 Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.3.2 Probability of Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3 Review of Hong Kong Databases and Earlier Studies for Information
to Assist in the Assessment of Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3.1 Analysis of the CHASE Cut Slope Data.................. 142
5.3.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3.1.2 Background of the CHASE Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3.1.3 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1.4 DA and Its Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1.5 1981-82 Analyses of the CHASE Data . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.3.1.6 The Author's DA Analyses of the CHASE Data . . . . 14 7
5.3.1.7 DA Application Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.2 Effect of Geology and Geomorphology on
Landslide Incidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.2.1 Geology (Table 5.10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.2.2 Terrain Code (Table 5.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2.3 Slope Gradient (Table 5.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2.4 GLUM Classification (Table 5.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.3 Review of Major Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3.3.1 Discussion of Factors Causing Landslides . . . . . . . . . 173
5.3.3.2 Discussion of Runout, Damage and Loss of Life . . . 174
5.3.4 Stage 1 Reports and the Ranking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.3.5 Registered Slope Stage 1 Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.3.5.1 Review of Registered Slope Stage 1 Study
Outcomes and Slope Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.3.5.2 Review of Registered Slope Incidence, Consequence
Scores Versus Slope Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.3.6 Survey of GEO Senior Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.4 Proposed Method of Calculating the Probability of Failure for Hong
Kong Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.4.1 Method Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.4.2 Calculation of Individual Cut Slope Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.4.2.1 Estimation of F'c for Cut Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.4.2.2 Estimation of F"c for Cut Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.4.3 Example of Risk Calculation for a Cut Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4.4 Calculation of Individual Retaining Wall Factors . . . . . . . . . 205
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4.4.2 Estimation of F'w for Retaining Walls . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.4.4.3 Estimation of F"w for Retaining Walls . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
5.4.5 Example of Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall......... 210
5.4.6 Calculation of Individual Fill Slope Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
The Risk Assessment of Slopes viii
5.4.6.2 Estimation ofF( for fill slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

5.4.6.3 Estimation of F"r for Fill Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.4. 7 Example of Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Geomorphology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1 Geomorphological Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.1 Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.2 Geomorphology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.5.1.3 Water Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.1.4 Sink Holes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.1.5 Slide Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.2 Historical Record of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
5.5.3 Description of Sub-Zoning Areas....................... 221
5.5.4 Calculation of Landslide Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
5.5.5 Comparison of Calculated Probabilities With the System
Proposed by Fell et al (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
5.6.1 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.6.1.2 Probability of Slope Failure in Kalorama,
Lillydale Shire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
6 VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

6.1 Review of Literature on Landslide Movement and Runout . . . . . . . . 235
6.1.1 Types of Landslide Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
6.1.2 Landslide Movement Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.1.2.1 Single Body Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.1.2.2 Continuum Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.1.2.3 Discreet Element Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
6.1.2.4 Mud Flow and Debris Flow Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
6.1.2.5 Rock Avalanches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.1.2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.1.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7
6.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.2.2 Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.2.3 Establishment of the Landslide Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.1 Data Sources and Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.2 Database Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3.3 Classification into Different Situations or Scenarios 258
6.2.3.4 Accuracy of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4 Analyses and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4.1 Overview of Landslide Database Statistics . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.4.2 F=HIL Versus V Plots for Hong Kong and
Comparison to Other Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6.2.4.5 Application of the Simple Sled Model to
Cut Slope Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
The Risk Assessment of Slopes ix
6.2.4.6
Runout Distance Prediction for Hong Kong Slopes
Using Multiple Regression Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
6.3 Vulnerability of Persons And Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.2 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
6.3.3.1 Well Documented Multiple Fatality Landslides . . . . 297
6.3.3.2 Single Fatality Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
6.3.3.4 Summary and Recommended Vulnerability Values
for Loss of Life in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.4 Vulnerability of Property In Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.4.1 Data Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.3.5 Vulnerability of Persons and Property in Lillydale Shire . . 320
6.4 Assessment of Temporal Probability vt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
6.4.1 Simple Risk Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
6.4.2 Consequential Risk Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
6.5.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.5.1.1 Literature Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.5.1.4 Temporal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
7 CALCULATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK ................... . 332

7.1 Introduction ................................................ . 332
7.2 Risk Assessments of Areas in Melbourne's Lillydale Shire ....... . 332
7.2.1 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Montrose Study Area .. . 332
7.2.1.1 Loss of Property Risk Assessment .............. . 332
7.2.1.2 Loss of Life Risk Assessment ................... . 333
7.2.1.3 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Montrose ... . 337
7.2.2 Landslide Risk Assessment of the Kalorama Study Area .. 340
7.2.2.1 Vulnerabilities ................................ . 341
7.2.2.2 Calculation of Total Risk Rt to Buildings ........ . 341
7.2.2.3 Notes on Loss of Life Risk ..................... . 343
7.2.2.4 The Economics of Risk Reduction in Kalorama ... . 343
7.3 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire Due To Landsliding .. 343
7.3.1 Introduction ......................................... . 343
7 .3.2 Loss of Real Estate Value Due to Specific Landslide
Situations ........................................... . 344
7.3.2.1 Situation 1 ................................... . 344
7.3.2.2 Situation 2 345
7.3.2.3 Situation 3 346
7.3.2.4 Situation 4 347
7.3.2.5 Situation 5 348
7.3.2.6 Situation 6 349
The Risk Assessment of Slopes X
7 .3.3General Effect of Landslide Zoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

7.3.4 Effects of Landslide Debris Flow Zoning on House Values . 350
7.3.5 How Long the Loss of Real Estate Value Remains . . . . . . . . 350
With Ordinary Repair/Construction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
7.3. 7 At What Level of Landslide Damage a House Would
Have To Be Condemned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
7.3.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
7.4 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
7.4.1 Example of Calculation of Annual Fatality Risk for
a Cut Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
7.4.1.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
7.4.1.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Pre . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
7.4.1.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V for a Pedestrian . . . . 354
7.4.1.4 Calculation of Annual Specific Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
7.4.1.5 Discussion on Individual Risks to Life . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
7.4.1.6 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
7.4.2 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Retaining Wall . . . . . . . 357
7.4.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7
7.4.2.2 Calculation of failure probability Prw . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
7 .4.2.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V for a Pedestrian . . . . 358
7.4.2.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
7.4.2.5 Discussion on Individual Risk to Life and
Societal Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
7.4.2.6 Other Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
7 .4.3 Example of a Risk Calculation for a Fill Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
7.4.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
7.4.3.2 Calculation of Failure Probability Prr . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
7.4.3.3 Assessment of Vulnerability V of a Pedestrian . . . . . 360
7.4.3.4 Calculation of Individual Risk to Life . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
7.4.3.5 Calculation of Societal Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
7.4.3.6 Other Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
7.4.4 Comments on Calculated Risks to Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
7.5.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
7.5.1.2 Loss Of Real Estate Value in Lillydale Shire
Due To Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
7.5.1.3 Examples of Risk Calculations in Hong Kong . . . . . 365
LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
8.1 Detailed Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Flow................................................. 367
8.1.2 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . 369
8.1.2.1 Rainfall and Landslides in Natural Slopes . . . . . . . . 369
8.1.2.2 Rainfall and Landslides in Man-Modified Slopes . 376
8.1.2.3 Rainfall-Landslide Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xi
8.1.3 Statistical Analysis of Rainfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

8.1.3.1 Frequency Analysis of Extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
8.1.3.2 Fitting Frequency Curves to Extreme Rainfall Data 386
8.1.3.3 Appropriate Frequency Curves for Rainfall
Extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7
8.1.3.4 Regional or Spatial Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . 390
8.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
8.2 The Study of Rainfall and Landsliding in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . 391
8.2.1 Introduction and Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
8.2.2 Extraction of Raw Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
8.2.2.1 Rainfall Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
8.2.2.2 Landslide Incident Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
8.2.3 Definition of Study Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.3.1 Spatial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.3.2 Temporal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.2.4 Selection of Rainfall Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.1 Establishment of Landslide Incident Database With
Date and Nearest Rain Gauge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.2 Calculation of Rainfall Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
8.2.5.3 Definition and Calculation of Rainfall Events . . . . . 401
Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
8.2. 7 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
8.2. 7.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding
(Component 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
8.2. 7.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain
Gauge
(Study Component 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
8.2. 7.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . . 417
8.2. 7.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding . . . . . 437
8.3.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
8.3.1.1 Rainfall Thresholds Causing Landsliding . . . . . . . . . 460
8.3.1.2 Prediction of Number of Landslides at a Specific Rain
Gauge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
8.3.1.3 Spatial Statistical Analysis of Rainfall Extremes . . 461
8.3.1.4 Spatial Statistics of Rainfall and Landsliding . . . . . 462

(THE EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
9.1 Detailed Literature Review.................................... 466
9.1.1 General Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
9.1.1.1 Institutional Approaches to Acceptable Risk . . . . . . 466
9.1.1.2 Institutional Guidelines to Acceptable Risk . . . . . . . 469
9.1.1.3 Comparisons of Risk Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 71
9.1.2 Historical Landslide Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xii
9.1.2.1 World-Wide Landslide Losses................... 481

9.1.2.2 Average Annual Landslide Death Rates . . . . . . . . . . 491
9.1.2.3 Major Landslide Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
9.1.2.4 Consequences of Landslide Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
9.1.3 Legal Implications of Landslides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
9.1.3.1 Legal Implications of Landslide Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . 497
9.1.3.2 Legal Implications of Landslide Damages . . . . . . . . . 499
9.1.4 The Psychology of Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
9.1.4.1 Introduction...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
9.1.4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
9.1.4.3 Risks People are Concerned About . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
9.1.4.4 Revealed and Expressed Acceptable Risks . . . . . . . . 504
9.1.4.5 Investigation of the Cognitive Structure of Risk
Perception Using Factor Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
9.1.4.6 Social and Cultural Approaches to Risk Perception 509
9.1.4. 7 The Role of Accidents and Disasters in Amplifying Risk
Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
9.1.4.8 Acceptability of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
9.1.4.9 Risk Perception by Civil Engineers in Australia . . . 514
9.1.4.10 Risk Perception of Dam Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
9.1.5 Literature Review Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2 Survey of Landslide Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.1 Context of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.2 Description of Methods and Target Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
9.2.3 Results and Discussion of Frequency Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . 519
9.2.3.1 General Views of and Concerns with Landsliding.. 519
9.2.3.2 Views on Limits to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
9.2.3.3 Ranking of Landsliding Relative to Other Hazards 536
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
9.2.3.5 Perception of Annual Loss of Life Frequency . . . . . . 54 7
9.2.3.6 Relative Ranking of Landslide Situations . . . . . . . . . 54 7
9.2.3. 7 Acceptable Probabilities of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
9.2.3.9 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
9.2.4 Results and Discussion of Factor Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
9.2.4.1 Overview of Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
9.3 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
9.3.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
9.3.1.1 General Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
9.3.1.3 Quantitative Results Regarding Landslide Risk
Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
9.3.1.4 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
The Risk Assessment of Slopes Xlll
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE

RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1.1 Probability of Landsliding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
596
10.1.2 Vulnerability to Landsliding..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
10.1.3 Calculation of Landslide Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
10.1.4 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landsliding
in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
10.1.5 Acceptable Risk and Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
10.2 Recommendations for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604
11 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
APPENDIX SERIES A
DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS . . . . . 635
AppendixA1
Examples of Hong Kong Landslide Incident Reports and Cards . . . 636
AppendixA2
Hong Kong Landslide Risk Perception Survey Questionnaire 640
APPENDIX SERIES B
PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
Appendix B1
Listing of All Chase Numeric Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
Appendix B2
Listing of Discriminant Scores for DF D3 for All CHASE Slopes . . . 676
Appendix B3
Listing of Failed Registered Features in the Landslide Database 681
APPENDIX SERIES C
VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
Appendix C1
Definitions of Situations in the Landslide Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
Appendix C2
Regressional Goodness of Fit Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709
Appendix C3
Statistical Details of Runout Distance Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
Appendix C4
Cross-sections ofWell Documented Fatal Landslides 723
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XIV
APPENDIX SERIES D
LANDSLIDE RISK CALCULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
Appendix D1
Montrose Risk Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743
Appendix D2
Kalorama Risk Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750
APPENDIX SERIES E
RAINFALL AND LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 755
Appendix E1
Listing of Landslide Incident Failure Dates and Near est
Two Rain Gauge Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756
Appendix E2
Preliminary Exploratory Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773
Appendix E3
Analyses and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 784
Appendix E4
Rainfall Threshold Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
Appendix E5
on Hong Kong Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Appendix E6
(1989-92 Period) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Appendix E7
Details of Statistical Models Predicting Rainfall Extremes . . . . . . . . 826
Appendix E8
Significant Storm Events in Hong Kong During 1984-93 . . . . . . . . 830
APPENDIX SERIES F
ACCEPTABLE RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION (THE
EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Appendix F1
Raw Questionnaire Response Frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Appendix F2
Results of Correlation Cross-Tabulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Appendix F3
Results of Factor Analyses of Questionnaire Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XV
LIST OF TABLES
corresponding quantities measured (based on Fell, 1994). 15
Table 2.2 Comparison of nine landslide classifications (after Hansen,
1984)................................................. 44
Table 2.3 The landslide classification of Varnes (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 4.1 Summary of Hong Kong landslide data sources (based on Finlay
and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.3 Geology, terrain and known landslides in Lillydale Shire (Olds
and Wilson, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Table 4.4 Landslide "risk" zones for Lillydale Shire (Olds and Wilson,
1992; Coffey Partners International, 1990a). . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 4.5 Summary of Montrose catchment debris flow "risk" ranking
factors and assessments (Moon et al, 1992; Coffey Partners
International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Coffey Partners International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Table 4.7 Assumed recurrence interval ranges for the four debris flow
hazard zones (Shire of Lillydale, 1993; Coffey Partners
International, 1991a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table 4.8 Lillydale Shire data sources, processing, analysis, and
Table 4.9 Questionnaire sections and the corresponding
study objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 5.1 Total number of constructed slopes in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . 135
Table 5.2 Landslides recorded by the GEO during 1984-93
for all slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
slopes. The second column contains incidents greater than
50m 3 (major incidents). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
1984-93. Zero entries are omitted for clarity. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 5.5 GEO records of facilities affected by sliding during
1984-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
1984-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Table 5.7 Statistics of landslide casualties (deaths and injuries) derived
from fire services records (before 1982) and GEO records (1982
and after). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
entire CHASE variable set (List 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
easily determined variable sub-set (List 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Table 5.10 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related to geology. 159
Table 5.11 Hong Kong - Occurrence of landsliding related
to terrain unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
to slope gradient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Table 5.13 The GLUM classification system
(Hansen and Styles, 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xvi

to GLUM class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
landsliding for cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
landsliding for fill slopes and retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
landsliding for natural slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
loss oflife from cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
loss of life from fill slopes and retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . 171
loss of life from natural slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Table 5.21 Summary of Hong Kong major case study flow distances and
slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Table 5.22 Hong Kong stage 1 report data 1985-88. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Table 5.23 Summary of Hong Kong stage 1 report outcomes 1985-88. 180
correctly assessed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Table 5.25 Rank versus Hong Kong stage 1 report outcome. . . . . . . . . . 181
Table 5.26 Summary of Hong Kong cut slope and retaining wall incidents,
1989-1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Table 5.27 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register- summary of overall
status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Table 5.28 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register - breakdown of
outcomes following a Stage 1 no further action
recommendation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Table 5.29 Hong Kong cut and retaining wall register - breakdown of
outcomes following a Stage 2 study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
failed during 1992-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
probability of sliding for cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
probability of failure for retaining walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
probability of failure for fill slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Table 5.34 Average annual probability of sliding Pain Hong Kong. . . . 191
instability in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
probabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
failed cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
, Table 5.40 Values of F~4 for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Table 5.41 Values of F'cs for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Table 5.42 Values of F"c1 for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Table 5.43 F"c3 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XVll
Table 5.45 Factors F'wl, F'w2 and F'ws for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Table 5.47 Slope angle above for Hong Kong retaining walls. . . . . . . . . 209
Table 5.49 F'w6 values for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Table 5.51 F'fl, F(2 and F'f3 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Table 5.52 F{4 factors for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Table 5.53 Values of F{s for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Table 5.54 F[6 values for Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Table 5.55 Description of Kalorama study sub-zone areas. . . . . . . . . . . 224
Table 5.56 Details of the Kalorama geomorphological sub-zoning of the
high landslide hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Table 5.57 Probabilities of landsliding adopted for the Kalorama study
area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Table 5.58 Assessed probabilities of landsliding for the Kalorama area
under the system proposed by Fell et al (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Table 6.1 Suggested landslide velocity classes (IGSUNESCO/WPWLI,
1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Table 6.2 Suggested landslide velocity classes
(Dong and Wang, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
mass-movement materials subject to free-surface,
simple-shear gravity flow (Iverson, 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Table 6.4 Sample extract from the Hong Kong landslide database. . . 259
Table 6.5 S:um~ary of Hong Kong landslide database numbers by
situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Table 6.6 Distribution of Hong Kong landslide volumes V (m 3 ) for
Table 6.7 Distribution of Hong Kong slope angles Al (degrees) for
Table 6.8 ~istri~ution of depth of Hong Kong failures D (m) for different
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Table 6.9 Distribution of width of sliding Wl (m) for different Hong Kong
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Table 6.10 Distribution of height of failure H (from head of scarp to toe
debris, in metres) for different Hong Kong situations. . . . . . 263
Table 6.11 Distribution of runout distance L (measured horizontally from
head of scarp to toe debris, in metres) for different Hong Kong
situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Table 6.12 Distribution of coefficient of apparent friction F=H!L for
different Hong Kong situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Table 6.13 Failure type description and data sources for
F versus V plots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Table 6.14 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1. . . . . . . . . . 285
Table 6.15 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1C. . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.16 Multiple linear regression results for Situation 1A. . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.17 Multiple linear regression results for Situations
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
R 2 >0.50 (R 2 >0.40 as an absolute limit). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xviii
Table 6.19 Equations for Hong Kong runout distance models. . . . . . . . 291
Table 6.20 Suggested first estimates for independent variables in equations
for Hong Kong runout distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Table 6.22 Predicted debris profile values for HI= 10m, AI =60°. . . . . 293
Table 6.23 Locations of the head of the failure scarp for Hong Kong cut
slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Table 6.24 Well documented multiple fatality landslide incidents. 300
Table 6.25 Rockfalls injuring people in Hong Kong in open space. 306
Table 6.26 Rockfall onto building causing injuries in Hong Kong. 306
Table 6.27 Soil/rock debris causing injuries in open space
in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Table 6.28 Buildings on landslides in Hong Kong whose destruction
resulted in injuries or fatalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
values for death from landslide debris in similar situations. 308
Table 6.30 Summary of table numbers, Hong Kong landslide incident
classes by failure type and affected element(s). . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Table 6.31 Rock falls onto vehicles -Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Table 6.33 Rock fall onto buildings in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Table 6.35 Soil/rock debris flowing onto 1-2 storey non- residential
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Table 6.37 Soil/rock debris flowing onto multistorey non-residential
Table 6.38 Hong Kong buildings undermined by landslides. . . . . . . . . . 317
Table 6.39 Summary of building vulnerability to undermining by landslide
-Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Table 7.1 Montrose debris flow average building vulnerabilities Vz. . . 333
Table 7.2 Montrose debris flow average vulnerabilities of persons Vz. 334
Table 7.3 IRR values for risk reduction scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Table 7.4 Vulnerabilities of buildings in the Kalorama study area. . . . 342
Table 7.11 General effect on real estate values due to landslide zoning. 350
(based on 15 minute 20 year data) for various recurrence
intervals (extracted from Peart, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Table 8.2 Pearson's frequency curves (Elderton and Johnson, 1969). 385
Table 8.3 Gumbel's extreme frequency curves (based on Haan, 1977). 386
Table 8.4 Plotting positions (Haan, 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xix
Table 8.5 Properties of Pearson frequency curves (Cornish, 1970). . . 389

Table 8.6 Example of the raw decompressed five minute rainfall data for
22 rain gauges, H01-H22, for the 1989-92 study period. . 393
Table 8.7 Percentage of rainfall data missing per gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Table 8.8 Example of landslide incident listing from
the annual report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Table 8.9 An example of a rainfall event at five minute intervals bounded
by at least fifteen minutes of zero rainfall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Table 8.10 An extract from the rainfall events database for gauge HOI. 402
Table 8.11 Summary of study components, stages, data sources, analyses
and results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
distributions of rainfall variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
to be exceeded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Database 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Table 8.18 Recommended rainfall threshold values for Hong Kong.... 410
Table 8.19 Results for multiple linear regression analyses for models
through the origin for the 1984-93 study period. . . . . . . . . . 416
Table 8.20 Summary of regression curve fitting results to 1984-93 data
using H3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
Table 8.21 Base statistics of rainfall maxima values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Table 8.22 Base statistics of logarithms of rainfall maxima values. . . . 429
Table 8.23 Regression results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
Table 8.24 Predicted rainfall extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Table 8.25 Results of regression analyses of database SD2. . . . . . . . . . . 445
Table 8.26 Peak rainfall values recorded during the 4-5 November 1993
storm on Lantau Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Table 8.28 Results for Method 2 stepwise linear regression models through
the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Table 8.29 Calculation of the number of landslides for individual rain
gauges using fixed variable values across the whole island. 452
Table 8.30 Calculation of landslides on Hong Kong Island from individual
rain gauge models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7
Table 8.32 Calculated numbers of landslides on Hong Kong Island for 1 in
100 AEP and 4-5 November 1993 Lantau island
storm events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Table 9.1 Comparison of individual risk levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74
Table 9.2 Sources for Table 9.1................................... 476
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XX
Department of Planning, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77
Table 9.4 Individual risks (UK) expressed in terms of loss of life
expectancy. (The Royal Society, 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
Table 9.5 Travel deaths per 10 9 km travelled in the United Kingdom
(The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
Kingdom per 10 6 cases (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . 479
Table 9.7 Accidental death rates attributed to sporting activities in the
UK and the USA (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
(number of deaths per 10 8 hours of involvement) (The Royal
Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Table 9.9 Reduction of slope failures following the introduction of the
building grading code in Los Angeles, California (Schuster,
1994)................................................. 482
~~~~a~is:~~~:.l.l~~~~l~~~ .~~~t.~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . . . .

Table 9.10
491
Landsliding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
Century (Schuster, 1995; Eisbacher and Clague, 1984). . . . 493
Table 9.13 Landslides in China that have killed at least 100 people (Li
Tianchi, 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
1985)................................................. 495
1986)................................................. 496
Table 9.16 Summary of landslide disaster consequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Table 9.17 Some negative characteristics of hazards influencing risk
perception (Otway and von Winterfeld, 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
(from Ingles, 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Table 9.20 Relative ranking of risks from several selected hazards by the
various survey groups (section 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
Australian data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
hazard (section 3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
(question 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Table 9.24 Cognitive factors for the "being involved in a petrochemical
plant accident" hazard (question 5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
Table 9.25 Perception of annual life loss frequencies due to an unspecified
hazard (section 6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Table 9.26 Relative ranking of landslide situations (question 7). . . . . . 552
Table 9.27 Multiplying factors for converting respondents' raw
probabilities to annual risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Table 9.28 Raw acceptable probabilities of landsliding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Table 9.29 Acceptable annual landslide risks for property damage. . . . 565
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXI
Table 9.30 Acceptable annual landslide risks for loss of life. . . . . . . . . . 566
Table 9.31 Summary of correlations between responses to sections 6, 8 and
9, and cognitive variables for the landslide hazard
(section 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Table 9.32 Demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
Table 9.33 Scale types and ranges for the demographic variables tested for
risk aversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
Table 9.34 The questionnaire income scales and the corresponding values
of these as percentages ofthe GDP per person. . . . . . . . . . . . 572
demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
property damage) and demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
loss of life) and demographic variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
Table 9.40 Fold-out questionnaire summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
Table Bl.l Listing of all numeric CHASE variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
Table B2.1 Listing of discriminant scores for DF D3 for
all CHASE slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
Table B3.1 Listing of failed registered features in the
landslide database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
Table Dl.l Montrose study area risk calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 744
Table D2.1 Kalorama study area risk calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
Table ELl Listing of reported landslide failure dates and nearest two rain
gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756
Table E2.1 List of landslide incidents used in the author's preliminary
analyses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773
Table E2.2 Threshold values derived from 40 incidents with known dates,
times and nearest gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783
Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived from 40 incidents with
known dates, times and nearest gauges
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
Table E4.2 Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for all rainfall events having
an individual landslide incident reported on the event date
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
longest duration having only one landslide reported on that date
(1989-92 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
longest duration having more than one landslide reported on
that date (1984-93 study period). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798
Table E4.5 Sources of Threshold Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799
Table E4.6 Trial rainfall values used in thresholds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799
Table E4.7 Example of rainfall events at gauge H1 7 on 7-10/5/1992 in the
combined database (CD). The bracketed values indicate events
which exceeded the specified threshold combination shown at
the top of the file. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxii
Table E4.8 Example of a trial threshold run file showing the selection
criteria, the output of dates and events, and the prediction
statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
to be exceeded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Database 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Database 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
failure on a particular date (1984-93 study period). . . . . . . 806
period). . .. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Table E5.1 Zones of development together with the estimated relative
density of features in each. The adjusted factors were used in
the study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Table E5.2 GEO estimates of the number of features on Hong Kong Island
per type of feature (Finlay and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Table E5.3 Estimates of features per each 1:5,000 map of Hong Kong
Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Table E5.4 Calculation of modified areas per each 1:5,000 map of Hong
Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Table E5.5 Calculation of features per each gauge on
Hong Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
datasets for models through the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
derivatives) as the only independent variable. The 1989 dataset
is included for comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Table E7 .2 Details of Pearson linear regression models predicting rainfall
extremes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Table E8.1 Significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93. . . 830
Table Fl.1 Raw questionnaire response percentage frequencies for
section 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Table F1.2 Raw questionnaire response frequencies for section 2. . ... 836
Table Fl.3 Questionnaire response percentage frequencies for
sections 3 to 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
The Risk Assessment of Slopes JOWl

Table F2. 7 Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic variables
and question 6, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
and question 8 and 9, group 10, property damage. . . . . . . . . 859
and question 8 and 9, group 10, loss of life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
question 6, group 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxiv

question 6, group 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
question 6, group 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
question 6, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Table F2.50 R between q4 and q8, 9, group 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Table F3.5 ULS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Table F3.6 GLS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Table F3.7 ML Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXV
LIST OF FIGURES
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1992). . . . . . 6
Figure 2.2 Risks of dying at age 35-69 in UK
(The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2.3 Natural disaster losses 1960-1989 in constant 1990 US
dollars (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 2.4 A comparison of some risk management systems as outlined
by Krewski and Birkwood (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 2.5 The process of risk management as described by the Royal
Society (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Executive, 1989b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 2.7 Contours of individual risk overlaid onto maps of an area
(Health and Safety Executive, 1989b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 2.8 Procedure for selecting expert judgement techniques.
(Roberds, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 2.9 An example of a portion of an event tree for a dam and
spillway (Nielsen et al, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 2.10 Illustration of the basic root-like structure of the fault tree
(Reid, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Figure 2.11 Outline fault tree for a hazard survey (Lees, 1980). . . . . . 30
Figure 2.12 Societal risk (FN) curve for some human-caused risks in the
USA (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). . . . . . . 32
Figure 2.13 An example of land system mapping
(Jones and Lee, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.1 Framework for landslide risk management systems,
developed from Krewski and Birkwood (1986). . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 4.1 Location and geology map of Lillydale Shire (Olds and Wilson,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Figure 4.2 The Montrose debris flow study area plan and slope profile
along the 1891 debris flow path (Moon et al, 1992). . . . . . 84
Figure 4.3 Extract from the debris flow "risk" zoning map (Moon et al,
1992) .. ~........................................... 89
development controls (Shire of Lillydale, 1993). . . . . . . . . 90
Figure 4.5 The Montrose risk assessment study area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 4.6 The Kalorama risk assessment study area. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure 4.7 Locations of landslide risk perception surveys. . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 5.1 A graphical interpretation of the Conventional Reliability
Index/3 (Li, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Figure 5.2 Definition of Hasofer and Lind's reliability index f3HL (Li,
1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Figure 5.3 Variation of a soil property k(t) with location t for the
different soil types (Li and White, 1987b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Figure 5.4 Categories of uncertainty in soil properties (Christian et al,
1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Figure 5.7 Frequency distribution of the chunam condition (V4 6)
CHASE data variable ............................ -:-. . . 152
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxvi
Figure 5.8 Frequency distribution of the number of berms (Vl 0 8)

CHASE data variable ............................ -:-. . . 152
Figure 5.9 Frequency distribution of the material type in top layer
(V6_15_1) CHASE data variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 5.10 Cumulative frequency distributions of natural angle above
slope (V10_9) CHASE data variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 5.11 Cumulative frequency distributions of D3 scores for the
CHASE data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Figure 5.12 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence plus
cuts and walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Figure 5.13 Cumulative frequency distributions of incidence times
cuts and walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
landslide database cut slope angle data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Figure 5.16 Plot of CF8 , CFr for the CHASE cut slope angles. . . . . . . . 197
landslide database cut slope height data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Figure 5.19 Plot of CF8 , CFr for the CHASE cut slope heights. . . . . . . 198
Figure 5.20 Factors influencing groundwater conditions
for cut slopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Figure 5.21 Ratio of CF8 /CFr for DF discriminant scores D3 for the
CHASE data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Figure 5.22 Ratio of CFr!CFr for Hong Kong cut slope I + C scores. . 204
Figure 5.23 Ratio of CFriCFr for Hong Kong cut slope I X C scores. . 204
Figure 5.24 Cumulative frequency plots for Hong Kong retaining wall
heights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
landslide database retaining wall height data. . . . . . . . . . 208
Figure 5.26 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in retaining
walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure 5.27 Cumulative frequencies for Hong Kong fill slope angles. 214
landslide database fill slope angle data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Figure 5.29 Cumulative frequency of Hong Kong fill slope height. . . 215
landslide database fill slope height data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Figure 5.31 Factors influencing groundwater conditions in fills. . . . . 218
hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Figure 5.33 The sub-zones of the Kalorama high landslide
hazard area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Figure 6.1 The sliding sled model (Aydan et al, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Figure 6.2 The sliding sled model (Scheidegger, 1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Figure 6.3 The sled on rolling cylinders model (Aydan et al, 1992). . 240
Figure 6.4 The idealised long, shallow landslide of Savage and Smith
(1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxvii
Figure 6.5 Comparison of velocity profiles for different debris

depositional models (Van Gassen and Cruden, 1989). 24 7
Figure 6.6 Definitions of rock avalanche dimensions (Eisbacher and
Clague, 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Figure 6.7 Relationship between the excessive travel distance Le and the
rock avalanche volume V (Hsu, 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Figure 6.8 The mobility of extraterrestrial rock avalanches, one from
Mars and two from the Moon (Melosh, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . 249
mobility based on weight and volume (Lucchita, 1979). . 250
mobility based on potential energy and volume (Lucchita,
1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Figure 6.11 Results from four runout distance models used to assess the
rock avalanche risk at Plati, Italy (Nicoletti, 1992). . . . . . 252
Figure 6.12 Comparison of the mobility of chalk, coal mine waste and
kaolinised granite failures and rock avalanches (Hutchinson,
1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Figure 6.13 Comparison of Japanese landslide and rock avalanche
mobility (Sassa, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Figure 6.14 Mudslide slope (average) versus mudslide length
(Hutchinson, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Figure 6.15 Landslide model with two apparent friction angles (Sassa,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Figure 6.16 The mobility of waste dump failures (Golder Associates,
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Figure 6.17 Definition of variable F = H!L for a cut slope following
Scheidegger (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Figure 6.18 Definition of variable FX = HXILX, based on the centre of
gravity of the failed mass, for a cut slope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Figure 6.19 The approximate equality ofF and FX for cut slopes. . . . 265
Figure 6.20 Correlation between Hand L for Hong Kong cuts,
R 2 =0.64. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Figure 6.21 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong cuts,
R 2 =0.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Figure 6.22 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts including
outlier, R 2 =0.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Figure 6.23 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong cuts without
outlier, R 2 =0.84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Figure 6.24 Correlation between H and L for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Figure 6.25 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Figure 6.26 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong fills,
R 2 =0.84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Figure 6.27 Correlation between H and L for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Figure 6.28 Correlation between HX and LX for Hong Kong retaining
walls, R 2 =0.28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Figure 6.29 Correlation between F and FX for Hong Kong retaining walls,
R 2 =0.93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Figure 6.30 Plot ofF versus V for all Hong Kong cut slopes (situations 1,
1A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxviii
Figure 6.31 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong fill slopes
(situations 7, 7A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Figure 6.32 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong retaining walls
(situations 6, 6A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Figure 6.33 Plot ofF versus V for Hong Kong cut slopes with A2>0. 273
Figure 6.34 Plot ofF versus logV for various landslides. . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Figure 6.35 Plot of logF versus logV for various landslides. . . . . . . . . . 276
Figure 6.36 Definition of a simple sled model for a cut slope. . . . . . . . 278
Figure 6.37 Lack of correlation between HX and Ll for Hong Kong cut
slopes, R 2 =0.27. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Figure 6.38 Explanation of box plot features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Figure 6.39 Plot of the distribution ofF = H/L for different material types
Figure 6.40 Plot of the distribution ofF = HIL for different failure causes
Figure 6.41 Cumulative frequencies for the values of the apparent friction
angle F for Hong Kong cut slope failures where the slope
below was zero (A2=0) and non zero (A2>0). . . . . . . . . . . 290
Figure 6.42 Problem definition for a cut slope runout distance
prediction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Figure 6.43 Example prediction of debris profile for a cut with HI= lOrn,
A1=60°. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Figure 6.44 Plot of deaths versus volume, and deaths versus proximity -
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Figure 6.45 Plot of deaths versus landslide height, and deaths versus
landslide runout- Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
apparent coefficient of friction versus landslide volume -
Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
landslide volume. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Figure 6.48 Squatter hut damage versus landslide volume
-Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Figure 6.49 1-2 storey residential building damage versus landslide
volume- Hong Kong................................ 317
Figure 6.50 1-2 storey non -residential building damage versus landslide
volume- Hong Kong................................ 318
Figure 6.51 Multistorey residential building damage versus landslide
volume- Hong Kong................................ 319
Figure 6.52 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road cut. . 321
Figure 6.53 Factors influencing temporal probability for a road fill. . 321
above a road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
below a road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Figure 6.56 Factors influencing temporal probability for a footpath. . 323
Figure 6.57 Factors influencing temporal probability for a
bus shelter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
building under a cut. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
building under a retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXIX
Figure 6.60 Natural hillside debris flow initiated by

minor development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Figure 6.61 Failure initiated by excavation or sliding in natural slope
causes further sliding onto buildings, resulting in collapse (eg
Highland Towers in Malaysia, Po Shan Rd in
Hong Kong). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Figure 6.62 Overflow resulting from blocked drainage caused by a small
slide causes a debris flow in the road fill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Figure 7.1 Comparison of the Montrose study area societal risk with
various industrial and dam societal risk curves compiled in
Finlay and Fell, (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Figure 7.2 Upper and lower bound IRR rates for a 100 year period for
differing costs of saving a life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Figure 7.6 Landslide situation 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7
Figure 7.9 Estimated debris profile for a cut slope failure. . . . . . . . . 356
Figure 8.1 Relationship between area slipped and rainfall excess
(Crozier, 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
landslides (Sidle et al, 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Figure 8.3 Rainfall intensity-duration -frequency curves for Reefton,
New Zealand, compared with intensity-duration
combinations required for soil mantle saturation under
various antecedent moisture conditions
(Sidle et al,1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Figure 8.4 Triggering thresholds derived from daily rainfall and
antecedent water status for Wellington City (Crozier and
Eyles, 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Figure 8.5 Rainfall threshold for various numbers of landslides in Hong
Kong (Lumb, 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Peninsula (Crozier and Eyles, 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Figure 8.7 Relationship between rainfall and number of landslides in
Korea (Kim et al, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
records at La Honda occurring after 280 mm antecedent
rainfall has been exceeded (Wieczorek, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . 375
Figure 8.9 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil (Howard et al,
1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Figure 8.10 Size fraction diagram showing debris flow soil
(Ellen, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
landslide events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
Figure 8.12 Landslide warning system instruction sheet (Premchitt,
1985b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Figure 8.13 Various intensity-duration thresholds for debris flow
triggering (Keefer et al, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
Figure 8.14 Earthquake magnitudes plotted on Gumbel extremal
probability paper (Gumbel, 1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXX
Figure 8.15 Regions in/31, /32 plane for various Pearson distributions
(Raudkivi, 1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Figure 8.16 Locations of rain gauges in the Territory of Hong Kong. 396
Figure 8.17 Example of the 1993 landslide incident location map for a
portion of Hong Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
Figure 8.18 Intensity-duration plot for all the gauges and all storms in
the 1984-93 study period, showing the proportion of slopes
failing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
corresponding number of landslides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Figure 8.20 Quadratic model for the number of landslides near a rain
gauge, R 20 =0.55. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Figure 8.21 Quadratic model without outliers for the number of landslides
R 20 =0.56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Figure 8.23 Cubic model without outliers for the number of landslides
Figure 8.24 Comparison of the 1983-93 maxima series (11 year period)
values with the equivalent return periods based on Peart
(1993). 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 0. 0421 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0
Figure 8.25 Example of a Gumbel Type I rainfall maxima plot for gauge
H01 ............................................... 422
Figure 8.26 Error bar plot of MIS on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. 423
Figure 8.27 A typical box plot and its features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Figure 8.28 Box plot of MIS on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 424
Figure 8.29 Box plot of HI on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . . 425
Figure 8.30 Box plot of H3 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . . 425
Figure 8.31 Box plot of Hl2 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 426
Figure 8.32 Box plot of H24 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 426
Figure 8.35 Box plot of DIS on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. 428
Figure 8.36 Box plot of D30 on Gumbel Type I extremal paper. . . . . . 428
Figure 8.37 Goodness of fit values for various models and
weightings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Figure 8.38 Box plots comparing predicted rainfall extremes with those of
Peart (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
outside the storm database SDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
(Tang, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
(Siu, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Figure 8.42 24 hour isohyets for the 8 May 1992 storm
(Evans, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
Figure 8.43 24 hour isohyets for the 4-5 November 1993 storm (GEO,
1993). 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 4430 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 8.44 Linear model, R 20 =0.26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445

Figure 8.45 Quadratic model, R 20 =0.73. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Figure 8.46 Cubic model, R 20 =0.86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Figure 8.47 Prediction curves for number of landslides on Hong Kong
Island (Method 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxi
Figure 8.48 4-5 November 1993 Lantau storm transposed onto Hong
Kong Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Figure 8.49 Example of a quadratic model curve for the number of
landslides near gauge HOl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
Figure 8.50 Correlation between H3 and H24, R 20 =0.78. . . . . . . . . . . 455
Figure 8.51 Correlation between H12 and H24, R 20 =0.93. . . . . . . . . . 455
Figure 8.52 Correlation between DIS and H24, R 20 =0. 72. . . . . . . . . . 456
Figure 9.1 Regions of acceptable, unacceptable and tolerable (ALARP)
risk (Melchers, 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Figure 9.2 An example of a FN curve (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . 468
Figure 9.3 Some historical geotechnical risk levels
(Whitman, 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Figure 9.4 An illustration of the ALARP region on a FN curve (Hong
Kong Government Planning Department, 1994). . . . . . . . 4 70
Figure 9.5 Comparison of proposed individual and societal risk criteria
and risk criteria used in the Netherlands, United Kingdom
Hong Kong and Australia (Finlay and Fell, 1995). . . . . . . 4 72
Figure 9.6 Relationship between judged and statistically estimated
fatality rates in the USA (The Royal Society, 1992). . . . . 507
relationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each factor is
made up of a combination of the characteristics as shown in
the lower portion of the diagram (Slovic, 1987). . . . . . . . . 511
1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
Figure 9.9 Rohrmann's (1995b) structural model of the subjective
evaluation of the acceptability of risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Figure 9.19 Responses to the first part of section 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
Figure 9.20 Responses to section 10 by Hong Kong survey groups. . . 529
Figure 9.22 Response by Hong Kong survey groups to section 11. 531
Figure 9.28 A diagrammatic explanation of how one frequency histogram
is condensed into a frequency strip. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
Figure 9.29 Sample simplified frequency plot for one cognitive factor for
all survey groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
Figure 9.30 Landslide situations used in sections 7, 8 and 9. . . . . . . . 549
House A ............................................ 555
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXXII

House B............................................ 556
House C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Figure 9.34 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding if this was
your house and you just found out about the landsliding. 558
House D............................................ 559
House E............................................ 560
House F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
House G............................................ 562
Figure 9.39 Age of respondents (question 14.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
Figure 9.40 The sex of respondents (question 14.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Figure 9.41 The proportion of smokers among the respondents (question
14.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Figure 9.42 The length of time respondents have been living in their
dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
Figure 9.43 The length of time respondents intend to stay living in their
current dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Figure 9.44 The number of children living in the respondents'
dwelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
Figure 9.45 The proportion of Hong Kong respondents who own a flat
(question 14.4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
Figure 9.46 The proportion of Hong Kong flat-owning respondents who
live in the flat they own (question 14.5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
groups (question 14.11a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
groups (question 14.11b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
Figure 9.49 The level of education of respondents in the Hong Kong
survey groups (question 14.9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Figure 9.50 The monthly household income of respondents in the Hong
Kong survey groups (question 14.10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Figure 9.51 The education level of Australian survey groups'
respondents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586
Figure 9.52 The income level of Australian survey groups'
respondents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586
(page 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
(page 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638
Figure A1.3 An example of a Hong Kong landslide card. . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
Figure C1.1 Situation 1 - Cut slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
Figure C1.2 Situation 1A- Cut slope failure affecting a house. . . . . . 688
Figure C1.3 Situation 1C - Cut slope with two slope angles. . . . . . . . 689
Figure C1.4 Situation 1-5A - Natural slope failure affecting
a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
Figure C1.5 Situation 1CA- Cut slope with two angles
affecting a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxiii
Figure C1.6 Situation 1D - Cut slope with two angles and berm, failing in
the top portion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
Figure C1.7 Situation 3 - Boulder fall from a cut slope; Situation 3A-
boulder fall from a cut slope onto a house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
Figure Cl.8 Situation 4 - Cut slope failure above retaining wall. . . . 694
Figure C1.9 Situation 4B - Cut slope failure above retaining wall. . . 695
Figure C 1.10 Situation 4D - Fill or cut slope failure above
retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696
Figure C1.11 Situation 5 - Natural slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697
Figure C1.12 Situation SA- Natural slope failure above cut. . . . . . . . . 698
Figure Cl.13 Situation 5H - Natural slope failure above cut affecting a
house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
Figure C 1.14 Situation 6 - Retaining wall failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
Figure C1.15 Situation 6A- Retaining wall failure affecting house. . . 701
Figure C1.16 Situation 6B - Failure under a retaining wall. . . . . . . . . . 702
Figure C 1.17 Situation 7 - Fill slope failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
Figure Cl.18 Situation 7A - Fill slope failure affecting house. . . . . . . . 704
Figure C 1.19 Situation 7B - Fill slope failure becoming a debris flow. 705
Figure C1.20 Situation 8 - Large failure under retaining walls. . . . . . 706
Figure C 1.21 Situation SA - Large failure through retaining wall. . . . 707
Figure C1.22 Situation 9 - Blocked catchwater, slope below scoured. . 708
Figure C2.1 The concept of regressional goodness of fit. . . . . . . . . . . . . 710
Figure C2.2 Regressional goodness of fit for a model through
the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 712
Figure C4.1 Kennedy Rd (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
Figure C4.2 Cheung Shan (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725
Figure C4.3 Kwun Lung Lau (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
Figure C4.4 Aberfan (1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
Figure C4.5 Po Shan Rd (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
Figure C4.8 Baguio Villas (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
Figure C4.9 Highland Towers (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Figure C4.10 NT/8/8 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Figure C4.11 4/11SWB (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Figure C4.12 ME87/7/20 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Figure C4.13 2/11NWA (1979). .. . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . 732
Figure C4.14 14/11SWC (1983). . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . .. .. .. 733
Figure C4.15 K60 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
Figure C4.16 24/79 (1979). ' .. ' .. '' ' ' .. ' ..... ' .. '. ' ' .. '''' . ' ' .. ' '. 734
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxiv
Figure C4.1 7 K31A (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734

Figure C4.18 K14 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
Figure C4.19 NT/8/7 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
Figure C4.20 NT/8/27 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
Figure C4.21 K30 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
Figure C4.22 K45 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 738
Figure C4.23 K13 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 738
Figure C4.24 HK2 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 739
Figure C4.25 HK85/6/2 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
Figure C4.26 MW92/7/9 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
Figure C4.27 K87/9/4 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 777
1incidents with known failure time and nearest
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 778
incidents with known failure time and nearest rain gauge. . ..
779
rain gauge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780
Figure E2.5 Box plot of rainfall data for all 88 incidents with dates, times
and nearest rain gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781
incidents. There are 40 incidents in this subset. . . . . . . . 781
Figure E3.1 Flowchart of study methods identifying data streams,
analyses and outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 785
(map 11SE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
(map 11SW). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
(map 15NE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
(map 15NW). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Figure E6.1 Quadratic model through the origin, R 20 =0.60. . . . . . . . . 822
R 20 =0.75. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Figure E6.3 Cubic model through the origin, R 20 =0.61. . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Figure E6.4 Cubic model through the origin, data without outliers,
R 20 =0.75........................................... 824
storm events in the 1989-92 study period. . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Figure F3.1 Sample derivation of 3 factor table for group 6 from raw
output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXXV
LIST OF SYMBOLS
Latin Symbols

ao ... an Coefficients 5.3.1
A Empirical constant 6.1.2.2
AI Cut slope angle 6.2.4.5
6.2.4.6
A2 The angle below the slope 6.2.4
AVSTREN Average material strength 5.3.1
B1, B2, ... Bn A set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive events 2.1.4.3
c A constant 6.2.4.5
c' A constant 6.2.4.5
c' Effective cohesion 5.1.2
8.1.1
The undrained strength 5.1.2
c Consequence score 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
7.4
Cv Coefficient of variation 8.1.3.2
1\
C(h) The moment estimator of the ACF of a soil property

measured at uniform intervals of distance along one
dimension 5.1.2
CFu Cumulative frequency of unfailed slopes 5.4.2.1
CFr Cumulative frequency of failed slopes 5.4.2.1
D Discriminant score 5.3.1
D Depth of failure 6.2.4.6
10.1
D Number of deaths 6.3.3.3
D Storm duration 8.1.2
DIS Rainfall over 15 days 8.2
E Element(s) at risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
EL Energy loss 6.2.4.5
f The average coefficient of friction 6.1.2.1
f(M) Values taken at point M of a geometrical field 5.1.2
f(M+h) Values taken at point M+h of a geometrical field 5.1.2
F Coefficient of apparent friction 6.2.4
6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxvi

F Probability modification factor 5.4
7.4
F' Primary modification factor 5.4
7.4
F" Secondary modification factor 5.4
7.4
F Factor of Safety 5.1.2
F'c Primary modification factor for a cut slope 5.4.2.1
7.4
F"c Secondary modification factor for a cut slope 5.4.2.2
7.4
Fe Factor for evidence and history of instability 5.4
7.4
F{ Primary modification factor for a fill slope 5.4.6.2
7.4
F'{ Secondary modification factor for a fill slopes 5.4.6
Fo Central Safety Factor 5.1.2
F'w Primary modification factor for a retaining wall 5.4.4.2
7.4
F"w Secondary modification factor for a retaining wall 5.4.4
FX Coefficient of apparent friction based on the centre
of gravity of the failed mass 6.2.4
g Acceleration due to gravity 6.2.4.5
g(t) A trend component 5.1.2
g(X) A trend component 5.1.2
G(RS) Systems performance function 5.1.2
h Lag distance 5.1.2
h Total vertical height of the path of the landslide 6.1.2.1
H Natural hazard 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
H Vertical distance from the head of the scarp to the 6.1.2.5
debris toe 6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
HI Hourly rainfall 8.2
HI Slope height 6.2.4.6
H4 Depth of debris at the toe of the slope 6.2.4.6
H4 Debris depth at the base of the cut 6.2.4.6
Hg Vertical drop of the failed mass centre 6.1.2.1
HX Vertical distance from the head of the scarp to the
debris toe based on the centre of gravity of the failed
mass 6.2.4
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxvii

I Number of injuries 6.3.3.3
I Incidence score 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
7.4
I Average gradient of the transportation zone 6.1.2.4
I Mean storm intensity 8.1.2
IRR Internal Rate of Return 7.2.1.3
10.1
k(X) The soil property 5.1.2
Ks Uniform saturated hydraulic conductivity 8.1.1
Kr A frequency factor 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
L Horizontal distance from the head of the scarp to 6.1.2.5
the debris toe 6.3.3.3
6.5
10.1
L1 Distance travelled by the mass along the horizontal
L3 Horizontal distance between the centre of gravity of
the mass in its initial position and the toe of the
slope 6.2.4.5
Debris flow deposition length 6.1.2.4
Horizontal length of the deposited material 6.1.2.5
Excessive travel length 6.1.2.5
Horizontal travel distance of the failed mass centre 6.1.2.1
Distance travelled by the mass along the cut slope 6.2.4.5
Horizontal distance from the head of the scarp to
the debris toe based on the centre of gravity of the
failed mass 6.2.4
m The failed mass 6.2.4.5
m The rank of a particular point 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
m The number of underlying cognitive factors 9.2.4
m The number of common factors for a factor analysis 9.2.4
M Magnitude 3.3
n Number of variables 5.1.2
n The total number of data points 8.1.3.2
8.2.7.3
N(h) The number of sample pairs 5.1.2
NATANG The natural angle above the slope 5.3.1
p The number of cognitive variables 9.2.4
Po Value ofpx(x) at the mode 8.1.3.1
Px(x) A general Pearson extreme frequency distribution 8.1.3.1
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xxxviii

p Proximity 6.3.3.3
p Probability that a particular landslide(s) will occur 3.3
within a specified time frame (generally a year) 5.3.4
5.5.4
P(AIBJ The conditional probability of A occurring given B
occurs 2.1.4.3
P(AnB) The probability that both events A and B occur 2.1.4.3
P(B) Probability of event B 2.1.4.3
P(Bj) Prior probability j 2.1.4.3
P(Bj IAJ Posterior probability given new information A 2.1.4.3
PDI The annual probability of loss of life to an individual 2.2.2.2
Pa Average annual probability of sliding 5.4
7.4
Pr The probability of the individual slope failing 5.1.2
5.4
7.4
Pre The probability of a cut slope failure 5.4
7.4
Prr The probability of a fill slope failure 5.4
7.4
Prw The probability of a retaining wall failure 5.4
7.4
PH Probability relating to human activities 3.3
PR Probability relating to rainfall 3.3
Ps Probability relating to seismic activities 3.3
P(H) The annual probability of the hazardous event 2.2.2.2
P(LITJ Probability of loss of life of an individual occupant 2.2.2.2
P(SIHJ The probability of spatial impact 2.2.2.2
P(TISJ The probability of temporal impact 2.2.2.2
P[R(XJ,S(XJJ Joint probability function 5.1.2
R Reliability 5.1.2
R Pearson's correlation coefficient 9.2.3.8
Rs Specific risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
7.2
7.4
Rt Total risk 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
7.2
R2 Coefficient of determination for a model with a con- 5.3.1
stant 6.2.4
8.2.7.2
8.2. 7.4
The Risk Assessment of Slopes XXX1X

R2o Coefficient of determination for a model through the 6.2.4
ongm 8.2.7.2
8.2.7.4
R(XJ Resistance of the structure 5.1.2
S(XJ Imposed loading 5.1.2
SO RANG Original cut slope angle 5.3.1
STACAT Standardised catchment area 5.3.1
t Independent variable 8.1.3.1
t A point in space 5.1.2
Vo An initial velocity 6.1.2.1
v A geometrical field 5.1.2
v Landslide volume in m 3 6.1.2.5
10.1
v Vulnerability 2.1.2
2.2.2.2
3.3
5.3.4
6.3.4
6.4
6.5
7.4
Vz Probability of loss of life or portion of element value 3.3
6.3
6.3.4
6.4
7.2
9.2.3.7
Vs Probability of spatial impact of a landslide on an ele- 3.3
ment 6.4
Vs The sediment volume in m 3 6.1.2.4
vt Probability of temporal impact 3.3
6.4
V4 6 Chunam condition 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
V10 8 Number of berms 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
V6 15 1 Top layer material type 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
V10 9 Slope angle above 5.3.1.6
7.4.1.2
X Total horizontal reach of the landslide 6.1.2.1
X;_ Basic random variables 5.1.2
Xr The magnitude of the event having a return period
T 8.1.3.2
x1 ... Xn Raw values of variables 5.3.1
X The matrix of coordinates of the sample properties 5.1.2
y;L The soil property being measured 5.1.2
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xl

z A standardised parameter 5.1.2
Z(X;) Sample values at points Xi 5.1.2
Z(X;_ +h) Sample values at point X;_+ h 5.1.2
Greek Symbols

a Empirical constant 6.1.2.2
8.1.3.1
{3 Reliability Index 5.1.2
{3 Local slope angle 6.1.2.1
{31 Coefficient of skewness 8.1.3.2
{32 Coefficient of kurtosis 8.1.3.2
f3o to f3n Coefficients 8.1.3.1
f3HL Hasofer and Lind (1974) invariant definition of the
reliability index 5.1.2
0 Mode ofpx(x) 8.1.3.1
E(t) A random component 5.1.2
E(X) A random component 5.1.2
<P Angle of internal friction 6.1.2.1
<P' Effective friction angle 5.1.2
6.1.2.5
8.1.1
y(h) A semivariogram function 5.1.2
T(?J) The gamma distribution 8.1.3.1
r; Pore-water pressure coefficient 6.1.2.1
f.1 Coefficient of friction 6.1.2.5
6.2.4
/11 Uniform coefficient of friction on a cut slope 6.2.4.5
/12 Uniform coefficient of friction on the horizontal
/1G Mean of the performance function G(R.S) 5.1.2
f.lr Rolling friction coefficient 6.1.2.1
f.ls Coefficient of sliding friction 6.1.2.1
e A varying slope angle 6.2.4.5
aa Standard deviation of the performance function
G(R.SJ 5.1.2
Q A measured quantity 6.1.2.2
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xli
Abbreviations

ACF Autocorrelation Function 5.1.2
ADRI Antecedent Daily Rainfall Index 8.1.2.1
AEP Annual Exceedance Probability 3.3
8.2.6
8.2.7.4
8.3.1
9.1.1
9.2.3.7
10.1
AGS Australian Geomechanics Society 5.5
10.1
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable 9.1.1
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable 7.2
9.1.1
9.2
9.3
10.1
AN COLD Australian National Committee on Large Dams 2.1.3.3
2.2.3
7.2
9.1.1
9.2
10.1
API Aerial Photographic Interpretation 5.3.1
AR Stationary Autoregressive process 5.1.2
ARIMA Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average model 5.1.2
ARMA Autoregressive Moving Average model 5.1.2
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers 2.1.3.3
2.2.1
2.2.3
BC Hydro British Columbia Hydro 2.2.3
c a Cut failure 6.3.4.2
CHASE Cut Slopes in Hong Kong- Assessment of Stability 4.1.2
by Empiricism 5.3.1
5.4.2
10.1
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (Australia) 4.3.3
CD Combined Database 8.2.7.4
D Decision level 8.1.2.3
DA Discriminant Analysis 5.3.1
DF Discriminant Function 5.3.1
EGM Engineering Geology Map 4.1.2
EM Erosion Map 4.1.2
F a Fill failure 6.3.4.2
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xlii

FAR Fatal Accident Rate 2.1.5.1
9.1.1
FEMA US Federal Em,ergency Management Agency 2.2.3
FN curve Frequency (or probability) versus Number of fa- 2.1.3.3
tali ties 2.2.1
9.1.1.1
9.1.1
FOSM First Order, Second Moment Method 5.1.2
GASP Geotechnical Areas Studies Program 4.1.2
GCO Geotechnical Control Office (former name of the 4.1.2
GEO) 5.2.1
5.3.1
5.3.4
GDP Gross Domestic Product 9.2.3.9
GEO Geotechnical Engineering Office, Civil Engineer- 3.4
ing Department, Hong Kong 4.1.1
5.2.1
5.3.6
6.2.3
6.3
7.4
8.2
8.2. 7.4
9.2
10.1
GEOTECS Computer generated maps 4.1.2
5.3.2
GLEAM Generalised Limitations and Engineering Apprais-
alMap 4.1.2
GLUM Geotechnical Land Use Map 3.4
4.1.2
5.3.2
5.4.2.1
•
GPS Generalised Procedure of Slices 5.1.2
HKCED Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department 4.3.3
9.2
9.3
10.1
IAEG/ International Association of Engineering Geology
CLOMMS Commission on Landslides and Other Mass Move-
ments on Slopes 2.2.2.2
ICASP International Conferences on Application of Stat-
istics and Probability in Civil and Structural En-
gineering 5.1.2
I COLD International Committee on Large Dams 9.1.1
ICOSSAR International Conferences on Structural Safety
and Reliability 5.1.2
ICTC Interdepartmental Committee on Toxic Chemi-
cals 2.1.3
IDSR Individual Discrimination Success Rate(%) 5.3.1
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xliii

IGSUNESCO/ International Geotechnical Societies' UNESCO 3.2
WPWLI Working Party on World Landslide Inventory 6.1.1
L Landslip level 8.1.2.3
LCI Lower 95% Confidence Interval 8.2.7.4
LM Landform Map 4.1.2
LNS Least Normal Squares 5.1.2
LPM Landslide Preventative Measures 5.3.5
MA Moving Average process 5.1.2
MAUT Multi -Attribute Utility Theory 2.2.3
MIPS Millions of Instructions Per Second 8.2.5.2
N a Natural slope failure 6.3.4.2
NFA No Further Action recommendation 5.3.5
5.4.2.1
ODSR Overall Discrimination Success Rate(%) 5.3.1
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 5.1.2
Pl Point score set 1 8.2
PAR Population At Risk 6.3.3.3
PCM Physical Constraints Map 4.1.2
PEM Point Estimate Method 5.1.2
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 2.1.4.3
PHI Potentially Hazardous Installation 2.1.3.3
9.1.1
PMRM Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method 2.2.3
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 2.1.4.3
2.2.3
PSA Probabilistic Slope (stability) Analysis 5.1.2
QRA Quantified Risk Assessment 2.1.4.3
R a Retaining wall failure 6.3.4.2
RMA Reduced Major Axis 5.1.2
RSSG The Royal Society Study Group 2.1.3
RO Royal Observatory 4.1.3
RV Regionalised Variable 5.1.2
SlR Stage One Reports (carried out by the GEO's Plan-
ning Division) 4.1.2
SCOPE Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environ-
ment 2.1.3
SD Storm Database 8.2.7.4
SDA Stepwise Discriminant Analysis 5.3.1
SOSM Second Order Second Moment Method 5.1.2
SRV Single Random Variable approach 5.1.2
SWT Surrogate Worth Trade-Off method 2.2.3
The Risk Assessment of Slopes xliv

TCM Terrain Classification Map 4.1.2
UCI Upper 95% Confidence Interval 8.2.7.4
UNSW University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 4.1.1
8.2.7.3
USBR US Bureau of Reclamation 2.2.3
US NRC US National Research Council 2.1.3
uw Unweighted regression model 8.2.7.3
8.2.7.4
WA Regression model weighted by the Thiessen poly- 8.2.7.3
gon area 8.2.7.4
WF Regression model weighted by the number of fea- 8.2.7.3
tures nearest to a rain gauge 8.2.7.4
WHO World Health Organisation 2.1.3

(THE EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK)
The chapter consists of three main sections. The first section presents a
detailed literature review of acceptable risk and risk perception. The second
section discusses the results of the author's survey of landslide risk perception.
The concluding third section summarises the findings and makes
recommendations regarding the evaluation of landslide risk.
9.1 Detailed Literature Review

The detailed literature review of acceptable risk and risk perception is
presented in four parts. These are:
0 general concepts,
0 historical landslide risk,
0 legal implications of landsliding, and
0 the psychology of risk perception.
9.1.1 General Concepts

The results of risk assessments need to be evaluated, as discussed in
section 2.1.4. Different examples of risk evaluation paradigms are presented in
an overview paper by Rowe (1987). For risk assessments of existing facilities,
the evaluation that follows needs to determine whether the risks are acceptable,
and if not, what should be done to lower them. For risk assessments of new
facilities, the evaluation needs to determine the "best" possible site or option,
and whether the safeguards are sufficient. These evaluations directly influence
decisions regarding the allocation of substantial resources and are not made
lightly. As the public is also directly affected the whole evaluation process
involves conflict, negotiation and compromise (McDonell, 1991). The entire
area of risk perception and acceptable risk impacts on the process.
9.1.1.1 Institutional Approaches to Acceptable Risk

The word "institutional" in the heading is used to indicate the most
common approach of various authorities and institutions, although many
individuals may also agree with the approach or support it to a certain extent
(see Melchers, 1993). According to Melchers the approach could be called a
"public policy" approach when applied to decision making. The main
components of this approach are the ALARP principle and measurements of
individual and societal risk.
A) The ALARP Principle

The institutional approach starts by first noting that society and
individuals within it all face various risks. The second point is that risks cannot
be eliminated, only reduced by applying additional resources. Furthermore, the
reduction of risks from one hazard may increase risks from other hazards and
thus not be beneficial overall. The third point is that a region of unacceptable
risk exists, where the existence of risks cannot be justified by any means. At the
other end of the scale exists a region of broadly acceptable risk, where the
majority of the community will accept and live with this level of risk. The final
point is that the region between the two is one where risks are not necessarily
accepted but tolerated. This is the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
region. This region is also known as the As Low As Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA) region. In this region risk reduction may be impracticable or too costly
compared to the benefits gained (Melchers, 1993). The concept is illustrated in
Figure 9.1. Melchers (1993) offers an interesting discussion on the practical
difficulties of applying the ALARP principle.
UNACCEPTABLE RISK
RISK REGION COMMENTS
Risk cannot be justified

Unacceptable region save in extraordinary
circumstances
Tolerable only if risk

reduction is
impracticable or if cost
The ALARP
is grossly
or tolerability
disproportionate
region
(depending on the level
of risk) to the
improvement gained
Broadly acceptable
Necessary to maintain
region (no need for de-
assurance that risk re-
tailed demonstration of
mains at this level
ALARP)
NEGLIGIBLE RISK
Figure 9.1 Regions of acceptable, unacceptable and tolerable (ALARP) risk

(Melchers, 1993)
B) Individual and Societal Risk Levels

The concept of "socially acceptable risk", or "acceptable risk", is used
widely in the planning of industrial development, and is beginning to be used
more widely in other areas of engineering, such as dam engineering. In
considering acceptable risk, one usually considers the risk to individuals from
the hazard (either the average risk, or the risk to the individual most at risk);
and the societal risk, or the annual probability of an event (eg. a landslide)
leading to a number of lives being lost (viz. Fell, 1994, and ANCOLD, 1994).
Individual risks are commonly expressed as Annual Exceedance Probabilities
(AEPs), for example a 1 in 10,000 individual risk. Societal risks are commonly
expressed as FN curves, with the F, the annual frequency of the hazard causing
Nor more fatalities, being the vertical axis. The horizontal axis is N, the number
of fatalities. An example of a FN curve for various historical risks on a
world-wide basis is given in Figure 9.2. Whitman's (1984) FN plot for some
historical geotechnical risks is reproduced for interest in Figure 9.3. The data
sources and populations underlying this plot are not clear.
Acturial
From risk estimation - - - -
u..l '•• ..._

.n" ',
' ',, Dam Failure
£
.
0
',
..
"'0
\ Chlorine' ',,
'
~ ~ Transport ',,
m·J "'' '
''
/\
0 \ ',''
~~ \, ' .... , ''

·.:
s- 10"' LPG '
\ '\ .......
,
c"'
.ii: Transport
...............
,
\
\
'
' ',
'.>-....
' LNG Tankers \
0 s ~ ' \ ' ../
,... xr 100tLcl1Zar',, \ '~'",
~ Reactors- ' ' ' 100 ~clear
~ Enrly deaths cnr\, \ ~ Reactors -
~ __ _....100 PWR \ ~ \ Early plus
u. tr 6 ~--...-:: Early diZothS, \ \ delayed deoths
...... -- ... ( 1) ,,
WR' ',, '
Seismic', ', \
tr' (nitiator(2l', ', '
10 2
4
101 10 3 10
Number of deaths, tl
Figure 9.2 An example of a FN curve (The Royal Society, 1992).

"MARGINALLY ACCEPTED"
MERCHANT SHIPPING
•w MOBILE DRILL RIGS

a:
:::>
...J
~ 10-2
• GEYSERS
u. SLOPE CANVEY LNG
0 STABILITY STORAGE
>-
.._.
...J 10-3
en
4:: CANVEY
en REFINERIES
0
a:
a..
<t 10-4
:::>
z
z (/)
w
4:: 0
;::)
1-
cn.
(!)
z-1
a:
w
I
1-
0
10-6L-_______ L_ _ _ _ _ __.L-------~----~~------~------~
LIVES LOST 1 10 100 1000 10 000
COST in$ 1m 10m 100m 1b 10b
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Figure 9.3 Some historical geotechnical risk levels (Whitman, 1984).
Generally, both individual and societal risk criteria are to be satisfied. It is

common to specify two levels of risk, the larger (or upper) being called the limit,
and the smaller (or lower) being called the objective. Risks larger than the limit
are always unacceptable, those lower than the objective are always acceptable,
and those in between are to be as low as reasonably practicable (ie. subject to the
ALARP principle). An illustration of the ALARP region on the Hong Kong
Government's FN curve for Potentially Hazardous Installations (PHis) is
shown in Figure 9.4. This FN curve is an example of institutional risk guidelines
or targets, as it describes the desired levels of risk to be achieved rather than the
current levels being experienced.
9.1.1.2 Institutional Guidelines to Acceptable Risk

Various institutions offer guidelines on acceptable risk levels, commonly
for both individual and societal risks, such as that illustrated in Figure 9.4. The
author found that the most developed guidelines exist in the nuclear and
chemical industries - the "hazardous industries". In civil engineering the main
development of acceptable risk guidelines has occurred in the dam engineering
area. International dam bodies such as the International Committee on Large
Dams (ICOLD) have set broad standards of practice. Two national bodies, the
Canadian BC Hydro and Australian ANCOLD, have developed notable
acceptable risk guidelines. To the author's knowledge no acceptable landslide
risk guidelines exist, and hence the guidelines for dams are discussed as the
"closest" available information in the civil engineering field.
1Q-2
10~ *----------+----------+----------+----------~--------~
(/)
UNACCEPTABLE
<l>
~
~
~ 10-4
....<l>0 LIMIT
E
....0
z
-
..c
"§:
(/)
10-5
c<l>
:g
(.)
(.)
co
0
LL
>.
(.)
c
<l>
:J
0"
<l>
.!::: 1 o-7 1--------+------~~~~ /.'-
~
:J
c
c
<(
ACCEPTABLE
10-8
10-9 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Number of Fatalities N
Figure 9.4 An illustration of the ALARP region on a FN cune (Hong Kong

Government Planning Department, 1994).
AN COLD (1994) have adopted the following individual risk criteria for dams as
the maximum that should be accepted for proposed dams or upgrading of
existing dams:
Objective 10- 6 per exposed person per annum as an average
over the population at risk, and
10- 5 per person per annum for the person at greatest
risk.
Limit Values of up to 10 times the objective values for existing
dams, subject to application oftheALARP Principle. That
is, the risks should be regarded as tolerable only if risk
reduction is impracticable, or if the cost is grossly
disproportionate to the improvement gained.
As an interim measure of societal risk AN COLD (1994) have adopted the criteria
shown in Figure 9.5. This Figure is discussed further in section 9.1.1.3.
9.1.1.3 Comparisons of Risk Levels

Risk levels can be compared by looking at fatality rates from various risks.
Such comparisons are useful in looking at the relative positioning of various
risks, and are commonly carried out (ANCOLD, 1994). However, when
comparing fatality rates one needs to keep in mind the basis of the calculations
used to derive them, and the fact that these average risks mask maximum and
minimum levels experienced in different localities or in specific sections ofthe
population.
A) Individual Risks
The author has researched the literature and gathered extensive published
data on various individual risk levels. These levels were in turn compiled by
their respective sources from statistical publications as well as government
and/or industry sources. Most involve an estimate of the underlying population
exposed to risk. The author has grouped individual risk levels into the following
nine broad categories:
0 all causes,
0 health,
0 medical,
0 natural hazards,
0 general accidents,
0 occupational,
0 travel,
0 sport, and
10-1 ~--------~~--------~----------~----------~--------~
Netherlands
Industrial
Intolerable
(interim)
10-2+-----T----4~---------H~--------+---------~~--------~
'' '''
' ', \ \ ' ',,_ ~
Channel~~
' ',,\' \ ',
Tunnel \~
,,
10~ +---------~~--~--~+---------~~--------+---------~
'
' \
Generally
,, '
'
\\
~ . R'
accepted
\'', \ ' \ Unron a1lway, UK
~
range of
' ' '

u.. '
maximum
>--
0 tolerable
\ '\ '
z
w
::J
0
ill
1
risk to an
Individual
o-4 +---------"d-
Netherlands
Industrial \'
Negligible
(interim)
'
UK Industrial
Intolerable
\\
a:: ''
u..
_J ' '
<( '' ''
::J
z AN COLD ''
z
<(
Objective '
•
'
'"
Hong Kong '' '
objective
''
'' ' '· '
''
'' ''
'
10~ +-----------+----------J~~~~--~~----~--~~--------~', '
'
UK Industrial
'" BC Hydro
Intolerable
Negligible (proposed)
and Hong Kong
'' limit
0·1 10 100 1,000 10,000
NUMBER OF FATALITIES, N
Figure 9.5 Comparison of proposed individual and societal risk criteria and
risk criteria used in the Netherlands, United Kingdom Hong Kong
and AustraJia (Finlay and Fell, 1995).
o building.
The international fatality rate data for various hazards is presented in Table 9 .1.
The data sources are summarised in Table 9.2. A somewhat similar table has
been produced by the New South Wales Department of Planning (1992)
specifically for Australia. The Australian data is shown in Table 9.3. An
alternative way of presenting the risks is to calculate the risk in terms of loss of
life expectancy rather than loss of a life (see section 2.1). Such calculations have
been performed by the United Kingdom's Royal Society (1992) and are shown in
Table 9.4. This simply illustrates that risks can be calculated on bases other
than a simple division of the loss of life by the underlying population. Other
expressions of risk are also illustrated by the Royal Society. Travel risks can be
expressed per kilometre travelled rather than in terms of fatality rates. Such a
calculation is shown in Table 9.5. Medical procedure risks can be calculated per
case, as shown in Table 9.6. Sporting deaths are often expressed per participant
hours (Table 9. 7). Occupational risks are commonly calculated in terms of the
Fatality Accident Rate (FAR) per hours worked. The FAR is used by many
industries as an safety indicator. Risks from death for various activities
expressed in terms of the FAR are illustrated in Table 9.8. The Royal Society also
points out that the rank order and apparent relative risks are very much
dependent on the choice of the measure of activity.
B) Societal Risk Levels

A comparison can be made of various institutional guidelines on individual
and societal risk levels. Such a comparison is made in Figure 9.5, which is based
on AN COLD (1994). The guidelines presented for comparison are by no means
exhaustive, but are slanted towards industrial and dam hazards. The risk
lines/curves all show the general trend of a decreasing frequency F with
increasing number of fatalities N. The objective and limit risk lines are often
about two orders of magnitude apart. Some authorities present convex curves
rather than straight lines. This allows for society's aversion to large accidents or
disasters with numerous fatalities (see, for example, ANCOLD 1994).
Table 9.1 Comparison of individual risk levels.
ANNUAL FATALITY SOURCE

HAZARD RATE REF-
(per million} ERENCE
All causes and any accident (UK}

Average over entire population 11,490 3
Men aged 55-64 15,280 3
Women aged 55-64 9,060 3
Men aged 35-44 1,730 3
Women aged 35-44 1,145 3
Boys aged 5--14 225 3
Girls aged 5--14 160 3
Death by any accident 240 3
Health
,/
Smoking 20 cigarettes per day (Australia) 5,000 5
Drinking alcohol, person at risk (Australia) 385 4
Air pollution, (eastern USA) 200 8
Drinking one bottle of wine per day (USA) 75 2
Medical procedures (UK}

Vaccination 3
Surgical anaesthesia 5.4 3
Childbearing (1974-76) 100 3
Childbearing (1987-89} 69 3
Needle biopsy of liver 200 3
Former thiouracil treatment of thyroid over-activity 4,000 3
Natural hazards (USA and Australia}

Hurricane (1901-1972) 0.4 2
Tornado (1953-1971) 0.4 2
Lightning (1969) 0.5 2
Earthquake in California 2 2
Meteorite strike, whole population (Australia) 0.001 4,5
General accidents (USA}

Electrocution 6
Poisoning 20
Drowning 30
Fires and burns 40 1
Falls 90 1
... continued
Table 9.1 (continued) Comparison of individual risk levels.

HAZARD RATE REF-
(per million) ERENCE
Occupational (UK) 1974-78 1987-90

Manufacture of clothing and footwear 5 0.9 3
Manufacture of vehicles 15 12 3
Manufacture of timber furniture 40 22 3
Manufacture of bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc 65 60 3
Chemical and allied industries 85 24 3
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 105 21 3
Agriculture (employees) 110 74 3
Construction industries 150 100 3
Railway staff 180 96 3
Coal miners 210 145 3
Offshore oil and gas 1,650 1,250 3
Deep sea fishing 2,800 840 3
Commercial diving < - - 2,860 - - > 7
Travel
Car travel, 10,000 km/year, British Columbia (Canada) 286 7
Road accidents (UK) 100 6
Pedestrian struck by a car, whole population (Australia) 35 4
Air travel (Canada) 33 7
Train travel, persons at risk (Australia) 30 5
Air travel, persons at risk (Australia) 10 5
Railway travel (USA) 4 1
Air travel (USA) 9 1
Water transport (USA) 9 1
Road accidents (USA) 300
Sport
Amateur boxing 0.5 3
Skiing (US) 0.7 3
Skiing (France) 1.3 3
Canoeing (UK) 10 3
Mountaineering (US) 27 3
Motorcycle racing (UK) 35 3
Rock climbing (UK) 40 3
... continued
Table 9.1 (continued) Comparison of individual risk levels.

HAZARD RATE REF-
(per million) ERENCE
Sport (continued)
Cave exploration (US) 45 3
Glider flying (US) 400 3
Scuba diving (UK) 220 3
Scuba diving (US) 420 3
Hang gliding (US) 40G-1,300 3
Hang gliding (UK) 1,500 3
Power boat racing (US) BOO 3
Sport parachuting (US) 1,900 3
Motor sports (England and Wales) 27 3
Building
Structural failure (UK) 0.14
Building fire (Australia) 4
Table 9.2 Sources for Table 9.1.
REF SOURCE
1 Reid, 1989
2 Kletz, 1976
3 The Royal Society Study Group, 1992
4 New South Wales Department of Planning, 1992
5 Higson, 1990
6 Health and Safety Executive, 1989
7 BC Hydro, 1993
8 Wilson and Crouch, 1987
Department of Planning, 1992).
Chances of fatality per

Voluntary risks (average to those who take the risk) million person years
Smoking (20 cigarettes/day)
- all effects 5,000
- all cancers 2,000
- lung cancers 1,000
Drinking alcohol (average for all drinkers)
- all effects 380
- alcoholism and alcoholic cirrhosis 115
Swimming 50
Playing rugby football 30
Owning firearms 30
Transportation risks (average to traveller)

Travelling by motor vehicle 145
Travelling by train 30
Travelling by aeroplane
- accidents 10
Risks Averaged Over the Whole Population

Cancers from all causes
- total 1800
- lung 380
Air pollution from burning coal to generate electricity 0.07-300
Being at home
- accidents in the home 110
Accidental falls 60
Pedestrians struck by motor vehicles 35
Homicide 20
Accidental poisoning
- total 18
- venomous animals and plants 0.1
Fires and accidental burns 10
Electrocution (non-industrial) 3
Therapeutic use of drugs 2
Cataclysmic storms and storm floods 0.2
Lightning strikes 0.1
Meteorite strikes 0.001
Table 9.4 Individual risks (UK) expressed in terms of loss of life expectancy.
(The Royal Society, 1992)
Loss of expectation of life if

exposed to hazard from age 20
years
Average age at
death if Those dying Average over all
unexposed to from the exposed to haz-
Adverse events specified hazard ard
Population causing death hazard (years) (years)
Complications of
All women 77.45 47.45 0.01
pregnancy
Motor traffic acci-
All men 71.97 27.07 0.30
dents
Female in blue
Lung cancer
asbestos
mesothelioma, 78.93 21.02 1.51
gas-mark
asbestosis
assembling
Male under- Mining acCi-
ground coal min- dents, 68.90 18.22 2.40
ers pneumoconiosis
Male nickel Cancer of lungs
69.28 14.18 3.97
refiners or nasal sinuses
Male doctors All conditions
smoking 15 to 24 associated with 76.30 14.68 5.45
cigarettes a day smoking
Table 9.5 Travel deaths per 109 km travelled in the United Kingdom
(The Royal Society, 1992).
1967-71 1972-76 1986-90

Railway passengers 0.65 0.45 1.1
Passenger on scheduled air services 2.3 1.4 0.23
Bus/coach drivers and passenger 1.2 1.2 0.45
Car/taxi drivers and passenger 9.0 7.5 4.4
Two-wheeled motor vehicle driver 163.0 165.0
104.0
Two-wheeled motor vehicle passenger 375.0 359.0
Pedal cyclists 88.0 85.0 50.0
Pedestrians 110.0 105.-0 70.0
Kingdom per 106 cases (The Royal Society, 1992).
Procedure Rate
Vaccination (England and Wales) 1
Surgical anaesthesia, England and Wales, 1970-73 40
Surgical anaesthesia, England and Wales, 1986 5.4
Childbearing, England and Wales, 1970-73 100
Childbearing, England and Wales, 1986 69
Needle biopsy of liver 200
Former thiouracil treatment of thyroid over-activity 4,000
Former treatment of ankylosing spondylitis by radiotherapy 10,000
Former use of Thorast as a radiological contrast medium 60,000
Table 9.7 Accidental death rates attributed to sporting activities in the UK

and the USA (The Royal Society, 1992).
Sport Rate
per 1os participant hours
School and college football 0.3
Amateur boxing, UK, 1946-62 0.5
Skiing, USA, 1967-68 0.7
Canoeing, UK, 1960-62 10
Mountaineering, USA, 1951-60 27
Motorcycle racing, UK, 1958-62 35
Rock climbing, UK, 1961 40
per 1os participant years
Cave exploration, USA, 1970-78 45
Gliderflying, USA, 1970-78 400
Scuba diving, UK, 1970-1980 220
Scuba diving, USA, 1970-78 420
Hang gliding, USA, 1978 400-1,300
Hang gliding, UK, 1977-79 1,500
Power boat racing, USA, 1970-78 800
Sport parachuting, USA, 1978 1900
Association football, England and Wales, 1986-90 1.2
Climbing, England and Wales, 1986-90 130
Motor sports, England and Wales, 1986-90 27
(number of deaths per 108 hours of involvement) (The Royal Society,
1992).
Activity FAR
Plague in London, 1665 15,000
Rock climbing {while on rock face) 4,000
Fireman in London air-raids, 1940 1,000
Travel by helicopter 500
Civilian in London air-raids, 1940 200
Jack-up platform in winter, at code limits 200
Policeman in Northern Ireland (average) 70
Construction, high rise erectors 70
Tolerable limit of 1 in 1,000 per year at work 50
Smoking {average) 40
Travel by air · 40
Travel by car 30
Oil and gas extraction 15
Accident, average man in his 30s 8
Disease, average man in his 30s 8
Radon gas natural radiation 6
Construction {average) 5
Travelling by train 5
Factory work {average) 4
Accident at home, all ages 4
Accident at home, able-bodied 1
All manufacturing industries
Tolerable limit of 1 in 10,000 per year near major hazard 1
Tolerable limit of 1 in 100,000 per year near nuclear plant 0.1
Terrorist bomb in London 0.01
Target risk for major fire in a public building 0.005
Building falling down 0.002
9.1.2 Historical Landslide Risks

To the author's knowledge there is no published data on acceptable risks
from landsliding, hence historical landslide risks may be used to indicate
acceptable and unacceptable landslide risks (cf Starr, 1969). This section details
the landslide losses world -wide, the average annual landslide death rates,
major landslide disasters and the consequences of landslide disasters.
9.1.2.1 World-Wide Landslide Losses

The author has obtained useful historical landslide loss information from
Brabb and Harrod (1989), Schuster (1995) and Schuster and Fleming (1986).
This information includes death rates for a number of countries, some estimates
of economic losses for others and details of control and preventative works
where they exist. It is important to note that for all countries the average death
rates from landsliding quoted by the respective sources appear to exclude large
fatality landslide disasters. These are detailed below on a country/region basis
as relevant.
A) North America
i) United States of America

Schuster (1995) notes that the average number of landslide deaths in the
USA is about 25 per annum. One of the worst natural disasters this century was
debris avalanching and associated flooding in Virginia in 1969 as a result of a
hurricane. Most of the 150 casualties are thought to have been debris flow
victims. The eruption ofMt St Helens in 1980 caused a massive rock slide/debris
avalanche of volume 2.8 km 3 that travelled 22 km and buried about 60 km 2 of a
valley. The resulting mudflows destroyed over 200 homes. Although nine
bridges, many buildings and highways were buried, only about 5-10 people
were killed due to the evacuation prior to the eruption. About 30 people were
killed and hundreds left homeless by the debris flows from the 1982 storm in the
San Francisco Bay area of California.
Schuster (1995) and Schuster and Fleming (1986) report that direct and
indirect losses to public and private property exceeded $US 1 billion in 1978,
increasing to nearly $US 1.5 billion by 1985. Schuster and Fleming also note
that the most financially devastating slope failures have been those triggered by
the 1964 Alaska earthquake, the 1980 landslides in southern California, the
1982landslides in the San Francisco Bay area of California, and the 1983-84
landslides in Utah. Costs per specific areas are also detailed by Schuster (1995)
and Schuster and Fleming (1986).
The United States currently has no comprehensive national program of

landslide loss reduction, but proposals for one have been made by the Committee
of Ground Failure Hazards of the National Research Council (Schuster, 1995).
Individual cities and counties have developed local development controls
(grading codes) and guidelines as responses to the landslide disasters in the
1970s and 1980s. For example, Los Angeles introduced a grading code in 1952
following severely damaging winter storms (Schuster, 1994). This code was
revised to provide far more stringent regulations in 1963. The effectiveness of
this code is shown in the reduction of damage to building sites built under the
code (Table 9.9). Under the National Flood Insurance Program provision is
made to to cover "mudslides", but confusion is widespread as the term is used
without a technical definition (Olshansky, 1990).
Table 9.9 Reduction of slope failures following the introduction of the building
grading code in Los Angeles, California (Schuster, 1994).
Building code Number of sites Number of site Percentage of

Damage costs
In effect developed failures site failures
Pre-1963 37,000 2,790 7.5 $US 40-49 million
Post 1963 30,000 210 0.7 $US 1-2 million
ii) Canada
The average fatalities from landslides are five persons per annum
(Schuster, 1995). In 1903 a massive rock slide killed about 70 people in the town
of Frank (Schuster and Fleming, 1986). In 1971 a flow in sensitive clay
destroyed an part of the town of StJean Vianney, Quebec, killing 31 people and
destroying40 homes (Crudenetal, 1989). In May 1971 the Quebec government
decided to relocate the entire town of 200 houses to Arvida, 5 km away. The St
Jean Vianney landslide started a precedent of total compensation to private
owners by the provincial government with the assistance of the Federal
government. This is because landslide insurance is not available in Canada.
However, Cruden et al note that similar subsequent compensations never
established compensation as a general government policy, and the trend is now
reversed.
Economic losses from landsliding in Canada are estimated to be of the
order of $US 1 billion per annum (Cruden et al, 1989). Over $CA 25 million was
spent from 1977-83 on landslide preventative measures stopping the

re-activation of the Downie rock slide threatening the Revelstoke Dam
reservoir (Schuster 1995).
Individual municipalities and cities have incorporated requirements for
minimum set- backs from hazardous slopes as a means of land development
control (Crud en et al, 1989). No national landslide loss reduction program exists
as yet.
B) Central and South America
i) Central America
Landslides in the Panama Canal have continued to be a chronic problem
since the start of its construction (Schuster, 1995). They delayed the completion
of the canal by nearly two years and also caused its closure on seven different
occasions after it was open to traffic in 1914.
ii) South America

In Peru catastrophic debris avalanches on the slopes of Mt Huascaran in
the Cordillera mountains occurred in 1962 (4,000 to 5,000 fatalities) and in 1970
(over 18,000 killed) (Schuster,1995). Another massive landslide in the Andes
killed about 450 people in 1974. In 1985 volcanic mudflows destroyed the city of
Armero in Columbia, entombing over 20,000 people. The catastrophic life loss
was partly due to a failure in emergency response.
Over $US 40 million was spent from 1982-84 to control the movement of a
3 million cubic metre creeping mass of rock and colluvium at Tablachaca Dam in
Peru (Schuster, 1995).
In Ecuador landslide fatalities have increased from 10 deaths in the 1950s
to 290 deaths in the 1980s (Benitez, 1989). In 1983 a landslide killed 150 people
on the Panamerican Highway. In 198 7 a number oflandslides resulted in a large
number of fatalities for each landslide. Landslides at the entrance to the
Nambija goldmine killed 80 people. Near Cochancay dozens of people were
killed when five buses were buried by landslides. Earthquake triggered
landslides killed more than 1,000 people near Reventador. The estimated
damage in the 1980s is $US 4 million.
C) Europe
i) United Kingdom
Hutchinson (1995) and Brook (1995) provided data on deaths due to
landsliding in the United Kingdom. Deaths due to sliding average only one or
two per year. However, 144lives were lost in the Aberfan disaster (Bishop et al,
1969), which increases the average. About two to four deaths per year in quarry
accidents also occur. The quarry deaths come into the category of voluntary
(occupational) risk.
In October 1966 a landslide that began as a failure of a coal tailings tip
destroyed most of the town of Aberfan in Wales, killing 144 (Bishop et al, 1969).
The Aberfan disaster had a major influence on safety legislation, particularly
tipping practice. It also led to a massive coal tailings tip stabilisation program
which was carried out over a decade (Hutchinson, 1995).
Special focus also exists on the management and stabilisation of coastal
landslides forming the Undercliff of the Isle of Wight, even though no deaths
have occurred there since 1799 (Hutchinson, 1995).
ii) Sweden
Although large nunibers oflandslides occur, the fatalities are relatively low
(Viberg, 1989). The average annual fatality rate is about one person. In the 20th
century the worst disaster was the Tuve 1977landslide which claimed 9lives.
The estimated annual landslide costs are in the range $US 10-20 million
per annum (Schuster, 1995). A Swedish national policy on landslide risk has
been formulated, with the responsibility for landslide risk being divided
between the national government and municipalities (Viberg, 1989). The policy
incorporates the regulation of land development in landslide risk areas.
iii) Denmark
Denmark is not a country with serious landslide problems (Pedersen et al,
1989). No landslide fatalities have been reported. The annual landslide cost is in
the range of $US 1-3 million.
iv) Norway
On average 15 people are killed by landslides each year (Gregersen and
Sandersen, 1989). The landslide problems are dominated by quick-clay slides.
In 1978 a quick-clay slide at Rissa destroyed 7 farms and 5 houses with no loss of
life. 112 people were killed by a quick-clay slide at Verdalen in1983.
The average annual landslide cost is estimated at $US 6 million (Gregersen
and Sandersen, 1989). The acceptable annual risk levels for a natural hazard
affecting a house are prescribed as 10- 3 uo- 2 for buildings that are only
occasionally occupied) in the Norwegian Building Code. Insurance against

natural hazards (including landsliding) is part of the standard conditions for fire
insurance policies and includes all material losses except for the loss ofland. The
loss ofland is compensated by theN atural Fund for Natural Disaster Assistance.
Landslide hazard mapping is also under way.
v) Italy
The worst disaster this century occurred in 1963 at the Vaiont reservoir
(Schuster, 1995). A high speed rock slide caused a reservoir wave that
overtopped the dam and took over 2,500 lives. Another rock avalanche occurred
at Val Pola in 1987, killing 27 and destroying four evacuated villages.
Annual landslide losses were estimated to be $US 1.14 billion per annum
by an unpublished UNESCO survey (Schuster and Fleming, 1986). The
estimated cost of the Vaiont disaster was about $US 600 million.
vi) Spain
The annual landslide fatality rate is estimated to be two to three persons
per annual based on Ayala and Ferre (1989). An earthquake triggered rock fall
near Azagra, Navarra, killed 100. Mine tailings have also resulted in fatalities -
for example, 12 people were killed in 1965 at Cantabria.
Ayala and Ferrer (1989) estimated annual landslide costs of the order of
$US 220 million per annum. Maps and landslide catalogues are also in
preparation on a national basis.
vii) France
In 1970 at least 72 people were killed by landslides, but very few landslide
deaths are indicated to have occurred recently (Flageollet, 1989). The economic
costs are substantial- $US 1.6 billion in 1983, $US 640 million in 1984, $US 635
million in 1985 and $US 361 million in 1986.
France is well advanced with developing a national program of landslide
loss reduction by developing landslide hazard maps through its Zones Exposed
to Risks of Movements of the Soil and Subsoil (ZERMOS) program. The scope of
the ZERMOS program has been enlarged to provide guidelines for land
development control, and the 1:5,000 maps are now known as PER (Plans
d'Exposition aux Risques) (Flageollet, 1989). Legislation in 1982 made these
landslide hazard maps a legal requirement as it requires insurance against
natural hazards, and therefore landslide hazard mapping on a large scale.
viii) Central European Alps

Eisbacher and Clague (1984) present an account oflandslides in the central
European Alps in the last 2,000 years in the form of case studies. A selection of
the best documented catastrophes is discussed further in section 9.1.2.3.
Switzerland, Austria, France and Italy all have a long history oflandsliding. In
other parts of central Europe landslide deaths have occurred only sporadically,
mainly in Romania and Bulgaria, although significant damage has been
incurred (Kotarba, 1989).
D) Asia
i) China
Over 75% of China's land mass is mountainous (Li Tianchi, 1989). The
large number of landslide deaths in China are related to earthquakes, heavy
rainfall and flooding from the failure oflandslide dams. The average number of
landslide fatalities exceeds 100 per annum. In the 20th century, the greatest
number of landslide deaths, over 100,000, occurred in Ningxia in 1920 due to
massive earthquake-triggered loess slides. More recently 277 people lost their
lives in 1988 in the Gansu province from a loess slide. These disasters occur one
every few years. Landslides each resulting in over 100 deaths in China are
discussed further in section 9.1.2.3.
The landslide costs are not available on a national basis yet, but Li Tianchi
(1989) details costs for individual areas, railways and roads. The estimated total
cost is $US 0.5 billion annually during 1951-87.
There is no national landslide society in China as yet, but landslide
societies and committees have been established in landslide-affected provinces
(Li Tianchi, 1989). They hold international symposia such as the China-Japan
Field Workshop on Landslides in 1987. The Chengdu Institute of Mountain
Disasters and Environment of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the
Northwest Institute of China Academy of Railway are the two main institutions
concerned with the study and control of landslides.
ii) Nepal
Schuster (1995) indicates that hundreds of people have been killed by
landslides in recent decades. Very little information is available on fatalities and
costs. This is a common situation for all less developed countries.
iii) Taiwan
The combination of steep terrain, high seasonal rainfall and frequent
seismic activity causes large numbers of landslides in Taiwan (Brand, 1989).
There are few recent reports of casualties. Earlier in the century earthquake
induced landslides killed about 350 people in 1941, and the failure of a landslide
dam resulted in 154 deaths in 1951. Economic losses are high, but consolidated
cost data is not available.
iv) Japan
In Japan catastrophic slope failures resulting in large losses of life and

property occur almost every year (Schuster, 1995; Schuster and Fleming, 1986).
For example, one of Japan's largest cities, Kobe, was hit by debris flows in July
1938. Over 100,000 homes were destroyed and 50S lives lost. More recently 333
people were killed in 1983 when thousands of landslides and debris flows
occurred inN agasaki and northern Kyushu. The average landslide fatality rate
from 1967-82 is 150 per annum (Schuster and Fleming, 1986).
Because of the continuing threat oflandslide disasters Japan has evolved a
comprehensive program of landslide loss reduction since the second World War
(Oyagi, 1989; Schuster and Fleming, 1986), often known as the SABO erosion
control works. The 1958 Landslide Prevention Law was the first program in
Japan devoted exclusively to landslides. Other legislation has been passed since
then, including the 1969 Law for the Prevention of Disasters Caused by the
Collapse of Steep Slopes. This legislation provides government compensation
from natural disasters for which no individual bears responsibility, and for
preventative works. The estimated annual cost was $US 500 million in 1982.
Schuster's (1995) more recent estimate of landslide control costs is $US 4-5
billion, including more than $US 3 billion in the Sabo erosion works (debris flow
control).
v) South Korea
Choi and Youn (1994) present data which indicate that over the period
1976-1991, the average number of deaths per annum in South Korea was 56,
with a maximum of222 in 1977. It should be noted that as described by them
and Kim et al (1994), most of the landsliding is small with a mean volume of
about 1,000m3 (mostly debris flow). Kim et al also present landslide damage
costs for specific affected areas.
vi) India
The economic landslide losses in India are estimated to be comparable to
those in the United States, Japan, China and Italy (Schuster and Fleming,
1986). National figures are not available, however, a total landslide damage cost
was estimated to be nearly $US 1 billion per annum for the landslide-prone,
mountainous parts of northern India.
vii) Former Soviet Union

The greatest catastrophe in this century occurred in the former Soviet
Union in 1949 (Schuster, 1995). A magnitude 7.5 earthquake in Tadzhikistan
caused large number of massive landslides and debris flows that buried 33 towns
and villages. The estimates of the loss oflife range from 13,000 to 20,000. Some
large cities in the former Soviet Union are located in dangerous debris and mud
flow areas. In 1921 a debris flow killed 500 people in the capital of the Kazakh
republic. One of the world's largest landslides in Pamir (of volume 2.5 km3)
caused very few casualties because the area was sparsely populated. Khegai and
Popov (1989) indicate large losses of life in Kazakhstan from massive debris
flows, and their estimate of landslide cost exceeds $US 500 million.
viii) Hong Kong

During the period 1984-93, the average landslide fatality rate in Hong
Kong was one per annum (Finlay and Fell, 1995). Due to recent deaths in 1994
and 1995 this number has probably increased to two per annum. A number of
landslide disasters occurred in the 1970s. Recent landslide disasters of the
1960s and 1970s are detailed by Brand (1989, 1995). In 1966 heavy rains
resulted in 64 fatalities due to numerous landslides. The most disastrous
landslides occurred in 1972, with a total of250 casualties. The majority of these
were involved in two major landslides at Po Shan Road and Sau Mau Ping. A
failure on the steep natural colluvial hillside at Po Shan Road demolished a four
storey building and a 13 storey apartment block, killing 6 7. At the Sau Mau Ping
housing estate, a fill slope liquefied, inundating dwellings and killing 71 people.
In 1976 the number of people killed or injured was 57, with another fill slope
failure at Sau Mau Ping claiming 18 lives. As a result of the inquiry into these
disasters, the government established the Geotechnical Control Office (GCO) in
1977 to control the geotechnical aspects of all development in Hong Kong. The
organisation has changed its name to the Geotechnical Engineering Office
(GEO) in 1992. In 1994 a retaining wall failure at Kwun Lung Lau that took five
lives resulted in the employment of an additional133 GEO staff.
The annual cost of landslide remedial works in Hong Kong is indicated to
be over $US 25 million (Schuster, 1995). The GEO continues to function in its
role of geotechnical control of development. A recent research study has
investigated the risk assessment of landsliding (Finlay and Fell, 1995).
ix) Singapore
Brand (1989) indicates that casualties and serious damage from landslides
are virtually unknown in Singapore.
x) Malaysia
Fatalities from landsliding occur frequently according to Brand (1989),
although the average fatality rate was not indicated. Open cut tin mines have
resulted in 246 deaths from slope failure alone during 1960-80. A rock fall
disaster occurred in 1973 when a 9,000m3 slab of rock fell from a cliff onto flimsy
dwellings, killing over 40 people. A more recent disaster involving the collapse of
a 14 storey condominium (part of the Highland Towers complex) in 1993 claimed
48lives (Inquiry Committee, 1994). A combination ofupslope fill, undesigned
rubble walls, inadequate foundations and poor construction methods and
supervision led to the collapse. The adjoining two identical towers were
condemned.
The Highland Towers disaster prompted a major review of building
approval processes, a tightening of standards and requirements for mandatory
independent review of design in high risk areas.
xi) Philippines
Very little information on landsliding in the Philippines is published
(Brand, 1989). Only more serious events have been reported. In 1978 a
landslide slid across the Olongapo-Sybic National Highway, killing 30 people
who lived below the road. Near Davao, on the island of Mindanao, 23 people
were reported to have died in 1988. Several hundred people have been killed due
to failures in uncontrolled excavations in gold rush areas. In more recent times
press reports indicate a number of deaths from lahars flowing from Mt
Punitubo, but the details of these are not available.
xii) Indonesia
Indonesia's large population is concentrated in several densely developed
areas (Brand, 1989). Volcanic and earthquake activity increases the dangers to
life. Lahar flows, mud and debris flows occur frequently, and landslide deaths,
though not quantified as an annual fatality rate, are numerous. One example is
the failure of a natural slope with quarry workings at the toe in 1987 in west
Sumatra, killing 132 people. No economic estimates of landslide losses are
available (Brand, 1989).
xiii) Thailand
Brand (1989) notes that no urban landslide problems (and therefore
casualties) exist as centres of population are not located on hilly terrain. Only a
few isolated casualties have been reported. However, rural landslide disasters
have happened. In 1988 up to 700 people were killed in villages inundated by
flow slides. Deforestation of the hill sides plays a major contribution to the rural
landslide disasters.
E) Australasia
i) Australia
Although landsliding in Australia is extensive (Fell, 1995), in terms of
landslide fatalities Australia is quite fortunate. The only two recently recorded
fatalities were due to the failure of a railway embankment in Coledale, south of
Sydney, in 1988 (Mostyn and Adler, 1992). However, these resulted in a Coronial
Inquest, a $AU 50 million stabilisation program and the charging of an engineer
with manslaughter. The engineer was acquitted, but the public outcry and the
government reaction clearly showed that landslides fatalities were not
acceptable.
Blong and Eyles (1989) indicate economic consequences by detailing
stabilisation and remedial costs in specific areas, as no national landslide
damage register operates. They note that the most severe consequences were
experienced in the state of Tasmania, where over 50 houses were damaged or
destroyed during 1956-80. Fell (1995) notes more recent expenditures of tens
of millions of dollars on railway and freeway landslide stabilisation works. The
hidden cost of sterilised, undeveloped land zoned as high landslide risk is also
highlighted by Fell.
No national landslide loss reduction body exists in Australia (Fell, 1995).
ii) Papua New Guinea

Major landslides are often a result of earthquakes and volcanic activity
(Blong and Eyles, 1989). The annual average landslide fatality rate is estimated
to be between five and ten. Economic losses have not been quantified, but are
noted to be significant by Blong and Eyles.
iii) New Zealand

Landslides, together with earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, are a part of
New Zealand's geological environment, and present continuing problems
(Blong and Eyles, 1989; Prebble, 1995). The average loss oflife from landsliding
is fairly low, less than one fatality per annum, but the economic significance is
greater. The most significant recent urban landslide was the 1979 Abbotsford
block slide, covering 18ha, which destroyed 64 houses in Dunedin. Fortunately
no fatalities were incurred due to the relatively slow movement of the slide.
Annual landslide costs in New Zealand are estimated to be over $US 12
million per annum (Blong and Eyles, 1989). Much larger costs can be incurred
from individual landslide disasters - for example, the 1988 Cyclone Bola is
estimated to have cost $US 72 million in damages. The most expensive landslide
stabilisation undertaken to date is the $US 220 million works on ancient
landslide complexes threatening the reservoir of the newly completed Clyde

Dam (Prebble, 1995).
A national landslide home insurance program reimburses owners for
damages from landslides or other natural hazards (Schuster, 1995). This
program has stemmed from the Earthquake and War Damage Act of 1944.
9.1.2.2 Average Annual Landslide Death Rates

Schuster (1995) indicates that Varnes (1981) estimated that during the
1971-74 period nearly 600 persons per year were killed worldwide by slope
failures, about 90% of which were in the Circum-Pacific region. Table 9.10
summarises the average annual death rates due to landsliding from various
countries which were reported in Brabb and Harrod (1989). These appear to
Table 9.10 Average annual landslide death rates excluding large disasters.
Average Annual
Continent Country Source
Death Rate
UK 1-2 2
France <1 1
Spain 2-3 1
Europe
Portugal 1 1
Norway 15 1
Central Europe ,...__1 1
USA 25 1
North America
Canada 5 3
South
Ecuador 29 1
America
Africa South Africa <1 1
Japan 150 3
South Korea 56 4
Hong Kong 2-3 5
Asia
China ......., 100 1
Papua New
10 1
Guinea
Australia Australia <1 1
Sources: 1. Brabb and Harrod, 1989
2. Hutchinson, 1995
3. Schuster and Fleming, 1986
4. Choi and Youn, 1994
5. Finlay and Fell, 1995
exclude catastrophic landslide events. One can see that Japan has the biggest
actual number of annual landslide fatalities. In order to compare these numbers
more meaningfully one could divide them by the total population of the country
in question or, better still, by the actual population exposed to landslide risk.
This second set of population estimates is, however, more difficult to establish.
It should also be noted that many of these averages do not include large landslide
disasters which are detailed in section 9.1.2.3.
Table 9.11 presents a summary of average annual probability of death due
to landsliding over the entire population for selected developed countries. It will
be seen that Norway has the highest probability, Australia the lowest, and Hong
Kong is comparable to the other countries. It should be noted that the countries
listed in Table 9.11 all spend considerable sums of money to reduce landslide
risk. This is described in Schuster (1995), who indicates some details of annual
expenditures on landslide risk reduction.

Landsliding. ·
Average No Annual Probability of

Approximate
Country Deaths Per Population(2) Death Due to Landslide
AnnumC1> X 105
Norway 15 4,300,000 in 3
Japan 150 125,000,000 in 8
South Korea 56 45,000,000 in 8
in 50 to
USA 25-50 250,000,000
in 100
Canada 5 28,000,000 in 56
Hong Kong in
6,000,000 60
{1984--94)
Australia < 1 17,500,000 < 1 in 175
Sources: 1. Brabb and Harrod, 1989, Schuster and Fleming, 1986, Choi and Youn, 1994, Finlay
and Fell, 1995.
2. Europa Publications Ltd, 1994.
9.1.2.3 Major Landslide Disasters

Some of the more catastrophic landslide events which have occurred
around the world are detailed by Schuster (1995). Large numbers of people have
died in landslides in developing countries, eg. landslides in Peru in 1962 and
1970 killed 4,000 to 5,000 and 18,000 persons respectively (Brabb and Harrod,
1989). Catastrophic landslide disasters in Europe, China and Japan are shown
in Tables 9.12 to 9.14. Table 9.14 also includes data for 1982-83 from Fuyita
(1985). All events listed in Table 9.14 were caused by heavy rainfall, most
commonly related to typhoons, none were triggered by earthquakes or volcanic
activity. Schuster and Fleming (1986) present a breakdown of the proportions of
deaths caused by landsliding only for deaths in Japan, which is reproduced in

Table 9.15. Choi and Youn (1994) indicate that the number of deaths in South
Korea peaked at 222 in 1977. Landslide disasters in Malaysia and Hong Kong
have already been mentioned previously.
Century (Schuster, 1995; Eisbacher and Clague, 1984).
No. of
Year Location Type of Slope Failure
Deaths
Plaine d'Oisans (Romanche River Failure of landslide dam, resulting
1219 Thousands
Valley, France in downstream flooding
1,500 to
1248 Mount Granier, France Rock avalanche
5,000
Earthquake-triggered rock falls and Heavy loss
1348 Dobratsch Massif, Austria
rock avalanches of life
Ganderberg-Passeier Wildsec Failure of rock-slide dam, resulting
1419 > 400
(Passer Valley), Italy in downstream flooding
1486 Zarera (Val Lagune), Switzerland Rock avalanche 300
Kienholz (Brienzer See).
1499 Debris flow ,.._,400
Switzerland
Failure of rock-avalanche dam, ,.._,600
1515 Biasca (Val Blenio), Switzerland
resulting in downstream flooding
1569 Hofgastein (Gastein Valley), Austria Debris flow 147
1569 Schwaz (Inn Valley), Austria Debris flow 140
Corbeyrier-Yvorne (Tour d'Ai),
1584 Debris flow 328
Switzerland
1618 Piuro (Val Bregaglia), Italy Rock-<Jebris, avalanche "-'1,200
1669 Salzburg, Austria Rock toppled rock fall 250
Goldau (Rossberg Massif),
1806 Rock avalanche 457
Switzerland
1814 Ante lao Massif (Boite Valley). Italy Rock avalanche 300
1881 Elm (Sernf Valley), Switzerland Rock avalanche 115
1892 St Gervais (Arve Valley), France Ice-debris flow 117
Vaiont Reservoir (Piave Valley), Rock slide caused flooding along At least
1963
Italy shore of reservoir and downstream 1,900
9.1.2.4 Consequences of Landslide Disasters

Major landslide disasters have often instigated major government policy
changes and/or expenditures, and hence can be used as a guide to unacceptable
landslide risks. In most cases the probability of these events is difficult to
estimate accurately without detailed studies, but the consequences are certainly
well documented. The author has presented information on such events in
several countries in section 9.1.2.1. The policy changes are indicated in Table
9.16 below.
Table 9.13 Landslides in China that have killed at least 100 people (Li Tianchi,
1989)
Affected Number of
Year Province Type of slope failure
Area deaths
186 BC Gansu Wudu Rock and debris avalanche 760
100 Hubei Zhigui Rock slide and avalanche > 100
1310 Hubei Zhigui Rock slide and avalanche 3,446
1558 Hubei Zhigui Rock slide and avalanche > 300
1561 Hubei Zhigui Rock slide and avalanche > 1,000
1718 Gansu Tongwei Earthquake-induced landslide 40,000
1786 Suchuan Luding Flood from landslide dam failure 100,000
1847 Qinghai Beichuan Loess and rock slide hundreds
1856 Sichuan Qianjiang Rock slide induced by earthquake > 1,000
1870 Sichuan Satang Rock slide induced by earthquake > 2,000
1897 Gansu Ningyuan Loess and rock slide > 100
1917 Yunnan Daguan Rock slide 1,800
1920 Ningxia Haiyuan Earthquake induced loess slides 100,000
1933 Sichuan Maowen Flood from landslide dam failure 2,429
1935 Sichuan Huili Rock and debris slide 250
1943 Qinghai Gong he Loess and mudstone slide 123
1951 Taiwan Tsao-Ling Flood from landslide dam failure 154
1954 Xizang Jiangzhi Flood caused by glacier dam failure 450
1964 Gansu Lanzhou Landslide and debris flow 137
1965 Yunnan Luguan Rock slide 444
1966 Gansu Lanzhou Landslide and debris flow 134
1972 Sichuan Lugu Debris flow 123
1974 Sichuan Nanjiang Landslide 195
1975 Gansu Zhuanglong Loess slide caused by flooding > 500
1979 Sichuan Yaan Debris flow 114
1980 Hubei Yuanan Rock slide and avalanche 284
1983 Gansu Dong Xiang Loess landslide 277
1984 Yannan Yin min Debris flow 121
1984 Sichuan Guanlue Debris flow > 300
1987 Sichuan Wushan Rock avalanche 102

1985).
Number of
Number of Houses
Date Prefecture Severely Affected Area Dead or Destroyed or
Missing Badly
Damaged
July 1938 Hyogo Mount Rokko (Kobe area) 505 130,192
July 1945 Hiroshima Kure City and its environs 1,154 1,954
Sept1945 Gumma Mount Akagi 271 1,538
July 1951 Kyoto Kameoka 114 15,141
June 1953 Kumamoto Mount Aso 102 No data
July 1953 Wakayama Arita River 460 4,772
Aug 1953 Kyoto Minamiyamashiro 336 5,122
Sept1958 Shizuoka Kanogawa River 1,094 19,754
Aug 1959 Yamanashi Kamanashi River 43 277
June 1961 Nagano Ina Valley Region 130 3,018
Sept 1966 Yamanashi Lake Saiko 32 81
July 1967 Hyogo Mount Rokko 92 746
July 1967 Hiroshima Kure City and its environs 88 289
July 1972 Kumamoto Amakusa Island 115 750
Aug 1972 Niigata Kurokawa Village 31 1'102
July 1974 Kagawa Shodo-shima Island 29 1,139
Aug 1975 Aomori Mount lwaki 22 28
Aug 1975 Kochi Niyodo River 68 536
Sept1976 Kagawa Shodo-shima Island 119 2,001
May 1978 Niigata Myoko-Kogen 13 25
Oct 1978 Hokkaido Mount Usu 3 144
Aug 1979 Gifu Horadani 3 16
Aug 1981 Nagano Ubara 10 56
July 1982 Nagasaki Nagasaki City 299 19,447
July 1983 Shimane Western Shimane 107 17,600
1986).
(A)
(B) (C) Percentage of
Deaths Due to
Deaths Due to Deaths Due to Deaths Due to
Year Floods and All
Mudflows and Other Types of Landslides
Types of
Debris Flows Landslides :100x(B +C)/A
Landslides
1967 603 297 158 75.4
1968 259 154 5 61.4
1969 183 32 82 62.3
1970 175 22 27 28.0
1971 376 53 171 59.6
1972 637 194 239 68.0
1973 81 19 18 45.7
1974 239 40 129 70.7
1975 202 71 49 59.4
1976 242 72 81 63.2
1977 54 12 8 37.0
1978 110 16 24 36.4
1979 202 4 23 13.4
1980 114 0 25 21.9
1981 92 13 20 35.9
*1982 508 152 185 66.3
Total deaths 4,077 1,151 1,244
Average 82
255 78
deaths/year
*1982 unpublished data provided by the Ministry of Construction (Japan)
It is clear that maJOr changes to government policies and/or large

expenditures on compensation and stabilisation works resulted from the
consequences of major landslide disasters. Clearly the loss oflarge numbers of
lives in a landslide disaster is unacceptable, and substantial resources have been
employed in various countries to prevent landslide disasters from recurring.
The aversion of society to disasters with multiple fatalities applies to landslides
as well, which is not unexpected (see Rohrmann, 1995a; AN COLD, 1994; Slavic,
1987). Hence one can conclude that while society may generally accept isolated
deaths of individuals from landslides, perceiving these as random (Rohrmann,
1995b), landslide disasters with multiple fatalities are to be avoided at all cost.
This is particularly the case where there is a degree of perceived control over the
situation, ie disasters influenced or caused by the failure of man-modified
slopes. Natural disasters, on the other hand, are seen as "acts of God",
unpredictable and uncontrollable, and therefore must be somehow lived with.
Table 9.16 Summary of landslide disaster consequences.
Number of
Country Year Disaster Consequences
Deaths
Sabo Erosion Control Works (since 1900's)
1958 Landslide Prevention Law
Hundreds,
Japan Continuing disasters 1969 Law for the prevention of Disasters
thousands
Caused by the Collapse of Steep
Slopes
1969 Virginia 150 Numerous local government regulations for
1980 Mt St Helens 5-10 development control introduced
USA
San Francisco Los Angeles grading code introduced, re-
1982 30 vised
Bay
Massive coal tailings tip stabilisation pro-
gram
UK 1966 Abert an 144
Major review of safety legislation, particular-
ly tipping practice
Sau Mau Ping 71
1972 Establishment of the Geotechnical Control
Hong Po Shan Rd 67
Office in 1977 to control the geotechnical
Kong
Sau Mau Ping aspects of development
1976 57
and others
Major review of building approval processes
Highland Tightening of standards
Malaysia 1993 48
Towers Requirement for independent design review
in high risk areas introduced
Coronia! inquest, manslaughter charges,
Australia 1988 Cole dale 2
major stabilisation works
9.1.3 Legal Implications of Landslides

Persons and corporations seek compensation for deaths or damages from
natural disasters, and landslide disasters are no exception (Schuster, 1995;
Olshansky, 1990). If one or more persons and/or institutions can be seen to be
potentially liable for negligence, redress is likely to be sought in court. The
author has gathered some examples, and discusses the legal issues below.
9.1.3.1 Legal Implications of Landslide Deaths

With increasing frequency institutions and/or their officers are sued for
neglect following landslide deaths. Three examples from Italy, Canada and
Australia serve to illustrate the main issues.
Following the 1963 Vaiont disaster in Italy Schuster (1995) notes that civil
suits for personal injury and loss of life amounted to $US 16 million.
Bunce, Cruden and Morgenstern (1995) and Bunce (1994) present some
useful data relating to landslide risk on British Columbia Highway 99. A death
due to rock fall was followed by a law suit, in which the relatives of the deceased
successfully sued the State Highway Authority. The judgement concluded that:
"The province owes a duty of care which ordinarily extends to their

reasonable maintenance to those using its highways. The
Department of Highways could readily foresee the risk that harm
might befall users of a highway if it were not reasonably maintained.
The maintenance could be found to extend to the prevention of injury
from falling rock (p.1229)"
The estimated annual risk for the landslide in cutting in which the death
occurred was calculated by Bunce (1994) to be 6 x 10- 8 for a single user, and
3 x 10- 5 for a commuter using the road 500 times per year. The annual
probability of a rock fall causing death for the exposed population was assessed
as 8 x 10- 2 . This risk offatality is clearly too high even for a voluntary risk (and
death due to rock falls are likely to be perceived as involuntary by the public),
and thus the authority would be required to reduce it.
In Australia, the failure of a railway embankment in Coledale, south of
Sydney; in 1988 (Mostyn and Adler, 1992) killed a mother and her child, who
were in a house immediately below the embankment. A combination of factors
including an existing deep-seated failure, blocking of drainage culverts under
the embankment which resulted in the overtopping and erosion of the
embankment, and porous zones within the embankment itself all contributed to
the resulting mudslide. There was a tremendous public outcry. A Coronia!
Inquest was held, following which the chief geotechnical engineer from the
railway authority was charged with manslaughter. The engineer was acquitted,
but the public outcry and the government reaction clearly showed that
landslides fatalities were not acceptable. A $AU 5 million stabilisation program
of the railway embankment then followed.
These examples are not exhaustive, but illustrate the legal concept of a
duty of care for authorities which own or maintain man -modified slopes that
could fail, and injure or kill people. This concept exists in countries following the
British common law. In this system negligence is a criminal offence, and
institutions and the officers deemed to be responsible for negligent
actions/inactions can be held jointly and individually liable for manslaughter.
Engineers and others can be jailed if found guilty of criminal negligence. The
issue of negligence is an ongoing topic of debate in countries with the British
common law structure.
9.1.3.2 Legal Implications of Landslide Damages

The three examples from the United States of America below indicate that
people are willing to file law suits for landslide property damage, particularly in
the American legal system where lawyers' fees are a direct percentage of the
claim (if it is won).
The Portugese Bend landslide in Palos Verdes Hills, California, made it
necessary to raze 127 homes and a recreational club located on the slide between
1956 and 1959 (Schuster, 1995). Property owners in the area sued the County of
Los Angeles on the basis that road construction by the County was responsible
for the initiation of the failure, and were awarded $US 9.5 million.
In the wake of the disastrous storms in the San Francisco Bay area in 1982
some 930 law suits and claims totalling $US 298 million were filed against city
and county agencies in the San Francisco Bay area (Schuster, 1995). This total
amount of legal claims is considerably greater than the total property losses
resulting from the storm.
The Big Rock Mesa landslide along the Malibu coast west of Los Angeles by
1984 brought about the condemnation of 13 houses and threatened more than
300 others (Schuster, 1995). A large number of law suits was filed against the
County of Los Angeles and a number of consultants, resulting in a total of more
than $US 500 million legal claims.
The use of tort liability as a deterrent against poor hillside construction
and maintenance practices is discussed at length by Olshansky (1990). He notes
that attorneys believe that this may be the best incentive for reducing landslide
losses, and that the threat of liability currently is the defacto policy instrument
in the United States ofAmerica in the absence of a coordinated or administrative
landslide policy. Depending on the laws of each state and the facts of a given case,
many parties may be potentially liable for their actions relating to landslide
damage. Olshansky summarises the results of an exhaustive survey of case law
from this view point. The potentially liable parties include:
o Builders - for inadequate work, especially in the foundation.
o Architects and engineers - geotechnical engineers are expected to
have current knowledge and practice accordingly.
o Sellers - it is less likely for unstable or threatened home sites to enter
the market.
o Real estate agents -for misrepresentation or non-disclosure.
o Adjoining land owners - for removing lateral support, diverting
surface runoff or inadequately maintaining unstable land.
o Government and public agencies - for actions that cause landslide
damage. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
protected the government from being sued without its consent, has
been removed in most states. Local government are generally
immune from torts claims resulting from inadequate building
inspections.
Olshansky goes on to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of tort liability
as a public policy. He outlines the general support of the torts system from a
theoretical view point, but points out that many critics of the system believe that
it inadequately deters unsafe action and insufficiently compensates victims.
This inadequacy is apparently also supported by the few available empirical
studies, and " ... as with automobile accidents, the legal system may be more
concerned with allocating responsibility than with compensating victims".
Olshansky then examines the use of insurance as a solution to the problem of
landslide damages, detailing its potential advantages over other strategies.
Mter reviewing a number of case studies he concludes that insurance is
"potentially the most effective and equitable means of compensation for
landslide damages", and gives pertinent details of the practical application of a
landslide insurance system.
9.1.4 The Psychology of Risk Perception
This
section on risk perception discusses the following:
o background to risk perception studies,
o risks people are concerned about,
o revealed and expressed acceptable risks,
o investigation of the cognitive structure of risk perception using factor
analyses,
o social and cultural approaches to risk perception,
o the role of accidents and disasters in amplifying risk perception,
o acceptability of risk,
o risk perception by civil engineers in Australia, and
o risk perception of dam risk.
It forms the last part of the author's review of the literature on acceptable risk
and risk perception.
9.1.4.2 Background
The psychology of risk perception has been heavily researched for several
decades. The Royal Society (1992) offers a detailed overview of the literature.
According to the Royal Society, sense perception is generally used as a model for
risk perception research. Slavic (1987), one of the leading authors in risk
perception studies, gives a concise discussion of risk perception issues and
studies. Slavic sees risk perception research as aiding policy-makers by
improving communication between them and the public, and by focusing
educational efforts. Risk perception research can also help predict public
responses to new technologies, disastrous events and the introduction of new
risk management strategies.
A thorough and comprehensive review of risk perception research can be
found in Rohrmann (1995b). Rohrmann reviews a large number of risk
perception studies, which he divides into three groups. These are general
studies on risk judgements, studies on specific risk sources and aspects, and
international comparisons of risk perception. The first group of studies relates
to judging a set of hazards using a set of predefined risk aspects on a sample of
the general public, usually students. The main interest of these studies is the
cognitive structure underlying risk judgements and factors influencing the
perceived magnitude and acceptance of risks.
The second set of studies address specific research issues, including:
o differences in risk perception between societal groups within a
country,
o studies looking at occupational hazards,
o studies employing particular methods/approaches,
o studies focusing on specific sets of risk sources,
o studies dealing with the dimensions of risk perception, and
o studies based on expert views of the riskiness of hazards.
These studies contribute to the further understanding of risk perception.
The third group of studies looks at cross-national comparisons of
attitudes to risks, indicating considerable cross-cultural differences in risk
perception and evaluation. This is consistent with the arguments of cultural
theorists such as Wildavsky and Dake (1992). Rohrmann (1995b) concludes that
the characteristics of a risk source clearly matter when people assess and judge
risks. Acceptance seems to be mainly motivated by benefit considerations and
control beliefs. Hazards caused by nature are perceived and evaluated as more
tolerable than those coming from human activity and/or technology. Thus
Rohrmann states that the technical/quantitative approach of risk analysis is
inadequate to reflect the complex pattern of individual risk evaluations. He
believes that " .. .lay peoples' ... basic conceptualisation of risk is much richer
than that of experts, and reflects legitimate concerns ... ". Indeed he states:
"Actually, risk judgements may indicate more than just perception of
riskiness - they reveal global views on the development of
humankind, on technological progress, on the meaning of nature ... "
Slavic (1987) outlines the contributions to the understanding of risk perception
from the fields of geography, sociology, political science, anthropology and
psychology. The salient points are:
o Risk perception and acceptance have their roots in social and cultural
factors.
o The responses to hazards are socially influenced and often form after
an event has occurred.
o People downplay certain risks and emphasise others as a means of
group controL
o People employ mental strategies (heuristics) to make sense of an
uncertain world, but these lead to large and persistent biases.
o Experts are prone to many of the same biases as the general public.
o Strong initial views are resistant to change in spite of contrary
evidence, supplied later.
o When people lack strong opinions initially, their responses will vary
with the way the problem is formulated.
o Technologically sophisticated analysts use risk assessments, while
the public uses risk perceptions (ie. intuitive risk judgements).
Hence risk perception is a "complicated business" indeed (Fischhoff et al, 1993).
This broad background to risk perception leads into the discussion of the risks
that people are concerned about.
9.1.4.3 Risks People are Concerned About
A) General
Slavic (1987) notes that peoples' sensing and avoidance of harmful
environmental conditions is an instinct necessary for survival. He points out
that humans have the capacity to alter their environment as well as respond to
it. It is this capacity that both creates and reduces risk. Slavic's description of
the evolution of risk assessment is worth noting:
"In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and
nuclear technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause
catastrophic and lasting damage to the earth and life forms that
inhabit it. The mechanisms underlying these complex technologies
are unfamiliar and incomprehensible to most citizens. Their most

harmful consequences are rare and often delayed, ... and not well
suited to management by trial and error learning. The elusive and
hard to manage qualities oftoday's hazards have forced the creation
of a new intellectual discipline called risk assessment, designed to aid
in identifying, characterising and quantifying risk."
Hence humans will attempt to avoid any harmful situation or risk. When asking
people about what risks are of concern to them, Fischer et al (1991) found a
whole range of issues. Females and students were generally more concerned
about the environment, whereas males and older subjects were more likely to
mention health and safety risks. The respondents indicated more willingness
for the reduction of risks that posed a direct personal threat such as health risks
rather that a more general or diffuse threat such as pollution. Respondents also
saw themselves as bearing primary responsibility for managing threats to their
own health, but saw governments as bearing a heavier responsibility for
managing environmental risks and war.
In his detailed overview of risk perception research Rohrmann (1995b)
indicates that a number of studies in various countries have shown that
generally the "worst" perceived risks are smoking and nuclear power, followed
by asbestos production and automobiles. This is because the risks that rated the
most negative valuations in terms of perceived risk magnitude, health impacts
and general non -acceptability were long term heavy smoking, working in
asbestos production and living near a nuclear power plant (see also Rohrmann,
1994). These risks also produce the most fear associations. The risks with the
least negative ratings are living near an airport, electric storm areas, flying an
emergency helicopter and skiing.
According to Rohrmann (1994) the subjective probability of dying, concern
about health effects and the catastrophic potential of the risk source all predict
perceived magnitudes of risk. For hazards with acute impacts such as sport or
natural hazards, the probability of dying has a higher weight that health effects.
However, health impact is a better predictor of perceived risk magnitude than
the classic probability of dying indicator for risks with chronic impacts, and
catastrophic potential is also relevant.
B) Comparisons Across Different Countries and Groups

Differences as well as similarities in risk perception exist between different
groups as well as different countries (Rohrmann, 1995a; Rohrmann, 1994).
Rohrmann (1994) studied four different groups (technological, monetarian,
ecological and feminist orientation) in three different countries (Australia, New
Zealand and Germany). For the different Australian social groups, Rohrmann
found that:
o People with an ecological orientation as well as those involved with
feminist issues evaluate risks much more critically than the other two
groups.
o The largest group differences occur for technology-induced risks
such as nuclear power or chemical plants, which are also the most
debated technologies.
o Some interesting exceptions arose. For example, with risks such as
smoking, tranquillisers and overeating, technologists gave the lowest
risk acceptance ratings and ecological and feminist groups the
highest rating.
Rohrmann (1994) also found the following results for risk perception by
Australians:
o fear of health impacts is higher for risks with acute rather than
chronic effects,
o risk acceptance is higher for activities than for residential/
environmental hazards (and within the latter, for natural rather than
technology-induced risks),
o individual acceptance is higher for risks associated with private
activities, whereas societal acceptance is higher for occupational
risks, and
o much more societal benefit is seen for risky occupational activities
than for private ones.
Rohrmann (1994) found that differences in attitudes to risk among
technologically and ecologically oriented respondents were greater for German
groups compared to Australian groups. Also he notes the similarity of the
responses for the feminists and the ecologists, whereas the monetarian groups
tended to parallel the characteristic attitudes of engineers/technicians across all
three countries studied. The perceived magnitudes of risk were predicted by the
subjective probability of dying from the hazard, concern about health effects and
the catastrophic potential of the hazard. Rohrmann concluded that differences
between societal or ideological groups are larger than cross-national
differences, and that the pattern of risk perception is generally similar for
Australian, New Zealand and German data.
9.1.4.4 Revealed and Expressed Acceptable Risks

The pioneering work of Starr (1969) sought to answer the question of
"How safe is safe enough?". Slovic (1987) calls Starr's (1969) approach the
"revealed preference" approach, as Starr postulated that by trial and error

society has already arrived at an" essentially optimal balance" between the risks
and benefits associated with any existing activity. Hence Starr argued that one
could use historical risk and benefit data to obtain the "revealed" levels of
acceptable risk. By his approach Starr found that:
o acceptability of risk from an activity is roughly proportional to the
third power of benefits from that activity, and
o the public will accept risks from voluntary activities roughly 1,000
times greater than those from involuntary hazards that provide the
same level of benefits.
Slavic (1987) notes that Starr's (1969) approach has been debated at length. In
contrast to Starr's approach Slavic details the "expressed preference" approach
used by psychologists in the study of risk perception. Through eliciting peoples'
"expressed preferences" for acceptable risk psychologists develop a taxonomy
(classification) for hazards, which is then used to understand and predict
responses about risks. This is called the psychological paradigm, and uses
psycho-physical scaling and multivariate analysis to produce quantitative
representations ("cognitive maps") of the structure of risk attitudes and
perceptions. Within the paradigm people make judgements about:
o current riskiness,
o desired riskiness (the ideal),
o current level of regulation, and
o desired (ideal) level of regulation.
These judgements are related to judgements about the following properties of
hazards:
o The hazard's status in terms of characteristics that have been
hypothesised to account for risk perceptions and attitudes, ie:
voluntariness,
dread,
knowledge,
controllability, etc.
o Benefits that each hazard provides to society.
o Number of deaths caused by the hazard in an average year, ie. the
fatality rate.
o Number of de'aths caused by the hazard in an disastrous year, ie the
catastrophic dimension.
o How often a disastrous year occurs, ie every 50, 1,000 or 1 million
years?
Numerous psychological studies of "revealed" risk perceptions have been

carried out. As the Royal Society (1992) points out, one can find many
proponents of both approaches in various disciplines and institutions.
A) "Revealed" or Actual Acceptable Risks

The "revealed" preferences are also labelled quantitative risk estimates by
the Royal Society (1992). Quantitative estimates of risk are commonly obtained
by calculating actual fatality rates due to various hazards (The Royal Society,
1992). Numerous studies of actual fatality rates for various hazards are listed by
the Royal Society. The author has offered a detailed discussion of actual
comparative risk levels in section 9 .1.1.3. When relating comparative risk levels
to people's perception of risk, the trend according to the Royal Society would
appear to be for lay people, ie those not working in risk related fields, to
underestimate fatalities from more common or frequent hazards (eg car
accidents) and overestimate fatalities from less frequent hazards (eg flooding).
This is illustrated in Figure 9.6 for 40 causes of death in the USA. If the judged
and statistical estimates were equal the data would fall on the identity line. The
Royal Society also notes that quantitative risk estimates produced by desk-top
studies should be used with a degree of caution as the numbers tend to hide
many assumptions behind the studies.
McDaniels et al (1992) used the willingness to pay approach to determine
quantitatively what people are willing to pay for risk reduction. In looking at the
value of safety he concluded that well defined risks are affected by the level of
personal exposure whereas less defined risks are strongly influenced by dread
and severity. Other "willingness to pay" approaches are mentioned by the Royal
Society (1992).
The Royal Society (1992) and Melchers (1993) provide useful points on the
nature of the objective versus subjective risk debate which criticises the use of
the "revealed preference" or actual risk approach. Briefly, the proponents of
objective risk criteria argue that value judgements can be separated from the
determination of risk, and hence objective risk criteria can be found using the
scientific method (the Royal Society, 1992). The opponents of objective risk
criteria argue that all risk assessments are subjective, and that value
judgements are made in order to reduce a complex, multi -dimensional problem
into numbers (The Royal Society, 1992). Hence the proponents of objective risk
are likely to see risk conflicts as conflicts between the ill-informed public and
well-informed experts (Douglas, 1985). The opponents of objective risk,
Douglas (1985) notes, will argue that risk conflicts are underlain by conflict over
values and power. Wynne (1989) argues to change the current "objective versus
perceived risk" language of risk conflicts to developing a means for "unearthing

and examining the buried social assumptions that structure expert and lay
arguments about risk".
B) "Expressed" Preferences or Qualitative Estimates of Risk

Many varied qualitative studies of risk perception again can be found listed
by the Royal Society (1992). The basic groups are the simple risk ranking
techniques and the psychometric tradition. The ranking techniques are well
illustrated in publications such as "The Risk Ranking Technique in Decision
Making" (Chicken and Hayns, 1989). These require qualitative assessments of
risk in terms of one or more technical, economic or socio-political factors.
The psychometric tradition of eliciting people's perceptions of risk in terms
of numerous characteristics is well documented in papers such as Fischhoff et al
(1978) and Slovic (1987). An example of many textbooks on the theory is
Nunally (1967). Slovic (1987) argues that perceived risk is quantifiable and
predictable. The main point that came out of the various studies he cites is that
the "expressed" levels of acceptable risks are often lower than the "revealed"
levels. Hence people tend to view most current risk levels as unacceptable, and
yet continue to live with them.
6
10
....
10
5
Motor v.ehlcle
.
ACCidents •
/~All
.-!'Accidents • All Disease
/!
~
• All Cancer
C1)
/ / •Heart Disease
~
c.
10
4
Homicide • • •st ro ke
Vl • Stomach Cancer
..c:: Pregnancy
3 Flood
• :\ • TB l abetes
r• ••
~
C1) 10
-....
"0
0
C1) 2
. Tornado. • •
8otu I1sm • • Asthma
Electrocution
..0 10
E
::I
c::
"0
--E
C1)
~
10
Vl
UJ
3 4 5 6 7
1 10 10 10 10 10 10
Actual number of deaths per year
Figure 9.6 Relationship between judged and statistically estimated fatality

rates in the USA (The Royal Society, 1992).
Slovic (1987) outlines the employment of the psychological paradigm,

which uses psychological scaling and multivariate analyses to obtain
quantitative representations (cognitive maps) of risk perception. These are the
related to the characteristics (often called cognitive variables) of the hazard
which influence risk perception, such as the degree of voluntariness or dread.
Rohrmann (1995) points out that risk perception has predominantly been
studied by psychological methods. The psychometric approach is based,
according to Rohrmann, on the following four intentions:
o to establish "risk" as a subjective concept, not an objective entity,
o to include technical/physical and social/psychological aspects in risk
criteria,
o to accept opinions of "the public" (ie. not experts) as the matter of
interest, and
o to analyse the cognitive structure of risk judgements.
Table 9.17 lists some negative characteristics (cognitive variables) of hazards
that influence risk perception. The list is illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Table 9.17 Some negative characteristics of hazards influencing risk perception

(Otway and von Winterfeld, 1982).
1. Involuntary exposure to risk.

2. Lack of personal control over outcomes.
3. Uncertainty about probabilities or consequences of exposure.
4. Lack of personal experience with the risk {fear of the unknown).
5. Difficulty in imagining risk exposure.
6. Effects of exposure delayed in time.
7. Genetic effects of exposure {threatens future generations).
8. Infrequent but catastrophic accidents.
9. Benefits not highly visible.
10. Benefits go to others.
11. Accidents caused by human failure rather than natural causes.
Recent research (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Tversky et al, 1988;

Levin, 1987) has shown that preferences expressing people's values are
sometimes subject to reversal depending on how the questions are framed. At
\
the very least the way questions are framed will to some extent influence the
response obtained. The researcher's task is then to minimise these influences by
careful questionnaire design. Tversky et al (1988) note that preference reversal
may indicate that people often do not have well-defined values and beliefs.
Tversky et al note that this may also help explain the discrepancies between
expressed preferences and revealed preferences, ie between what risk people say
they will accept and what risk they actually live with. Thus Tversky et al argue
the foundations of choice theory and decision analysis (the standard tools of risk
managers) may be questioned if well-defined risk preferences are indeed
absent.
9.1.4.5 Investigation of the Cognitive Structure of Risk Perception

Using Factor Analyses
Studies of risk perception often perform factor analyses of the raw data (see
Rohrmann, 1995). Factor analyses are simply the reduction of a larger number
of qualitative hazard characteristics (cognitive variables) to fewer underlying
factors. This can be done as most cognitive variables are not completely
independent of each other; indeed many are highly correlated. For example, for
81 hazards Slavic (1987) has reduced 18 hazard characteristics to two factors,
namely "dread" risk and "unknown" risk. The hazards' factor scores have then
been plotted in the two factor space. The plot is shown in Figure 9. 7. Each factor
is made up of a combination of characteristics indicated by the lower diagram.
The author has also employed factor analyses in his study of the cognitive
variables applicable to landslide risk. The author's approach, results and
discussion can be found in section 9.2.4.
9.1.4.6 Social and Cultural Approaches to Risk Perception

The social and cultural approaches to risk perception are discussed in
detail by Rohrmann (1995), the Royal Society (1992) and Slavic (1987). These
include social processes and risk perception, the social framing of risk
assessments, the social amplification of risk and cultural theory. Each of these
areas is reviewed briefly.
A) Social Approaches to Risk Perception

The Royal Society's succinct description of social processes and risk
perception is worth reproducing. The Royal Society states:
"There are good a priori grounds for examining the role that social
processes might play in risk assessment, risk behaviour and risk
perception. The perceiver of risk is rarely an isolated individual, but a
'social being' who necessarily lives and works, plays and rests, within
networks of informal and formal relationships with others. Such
relationships are manifest in a wide range of both small and large
scale social and institutional arrangements within and across
societies. These arrangements set constraints and obligations upon
people's behaviour, provide broad frameworks for shaping of their

attitudes and beliefs, and are also closely tied to questions both of
morality and of what is to be valued and what is not. There is no
reason to believe that beliefs and values relating to hazards are any
different from other more general beliefs and values .. . The
accumulated empirical evidence from the psychometric and social
psychological studies supports the view that a purely psychological,
individual-based analysis can account for only a part of risk
perception and risk behaviour ... "
In her book on "Risk Analysis According to the Social Sciences" Douglas (1985)
looks at risk acceptability from a social science perspective. The pertinent
chapters are:
Chapter 1 - Moral Issues in Risk Acceptability
Douglas contrasts the dominant utilitarian system versus egalitarian and
elitist systems. She argues that social view points are important and
improve rather than cloud the "mathematical view".
Chapter 3 - Perception of Risk
Douglas notes that humans are not rational thinkers and that our
knowledge of risk perception is controlled by the choice of method of
studying risk perception.
Chapter 4 - Choice and Risk
The main points made are that attitudes towards risk are jointly
determined by values and probabilities, not solely by the utility function,
and that individuals are more concerned by changes from some baseline
rather than total "amounts" to be won or lost.
The book looks at issues and perspectives not commonly found in traditional
technical risk assessments and how they form part of the social framework.
Theory of choice, operations research procedures and the social
constitution of acceptable risk are expounded by McDonell (1991). Wynne
(1982) critiques common assumptions and beliefs underlying scientific
research, rationality and objectivity. Beck (1989) claims that risk analysis is
underlain by a social dilemma of either capitulating in the face of systematically
produced dangers or abrogating basic democratic principles through
authoritarian reinforcement of the state order so as to control these dangers.
Ronge (1982) offers the following view: "Risk research was invented to (and
attempts to) support political institutions in their job of mediating technological
projects with social needs and dominating social opposition of acceptance".
Otway and von Winterfeld (1982) argue for the return of risk acceptability to its
social and political context.
FACTORl
UnknoWiliWk
Laarilc.
w.... n~ • Elo=l< lloWI • SST

s-t.aria • • trocrica • eDES
Wucr chlorWidoG .• Hcwvh' rophcDc • ,_.,_ r....m-.
CCMIIat Mitdya e P-,..;.,1 doloridc •
e c..t-i- UI&IC
.....-
Oral~· •
vo~.~- • ~x.,.,.. Mira ~........__,_. e l. "'· J. T
o.,_ • • IUD AAolibioda e
a..- -roe~..n.• •
• eDDT
Aucolad • Mer_,- • f....U 1\ocis
• lAod poift( FACTOR I
• c.o.I-Mraiat (pollu<ioo)
Drad!Usk
__
e"*ocaa...(COJ •
_....._... S.Oklal(.u-).
s--obilco•
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• c-lal.lq("'-1
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T .......,u- • • T""""" ·s~~~ra

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( )•
• u......,.......~;.. • eo.J.-!-1--IICII:idc:au
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• biln>M -w.o....
-~..w-
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FACTORl
Not obscrn.blc:
Coatrollablc: Uukown 10 those: exposed UncoatroUablc:
Not dread Effect delayed Dra.d
Not &lobal catartrophic Ncwrislc Global catastrophic
Comcqucncxs aot fatal IUsks unknowtlco scic:ncc Coascqucuces fatal
Equitable Not equitable:
IDdlvidual ~phic FACTOR!
Low rblt 10 future Hi&h risk 10 future
..,.w:ratiocu Observable ICDCf&UOCU
Euily reduced Knowu to those: exposed Noc cuily rcduad
IUslt decrcasin, Effect immediate: Risk macasin,
Voluucary Old risk lavolwuazy
Risks known to scicDa:

relationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up
of a combination of the characteristics as shown in the lower portion
of the diagram (Siovic, 1987).
Rayner and Cantor (1987) propose a different approach to dealing with risk
via a fairness hypothesis. Conflict over risk rather than probability is the focus
of their study. According to Rayner and Cantor the conflict is seen to occur
between the following four basic societal groups:
o competitive/market,
o atomised individuals,
o bureaucratic/hierarchical, and
o egalitarian.
They conclude by stating that understanding the differences in group goals may
enhance decision negotiations. Otway (1980) looks at the perception of
technological risk, concluding that acceptable risk definitions will vary from
case to case, and the process is more important than the numbers.
Thus useful insights can be gained from the social approaches to risk
perception and acceptable risk, particularly regarding the limitations of
quantified risk assessment and the different meanings that the term
"acceptable risk" has to different people (The Royal Society, 1992).
B) Cultural Approaches to Risk Perception

Cultural theory is one of the major challenges to orthodox psychological
approaches to risk perception (The Royal Society, 1992). The basic idea is that
there are a limited number of different contradicting cultural biases and
associated lifestyles, which depend on the extent to which the individual is part
of a bounded "group", and the extent to which the individual conducts their
social life according to rules - "grid". Hence the name given the theory is
sometimes grid- group cultural theory. A proposal to create a cultural theory of
risk can be found in Thompson and Wildavsky (1982). The Royal Society notes
that cultural theory has generated much less systematic evidence than that
gathered by the psychologists, and hence may not be as validated and useful at
this stage.
9.1.4. 7 The Role of Accidents and Disasters in Amplifying Risk

Perception
Throughout history major events such as accidents and disasters have

changed public and institutional attitudes to risks, and often introduced stricter
regulation and control. One only needs to recall nuclear accidents such as
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, and chemical plant accidents such as Bhopal.
These accidents greatly increased the public's fears of the nuclear and chemical
industries, and caused a dramatic increase in safety requirements and the
degree of regulation (Rohrmann, 1995b). Some accidents or disasters can thus
cause "ripples" that impact far beyond their immediate sphere of influence and
"signal" a change in the public and institutional approach (Slavic, 1987). The
model of the impact of unfortunate events is shown in Figure 9.8. It highlights
the far-reaching consequences of major disasters or events.
9.1.4.8 Acceptability of Risk

What constitutes an acceptable risk? This question has been studied and
debated at length (Rohrmann, 1995a; Melchers, 1993; The Royal Society, 1992).
It appears to be generally accepted that when the risk is in the negligible region,
then it is "acceptable" as people do not demand its reduction, and it is felt not to
be significant. Similarly, when the risk is above the ALARP region, it is
"unacceptable" and must be reduced. Most risk controversies occur for risks in
the ALARP region, as many groups feel that the current risk levels are not
"reasonably low" (Melchers, 1993). The Royal Society (1992) points out that
people may tolerate risks in the ALARP region (ie be prepared to live with them)
while not accepting them. Hence the difference between acceptable and
tolerable risks is pointed out. There are many reasons while people may tolerate
a risk while not accepting it. The main reason is often the inability to avoid
exposure to the risk for economic or other reasons. Thus one needs to bear in
mind that the tolerance of a risk does not mean its acceptance (The Royal
Society, 1992), and hence Starr's (1969) hypothesis that society has already
arrived at an "essentially optimal balance" between the risks and benefits
associated with any existing activity may be too simplistic for use in the
determination of acceptable risks.
\ I
loss ol
s~tes
ReguLatory
Portrayal Risk-rel~ted
constuinls
of event behavior
·-··············· ...................
•Symbols •Institutions liligation
• Siquls
•IRUQety I •Groups
•lnaividuals
Community
opposition
Investor
lliQhl
RISK EVENT INfORMATION INTERPRETATION SPREAO OF IMPACT TYPE OF IMPACT

MNT CHARACTERISTICS fLOW AND RESPONSE (RIPPLING) (COMPANY lEVEl)
1992).
A conceptual proposal for acceptable risk is given by Fischhoff (1994).

Fischhoff defines a technology as as having a socially acceptable level of risk if
"its benefits outweigh its risks for every member of society". This proposed
definition is in sharp contrast with the utilitarian approach which looks at the
total benefits accrued to a society by a technology exceeding the total risks to a
society. Fischhoff then goes on to discuss the issues and difficulties in defining
acceptable technologies and trade-offs, and proposes practical ways of
overcoming them.
Rohrmann (1995b) summarises the findings of risk perception studies on
the subjective evaluation of the acceptability of risks into a structural model
represented as an "influence diagram". This diagram is reproduced in Figure
9.9. One can see that quantitative factors such as the probability of dying (ie
annual fatality rate) form only some of the components of an individual's
evaluation of the acceptability of risk.
9.1.4.9 Risk Perception by Civil Engineers in Australia

A study in 1982 with a building and structural engineering orientation by
Ingles (1983) surveyed the perception of risk by Australian civil engineers. 323
anonymous surveys out of 646 were returned. In his analysis of the results
Ingles found that:
o Australian civil engineers are highly risk averse (to failure rather
than risk).
o Risk aversion to fatal risk was at much higher levels than for not fatal
risk, as expected.
o Australian civil engineers correctly perceive that actual risk is
generally not more than one order of magnitude below tolerable risk.
o The respondents were reasonably dispassionate towards risk at all
levels when evaluating the Construction Industry Research and
Information Association's total acceptable risk of building failure.
Ingles derived a table of risk tolerances from his survey, which is reproduced in
Table 9.18. It can be seen that the perceived individual fatality risk is in the
upper range of tolerable individual risk (Finlay and Fell, 1995; AN COLD, 1994).
The monetary risk difference of an order of magnitude between private and
public loss is interesting, and consistent with numerous findings of
psychological studies (see Rohrmann, 1995b). Both the tolerable injury level
limits are similar, and are above actual accident rates (Fell, 1994; The Royal
Society, 1992).
A
A
A
.t:
I
a;
c
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l
1 m
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I
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f '
: _ _ _ _ _ _ ,!'
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E
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.E (.) '-----·--------J
Figure 9.9 Rohrmann's (1995b) structural model of the subjective evaluation of

the acceptability of risks.

(from Ingles, 1983).
TYPE OF Monetary Personal Monetary Injury Loss of

Fatality
RISK loss (private) injury loss (public) to others reputation
RISK 1Q--4 2 X 10-3 1Q-2 2 X 10-2 4 X 10-2 4 X 1Q-2
9.1.4.10 Risk Perception of Dam Risk

Drs Bishop and Syme are CSIRO psychologists who have carried out
research in Australia on the perception of risk from dams by the public. Their
work provided guidance for the author's work on landslide risk perception in
that:
o dam risk affects a large number of residents - so can landslide risk,
and
o dams have modified the natural environment, construction on slopes
has done the same, hence one expects some similarities in the
perception of both risks by the public, at least for man-modified
slopes.
Residents affected by dam risk as well as control groups were surveyed by
Bishop, Syme and others. Bishop et al (1992) found that most residents believed
the risk of dam failure to be low. Those residents more concerned about dam
failure were also more concerned about other risks as well. Bishop et al carried
out factor analyses on cognitive variables and found that the results did not
replicate those of Fischhoff et al (1978). They concluded that residents do not
have the same underlying frames of reference when making judgements about
dams compared to other risks. Bishop et al also found that the closer the
respondent lived to the dam the more they rated the dam risk as being fatal and
not well understood. There was a considerable dread aspect to the perception of
dam risk.
Further work by Syme et al (1992) showed that when respondents were
presented with dam safety scenarios where potential loss of life and property
damage were systematically varied, respondents showed a greater sensitivity to
loss of life. In the main respondents were risk-averse. There were also
significant differences in attitudes between the different survey groups. Finally,
Syme et al also found that the respondents would hold the engineer as legally
responsible in the event of dam failure.
The author felt that a number of aspects of dam risk perception would be
similar to landslide risk perception. The author's investigation oflandslide risk
perception is detailed in section 9.2.
9.1.5 Literature Review Summary

The detailed literature pertaining to acceptable risk and risk perception
was reviewed. The author first outlined the general concepts, including
institutional approaches to acceptable risk, the ALARP principle, individual and
societal risk measures. Historical landslide risks were reviewed second in terms
of the broad world -wide picture. Both landslide fatality rates and monetary
estimates of losses were given for individual countries. Average annual
landslide deaths, major landslide disasters and their consequences were
detailed. A look at the legal implications of landsliding followed. The review of
the psychology of risk perception highlighted the multi-disciplinary nature of
the subject. The author discussed ways of obtaining revealed and expressed
preferences of acceptable risk, and why the revealed and expressed preferences
differ. The investigation of the cognitive structure of risk perception using
factor analyses, social and cultural approaches to risk perception and the role of
accidents and disasters in amplifying risk perception were all reviewed. The
acceptability of risk and risk perception by Australian civil engineers were
analysed. The studies of dam risk perception, parts of which parallel the
author's own work, were also reviewed.
9.2 Survey of Landslide Risk Perception
9.2.1 Context of Study

As discussed in section 4.3.2, the mm of the survey of landslide risk
perception was twofold. First, the study was carried out in order to obtain
concrete qualitative and quantitative data on the perception oflandslide risk by
various groups of people. Secondly, the study was also employed as a prototype of
a public consultation process, particularly suitable for use in communities
affected by landslide risk.
Surveys of landslide risk perceptions were carried out in two Australian
cities (Melbourne and Sydney) as well as in Hong Kong to enable comparison of
the similarities and differences in responses on an international as well as a
national level. Overview details are given in section 9.2.2 below.
9.2.2 Description of Methods and Target Groups

A total of 10 survey groups were targeted, three in Hong Kong and seven in
Australia. Of these five groups were professionals and/or government staff
dealing with landsliding, and five were groups of residents. Three groups of
residents were affected by various types of landsliding and two groups of
residents were control groups with no experience of landsliding. An overview of
the groups can be found in Table 9.19. Detailed descriptions of survey methods
and target groups are given in section 4.3. The survey group demographic
information is briefly summarised below.
Table 9.19 Summary of survey group information.
Method
Group Type of Return Number of
Coun- of
No. City Type Land slid- Rate Respond-
try Admin is-
or Area lng (%) ents
tration( 1 )
1 HK HK 3 33
~
2
00 00 HKCED Various 3 Not
32
- NN NN staff known
3 GG GG 3 20
L Infrequent
Montrose
4 I debris 1 69 84
residents
L flows
- M L
y Kalorama Slow
5 E 3 31 42
residents landslides
r---- L D
A B A Rural area
6 u 0 L residents Slow
3 35 59
s u E (Silvan, landslides
T R Wand in)
r---- R N s Mooroolbark
7 A E H None 3 35 74
residents
r---- L I
I R Lillydale
8 Various 3 100 26
A E Shire staff
- s Werrington
9 y None 2 58 70
residents
- D
N Australian
10 E landslide Various 2 77 20
y experts
Notes: 1. The method of administration is detailed in section 4.3.7.
Most respondents in most groups were either in the 25-40 year or 40-60
year age bracket. The exceptions are group 3 (the non -professional,
non-technical staff of the HKCED) which had a significant proportion of
respondents aged 15-25 years, and group 10 (the Australian landslide experts)
which had significantly older respondents.
Most respondents were male. Group 5 (Kalorama residents) had almost
equal numbers of males and females, while group 9 (Werrington residents) was
the only group with more females than males. Group 10 (the Australian
landslide experts) was all male. The majority of respondents in each group were
non -smokers.
Most respondents of the HKCED survey groups 1 and 2 had lived in their
current dwelling less than five years. Other groups had 5-15 years as their
modal response. Respondents of the HKCED survey groups 1 and 3 intend to
stay in their current dwelling less than five years. Respondents in other groups
intend to stay in their current dwelling 5-15 years, or longer.
Most respondents had no children living in their dwelling except for groups
9 and 10, where the mode was two children. The number of children living in the
respondent's dwelling may cause them to be more risk averse.
The ownership of flats in the HKCED groups varied from about 50% in
group 1 to 30% in group 2 and 70% in group 3. Of those who owned flats, the
majority were living in the flats they owned (Figure 9.46). Most professional and
technical staff (groups 1 and 2) were involved in GEO work while the others
(group 3) were not. The majority of respondents in all three HKCED groups had
tertiary education. Income levels naturally varied between the groups. The
professionals had the highest income levels, followed by the technical staff and
then the other staff.
The education levels of the Australian survey groups were spread over the
first three categories ofYear 10, Year 12 and TAFE or other college for groups 4 to
7, and 9. Only the Australian landslide experts (group 10) had a majority of
respondents with university training. The Lillydale Shire staff respondents'
education (group 8) was spread evenly between the top three categories of Year
12, TAFE or other college and university. The gross annual household incomes
of groups 4 to 7 and 9 were spread evenly in the bottom three income categories.
The Lillydale Shire staff and the Australian landslide experts (groups 8 and 10)
had higher income levels.
9.2.3 Results and Discussion of Frequency Analyses

The results and discussion of frequency analyses are presented in the same
order as previously introduced in section 4.3.4. The qualitative results are
presented and discussed first, followed by the quantitative results. The
complete listing of raw response frequencies can be found in Appendix Fl. For
the reader's convenience an A3 sized fold-out summary page describing the
questionnaire structure and survey groups is provided at the end of the chapter
(Table 9.40). This will assist in the reading of the results.
9.2.3.1 General Views of and Concerns with Landsliding

Questions 1.1 to 1.3 were designed to gauge the general level of concern
with landsliding by the respondents in their personal life. The response to the
question 1.1 "How often do you think about the possibility of landsliding
affecting your life?" was similar for all survey groups. The frequency histogram
of responses to question 1.1. is presented in Figure 9.10. It is clear that most
respondents never think about the possibility oflandsliding affecting their life -
this is the modal (most frequent) response. The only exception were the
Lillydale Shire staff(group 8) and the Australian landslide experts (group 10), a
significant portion of whom thought about landsliding once a week.
Question 1.2 asked: "Is landsliding something that:
h) causes you stress and worry, or
i) causes you stress and worry sometimes, or
j) you know it is a problem but you are not especially worried about it, or
k) you are not worried about it.
Most respondents noted that "I know landsliding is a problem but am not
especially worried about it" or "I am not worried about it (ie landsliding) ", again
indicating a low level of concern. The frequency histogram of responses to
question 1.2 is shown in Figure 9.11.
Question 1.3 asked the respondents to indicate where they obtained their
information on landsliding from. The source of information is important as, for
example, the media tends to sensationalise a landslide disaster thereby possibly
increasing risk aversion, whereas official and geotechnical reports tend to be
more factual. The frequency histogram of responses to question 1.3 is shown in
Figure 9.12. It shows that groups 7 and 9 (Mooroolbark and Werrington) were
the least informed, having modal responses in the "No information" category.
Given that both of these groups were control groups the result is not surprising.
On the other hand the most informed groups were Lillydale Sire staff and the
Australian landslide experts (groups 8 and 10), with information from personal
experience, official and geotechnical reports and the media. Surprisingly the
modal response for Hong Kong Civil Engineering Department (HKCED) staff
groups (groups 1 to 3) was the media. This is unusual in that respondents in
these groups work on landslide control and hence have access to many reports
and technical papers.
Following questions 1.1 to 1.3 several specific questions regarding the
respondent's own enquires of his or her own initiative was elicited. For HKCED
staff, most respondents have not had any discussions with government, civil or
geotechnical engineers regarding how landsliding may affect them (question 1.4
and 1.5). The frequency pie chart of responses to question 1.4 and 1.5 is shown in
Figures 9.13 and 9.14.
Respondents in Melbourne's Lillydale Shire (groups 4 to 8) were asked
similar questions. Question 1.4 enquired whether they had received landslide
information from the council (local government) as part of its landslide
awareness publicity campaign for residents in landslide-affected areas. Most
respondents in each group except the Mooroolbark control group (group 7) had
;1 ~
(1> (t
01.1 How often do you think about the possibility of landsliding affecting your life? :;a ...,
............
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Never Once a year Once every three months Once a month Once a week Every day
Group number and class
Figure 9.10 Responses to question 1.1.

v.
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N
01.2 Landsliding is something that:
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Causes me stress and worry Causes me stress and worry I know it's.a problem but am not I am not worried about
sometimes espec1alry warned about

Ut
N
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01.3 Where do you get your information on landsliding from? ~~
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No information Personal experience Family and friends Media Official reports Geotechnical reports Other
VI
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01.4. Have you had any discussions with government regarding how landsliding may
affect you?
19%
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
KEY II YES ~ NO
Figure 9.13 Response from HKCED groups to question 1.4.
01.5. Have you had any discussions with a civil or a geotechnical engineer regarding
how landsliding may affect you?
39% 9% 25%
KEY II YES ~ NO
Figure 9.14 Response from HKCED groups to question 1.5.

received landslide information. The frequency pie chart of responses to question

1.4 is shown in Figure 9.15. The Shire also held a public meeting regarding
landsliding as part of the same awareness campaign. However, most
respondents in all survey groups did not attend. The frequency pie chart of
responses to question 1.5 is shown in Figure 9.16. However, the level of concern
about landsliding was certainly higher among the group most at risk - the
Montrose group (group 4) - judging by the relative numbers of residents
attending the public meeting.
01.4 Have you received landslide information from council?
80% 83% 56%
88%
KEY
6%
II YES
Group 7 Group 8
~ NO
Figure 9.15 Response from Lillydale Shire groups to question 1.4.
Most respondents in each group did not have discussions with council, civil
or geotechnical engineers regarding how landslidingmay affect them (questions
1.6 and 1. 7). The frequency pie chart of responses to questions 1.6 and 1. 7 are
shown in Figures 9.17 and 9.18.
9.2.3.2 Views on Limits to Development

Sections 10 to 13 elicited respondents feelings on various issues regarding
the development of land subject to landslide risk. The first part of section 10
enquired whether there should be official limits to building in areas subject to
landslide risk. Responses indicate an overwhelming support for the regulation
of development on land subject to landslide risk (see Figure 9.19). The second
01.5 Did you attend the public meeting in December 1992?
17%
KEY
II YES
Group 7 Group 8
~ NO
01.6. Have you had any discussion with council regarding how landsliding may affect you?
21% 24%

25%
KEY
II YES
Group 7 Group 8
~ NO

01.7. Have you had any discussions with a civil or a geotechnical engineer regarding how
landsliding may affect you?

-
29%
KEY
II YES
Group 7 Group 8
~ NO
part asked who should be responsible for setting the acceptable risk standards.
For the HKCED survey groups the respondents indicated that the standards of
acceptable landslide risk should be set by government, the GEO and the experts.
The frequency histogram of responses to the second part of section 10 by the
HKCED survey groups is shown in Figure 9.20. The Australian survey groups'
response was quite similar (viz Figure 9.21), indicating local council (local
government) and experts as the main bodies to set acceptable risk standards. Of
course in Australia there is no equivalent organisation to Hong Kong's GEO.
Section 11 asked who should pay for the cost of landslide stabilisation so
that building on the affected land could take place. The two main bodies
nominated by the HKCED survey groups were the developer and the
government (Figure 9.22). The Australian survey groups overwhelmingly
nominated the land owners (Figure 9.25), with significant responses also
recorded for the local and state government levels. None of the groups indicated
insurance companies with a significant response. Hence the concept of
insurance against landslide risk seems to be foreign to most respondents.
Section 12 sought the respondents' views on who should bear either the
increased landslide stabilisation costs resulting from a higher standard, or the
cost of new regulations requiring landslide stabilisation, before development
010 Should there be official limits to development on land with a landslide risk? ~~
(1) ct
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2% 16% 1%
Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8
4% ~~ 20%
KEY
~ YES
II NO
~ ~
Group 9 Group 1o
VI
Figure 9.19 Responses to the first part of section 10. N
00
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01 0 Who should be responsible for setting the standard of acceptable risk? ::0 ....
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Resident Resident Owner Hong
The local Legislative Housing An inter-
who is a who is an but not Kong
community Government council GEO Experts national Other
tenant owner tenant authority Housing
body
Society

Vl
Figure 9.20 Responses to section 10 by Hong Kong survey groups. N
\0
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010 Who should be responsible for setting the standard of acceptable risk? Cl> ct
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The loc~l Land owners Local council State Federal An international

commumty government government Experts body Other
Figure 9.21 Responses to section 10 by Australian survey groups.
VI
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011 Who should pay for stabilising landslides?
80
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1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
The developer Previous Present Government Insurance Other

owners owners , compan1es
Figure 9.22 Response by Hong Kong survey groups to section 11.
012 Who should pay for the cost of new regulations?

100
80
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owners owners compan1es

013 Who should pay for the cost of remedial works?
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1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

owners owners companies
took place. The HKCED survey groups nominated (in decreasing order) the
government, present owners and the developers as the bodies to bear the
financial burden. The frequency histogram of responses to section 12 by the
HKCED survey groups is shown in Figure 9.23. The Australian survey groups,
on the other hand, first indicated the land owners, then the institution bringing
in the new regulations, and then local and state governments (Figure 9.26).
Section 13 enquired as to who should bear the remedial costs of reducing
landslide risk when an unacceptably high landslide risk is discovered after
development is complete. This section was added after the Werrington
full-scale trial, and hence the Werrington respondents and the Australian
experts group (groups 9 and 10) did not reply to this section. The HKCED survey
groups indicated, with about equal importance, the developer, government and
the present owners as bodies to bear the financial burden. The frequency
histogram of responses to section 13 by the HKCED survey groups is shown in
Figure 9.24. The Australian survey groups indicated first the local government,
then land owners and the state government (Figure 9.27).
~ ~
(1> (;
011 Who should pay for landslide stabilisation? :;a . . .
......
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The locc;~l Land owners State Federal Insurance
community Local council government government compan1es
l1l
(.;.)
(.;.)
012 Who should pay for the cost of new regulations requiring landslide stabilisation? ;1 ~
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The loc~l Land owners State Federal Insurance The institution
communtty Local council government government compantes bringing them in
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w
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013 Who should pay for the cost of remedial works when landslide risk is discovered after development? ~ ct
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The local Land owners State Federal Insurance
commun1ty Local council government government compan1es
VI
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VI
9.2.3.3 Ranking of Landsliding Relative to Other Hazards

Landsliding was compared (in terms of potential to cause loss oflife) to six
other selected hazards in section 2. These were:
o an occupational hazard (the respondent's job),
o an industrial hazard (petrochemical accident),
o a health hazard (smoking),
o three travel hazards, being:
traffic accident while driving a car,
- pedestrian struck by a car, and
- plane travel.
These hazards were selected as they are diverse, and also some of them
have known fatality rates to which the relative position of the landsliding hazard
can be compared. The respondents had to compare hazards in pairs, and select
the worst one (in terms ofloss of life) in each case. This method of comparison is
more accurate than trying to number all seven hazards with, say 1 for the worst
through to 7 for the best, as the respondent may not think much about the
relative position of the hazards to each other (see Nunally, 1967).
The responses were collated by the author and the overall relative ranking
constructed. Unfortunately only a few respondents recorded their jobs, so
analysis based on job types was not possible. The results are shown in Table
9.20. The seven Australian survey groups are relatively consistent in their
responses. Traffic accident while driving a car is seen as the highest hazard
(rank 1), smoking cigarettes as rank 2, pedestrian struck by a car as rank 3, and
petrochemical plant accident to people living nearby generally as rank 4. Plane
travel, working in one's job and landsliding are not as consistent. Most
Australian survey groups feel that plane travel is rank 5, working in one's job
rank 6 and landsliding rank 7. Hence landsliding is perceived by the Australian
survey groups as the least dangerous to life out of the seven selected hazards.
When one examines the historical landslide risks in Australia (section
9.1.8), this perception is indeed correct in a general or average sense. One
Australian survey group ranked landsliding as rank 5 (group 4) and one as rank
6 (group 8). The high rank is for group 4 (the Montrose group), which is subject
to high debris flow risks in certain areas. For example, some residents in
Montrose were in fact advised that they are subject to an annual probability of
landsliding of 1 in 100 to 1 in 1,000 (Moon et al, 1992). Hence the perceived
danger is broadly correct with the raised awareness of landslide risk of this
particular survey group due to the landslide awareness campaign, discussed in
section 4.3.5.1. Despite their raised awareness though, the ranking of the
landslide hazard as 5 by Montrose residents is still too low as the residents
Table 9.20 Relative ranking of risks from several selected hazards by the various survey groups (section 2). ;J~
~ Cb
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GROUP I KEY: a
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HAZARD
o
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Traffic accident while
driving a car ---- ---- ----
B---------~-----:.--§1------:.-
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HIGHEST
RISK
.g
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~
Smoking cigarettes
Pedestrian struck by a
car
Petrochemical plant
accident
Working in one's job 5
Plane travel 6
Landsliding LOWEST 7
RISK
L A ,;
v ye
HONG KONG AUSTRALIA
VI
UJ
-..1
experience higher debris flow risks than risks from, say travel hazards. The
actual rank for landsliding should be closer to one, or one for some residents at
high risk. There can be several explanations for the underestimation of
landslide risk. One reason may well be that because of a lack of personal
experience with recent debris flows the residents may underestimate or not even
be aware of the possible dangers (cf Slovic, 1987), whereas travel hazards are a
fact of life for the residents. Group 8 is Lillydale Shire staff who organised the
publicity campaign and who perceive landsliding as a higher risk than the
general population owing to the recent debris flow and risk zoning studies.
Table 9.20 shows a significantly different response by the HKCED survey
groups. The highest hazard is seen as pedestrian struck by a car, and traffic
accident while driving a car is ranked 2. One should note at this point that the
car accident rate is lower in Hong Kong than in Australia, and hence this
reversal of the positions of these two hazards as compared to the Australian
survey groups may well be due to this fact. Interestingly landsliding is ranked 3
by two groups and 4 by the other. Smoking cigarettes is ranked 4 by two groups
and 5 by another. Petrochemical plant accident is ranked as 3 by one group and 5
by the other two. Plane travel ranks as 6 for all three groups. Working in one's
job is seen to be the safest activity by all three survey groups. In comparison with
the Australian survey groups it can be seen that smoking is perceived as far less
dangerous than landsliding by the HKCED survey groups. The higher position
of the landslide hazard in HKCED survey groups' minds is very likely due to
annual landslide fatalities in Hong Kong, heightened media awareness and the
fact that they work for the GEO, whereas Australia (to the author's knowledge)
has had very few fatal landslide incidents.
If one compiles a table listing actual fatality rates in the ranked order as
obtained for section 2, one would be able to see whether the perceived risk is in
line with actual fatality rates. Such a table has been compiled for the Australian
responses, as the author had sufficient data available to do this, and is
reproduced in Table 9.21. It can be seen that the rank of the hazards broadly
corresponds to actual fatality rates experienced from these hazards in Australia.
The only hazard that is significantly out of line is smoking - according to its
fatality rate it should be ranked first, followed by the traffic accident while
driving a car. The ranking is the reverse of this. These results indicate that the
public is capable of estimating the relative ranking of fatality rates reasonably
well.
9.2.3.4 Cognitive Structure of Perception of Selected Hazards

Sections 3 to 5 analysed the perception of selected hazards using five
factors to investigate the cognitive structuring of the respondents' perception.
As discussed in section 9.1.4, differing perceptions of a hazard will result in
differing levels of acceptable risk. Sections 3 to 5 tested the respondents'
familiarity with the hazard, the degree to which the hazard was seen to be
voluntary, the degree of dread of the hazard, the extent of perceived control over
the hazard and the likelihood of fatalities from the hazard.
The particular hazards investigated were traffic accident while driving a
car, being involved in a landslide and being involved in a petrochemical plant
accident. Responses were elicited for qualitative descriptions of the cognitive
scale extremes. Scales comprising numbers 1 to 7 spanned between the two
extremes of each factor, and respondents were asked to circle one number
corresponding to the position on the scale they thought best represented the
location of the hazard. Some spread in the results is expected because of this and
also because the general description of each hazard lacked details.
Australian data.
ANNUAL AUSTRALIAN
RANK HAZARD FATALITY RATE2
(per million)
1 Traffic accident while driving a car 200
2 Smoking 5,000
3 Pedestrian struck by a car 40
4 Petrochemical plant risk to nearby residents 1003 Objective
(4-6) 13 Limit
5 Plane travel 10
(5-7)
1001,4 Coal mining
6 Working 231,4 Manufacturing
(4-7) 4.51, 4 Office work
7 Landsliding < 1
(5-7)
Notes:
1. Unfortunately only a few respondents recorded their occupation as requested, hence
comparisons of the respondents' occupational risks with their recorded ranking were not
possible.
2. Australian data is from Higson (1990).
3. No data available, figures are from ANCOLD {1994).
4. UK data is from Health and Safety Executive (1989).
The presentation of the results for these sections uses frequency

histograms compressed into "strips", with a black box showing the modal (ie. the
most frequent) response and striped boxes to indicate the range of 80% of the
responses. A diagrammatic explanation of how these are derived is given in

Figures 9.28 and 9.29.
FULL HISTOGRAM FOR ONE SAMPLE
MODE
~
co
II
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(/)
c
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0
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
New Old
80% or more of respondents

(including the modal response)
.A..
' 'I
MODE'
.J:
2 3 4 5 6 7
New Old
CONDENSED "STRIP" FOR ONE SAMPLE
Figure 9.28 A diagrammatic explanation of how one frequency histogram is

condensed into a frequency strip.
COMPLETE DIAGRAM FOR ONE COGNITIVE FACTOR
G
R
0 New Old
u
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
t! I
I
MODEl
I
I
I
I
80% or more of respondents

(including the modal response)
Figure 9.29 Sample simplified frequency plot for one cognitive factor for all
survey groups.
Table 9.22 shows the responses for the traffic accident while driving a car
hazard. The new/old scale (q3.1) is responded to predicably in that all survey
groups identify the hazard as old. Responses on the voluntary/involuntary scale
(q3.2) seemed a surprise at first, with the Australian survey groups perceiving
the hazard as involuntary. The HKCED survey groups and the Australian
landslide experts saw it as neither voluntary nor involuntary. The literature
indicates that driving is a voluntary activity. The author believes that while this
is true, the respondents were indicating that a traffic accident itself is
involuntary, which is indeed true also. However, acceptable traffic accident risks
are still in the voluntary category (ie. of the order of 10- 3 to 10- 4 ) as people can
choose not to drive. The common/dread scale (q3.3) indicated that traffic
accidents were more of a common rather than a dread risk. Also the groups
consistently indicated that the hazard was more controllable than
uncontrollable (q3.4), and neither fatal nor non -fatal (q3.5) Overall the
responses to section 3 are consistent with other studies recording the perception
of traffic accidents (see Rohrmann, 1995b).
Section 4 looked at the same cognitive factors for being involved in a
landslide. Table 9.23 presents the results. For the HKCED survey groups and
the Australian landslide experts the landslide hazard was old. These groups
have direct experience with landsliding. The remaining survey groups have no
direct experience with landsliding, and so rated the landslide hazard as new
(q4.1). All survey groups rated landsliding as involuntary (q4.2). In contrast to
the traffic accident while driving a car hazard, this hazard is perceived as
involuntary as there is no choice and/or warning associated with the hazard.
The actual acceptable probabilities oflandsliding (discussed further on) confirm
the perception of landsliding as an involuntary hazard by requiring low
probabilities of death similar to other involuntary hazards. Landsliding was
perceived as neither common nor dreadful by most groups (q4.3). The HKCED
professionals (group 1), however, exhibited a higher dread oflandslides than the
others.
The responses varied widely for the uncontrollable/controllable factor
(q4.4). The HKCED survey groups and Australian landslide experts saw
landsliding as uncontrollable. These groups have an ongoing awareness of
landsliding. The Montrose and Werrington residents also saw landsliding as
uncontrollable. For the Montrose group this could be due to a fear of an
unknown hazard, and the fact that they have been advised by Lillydale Shire
that nothing can be done to control the debris flow hazard as it is too large, the
control would be too costly and not seen as the Shire's responsibility (see Moon et
al, 1992). Responses from Lillydale Shire groups (groups 4 to 8) are widely
spread, indicating a wide range of beliefs about the degree of controllability of a

landslide. It should be noted that these residents have been given substantial
information on landsliding in their area through the Shire's public awareness
campaign (viz section 4.3.5.1). Residents in areas of slow-moving landslides,
Kalorama (group 5) and the rural area (group 6) have been informed that if the
guidelines set by the Shire in their zoning are followed, such as obtaining
geotechnical reports prior to development and maintaining slopes, then the
landslide hazard will be controlled. This is indeed reflected in their responses
which indicate that the landslide hazard is more controllable than
uncontrollable.
For the fatal/not fatal factor (q4.5), HKCED survey groups and Australian
landslide experts saw the hazard as more likely not to be fatal, whereas Lillydale
Shire groups and the Werrington group saw it as neither fatal nor not fatal. The
"neither" response may be due a lack of knowledge of or experience with this
new hazard (cf. q4.1).
Section 5 looked at the same cognitive factors for an unspecified
petrochemical plant accident. The results are presented in Table 9.24. One can
see that the hazard is new (q5.1), involuntary (q5.2), more dread than common
(q5.3), controllable (q5.4), and more not fatal than fatal (q5.5). The response
patterns are consistent with other published data (see Rohrmann, 1995b, for a
summary).
Since the results for previously studied hazards (traffic accident while
driving a car and petrochemical plant accident) are consistent with published
studies (cf Rohrmann, 1995b), one can regard the responses for the landslide
hazard as valid also. The main conclusion drawn from the responses to sections
3 to 5 is that landslide hazard is perceived as involuntary, and hence the public
will require acceptable risk levels corresponding to an involuntary hazard. The
value of public awareness campaigns is also born out by the results. The beliefs
of the residents are shown to be significantly influenced by the information
supplied. In the case of the Montrose group, the supplied information convinced
the residents that the debris flow hazard was uncontrollable, as nothing could be
done to stop it. On the other hand, the Kalorama and rural area groups were of
the belief that slow-moving landslides have a degree of controllability if the
laid-down guidelines are followed after the public awareness campaign. Since
public perception is readily influenced by public awareness campaigns, care
must be taken not to raise expectations beyond realistic levels. It is also
noteworthy that direct involvement with landsliding by the HKCED survey
groups and the Australian landslide experts did not alter their perception of
landsliding as involuntary and uncontrollable.
hazard (section 3).
G 03.1 Is this hazard new to you, or old G 03.2 To what extent does this happen
R and familiar? R voluntarily or involuntarily?
0 0 Voluntary
New Old Involuntary
u u
p
p 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
03.3 Is this a hazard that people have 03.4 If you are exposed to this hazard,
learned to live with and can think to what extent can you, by per-
G about reasonably calmly (com- G sonal skill or care, avoid death, le
R mon) or Is It one that people have R to what extent is the hazard con-
0 a great fear (dread) of? 0 trollable?
u u
p Common Dread p Controllable Uncontrollable
2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
03.5 When this hazard eventuates,

G how likely Is it to result In
R death(s) or fatalities?
0
u Fatal Not fatal
p
2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
KEY:
3
GROUP MODE
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
80%0F DATA
(question 4).
0 0
u New Old
u Voluntary Involuntary
p p
2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
G about reasonably calmly (com- G sonal skill or care, avoid death, ie
R mon) or is it one that people have R to what extent is the hazard con-
u u
2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10

G how likely Is it to result in
0
u Fatal Not fatal
p
2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
KEY:
3
GROUP MODE
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
...... ......
~~ ~~~ ~~
80% OF DATA
Table 9.24 Cognitive factors for the "being involved in a petrochemical plant
accident" hazard (question 5).
0 0
u New Old u Voluntary Involuntary
p p
2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
G about reasonably calmly (com- G sonal skill or care, avoid death, le
R mon) or Is It one that people have R to what extent Is the hazard con-
u u
2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10

G how likely is It to result In
0
u Fatal Not fatal
p
2 3 4 5 6 7
2
KEY:
3
4
GROUP MODE
5
6
7 6
8
~._._. __.....y,___ ~..J
9
10
80%0F DATA
9.2.3.5 Perception of Annual Loss of Life Frequency

Section 6 established the link between qualitative and quantitative risk
levels by eliciting the perception of a quantified annual loss of life frequency (ie.
risk) due to an unspecified hazard in qualitative terms such as extremely high,
very high, and so on. The annual loss oflife frequency ranged from 1 in 2 people
dying to 1 in 1 million people dying. One should note that some respondents had
misinterpreted the question, for example, circling Very Low Risk instead of the
expected Extremely High Risk, reasoning as follows: "One person dying out of
two is an Extremely High Risk to life, but I will circle Very Low Risk as this is
unlikely to happen". Af3 this was the only way the question was interpreted, the
author felt justified in taking the "mirror image" of the reversed responses and
combining them with the correct ones before carrying out frequency analysis. If
the reversed responses were not incorporated into the data set, the data set
would have been too small for meaningful statistical analysis. In fact, the
incorporation of the reversed responses did not significantly alter the statistical
results.
The results are presented in a condensed frequency strip format in Table
9.25. The extremes of the annual life loss frequency scale were responded to
predicably. More than 80% of respondents in each group thought that 1 in 2
people dying was an extremely high risk, and 1 in 1 million people dying was
rated as very low risk by most people in each group. More interesting results
arose in the central region, which can be interpreted as the ALARP region. The
1 in 1,000 annual loss of life frequency is often seen as the upper limit of
acceptable risk from a voluntary hazard (see for example Starr, 1969). Most
respondents rated this as a high to very high risk. The 1 in 10,000 annual loss of
life frequency had the most spread- out responses. The modes ranged from very
high to low risk. The major shift towards a lower perceived risk seems to occur
around the 1 in 100,000 annual loss oflife frequency. Most groups had low risk as
their modal response, one medium and one high.
Even though the responses at either end of the scale may be somewhat
influenced by the choice of scale ends (see section 9.1.4.4B), the results are still
representative. One can see that for a risk to be perceived as low or very low, the
annual loss oflife frequency would need to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1
million.
9.2.3.6 Relative Ranking of Landslide Situations

Section 7 elicited the relative ranking of various landslide situations,
effectively asking "Which landslide situation is the worst?". The section was
included after the Werrington full scale trial, and hence was not responded to by
the Werrington or Australian landslide experts survey groups (groups 9 and 10).
The landslide situations covered a range of five natural landslide situations
(house A to house E). House F was threatened by a man-modified landslide
hazard (a retaining wall), and house G was on a cliff. The situations thus
depicted cover a broad range of commonly occurring landslides. They are
illustrated in Figure 9.30. Some respondents misread the question and instead
of placing the numbers 1 to 7 in the boxes (1 representing the worst situation and
7 the best) ranked each situation individually on a scale of 1 to 7. This resulted in
a reduced (to about 60%) but still statistically viable sample sizes.
The results are presented in Table 9.26. The large scatter is not
unexpected given the lack of detail supplied about each situation and the
difficulty in ranking, even by experts. First, it is worth looking at the extremes.
The best situation was, by consensus, house F, the house protected by a
man -made structure - a retaining wall. One may justifiably hypothesise that
the respondents felt that the wall would be built to engineering standards and
hence be less likely to fail than other "naturally unstable" situations. HouseD,
located on a large magnitude landslide, was perceived to be the worst situation.
This is an expected result. However, house E, at the bottom of a large
landslide/debris flow, was seen by most groups as the second- best situation
after house F. This result was surprising at first glance. However, discussions
with respondents in the Montrose area revealed the following reasons for the
relatively low risk in this quite dangerous situation:
o most residents thought that if a debris flow occurred it would not
reach their home, and
o the diagram of the situation did not clearly indicate the flow reaching
the house, let alone demolishing it.
House Cis seen as being in a somewhat worse situation than house B, which in
turn is seen as somewhat worse than house A. House G, situated on a cliff, had a
strong polarity in the modes, being seen as either the worst (groups 4 to 7), the
best (groups 1, 2 and 10) or both (group 3). Clearly some groups, or portions of
respondents within groups, perceived the cliff to be stable and safe, whereas
others as unstable and therefore as highly dangerous.
7.10 1m LANDSLIDE
HOUSE A
Enter rank~
number here
for house A
7.20 HOUSE B
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
rank~
50 m
Enter
number here
for house B
7.30 LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
Enter rank~
number here
for house C HOUSE C
Figure 9.30 Landslide situations used in sections 7, 8 and 9.

7.40 HOUSED
500 m
Enter rank~
number here
for houseD FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
7.50 500 m
Enter rank~
number here FLOW FROM HOUSE E
for house E LANDSLIDE
7.60 LANDSLIDE RETAINING WALL
HOUSE F
Enter rank~
number here
10m
for house F
7.70 HOUSE G
Enter rank~
number here
for house G 100m
Figure 9.30 (continued) Landslide situations used in sections 7, 8 and 9.

Table 9.25 Perception of annual life loss frequencies due to an unspecified hazard (section 6). ;Jri'
(b it
:;o ....
-·
"'~"Tj
......
.
~§:
"' j:ll
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
0
06.1
1 in 2 people dying 0
06.2
06.3
06.4
1 in 1,000 people s"' ::r' ,.,
'.;<
u u u u g tJ
.............
p EH VH H M L VL p EH VH H M L VL p EH VH H M L VL p EH VH H M L VL
0 c:::
1 1 1 1
•»» »»I I I
,...,z
~Ul
2 2 2 2 0 :;::
]~
3 3 3 3
"'
4 4 4 4
5 5 5 5
6 6 6 6
7 7 7 7
8 8 8 8
9 9 9 9
10 10 10 10
G
R 06 •5 G 06.6 G
R 067
.
R
0 1 in 10,000 people dying 0 1 in 100,000 people dying 0 1 in 1 million people dying
u u u
p EH VH H M L VL p EH VH H M L VL p EH VH H M L VL
t»» »»J I I:JiiPIIIIII::»
1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5 KEY:
6 6 6 G
R M
7 7 7 0 0
u
8
9
8
9
8
9 ..
p
.D
E
sill~·
10 10 VI
10 VI
......
Table 9.26 Relative ranking of landslide situations (question 7). ~~
~ ct
-·
~ '......"'
"'~ .'Tj
;;; §.:
07.1 - HOUSE A 07.2 - HOUSE B 07.3 - HOUSE C 07.4 - HOUSE D "' PJ
~ ';<!
G G G G
WORST BEST
R R WORST BEST R WORST BEST R WORST BEST 3"' ::r
'"0
0 0 0 0 g tj
u
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 u
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 ( 7 u
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 u
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 O'c
'""Z
1 1
SQ(/J
2 2
,g
~
~
2 2 '-"
3 3 3 3
"'
4 4 4 4
5 5 5 5
6 6 6 6
7 7 7 7
8 8 8 8
07.5 - HOUSE E 07.6 - HOUSE F 07.7 - HOUSE G

G G G
R WORST BEST WORST BEST WORST BEST
R R
0 0 0
u 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 1 2 u
p p 3 4 5 6 7 p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3 KEY:
4 4 4 G
5 5 R M
5 0 0
u
..
6
7
6
7
6
7 .
p
D
E
8 8 8
61 I I WW2. VI
VI
N
9.2.3. 7 Acceptable Probabilities of Landsliding

Sections 8 and 9 required the choice of a specific acceptable probability of
landsliding, ranging from 1 in1 to 1 in 1 million, for a house in a hypothetical (but
realistic) landslide situation. The probabilities were required for property
damage, and loss oflife, for the same seven landslide situations that were ranked
in section 7. As well as the diagrams of the landslide situations, each situation
had further details provided about the landsliding. A description of what would
happen if the landslide occurred - in terms of time frame, destruction of the
house and chance of death of occupant - was provided. These questions enabled
direct expressed probabilities of acceptable landslide risk to be obtained. One
needs to note that the raw results quoted above were actually over a 10 year
exposure period to landslide risk for both property damage and loss oflife risks.
This was spelt out to the respondents in the preamble to section 8. One should
also note that section 9 had the same landslide situation as house C in section 7,
but the respondent was asked to imagine that this was their house. This was
done to see if any change in acceptable landslide probabilities occurred if the
person's own property was in danger rather than some else's.
A) Raw acceptable landslide probabilities

The raw acceptable landslide probabilities are shown in Figures 9.31 to
9.38. One first notes that the acceptable probabilities of landsliding for loss of
life are generally one or two orders of magnitude lower than those for property
damage. This is not an unexpected result, and shows that people value their
lives more than property.
The shallow landslide affecting house A (question 8.1) had a modal
probability of 10- 4 for property damage for most groups (Figure 9.31). 80% of
the respondents were in the 10- 3 to 10- 6 probability range - a quite large
spread. This spread reflects the differing attitudes of the respondents to risk.
The Australian landslide experts (group 10) were significantly less risk averse.
This group has been discussing risk-based methods, and lives with risk in their
predictions. The modal probabilities for loss of life were 10- 5 to 10- 6 . The
HKCED survey groups were less risk averse in this situation than the Australian
survey groups. This may be due to the fact that this type of landsliding is
common in Hong Kong but not in Australia. Familiarity with the landslide
hazard increases its acceptable probability (cf. Slavic, 1987).
The deeper, slow moving landslide under house B (question 8.2) had a wide
spread of modal responses in the probability range of 10- 3 to 10- 6 for both
property damage and loss oflife (Figure 9 .32). The modal probabilities for loss of
life have increased by an order of magnitude. The similarity of the responses for
both property damage and loss of life is due to the fact that the situation is not
really life-threatening. Also the damage to the house takes place slowly rather
than rapidly. These factors help to explain the broad scatter in the responses,
ranging from acceptable probabilities associated with voluntary risk (10- 3) to
acceptable probabilities associated with involuntary risk (10- 6).
The large landslide flowing onto house C (question 8.3) was perceived as
more fearful and (correctly) as higher risk. Hence responses were more aligned
with acceptable probabilities associated with involuntary rather than voluntary
risks. The modal responses for property damage raged from lo-s to lo- 6, with
one mode at 10- 4 (Figure 9.33). The modes for loss oflifewere alllo- 6 except for
one at lo-s. The same landslide flowing onto the respondent's own house
(question 9) had virtually identical responses (see Figure 9.34). This is not to say
that people do not behave differently when their own property is concerned -
they do (viz Rohrmann, 1995b; Slavic, 1987; Starr, 1969). However, their
expressed responses often differ from their actual behaviour, as highlighted in
section 9.1.4.4. Thus they may demand the same low risk levels for others as for
themselves - as in this case - while they actually will live with higher risks
themselves. Living with higher risks often means that they are being tolerated
rather than accepted for various reasons (The Royal Society, 1992)
House D (question 8.4) was perceived as the worst situation in section 7.
However the responses for acceptable probabilities were quite similar to those
for house C (viz Figure 9.35). The modal response for the acceptable probability
oflandslidingfor property damage was 10-s to 10- 6, with one mode at 10- 4 . For
loss of life the modal responses were alllo- 6 except two at 10- 5 .
House E (question 8.5) was seen as the worst situation in section 8 by all
groups of respondents. Except for two modes at lo-s the rest were 10- 6 for
property damage (Figure 9.36). All modes were 10- 6 for loss of life. The fear of
the perceived danger in this situation can be seen by the tightening of the 80%
data band (striped boxes).
House F, protected by a retaining wall (question 8.6) was seen as somewhat
better than houses D and E (Figure 9.37). Most modal responses for property
damage were lo-s, some 10- 4 and others 10- 6. Most modal response for loss of
life ranged from lo-s to lo- 6, with one at lo- 4 .
House G on a cliff (question 8. 7) was perceived as quite a dangerous
situation. The modal response for property damage ranged from lo-s to 10-6
(Figure 9.38). Group 3 had a second mode at 10- 2 , which was quite unusual, and
group 10 a mode at 10- 4 . However, all modes were on lo- 6 for loss oflife, as the
chance of death was very high given cliff failure.
08.1 If the landslide occurs it will damage but not demolish the house. It may occur quickly (in
minutes). If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 20 chance of
being killed.
1m LANDSLIDE
HOUSE A
PROPERTY DAMAGE LOSS OF LIFE

G MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY G MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY
R OF LANDSLIDING R OF LANDSLIDING
0 0
u u
p p
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
..
0 D
u E
p
6 I ~
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.31 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House A.

08.2 If the landslide occurs the house will slowly be demolished over a year. If you live in the
house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 100 chance of being killed.
HOUSE 8
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE

0 0
up u
p 10o 10_, w-2 1o-J 1Q-4 1o-s 1~
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
~--~~---+--~~~~
7 7
~--~~---
8 8
t----i--+--
9 9
t---11----i711'7"7'il,.-,-.,.
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
0
u
p ..
D
E
s I
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.32 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House B.

08.3 If the landslide occurs the house will be demolished in an hour. If you lived in this house
and the landslide occurred you have a 1in 3 chance of being killed.
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
HOUSE C

0 0
u 100 1Q-1 1Q-2 10-3 1o-4 10-5 10-6 u 10° 10-1 1Q-2 1Q-3 1Q-4 1Q-5 1Q-6
p p
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
0
u
.. I
p .
D
E
6 WMWA . .
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.33 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House C.

09 Imagine that you live the house shown below, and then found out later that it was subject to
landslide risk. If the landslide occurs the house will be demolished in an hour. If you are
in this house and the landslide occurred you have a 1in 3 chance of being killed.
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
OWN HOUSE

0 0
up 1QO 1Q-1 1Q-2 10--3 1Q-4 1o-s 1Q--6 up 1QO 10-1 1Q-2 1o--3 10--4 1Q-5 1Q--6
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
:,,~ 9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
..
0 D
u E
p
6 I ~
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.34 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding if this was your

house and you just found out about the landsliding.
08.4 If the landslide happens it will be very fast - in less than ten minutes- and the house will
be destroyed. If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 5 chance
of being killed.
HOUSED
500 m
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE

0 0
u 1 oo 1Q-1 1 o--2 1o-3 1Q-4 1Q-5 1()-Q u 100 1Q-1 1o--2 1Q-3 10-4 1Q-5 1()-Q
p p
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
..
0 D
u E
p
•
6 I ~
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.35 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House D.

08.5 If the landslide occurs it will be very fast and the house will be destroyed. If you live in this
house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 2 chance of being killed.
500 m
FLOW FROM HOUSE E

LANDSLIDE

0 0
u 1oo 1o-1 1o-2 10-3 10-4 1o-5 o-s
1
u
p p
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
0
u
.. I
p .0
E
s
. ._. ___. .-v-,...--,..,""
.
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.36 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House E.

08.6 If the retaining wall built to stabilise the landslide falls over the house will be destroyed.
If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 10 chance of being killed.
LANDSLIDE RETAINING WALL
HOUSE F
10m

0 0
u 1o0 10-1 10-2 1o-3 1Q-4 1o-s 1Q-6
u 10o 10-1 1o-2 1Q-3 1o-4 1o-s o-s
1
p p
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
KEY:
G M
R 0
0
u
.. I
p ..
D
E
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.37 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House F.

08.7 The sea may cause the cliff to collapse, taking the house with it. The collapse could occur
in less than two minutes. If you live in this house and the cliff collapses you have a 1 in
2 chance of being killed.
HOUSE G
100m

0 0
u 1oo w-, w-2 10-3 10-4 10-s 10-..s u 100 1Q-1 1Q-2 1Q-3 10-4 1Q-5 10-6
p p
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
L-----L-.......L.-_.___
KEY:
G M
R 0
0 D
u
p
... ...E
6 I
80% OF DATA
Figure 9.38 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for House G.

B) Annual acceptable landslide risks

One needs to note that the raw results quoted above were actually over a 10
year exposure period to landslide risk for both property damage and loss of life
risks. This was spelt out to the respondents in the preamble to section 8. Hence
the acceptable annual risk oflandslide damage to property needs to be calculated
by dividing the raw probability by 10. The loss of life part of the section also had
a specified vulnerability (Vi) for loss of life in each case, which was less than one.
Hence the annual loss oflife landslide risk needs to be calculated by multiplying
the raw probability by 0.1 Vi. The multiplying factors required to convert the
respondents' raw probabilities to annual individual risks are shown in Table
9.27.
Table 9.28 summarises the ranges of raw probability responses for each
surveyed landslide situation. Ranges are given for both the mode (the most
frequent response) and for 80% of the responses. The ranges cover at least 75%
of all survey groups. One first notes that acceptable probabilities of landsliding
for loss of life are one to two orders of magnitude lower than those for property
damage, which is expected. Second, the modal probabilities are mostly low -
often around 10- 6 . Third, for 80% of respondents the range was very wide -
three orders of magnitude. This reflects a wide diversity of risk attitudes.
When considering property damage, the degree and rapidity of destruction
are important. The responses to question 8.1 show that respondents are more
willing to accept some damage rather than total loss. This is very important in
small volume landslide situations such as the majority of those experienced in
Sydney and Hong Kong. Responses to question 8.2 indicate that slow
destruction is perceived as better than rapid destruction in questions 8.3 to 8. 7,
and section 9. It is not obvious why this should be so. Possibly the respondent's
hope that someone (eg the government?) will be able to act in time to stop the
destruction is one plausible explanation.
Tables 9.29 and 9.30 show the calculated annual acceptable landslide risks
for property damage and loss oflife. These are listed in the following three ways:
o as a probability figure, eg. 1 x 10- 6,
o as a probability figure multiplied by 10 6, eg. 0.01, and
o as an AEP, eg. 1 in 1 million.
The values can be seen to be very low - almost demanding absolute safety, ie. no
fatalities. However, by comparing Tables 9.28 to 9.30, one can see that most
respondents in fact did not take the 10 year exposure period and the specified
vulnerability into account. This is apparent as Table 9.28 shows the lowest
required risks for less dangerous situations such as houses A, B and F, whereas
Tables 9.29 and 9.30 are more consistent in this regard. Hence the raw
probabilities in Table 9.28 are likely to be more representative of the acceptable

annual landslide risks, as it may have been too complicated for most respondents
to back-calculate in their heads the correct annual landslide risk using the 10
year exposure period and the specified vulnerability. In any case, it is clear that
the acceptable landslide risks expressed by the respondents are very low,
especially for loss of life.
Table 9.27 Multiplying factors for converting respondents' raw probabilities to

annual risks.
LOSS OF LIFE
PROPERTY
LANDSLIDE SITUATION Conversion
DAMAGE
Vt factor
House A Shallow landslide 0.1 1 in 20 0.005
House B House on deep, slow-moving landslide 0.1 1 in 100 0.001
House C House below medium sized landslide 0.1 1 in 3 0.033
HouseD House on large debris-flow source landslide 0.1 1 in 5 0.020
House E House in debris-flow path 0.1 1 in 2 0.050
House F House protected by a retaining wall 0.1 1 in 10 0.010
House G House on cliff edge 0.1 1 in 2 0.050
Table 9.28 Raw acceptable probabilities of land sliding.

HOUSE 80%0F 80%0F
MODE MODE
RESPONSES RESPONSES
House A 10-4 1o-3 to 1 o--s 1 o-5 to 1 o--s 1 o-4 to 1 o--s
House B 1 o-4 to 1o--s 1 o-3 to 1o--s 1 o-4 to 1 o--s 1 o-3 to 1 o--s
House C 1 o--S to 1o--s 1 o-3 to 1 o--s 10--6 1 o-3 to 1 o--s
HouseD 1 o--S to 1 o--s 10-3 to 1o--s 10--6 10-4 to 10--6
House E 10--6 1 o-4 to 1o--s 10--6 10-4 to 10--6
House F 1o--S to 1o--s 1o-3 to 1o--s 1 o--S to 1 o--s 1o-3 to 1o--s
House G 1 o--S to 1 o--s 1o-3 to 1 o--s 10--6 1o-3 to 1o--s
Table 9.29 Acceptable annual landslide risks for property damage.
HOUSE MODE 80% OF RESPONSES

1 x 1o-5 1 X 10-4 1 X 10-7
House A 10 100 to 0.1
1 in 100,000 1 in 10,000 1 in 1Omillion
1x1o-5 1 x1o-7 1 X 10-4 1 x1o- 7
House B 10 to 0.1 100 to 0.1
1 in 100,000 1 in 1Omillion 1 in 10,000 1 in 1Omillion
1 X 10-6 1 X 10 7 1 X 10-4 1 x1o- 7
House C 1 to 0.1 100 to 0.1
1 in 1million 1 in 1Omillion 1 in 10,000 1 in 1Omillion
1 X 10-6 1 x1o-7 1 X 10-4 1 x1o- 7
HouseD 1 to 0.1 100 to 0.1
1 in 1million 1 in 10million 1 in 10,000 1 in 1Omillion
1 x 1o-7 1 x1o- 5 1 x1o-7
House E 0.1 10 to 0.1
1 in 10million 1 in 100,000 1 in 1Omillion
1 X 10-6 1 X 10-7 1 X 10-4 1 x1o- 7
House F 1 to 0.1 100 to 0.1
1 in 1million 1 in 1Omillion 1 in 10,000 1 in 10million
1 X 10-6 1 x1o- 7 1 X 10-4 1 x1o- 7
House G 1 to 0.1 100 to 0.1
1 in 1million 1 in 10million 1 in 10,000 1 in 1Omillion

Land sliding
A) Risk Averse and Risk Taking Groups

The most risk averse group by far was the Werrington group (group 9).
Regardless of the situation the modal response was always a probability of lo- 6
(the lowest possible) for both property damage and loss of life. The more risk
taking groups were group 3 (the non -professional, non -technical staff of the
HKCED) and group 10 (the Australian landslide experts). These groups were
more risk taking (by up to two orders of magnitude) mainly in the cases of
property damage in the less dangerous landslide situations. This behaviour may
be due to a pragmatic approach within the groups. The Kalorama group of
residents (group 5) was consistently more risk taking than the others (groups
1-4 and 6-10) for both property damage and loss oflife, having a mode at least
an order of magnitude higher than the others. One of the reasons for this may be
that the respondents were aware that they had built/bought their dwellings in a
steep (ie more risky) area. The area is prone to bush fires. Most respondents
have lived and intend to live in the area for a long time. The Kalorama group also
has older respondents, a large percentage of females, and mostly no children
living in the dwellings. These demographic factors may also contribute to the
risk taking attitude.
Table 9.30 Acceptable annual landslide risks for loss of life.
HOUSE MODE 80% OF RESPONSES

5x1o-s 5x1o-9 5 X 10- 1 5x1o-9
House A 0.05 to 0.005 0.5 to 0.005
1 in 20million 1 in 200million 1 in 2million 1 in 200million
1 X 10-/ 1 x1o-9 1 X 10-6 1 x1o-9
House B 0.1 to 0.001 1 to 0.001
1 in 1Omillion 1 in 1,OOOmillion 1 in 1million 1 in 1 ,OOOmillion
3 X 10-8 3x 10-5 3x 10-a
House C 0.03 33 to 0.03
1 in 33million 1 in 33,000 1 in 33million
2 x10-a 2x 10-6 2x1o-8
HouseD 0.02 2 to 0.02
5x1o-a 5x1o-a 5x10-a
House E 0.05 5 to 0.05
1 X 10-7 1 x1o-a 1 x1o-5 1 x1o-s
House F 0.1 0.01 10 to 0.01
1 in 1Omillion 1 in 1OOmillion 1 in 100,000 1 in 1OOmillion
5 x10-a Sx 10-5 5x10-a
House G 0.05 50 to 0.05
B) Values of Acceptable Landslide Probabilities

The first point to note is that the expressed values for the respondent's own
dwelling did not differ from those for the dwellings of others. The reasons for
this were discussed above. Second, the tendency for lower acceptable
probabilities (corresponding to those for involuntary hazards) becomes
apparent, particularly for loss oflife in the more dangerous landslide situations.
Both of these points are not unexpected.
Finally one must note the wide spread of most of the responses over the
10- to 10- 6 raw probability range, which corresponds to the ALARP risk
3
region. The question of which acceptable probability one should use in decision
making then arises. Should one cater for the lowest of the expressed
probabilities, ie 10- 6? Is this too high a standard? Would the modal responses be
most appropriate? Or should one ignore the survey altogether and select
acceptable risk levels corresponding to current death rates from, say, car
accidents? The author does not believe the last option to be at all appropriate, as
it mixes voluntary and involuntary risks, and may not be comparing like risks (cf
Rohrmann, 1995a; Slavic, 1987).
All of these questions, and decisions in response to them, will of necessity
have financial implications in a landslide risk management system. The fact is
that there are no simple answers. These questions and decisions are in reality
part of a political process, and hence treated accordingly.
C) Comparison of Expressed Acceptable Landslide Risks for Loss of

Life With Other Risks
i) Comparison with institutional guidelines

The respondents' expressed acceptable landslide risk for loss of life were
quite low (see section .9.2.3. 7). Generally, 80% of respondents required
acceptable probabilities in the range 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 1 million (a wide range).
The modal responses were in the 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1 million range. The
institutional guidelines indicate the upper limit of individual tolerable risk to be
in the range 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000 (Finlay and Fell, 1995; ANCOLD, 1994).
ANCOLD (1994) indicates as its objective a 1 in 1 million probability for the
"average" person exposed, and a 1 in 100,000 probability for the person "at
greatest risk". Values of up to 10 times the objective values apply as the limit,
subject to application of the ALARP Principle. The objective values of other
countries mostly lie in the 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 100,000 range (see Figure 9.5). Thus
the respondents' expressed acceptable landslide risk for loss oflife can be seen to
be similar to most institutional objective values, and hence as not unreasonable
(cf Slovic, 1987).
ii) Comparison with annual fatality rates of other hazards

The author has contrasted the raw modal responses for expressed
acceptable landslide probabilities leading to loss of life with the annual fatality
rates for other hazards discussed in section 9.1.1.3. The modal responses
correspond to the fatality rates for the following hazards:
o travelling by plane,
o railway travel,
o water transport,
o building fire,
o manufacturing clothing and footwear,
o building fire,
o canoeing, and
o rare natural hazards, eg. lightning strike.

It is clear that these hazards are commonly regarded as low risk. By desiring the
same probabilities for the probability oflandsliding (leading to loss oflife) as for
low risk hazards people have expressed a desire for low landslide risk to life. Of
course, while expressing this desire some of the respondents continue to live
with landslide risks far higher than these, thereby revealing a higher acceptance
of risk than they have expressed (cf. Slavic, 1987). Again, this is likely to be the
case because the risk is being tolerated rather than accepted by the people in
questions, ie it lies in the ALARP range (cf The Royal Society, 1992).
iii) Comparison of expressed risks of the Montrose group with actual

assessed risks
The fact that the risk is being tolerated by Montrose residents is brought
out by the contrast between the respondents' expressed acceptable risk levels
and the risk levels they are living with as assessed in the debris flow zoning study
(Moon et al, 1992). For residents in high and medium hazard zones the
recurrence interval of a debris flow assessed by Moon et al is greater than 1 in
10,000, with 1 in 300 for the most exposed group. Some of these probabilities
exceed the upper limit of individual tolerable risk of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000 if
the vulnerability is assumed to be 1 (Finlay and Fell, 1995; AN COLD, 1994). In
contrast 80% of the Montrose respondents desired a probability of 1 in 10,000 to
1 in 1 million, with the modal responses mostly in the 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1
million range. This particular group is tolerating the risk they live with, but not
accepting it (cfThe Royal Society, 1992). The Montrose residents have indicated
that far lower probabilities of landsliding would be preferred if it was possible.
D) Risk Aversion and Cognitive Variables

The author investigated the relationship between risk aversion and
cognitive variables related to landsliding by calculating Pearson's correlation
coefficient R for the sections recording desired risk levels (sections 6, 8 and 9)
and the section recording cognitive variables for landsliding (section 4). The
coefficient is 0 when there is no correlation between the two variables under
consideration, + 1.0 when perfect positive correlation exists, and -1.0 when
perfect negative correlation exists. Tables of the correlation coefficients can be
found in Appendix F2. The results are summarised in Table 9.31.
Firstly one notes that there are no correlations applying across all the
groups, which is possibly to be expected as the groups themselves are a
heterogeneous set. Secondly the correlations between responses to section 6 and
the landslide cognitive variables are reverse of what would be expected. For
example, the results indicate that the more risk-taking respondents in group 3
see landsliding as a new risk, risk-takers in group 8 see landsliding as

involuntary, and so on. However, these results should be neglected in favour of
those for correlations of sections 8 and 9 with section 4, as section 6 is rather
vague and not specific to landsliding, whereas sections 8 and 9 address specific
landslide situations. The main points arising from the results are:
o Correlations are similar for property damage and loss oflife landslide
situations, as expected.
o Respondents in group 3 who see landsliding as new are more
risk-averse, whereas risk-averse respondents in group 5 see
landsliding as old.
o Respondents in groups 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10 who see landsliding as
involuntary are more risk-averse.
o Risk-averse respondents see landsliding as a dread rather than
common hazard, particularly for loss of life.
Table 9.31 Summary of correlations between responses to sections 6, 8 and 9,

and cognitive variables for the landslide hazard (section 4).
SECTION 6 {ANNUAL LOSS OF LIFE RATE, UNSPECIFIED HAZARD)

GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
04.1 +
04.2 + + + ++
04.3 + + +
04.4 + ++ ++
04.5 + ++ +
Risk taking with Increasing

response value
{:+ 50% or more of responses have R ;::: +0.30
50% or more of responses have R ;::: +0.20
50% or more of responses have R :::; -0.20

Risk averse with Increasing
response value {=- 50% or more of responses have R :::; -0.30
SECTION 4 QUESTIONS REGARDING LANDSLIDING

04.1 Is this hazard new to you, or old and familiar?
04.2 To what extent does this happen voluntarily or involuntarily?
04.3 Is this a hazard that people have learned to live with and can think about reasonably
calmly (common) or is it one that people have a great fear (dread) of?
04.4 If you are exposed to this hazard, to what extent can you, by personal skill or care, avoid
death, ie to what extent is the hazard controllable?
04.5 When this hazard eventuates, how likely is it to result in death(s) or fatalities?
Table 9.31 (continued) Summary of correlations behveen responses to sections 6,

8 and 9, and cognitive variables for the landslide hazard (section 4).
SECTIONS 8, 9 (PROPERTY DAMAGE FROM LANDSLIDING}

GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
04.1 + ++
04.2 ++ ++ ++ + + ++ +
04.3 + ++
04.4 ++ +
04.5 + ++
SECTIONS 8, 9 (LOSS OF LIFE FROM LANDSLIDING)

GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
04.1 ++ +
04.2 ++ ++ + + + + ++
04.3 ++ + ++
04.4 + +
04.5 + + +
Risk averse with increasing 50% or more of responses have R ~ +0.30

response value 50% or more of responses have R ~ +0.20
Risk taking with increasing 50% or more of responses haveR s -0.20

response value 50% or more of responses have R s -0.30
SECTION 4 QUESTIONS REGARDING LANDSLIDING

04.1 Is this hazard new to you, or old and familiar?
04.2 To what extent does this happen voluntarily or involuntarily?
04.3 Is this a hazard that people have learned to live with and can think about reasonably
calmly (common) or is it one that people have a great fear (dread) of?
04.4 If you are exposed to this hazard, to what extent can you, by personal skill or care, avoid
death, ie to what extent is the hazard controllable?
04.5 When this hazard eventuates, how likely is it to result in death(s) or fatalities?
o Mixed responses were obtained for the controllable/uncontrollable

cognitive variable. Risk-averse respondents in groups 1, 5 and 6 see
landsliding as an uncontrollable hazard, whereas those in groups 3, 8
and 10 as controllable.
o Different results were obtained for the fatal/not fatal cognitive
variable for the property damage and loss of life cases. Obviously the
loss oflife case is valid for this cognitive variable. The results indicate
that those respondents who believe landsliding is likely to cause
fatalities are more risk-averse.
The main results, when carefully interpreted, highlight the fact that individuals
are more risk- averse in regards to landsliding when they perceive the hazard to
be involuntary, dread rather than common, uncontrollable and fatal. This is
encouraging as the results for the landslide hazard are consistent with the wide
body of published literature on risk generally (eg. Rohtmann, 1995b; Slovic,
1987).
E) Risk Aversion and Demographic Factors

The author also tested the correlations between landslide risk aversion
(sections 6, 8 and 9) and demographic variables, as there was some evidence in
the literature to suggest this (Rohrmann, 1995b). The available demographic
variables are listed in Table 9.32.
Table 9.32 Demographic variables.
Variables applicable to all survey groups

AGE Respondent's age
SEX Respondent's sex
SMOKE Whether the respondent is a smoker or not
CHILD The number of children living in the respondent's dwelling
EDU The education level of the respondent
INCOME The income level of household
LIVED How many years the respondent has lived in their current dwelling
STAY How many years the respondent intends to stay in their current dwelling
Variables applicable to Hong Kong survey groups (groups 1, 2 and 3 only)

Whether the respondent owns a flat or not, and whether they live in the flat they
OWN FLAT
own (where applicable)
WORK Whether the respondent is primarily engaged in GEO or non-GEO work
The scale types and ranges of these variables are shown in Tables 9.33 and
9.34. The Pearson correlation coefficients R between these variables and
responses to sections 6, 8 and 9 are tabulated in Appendix F2. The results are
summarised in Tables 9.35 to 9.37. The results indicate the following regarding
an unspecified, general hazard:
o Correlations vary from group to group as the groups themselves are a
heterogeneous set.
Table 9.33 Scale types and ranges for the demographic variables tested for risk
aversion.
SCALE VARI- COUN- INTERVAL

TYPE ABLE TRY 1 2 3 4 5
AGE
I HK,AU 15-25 25-40 40-60 > 60
(years)
I SEX HK,AU Male Female
I SMOKE HK,AU Yes No
I CHILD HK,AU 0 1 2 3 >3
HK Primary Secondary Tertiary
I EDU TAFE, other
AU Year10 Year12 University
college
I INCOME HK,AU see Table 9.34 below
LIVED
c (years)
HK,AU <5 5-15 15-25 > 25
STAY
c (years)
HK,AU <5 5-15 15-25 > 25
I own a I own a flat

OWN- I do not
I HK only flat and but do not
FLAT own a flat
live in it live in it
I WORK HK only GEO Non-GEO
Notes:
I Integral
C Continuous
HK Hong Kong
AU Australia
Table 9.34 The questionnaire income scales and the corresponding values of
these as percentages of the GDP per person.
Income Intervals 1 1 2 3 4 15
Gross monthly household income ($HK OOOs) 5 10 20 40
Hong Gross annual household income ($HK OOOs) 60 120 240 480
Kong Gross annual household income
40 80 170 340
as% of GOP/person 1
Gross annual household income ($AU OOOs) 25 40 60 100
Australia Gross annual household income
125 200 300 500
as% of GOP/person2
Notes:
1. GOP/person - $HK 142,000 (Europa Publications Ltd, 1994)
2. GOP/person -$AU 20,000 (Europa Publications Ltd, 1994)

demographic variables.
GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AGE + +
SEX + + +
SMOKE +
CHILD +
EDU
INCOME ++
LIVED
STAY + + ++
OWN FLAT
WORK ++ KEY:
50% or more of responses have R ~ +0.30

Risk taking with increasing ·
50% or more of responses have R ~ +0.20
response value
Risk averse with Increasing 50% or more of responses have R ~ -0.20

response value 50% or more of responses have R ~ -0.30

property damage) and demographic variables.
GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AGE
SEX + + +
SMOKE +
CHILD ++ +
EDU +
INCOME + ++ +
LIVED
STAY ++ +
OWN FLAT ++ +
WORK KEY:
Risk averse with increasing

response value
{:+ 50% or more of responses have R
50% or more of responses have R
~
~
+0.30
+0.20
{=-
Risk taking with increasing 50% or more of responses have R -0.20
response value 50% or more of responses have R ~ -0.30
Table 9.37 Summary of correlations between responses to sections 8, 9 (for loss

of life) and demographic variables.
GROUP
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AGE
SEX + + +
SMOKE
CHILD ++ + +
EDU +
INCOME + ++
LIVED
STAY ++
OWN FLAT ++ +
WORK KEY:
Risk averse with Increasing

response value
{:+ 50% or more of responses have R
50% or more of responses have R
~
~
+0.30
+0.20
50% or more of responses have R :5: -0.20

Risk taking with increasing
response value {=- 50% or more of responses have R :5: -0.30
o The older respondents in group 1 are risk-averse.

o Non-smokers in group 4 are risk-averse.
o Respondents in groups 1 and 3 with higher incomes are risk-averse,
whereas they are risk-taking in group 8.
o Respondents in groups 3 and 10 who have lived longer in their
dwelling are risk-averse.
The results indicate the following regarding landslide hazard:
o Correlations vary from group to group as the groups themselves are a
heterogeneous set.
o The results for property damage and loss of life correlations with
sections 8 and 9 are similar.
o The older respondents in group 5 are risk-taking.
o Some risk-aversion is shown by females in groups 1, 5 and 8.
o Respondents in group 2 with children living at home are risk-averse.
o Respondents in groups 2, 3 and 6 with higher incomes are
risk-averse, whereas respondents in group 10 are risk-taking.
o Respondents in groups 1, 2, 3 and 10 who have lived longer in their
dwelling are risk-taking (group 10 can "control risk").
o Respondents in group 2 who intend to stay longer in their dwelling

are risk- averse.
o Respondents in group 2 who own their own flat are risk-averse.
The results again indicate that landslide risk perception is generally congruent
with published risk perception studies on other hazards, in that risk aversion is
higher for persons with children in their home, with higher incomes, those who
intend to live in their dwelling for a longer time and those who own their
dwelling (see Rohrmann, 1995b, for an overview). It is interesting to also note
the two results differing from the published studies. Firstly, the Australian
landslide experts (group 10) had an association with risk-taking and higher
income. One reason for this may be that the experts are familiar with
landsliding and feel that they can control it, hence the risk-taking attitude.
Secondly, the older Kalorama residents (group 5) were also risk-taking. This
may be due to the fact that they have lived in the area for a long time, and by their
own choice (ie voluntarily) they are exposed to and aware of a much higher risk
of bushfire than that resulting from landsliding.
9.2.3.9 Demographics
A) Age
The frequency histogram of the respondents' ages is shown in Figure 9.39.
Most respondents in most groups were either in the 25-40 year or 40-60 year
age bracket. The exceptions are group 3 (the non -professional, non -technical
staff of the HKCED) which had a significant proportion of respondents aged
15-25 years, and group 10 (the Australian landslide experts) which had
significantly older respondents.
B) Sex
Most respondents were male (Figure 9.40). Group 5 (Kalorama residents)
had almost equal numbers of males and females, while group 9 (Werrington
residents) was the only group with more females than males. Group 10 (the
Australian landslide experts) was all male.
C) Smokers
The majority of respondents in each group were ·non-smokers (Figure
9.41).
D) Length of time spent in current dwelling

Most respondents of the HKCED survey groups 1 and 2 had lived in their
current dwelling less than five years (Figure 9.42). Other groups had 5-15
years as their modal response.
E) Length of time respondents intend to stay in their current

dwelling
Respondents of the HKCED survey groups 1 and 3 intend to stay in their
current dwelling less than five years (Figure 9.43). Respondents in other groups
intend to stay in their current dwelling 5-15 years, or longer.
F) Number of children living in the respondent's dwelling

Most respondents had no children living in their dwelling (Figure 9.44)
except for groups 9 and 10, where the mode was two children. This variable was
originally included as it was thought the number of children living in the
respondent's dwelling may cause them to be more risk averse. The analysis
results did not support this hypothesis.
G) Other demographics of the HKCED survey groups

The ownership of flats varied from about 50% in group 1 to 70% in group 2
and 30% in group 3 (Figure 9.45). Of those who owned flats, the majority were
living in the flats they owned rather than in another dwelling (Figure 9 .46).
Most professional and technical staff (groups 1 and 2) were involved in GEO
work while the others (group 3) were not (Figure 9.4 7). 39% of the total HKCED
respondents were professionals (group 1), 38% technical staff(group 2) and 23%
other (group3). These proportions are shown in Figure 9.48. The majority of
respondents in all three groups had tertiary education (Figure 9.49).
Income levels naturally varied between the groups. The questionnaire
income scales and the corresponding values of these as percentages of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per person were shown in Table 9.34. Most of the
professionals had monthly household income levels over $HK 40,000 (340%
GDP/person), while most technical staff were in the $HK 20,000 to $HK 39,999
range (170-340% GDP/person), and most of the other staff in the$HK10,000to
$19,999 (80-170% GDP/person) income category (Figure 9.50).
H) Education and income levels of the Australian survey groups

The education levels of the Australian survey groups were spread over the
first three categories ofYear 10, Year 12 and TAFE or other college for groups 4 to
7, and 9 (Figure 9.51). Only the Australian landslide experts (group 10) had a
majority of respondents with university training. The Lillydale Shire staff
respondents' education (group 8) was spread evenly between the top three
categories of Year 12, TAFE or other college and university.
The questionnaire income scales and the corresponding values of these as
percentages of the GDP per person were shown in Table 9.34. The gross annual
household incomes of groups 4 to 7 and 9 were spread evenly in the bottom three
;1~
ft
(1>
014.1 Respondents' age. :;d ....
..... ........
"' .
:>;''Tj
100,----------------------r--------------------~--------------------~--------------------~ ~ [
"' !:»
~ :.<
"' "';j
8 ::r
g ,-...
.... CJ
so ~I I . . . C!z
0
~(/.l
.g
('l)
~
-......;
"'
?f
>.
60 I I ~ I ~
(.)
c
<ll
::I
0'
<ll
U: 40 f-----i
20
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15-25 years 25-40 years 40-60 years > 60 years

Figure 9.39 Age of respondents (question 14.1).
V\
-.1
-.1
~32%
~ ~ ~15%
9% 6%
~
~35% ~31%
~
46% 25%

57%
~
0%
KEY
Group 9 Group 10
~ MALE
II FEMALE
Figure 9.40 The sex of respondents (question 14.2).
~ 6% ~6% ~5% ~19%

~24% ~16% ~22% ~12%

~Group 9
29%
~
Group 10
5%
~
KEY
NON-SMOKERS
II SMOKERS
Figure 9.41 The proportion of smokers among the respondents (question 14.3).
~~
(b ct
How long have you lived in your house or flat? :;d ""
en·~
~ "11
~§I
100.---------------------~~--------------------~--------------------~--------------------~ "'~ ~
:;<:
s"'g "'
;:T
tj
..... ,....._
H>z
0 c::
80r---------------------~--------------------+---------------------+---------------------~ ~Cil
.g
(b
~
'-'
"'
~ 60
~
>-
u
cQ)
::J
CT
....
Q)
LL 40
20
0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
< 5 years 5-15 years 15-25 years > 25 years
lJl
Figure 9.42 The length of time respondents have been living in their dwelling. -.1
1.0
~ ~
(1) ct
How long do you intend to stay in the house or flat you are currently in? ::0 ....
.....
"'~ .......
100~----------------------r---------------------r---------------------T----------------------.
'§:
"'~
"Tj
~
'::<
s"' '"0
i::J"
g t1
--..
.~(/J
0
. , c:::z
80~--------------------~--------------------+---------------------+---------------------~
0 ~
]'-'
"'
~ 60
~
>.
(.)
c
Q)
:::J
0"
....
Q)
l.L 40
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
< 5 years 5-15 years 15-25 years > 25 years
Vl
Figure 9.43 The length of time respondents intend to stay living in their current dwelling. 00
0
;1~
(1) Ft
How many children are living in your house or flat? ....:::0"' .....
~
~'Tl
~ §:
100,-----------------T-----------------r---------------~-----------------r----------------~ "'~ ~
':.<
'"t1
sg
(/l
P"
t)
.... ,--..
0 c:::
'""Z
80~----------------~----------------~-----------------+-----------------+----------------~ ~U".l
0 ~
"g~
(/l
~ 60
~
>.
(.)
c
Cl.>
:::1
0"
Cl.>
.....
u.. 40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 >3
VI
Figure 9.44 The number of children living in the respondents' dwelling. 00
.......
014.4 Do you own a flat?
52% 31% 70%
KEY ~ YES II NO
Figure 9.45 The proportion of Hong Kong respondents who own a flat (question
14.4).
014.5 If you own a flat, are you living in it?
0% 29%
6%
KEY ~ YES II NO
Figure 9.46 The proportion of Hong Kong flat-owning respondents who live in
the flat they own (question 14.5).
014.11a The nature of your work in the CEO is:
21% 16% 95%
KEY ~ GEO II Non-GEO
Figure 9.47 The nature of work of respondents in the Hong Kong survey groups
(question 14.11a).
014.11 b The nature of your work in the CEO is:
Figure 9.48 The nature of work of respondents in the Hong Kong survey groups
(question 14.11b).
014.9 The maximum level of education you have completed is:
~
~ 60
>.
(.)
c
Q)
:::J
rr 40
....
Q)
LL
2 3 2 3 2 3
Primary Secondary Tertiary

Figure 9.49 The level of education of respondents in the Hong Kong survey
groups (question 14.9).
014.10 What is your monthly household income?
~
~ 60
>.
(.)
c
Q)
:::J
rr 40
....
Q)
LL
20
23 123 123 123 23

Monthly
household < $HK 5 ,000 $HK 5,000 to $HK 10,000 to $HK20,000 to > $HK 4 0,000
income $HK 9,999 $HK 19,999 $HK 39,999
GOP per <40% 40-80% 80-170% 170-340% > 340%
person
Figure 9.50 The monthly household income of respondents in the Hong Kong
survey groups (question 14.10).
income categories, ranging up to $AU 60,000 or 300% GDP per person (Figure
9.52). The Lillydale Shire staff and the Australian landslide experts (groups 8
and 10) had higher income levels.
9.2.4 Results and Discussion of Factor Analyses
9.2.4.1 Overview of Method
Factor analysis is a common technique used in studies of risk perception by

psychologists (eg Rohrmann, 1995, and Slavic, 1987). It is part of the
investigation of the "cognitive structure of judgements about the magnitude
and acceptability of risks" (Rohrmann, 1995). Rohrmann notes that this
approach was pioneered by the Oregon group of psychologists (B. Fischhoff, S.
Lichtenstein and P. Slavic). The approach was also suggested to the author by Dr
Adams of UNSW's School of Psychology. It is well documented in most
psychology and applied multivariate analysis textbooks. The author found clear
and practical expositions of the method in Johnson and Wichern (1982, Chapter
9) and Haan (1977, p. 249ff).
Factor analysis starts with a measurement of a set of cognitive variables for
a study of single or multiple hazards. An example of such a variable is the
new/old cognitive variable. The responses for this variable are commonly
recorded on seven -point scales, with 1 corresponding to new and 7
corresponding to old, say (Nunnally, 1967). The respondent then selects a
response corresponding to his or her perception of this particular characteristic
(ie. cognitive variable) for the hazard in question.
Factor analysis aims to reduce the number of cognitive variables p to lesser
number m of underlying cognitive factors, where each factor is expressed as a
linear combination of the cognitive variables. The coefficients that the cognitive
variables are multiplied by to obtain the factors are often termed factor loadings.
Factor analysis is based on the fact that cognitive variables are often correlated
with each other, and the factors, when properly derived, can represent the
underlying cognitive structure of the hazard(s) (Slavic, 1987). Thus factor
analysis can give a valuable insight into the relationships between various
cognitive variables and an understanding of the entire cognitive structure of
risk perception.
The author had available responses for five cognitive variables for
investigation of landslide hazard perception (section 4). These were:
1. new/old,
2. voluntary/involuntary,
3. common/dread,
4. controllable/uncontrollable, and
5. fatal/not fatal.
What is your education?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year10 Year12 TAFE, other University

college
Figure 9.51 The education level of Australian survey groups' respondents.
What is your gross annual household income?

100
80
~
~ 60
>.
(.)
c
<1>
::l
0"
<1>
40
.....
LL
20
0
4 56 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 56 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Annual
household <$AU 25 OOO $AU 25,000 to $AU 40,000 to $AU 60,000 to >$AU 1OO,OOO
income ' $AU 39,999 $AU 59,999 $AU 99,999
GOP per < 120% 120-200% 200-300% 300-500% > 500%

person
Figure 9.52 The income level of Australian survey groups' respondents.

Hence the original number of cognitive variables wasp= 5. The same variables
were available for the traffic accident while driving a car hazard and
petrochemical plant accident hazard, but factor analyses were not performed for
these as the author's interest was the perception of the landslide hazard.
A number of factor analysis methods are available. The choice of the factor
analysis method is not crucial; in fact a more satisfactory result is obtained
when a number of methods are used on the same data and all results
substantially confirm the same factor structure (Johnson and Wichern, 1982).
The methods used by the author were those available on the SPSS
statistical analysis package, namely:
PC Principal Components
ULS Unweighted Least Squares
GLS Generalised Least Squares
ML Maximum Likelihood
PAF PrinCipal Axis Factoring
ALPHA Alpha factoring
IMAGE Image Factoring
Normally the calculated factors are rotated in order to obtain a clearer
understanding and reduce the correlation between factors (Johnson and
Wichern, 1982). Again various methods of rotation are available. The author
used a number of orthogonal rotation methods (VARIMAX, EQUAMAX,
QUARTIMAX) as well as an oblique rotation method (OBLIMIN).
There are no recommended strategies for factor analysis - the approach
appears to be an art form to a certain extent. However, the author found the
following suggested approach by Johnson and Wichern (1982), somewhat
modified, to be reasonable:
o Perform an unrotated factor analysis for a selected number of
common factors m.
(The author used PC, ULS, GLS, ML, PAF, ALPHA and IMAGE for
m=2.)
o Rotate the factors.
(The author used VARIMAX, EQUAMAX, QUARTIMAX and
OBLIMIN rotations.)
o Compare the solutions, checking that the loadings group in the same
manner.
(Such comparisons were carried out.)
o Repeat the above steps for a larger number of common factors m,
checking whether the extra factors contribute to the understanding
of the cognitive structure.

(The author used m=3.)
o For large data sets, split them in half, perform analyses and compare
with previous solutions to confirm validity.
(Unfortunately the author was unable to split the small data sets.)
The results of the analyses are discussed in section 9.2.4.2 below.

Tables 9.38 and 9.39 list the percentage of data variance explained by
factors from factor analyses across the different survey groups for m=2 and
m=3 respectively. These percentages are the same for both unrotated and
rotated solutions. It can be seen that the PC procedure is the most effective in
explaining the data variance for a given m, followed by the ULS, GLS and ML
procedures. The PAF, ALPHA and IMAGE procedures are far from as good. One
also notes that three factors were able to be extracted only by the PC, PAF and
IMAGE procedures for alllO survey groups. Thus the PC procedure appears
most effective for this data set.
survey groups.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
GROUP PC ULS GLS ML PAF ALPHA IMAGE
1 58.7 1 41.4 1 41.6 1 41.5 1 35.0 1 32.4 1 11.2 1
2 75.4 1 59.5 1 60.2 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 40.1 1
3 57.5 1 44.9 1 45.2 1 44.9 1 40.6 1 31.3 1 14.2 1
4 60.8 1 48.0 1 48.1 1 48.1 1 37.6 1 38.6 1 15.7 1
5 54.0 1 30.0 1 29.9 1 30.1 1 26.0 1 27.2 1 8.7 1
6 63.0 1 40.3 1 40.3 1 40.4 1 39.2 1 39.2 1 16.0 1
7 60.8 1 35.7 1 35.6 1 35.6 1 35.2 1 35.7 1 15.2 1
8 67.0 1 55.0 1 55.1 1 55.1 1 50.7 1 - 3 24.4 1
9 63.5 1 37.3 1 37.3 1 37.3 1 37.3 1 37.2 1 19.1 1
10 67.3 1 53.8 1 53.8 1 53.8 1 48.3 1 47.2 1 24.6 1
Notes:
1. Both unrotated and rotated (Varimax) analyses were successful.
2. Factors could not be extracted as the procedure did not converge.
3. No analyses were carried out as the Hessian was not positive definite.
survey groups.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
GROUP PC ULS GLS ML PAF ALPHA IMAGE
1 76.8 1 76.8 2 76.8 2 76.8 2 42.2 1 42.4 1 11.2 1
2 87.6 1 87.6 2 87.6 2 87.6 2 62.8 1 63.4 1 40.1 1
3 77.7 1 77.7 2 77.7 2 77.7 2 46.7 1 - 3 14.3 1
4 78.7 1 43.7 1 - 3 - 3 39.4 1 40.7 1 15.7 1
5 72.9 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 27.8 1 30.2 1 8.7 1
6 77.4 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 43.0 1 43.1 1 16.2 1
7 75.6 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 36.8 1 36.9 1 15.4 1
8 82.8 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 56.3 1 56.2 1 24.4 1
9 78.4 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 38.7 1 42.4 1 19.5 1
10 81.8 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 51.0 1 52.0 1 24.6 1
Notes:
1. Both unrotated and rotated (Varimax) analyses were successful.
2. Factors could not be extracted as the procedure did not converge.
3. No analyses were carried out as the Hessian was not positive definite.
With two factors the percentage of data variance explained by the PC

procedure ranged from 54% to 75%, and from 73% to 87% for three factors. The
worst group in terms of the percentage of data variance explained was Montrose
residents (group 5), and the best groups the technical staff of the HKCED,
Werrington residents and Australian landslide experts (groups2, 8 and 10).
The factor loadings obtained from factor analyses are presented in a
condensed overview format in Appendix F3. From these one can see that each
survey group has its own individual combinations of cognitive variables (ie.
factors), and there is no universal, consistent set of factors across all groups such
as those found by Slovic (1987). This is not unexpected as only one hazard
(landsliding) with a small number of cognitive variables was available for factor
analysis, whereas Slovic and others analysed many hazards with relatively large
numbers of cognitive variables. One also notes that for the landslide hazard
three factors give a better separation than two factors.
The interesting points arising from the factor analysis results are the most
common combinations of factor loadings obtained. These are:
o Variable 1 (new/old) by itself,
o Variable 5 (fatal/not fatal) by itself,
o Variables 1 and 5 combined,
o Variables 1, 2 and 3 combined,
o Variables 2 and 4 combined,

o Variables 1 to 4 combined, and
o Variables 2 to 5 or 3 to 5 combined.
It can be seen that the most important cognitive variables out of the five tested
for landslide risk perception are whether the hazard is new or old to the
respondent, and how likely the respondent believes it is that the hazard will be
fatal. The importance of whether the landslide hazard is fatal or not cognitive
variable can also be seen in the responses to sections 8 and 9 detailing specific
landslide risk situations, discussed in section 9.2.3. 7. The voluntary/
involuntary, common/dread and controllable/uncontrollable variables are also
important, and the results show that landslide risk perception is influenced by a
combination of beliefs held by an individual for each variable.
9.3.1 Conclusions
9.3.1.1 General Views

Most respondents never think about the possibility oflandsliding affecting
their life. The majority of respondents have a low level of concern with
landsliding. The level of concern about landsliding was higher among the group
most at risk- the Montrose group. Most respondents in each group did not have
discussions with government, civil or geotechnical engineers regarding how
landsliding may affect them. The most frequent information source on
landsliding is the media, followed by official and geotechnical reports, and
occasionally personal experience.
Responses indicated an overwhelming support for the regulation of
development on land subject to landslide risk, indicating that the standards of
acceptable landslide risk should be set by government and the experts. The
Hong Kong survey groups indicated that the payment for landslide stabilisation
should be borne by the developer and the government. The Australian survey
groups nominated landowners and the government. The increased landslide
stabilisation costs resulting from a higher standard (before development takes
place) should be borne by the government, landowners and developers. This is
also the case for the remedial costs of reducing landslide risk.
The Australian survey groups ranked landsliding as less hazardous in
comparison with an occupational hazard, an industrial hazard, a health hazard
and three types of travel hazards. The HKCED survey groups ranked these
hazards quite differently. Landsliding was ranked third by two groups and
fourth by the other. The difference in the relative positions of landsliding
between the two countries are likely to be due to the differing landslide fatality
rates and awareness levels in each country. The worst hazards were seen as
pedestrian struck by a car, and traffic accident while driving a car, by groups in
both countries. Smoking was seen as a lesser danger in Hong Kong than in
Australia. For the Australian survey groups, a comparison of the relative hazard
ranking and actual fatality rates showed that that the public is capable of
estimating the relative ranking of fatality rates fairly well.
9.3.1.2 Cognitive Structure of Perception of Selected Hazards

The "being involved in a landslide" hazard is seen as new for all except
HKCED survey groups and the Australian landslide experts, involuntary,
neither common nor dreadful, a range of responses was obtained for the
uncontrollable/controllable factor, and neither fatal nor not fatal (ie. depends on
specific landslide situation). The main point to come out here is that landsliding
is perceived as an involuntary hazard and hence the public will require the low
acceptable risk levels corresponding to an involuntary hazard.
The "traffic accident while driving a car" hazard is seen as old, more
involuntary than voluntary, common, more controllable than uncontrollable,
and neither fatal nor non-fatal. The "petrochemical plant accident to nearby
residents" hazard is seen as new, involuntary, more dread than common,
controllable, and more not fatal than fatal. The responses regarding the traffic
accident and petrochemical plant accident hazards are consistent with other
published data.
For the relationship between risk aversion and cognitive variables, the
results indicated that individuals are more risk- averse in regards to landsliding
when they perceive the hazard to be involuntary, dread rather than common,
uncontrollable and fatal. This is consistent with the wide body of published
literature for the perception of other risks (eg. Rohrmann, 1995; Slovic, 1987).
9.3.1.3 Quantitative Results Regarding Landslide Risk Perception

Section 6 established the link between qualitative and quantitative risk
levels by eliciting the perception of a quantified annual loss oflife frequency. For
a risk to be perceived as low or very low, the annual loss of life frequency would
need to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1 million.
Section 7 elicited the relative ranking of various landslide situations,
effectively asking "Which landslide situation is the worst?". Large scatter in the
responses was obtained. This is not unexpected given the lack of detail supplied
about each situation. The best situation was, by consensus, house F, the house
protected by a man -made structure - a retaining wall. House D, located on a
large magnitude landslide, was perceived to be the worst situation. House G,

situated on a cliff, had a mixed response, as some groups, or portions of
respondents within groups, perceived the cliff to be stable and safe, whereas
others as unstable and therefore as highly dangerous.
Acceptable probabilities oflandsliding for loss oflife are one to two orders
of magnitude lower than those for property damage, which is expected. Second,
the modal probabilities are mostly low (around 10- 6). For 80% of respondents
the range was very wide - three orders of magnitude. This reflects a wide
diversity of risk attitudes. The author found that most respondents in fact did
not take the 10 year exposure period and the specified vulnerability into
account. The expressed values of acceptable landslide probabilities is that those
for the respondent's own dwelling did not differ from those for the dwellings of
others. This is because people's expressed responses often differ from their
actual behaviour (see, for example, Slavic, 1987). The tendency for lower
acceptable probabilities (corresponding to those for involuntary hazards)
becomes apparent, particularly for loss of life in the more dangerous landslide
situations. Both of these points are not unexpected. The wide spread of most of
the responses over the 10- 3 to 10- 6 raw probability range corresponds to the
ALARP risk region. The question of which acceptable probability one should
use in decision making will thus need to be addressed.
The most risk averse group by far was the Werrington group (group 9). The
more risk taking groups were the non -professional, non -technical staff of the
HKCED (group 3) and the Australian landslide experts (group 10). These
groups were more risk taking by up to two orders of magnitude mainly in the
cases of property damage in the less dangerous landslide situations. The
Kalorama group of residents (group 5) was consistently more risk taking than all
other groups for both property damage and loss oflife, having a mode at least an
order of magnitude higher than the others.
The author has contrasted the raw modal responses for expressed
acceptable landslide probabilities leading to loss of life with the annual fatality
rates for other hazards discussed in section 9.1.1.3. The modal responses for
expressed acceptable landslide probabilities leading to loss oflife correspond to
the fatality rates for hazards that are commonly regarded as low risk. By
desiring the same probabilities for the probability of landsliding (leading to loss
oflife) as for low risk hazards the respondents have expressed a desire for a low
landslide risk to life. While expressing this desire some of the respondents may
continue to live with landslide risks far higher than these, thereby revealing a
higher acceptance of risk than they have expressed (Slavic, 1987). This is likely
to be the case because the risk is being tolerated rather than accepted, ie it lies in
the ALARP range (The Royal Society, 1992).
9.3.1.4 Demographics
Regarding the broad demographics of the survey groups, most respondents
in most groups were either in the 25-40 year or 40-60 year age bracket, male
and non-smokers. Most groups' respondents had lived in their current
dwelling for 5-15 years. The majority of respondents in all three HKCED
groups had tertiary education. Income levels varied between all the groups. The
results indicated that landslide risk perception is generally congruent with
published risk perception studies on other hazards, in that risk aversion is
higher for persons with children in their home, with higher incomes, those who
intend to live in their dwelling for a longer time and those who own their
dwelling. It is interesting to also note the two results differing from the
published studies. Firstly, the Australian landslide experts (group 10) had an
association with risk -taking and higher income, and secondly the older
Kalorama residents (group 5) were risk-taking.
The interesting points arising from the factor analysis results are as
follows. The most important cognitive variables out of the five tested for
landslide risk perception are whether the hazard is new or old to the respondent,
and how likely the respondent believes it is that the hazard will be fatal. The
importance of whether the landslide hazard is fatal or not cognitive variable can
also be seen in the responses to sections 8 and 9 detailing specific landslide risk
situations. The voluntary/involuntary, common/dread and controllable/
uncontrollable variables are also important, and the results show that landslide
risk perception is influenced by a combination of beliefs held by an individual for
each variable.
A number of recommendations are drawn from the above conclusions.
These are split into recommendations for future research, and
recommendations for landslide risk management systems.
Following the author's research into landslide risk perception it is
recommended that the following areas of landslide risk perception be further
investigated:
o A more detailed investigation of the acceptable probabilities of
landsliding, for both property damage and loss of life. A much wider
range oflandslide situations needs be looked at in order to develop a
more comprehensive landslide risk perception database. Groups of
residents in areas affected by various landslide risks, control groups

as well as expert and institutional groups should be surveyed.
o A more detailed database of actual landslide risks experienced around
the world be compiled. This would best be done at a national level,
with coordination by an international committee. More detail is
required particularly on the vulnerability aspects for both loss of life
and property damage.
o The cognitive structure of landslide risk perception be investigated
for larger numbers of cognitive variables, with more groups in
landslide-affected and landslide-free areas surveyed around the
world.
o A wider study of the cognitive structure of landslide risk perception
incorporating substantial numbers of cognitive variable and other
hazards, in order to improve the understanding of the underlying
structure of landslide risk perception. It would be desirable to
examine differences across cultural and national groups as well as
between individuals with particular orientations.
This research will enhance further the understanding of acceptable landslide
risk and landslide risk perception, and provide important inputs into the entire
landslide risk management system.
but based on insights gained from the author's study of landslide risk
perception, the following recommendations for landslide risk management
systems are made:
o Policies and processes incorporating an awareness of issues affecting
landslide risk perception should be incorporated into landslide risk
management systems.
o Surveys of landslide risk perception need to be carried out to
determine attitudes of groups affected by landsliding, as well as of
those not affected.
o Effective two-way risk communication should be put into place as
soon as practicable.
o Consultation processes with the public and other stakeholder
groups should be established on landslide risk assessment policy
formulation and implementation.
With the above recommendations put into place the management of landslide
risk will become a far more informed and effective practice, benefiting all
concerned.
Table 9.40 Fold -out questionnaire summary.
Section Study Objective Component

1 General views of landsliding
3 Cognitive factors associated with the traffic accident while driving a car hazard
4 Cognitive factors associated with being involved in a landslide hazard
5 Cognitive factors associated with being involved in a petrochemical plant accident
10 Views on limits to development
11 Views on landslide stabilisation
12 Views on cost of new regulations
13 Views on cost of remedial works
2 Ranking of landsliding relative to other hazards
7 Ranking of various landslide situations to each other
6 The perception of specific annual death rates from an unspecified hazard
8, 9 The maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding in various landslide situations
14 Demographics
Group Group Type Type of Number of

Country City
No. or Area Landsliding Respondents
1 HK HK 33
2
00 00 HKCED Various 32
NN NN staff
3 GG GG 20
L Montrose Infrequent
4 I 84
residents debris flows
L
M L Kalorama Slow
5 42
E y residents landslides
L D
Rural area
A B A
residents Slow
6 u 0 L
(Silvan, landslides
59
s u E
Wand in)
T R
7 R N s Mooroolbark
None 74
A E H residents
L I
I R Lillydale
8 Various 26
A E Shire staff
9
s Werrington
None 70
y residents
D
N Australian
10 E landslide Various 20
, y experts
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

FUTURE RESEARCH
10.1 Conclusions
Generic conclusions arising from the work of the author are given herein.
The reader is referred to individual chapters for more details.
10.1.1 Probability of Landsliding
10.1.1.1 Probability of Slope Failure in Hong Kong

The author has used over 3,000 landslide records kept by the GEO in Hong
Kong for the 1984-93 study period to compile statistics of landsliding in
man-modified slopes. The average annual probabilities of failure for cuts,
retaining walls and fills were found to be 1 in 85, 1 in 360 and 1 in 525
respectively. Through a review of existing information and earlier studies (the
CHASE cut slope data, information on geology and geomorphology, major case
studies, stage 1 reports and the ranking system, the outcomes of stage 1 studies
for registered slopes and their performance, plus a limited survey of senior G EO
staff) the author proposed and devoloped in detail a method for assessing the
probability of slope failure in Hong Kong. The method entails the use of
probability modification factors based on observable factors for a slope, such as
age, geology, geometry, geomorphology and groundwater conditions, to modify
the average probability of failure. The method does not need additional site
investigation or material testing data, but does need trialing and further
refinement in order for it to become a workable component of the landslide risk
assessment system in Hong Kong.

In the Kalorama sub-zoning study the author used geomorphological
mapping and historical landslide records to determine and refine relative and
absolute probabilities of landsliding. These were found to be similar to
probabilities derived from the geomorphology- based system proposed by Fell et
al (1996), being governed to some extent by the historical landslide frequencies.
This type of approach can be applied in other areas at a low cost.
10.1.2 Vulnerability to Landsliding

In the study of vulnerability of elements to landsliding (Chapter 6), the
author has reviewed the literature, predicted runout distances for slopes in
Hong Kong (illustrating methods applicable to any landslide database

world -wide), and assessed the vulnerability of persons and property to
landsliding. The following conclusions are drawn from this work.
10.1.2.1 Runout Distance Prediction

By examining the Hong Kong landslide database statistics and
investigating the relationships between the geometric variables, the author
found that the ratio of H/L was important for runout distance prediction in
Hong Kong. ByproducingFversus Vplots for cuts, fills and retaining walls, and
comparing these to other such published plots, it was found that the data
exhibited a wide scatter due to the different failure mechanisms and materials.
A simple sled model was applied to the cut slopes portion of the landslide
database. The simple sled model fitted the cut slope data best when the
coefficient offriction was assumed to be the same along both surfaces. The mean
value ofthe coefficient of friction was found to be 0.96 (tan44°).
Multiple regression analyses of the database were used to obtain statistical
models for the prediction of runout distance with one or two independent
variables and a reasonable fit to the data. The material and causes of failure
variables as recorded in the incident reports were found not to be statistically
significant for the prediction of runout distance. Thus regression models based
purely on geometric variables were constructed. The situations with enough
data for the construction of statistical models were cuts, rock falls, natural slope
failures, retaining walls and fill slopes. Equations for the mean predicted
runout distance together with the lower 5% and upper 95% confidence intervals
were given. The equations for natural slope run out distance should not be used
without other methods, as the data behind these is limited, and they involve the
estimation of the location of the head of the scarp. The equations for the cut
slope debris depth and runout distances for rock falls, retaining walls and fills
have quite wide confidence bands due to the underlying data scatter. They are
still useful for risk estimation. The runout distance models apply to the
situation where the debris runs out onto a near horizontal slope below, as the
landslide database had a majority of cases with horizontal slope below. Some
qualitative guidance on non- horizontal slopes below was given by the author.
These methods of statistical analysis can be applied to any man -modified
slopes landslide database in the world in order to identify the important
predictive variables in the database, compare the data with other publications,
and develop database-specific models for the prediction of runout distance.
10.1.2.2 Vulnerability of Persons and Property

The analysis of the Hong Kong landslide data showed that a person is very
vulnerable in the event of complete or substantial burial by debris, or the
collapse of an enclosing vehicle or building. If the person is buried by debris,
death is most likely to result from asphyxia rather than crushing or impact. If
the person is not buried, injuries are much more likely than death. The number
of deaths rises rapidly when the landslide volume exceeds 1,000 m3. Below this
volume the number of fatalities is independent of the landslide magnitude.
Small volume failures (less than 100m3) can cause one or more casualties, but
large numbers of casualties generally result from large volume landslides
(greater than 1,000 m 3). Multiple fatalities are likely to occur in the case of a
failure of large magnitude (over 1,000 m 3) or a very close proximity of a large
number of persons to a small-medium failure (50-1,000 m3) with a rapid
velocity, and from the burial of persons by the landslide debris or the demolition
of occupied buildings. The author detailed the range of vulnerabilities found,
and recommended vulnerability values for various situations.
While the property damage data came exclusively from Hong Kong, the
conclusions drawn below are valid for similar types of property elsewhere in the
world.
The amount of damage to a vehicle depends on the amount of warning time
available, proximity ofvehicle(s) to the slope, magnitude of the landslide, debris
run out distance and depth, and temporal factors such as the amount of traffic,
the time of day and so on. Landslides with volumes over 100 m 3 are likely to
destroy vehicles if their proximity is sufficient. Rock falls are far more damaging
than soil debris for the same volume.
The inadequacy of data and documentation as to the type of building
structure and the damage experienced limited the quantification of building
damage. The vulnerability of buildings can be far better quantified in the future
if details of damage are properly recorded for each incident on an ongoing basis.
Squatter huts and sheds are the most flimsy structures , easily demolished by
small volume landslides. 1-2 storey masonry or concrete buildings, such as
houses and factories, are stronger. Multistorey buildings are the strongest in
resisting demolition by landsliding. Only the Po Shan landslide demolished two
multistorey buildings and damaged another.
Temporal probability needs to be estimated for vehicles and other movable
equipment, otherwise the risk may be grossly overestimated. The author
provided diagrams and lists of factors influencing the temporal probability of
persons for road cuts, road fills, retaining walls above/below the road, footpaths,
bus shelters, and persons in buildings below cuts or retaining walls rather than
giving fixed guidelines.
10.1.3 Calculation of Landslide Risk
10.1.3.1 Risk Assessments in Lillydale Shire
A) Risk to Buildings
Vulnerabilities for building damage were developed by the author for both
the landslide and debris flow hazards. These were then used in the risk to
building calculations in the Montrose and Kalorama study areas. The total risk
to buildings in the Montrose study area is 0.02-0.22% of the total study area
building value per annum. The total building risk in the Kalorama study area
for small and large landslides is 0.52%-0.60% and 0.17%-0.22% of the total
value of buildings per annum. The building risk from small landslides is larger
than that from the large landslides as small landslides occur more frequently
and in more locations.
B) Risk to Life
Vulnerabilities of persons to debris flows were developed and used in the
risk to life calculations in the Montrose study area. The highest calculated upper
bound value of annual individual risk to life is 0.008, well above the commonly
accepted limits to individual risk for other hazards. 39 properties in the study
area have an upper bound value of annual individual risk to life above 10- 3, ie in
the unacceptable risk region. A further 20 properties have an upper bound value
of annual individual risk to life of 10- 4 , which is within the ALARP region, eg for
dams (ANCOLD, 1994). The remaining 92 properties have an upper bound
value of annual individual risk to life of 10- 6, which is in the acceptable risk
region. The average annual expected loss of life due to debris flow in the
Montrose study area is 51-620 persons over 1,000 years - a substantial
number. The fact that many lives are likely to be lost in a single debris flow
disaster rather than spread out over a number of years is likely to make the
situation less acceptable. The loss of life from a debris flow disaster was
estimated to be 68 to 83lives from a storm event with the probability of 1 in 100
to 1 in 1,000, comparable to the average annual expected loss of life figures.
These values are above commonly accepted industrial or dam societal risk limits.
C) The Economics of Risk Reduction

The economics of risk reduction in both study areas were examined by
analysing the IRR for various scenarios. The IRR for both Montrose risk
reduction scenarios without the inclusion of the value of saving lives is negative
or near zero for periods of 100 to 10,000 years, and with the cost of lives saved
taken into account approaches economically justifiable levels at the upper
bounds. A scenario for the reduction of landslide risk in the Kalorama study
area had aniRR of from -0.5% to+ 1.0% for periods oflOO to 10,000years. This
is again a low, not economically feasible value The difference between the two
study areas is that Montrose presents a serious risk to life, whereas in Kalorama
the risk to buildings carries more weight.
D) Loss Of Real Estate Value Due To Landsliding

Significant real estate losses are experienced by buildings threatened by
landsliding, buildings close to landslide-damaged buildings and properties in
medium and high hazard landslide and debris flow zones. The losses of real
estate value decrease with increasing distance from locations of landslide
destruction, and locations threatened by landsliding.
10.1.4 Relationship Between Rainfall and Landsliding in Hong

Kong
The author used five minute rainfall data and a number of rain gauges to
obtain significantly different results to that of previous studies using hourly or
daily data for a single rain gauge. The rainfall thresholds identified by the
author, based on five minute rainfall data and isolated landslide events achieved
only a 35% correct prediction oflandslide events, primarily due to the coarse and
at times inaccurate recording of failure times and dates.
The study looked at relationships between the proportion of failed features
in an area represented by a single rain gauge. The results indicated three hour
and twelve hour rainfall as best explaining most of the data variance. The
results also indicated the importance of shorter duration rainfalls in the range of
one hour to twelve hours, which is consistent with the current basis for the
rainfall warning system. A series of polynomial curve fittings showed that
quadratic and cubic curves yield improved fit, as well as showing a non -linear
increase in the number oflandslides with increasing rainfall. From these curves
the author has selected the cubic curve model with outliers through the origin
for the prediction oflandslides near a particular rain gauge in Hong Kong, as the
curve has the best statistical fit.
Three different methods of analysis were used to derive models for

predicting the numbers oflandslides on Hong Kong Island. These were a curve
combining all gauges from the storm data, using 22 individual curves for each
rain gauge, and using the curve predicting the numbers of landslides for
individual gauges extrapolated to Hong Kong Island. The first method used a
database containing the rainfall values and total number of landslides on Hong
Kong Island for each storm event. The spatial distribution of rainfall was
accounted for by averaging. The most significant rainfall variable is twelve hour
rainfall. The predicted numbers of landslides were found to be significantly
model-dependent as insufficient major storm data is available in the 10 year
study period to determine the shapes of the predictive curves for more extreme
events.
Island given a rainfall event consisted ofbuilding individual models for each rain
occurring near each gauge and summing these for a total value. The calculated
number of landslides is about half of those calculated when the maximum
rainfall values were assumed constant across the entire island. This is the effect
of the spatial distribution of rainfall within a major storm event. The third
method took the curves for predicting the number of landslides near an
individual rain gauge and used a single rainfall variable fixed across the entire
island.
Comparing the mean values predicted by all three models has shown that
spatial averaging was insufficient to fully eliminate the overestimation of the
predicted number of landslides when a constant mean rainfall value is applied
over an area. The numbers of landslides could be overestimated by a factor of
two or more. The best method for the prediction of the number oflandslides on
Hong Kong Island from a 1 in 100 AEP storm event is obtained by transposing an
approximate 1 in 100 AEP storm event onto the worst position on Hong Kong
Island, and calculating the number of landslides near individual rain gauges
using the actual spatial storm rainfall distribution. The predicted number of
failures obtained using this approach is between 5-11% of the total number of
features (about 370 to 820 landslides), which is more than the maximum of239
landslides recorded in 8 May 1992 since the systematic recording of landslides
commenced in 1984.
10.1.5 Acceptable Risk and Risk Perception
From surveys of landslide risk perception of a number of different groups

in Australia and Hong Kong, and a review of acceptable risk and risk perception,
the following main conclusions were drawn.
o Most people seldom think about the possibility of landsliding
affecting their life, except those who are involved m
landslide-related work. Most have a low level of concern with
landsliding. The level of concern about landsliding was higher for the
group most at risk.
o Respondents indicated an overwhelming support for the regulation
of development on land subject to landslide risk and that the
standards of acceptable landslide risk should be set by government
and the experts. They thought that the payment for landslide
stabilisation should be borne by the developer, land owners and the
government, and that the increased landslide stabilisation costs
resulting from a higher standard (before development takes place)
should also be borne by these bodies, as should the remedial costs of
reducing landslide risk when an unacceptably high landslide risk is
discovered after development is complete.
o When landsliding was compared in terms of potential to cause loss of
life to six other hazards, it was ranked as the least hazardous out of
the seven hazards by Australian survey groups. The HKCED survey
groups ranked these hazards quite differently. Landsliding was
ranked third by two groups and fourth by one other. The differences
in the relative positions oflandsliding between the two countries are
likely to be due to the differing landslide fatality rates and awareness
levels in each country. A comparison of the relative hazard ranking
and actual fatality rates showed that that the public is capable of
estimating the relative ranking of fatality rates fairly well.
o The cognitive variable responses for three hazards indicated that the
"traffic accident while driving a car" hazard was seen as old, more
involuntary than voluntary, common, more controllable than
uncontrollable, and neither fatal nor non -fatal. The "petrochemical
plant accident to nearby residents" hazard was seen as new,
involuntary, more dread than common, controllable, and more not
fatal than fatal. The "being involved in a landslide" hazard was seen
as new for all except HKCED survey groups and the Australian
landslide experts, involuntary, neither common nor dreadful and
neither fatal nor not fatal (ie. it depends on the specific landslide
situation). A range of responses was obtained for the uncontrollable/

controllable factor. Landslide hazard is perceived as involuntary, and
hence the public will require acceptable risk levels corresponding to
an involuntary hazard.
o The value of public awareness campaigns is also born out by the
results. The beliefs of the residents are shown to be significantly
influenced by the information supplied. Care must be taken not to
raise expectations beyond realistic levels during public awareness
camprugns.
o Individuals are more risk- averse in regards to landsliding when they
perceive the hazard to be involuntary, dread rather than common,
uncontrollable and fatal. The results for the landslide hazard are
consistent with the wide body of published research on the perception
of other risks.
o The perception of a quantified annual loss of life frequency showed
that for a risk to be perceived as low or very low, the annual loss oflife
frequency would need to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1 million.
This is consistent with acceptable involuntary risks in other areas
such as dams and petrochemical plants. The ranking of the landslide
situations indicated that landslide situations with smaller, slower,
less destructive landslides with some degree of control are seen as
better than larger, faster, more destructive landslides.
o The tendency for lower acceptable probabilities, corresponding to
those for involuntary hazards, becomes apparent particularly for loss
of life in the more dangerous landslide situations. The modal
acceptable landslide probabilities are mostly low, often around 10- 6
per annum. The wide spread of 80% of the responses over the 10- 3 to
10-6 per annum raw probability range corresponds to the ALARP
risk region, reflecting a wide diversity of risk attitudes. Overall, the
respondents have expressed a desire for a low landslide risk to life.
While expressing this desire, some oft he respondents continue to live
with landslide risks far higher than these, thereby revealing a higher
"acceptance" of risk than they have expressed. This is likely to be due
to the risk being tolerated rather than accepted - an important
distinction.
o The acceptable probabilities of landsliding are one to two orders of
magnitude lower for loss oflife than those for property damage. The
expressed values of acceptable landslide probabilities did not differ
for the respondents' own house from those for the dwellings of others.
10.2 Recommendations for Future Research
Following the author's research work, the author recommends that the
areas listed below be further investigated.
o Further studies evaluating the different theoretical and statistical
runout distance models are needed to compare their effectiveness and
accuracy. A database indicating which models/methods are most
applicable in various situations would be ideal.
o Virtually no information on the exact location and numbers of
persons present at the time of sliding was available in the literature,
even for major landslide disasters. Future collection of such data is
essential to enable a better quantification of vulnerability.
o No information was available to the author regarding the total value
of the damaged property, and only indicative information on the
amount or proportion oflandslide damage sustained. This data needs
to be recorded to improve the accuracy of the quantification of
vulnerability for property.
o More research on rainfall and landsliding in man- modified slopes is
needed on a world -wide basis to improve the prediction oflandslide
probability using rainfall. This will require detailed inventories of
man -modified slopes as well as systematic recording of failures in
these slopes.
o Further development of quantitative spatial models, based solely on
rainfall, predicting the numbers of landslides in other areas of high
landslide risk is highly desirable for the quantification of landslide
risk in these areas.
o Research on rainfall and landsliding in natural slopes needs to be
carried out with a risk assessment viewpoint. This means
establishing spatial models to predict the quantities of landslides
given certain rainfall events, the investigation of the inclusion of
other variables such as slope, material strengths and so on, in order to
improve and refine such models .. Ideally these models would also
predict the runout areas of the landslides in order to enable the
assessment of consequences.
o The research on rainfall and landsliding can be further enchanced by
developing models including soil moisture deficits, wetting fronts,
negative pore pressures and their reduction and intergrating these
into the analysis.
o More research is required in the meteorological arena in order to
better define quantify extreme storm events in spatial terms. The
prediction of extreme storm events in spatial terms could then feed

into spatial models predicting the numbers of landslides, and hence
the calculation of societal landslide risks.
o Development and/or investigation of the best spatial and temporal
models for linking rainfall, possibly other variables and landsliding.
o A more detailed investigation of the acceptable probabilities of
landsliding, for both property damage and loss of life. A much wider
range of landslide situations needs be looked at in order to develop a
more comprehensive landslide risk perception database. Groups of
residents in areas affected by various landslide risks, control groups
as well as expert and institutional groups should be surveyed.
o A more detailed database of actual landslide risks experienced around
the world be compiled. This would best be done at a national level,
with coordination by an international committee. More detail is
required particularly on the vulnerability aspects for both loss of life
and property damage.
o The cognitive structure of landslide risk perception be investigated
for larger numbers of cognitive variables, with more groups in
landslide-affected and landslide-free areas surveyed around the
world.
o A wider study of the cognitive structure of landslide risk perception
incorporating substantial numbers of cognitive variable and other
hazards, in order to improve the understanding of the underlying
structure of landslide risk perception. It would be desirable to
examine differences across cultural and national groups as well as
between individuals with particular orientations.
o Studies establishing acceptable and tolerable landslide risk criteria
for individual and societal risks are needed to enable the evaluation of
results of quantitative landslide risk assessments.
This research will further enhance the understanding of the vulnerability to
landsliding, the relationship between rainfall and landsliding, acceptable
landslide risk and landslide risk perception, and provide important inputs into
the entire landslide risk management system.
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APPENDIX SERIES A
DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS
Appendix AI
Examples of Hong Kong Landslide Incident Reports and Cards .... 636
AppendixA2
Hong Kong Landslide Risk Perception Survey Questionnaire ...... 640
APPENDIX Al
EXAMPLES OF HONG KONG LANDSLIDE INCIDENT
REPORTS AND CARDS
Al.l Examples of Hong Kong Landslide Incident Reports and Cards

An example of a Hong Kong landslide incident reports is given in Figures
ALl and A1.2. An example of a Hong Kong landslide card for the same incident
is given in Figure A1.3.
File No.
GCO INCIDENT REPORT -~m
·.. f .. GCO Incident No. -····-····-:l/.... _....(. ..~€_ ..fz/.-t:/.d.!f____ .... :. ... _...-..·----·-----
Oattt Report Received .. :.:.•..•.••....••.•. :.••........••••...••..•..•••••.•_........... ~........ ··Time :·-·-····-····----··-- .
2. Location of Failure .•......••..•.••.•••.• !QT.. .... ~ ....."~~~.....'(!~~!.~ ....r•• !~!.~:...J..f.:.::.!..#.~.:..:":..:._:.

Co-ordinates or GIU cell reference ··············-····················-···············:................... -:......................................
(Attacn a 1:1 000 survey plan to show location oll.,lure. and Slope Refe<enco Number if poss•ble).
I
3. For Duty Officer a_nd Emergency Team Members
Time of Report ........................................... Pager call received ..................................................................
Contact Pager Co. ..............................................................................................................................................
Phone call received in Emergency Control Room .........................................................................................
4. Incident Reported from: Mr/Mrs/Ms .............................................................................................................

Tel. HK/Kin/NT ....................................... from:-
0 H/HK/KLN/NT 0 00/ .......... . [j Police ' BOO 0 Public C:: Radio CJ HD
0 AO 0 DLO/.......... 0 WSD 0 Aerial Photos 0 Others .............................................. .
5. Maintenance Responsibility:
0 HO (!(Private 0 WSD 0 HD 0 USD 0 Licensed Crown Land
0 Short Term Tenancy G"Unclear 0 Others ............................................................
6. Action Taken by Controller:

GCO Officer Mr. ................................................. despatched to inspect at time ..................................... .
Other Action .................•......................................
7. Date of Inspection ........•...~..: ..1£.~ .. t.J............ Inspected by ............... H...:.~:.. ~~...................... ..

with Mr/~ ........ P..~.T.1 ..... ~.~.:: ..ff.~ ......... of
0 H/HK/KLN/NT 0 DO [] BOO
0 Police 0 WSD 0 HD/USD c:(Others ..'f!.('!jJ:.~f.!..'Y..........'J....... .P.~JfY:.
nme arrived on site ........... :l.::.J:>......... ~-~.... Time left site ..............l:t:..~ .. ~.... P.!!-:1 .......................... ..
8. Time and Date of Failure: ................ ?::L: ... ?...:J.!..~ ...... .C..~.J~.~}.'!...::::...?.. .. ~.. .2.. ............. ..
(ir is important to oive exacl time it possible: ask '"'dents 01 others)
9. Type of Material:
Gsoil 0 Rock 0 D.V. 0 D.G. 0 Fill 2"Colluvium ( ! )
10. Type of Failure:

0 Fill Slope ~il Cut Slope 0 Rock Cut Slope
0 Soil and Rock Cut Slope 0 Natural Slope C Boulders
0 Retaining Wall 0 Flooding 0 Subsidence 0 Wash out
0 Fallen Trees 0 Others .......................................................... ..
11. Scale of Failure: ............':::.. . ./...f...~ ............ mJ
12. Areas Affected:

0 Squatters 0 Road ~ding lot 0 Construction Site
0 Country Park 0 Private Access 0 Pedestrian Pavement
0 Others ........................................................... .
13. Consequence of Failure:

0 Person died 0 Person injured 0 Others ........................................................... .
0 Lane of road blocked 0 Huts destroyed/affected
~uilding lot affected 0 Pedestrian pavement
ceo 1os 1U1
Figure Al.l An example of a Hong Kong landslide incident report (page 1).
f4. Possible C<Juses of F~~

0 Ground Water !Z" Infiltration 0 Rupture of Water Main{OI'llins
0. Piping 0 Excavation 0 Erosion · 0 Others - - - - - - - - , - - -
'T5. Immediate Advice Given:

0 Squarter huts permanently evacuated 0 Cover faituu!" scar with tarpaulin
Hut No(s) .............,............................................. ~nee oH area in danger
0 Trim back failure surface
0 Squatter huts temporarily evacuated
0 Chunam Trimmed failure surface with weep-
Hut No(s) ........................................................... holes
0 Provide/reconstruct drainage system
ZFia!S evac~ated/etosooe Oode1 Acco"""c"ded z-C'heck land status .2. -k> "'~ 8~
·Building/Flat No. ?.7!.L.l;I.F.:....l-. ... ~I.F- "$..l!A ..
= Close all/one .......................... lane(s) or road
.: Close pedestnan p<~vement
CJ Buttressing
r::_Aarn nearby occupants or possible danger
during heavy rainstorm
-: Dover! surf<Jce runoff from reaching failure :J Others
area
16. Is Further lnspecuon Required? :z<es
17. Is Landslip Record CJrd Required: ~es

18. Derails of Failure (location plan & section).
~~ i
~~oi;U·I. J
8 J
cb.l1~\ ---o.,....---..v:r--.,-.v,---..u--..u--
f'.(V'
Inspection Officers Sign11ture
Inspection Officer"s N.Jme
Report to be conunuea on blank sheets i' necessary.

Fill in as appropnate
Figure A1.2 An example of a Hong Kong landslide incident report (page 2).
,--
2 t ..pa:t<d by Failure Number
~.ot:ftll~ a. 1117,
:'lo. ;,. b. D. 195
Acuvc
CoG&tnaclioa
Site. ¥-.No
10 File No.
%/E%/fJj • 3(£}
I<' a!~
12
C•t
IJ
../
Possible Uwc
Fill
14 ---
Chwwn/
20
./
Grua
21 22
Tna/
8ushcs
llaiafall in precod.ia1
2J
SlODC
Pitcl>inc
(M
IA6Jtn- Pipe Es.cava-
Udays I day
!JOD Failure: tJOa
I bout
Jl )2 Jl .a 41 42
../ 304- S9-5 45-
60 Rnnainia&
M•t<rial o...,..
D. G. Soil llodr.
Collu- ~IF of ~~A-~-< NJ.
..um l711 AJ(A
31 52 5J S4 c/..sd ~1.0.
.../ '1.7
80 llo.ck
A<Wyoil
Ycs1No
I ;I
I: I
...i
E:
.._
I
lluklily
;~t<-cfU.,,.,.2 ·-·II
nr dci"oti~
l'h""' t'U-Ic.l\ot.Uit:)
flllll f'(JII.I ll.fo ta.'J
Figure Al.3 An example of a Hong Kong lands) ide card.

APPENDIX A2
HONG KONG LANDSLIDE RISK PERCEPTION
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
A2.1 The Hong Kong Landslide Risk Perception Questionnaire

A blank copy of the Hong Kong landslide risk perception questionnaire is
given in this appendix. Questionnaires used in Australia were the same except
for a few relevant changes in sections 1, 2, and 10-14.
1. YOUR THOUGHTS ON LANDSLIDING

1.1 How often do you think about the possibility of landsliding affecting your life?
(Please tick one box)
Once every
Never Once a year Once a month Once a week Every day
3 months
D D D D D D
1.2 Is landsliding something that (Please tick one box)
A) Causes you stress and worry ... ...... .. .. .. .. .............. .. .. .... .. .. .. ...... .. .. .... .. .. .. . D
or B) Causes you stress and worry sometimes.............................................. D
or C) You know it is a problem but you are not especially worried about it D
or D) You are not worried about it ................................................................ D
1.3 Where do you get your information on landsliding from?

(Please tick one or more boxes)
I have no information on land sliding ............. .... ................ .. .. .......... D
Personal experience ... .. ........ .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ........ .. .. ........ .... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. D
Family/friends .................................................................................. D
Media ................................................................................................ D
Official reports ........... .... .... ...... .. .......... ............ ........ .. ...... .... ........ .... D
Geotechnical reports . ........ .. .. .... .. .. .. ..... ... .. ...... .. .... .. .... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ... D
Other (please specify)
1.4 Have you had any discussions with the government regarding Yes No
how the landsliding may affect you? D D
1.5 Have you had any discussions with a civil or a geotechnical Yes No
engineer regarding how the landsliding may affect you? D D
2. RELATIVE COMPARISON OF HAZARDS
Out of the hazards (resulting in loss of life) listed in each numbered pair,
please tick the one you believe to be the greatest hazard to your local
community as a whole ie which one of the pair of hazards is more
likely to result in a loss of life? For example:
2.3 smoking cigarettes

OR
D plane travel
Please tick one box in each pair
2.1 D working in your job

(your job title is. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
OR
D smoking cigarettes
2.2 ,0 working in your job

OR
D plane travel
2.3 D smoking cigarettes

OR
D plane travel
2.4 D traffic accident while driving a car

OR
D working in your job

OR
D petrochemical plant accident to people living nearby 1
Notes : 1. Assume there is a petrochemical plant in your community.
2. If you are unsure about what landsliding means, please refer

to the diagrams in the latter part of the questionnaire.

OR
D landsliding 2
2.7 D plane travel

OR
D petrochemical plant accident to people living nearby
2.8 D landsliding
OR

OR
D traffic accident while driving a car
2.10 D petrochemical plant accident to people living nearby

OR
2.11
OR
D landsliding
2.12 D traffic accident while driving a car

OR
D plane travel

OR
2.14
D landsliding
OR
2.15
D P,lane travel
OR
D landsliding
2.16
D pedestrian struck by a car
OR
2.17
D working in your job
OR
2.18
OR
2.19
OR
2.20
OR
D landsliding
2.21
D plane travel
OR
3. TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WHILE DRIVING A CAR
Five characteristics of the hazard are shown below. Please read the ques-
tions carefully and circle the number on each line that best represents
where the hazard lies with respect to the particular characteristic.
For example : 1 2 3 4 5 7
Voluntary Neither Involuntary
3.1 Traffic accident while driving a car : Is this hazard new to you, or old and familiar?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
New Neither Old
3.2 Traffic accident while driving a car : To what extent does this happen voluntarily
or
involuntarily?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3.3 Traffic accident while driving a car : Is this a hazard that people have learned to live
with and can think about reasonably calmly (common) or is it one that people have a
great fear (dread) of?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Common Neither Dreadful
3.4 Traffic accident while driving a car: If you are exposed to this hazard, to what extent
can you, by personal skill or care, avoid death, ie to what extent is the hazard control-
lable?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Controllable Neither Uncontrollable
3.5 Traffic accident while driving a car: When this hazard eventuates, how likely is it
to result in death(s) or fatalities?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Certain NOT Neither Certain
to be fatal to be fatal
4. BEING INVOLVED IN A LANDSLIDE
Five characteristics of the hazard are shown below. Please read the ques-
tions carefully and circle the number on each line that best represents
where the hazard lies with respect to the particular characteristic.
For example : 1 2 3 4
Neither
5 @ 7
Voluntary Involuntary
4.1 Being involved in a landslide : Is this hazard new to you, or old and familiar?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
New Neither Old
4.2 Being involved in a landslide : To what extent does this happen voluntarily or
involuntarily?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.3 Being involved in a landslide : Is this a hazard that people have learned to live with
and can think about reasonably calmly (common) or is it one that people have a great
fear (dread) of?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.4 Being involved in a landslide : If you are exposed to this hazard, to what extent can
you, by personal skill or care, avoid death, ie to what extent is the hazard controllable?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.5 Being involved in a landslide: When this hazard eventuates, how likely is it to result
in death(s) or fatalities?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. BEING INVOLVED IN A PETROCHEMICAL PLANT ACCIDENT
Five characteristics of the hazard are shown below. Assume you are living
close to a petrochemical plant. Please read the questions carefully and
circle the number on each line that best represents where the hazard lies
with respect to the particular characteristic.
For example : 1 2 3 4 5 7
5.1 Being involved in a petrochemical plant accident : Is this hazard new to you, or old
and familiar?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
New Neither Old
5.2 Being involved in a petrochemical plant accident: To what extent does this happen
voluntarily or involuntarily?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.3 Being involved in a petrochemical plant accident : Is this a hazard that people have
learned to live with and can think about reasonably calmly (common) or is it one that
people have a great fear (dread) of?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.4 Being involved in a petrochemical plant accident : If you are exposed to this hazard,
to what extent can you, by personal skill or care, avoid death, ie to what extent is the
hazard controllable?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.5 Being involved in a petrochemical plant accident: When this hazard eventuates, how
likely is it to result in death(s) or fatalities?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. YOUR VIEW ON FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF LIFE
Experts often express the frequency of loss of life from a hazard as, for example, 1 in
10,000. This means that one person out of 10,000 people will die from the hazard
each year. A higher hazard might be, say, 1 in 10, because one person out of 10
people (or 1,000 people out of 10,000) would die from the hazard each year.
We would like to find out how you view the following frequencies of loss of life.
Please circle the words next to each frequency which indicate how much of a risk
you feel that particular yearly frequency of loss of life is,
FOR EXAMPLE :
6.1 1 person dying Very Very

out of2 each High Medium Low
high low
year, in my risk risk risk
risk risk
opinion, is a
YEARLY
FREQUENCY
OF RISK TO LIFE
LOSS OF LIFE Please circle one response on each line
Extremely Very Very

6.1 1 person dy- High Medium Low
high high low
ing risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of 2
Extremely Very Very

high high low
mg risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of 10
Extremely Very Very

high high low
ing risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of 100
YEARLY
FREQUENCY RISK TO LIFE
OF Please circle one response on each line
LOSS OF LIFE
Extremely Very Very

high high low
mg risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of 1,000
Extremely Very Very

high high low
mg risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of 10,000
Extremely Very Very

high high low
ing risk risk risk
risk risk risk
out of
100,000
Extremely Very Very

6.7 1 person dying High Medium Low
high high low
out of risk risk risk
risk risk risk
1,000,000
7. RANKING OF LANDSLIDE SITUATIONS
The diagrams below show houses in typical landslide situations. Please number
each of the boxes next to each diagram from 1 through to 7, where 1 represents the
worst situation, in your opinion, 2 the second worst, and so on. 7 represents the best
situation. Use each number only once.
7.10 1m LANDSLIDE
HOUSE A
Enter rank~
number here
for house A
7.20 HOUSE 8
FLOW.FROM
LANDSLIDE
rank~
50 m
Enter
number here
for house B
7.30 LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
Enter rank~
number here
for house C HOUSE C
7.40 HOUSED
500 m
Enter rank~
number here
for houseD FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
7.50 500 m
Enter rank~
number here FLOW FROM HOUSE E
for house E LANDSLIDE
7.60 LANDSLIDE RETAINING WALL
HOUSE F
Enter rank~
number here
10m
for house F
7.70 HOUSE G
Enter rank~
number here 100m
for house G
8. HYPOTHETICALS
For each of the houses in the following diagrams imagine that you have bought the house
shown, which is a very nice place, and you would really like to live there for the next ten
years. Each house has some probability (chance) of being hit by landsliding. The dam-
age that this would cause is given to you by an expert.
Probability of landsliding is often expressed as, for example, a 1 in 100 probability. A

1 in 100 probability of landsliding is ten times more likely to happen than a 1 in 1,000
probability.
Please circle the probability of landsliding you would be willing to live with over the
next 10 years.
The first part shows the probability you would accept if the landslide could only damage
the house as described by the expert. An example is shown below.
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert: "If the landslide occurs it will damage but not demolish the house. It may occur
quickly (in minutes)." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would ac-
cept?
1 in 1 in 1 in r;:'\ 1 in 1 in 1 in
1
CERTAIN
10 100
~ 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
VERY UNLIKEL)
The second part shows the probability of landsliding you would accept if there was a
chance of losing your life if the landslide happened. An example is shown below.
LOSS OF LIFE
Expert : "If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 20 chance of
being killed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would now accept?
1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in ~~ lin
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 ~ 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL'
8.1 HOUSE A
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert: "If the landslide occurs it will damage but not demolish the house. It may occur
quickly (in minutes)." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would ac-
cept?
1 in 1 in I in I in I in 1 in I in
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEV
1m LANDSLIDE
HOUSE A
LOSS OF LIFE
Expert : "If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 20 chance
of being killed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would now ac-
cept?
1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in I in I in 1 in
1 10 100 1,000 IO,OOO 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEV
8.2 HOUSEB
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert: "If the landslide occurs the house will be slowly demolished over a year." What
is the maximum probability of landsliding you would accept?
1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
HOUSE 8
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
LOSS OF LIFE
Expert: "If you live in this house and the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 100 chance
of being killed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would now ac-
cept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
8.3 HOUSE C
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert : "If the landslide occurs the house will be demolished in an hour." What is the
maximum probability of landsliding you would accept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 I00,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL\
LANDSLIDE
HOUSE C
LOSS OF LIFE
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
8.4 HOUSED
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert: "If the landslide happens it will be very fast- in less than ten minutes- and the
house will be destroyed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would
accept?
1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in I in I in I in
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL~
HOUSED
I 500m
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM
LANDSLIDE
LOSS OF LIFE
1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in I in I in 1 in
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
8.5 HOUSEE
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert: "If the landslide happens it will be very fast and the house will be destroyed."
What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would accept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL"\
I SOOm
LANDSLIDE
FLOW FROM HOUSE E

LANDSLIDE
LOSS OF LIFE
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL\:
8.6 HOUSEF
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert : "If the retaining wall built to stabilise the landslide falls over the house will be
destroyed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would accept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL)
LANDSLIDE RETAINING WALL
HOUSE F
10m
LOSS OF LIFE
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
8.7 HOUSE G
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert : "The sea may cause the cliff to collapse, taking the house with it. The collapse
could occur in less than two minutes." What is the maximum probability of landsliding
you would accept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL)
HOUSE G
100m
WAVE CUT PLATFORM SEA
LOSS OF LIFE
Expert: "If you live in this house and the cliff collapses you have a 1 in 2 chance of being
killed." What is the maximum probability of landsliding you would now accept?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
9. WHAT IF YOU FOUND OUT YOUR OWN HOUSE WAS THREATENED?
Imagine that you lived in the house shown below and later found out that it was threat-
ened by landsliding. The risk is described to you by an expert.
DAMAGE TO HOUSE
Expert : "If the landslide occurs your house will be demolished in an hour." What is
the maximum probability of landsliding you would accept before moving house?
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
CERTAIN VERY UNLIKEL'l
LANDSLIDE
YOUR HOUSE
LOSS OF LIFE
Expert: "If the landslide occurs you have a 1 in 3 chance of being killed." What is the
maximum probability of landsliding you would accept before moving house?
lin lin 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
10. WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING LIMITS?
Do you think there should be official limits to landslide risk for building,
ie if the risk is greater than a certain limit, mitigation measures should be
implemented to reduce the risk?
Yes No
D D
If yes, who do you feel should be responsible for setting the standards of
acceptable landslide risk? (You can tick more than one box)
D Local community D Housing Authority
D Resident who is a D Hong Kong Housing Society

tenant
D Resident who IS an D GEO

owner
D Owner, but not tenant D Experts
D Government D An international body
D Legislative Council D Other (please specify)

11. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR STABILISING LANDSLIDES?
Assume official limits to landslide risk for building are in place, ie if the risk is greater
than a certain limit mitigation measures are required to be implemented to reduce the risk.
You know about these limits. You would like to buy a flat in a residential estate in which
some slopes have to be stabilised in order to meet the official limits. Who do you feel
should pay for the the cost of stabilisation?
Please tick one or more boxes
The developer Previous own- Present owners
D ers D D
Government Insurance compa- Others (please speci-
D nies 0 fy) D
12. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE COST OF NEW REGULATIONS?
Imagine you have just bought a flat in a residential estate and you knew there was a risk
of landsliding on this land which you considered to be low enough not to worry about it.
After your purchase new regulations were brought in, and according to them slopes in
the estate have to be stabilised to reduce the landslide risk. Who do you feel should pay
for the work because of the new regulations?
D ers D D
D nies 0 fy) D
13. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE COST OF REMEDIAL WORKS?
Imagine you have bought a flat in a residential estate, not knowing about a risk of landslid-
ing in the estate. Afterwards new investigations revealed that quite a high risk of land-
sliding exists, and remedial works are needed to reduce these risks. Who do you feel
should pay for the work in this case?
D ers D D
D nies
D fy)
D
14. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU
15-25 25-40 40-60 over 60

14.1 Your age
D D D D
Male Female
14.2 Your sex
D D
Yes No
14.3 Do you smoke?
D D
Yes No
14.4 Do you own a flat?
D D
Only respond to 14.5 ifyou answered yes to thepreviousques-

tion
Yes No
14.5 If you own a flat, are you living in it?
D D
14.6 How long have you lived in your flat? _ _ _ _ _ _ (years)
14.7 How long do you intend to stay in the flat? (years)

------
Yes No
14.8 Are there any children living in your flat?
D D
1 2 More
3
than 3
If so, how many children?
D D D D
Primary Secondary Tertiary

14.9 Education which
you have completed D D D
14.10 Monthly household

income (OPTIONAL)
D under $5,000
D $5,000-$9,999
D $10,000-$19,999
D $20,000-$39,999
D over $40,000
14.11 What is the nature of your work in the GEO?
GEO Non-GEO
a) Tick one box only
D D
Professional Technical Other ~
b) Tick one box only

D D D
I THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO DO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

APPENDIX SERIES B
PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING
Appendix Bl
Listing of All Chase Numeric Variables .......................... 666
AppendixB2
Listing of Discriminant Scores for DF D3 for All CHASE Slopes ... 676
AppendixB3
Listing of Failed Registered Features in the Landslide Database ... 681
APPENDIX Bl
LISTING OF ALL CHASE NUMERIC VARIABLES
Bl.l Listing Of All CHASE Numeric Variables

The listing of all CHASE numeric variables is given m Table Bl.l
following. The listing follows the original grouping:
1. General
2. Vegetation
3. Drainage
4. Slope protection and remedial works
5. Adjacent structures
6. Materials
7. Instability
8. Miscellaneous
10. Slope geometry
11. Drainage - presence of piezometer
12. Original slope geometry at failure location
13. Details of drains on slope
15. Additional items, including a Factor of Safety
Table Bl.l Listing of all numeric CHASE variables.
IDescription IVariable IUnits

GENERAL
Coordinates v1_6e m
v1_6n m
Elevation v1_7 m
Slope age v1_8 XXYY years, XX
minimum age,
YY=maximum-minimu
m age in years
TCM Slope gradient v1_9a 1-6
slope Terrain component v1_9b 01-09
Morphology v1_9c 01-15
Erosion v1_9d 1,0 2,1-5 3,1-3 4,1-6
Hydrology v1_9e 0-4
TCM Slope gradient v1 - 10a 1-6
upslope Terrain component v1_10b 01-09
Morphology v1 - 10c 01-15
Erosion v1 - 10d 1,0 2,1-5 3,1-3 4,1-6
Hydrology v1 - 10e 0-4
... contmued
Table 81.1 {continued) Listing of all numeric CHASE variables.

Description Variable Units
Rainfall Gauge elevation v1 - 13 m
Mean annual rain at gauge v1 - 14 mm
Max 1hr rain at gauge v1 - 15r mm
Date of above v1 - 15d ddmmyy
Max 24hr rain at gauge v1 - 16r mm
Date of above v1_16d ddmmyy
Max 15d rain at gauge v1 - 17r mm
Date of above v1_17d ddmmyy
VEGETATION
Surfacing Cover on cut slope v2_1 o/o
Cover upslope v2_2 o/o
Type Type of vegetation on slope v2_3 1-4
Type of vegetation upslope v2_4 1-4
DRAINAGE
Groundwater Groundwater above slope toe v3_1 m
Max gnwtr above slope toe v3_2 m
Upslope drainage Catchment area v3_3 m2
Upslope drainage type v3_4 1-3
Upslope infiltration class v3_5 1-3
Erosion in original Gully erosion v3_6a 0
/o
slope Rill erosion ' v3_6b %
Sheet erosion v3_6c %
No erosion v3_6d %
Erosion in Gully erosion v3_7a o/o
landslide debris Rill erosion v3_7b %
Sheet erosion v3_7c o/o
No erosion v3_7d %
Erosion in landslip Gully erosion v3_8a 0
/o
scar Rill erosion v3_8b 0
/o
Sheet erosion v3_8c 0
/o
No erosion v3_8d %
PROTECTION/REMEDIAL
Chunam Chunam/face cover v4_1 1=yes,2=no
Drainage v4_2 1=yes,2=no
Retaining structures v4_3 1=yes,2=no
Revegetation v4_4 1=yes,2=no
% chunam cover v4_5 %
Chunam condition v4_6 1-4
Drain condition Cut-off drain v4_7a 1-4
Downslope drain v4_7b 1-4
Cross-slope drain v4_7c 1-4
Slope toe drain v4 7d 1-4
Bored drain v4_7e 1-4
... continued
Table 81.1 (continued) Listing of all numeric CHASE variables.

Drain blockage Cut-off drain v4_Ba 1-4
Downslope drain v4_Bb 1-4
Cross-slope drain v4 Be 1-4
Slope toe drain v4 Bd 1-4
Bored drain v4 Be 1-4
MATERIAL PROPERTIES
Profile Profile v6 1 1-12
Geology v6 2 1-24
Site rock type v6_3 1-23
Number of layers v6 4 1-5
Slide debris cover Measured along section line- from v6 Sa m
Measured along section line- to v6 Sb m
GCO probe Depth of refusal probe 1 v6 9a m
refusal values Depth of refusal probe 2 v6_9b m
Joints Peak angle - planar joint v6_51 degrees
Peak angle -wedge intersection v6_52 degrees
Release/toppling joints v6_53 1=p,2=a
present/absent
Layer1 Layer number v6_10_ 1
Length (along section line) v6_11 - 1 m
Layer bounded by debris v6 12 1 1-3 or X
Percentage of fragments larger v6_13_1 0
/o
than gravel
Jointing pattern v6 14 1 1-7
Material type v6 15 1 1-4
Grain size v6 17 1 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6 1B 1a 1 or 2
Colour v6_1B_1b 3 lots of two digit
codes
'N' type Schmidt hammer value v6 19 1 Numeric
'L' type Schmidt hammer value v6 20 1 Numeric
Field strength estimate v6 21 1 1-9
Hand penetrometer strength v6 22 1 kN/m2
Feldspar strength v6 23 1 1-4
Microfractures v6 24 1 1-3
Slake test v6 25 1 1-4
Infiltration Time in first box for 300mm head v6_26_1a minutes, X if > 30
potential of fine loss
fraction measured Second box - head loss over 30 v6_26_1b mm
by falling head minutes
test
Decomposition grade v6 27 1 1-6
... continued

Layer2 Layer number v6 10 2
Length (along section line) v6_11_2 m
Layer bounded by debris v6_12_2 1-3 or X
Percentage of fragments larger v6_13_2 %
than gravel
Jointing pattern v6 14 2 1-7
Material type v6 15 2 1-4
- Grain size v6 17 2 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6 18 2a 1 or 2
Colour v6_18_2b 3 lots of two digit
codes
'L' type Schmidt hammer value v6 20 2 Numeric
Field strength estimate v6 21 2 1-9
Microfractures v6_24_2 1-3
Slake test v6_25_2 1-4
fraction measured Second box- head loss over 30 v6_26_2b mm
test v6 27 2 1-6
Decomposition grade
Layer 3 Layer number v6 10 3
Length (along section line) v6 11 3 m
Percentage of fragments larger v6_13_3 %
than gravel
Jointing pattern v6_14_3 1-7
Material type v6_15_3 1-4
Grain size v6_17_3 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6_18_3a 1 or 2
codes
'L' type Schmidt hammer value v6_20_3 Numeric
Field strength estimate v6_21_3 1-9 '
Feldspar strength v6_23_1 1-4
Microfractures v6 24 3 1-3
fraction measured Second box -head loss over 30 v6_26_3b mm
test Decomposition grade v6_27_3 1-6
... continued
Table 81.1 {continued) Listing of all numeric CHASE variables.

Layer 4 Layer number v6 10 4
Length (along section line) v6_11_4 m
Percentage of fragments larger v6_13_4 o;o
than gravel
Grain size v6_17_4 1-2, 1-3
codes
'N' type Schmidt hammer value v6_19_4 Numeric
Field strength estimate v6_21_4 1-9
Hand penetrometer strength v6_22_4 kN/m2
test
Decomposition grade v6_27_4 1-6
LayerS Layer number v6_10_5
Length (along section line) v6 11 5 m
Percentage of fragments larger v6_13_5 o/o
than gravel
Grain size v6_17_5 1-2, 1-3
codes
test
... contmued

Layer1 Coarse fraction grading v6_28_1 1-3
Angularity v6_29_1 1-3
Grain size v6_30_1 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6_31 - 1a 1 or 2
Colour v6_31 - 1b 3 lots of two digit
codes
Infiltration- redundant v6_39_1 X only
Percentage of coarse fraction v6_41 - 1 o/o
having above
Grain size v6_30_2 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6_31 - 2b 3 lots of two digit
codes
Percentage of coarse fraction v6_41_2 %
having above
... continued

Grain size v6_30_3 1-2, 1-3
codes
Infiltration- redundant v6_39_3a X only
Percentage of coarse fraction v6_41_3 o;o
having above
Grain size v6_30_4 1-2, 1-3
codes
Percentage of coarse fraction v6_41_4 0
/o
having above
... continued

LayerS Coarse fraction grading v6_28_S 1-3
Angularity v6_29_S 1-3
Grain size v6_30_S 1-2, 1-3
Colour v6_31_Sa 1 or 2
Colour v6_31_Sb 3 lots of two digit
codes
'N' type Schmidt hammer value v6_32_S Numeric
'L' type Schmidt hammer value v6_33_S Numeric
Field strength estimate v6_34_S 1-9
Hand penetrometer strength v6_3S_S kN/m2
Feldspar strength v6_36_S 1-4
M icrofractures v6_37_S 1-3
Slake test v6_38_S 1-4
Infiltration- redundant v6_39_S X only
Percentage of coarse fraction v6_41_S o/o
having above
Layer1 Fines percentage v6_16_1a %
Particle size Sand percentage v6_16_1b 0
/o
distribution D2S v6_16_1c mm
DSO v6_16_1d/ mm
D7S v6_16_1e mm
Layer 2 Fines percentage v6_16_2a 0
/o
Particle size Sand percentage v6_16_2b %
DSO v6_16_2d mm
D7S v6_16 2e mm
Layer3 Fines percentage v6_16 3a 0
/o
/o
DSO v6_16_3d mm
D7S v6_16_3e mm
Layer4 Fines percentage v6_16_4a 0
/o
/o
DSO v6_16_4d mm
D7S v6_16_4e mm
LayerS Fines percentage v6_16_Sa %
Particle size Sand percentage v6_16_Sb 0
/o
distribution D2S v6_16_Sc mm
DSO v6_16_Sd mm
D7S v6_16_Se mm
... contmued

INSTABILITY
Failure Failure present/absent v7_1 1=p,2=a
Type of failure v7 2 1-5
Age of failure v7_3 XXYY years, XX
minimum age,
YY=maximum-minimu
m age in years
Debris present/absent v7 4 1=p,2=a
Debris cover on slide scar area v7_5 %
Debris moisture v7_6 1-3
Slide scar moisture v7_7 1-5
Joint control v7_8 1, 2 or Y
MISCALLANEOUS
Original geometry Original profile shape v8_1 1-7
Original plan shape v8_2 1-7
Slope area v8_3 m2
Berms Average berm width v8_4 m
Average inter-berm height v8_5 m
Average inter-berm angle v8_6 degrees
Piezometer Piezometer X offset from section v8_7 m
location line
Piezometer Y offset from section v8_8 m
line
Piezometer tip height above slope v8_9 m
toe
Piezometer water height v8_10 m
Slide details Slide location height above slope v8_11 m
toe
Scar height v8_12 m
Length v8_13 m
Width v8_14 m
Thickness v8_15 m
Area v8_16 m2
Volume (size) v8_17 m3
Maximum headwall scar height v8_18 m
Original length of slope v8_19 m
GEOMETRY
Slope Height v10_1 m
Angle v10_2 m
Length v10_3 m
Aspect/Orientation/Bearing v10_4 degrees
Plan area v10_5 m2
Toe width v10_6 m
Exposed area v10_7 m2
Number of berms v10_8 1-
Slope above crest Angle v10_9 degrees
... continued

DRAINAGE- PRESENCE OF PIEZOMETER
Presence of Piezometer present/absent near v11_1 1=P, 2=a
piezometer slope
ORIGINAL SLOPE GEOMETRY AT FAILURE LOCATION
Original slope Angle v12_1 degrees
details at slide
location Height v12 2 m
Original slope angle at section line v12_3 degrees
DRAINS
Cut-off drain Number v13_1 1-
Width v13_2a m
Depth v13_2b m
Downslope drain Number v13_2c 1-
Width v13_2d m
Depth v13_2e m
Cross-slope drain Number v13_2f 1-
Width v13_2g m
Depth v13_2h m
Slope toe drain Number v13_2i 1-
Width v13_2j m
Depth v13_2k m
Bored drain Number v13_21 1-
Diameter v13_2m m
EXTRA DETAILS
Layer1 Dry density, c, phi v15_1 Two digits for each, 99
if not known
W, K, EXP, PL v15_2 Two digits for each, 99
if not known
if not known
if not known
if not known
if not known
Existing FOS For 1 in 10 year rainstorm v15_7 Numeric
Layer correlation For each layer present v15_8 1-5, 1-5, 1-5, 1-5,
1-5
Perched water Height of base above slope toe v15_9 m
table
Extra box Spare space v15 10 Numeric
APPENDIX B2
LISTING OF DISCRIMINANT SCORES FOR DF D3
FOR ALL CHASE SLOPES
B2.1 Listing of Discriminant Scores for DF D3 for All CHASE Slopes

The listing of discriminant scores for DF D3 for all CHASE slopes is given in
Table B2.1 following. The discriminant function is:
D3 = -1.777 -0.2356(V4_6)+0.4323(Vl0_8)
+ 1.044(V6_15_l)-0.03056(Vl0_9) B2.1
Table B2.1 Listing of discriminant scores for DF D 3 for all CHASE slopes.
SLOPE V4_6 V10_8 V6_15_1 V10 9 03 CLASS V7_1

1 3 3 1 5 -0.31803 1 1
2 -9 0 2 0 2.43171 2 2
3 -9 0 2 35 1.20461 1 2
4 -9 0 2 20 1.73051 1 2
5 -9 0 2 20 1.73051 1 2
6 -9 0 2 35 1.20461 1 2
7 2 0 1 21 -1.94021 1 1
8 1 0 2 25 -0.80069 1 1
9 -9 0 2 -10 2.78231 2 2
10 -9 0 2 34 1.23967 1 2
11 3 0 1 20 -2.14074 1 1
12 1 -9 2 35 -5.04172 1 1
13 2 1 4 0 2.36083 2 2
14 2 0 2 32 -1.2817 1 1
15 2 0 1 25 -2.08045 1 1
16 2 1 1 0 -0.77168 1 1
17 3 2 2 25 -0.40733 2 1
18 -9 1 1 0 1.81981 2 2
19 2 2 2 35 -0.52234 1 1
20 2 0 1 25 -2.08045 1 1
21 -9 0 2 35 1.20461 2 2
22 2 0 2 30 -1.21158 1 1
23 1 0 2 30 -0.97599 1 1
24 -9 0 2 15 1.90581 2 2
25 -9 0 2 10 2.08111 2 2
... contmued
Table 82.1 (continued) Listing of discriminant scores for DF 0 3 for all CHASE slopes.
SLOPE V4_6 V10_8 V6_15_1 V10_9 03 CLASS V7_1
26 2 0 1 30 -2.25575 1 1
27 2 0 1 30 -2.25575 1 1
28 2 0 1 25 -2.08045 1 1
29 -9 0 2 20 1.73051 2 2
30 2 0 1 17 -1.79997 1 1
31 1 2 2 10 0.58975 2 2
32 3 0 2 25 -1.27187 1 1
33 2 0 2 10 -0.51038 2 1
34 3 0 2 40 -1.79777 1 1
35 2 0 1 15 -1.72985 1 1
36 2 0 3 25 0.00789 1 2
37 1 1 1 30 -1.58789 1 1
38 -9 0 2 25 1.55521 2 2
39 2 0 2 37 -1.457 1 1
40 -9 0 2 25 1.55521 2 2
41 2 0 2 40 -1.56218 1 1
42 2 0 2 36 -1.42194 1 1
43 2 0 2 30 -1.21158 1 1
44 4 0 1 40 -3.07753 1 1
45 4 0 1 30 -2.72693 1 1
46 3 0 1 30 -2.49134 1 1
47 -9 0 1 30 0.33574 2 2
48 -9 0 2 30 1.37991 2 2
49 1 1 2 30 -0.54372 1 1
50 -9 0 2 30 1.37991 2 2
51 2 4 2 25 0.6928 1 2
52 2 0 2 32 -1.2817 2 1
53 2 0 1 34 -2.39599 1 1
54 3 0 1 25 -2.31604 1 1
55 2 1 4 30 1.30903 2 2
56 -9 0 2 40 1.02931 2 2
57 1 2 2 28 -0.04133 2 1
58 2 0 2 25 -1.03628 1 1
59 4 0 2 30 -1.68276 1 1
60 2 0 2 35 -1.38688 2 1
61 2 4 2 10 1.2187 1 2
62 2 3 2 10 0.78643 2 2
63 -9 0 2 30 1.37991 1 2
65 2 1 1 35 -1.99878 1 1
67 2 0 2 30 -1.21158 1 1
68 -9 0 2 44 0.88907 1 2
69 2 0 2 40 -1.56218 1 1
71 1 3 2 35 0.14552 2 2
72 2 2 2 15 0.17886 1 2
... continued
Table 82.1 (continued) Listing of discriminant scores for OF 0 3 for all CHASE slopes.
73 2 3 1 20 -0.60834 1 1
74 2 2 1 10 -0.69001 1 1
75 2 3 1 5 -0.08244 2 1
76 2 0 1 35 -2.43105 1 1
77 -9 2 2 35 2.06915 2 2
78 2 4 1 20 -0.17607 1 1
79 2 3 1 20 -0.60834 2 1
80 2 3 1 20 -0.60834 1 1
81 1 4 1 0 0.76072 2 2
82 2 4 2 25 0.6928 2 2
83 2 4 2 0 1.5693 2 2
84 2 4 2 0 1.5693 2 2
85 -9 0 1 35 0.16044 1 2
86 2 1 1 35 -1.99878 1 1
87 2 3 2 0 1.13703 2 2
88 2 0 1 30 -2.25575 1 1
89 2 0 1 26 -2.11551 1 1
90 2 0 2 30 -1.21158 1 1
91 2 2 1 30 -1.39121 2 1
92 2 0 1 35 -2.43105 1 1
93 1 3 2 10 1.02202 2 2
94 1 3 2 5 1.19732 2 2
95 2 4 2 10 1.2187 1 2
96 2 4 2 15 1.0434 2 2
97 -9 3 2 20 3.02732 2 2
98 2 3 2 25 0.26053 2 2
99 -9 3 2 10 3.37792 2 2
100 -9 2 2 20 2.59505 2 2
101 2 1 2 35 -0.95461 1 1
102 -9 4 2 20 3.45959 2 2
103 1 4 2 25 0.92839 2 2
104 4 0 2 17 -1.22698 2 1
105 -9 0 2 5 2.25641 2 2
106 -9 0 2 20 1.73051 2 2
107 2 1 2 20 -0.42871 1 1
108 -9 1 2 25 1.98748 2 2
109 -9 1 2 30 1.81218 2 2
110 -9 1 2 30 1.81218 2 2
111 2 3 2 20 0.43583 2 2
112 -9 3 2 0 3.72852 2 2
113 2 1 2 15 -0.25341 2 1
114 2 0 1 40 -2.60635 1 1
115 2 2 2 33 -0.45222 2 1
116 2 1 2 30 -0.77931 2 1
... continued
Table 82.1 (continued) Listing of discriminant scores for OF 0 3 for all CHASE slopes.
SLOPE V4 6 V10_8 V6_15_1 V10_9 03 CLASS V7 1
117 -9 0 1 30 0.33574 2 2
118 1 3 1 20 -0.37275 1 1
119 -9 1 1 30 0.76801 2 2
120 2 1 2 25 -0.60401 2 1
121 2 1 1 35 -1.99878 1 1
122 -9 0 2 25 1.55521 2 2
123 1 2 2 0 0.94035 2 2
124 2 0 2 0 -0.15978 1 1
125 -9 0 2 30 1.37991 2 2
126 2 0 2 -8 0.1207 1 2
127 -9 3 2 15 3.20262 2 2
128 3 2 2 20 -0.23203 2 1
129 2 1 2 40 -1.12991 1 1
130 1 3 1 25 -0.54805 1 1
131 2 2 2 30 -0.34704 1 1
132 2 0 1 40 -2.60635 1 1
133 2 2 2 20 0.00356 2 2
134 4 1 1 30 -2.29466 2 1
135 3 1 2 30 -1.0149 1 1
136 1 3 2 0 1.37262 1 2
137 1 1 2 45 -1.06962 2 1
138 1 3 1 20 -0.37275 1 1
139 2 0 2 0 -0.15978 1 1
140 1 3 2 30 0.32082 2 2
141 3 2 2 25 -0.40733 2 1
142 -9 0 2 24 1.59027 2 2
143 2 5 1 33 -0.19958 1 1
144 1 1 2 34 -0.68396 2 1
146 1 1 2 45 -1.06962 2 1
147 2 2 2 25 -0.17174 1 1
148 1 3 2 40 -0.02978 2 1
149 2 2 2 21 -0.0315 2 1
150 1 1 2 0 0.50808 1 2
151 2 2 1 17 -0.93543 1 1
152 3 2 1 30 -1.6268 1 1
155 2 1 2 30 -0.77931 1 1
156 2 3 2 0 1.13703 1 2
157 1 4 2 30 0.75309 2 2
158 1 4 2 -30 2.85669 2 2
159 1 1 2 -14 0.99892 2 2
160 2 4 2 40 0.1669 1 2
161 1 2 4 0 3.02869 2 2
162 1 3 2 30 0.32082 2 2
163 1 3 2 0 1.37262 2 2
... continued
Table 82.1 (continued) Listing of discriminant scores for DF D3 for all CHASE slopes.
164 2 2 1 0 -0.33941 2 1
165 -9 3 1 25 1.80785 2 2
166 1 3 2 -5 1.54792 2 2
167 2 3 4 35 1.99827 1 2
169 1 1 2 15 -0.01782 2 1
170 3 1 2 20 -0.6643 2 1
190 2 4 2 35 0.3422 2 2
191 2 0 1 30 -2.25575 1 1
192 2 2 2 40 -0.69764 2 1
193 3 0 1 40 -2.84194 1 1
196 2 1 2 35 -0.95461 1 1
197 4 3 1 20 -1.07952 2 1
198 2 3 2 45 -0.44067 1 1
199 4 1 2 33 -1.35567 1 1
200 -9 0 2 25 1.55521 2 2
201 2 3 2 15 0.61113 1 2
202 2 3 4 6 3.01501 2 2
203 2 3 2 20 0.43583 1 2
204 2 2 2 30 -0.34704 1 1
205 2 5 2 20 1.30037 1 2
APPENDIX B3
LISTING OF FAILED REGISTERED FEATURES IN
THE LANDSLIDE DATABASE
B3.1 Listing of Failed Registered Features in the Landslide

Database.
The listing of failed registered features in the landslide database is given in
Table B3.1.
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database.
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APPENDIX SERIES C
VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING
Appendix Cl
Definitions of Situations in the Landslide Database .............. 685
Appendix C2
Regressional Goodness of Fit Measures ......................... 709
Appendix C3
Statistical Details of Runout Distance Models .................... 713
Appendix C4
Cross-sections of Well Documented Fatal Landslides ............. 723
APPENDIX Cl
DEFINITIONS OF SITUATIONS IN THE LANDSLIDE
DATABASE
Cl.l Definitions of Situations in the Landslide Database

The definitions of the situations in the Hong Kong landslide database are
given in Figures Cl.l to Cl.22. The original slope geometry as well as failure
geometry are defined.
SITUATION 1
CUT SLOPE
51 52 AS
A3~----====~----
CUT FACE H1
ELEVATIONS
H4
L2 81
Wt - width of failure scar

W2 - width of debris
W3 - width of debris on lower slope
Figure Cl.l Situation 1 - Cut slope failure.

W1
PLAN
Slope Variables
Angles A 1, A2, A3
Heights H1
Widths 81
Failure Variables
Angles A4
Heights H2,H3,H4
Thickness D, T2
Widths Wt, W2, W3
Lengths L 1, L2, S1, S2
Figure Cl.l(continued) Situation 1 - Cut slope failure.

SITUATION 1 A
CUT SLOPE AFFECTING A HOUSE
S1 S2 A5
A3~----==~~---
A2
ELEVATIONS
W3 W2 W1
H4
HH - height of debris against house

W1 - width of failure scar
Figure C1.2 Situation lA - Cut slope failure affecting a house.

SITUATION 1C
CUT SLOPE WITH TWO ANGLES
AS
H4
CUT
H1
ELEVATIONS
83
W3 W2 W1 H
H5
T2
L1

L2 81
Figure C1.3 Situation lC- Cut slope with two slope angles.
SITUATION 1-5A
NATURAL SLOPE FAILURE AFFECTING HOUSE
S1 L1 L2
ELEVATION
W1 W2 W3

W2 - width of debris on failure slope
W3 - width of debris on slope below
L 1 - to change of grade, corresponds to debris
thickness T2
L2 - corresponds to debris thickness T3
Figure C1.4 Situation 1-SA - Natural slope failure affecting a house.

SITUATION 1 CA
CUT SLOPE WITH TWO ANGLES AFFECTING A HOUSE
AS
CUT
A2
ELEVATIONS
83
W3 H

Figure Cl.S Situation lCA- Cut slope with two angles affecting a house.
SITUATION 1 D
CUT SLOPE WITH TWO ANGLES AND BERM, FAILING IN TOP PORTION
AS
H1
CUT A3
H2
A2
ELEVATIONS
W3 W2 W1
H4
H3

L2 81 W2 - width of debris
Figure C1.6 Situation lD - Cut slope with two angles and berm, failing in the
top portion.
SITUATION 3
BOULDER FALL FROM/ ABOVE CUT SLOPE
H2
A2
L1
L2
ELEVATION
SITUATION 3A
BOULDER FALL FROM/ABOVE CUT SLOPE ONTO HOUSE
Geometry as per situation 3.

81 - distance from base of cut to near house edge
Figure C1.7 Situation 3 - Boulder fall from a cut slope; Situation 3A -

boulder fall from a cut slope onto a house.
SITUATION 4
CUT SLOPE FAILURE ABOVE RETAINING WALL
51 52
L1 L2
81
W1 W2 W3
ELEVATION

Figure C1.8 Situation 4 - Cut slope failure above retaining wall.

SITUATION 48
CUT SLOPE FAILURE ABOVE RETAINING WALL
51 52
W1 W2 W3
ELEVATION

W2 - width of debris against house
82 - width of berm above wall
Figure C1.9 Situation 4B - Cut slope failure above retaining wall.

SITUATION 40
FILL OR CUT SLOPE FAILURE ABOVE RETAINING WALL
S1 S2
81
L2 L1
W1 W2
ELEVATION

W2 - width of debris against house
Figure Cl.lO Situation 4D - Fill or cut slope failure above retaining wall.
SITUATION 5
NATURAL SLOPE FAILURE
L1 L2
ELEVATION
Wt W2 W3

W2 - width of debris on failure slope
L 1 - corresponds to debris thickness T2
Figure Cl.ll Situation 5 - Natural slope failure.

SITUATION 5A
NATURAL SLOPE FAILURE ABOVE CUT
AS
ELEVATIONS
W1
W3 W2
H4
L2 81

T2 - width of debris on cut slope (if any)
Figure Cl.l2 Situation SA- Natural slope failure above cut.

SITUATION 5H
NATURAL SLOPE ABOVE CUT AFFECTING A HOUSE
82 St AS
A3~----====~----
A2
ELEVATIONS
W2 W1
H4

Figure Cl.l3 Situation SH - Natural slope failure above cut affecting a house.
SITUATION 6
RETAINING WALL FAILURE
51 AS
A3~----==~~---
H2
H1
H3
A2
ELEVATIONS
W2 W1
D /
)-///
I
L1

Figure C1.14 Situation 6 - Retaining wall failure.

SITUATION 6A
RETAINING WALL FAILURE AFFECTING HOUSE
St
A5
A3~----====c=----
H2
H3
ELEVATIONS
W2 W1
0 /
)--///
I
A4
L1

Figure C1.15 Situation 6A - Retaining wall failure affecting house.

SITUATION 68
FAILURE UNDER RETAINING WALL
51 52
Hl
83
W1 W2 W3
ELEVATION

W2 - width of debris on berm
W3 - width of debris below
Figure C1.16 Situation 6B - Failure under a retaining wall.

SITUATION 7
FILL SLOPE FAILURE
52 51
\
\ 0
H2 ),
' ' ' ...... __ H1
H3
A2
ELEVATIONS
W1 W2 W3

W2 - width of debris on fill slope
Figure C1.17 Situation 7 -Fill slope failure.

SITUATION 7 A
FILL SLOPE FAILURE AFFECTING HOUSE
52 St
A2
ELEVATIONS
Wt W2 W3

W2 - width of debris on fill slope
Figure C1.18 Situation 7A- FiJI slope failure affecting house.

SITUATION 7B
FILL SLOPE FAILURE BECOMING A DEBRIS FLOW
$2 $1 81
ELEVATION
W1 W2 W3

W2 - width of scour downslope
T2 - scour depth (negative)
Figure C1.19 Situation 7B - Fill slope failure becoming a debris flow.

SITUATION 8
LARGE FAILURE UNDER RETAINING WALLS
82
I 81
I
\ H1
S2 \
\
\
\
\
' H2
83
L 1 to debris edge
ELEVATION

Figure C1.20 Situation 8 - Large failure under retaining walls.

SITUATION 8A
LARGE FAILURE THROUGH RETAINING WALL
83
L 1 to debris edge
ELEVATION

Figure C1.21 Situation SA - Large failure through retaining wall.

SITUATION 9
BLOCKED CATCHWATER, SLOPE BELOW SCOURED
51 52
81 L2
W1 W2 W3
ELEVATION

W2 - width of debris in catchwater
W3 - width of scour
L2 - length of scour
82 - scour scarp (if any)
Figure Cl.22 Situation 9 - Blocked catchwater, slope below scoured.

APPENDIX C2
REGRESSIONAL GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES
C2.1 Regressional Measures of Goodness of Fit

The measures of the goodness of fit for regression models are described
herein. The descriptions are based on the theory of regression discussed by
Bowerman and O'Connell (1990), Montgomery and Peck (1982) and Campbell
(1987). While the focus is on linear regression, these concepts can easily be
extended to other regression curves.
C2.1.1 Goodness of Fit Concept

The concept of goodness of fit as applied to regression models of
multivariate data is based on the proportion of the total variance explained by
the model. For illustration purposes, consider a single independent variable X
giving rise to a dependent variable Y. As observations one has n pairs of X-Y
values. These can be plotted on a scatter plot. The total variation is then defined
as the distance from a point ()() YiJ to the horizontal line representing the
average of theY values, Y (Figure C2.1). If a linear regression model is fitted, the
proportion of the total distance from the Y line explained by the model is the
~
distance from the point to the regression line, Yi - Y, and the unexplained
difference is the distance from the regression line to the Y line, Y - Y. These
are illustrated in Figure C2.1.
Variance is defined as the sum of all the "explained" distance squared and
summed over all the data points. The squaring is necessary so that positive and
negative distances are not cancelled out. Hence the following definitions
(dropping the i subscripts) are used:
Total variance L'(Y - Y) 2 C2.1
Explained variance C2.2
Unexplained variance L'(Y- 2 D C2.3

The measure of the goodness of fit of regression models is the coefficient of
determination R 2, defined as the proportion of the total variance explained by
the model:
A
R2 = L'(Y - Y> 2 = EXPLAINED VARIANCE

L'(Y- Y)2 TOTAL VARIANCE C2.4
This definition ensures that R 2 is always positive, and in the range O< R 2 <1.
X
data point
()(,J:i)
Y-Y
_\ ____ _
Y, data average
Y, regression line
Figure C2.1 The concept of regression a] goodness of fit.
C2.1.2 Derivation of R 2 for Linear Models With and Without a

Constant
A) R 2 for a Linear Model With a Constant

A linear regression model with a constant has the form
C2.5
where
b 0 = Y-b 1X, -
X =n•
-
XX - XY
Y=-n C2.6
and
b _ nJ:XY - (XX) (LY)

1 - n2:X2 _ (XX) 2 C2.7
Here R 2 measures the proportion of the variability

E 1 is the random error term.
about the mean value Y using the sum of the squares (Montgomery and Peck,
1982). By substituting C2.6 and C2. 7 into C2.4 and using
2:(Y- Y) 2 = );y2 - nr, 2:(Y- D2 = br)LY + b 12:XY- nr one obtains the
following computational formula:
R2 = n2(1'XY)2 - 2n(1'X)(2:Y)(2:XY) + (1;X)2();Y)2

n22:X22:¥2 _ n2:¥2(2:X)2 _ n2:X2(1'Y)2 + (1'X)2();Y)2
R2 = (n2:XY- (2:X)(2:Y))2
(n2:X2 _ (1'X)2)(n2:¥2 - (2:¥)2) C2.8
This expression is often termed the Pearson product-moment (Bowerman and

O'Connell, 1990).
B) R 2 for a Linear Model Through the Origin

A linear regression model through the origin has the form
C2.9
where
C2.10
E2 is the random error term. By substituting C2.9 and C2.10 into C2.4 and using
2:(Y- Y) 2 = 2;y2- nr, 2:(Y- D2 = c 2:XY- nT the following
computational formula is obtained:
2 n(1'XY)2 - (1'Y)22:X2
Ro = n2:X22:¥2 _ (1'Y)22:X2 C2.11
The author uses the subscript o to differentiate the R 2 value for a regression
model through the origin from that for a regression model with a constant. R 20
measures the proportion of the variability about the mean origin value Y=O
using the sum of the squares, as shown in Figure C2.2 (Montgomery and Peck,
1982). This is the only description of the derivation of the R 20 value found by the
author in the literature, and it may lead to misleadingly high values of R 20 m
certain situations.
C2.1.3 R 2 ~R 20
From equations C2.8 and C2.11 it is apparent that R 2 ;r:R 20 (both the
numerator and denominator expressions differ), and thus R 2 and R 20 cannot be
directly compared for regression models using the same data. This is
emphasised by Montgomery and Peck (1982), Bowerman and O'Connell (1990)
and Campbell (1987). Montgomery and Peck (1982) suggest using mean square
error rather than R 2 , R 20 values for comparison of models with and without a
constant when the differences are between the R 2 , R 20 values are large. No
other references to the matter of model comparison were found by the author in
the literature.
X
data point
(~,Yi)
Y- y ~
Y, regression line
Y- y
Y = 0, data average
I y
Figure C2.2 Regressional goodness of fit for a model through the origin.
APPENDIX C3
STATISTICAL DETAILS OF RUNOUT DISTANCE
MODELS
C3.1 Statistical Details of Runout Distance Models

The statistical details for runout distance models for situations 1, 3, 56 and
7 are given in Figures C3.1 to C3.9. These include residual plots, checks for
variable normality (normal P- P plots), and the relationships between variables
used as first estimates and the corresponding independent variables in the
models.
.4
..·. ... ·r· ,I'. ..•....·... ..., ., ..

•......·. ,.··:••.• ...• ",....., ....•:J .. .. . •,.,•
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......
'iii .)
<I>
a:
-.4
-.6
-.8
-.5 0.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Log L
Nonnal p.p Plot of LL

Normal P-P Plot of LH
.75
~ .0
0
a. a:
s
(.)
.60
E
OJ
()
'0
"0
.l!! Ol
CJ
!)(
~
a.
w ><
w
.25
0.00
Observed Cum Prob

Observed Cum Prob
Figure C3.1 Statistical model details for situation 1.

Normal P-P Plot of D Normal P-P Plot of H4

1.00 1.00
.75 .75
.a .0
e e
0..
E
0..
E .
.--
:J
() "'
()
.50
"0
"'g
u"'
I
UJ
"'c.><
UJ
.25
0.00
0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00 0.00 25 .50 .75 1.00
Observed Cum Prob Observed Cum Prob
Normal P-P Plot of H1 Normal P-P Plot of L TA 1

1.00
1.00 1 -------------
.75
f
,:
..0 .0
e
0..
0
a:
5
() r ~
()
.so
'0
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.,
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t3
~
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c.
X
UJ UJ
.75 1.00
o.~.~oo:;---25::;----_c-so:----~---.!
.75 1.00
0 20 60 120
H1 (m)
Figure C3.2 Statistical model details for situation 1 (continued).

716
Normal p.p Plot ol LTAI
.7s,
~
a:
s
"'u..
(.)
.50
I •
.\:t
w
.25 j
·.2
... :
0.00
·.•.J------~-------------~------12.0 0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00
-.5 0.0 .5 1.0 1.5
Observed Cum Prob
Log (L2)
Normal P·P Plot of LL2

1.00 Normal p.p Plot ol LH2
1.00
.75
.0
;_ .0
0 751
E a: -
"
"u.
(.)
s
(.)
"~. 501
~
w c.
~
.25 w
25
... .so .75 1.00 0.00

0.00 25 .50 .75 1.00
Observed Cum Prob
Obs•"'•d Cum Prob
COMPARISON OF H 1 AND H2
:I .:
...
30
a,
20
10
1 1
l l [ l l
al :
..
HI H2

SITUATION 5
.5
..
.3
<a
:J
.2
:2
.,
a:'" .1
0.0
..
.. •i .•• :.
·.1 ..
·.2-1-----~
0.0 .5 1.0 15 2.0 2.5 30
log (l)
Normal P-P Plot of LL Normal P-P Plot of LH

1.00 1001
.c
e
c..
.75
.0
0
ci:
751
..
..
E E
:J
u"
(.)
a:
.50
..
"0
;:;
~c. 8.
~
>< "
J
w UJ
.25 25
0.00
.25 .so .75 1.00 0.00 25 so .75 100
Normal p.p Plot of LTA1

1.00
.75
~
ct
E
:J
u .50
.,
"0
~
!t
w
.25
7S 1.00
Observed Cum Prob

DISTRIBUTION OF H
E20
:J
~
()
c:
II)
:J
~
1.1..
10
I Sid. D•v =45.2:l

1
Mean • 26
~~~~~~~~~~--~~--~~----~~_L~N-6500
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 22S 250 275 JOO :125 :l50
H(m)
DISTRIBUTION OF H
16ir------------------------------------------,
14
12
E"
:J 10
~
IStd. O.v. 16.65

M•4VI:: 19
~_L~~~J_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N-~.00
0 5 10 IS 20 25 30 35 40 45 80
H(m)
eo
,
0>
70
03
60
0.
----- ..
I
E .a
T -- l
30 -
20 ·------------
f--
10
0
~ ------
N.
"'H

SITUATION 6
.6...---------------------------,
..
.2
iii
:;,
~
., .0 ....
a: .·
•.2 ..
·.4
·.8-l----~-----=------:r:----~=-------::-::-----::l
·.5 0.0 .5 1.0 u 2.0 2.5
Log L

1.00 1.00
.75 .751
.0 .0 I
0
cl:
e
0..
E
~ :l
u..,
u
~
tl
.50
.
uQl
.50
! w
c.
)(
.25
.50 .75 1.00 .so .75 1.00
Normal P-P Plot of LVW1

1.00
.75
-8
.t
5
u .50
~
..
tl
c.
dl
.75 1.00
Observed Cum Prob

COMPARISON OF H, H1 AND VW1

100
*~·
BO
60
*l1
40
20
*~O
886
0
N-
~
., ~ 51
-r
51
H HI VW1

18
*50
16
14
8!~
12
0~
0•7
-,.- -,.-
-.--
2
_j_ _j_
0
No 41 51
H "
Hl VW1

SITUATION 7
.6
.6
.4
Cil
:::l
3!
Ul
.2
..
Ql
a:
.
0.0
... . .. ..... : .
·.2
..
·.4
0.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Log L

1.00 1.00
.75 .75
-e
ll.
.0
e
Cl.
E E
:> :::J
() ()
.50 .50
..·-
·-..
] a;
u
~c.
! "
UJ
.251
0.00
0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00
Obserwd Cum Prob ObseNed Cum Prob
Normal P-P Plot of LVW1
.75
.c
0
a:
E
:>
()
.50
'0
!!!
u
~
)(
UJ
.25
0.00¥.'---~--~------...J
0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00
Observed Cum Prob

SITUATION 7
vv v v
v. v v
./
.
/
35
v
./
30
/ /
25
/ v /
v I
I
/ . v ./
v
. . v. v
15
/ ./
.. v v
10
' /
5
0 I/ /'
v. 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0 5 10
H1 (m)
COMPARISON OF H. H1 AND VW1

100
:u
80
80
....
40
.....,. ....* 04
045
O•t
o...
008
sr
20
--r l
0
N•
~ 57
~
.
I l
H H1 VW1 ""
30.0
0...
27.5
0.
,.,..
25. 0
22.5 ofi
--r
~o,.
20.0
~
17.5
(\1
E 15.o
E 12.5
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
I
.
__j_ __l_
0.0
N - 57
H H1
_]_
.
VW1

APPENDIX C4
CROSS-SECTIONS OF WELL DOCUMENTED FATAL
LANDSLIDES
C4.1 Cross-Sections of Well Documented Fatal Landslides

The cross-sections of well documented fatal landslides are given in this
appendix. They are in the form of diagrams shown to scale, and are grouped into
the following groups:
o debris falling onto cars/people (Figures C4.1 to C4.3),
o debris falling onto buildings below the landslide (Figures C4.4 to
C4.20),
o buildings on landslides (Figures C4.22 to C4.23), and
o rock falls (Figures C4.25 to C4.27).
C4.1.1 Debris Falling onto Cars/People
-0i
c: c )
•"
·;;; ,...
c
•r. ·;:""'
-
.::~
0
..
D
'\
... '
'' "\
~ ~ "\
"
::E ~
/'.
'! I ··., \
•,
........'·
~
"D
c
"
-' 0
Q. 'I
~
Q.
.
.! '
'
'
~
c
.~
0
..
11
a:J
.. I
~I
~;
"'II
I
I
I ..
... I
-'-·
·~I
I
-....,.,,
~I
l
0
~
··-!
0 I
;;
..r:
.c
g.O
- .1;.
u·~
." -
..
~~~ 3::.
"'
~i
-"'
Cll
~ ...f
0
0 ...
"' ~ ~ %: ~ ::: ~ "'-
Figure C4.1 Kennedy Rd (1992).

t::
::J
>
::J
>.
1... a.
0
'-
·-=VI
ou
a.c
E
QJ -
o
a.
Gl·- iii QJ
=='iii c
'Qu
... c
c
-
O.!? 1...
0
a._g ..c
u
g.oQJ
"'OQJ
c ... :::>
I
-~ u
VI QJ ...
.0
5.E o..c Ill
L..GI E Cl.. VI "'0
(!)..0 E QJ
0 :::a. a.
~ 'Q:=
'- VI
a.u
c
u.Q
c
... -
::J ...
0 QJ
(.!)o
c.
0 QJ
:::E
·v; :::
0
C.QJ
..c
OJ-
-o-·- a.
E0iii
·-
X VI C
u
o;:,o
o..o-
a._ ....
<x:oo
....
0
....
U"l
0
0
0
U"l
Ol
0
Ol
U"l
co
Figure C4.2 Cheung Shan (1993).

~
;l ~
~· (1) ~
::0
..... ......
1-1
~ .
"'?;">-tj
\:}
~ ~ [
~ Grill work "'
(1) Pl
'<
(screen wall)
BlockD at "' ~
Kwun Lung tau s

"' '"0
::r
Level platform g 0
~ inferred from the 1924 ..... .--..
c: aerial pbotograph.s
~ 300 mm diameter ,. ., cz
0
= E.sti.mated ground -~- foulwateuewer ~(/J

.g ~
~ profile before the landslide (1)'-'
=
(1Q
"'
~ ,.-...
Masonry wall
c: 72
-~
PAl~
.--..
,_.
\C 20
\C
~ c:l
'-' 0
'Jj
Partially
weathered
t
[i3
I&
volcanica
16
14
Apparent Cohesion An&le of Sheari..o&

12 Stratum c• (kPa) Resist..ance
Fill 0
••
JS•
0 2 .. 6111
PartWiy
weathered 2 JS.SO
volcanic&
-..I
N
0,
C4.1.2 Debris Falling onto Buildings Below the Landslide
0
8
"'
..
Ci
u. 0
~
~
0
0
~
- 8
-
... -
~
~
~
8
-..- !
•
-; S2
:E
~
c;; 8
:!!
~
"
~
8;!
CJ
...
c:
:~
0
8
8
~
g
0
0
S!
8
"'
8
"'
8...
0
s
.., 8
Ill
"'~
E
a.
i=
0
•
u
~
"
:c
.
~
a.
;::
0
~
.....
Ci 8
~
8
"'
8
"'
8.... 8
"'
0
0
"'
..
Ci
u.
Figure C4.4 Aberfan (1966).

SCALE 1 :2000
·~--~--~ / / I
12 storey
~~t~t~~~tCourt block damaged
FS Li's garage
destroyed I
~~l-o~f~
+
' .' /
41>> /
r'
i
-l
de!:?.troyed _ ·- - / 7}.
·t ._.., 7
'r"Z.r~stry
/ destroyed
a ---.~ _.1(:vt. . --· -~,
_../_.:c·:··. /. ;_ : /
~c:::~.:.: ·,·:' .. ·.:.·'__________....,_
j~s:O:a· l , " " . " j
Figure C4.5 Po Shan Rd (1972).
110 -------- ·----
100
_..
90
80
70 IHuts start here? I
60 1-
50
~ 1-
40 ""'~~ '=-
Block~
30
~~ •, 1-
20
~5 ,._ - ..15. i-
't I Y-'7- .. .. -- -- 16
~
. -- -
10 '--
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170
m
Figure C4.6 Sau Mau Ping (1972).

SCALE 1 :1000
1&'
41&'
1 l
/1 .
f.,
24
..,L
1&'
31 14:
~.,
Figure C4.7 Sau Mau Ping (1976).
Poklulam THA
Sittinu·out aroa Block
15CJ
140
~ill platform
.·
Profile Lalora land~lido
120
110
~
~ 100 Profile altar lendalide
c
g 80
•
)>
_n IJO
70 ilock 44
eo
1·,
50
40
-L_ 0 10 20111
Scul~
·-Podium
· Towar Block
Figure C4.8 Baguio Villas (1992).

140
130
Block 1
120 Highland
Towers
110
Retrogressive slides
I 1oo
a;
>
Q)
...J
""0 90
Q)
()
::J
-g
cr: 80
70
60
50
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 11 0 120 130 140 150
Horizontal Distance (m)
Figure C4.9 Highland Towers (1993).
SCALE 1:200
ID,.
l
3
Figure C4.10 NT/8/8 (1982).

SCALE 1:200
Figure C4.11 4/llSWB (1978).
SCALE 1:200
I Injury here
+--f
Figure C4.12 ME87/7/20 (1987).

SCALE 1:200
Buried here?
IL.
I
r .
qo· · · . . ·,
Figure C4.13 2/llNWA (1979).

SCALE 1:200
/5 fatalities
4
,. .... -. '
1( 2
Figure C4.14 14/llSWC (1983).
SCALE 1:200
3 killed
{.G
8.3 M.
Figure C4.15 K60 (1982).

SCALE 1:200
Resident buried
2.0
Figure C4.16 24/79 (1979).
SCALE 1:200
Hut in which people were killed
Collapsed wall
3 stream
Figure C4.17 K31A (1982).

huts on fire-damaged area SCALE 1:200
·y
~ drain discharging
\
\
\.
Grade IV
hut still standing

l
'\ 1 1
L L
l· Z.. Z.8 2.) l.f
Figure C4.18 K14 (1982).
SCALE 1:1000
Substantial seepage 16-18/8/82
2 killed in hut
Figure C4.19 NT/8/7 (1982).

'0
~
:.s;::
~
0.
0
Q)
0.
-g ._,
..c
-~
0
E
Q)
'0
:5
..c
w
__.
<(
0
en
Q)
>
co
....
O'l
Q)
'0
lQ
:c.
Figure C4.20 NT/8/27 (1982).

SCALE 1:1000
gully
child kill.ed here

32m
Figure C4.21 K30 (1982).

C4.1.3 Buildings on Landslides
SCALE 1:1000
pipes (load)
man killed
huts demolished
Figure C4.22 K45 (1982).
SCALE 1:1000
series of slips
on fire-damaged terraces
huts demolished
(built over stream)
Figure C4.23 K13 (1982).

SCALE 1:200
water person
overflow killed
inside
/S fit-.
Figure C4.24 HK2 (1982).

C4.1.4 Rock Falls

SCALE 1:200
qWI
injury-·
here handrail damaged
B)' I
road
t>r A-= ,.r

(),_$" 3,7m 5.(w
Figure C4.25 HK85/6/2 (1985).
SCALE 1:200
Ching
Cheung Rd
person injured here
/1 71
Figure C4.26 MW92/7/9 (1992).

SCALE 1:200
newly formed slope
~
.excavation~'
m progress ~ . hoarding
Person·injured in car
7m
boulder (800x800x800)
Tai Po Rd
/5~
Figure C4.27 K87/9/4 (1987).

APPENDIX SERIES D
LANDSLIDE RISK CALCULATIONS
AppendixDl
Montrose Risk Calculations .................................... 743
AppendixD2
Kalorama Risk Calculations ................................... 750
APPENDIX Dl
MONTROSE RISK CALCULATIONS
Dl.l Montrose Study Area Risk Calculations

Table Dl.l contains the Montrose study area risk calculations.
Table Dl.l Montrose study area risk calculations. ~~
('1) ~
...,
UVL LAB URB LRL URL

-·
~
.
"';><;"'Tj
......
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPB LVB UVB LVL
~ §:
40 Belvedere Dr 2 59 126 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0882 0.882 0.0005 0.005 "' Pl
('1)
"' .
'<!
42 Belvedere Dr 2 56 117 L,H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00012 0.00117 0.0000001 0.000001
"'a "'::rtl
44 Belvedere Dr 2 55 60 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00006 0.0006 0.0000001 0.000001
....g /""'-
46 Belvedere Dr 2 56 92 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 9.2E-05 0.00092 0.0000001 0.000001 .0. ., ez
~ IZl
49 Belvedere Dr 2 56 87 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.7E-05 0.00087 0.0000001 0.000001
.g ~
0.0000001 0.000001 (1)'--"
51 Belvedere Dr 2 85 117 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00012 0.00117
"'
53 Belvedere Dr 2 85 101 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00404 0.040 0.00001 0.0001
1 Browns Ad 2 75 105 X/H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0735 1.050 0.0005 0.008
3 Browns Ad 3 74 65 X/H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0455 0.650 0.0005 0.008
4 Browns Ad 3 100 96 X/HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.00672 0.960 0.00005 0.008
5-7 Browns Ad 2 85 116 H,X,M 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0812 0.812 0.0005 0.005
6 Browns Ad 2 100 115 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00012 0.00115 0.0000001 0.000001
8 Browns Ad 2 65 65 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.5E-05 0.00065 0.0000001 0.000001
9 Browns Ad 3 58 41 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.1 E-05 0.00041 0.0000001 0.000001
11 Browns Ad 2 65 62 HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00248 0.434 0.00001 0.005
12 Browns Ad 2 70 95 X/H, L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0665 0.950 0.0005 0.008
13 Browns Ad 2 100 61 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0427 0.427 0.0005 0.005
14 Browns Ad 2 90 82 X/H, L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0574 0.820 0.0005 0.008
15 Browns Ad 2 69 90 H,M 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.063 0.630 0.0005 0.005
16 Browns Rd 3 54 105 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.0042 0.042 0.00001 0.0001
17 Browns Ad 2 62 134 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00536 0.0536 0.00001 0.0001
18 Browns Ad 2 138 137 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00548 0.0548 0.00001 0.0001
19 Browns Ad 2 53 94 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00376 0.0376 0.00001 0.0001
20 Browns Ad 3 82 52 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.2E-05 0.00052 0.0000001 0.000001
4 Gibbs Ad 2 50 53 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00212 0.0212 0.00001 0.0001
- ----
-.)
continued ... .p..
.p..
Table 01.1 (continued) Montrose study area risk calculations. ~~
~ (b
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPB LVB UVB LVL UVL LAB URB LRL URL ::0 .....
.... '-<
I'll •
Gibbs Ad 2 64 92 M, H 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00368 0.0368 0.00001 0.0001 ;>\'" 'Tj
6
HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00348 0.609 0.00001 0.005 ~ [
8 Gibbs Ad 2 118 87 I'll ll>
~ ':<
10 Gibbs Ad 3 50 40 M, H 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.0016 0.016 0.00001 0.0001 I'll "tl
3 ::r
11 Gibbs Ad 2 60 145 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.0058 0.058 0.00001 0.0001 g...... ,-....
0
12 Gibbs Ad 2 52 73 M, H 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00292 0.0292 0.00001 0.0001
. . , c:::z
0
13 Gibbs Ad 3 60 47 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00188 0.0188 0.00001 0.0001 ~C/l
14 Gibbs Ad 3 65 42 M, H, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00168 0.0168 0.00001 0.0001
.g
~'-"
~
I'll
15 Gibbs Ad 3 61 104 HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00416 0.728 0.00001 0.005
16 Gibbs Ad 3 64 44 L,H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.4E--05 0.00044 0.0000001 0.000001
17 Gibbs Ad 2 62 118 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0826 0.826 0.0005 0.005 .
18 Gibbs Ad 3 62 59 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.9E--05 0.00059 0.0000001 0.000001
20 Gibbs Ad 3 62 47 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.7E--05 0.00047 0.0000001 0.000001
21 Gibbs Ad 3 62 55 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0385 0.385 0.0005 0.005
14 Heathfield Grv 2 65 52 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.2E--05 0.00052 0.0000001 0.000001
16 Heathfield Grv 2 64 106 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00011 0.00106 0.0000001 0.000001
18 Heathfield Grv 2 66 77 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7. 7E--05 0.00077 0.0000001 0.000001
19 Heathfield Grv 1 68 100 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.0001 0.001 0.0000001 0.000001
22-24 Heathfield Grv 2 88 82 H,L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0574 0.574 0.0005 0.005
23-25 Heathfield Grv 3 88 63 H,L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0441 0.441 0.0005 0.005
27 Heathfield Grv 2 70 85 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.5E--05 0.00085 0.0000001 0.000001
29 Heathfield Grv 2 72 107 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00011 0.00107 0.0000001 0.000001
3/32 Heathfield Grv 2 22 82 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.2E--05 0.00082 0.0000001 0.000001
---- -- ----
continued ... ...

-.l
v.
Table 01.1 (continued) Montrose study area risk calculations. ;J~
(1) ct
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPB LVB UVB LVL UVL LRB URB LRL URL ~
..... ....
~
"':;-;-" .>Tj
55 Kerr Cr 3 63 51 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.1 E--05 0.00051 0.0000001 0.000001 ~ [
"'(1) ~
'<
57 Kerr Cr 2 61 83 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.3E--05 0.00083 0.0000001 0.000001 "' ~
s
"' '"d
::r
59 Kerr Cr 2 54 58 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.8E--05 0.00058 0.0000001 0.000001 g...... 0
,--..
61-03 Kerr Cr 2 58 88 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.8E--05 0.00088 0.0000001 0.000001 0
65 Kerr Cr 3 58 47 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1· 0.01 0.01 4.7E--05 0.00047 0.0000001 0.000001
~
~(/l
z
c:::
Loll McKenzie Grv 2 75 91 MIH, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00364 0.637 0.00001 0.005
.g ::E
(1)'-'
:
LotS McKenzie Grv 2 150 85 HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.0034 0.595 0.00001 0.005 "'
1007 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 55 45 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.5E--05 0.00045 0.0000001 0.000001
1009 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 2 58 68 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.8E--05 0.00068 0.0000001 0.000001
1011 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 58 42 L,M 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.2E--05 0.00042 0.0000001 0.000001
1012 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 52 49 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0343 0.343 0.0005 0.005
1013 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 60 65 HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.0026 0.455 0.00001 0.005
1014 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 50 28 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00112 0.0112 0.00001 0.0001
1015 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 2 62 39 HIM, L 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00156 0.273 0.00001 0.005
1016-1018 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 90 69 L,M 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.9E--05 0.00069 0.0000001 0.000001
1017-1019 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 120 78 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 ?.SE--05 0.00078 0.0000001 0.000001
1020 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 85 78 HIM 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00312 0.546 0.00001 0.005
1026 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 64 47 HIM 0.00010 0.01000 0.4 0.7 0.10 0.50 0.00188 0.329 0.00001 0.005
1027 Mt Dandenong Tourist Ad 3 58 70 H,M 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.049 0.490 0.0005 0.005
continued ... -.J
.t::-
0\
Table 01.1 (continued) Montrose study area risk calculations. ;1~
(1) (1)
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPB LVB UVB LVL UVL LRB URB LRL URL ~ ....
.............
Cll •
1029-1031 Mt Dandenong Tourist Rd 3 95 43 H,L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.030 0.301 0.0005 0.005 ?;" 'Tj
1033 Mt Dandenong Tourist Rd 60 54 M, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00216 0.0216 0.00001 0.0001 ~ §:
3
~ ~
1-3 Old Coach Rd 2 120 88 L, M 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.8E--05 0.00088 0.0000001 0.000001 ~ >-c
3 ::r
4 Old Coach Rd 3 105 64 M, H, L 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00256 0.0256 0.00001 0.0001 g ~
5 Old Coach Rd 2 110 75 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.003 0.030 0.00001 0.0001
8,~
6 Old Coach Rd 2 130 63 M 0.00010 0.00100 0.4 0.4 0.10 0.10 0.00252 0.0252 0.00001 0.0001 CIJCIJ
0 ~
7 Old Coach Rd 2 120 82 X/H, L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0574 0.820 0.0005 0.008 ]'--'
Cll
10 Old Coach Rd 3 105 77 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7.7E--05 0.00077 0.0000001 0.000001
12 Old Coach Rd 3 70 39 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 3.9E--05 0.00039 0.0000001 0.000001
14 Old Coach Rd 3 70 49 X/H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0343 0.490 0.0005 0.008
15 Old Coach Rd 3 85 73 X 0.00333 0.01000 1.0 1.0 0.80 0.80 0.24309 0.730 0.002664 0.008
19 Old Coach Rd 2 110 125 X, L 0.00333 0.01000 1.0 1.0 0.80 0.80 0.41625 1.250 0.002664 0.008
21 Old Coach Rd 3 55 37 X/H, L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0259 0.370 0.0005 0.008
29 Old Coach Rd 1 75 107 X/H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.80 0.0749 1.070 0.0005 0.008
40 Richards Rd 1 55 88 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.8E--05 0.00088 0.0000001 0.000001
42 Richards Rd 2 55 68 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.8E--05 0.00068 0.0000001 0.000001
43 Richards Rd 2 55 83 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.3E--05 0.00083 0.0000001 0.000001
44 Richards Rd 2 55 87 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.7E--05 0.00087 0.0000001 0.000001
46 Richards Rd 2 55 77 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7.7E--05 0.00077 0.0000001 0.000001
47 Richards Rd 2 55 77 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7.7E--05 0.00077 0.0000001 0.000001
48 Richards Rd 2 55 69 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.9E--05 0.00069 0.0000001 0.000001
49 Richards Rd 2 61 99 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 9.9E--05 0.00099 0.0000001 0.000001
50 Richards Rd 2 55 65 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.5E--05 0.00065 0.0000001 0.000001
52 Richards Rd 2 55 48 H,L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0336 0.336 0.0005 0.005
408-414 Sheffield Rd Sth 3 110 51 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.1 E--05 0.00051 0.0000001 0.000001
416-424 Sheffield Rd Sth 2 175 128 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00013 0.00128 0.0000001 0.000001
-~ --·~- ---·-~-
L___
continued ... -..1
""'
-..1
Table 01.1 {continued) Montrose study area risk calculations. ~~
(1) ;::;
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPB LVB UVB LVL UVL LRB URB LRL URL :;d ....
..........
426-428 Sheffield Rd Sth 1 120 88 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.8E-05 0.00088 0.0000001 0.000001
.
"'X"'>-rj
0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00009 0.0009 0.0000001 0.000001 ~ [
436-442 Sheffield Rd Sth 2 145 90 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 "' Pol
450 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 53 41 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.1E-05 0.00041 0.0000001 0.000001
i)l ';.<
"'s ::r .,
454 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 53 33 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 3.3E-05 0.00033 0.0000001 0.000001 g tl
..... ,........
456 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 60 77 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7.7E-05 0.00077 0.0000001 0.000001 0
....,z c
458 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 68 45 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.5E-05 0.00045 0.0000001 0.000001 \:Q(I'J
.g
(1)
~
-......;
460 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 75 80 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00008 0.0008 0.0000001 0.000001 "'
463 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 75 75 L,H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 7.5E-05 0.00075 0.0000001 0.000001
464 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 58 45 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.5E-05 0.00045 0.0000001 0.000001
465-467 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 75 89 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0623 0.623 0.0005 0.005
466 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 55 43 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.030 0.301 0.0005 0.005
468 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 64 54 L,H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.4E-05 0.00054 0.0000001 0.000001
469 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 65 70 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00007 0.0007 0.0000001 0.000001
470 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 64 57 H 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.040 0.399 0.0005 0.005
471-475 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 78 64 H,L 0.00100 0.01000 0.7 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.0448 0.448 0.0005 0.005
472 Sheffield Rd Nth 3 140 34 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 3.4E-05 0.00034 0.0000001 0.000001
476 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 115 134 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00013 0.00134 0.0000001 0.000001
477 Sheffield Rd Nth 2 55 52 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.2E-05 0.00052 0.0000001 0.000001 I
406 Sheffield Rd Sth 2 80 87 L, H 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 8.7E-05 0.00087 0.0000001 0.000001
2 StJames Ave 3 55 42 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.2E-05 0.00042 0.0000001 0.000001
4 StJames Ave 2 55 57 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.7E-05 0.00057 0.0000001 0.000001
- - - - · - - - - - - - -1....- - ----- -----~ -- -------- ----1...-------
continued ... .,..
-.l
00
Table 01.1 (continued) Montrose study area risk calculations. ;1~
- ----- ('!> ct
NUMBER ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE ZONE LPB UPS LVB UVB LVL UVL LRB URB LRL URL ....
::0
(/l
._
'"1
•
0.000001
'
6 StJames Ave 2 55 47 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.7E-{)5 0.00047 0.0000001 :>;'"'Tj
8 StJames Ave 2 55 58 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.8E-{)5 0.00058 0.0000001 0.000001 (/l ~
[
('!>
(/l
'-<
~
10 StJames Ave 3 55 40 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00004 0.0004 0.0000001 0.000001
3
(/l ;:r
"'
12
14
StJames Ave
StJames Ave
2
3
56
56
65
29
L
L
0.00001
0.00001
0.00010
0.00010
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
6.5E-{)5
2.9E-{)5
0.00065
0.00029
0.0000001
0.0000001
0.000001
0.000001 -
g tJ
0
,...._
. . , c::z
16 StJames Ave 2 55 63 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 6.3E-{)5 0.00063 0.0000001 0.000001 ~Cil
18 StJames Ave 2 55 45 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 4.5E-{)5 0.00045 0.0000001 0.000001
0
]'-'
:e
(/l
20 StJames Ave 3 56 36 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 3.6E-{)5 0.00036 0.0000001 0.000001
22 StJames Ave 3 56 30 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00003 0.0003 0.0000001 0.000001
15 The Boulevarde 2 55 55 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.5E-{)5 0.00055 0.0000001 0.000001
22 The Boulevarde 2 55 57 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 5.7E--D5 0.00057 0.0000001 0.000001
25 The Boulevarde 2 55 60 L 0.00001 0.00010 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00006 0.0006 0.0000001 0.000001
~
10,651 10,800 Value 2.16 24.13 0.0192 0.2301
TOTAL Value TOTAL
21,451 % 0.02 0.22 ij//////7/o
KEY: All values are in $AU ·ooos LPB Lower bound debris flow probability UPB Upper bound debris flow probability
LVB Lower bound building vulnerability UVB Upper bound building vulnerability LVL Lower vulnerability bound for a person
UVL Upper vulnerability bound for a person LAB Lower bound risk to building URB Upper bound risk to building
LRL Lower bound risk to a person URL Upper bound risk to a person ~
'-D
APPENDIX D2
KALORAMA RISK CALCULATIONS
D2.1 Kalorama Study Area Risk Calculations

Table D2.1 contains the Kalorama study area risk calculations.
Table D2.1 Kalorama study area risk calculations. ~~
(1l ct
REF NO ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE SUB-ZONE LPB UPB LPBS UPBS LPBL UPBL vs VL LABS URBS LRBL URBL
-·
~
.
"';>;""!j
....
......
:t> s·
1 29 Barbers Rd 1 110 130 G,B 3 3 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.40 0.80 0.5200 0.5200 0.1300 0.1300 "'-
"' '< Pol
2 30 Barbers Rd 0.0923 0.0923

"'"' ....._,
(1l
3 70 82 B 3 3 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.50 0.90 0.4100 0.4100

s ::r
3
4
32
34
31-37
Barbers Rd
Barbers Rd
3
1
70
90
85
96
B
B
3
3
3
3
0.0100
0.0100
0.0100
0.0100
0.0013
0.0013
0.0013
0.0013
0.50
0.40
0.90
0.80
0.4250
0.3840
0.4250
0.3840
0.0956
0.0960
0.0956
0.0960 ---z
g
0
~
~Cil
t:l
c::::
5 Barbers Rd 3 140 47 BIH', H 3 5 0.0100 0.0125 0.0013 0.0017 0.40 0.65 0.1880 0.2350 0.0382 0.0509
.g ~
6 39 Barbers Rd 2 70 51 H' 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.30 0.60 0.1913 0.1913 0.0510 0.0510 (ll'-'"
7 40-42 Barbers Rd 2 55 65 A 14 14 0.0500 0.0500 0.0200 0.0200 0.40 0.70 1.3000 1.3000 0.9100 0.9100
"'
8 41-45 Barbers Rd 2 110 133 A'/H', A, H, I 5 10 0.0125 0.0250 0.0017 0.0050 0.40 0.70 0.6650 1.3300 0.1552 0.4655
9 44-48 Barbers Rd 3 120 47 AlA', c· 10 14 0.0250 0.0500 0.0050 0.0200 0.30 0.55 0.3525 0.7050 0.1293 0.5170
10 50 Barbers Rd 3 50 80 C', S 4 4 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.30 0.55 0.2400 0.2400 0.0550 0.0550
11 53 Barbers Ad 3 75 56 L, L' 6 6 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.30 0.55 0.2100 0.2100 0.0513 0.0513
12 52-54 Barbers Rd 3 55 79 c·. s 4 4 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.30 0.60 0.2370 0.2370 0.0593 0.0593
13 58 Barbers Rd 2 48 43 L 6 6 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.20 0.45 0.1075 0.1075 0.0323 0.0323
14 60 Barbers Ad 3 48 42 L 6 6 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.20 0.40 0.1050 0.1050 0.0280 0.0280
15 62 Barbers Rd 3 48 88 L 6 6 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.20 0.40 0.2200 0.2200 0.0587 0.0587
16 64 Barbers Ad 3 48 45 L 6 6 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.30 0.55 0.1688 0.1688 0.0413 0.0413
17 65 Barbers Ad 3 65 120 M', M, L 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.20 0.40 0.4800 0.4800 0.1200 0.1200
18 70 Barbers Ad 3 48 48 M 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.2880 0.2880 0.0660 0.0660
19 12-14 Caroline Cres 3 98 38 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.65 0.0760 0.0760 0.0247 0.0247
20 16 Caroline Cres 2 90 82 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.70 0.1640 0.1640 0.0574 0.0574
21 18-20 Caroline Cres 2 105 94 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.70 0.1880 0.1880 0.0658 0.0658
22 22 Caroline Cres 3 50 70 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.65 0.1400 0.1400 0.0455 0.0455
23 24 Caroline Cres 3 50 39 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.65 0.0780 0.0780 0.0254 0.0254
24 21 Dougherty's Ad 3 80 60 p 12 12 0.0333 0.0333 0.0100 0.0100 0.20 0.40 0.4000 0.4000 0.2400 0.2400
25 29 Dougherty's Ad 3 47 46 T', p 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.20 0.40 0.1150 0.1150 0.0307 0.0307
-....1
continued ... VI
.....
Table 02.1 (continued) Kalorama study area risk calculations. ;J~
~ (t
UPBS LPBL UPBL vs VL LRBS URBS LRBL .... URBL :::0 .....
REF NO ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE SUB-ZONE LPB UPB LPBS ...........
26 - Dunbar Ave 2 48 93 AlA' 10 14 0.0250 0.0500 0.0050 0.0200 0.50 0.90 1.1625 2.3250 0.4185 1.6740
.
"'?\"'"Tj
27 6-8 Ernest Rd 3 75 37 R',R 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.30 0.55 0.1388 0.1388 0.0339 0.0339 ~[
"'~ ~
';;<:
0.1238
28
29
10-12
13
Ernest Rd
Ernest Rd
3
3
70
60
45
61
R
O,R
10
7
10
7
0.0250
0.0200
0.0250
0.0200
0.0050
0.0025
0.0050
0.0025
0.30
0.20
0.55
0.40
0.3375
0.2440
0.3375
0.2440
0.1238
0.0610 0.0610
s"'g "'
::r
tj
30 14-16 Ernest Rd 1 70 68 O,R 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.65 0.4080 0.4080 0.1105 0.1105 ;-a
.., z
31 15 Ernest Rd 3 48 62 Q 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.20 0.40 0.2480 0.2480 0.0620 0.0620 ~(/l
32 17 Ernest Rd 3 50 56 O,M 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.20 0.40 0.2240 0.2240 0.0560 0.0560
.g
~
~
.........
33 18 Ernest Rd 2 70 78 Q, p 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.4680 0.4680 0.1073 0.1073 "'
34 19 Ernest Rd 1 48 91 N!Q 7 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.20 0.50 0.3640 0.3640 0.1138 0.1138
35 21 Ernest Rd 3 44 50 N,Q 7 7 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.20 0.40 0.2000 0.2000 0.0500 0.0500
36 20-22 Ernest Rd 3 70 79 p 12 12 0.0333 0.0333 0.0100 0.0100 0.30 0.55 0.7900 0.7900 0.4345 0.4345
37 24 Ernest Rd 2 70 99 p 12 12 0.0333 0.0333 0.0100 0.0100 0.30 0.55 0.9900 0.9900 0.5445 0.5445
38 8 Link Rd 2 80 51 I, H 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.70 0.2550 0.2550 0.0595 0.0595
39 9 Link Rd 2 58 68 H, K' 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.40 0.70 0.5440 0.5440 0.1190 0.1190
40 11 Link Rd 3 58 48 K, H, K' 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.65 0.2400 0.2400 0.0520 0.0520
41 13 Link Rd 3 50 37 K, I 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.65 0.1850 0.1850 0.0401 0.0401
42 15 Link Rd 2 65 111 I, K, L 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.70 0.5550 0.5550 0.1295 0.1295
43 2 Myra Ct 2 60 65 P/R 10 12 0.0250 0.0333 0.0050 0.0100 0.20 0.45 0.3250 0.4333 0.1463 0.2925
44 3 Myra Ct 3 60 86 P, R 12 12 0.0333 0.0333 0.0100 0.0100 0.20 0.40 0.5733 0.5733 0.3440 0.3440
45 4 Myra Ct 2 65 64 R, R' 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.45 0.3200 0.3200 0.1440 0.1440
46 5 Myra Ct 2 65 57 R', R 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.30 0.60 0.2138 0.2138 0.0570 0.0570
47 1 Outlook Dr 3 48 44 S,R 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.40 0.2200 0.2200 0.0880 0.0880
48 2 Outlook Dr 3 48 44 SIR 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.40 0.2200 0.2200 0.0880 0.0880
49 3 Outlook Dr 3 48 51 s 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.40 0.2550 0.2550 0.1020 0.1020
50 4 Outlook Dr 1 90 80 R,S 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.50 0.4000 0.4000 0.2000 0.2000
51 5 Outlook Dr 3 48 56 s 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.40 0.2800 0.2800 0.1120 0.1120
continued ... -....)
Vl
N
Table 02.1 (continued} Kalorama study area risk calculations. ;1~
(1) (b
REF NO ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE SUB-ZONE LPB UPB LPBS UPBS LPBL UPBL vs VL LABS URBS LRBL URBL :::0 ,..,
tn· ~
52 7 Outlook Dr 3 48 61 S,L 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.20 0.40 0.3050 0.3050 0.1220 0.1220 ?i""Tj
53 8 Outlook Dr 3 50 64 M/Q 7 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.3840 0.3840 0.0880 0.0880 ~
(ll
e:
Ill
~ ~
54 9 Outlook Dr 3 48 60 S/L 6 10 0.0125 0.0250 0.0017 0.0050 0.30 0.55 0.2250 0.4500 0.0550 0.1650 (ll '"0
a ::r
55 11 Outlook Dr 3 48 68 M, L,S 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.4080 0.4080 0.0935 0.0935 g tJ
56 13 Outlook Dr 3 48 51 M,L 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.3060 0.3060 0.0701 0.0701 ;;-e
.... z
57 15 Outlook Dr 3 47 40 M 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.30 0.55 0.2400 0.2400 0.0550 0.0550 !::2CI:l
58 19 Outlook Dr 3 48 45 M,N 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.40 0.65 0.3600 0.3600 0.0731 0.0731 .g
(1)
~
...._.
(ll
59 21 Outlook Dr 3 48 51 N,M 8 8 0.0200 0.0200 0.0025 0.0025 0.40 0.65 0.4080 0.4080 0.0829 0.0829
60 1 Price's Rd 2 55 106 c 3 3 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.50 0.90 0.5300 0.5300 0.1193 0.1193
61 2 Price's Rd 2 80 129 D,C 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.3225 0.3225 0.1161 0.1161
62 3 Price's Rd 2 65 77 c 3 3 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.50 0.90 0.3850 0.3850 0.0866 0.0866
63 4 Price's Rd 3 70 35 D 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.0875 0.0875 0.0315 0.0315
64 5 Price's Rd 2 65 103 c 3 3 0.0100 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.50 0.90 0.5150 0.5150 0.1159 0.1159
65 6 Price's Rd 3 65 115 w·.D 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.7188 0.7188 0.1725 0.1725
66 7 Price's Rd 2 70 113 R', C 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.7063 0.7063 0.1695 0.1695
67 8 Price's Rd 3 55 61 W'!T 5 9 0.0125 0.0250 0.0017 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.3813 0.7625 0.0915 0.2745
68 9 Price's Rd 3 55 73 A', T 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.4563 0.4563 0.1095 0.1095
69 10 Price's Rd 3 70 30 T,W' 9 9 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.3750 0.3750 0.1350 0.1350
70 11 Price's Rd 2 60 80 A', T 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.5000 0.5000 0.1200 0.1200
71 12 Price's Rd 3 80 38 T, U 9 9 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.40 0.65 0.3800 0.3800 0.1235 0.1235
72 13 Price's Rd 3 75 66 T', T 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.4125 0.4125 0.0990 0.0990
73 14 Price's Rd 2 55 65 T. T', u 9 9 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.40 0.70 0.6500 0.6500 0.2275 0.2275
74 15 Price's Rd 1 75 142 T', T 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.50 0.90 0.8875 0.8875 0.2130 0.2130
75 16 Price's Rd 1 55 109 T'/U 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.2725 0.2725 0.0981 0.0981
76 17 Price's Rd 2 50 109 T', p 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.70 0.5450 0.5450 0.1272 0.1272
77 18 Price's Rd 3 55 76 T'IU 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.1900 0.1900 0.0684 0.0684
··- -·~·--- --
continued ... -....!

Vl
Vol
Table 02.1 (continued) Kalorama study area risk calculations. ::r ~
>-1 ......
~ ~
REF NO ROAD TYPE LAND HOUSE SUB-ZONE LPB UPB LPBS UPBS LPBL UPBL vs VL LRBS URBS LRBL URBL :;o
..... '"1
~
78 20 Price's Rd 3 50 40 U, T' 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.1000 0.1000 0.0360 0.0360
"':>;"'Tj
.
179 21 Price's Rd 2 60 176 T', v 5 5 0.0125 0.0125 0.0017 0.0017 0.40 0.70 0.8800 0.8800 0.2053 0.2053 ~ [
"'
~ Pol
'<
80 22 Price's Rd 3 50 20 u 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.0500 0.0500 0.0180 0.0180 "' ~
s ""0
"' ::r
81 23 Price's Rd 3 48 24 u 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.40 0.65 0.0480 0.0480 0.0156 0.0156 g..... ...--.
C1
82 24 Price's Rd 3 48 12 u 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.0300 0.0300 0.0108 0.0108
.0. ., cz
83 2 Rosemont Cres 1 70 118 F 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.2950 0.2950 0.1062 0.1062 ~(/J
84 4--s Rosemont Cres 3 180 105 F 1 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.2625 0.2625 0.0945 0.0945
.g
~...__.,
~
85 8 Rosemont Cres 3 72 51 E 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.1275 0.1275 0.0459 0.0459 "'
86 10 Rosemont Cres 1 85 88 E,B 2 2 0.0050 0.0050 0.0010 0.0010 0.50 0.90 0.2200 0.2200 0.0792 0.0792
87 11 Rosemont Cres 2 50 68 A 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.8500 0.8500 0.3060 0.3060
88 12 Rosemont Cres 2 60 77 A'/E/B 2 10 0.0050 0.0250 0.0010 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.1925 0.9625 0.0693 0.3465
89 13 Rosemont Cres 2 52 61 A 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.7625 0.7625 0.2745 0.2745
90 15 Rosemont Cres 2 50 62 A', A 10 10 0.0250 0.0250 0.0050 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.7750 0.7750 0.2790 0.2790
91 20 Rosemont Cres 2 48 97 C/O/A' 1 10 0.0050 0.0250 0.0010 0.0050 0.50 0.90 0.2425 1.2125 0.0873 0.4365
~
5,869 6,413 Value 33.60 38.28 10.99 14.02
TOTAL Value TOTAL
12,282 0
/o 0.52 0.60 0.17 0.22
KEY: All values are in $AU 'OOOs

LBPS Lower bound small landslide probability
LB Lower bound sub-zone point score
UB Upper bound sub-zone point score
UBPS Upper bound small landslide probability
LBPL Lower bound small landslide probability
UBPL Upper bound small landslide probability
VS Building vulnerability to small landslide
VL Building vulnerability to large landslide
LABS Lower bound risk to building from small landslide
URBS Upper bound risk to building from small landslide
LRBL Lower bound risk to building from small landslide -...)
V\
URBL Upper bound risk to building from small landslide .t>-
APPENDIX SERIES E
RAINFALL AND LANDSLIDING
AppendixEl
Listing of Landslide Incident Failure Dates and Nearest
Two Rain Gauge Numbers ........................................ 756
AppendixE2
Preliminary Exploratory Analyses ................................. 773
AppendixE3
Analyses and Outputs ............................................ 784
AppendixE4
Rainfall Threshold Values ........................................ 796
AppendixE5
on Hong Kong Island ............................................. 807
AppendixE6
(1989-92 Period) ................................................ 820
AppendixE7
Details of Statistical Models Predicting Rainfall Extremes ........... 826
AppendixES
Significant Storm Events in Hong Kong During 1984-93 ............ 830
APPENDIX El
LISTING OF LANDSLIDE INCIDENT FAILURE DATES
AND NEAREST TWO RAIN GAUGE NUMBERS
Table El.l Listing of reported landslide failure dates and nearest two rain
gauges.
Rain Gauge Missing

No. ld Date Time Comment Used Rainfall Comment
1 2 Values
1 hk3/1 010184 ??
no rain h09, h07.1ittle
2 hk4/1 h09 h07 020484 1200 no rain elsewhere
h06/h17
3 hk4/2 h16 /h05 280484 caused by rain on 27
4 hk5/1 030584 1500 missing
5 hk5/2 h16 h13/h10 050584 washout no heavy rain on 4/5/84
road&const
6 hk5/3 h19 h18 210584 1700 site no rain on 20/5
cracking rain 20&26, water form
7 hk5/4 h01 h02 240584 only no fire fighting
8 hk5/5 h19 h18 250484 boulder yes
9 hk5/6 h02 h01/h04 300584 800
10 hk5/7 h19 h18 300584 1200
11 hk5/8 h18 h19 300584 900
retaining
12 hk5/9 h08 h21 300584 900 wall yes
13 hk5/10 h10 h13/h17 300584 1000
14 hk5/11 h02 h04 300584 1000
15 hk5/12 h08 h06 300584 900 boulder
16 hk5/13 h13 h16 260584 1800 boulder
retaining
17 hk7/1 h17 h13 030784 wall yes
very little rain, good rain
18 hk8/1 h08 h06 040884 1000 building lot no on 9/7/84
retaining
19 hk8/2 h18 h19 100884 1700 wall yes
20 hkB/3 h07 h09 110884 300
no rain 13th, rain on 12
21 hk8/4 h07 h09 130884 900 boulder no ?
22 hk8/5 h09 h18 150884 missing
23 hk9/1 h09 h18 020984 700
24 hk9/2 h13 h22 020984 0
maybe 4/9, 5/9 or 12/9,
25 hk9/3 h16 h06/h13 120984 ? slope creep using 12/9/84
26 hk2/1 h17 h13 060285 1000 const site no little rain
27 hk2/2 h09 h07/h18 070285 building lot no very little rain
28 hk2/3 h12 h13 120285 2300 caused by rain on 10th
29 hk2/4 h17 h22 260285 1000 const site no no rain
30 hk4/1 h18 h19 100485 1800
31 hk4/2 h16 h17 110485 500
32 hk4/3 h05 h08/h21 100485 pm
33 hk4/4 h07 h09 100485 1800
34 hk4/5 h08 h07 100485 1700
35 hk4/6 h17 h22 110485 700
36 hk4/7 h21 h08 110485 ? use 10/4/85
37 hk4/8 h08 h07 110485 ? fallen tree no
... continued
Table E1.1 (continued) Listing of reported landslide failure dates and nearest two rain gauges.
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
fallen gar-
38 hk4/9 h07 h09 110485 ? bage no
retaining
39 hk4/10 h03 h20/h16 130485 wall
40 hk4/11 h09 h07 140485 2300
41 hk4/12 h21 h08 160485 ? use 13/4/85
42 hk4/13 h18 h19 300485 ? no no rain 19or 26?
no rain. best rain
43 hk4/14 h05 h16 150585 ? 19/4/85. use 19th?
flooding,
44 hk5/1 h21 h08 290585 pm building Jot no
45 hk6/1 h09 h07 250685 800
46 hk6/2 h09 h07 250685 1400
47 hk6/3 h13 h16/h17 250685 am
48 hk6/4 h09 h18 250685 am
49 hk6/5 h02 h01 250685 1200
50 hk6/6 h19 h18 250685 100
51 hk6/7 h13 h16/h17 250685
no rain on 16.10.14,
52 hk7/1 h08 h06 160785 no 18 some rain. 30 day >
400
no rain, very little on
53 hk7/2 h19 h18 230785 pm no 20/5
54 hk8/1 h19 h18 010885 no no rain
55 hk8/2 h05 h20 150885 2100
56 hk8/3 h05 h20 190885
57 hk8/4 h20 h05/h03 260885 800
58 hk8/5 h03 h16 260885 800
59 hk8/6 h16 h10/h17 260885 800
60 hk8/7 h16 h17 260885 800
61 hk8/8 h15 h21 260885 700
62 hk8/9 h08 h06/h07 270885 1100
63 hk8/10 h06 h16/h08 270885 1000
64 hk8/11 h20 h05 270885 800
65 hkB/12 h02 h11 270885 800
66 hk8/13 h17 h06/h16 270885 am
could be 26/8, used
67 hk8/14 h03 h20/h16 270885 ? 27/8
68 hkS/15 h15 h21 290885 900
69 hk8/16 h05 h20 290885 900
70 hk8/17 h06 h17/16 290885 1000
71 hk8/18 h05 h20 290885 1100
72 hk9/1 h11 h10 260885
73 hk9/2 h18 h19 060985 100
74 hk9/3 h08 h05 060985 400 fallen tree no some rain
75 hk9/4 hOB h21 060985 900
fallen gar-
76 hk9/5 h02 h04/h11 060985 ? bage no
77 hk9/6 h18 h19 070985 100 caused by 6/9?
78 hk9/7 h02 h11 060985 pm missing
79 hk9/8 h12 h13 060985 1900 missing
80 hk9/9 h18 h19 100985 pm
81- hk9/10 h11 h10 100985 am
82 hk9/11 h14 h19 260885 pm
no rain on 12, may be
83 hk9/12 h09 h07 120985 ? erosion no 6/9/85
no rain. best 10/9.
84 hk9/13 h05 h08/h21 120985 ? 30day 500+, use 10th
85 hk9/14 h01 h03 270985 am no
86 hk10/1 h18 h19 051085 no no rain
very little rain 29/9/85 ?
87 hk10/2 h09 h18 081085 ? no or even eairlier
··-·
no rain 27, rain on 21.
88 hk10/3 h07 h08 270985 ? 24, 20 ->use 20
•.. continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
no rain from 2/10 to
89 hk10/4 h05 h08/h21 1G1085 ? no
16/10. little on 17
90 hk10/5 hOB h06/h07 OG0985 ?
91 hk11/1 h19 h18 061185 ? boulder no 1/10/B5 ?. no rain
retaining no rain from 3/11 to 5hr. 55m
92 hk11/2 h05 hOB/h21 1311B5 ? wall no 20/11 missing
r. wall, no rain, little rain 1, 2, G, 20m mis-
93 hk11/3 h07 h09 111185 ? bldng lot no 21 sing
bust water
94 hk1/1 hOB h21 31018G 1000 main no
no rain 11/12/B5 ->
95 hk2/1 h09 h18 0702BG ? no 21/2/BG
9G hk4/1 h03 h01 210486 900
97 hk4/2 h03 h01 210486 100
98 hk4/3 h21 h15 21048G ? use 21/4/8G
10m mis-
99 hk5/1 h20 h05 110586 pm
sing
retaining- 10m mis-
100 hk5/2 h15 r14 11058G 1800 wall yes
sing
10m mis-
101 hk5/3 h18 h09 11058G erosion no some rain
sing
ma?be 11 or 12/5, use
102 hk5/4 h21 h15 14058G ? 12/ missing
washout
103 hk5/5 h15 r14 220586 am erosion? no
104 hkG/1 h09 h07 050G8G 1100 cons! site no some rain missing
retaining
105 hk6/2 hOG h07 0606BG 1000 wall yes missing
retaining
106 hk6/3 h20 h05 0606BG 1100 wall yes missing
107 hkG/4 h09 h07 060G86 1100 missing
108 hkG/5 h19 h1B OGOGB6 boulder missing
109 hkG/G h09 h18 060G8G 1GOO missing
110 hkG/7 hOG hOB OGOG86 boulder
111 hkG/8 h09 h18 OGOG8G 1600 fallen tree no
112 hk6/9 h19 h14 060G86 am
113 hkG/10 h08 h05 270G86 1500
maybe 25/6/B6, used
114 hk6/11 h02 h04 27068G ? yes 27/6/87
no rain on this day, may
115 hk7/1 h08 h06/h07 300686 ? erosion? no be 29
retaining
116 hk7/2 h03 h06/h05 0407B6 am yes
wall
cracking, good rain 4, rain on 5,
117 hk7/3 h06 h07 090766 ? erosion no 6, 7, 10
118 hk7/4 h03 h05/h20 120766 700
119 hk7/5 h06 h07 120786 1000
120 hk7/6 h17 h16 120766 am
121 hk7/7 h13 h16/h12 120786 am
122 hk7/8 h04 h11 120766 1500 building lot yes
123 hk7/9 h05 h1G 120766 pm
124 hk7/10 h03 h05/h20 120786 am
125 hk7/11 h20 h05 12076G
no rain at this gauge use
126 hk7/12 h08 h05 120766 1900 h05
no rain at this gauge use
127 hk7/13 h08 h21 120766 pm h21
126 hk7/14 h19 h16 12076G 800
retaining
129 hk7/15 h18 h19 130786 600 yes
wall
130 hk7/16 h02 h01 14076G 1800
131 hk7/17 h10 h13 12076G pm
heavy rain 26/6, 317 417.
132 hk7/18 h07 h09 280766 ? no rain 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, missing
20,21,24
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
no move- heavy rain 26/6, 3/7

133 hk7/19 h07 h09 280786 ? ment no 417. rain 14, 16, 17, 18, missing
19,20,21, 24
no move- heavy rain 26/6, 3/7
134 hk7/20 h07 h09 280786 ? ment no 4/7. rain 14, 16, 17, 18, missing
19,20, 21,24
burst water
135 hk8/1 h12 h11/h04 110886 main no
136 hk8/2 h08 h06/h07 140886 const site no no rain, maybe 11/8/86
burst water
137 hk8/3 h12 h11/h04 200886 main no
some
138 hk8/4 h19 h14 210886 1400 missing
some
139 hk8/5 h19 h14 210886 1100 missing
140 hk8/6 h19 h14 220886 ? na no
141 hk8/7 h19 h14 220886 ? na no
142 hk8/8 h19 h14 220886 ? na no caused by rain on 21?
143 hk8/9 h03 h05/h20 240886
144 hk8/10 h20 h05 180886 very little rain
145 hk9/1 h15 r14 050986 1700
146 hk9/2 h20 h05 070986
147 hk9/3 h18 h19 070986 2000
no rain h09, some h07
148 hk9/4 h09 h07 080986 600 use h07
149 hk9/5 h20 h05 040986 1000
no move- some rain in last 30
150 hk9/6 h07 h09 050986 ? ment no days
151 hk9/7 h08 h21 220986 ? very little rain
152 hk10/1 h19 h18 110786
153 hk10/2 h20 h05 101086 ? no no rain, maybe 16/9/86
154 hk10/3 h20 h05 181086 am
155 hk11/1 h18 h19 071186 boulder no no rain
156 hk11/2 h18 h19 151186 600
no move- caused by rain on some
157 hk11/3 h19 h14 131186 ? ment no 11/11185 missing
158 hk12/1 h08 h21 191286 no no rain missing
signs of
159 hk12/2 h18 h19 311286 ? distress no no rain missing
hut col-
160 hk1/1 h05 h20 210187 ? lapse no no rain from 9/1 to 18/2
161 hk211 h18 h19 110287 ? no no rain maybe 4/1/87
retaining
162 hk2/2 h20 h05 160287 ? wall no
163 hk3/1 h18 h19 040387 no no rain
164 hk3/2 h19 h18 090387 ? no no rain 3/12/86
165 hk3/3 h15 h21 160387 pm building lot yes
166 hk3/4 h05 h20 170387 1100
167 hk3/5 h05 h08 120387 900 no no rain
168 hk3/6 h05 h20 170387 800 washout no
cons! site/
169 hk3/7 h08 h07 170387 1500 boulder no very little rain
170 hk3/8 h05 h20 180387 800
hut col-
171 hk3/9 h18 h19 160387 1100 lapse
172 hk3/10 h07 h06 170387 am const site yes
no move-
173 hk3/11 h09 h07 110387 ? ment no no rain
1hr mis-
174 hk3/12 h09 h07 160387 washout no heavy rain sing
retaining 8hr mis-
175 hk3/13 h17 h16 170387 900 wall yes sing
retaining-
176 hk3/14 h14 h19 170387 wall yes
177 hk4/1 h08 h07 060487 100
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
17B hk4/2 h05 h20 0604B7 1BOO
179 hk4/3 h14 h21 0604B7 1BOO
1BO hk4/4 h15 h21 070487 900
181 hk4/5 h09 h07 060487
const site/
182 hk4/6 h04 h02 070487 am boulder yes
complaint 10m mis-
183 hk4/7 h19 h18 140487 ? only 13/4/87? sing
maybe 12/4, used 45m mis-
1B4 hk4/B h14 h21 150487 ? 15/4/87 sing
1B5 hk4/9 h02 h01 140487 am
186 hk5/1 h06 hOB 1605B7 2200
187 hk5/2 h16 h17 140587 ? no no rain this day, 8/5?
1BB hk5/3 h05 h20 2205B7 1600
1B9 hk5/4 hOB h05 2305B7 BOO
190 hk5/5 h19 h1B 220587 1700
-- f--
retaining
191 hk5/6 h19 h1B 2205B7 1800 wall yes
retaining
192 hk5n h05 hOB 2305B7 900 wall yes
193 hk5/B h12 h11 2305B7 am
194 hk5/9 h13 h16/h10 2305B7 am
195 hk5/10 h14 h19 2305B7 am cons! site yes
196 hk5/11 h19 h1B 2205B7 2100
building lot
197 hk5/12 hOB h06 2805B7 ? washout no
19B hkS/13 h15 h21 2205B7 2400
rain on 1/6, some on
199 hk6/1 h14 h19 0206B7 1400 no 216
200 hk6/2 hOB h06 050687 1000 boulder yes missing
201 hk6/3 0506B7 ??
retaining
202 hk6/4 h1B h19 0506B7 1300 wall
203 hk6/5 h15 h21 0506B7 BOO
204 hk6/6 h15 h21 0506B7 500
retaining
205 hk6/7 h20 h05 0606B7 ? wall no most likley 5/6 missing
0406B7 3/~d~y
206 hk6/B h10 h16 ? no may be 27/5/87 m1ss1ng
207 hk619 h16 h10/h13 0806B7 no rain B/6, use 716
20B hk7/1 h05 h20 2507B7 400
retaining 1:30 mis-
209 hk7/2 h14 h19 2807B7 500 wall yes sing
caused by rain on 27.
210 hk7/3 h07 h09 2807B7 100 no failed before rain on 2B
?
211 hk7/4 h21 hOB 2807B7 2200
212 hk7/5 h15 h21 2907B7 2000
213 hk7/6 h20 h05 2907B7 1700
retaining 5m mis-
214 hk7/7 h05 h20 3007B7 900 wall yes sing
215 hk7/B hOB h07 3007B7 600 may be 2B or 29
216 hk7/9 h15 h21 300787 900
217 hk7/10 3007B7 ??
21B hk7/11 h05 h08/h20 3007B7 1300
219 hk7/12 h19 h1B 3007B7 1500
220 hk7/13 h13 h12 2907B7 building lot
221 hk7/14 hOB h21 3007B7 ? may be 2B or 29 use 2B
222 hk7/15 h01 h02 3007B7 1000
lot of rain 30/7, used
223 hk7/16 h02 h01 3107B7 am 31/7
224 hk7/17 h14 h19 2B07B7 ?
rupture wa-
225 hk7/1B h02 h01 3107B7 1100 termain no
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
caused by 29 to 30/7
226 hk8/1 h15 h21 310787 rain, using 31/7
227 hk8/2 h02 h11 310787
complaint no rain,
228 hk8/3 h19 h18 040887 ? only on no maybe
movement 3017187
30m mis-
229 hk8/4 060887 ? cons! site sing
14hr mis-
230 hk8/5 h09 h18 070887 100 ? very little rain sing
231 hk8/6 h21 h15 300787 building lot yes
232 hk8/7 h16 h17 100887 ? no no rain
233 hkB/8 h21 hOB 080887 ? no no rain. 3017187?
234 hk8/9 h17 h22 150887 2200
235 hk8/1 0 h08 h06 210887 1400 building lot no no rain
236 hk8/11 h08 h06 130887 ? no no rain 10 -> 13,
237 hk9/1 h18 h19 010987 ? 31/8/87
hut col-
238 hk9/2 h20 h05 050987 200 lapse no no rain
3hr mis-
239 hk9/3 h19 h18 160987 sing
no rain h17, maybe 22
240 hk9/4 h17 h22 250887 am or 23 use h22
hut col- very little rain, may be 2hr mis-
241 hk9/5 h05 h20 250987 ? lapse no 21/9/87 sing
242 hk10/1 h08 h07 191087 1700 no no rain
243 hk10/2 h17 h16 281087 am building lot
244 hk11/1 h19 h18 061187 am
complaint
245 hk11/2 h14 h19 231187 ? only no
1hr mis-
246 hk1/1 hOB h06 210188 700 no no rain sing
no rain 20/1/88, passed 10m mis-
247 hk1/2 h05 h20 200188 1500 no best 8/87 sing
5:30 mis-
248 hk2/1 h15 h21 080288 ? no no rain
sing
3:45 mis-
249 hk2/2 h18 h19 260288 ? boulder no sing
h07h09/ 45m mis-
250 hk3/1 h08 h07 080388 ? boulder no very little rain sing
251 hk4/1 h18 h19 220488 am
252 hk4/2 h15 h21 210488 ? building lot no very little rain
253 hk5/1 h07 h09 020588 ? building lot no no rain 2/5
very little rain on day be- 10hr mis-
254 hk5/2 h02 h04 140588 ? no fore sing
255 hk6/1 h07 h09 250688 ? boulder no no rain on 25
retaining
256 hk6/2 h19 h18 240688 2200 wall yes
retaining
257 hk6/3 h16 h17 230688 pm wall yes
no rain on 28th ,but on
258 hk6/4 h05 h20 280688 am canst site no 26,27,29
259 hk6/5 h03 h01 260688 ?
washouv 15m mis-
260 hk7/1 h12 h13 050788 1300 burst pipe no sing
261 hk7/2 h18 h19 080788 no no rain
262 hk7/3 h08 h06 190788 ? boulder yes good rain
263 hk7/4 h14 h15 190788 900
264 hk7/5 h19 h14 190788 2100 boulder yes
265 hk7/6 h16 h17 200788 1000
266 hk7/7 h17 h16 200788 1000
267 hk7/8 h14 h15 200788 am
h04/h10
268 hk7/9 h11 /h12 200788 am
269 hk7/10 h08 h07 200788 am boulder yes good rain
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
270 hk7/11 h18 h19 200788 400
271 hk7/12 h13 h10 190788 1400 boulder a lot of rain
272 hk8/1 h12 h13 150888 1400
retaining-
273 hk8/2 h14 h15 130888 1000 wall yes good rain
274 hk8/3 h08 h06 170888 am washout no

275 hk8/4 h05 h20 310888 1200
276 hk9/1 h19 h14 010988 ? use 31/8/88
277 hk9/2 h18 h19 140988 1300 no no rain
10m mis-
278 hk9/3 h08 h07/h06 150988 2300 very little rain sing
retaining no rain for 2 months, 11
279 hk11/1 h07 h06 241188 1200 wall no &12 missing
280 hk12/1 h10 h16 251288 1700 boulder no no rain 2 months missing
281 hkl/1 h12 090189
282 hkl/2 h12 110189
------
seated
283 hk1/3 h05 300189 5m mis-
sing,
284 hk3/1 h15 040389
285 hk3/2 h20 220389
286 hk3/3 h17 h06 310389
287 hk4/2 h03 070489
missing
288 hk4/1 h21 120489 13:05 to
24:00
missing
289 hk5/2 h06 h21 020589 13:05 to
24:00
290 hk5/1 h06 020589
291 hk5/3 h16 h22 020589
292 hk5/4 h18 040589
293 hk5/20 h03 200589
294 hk5/51 h03 200589
295 hk5/13 h01 h04 200589
296 hk5/21 h05 200589
297 hk6/3 h01 200589
298 hk5/61 h11 200589
299 hk5/16 h11 200589
300 hk5/7 h09 200589
301 hk5/8 h09 h06 200589
302 hk5/55 h03 200589
303 hk5/5 h06 200589
304 hk5/6 h07 200589
305 hkS/12 h21 200589
306 hk5/15 h06 h21 200589
307 hk5/40 h06 200589
308 hk5/41 h21 h06 200589
309 hk5/50 h05 200589
310 hk7/3 h06 200589
311 hk5/9 h07 200589
312 hk5/35 h17 200589
313 hk5/39 h16 200589
314 hk5/19 h19 200589
h15
315 hk5/24 ? 200589
316 hk5/34 h13 h22 200589
100%
317 hk5/44 h22 200589 missing
318 hk5/25 h18 200589
319 hk5/42 h18 200589
320 hk5/43 h14 200589
321 hkS/33 h17 200589
322 hk5/32 hOO 210589
•.. contmued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
323 hk5/23 h02 210589
324 hk5/45 h02 210589
325 hk5/46 h02 210589
326 hk5/56 h11 h04 210589
327 hk5/10 h01 210589
32B hk5/26 h01 h05 210589
329 hk5/22 h03 210589
330 hk5/30 h20 210589 100%
missing
331 hk5/47 h16 h03 210589
332 hk5/48 h16 h03 210589
333 hk5/14 h07 210589
334 hk5/31 h21 2105B9
335 hk6/2 h06 210589
336 hk5/1B h19 210589
337 hk5/11 h21 210589
33B hk5/36 h17 210589
-- 100%
339 hk5/38 h22 210589 missing
340 hk5/37 h16 h22 210589
341 hk5/59 hOB h17 2205B9
342 hk5/49 h17 h08 220589
343 h~5/29 h21 2205B9
344 hk5/17 h07 2205B9
345 hk5/2B h16 2205B9
346 hk5/27 h16 220589
347 hk5/53 h02 240589
34B hk5/52 h16 240589
349 hk5/57 h11 h04 260589
350 hk5/62 h01 260589 100%
missing
351 hk5/60 h21 260589
352 hk5/5B h13 260589
353 hk5/54 h14 260589
354 hk5/63 h19 310589
355 hk6/1 h06 010689
356 hk6/4 h19 090689
357 hk6/7 h03 1006B9
35B hk6/5 h21 130689
359 hk6/6 h1B 170689
360 hk6/8 h21 260689
361 hk7/1 h21 070789
362 hk7/2 h05 120789
363 hk8/1 h09 h06 050889
364 hk8/2 h06 310B89
365 hk9/1 h19 010989
366 hk9/2 h05 250989
367 hk10/1 h03 021089
368 hk11/1 h07 2B10B9
369 hk11/2 h07 hOB 101189
370 hk11/3 h11 201189
371 hk11/4 h03 241189
372 hk12/1 h07 2512B9
373 hk2/1 h19 060290
374 hk2/2 h09 230290
375 hk2/3 h06 260290
376 hk3/1 h19 190390
377 hk3/2 h05 190390
37B hk4/2 h07 hOB 090490
379 hk4/1 h17 100490 -·- - -- -
-·~- ---- --·-·-- ·····---- • -•- .-r-
3BO hk4/3 h07 260490

3B1 hk6/1 h06 010690
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
010690 h10 mis-

3B2 hk6/2 h13 h10 sing
3B3 hk6/3 h06 h09 130690
3B4 hk6/5 h21 170690
3B5 hk6/4 h21 190690
3B6 hk6/6 h07 h09 230690
3B7 hk7/1 hOB 230790
3BB hkB/1 h04 030B90
3B9 hk9/1 h16 h20 110990
390 hk9/2 h07 h09 110990
391 hk9/3 hOB 190990
392 hk9/4 h10 200990
393 hk9/5 hOB h05 200990
394 hk10/1 h06 241090
395 hk11/1 h21 h14 301190
396 hk1/1 hOB 020191
397 hk2/1 h17 090291
39B hk2/2 h19 2B0291
399 hk3/1 h01 140391
400 hk3/2 h21 270391
401 hk5/1 h19 010591
402 hk6/5 h02 OB0691
403 hk6/4 h01 OB0691
404 hk6n h01 OB0691
405 hk6/2 h07 OB0691
406 hk6/1 h22 OB0691
407 hk6/3 h16 090691
40B hk6/6 h21 090691
409 hk6/B h17 090691
410 hk6/9 hOB 190691
411 hk6/10 h07 240691
412 hk6/11 h07 h06 260691
413 hk7/1 h19 030791
414 hk7/2 h14 R14 170791
415 hk7/4 h07 230791
416 hk7/3 h07 240791
417 hkBn h1B 140B91
41B hkB/1 h21 150B91
419 hkB/2 h06 150B91
420 hk10/14 h07 150B91
421 hkB/5 h21 150B91
422 hk8/3 hOB 160B91
423 hkB/4 hOB 160B91
424 hk8/6 h15 170B91
425 hk9/1 h06 010991
426 hk9/2 h07 020991
427 hk9/3 h06 170991
42B hk9/4 h07 200991
429 hk10/4 h02 161091
430 hk10/1 h17 161091
431 hk10/3 h09 161091
432 hk10/9 h07 161091
433 hk10/7 h07 161091
434 hk10/2 h19 161091
435 hk10/6 h19 161091
436 hk10/B h17 161091
437 hk10/5 h14 171091 ..
----- '--- . -· ""- -- ··--·· ·--·-- --- -
43B hk10/12 h07 2B1091
439 hk10/13 h07 301091
440 hk12/1 h14 h15 091291
441 hk1/1 h19 050192
.•. continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
442 hk3/1 h19 040392
443 hk3/2 h13 040392
444 hk3/3 h17 090392
445 hk4/9 h22 050492
446 hk4/3 h17 h22 060492
447 hk4/1 h06 060492
448 hk4/2 h06 060492
449 hk4/10 h06 060492
450 hk4/4 h14 060492
451 hk4/7 h07 070492
452 hk4/6 h12 070492
453 hk4/5 070492
454 hk4/8 h19 080492
455 hk4/11 h21 080492
456 hk4/12 h21 080492
457 hk4/13 h21 080492
458 hk4/15 h21 090492
459 hk4/16 h17 090492
460 hk4/14 090492
461 hk4/27 h02 100492
462 hk4/36 h02 100492
463 hk4/29 h01 R17 100492
464 hk4/39 h04 100492
465 hk4/37 h01 R17 100492
466 hk4/40 h01 R17 100492
467 hk4/28 h02 100492
468 hk4/20 h07 100492
469 hk4/30 h07 100492
470 hk4/32 h07 100492
471 hk4/21 h07 100492
472 hk4/43 h21 100492
473 hk4/33 h22 100492
474 hk4/35 h22 100492
475 hk4/19 h17 100492
476 hk4/42 h02 100492
477 hk4/17 h02 110492
478 hk4/22 h02 110492
479 hk4/18 h04 110492
480 hk4/41 h04 110492
481 hk4/24 h17 110492
482 hk4/23 h22 110492
483 hk4/26 110492
484 hk4/25 h07 120492
485 hk4/31 h01 R17 140492
486 hk4/34 h18 160492
487 hk4/38 h19 160492
488 hk4/44 h17 270492
489 hkS/27 h02 080592
490 hkS/28 h02 080592
491 hk5171 h02 080592
492 hkS/93 h02 080592
493 hkS/162 h02 080592
494 hk5/163 h02 080592
495 hkS/203 h02 080592
-- --' .. "-·----- .
496 hk9/1 h02 080592
497 hk9/2 h02 080592
498 hk9/3 h02 080592
499 hk9/4 h02 080592
500 hk9/5 h02 080592
501 hk5/25 h04 080592
502 hk5/29 h01 R17 080592 ~~----'----~~--------
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
503 hk5/30 h01 R17 080592
504 hk5/31 h01 R17 080592
505 hk5/42 h04 080592
506 hk5/46 h04 080592
507 hk5/56 h04 080592
508 hk5/73 h01 R17 080592
509 hk5/76 h11 080592
510 hk5/110 h01 R17 080592
511 hk5/111 h01 R17 080592
512 hk5/156 h04 080592
513 hk5/180 h01 R17 080592
514 hk5/183 h04 080592
515 hk5/187 h01 R17 080592
516 hk5/204 h01 R17 080592
517 hk6/5 h04 080592
518 hk6/6 h04 080592
519 hk6/7 h11 080592
520 hk6/8 h11 080592
521 hk6/9 h04 080592
522 hk6/10 h01 R17 080592
523 hk5/8 h16 080592
524 hk5/35 h16 080592
525 hk5/36 h01 080592
526 hk5/57 h20 080592
527 hk5/72 h01 080592
528 hk5/96 h16 080592
529 hk5/97 h16 080592
530 hkS/98 h16 080592
531 hk5/99 h16 080592
532 hk5/100 h16 080592
533 hkS/101 h16 080592
534 hk5/112 h01 080592
535 hk5/114 h20 080592
536 hk5/122 h20 080592
537 hk5/123 h20 080592
538 hk5/124 h20 080592
539 hk5/126 h16 080592
540 hk5/128 h16 080592
541 hk5/129 h16 080592
542 hk5/130 h16 080592
543 hk5/151 h16 080592
544 hk5/197 h20 080592
545 hk5/198 h16 080592
546 hk5/199 h16 080592
547 hk6/11 h20 080592
548 hk6/14 h10 080592
549 hk6/15 h20 080592
550 hk6/16 h20 080592
551 hk6/44 h01 080592
552 hk7/10 h20 080592
553 hk5/125 h16 080592
554 hk5/127 h16 080592
555 hk5/26 h02 080592
556 hk5/63 h02 080592
557 hk5/179 h11 080592
558 hk5/9 h09 080592
559 hk5/14 h21 080592
560 hk5/43 h21 080592
561 hk5/53 h20 080592
562 hk5/105 h21 080592
563 hk5/131 h20 080592
.•. continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
564 hk5/137 h20 080592
565 hk5/138 h20 080592
566 hk5/139 h20 080592
567 hk5/149 h20 080592
568 hk5/152 h20 080592
569 hk6/2 h20 080592
570 hk6/12 h20 080592
571 hk6/13 h20 080592
572 hk1 0/1 h20 080592
573 hk10/2 h20 080592
574 hk5/33 h17 h22 080592
575 hk5/38 h07 080592
576 hk5/39 h17 h22 080592
577 hk5/67 h17 h22 080592
578 hk5/68 h17 h22 080592
579 hk5/69 h17 h22 080592
580 hk5/118 h07 080592
581 hk5/143 h07 080592
582 hk5/184 h07 080592
583 hk5/194 h22 080592
584 hk5/195 h17 h22 080592
585 hk5/82 h06 080592
586 hk5/83 h06 080592
587 hk5/102 h06 080592
588 hkS/103 h06 080592
589 hk5/205 hOB 080592
590 hk5/4 h06 080592
591 hk5/13 h06 080592
592 hk5/29 h06 080592
593 hk5/50 h06 080592
594 hk5/64 h06 080592
595 hk5/84 h06 080592
596 hk5/104 h06 080592
597 hk5/161 h07 080592
598 hk5/166 h06 080592
599 hk5/181 h06 080592
600 hkS/193 h06 080592
601 hk5/201 h06 080592
602 hk6/24 h06 080592
603 hk5/7 h07 080592
604 hk5/21 h07 080592
605 hk5/54 h18 080592
606 hk5/59 h18 080592
607 hk5/77 h07 080592
608 hk5/92 h18 080592
609 hk5/106 h07 080592
610 hk5/134 h07 080592
611 hk5/178 h18 080592
612 hk6/19 h12 080592
613 hk6/20 h11 080592
614 hk6/21 h11 080592
615 hk5/6 h10 080592
616 hk6/1 h04 080592
617 hk5/120 h11 080592
618 hk5/182 h13 080592
619 hk5/5 h16 080592
620 hk5/75 h17 080592 ------ ----
621 hk5/79 h16 080592
622 hkS/90 h12 080592
623 hk6/23 h17 080592
624 hk6/37 h17 080592
•.. continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
625 hk5/11 h19 080592
626 hk5/17 h19 080592
627 hk5/18 h19 080592
628 hk5/19 h19 080592
629 hk5/40 h19 080592
630 hk5/41 h19 080592
631 hk5/59 h19 080592
632 hk5/91 h19 080592
633 hk5/107 h19 080592
634 hk5/108 h19 080592
635 hk5/109 h19 080592
636 hk5/160 h19 080592
637 hk5/202 h19 080592
638 hk6/12 h19 080592
639 hk6/22 h19 080592
640 hk5/81 h21 080592
641 hk5/140 h21 080592
· - - ----·----
642 hk5/141 h21 080592
643 hk5/1 h17 080592
644 hk5/10 h17 080592
645 hk5/15 h17 080592
--
646 hk5/45 h10 080592
647 hk5/47 h05 080592
648 hk5/48 h05 080592
649 hk5/49 h17 080592
650 hk5/60 h17 080592
651 hk5/74 h10 080592
652 hk5/78 h17 080592
653 hk5/88 h17 080592
654 hk5/89 h05 080592
655 hk5/136 h10 080592
656 hk5/164 h17 080592
657 hk5/165 h17 080592
658 hk6/18 h10 080592
659 hk5/2 h13 080592
660 hk5/3 h22 080592
661 hk5/22 h22 080592
662 hk5/23 h22 080592
663 hk5/24 h16 080592
664 hk5/32 h22 080592
665 hk5/34 h22 080592
666 hk5/44 h22 080592
667 hk5/52 h16 080592
668 hk5/70 h22 080592
669 hkS/189 h22 080592
670 hkS/190 h22 080592
671 hk6/3 h22 080592
672 hk6/4 h22 080592
673 hk6/36 h22 080592
674 hk6/42 h16 080592
675 hk6/45 h22 080592
676 hk5/144 h09 080592
677 hk5/168 h09 080592
678 hkS/169 h09 080592
679 hk5/170 h09 080592
680 hk5/171 h09 080592
681 hk5/172 h09 080592
682 hk5/173 h09 080592
683 hk5/176 h09 080592
684 hk5/20 h14 080592
685 hk5/62 h14 080592
... continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
686 hk5/16 h05 080592
687 hk5/80 h05 080592
688 hk5/119 h05 080592
689 hk5/192 h05 080592
690 hk6/17 h05 080592
691 hk5/5 h05 080592
692 hk5/86 h05 080592
693 hk5/87 h08 080592
694 hk5/95 h08 080592
695 hk5/135 h05 080592
696 hk5/142 h05 080592
697 hkS/148 h15 080592
698 hk5/157 h05 080592
699 hk5/158 h15 080592
700 hk6/25 h05 080592
701 hk5/58 h17 080592
702 hk5/61 h17 080592
--f---.-·
703 hk5/85 h17 080592
704 hk6/47 h17 080592
705 hk5/37 080592
706 hk5/51 080592
707 hk5/55 080592
708 hk5/65 080592
709 hkS/66 080592
710 hk5/113 080592
711 hk5/115 080592
712 hk5/116 080592
713 hk5/117 080592
714 hk5/121 OB0592
715 hkS/150 080592
716 hk5/167 OB0592
717 hk5/174 OB0592
71B hk5/175 OB0592
719 hk5/177 OB0592
720 hkS/200 080592
721 hk5/145 080592
722 hk5/146 OB0592
723 hk5/147 OB0592
724 hk5/191 h01 090592
725 hk5/1B5 h11 090592
726 hk5/1B6 h11 090592
727 hk5/191 h22 090592
72B hkS/154 h22 100592
729 hkS/132 h17 100592
730 hk5/94 h17 110592
731 hk5/133 h22 110592
732 hkS/160 h16 120592
733 hkS/153 h22 120592
734 hk5/155 h16 130592
735 hkS/196 190592
736 hk6/26 h02 110692
737 hk6/27 hOB 110692
73B hk6/43 h16 120692
739 hk6/40 h01 130692
740 hk6/2B h06 130692
741 hk6/38 h06 130692
742 hk6/30 h05 140692
743 hk6/31 hOB 140692
744 hk6/32 h05 140692
745 hk6/41 h17 140692
746 hk6/33 h09 150692
.•• continued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
747 hk6/34 h19 150692
748 hk6/35 h07 160692
749 hk6/39 h07 160692
750 hk6/48 h22 220692
751 hk6/46 h16 250692
752 hk7/1 h20 070792
753 hk7/3 h20 070792
754 hk7/4 h20 070792
755 hk7/6 h07 070792
756 hk7/8 h17 070792
757 hk7/7 h21 070792
758 hk7/5 h08 080792
759 hk7/2 h17 080792
760 hk7/9 h05 110792
761 hk7/14 h07 170792
762 hk7/13 h02 180792
763 hk7/16 h01 180792
764 hk7/11 h07 180792
765 hk7/15 h06 180792
766 hk7/12 h15 180792
767 hk8/1 h17 h22 220792
768 hk8/4 h07 220792
769 hk7/18 h07 220792
770 hk7/17 h02 280792
771 hk8/3 h20 280792
772 hk8/2 h17 h22 060892
773 hk9/6 h06 240992
774 hk9/7 h09 260992
775 hk9/9 h16 280992
776 hk9/8 h07 280992
777 hk10/3 h08 181092
778 hk11 /1 h21 161192
779 hk11/2 h07 171192
780 hk11/3 h05 281192
rupture
781 hk2/1 h22 h17 100293 400 main no
782 hk212 h17 h22 270193 no no rain
no rain, rained on 22,
783 hk4/1 h06 h22/h17 220493 1550 no rain 21, no rain other
gauges
784 hk5/1 h09 h07 040593 am little rain
785 hkS/2 h08 h07 090593 fallen tree, no modest rain
786 hk5/3 h17 h22 070593 am no no rain, maybe 1or2/5
787 hk5/4 h21 h08 260593 ?
788 hk5/5 h17 h16 250593
very little rain 25, 26,
789 hkS/6 h01 h02 260593 boulder no some 24
790 hk6/1 h07 h09 240593 1300
791 hk6/2 h19 h18 230493 no no rain 20 or 21/4 ?
rup~ure
792 hk6/3 h21 h08 020693 150 mam no
rupture
793 hk6/4 h08 h21 040693 main no
794 hk6/5 h09 h07 020693 rock fall no little rain
795 hk6/6 h12 h10 090693 ? washout no very little rain
796 hk6/7 h07 h09 020693 am boulder
no rain, maybe rain
10/11 caused failure,
797 hk6/8 h08 h07 120693 am good rain elsewhere,
use 11/6
798 hk6/9 h14 h19 160693 1100
799 hk6/10 h14 h15 160693 1100
800 hk6/11 h09 h07 160693 boulder very good rain
... conttnued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
801 hk6/12 h16 h05 160693 washout no
802 hk6/13 h21 h15/hOB 160693 1230
803 hk6/14 h15 h14 160693 1400
B04 hk6/15 h15 h14 160693 washout no
805 hk6/16 h09 h07 170693 ? washout no most likly 16/6
806 hk6/17 h15 h21 170693
B07 hk6/1B h15 h14 160693
808 hk6/19 h21 h08 160693 1200 washout no
B09 hk6/20 h10 h12 160693 440
retaining
B10 hk6/21 h21 h08 160693 1615 wall
811 hk6/22 h14 h19 160693 rock fall
812 hk6/23 h14 h19 160693
813 hk6/24 h14 h19 160693
814 hk6/25 h19 h1B 160693 washout no lots of rain
B15 hk6/26 h20 h05 170693 1645 rock fall
B16 hk6/27 h06 hOB/h05 170693 1BOO - ~
----
- ·~~--
no rain h10. h111inle

817 hk6/2B h10 h11 1B0693 no rain. caused by 16/6/93
?
81B hk6/29 h10 h12 170693 washout no result of rain on 16/6
B19 hk6/30 h02 h01 150693 1400 washout no good rain
820 hk6/31 h21 hOB/h15 160693
821 hk7/1 h15 h14 160693
B22 hk8/1 h07 h08 160693 washout no lots of rain
823 hkB/2 h16 h13 060893 ? boulder no no rain 3/8 or 2/B/93
B24 hkB/3 h08 h06 130B93 700 boulder
825 hk8/4 hOB h07 270B93 no no rain from 23/B to 1/9
B26 hkB/5 h15 h14 010893 ?? 1/B -> 31/B using 9/B/93
wall, no
827 hk9/1 h06 h07 170993 am geotech no
concern
82B hk9/2 h06 h22/h17 170993 rock fall
829 hk9/3 h03 h01 250993 800
B30 hk9/4 h21 hOB 260993 2300
B31 hk9/5 hOB h06 260993
B32 hk9/6 h20 h5 260993 1730
833 hk9/7 h21 h15/hOB 260993 1B30 washout no
834 hk9/8 h21 h08 260993 1200 washout no
835 hk9/9 hOB h06 260993 2000 canst site
836 hk9/10 h08 h07 270993
837 hk9/11 h14 h19 270993 used 26/9
B38 hk9/12 h14 h19 270993
839 hk9/13 h14 h19 270993 ? 2619 maybe
840 hk9/14 h08 h07/h06 260993
841 hk9/15 h07 h06 270993 BOO
842 hk9/16 h09 h1B 250993
843 hk9/17 h07 h08 150993 washout no
844 hk9/18 h18 h09 270993
B45 hk9/19 h06 h22/h17 260993 ?
B46 hk9/20 h21 h08 260993
B47 hk9/21 h21 h08 260993
B4B hk9/22 h21 hOB 260993
849 hk9/23 h15 h21 260993
B50 hk9/24 h16 h10/h13 270993 930
851 hk9/25 h21 h08 260993 900 washout no
B52 hk9/26 h21 hOB 270993 rock fall
853 hk9/27 h17 h22 260993
B54 hk9/2B h16 h17 260993 1B45
855 hk9/2B h16 h17 260993 2300
856 hk9/29 h03 h01 260993 1000
B57 hk9/30 h16 h05 270993 am
... contmued
Rain Gauge Missing
1 2 Values
rupture
B5B hk9/31 h07 h06 240993 ? main no
B59 hk9/32 h06 h07 260993
no rain most likly
B60 hk9/33 hOB h21 2B0993 ? 26/9/93
no rain most likly
B61 hk9/34 hOB h05 2B0993 ? 26/9/93
B62 hk9/35 h05 h20 260993 pm
B63 hk9/36 h17 h13 260993 pm washout no
B64 hk9/37 h16 h17 260993 2100
865 hk9/3B h03 h01 270993 am
866 hk9/39 h21 hOB 260993
867 hk9/40 h21 h08/h15 260993
868 hk9/41 h17 h16 260993
869 hk9/42 h19 h1B 260993 26/9/93
B70 hk9/43 h06 h17 260993
871 hk10/1 h12 h13 041093 ? 26 or 2719 ? use 27
B72 hk1 0/2 h10 h12 270993 am
B73 hk10/3 h16 h05 260993 2300
B74 hk10/4 h05 h03/h16 260993 am washout no
B75 hk10/5 h07 h09 131093
876 hk10/6 h15 h21 131093
B77 hk10/7 h21 hOB 131093 2400
87B hk10/B h15 h21 260993 rock fall
879 hk11/1 h21 hOB 260993 washout no
880 hk12/1 h17 h22 010993 ?? washout no no rain 22/B?
APPENDIX E2
PRELIMINARY EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
E2.1 Description of Preliminary Analyses

The author's preliminary analyses focused on landslide incidents with
known dates and times of failure, and known nearest two rain gauges in the
1989-92 study period. There were 110 incidents in this data subset. A rainfall
record at the nearest rain gauge for 30 days calendar days before the reported
day offailure, and rainfall data up to the time offailure on the day of failure (at 5
minute intervals) was established for each of the 110 incidents. The cumulative
rainfall over the 30 days preceding their specific failure times was firstly plotted
(based on the 5 minute rain data) to check for any incidents that may not have
been caused by rainfall(ie a "flat line" plot). The plots can be seen in Figures
E2.1 to E2.4. It was found that 22 incidents had "flat lines", and a check in the
annual reports confirmed that they were due to other causes such as burst
mains, construction, fallen trees, and so on. Hence these 22 incidents were
removed from further analysis.
The remaining 88 incidents were analysed for threshold values of rainfall
as detailed in Appendix E4. It was found that the reported failure times were not
very accurate, and hence an additional2 days of rain record were added past the
reported failure date. Hence if the failure took place on 8 May 1992 at 1400 hrs,
the record included 30 days prior to this date and continued until midnight on 10
May 1992. The incidents, the nearest rain gauge, start and end dates for the
plots, as well as failure times and volumes are listed in Table E2.1.
Table E2.1 List of landslide incidents used in the author's preliminary analyses.
19B9
Nearest Start End Failure Volume
Incident (m3)
Gauge Date Date Time
HK B9/3/1 H21 1/2 4/3 1000 10
3/2 H05 19/2 22/3 1400 45
4/1 H15 9/3 12/4 0100 300
4/2 H05 4/3 714 0500 0.5
5/2 HOB 29/3 2/5 1400 17.5
5/3 H17 29/3 2/5 1200 2
5/5 HOB 17/4 20/5 2200 30
5/7 H07 17/4 20/5 1600 10
... continued
Table E2.1 (continued) List of landslide incidents used in

the author's preliminary analyses.
1989 continued
Incident (m3)
Gauge Date Date Time
5/9 H09 17/4 20/5 2100 10
5/10 H03 18/4 21/5 0300 45
5/11 H15 18/4 21/5 0200 30
5/12 H08 17/4 20/5 0900 20
5/15 H08 17/4 20/5 2200 1
5/18 H14 18/4 21/5 0100 550
5/22 H05 18/4 21/5 1000 36
5/27 H17 19/4 22/5 1500 20
5/29 H08 19/4 22/5 0800 3
5/30 H05 18/4 21/5 0600 4
5/35 H13 17/4 20/5 1900 6
5/38 H17 18/4 21/5 0100 80
5/39 H13 17/4 20/5 0900 6
5/42 H19 17/4 20/5 2100 0.5
5/43 H19 17/4 20/5 2300 20
5/48 H08 18/4 21/5 0700 1
5/50 H08 17/4 20/5 1500 5
5/51 H01 17/4 20/5 2100 15
5/59 H06 19/4 22/5 0100 10
8/2 H08 28/7 31/8 1300 6
11/4 H01 21/10 24/11 1300 5
12/1 H09 22/11 25/12 2400 9
1990
Incident
Gauge Date Date Time (m3)
HK 90/2/2 H07 20/1 23/2 0200 5.5
4/1 H13 713 10/4 1100 3
4/3 H06 23/3 26/4 1340 360
6/4 HOB 16/5 19/6 0900 0.3
6/5 H08 14/5 17/6 1100 2
9/5 H21 17/8 20/9 0300 1
10/1 H07 21/9 24/10 1800 5.5
11/1 H15 27/10 30/11 0930 0.2
1991
Incident
HK 91/3/2 H15 24/2 27/3 0030 150
6/7 H03 5/5 8/6 2400 3
6/9 H21 16/5 19/6 2400 1
7/3 H09 21/6 24/7 0600 3
8/3 H21 13/7 16/8 0930 35
... continued
-
Table E2.1 (continued) List of landslide incidents used in
B/4 H21 13/7 16/8 1230 2
BIG H21 14/7 17/8 1430 3
9/1 HOB 28/7 1/9 1125 5
10/4 H01 13/9 16/10 2030 5
10/B H22 13/9 16/10 2130 0.1
10/13 HOG 27/9 30/10 1500 5
1992
Incident Nearest Start End Failure Volume
HK 92/3/1 H14 1/2 4/3 0500 17
3/3 H22 6/2 9/3 1830
4/1 HOB 313 6/4 1000 1
4/2 HOB 3/3 6/4 1400 35
4/3 HOG 3/3 6/4 0430
4/4 H15 3/3 6/4 1800 40
4/G H13 4/3 7/4 0715 4
4/B H14 5/3 8/4 0230 4
4/9 H17 2/3 5/4 1500 11
4/10 HOB 3/3 6/4 0600 25
4/11 H15 5/3 8/4 1400 8
4/12 H15 5/3 8/4 0745 2
4/15 H15 613 9/4 2130 5
4/17 H01 8/3 11/4 0700 10
4/1B H02 8/3 11/4 0700 5
4/19 H22 7/3 10/4 2125 4
4/20 HOG 7/3 10/4 2400 2
4/22 H01 8/3 11/4 1000 5
4/27 H01 7/3 10/4 2100 7
412B H04 7/3 10/4 2030 1
4/29 H02 713 10/4 2000 7
4/30 HOG 7/3 10/4 2400 40
4/33 H17 7/3 10/4 2400 2
5/42 H02 5/4 8/5 0640 45
5/2 H17 5/4 8/5 0700 2
5/4 HOB 5/4 8/5 0700 2
5/3G H03 5/4 8/5 0700 22.5
5/G H11 5/4 8/5 0730 40
5/9 H05 5/4 8/5 0745 16
5/3 H17 5/4 8/5 0800 8
5/139 H05 5/4 8/5 0800 30
5/3B HOG 5/4 8/5 0810 500
5/104 HOB 5/4 815 0930 120
5/50 HOB 5/4 8/5 1000 100
5/1 H1G 5/4 8/5 1200 42
5/142 H21 5/4 8/5 1200 0.3
... continued
Table E2.1 (continued) List of landslide incidents used In

1992 continued
5/53 H05 5/4 8/5 1215 4
5/8G H21 5/4 8/5 1330 0.8
5/G7 HOG 5/4 8/5 1400 40
5/104 HOB 5/4 8/5 1430 120
5/5G H02 5/4 8/5 1500 1
5/59 H14 5/4 8/5 1500 100
5/59 H09 5/4 8/5 1500 100
5/139 HOS 5/4 8/5 1500 30
5/8 H03 5/4 8/5 1520 3500
5/15 H1G 5/4 8/5 1530 50
5/25 H02 5/4 8/5 1600 3
5/35 H03 5/4 8/5 1600 7.5
51184 HOG 5/4 8/58/5 1945 7
5/70 H17 5/4 8/5 2335 55
5/43 HOS 5/4 8/5 2400 50
G/24 HOB 5/4 8/5 1000 15
6/30 H21 10/5 13/6 1200 1
G/31 H21 10/5 13/6 1215 1
6/32 H21 10/5 13/6 1530 25
G/33 HOS 10/5 13/6 1000 50
7/11 H08 15/6 18/7 1000 1
7/15 H08 15/6 18/7 1500 4
10/3 H21 15/9 18/10 2130 45
11/1 H08 13/10 16/11 2400 2
11/3 H21 25/10 28/11 0700 3
Figure E2.5 shows box plots of all the 88 incidents versus rainfall values for
all the variables. The boxes bound 50% of the data, with the mean in the middle.
The top and bottom lines indicate maximum and minimum values. Note that
the 7, 15 and 30 day values were calculated over 10, 18 and 30 days prior to the
end of the incident rain record. Note that Figure E2.5 data includes 48 incidents
from large rainfall events. These incidents were caused by two large rainfall
events on 19-22 May 1989 and 8 May 1992 (hereafter referred to as the 89, 92
events), and these bias the overall sample if left untreated.
~00
800
700
E
E
_J 600
_J
i1:
z
<(
a:
w
~ 500
~
::J
~
::J
()
400
300
200
100
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 15000 7000 8000 ~000 10000
TIME (minutes)
incidents with known failure time and nearest rain gauge.
E
E
~
_J
_J
Lf
z
<(
a: 300
w
>
~
_J
=>
~
::J
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
TIME (minutes)
Figure E2.2 1990 cumulative rainfaJJ data for 30 days preceding failure for
!incidents with known failure time and nearest rain gauge.
E'
~
E
_J
_J
Lt.
z 300
<(
a:
w
>
~
::J
:::2
::J
()
200
o 1ooo 2000 3ooo 4ooo sooo 6ooo 7ooo eooo 9ooo 10000
TIME (minutes)
600
E
E
_J
_J
~ 500
z
<(
a:
w
>
~
:::> 400
::2:
::J
()
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
TIME (minutes)
1000
900
BOO
-, TT
700
eoo I
500
400
300
200
100
0
N• 8& 8& aa 8& 8& 8& ~ 8& M 8& 8& 8& M 8& 8& 8&
MS 6 H1_6 H12 6 0J_6 07_18 015_10 015 32 030 18
M15_8 H3_e - H24_e 01_10 07_32 015_18 - OJO_to - 030_32
Figure E2.5 Box plot of rainfall data for all 88 incidents with dates, times and
nearest rain gauges.
When the incidents from large rainfall events and the remaining incidents
were plotted separately, the maximum, mean and minimum values were larger
for the incidents from the 89, 92 events These are plots are shown in Figures
E2.6 to E2.8. In order to obtain realistic thresholds for the prediction of any
slides occurring the large 89, 92 event incidents had to be excluded from the
data. Figure E2.6 contains incidents without the large events.
1000
9001
800 I
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
No ~0 ~0 ~0 40 40 40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
M5 HI H12 07_10 07 32 015 18 030 10 030 32

MIS HJ 07_11 - 015_10 - 015_32 - 030 18 -
incidents. There are 40 incidents in this subset.
':1
700 ~
0 0 0
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
N• 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
J.t5 H1 H12 07_10 07 32 015_11 030_10 030_32
M15 H3 H24 07_11 - 015 10 015_32 030_11
Figure E2.7 Box plot of rainfall data for the 89 event incidents. There are 19
incidents in this subset.
1000
900
'i
BOO
700 oe ae oa
600
~~I=:::J
500
400
_it _ru_ 4_ ~ r-$ _at ~20 ~20 ~20
300
A~ *22 *22 *22
*20
*22 *22 *22
·-·
0 0 *20 *20 *20 *20
....¢!. *20 *20
200
Q20
,f;~).
100
~
0 ---""--
N• 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 211 29 29 29
M5 H1 H12 07_10 07_32 015_18 030_10 030_32
M15 H3 H24 07_18 015 10 015_32 030_18
Figure E2.8 Box plot of rainfall data for the 92 event incidents. There are 29
incidents in this subset.
From Figures E2.6 to E2.8 it is clear that the data for the 7, 15 and 30 day
periods over the 10, 18 and 30 days preceding failure is very similar if not the
same. Hence these variables were not differentiated in subsequent analyses.
The 40 incidents in Figure E2.6 excluding the large 89, 92 event incidents
were statistically analysed for the minimum, 10 and 25 percentile values. It was
found that 5 minute maximum rainfall values were often zero and thus not
useful for prediction. The values for all variables except forMS are listed in
Table E2.2.
Table E2.2 Threshold values derived from 40 incidents with known dates, times
and nearest gauges.
Rainfall values (mm)

Variable for percentiles
0 10 25
M15 7.0 9.6 12.6
H1 17.0 26.0 28.5
H3 29.5 34.0 50.1
H12 59.0 68.5 75.4
H24 84.5 85.2 103.1
D3 88.0 129.5 142,0
D7 126.0 132.5 197.5
D15 149.0 175.7 227.1
D30 205.0 218.3 251.8
Following the establishment of the threshold values the next step of

calibrating them against the full four year record could begin. The entire
1989-92 four year rain record was extracted at 5 minute intervals for each
gauge. The record was then scanned, initially to see the type of rainfall patterns
occurring. It became clear that a large number of records were zero, ie that
definite rainfall events occurred, with no rain (often for long periods) between
the rainfall events. It became necessary to define a rainfall event, and then to
establish a database of landslide incidents with known dates of failure and
nearest rain gauge locations in order to determine whether particular rainfall
events actually caused sliding or not. This led to Stage II of the work, described
in section 8.2. 7.1 of the main body of the thesis.
APPENDIX E3
FLOW CHART OF STUDY METHOD IDENTIFYING
DATA STREAMS, ANALYSES AND OUTPUTS
Key to types of databases generated during the study:
I Landslide incident database (from annual reports and maps)
R Rainfall database (from rainfall raw data)
CD Combined rainfall event and landslide incident database
SD Storm database
STAGE I ;~
(1> (t
OUTPUT
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS
...."' ...........
~
.... ...................~~
...-...................~
~
LANDSLIDE INCIDENTS RAINFALL DATA
' ;>;"'Tj
~ [
"' :<~
~
a "0
"' ::r
_<S?
Identify landslide incidents with
g t:1
;;''2
'""Z
~C/l
.g
(1>
~
......,
known failure dates and times.

"'
11
Identify their closest and second
closest rain gauge.
•
Produce 32 days of record at 5
minute intervals for each incident in +-----------, R1
11.
•
For incidents in 11 produce graphs of
cumulative rainfall for 30 days
Graphs 1
preceding and 2 days following
failure.
+
Check failure causes of incidents in
11, discard those not caused by 12
Figure E3.1
rainfall.
Flowchart of study methods identifying data

'
For incidents in 12 produce graphs of
cumulative rainfall for 30 days
preceding and 2 days following
Graphs 2
failure. -...)
streams, analyses and outputs. 00
VI
STAGE II ~~
0> (D
.. --
DATA STREAMS
r . .....................~~... ....................~
.
ANALYSIS OUTPUT :;d ..,
"' .
-· '-<
~'"11
~§.:
RAINFALL DATA COMBINED DATABASES "' Pol
'<
"'0> ~
"' '"0
3 ::r
g..... ,........
t::i
0 c
... z
~(/)
.g0> ~
'-"
Compute rainfall variable values for "'

A2
incidents in 12
Produce databas·e of rainfall events
combined with landslide incidents CD1
from 12 and R1
Subset CD1 incidents caused by

C02
the 89 storm
Subset CD1 incidents caused by

CD3
the 92 storm
Subset CD1 incidents not caused

CD4
by the 89 and 92 storms
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study methods identifying Statistical analyses of CD1-CD4 for Threshold
data streams, analyses and outputs. rainfall thresholds causing landsliding Set 1 -..)
00
0\
STAGE Ill ;1~
(1) (t
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT
-·"' .
::0 ...,
::>;'"Tj
.......
~§.:
"' Ill
~ ':;<:
LANDSLIDE INCIDENTS RAINFALL DATA COMBINED DATABASES
s"' '"1:;::;"
g t:J
.... "'""'
c:::
,. . , z
0
~en
.g
(1)'-'
~
"'
Identify landslide incidents
with known failure date.
13
Identify their closest and
second closest rain gauge.
Extract S minute record for

R3
H01-H22.
Compile running values for all

rainfall variables for H01-H22. R4
Produce files of rainfall events

R5
for H01-H22.
Produce comoined database
CDS
from 13 and AS.
Apply Threshold Set 1 to CDS,
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study methods identifying maximise prediction of dates Results Set 1
on which landslides occur. -.]
data streams, analyses and outputs. 00
-.]
STAGE IV ;1~
........
CD 0
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT :;o
..........
'"1
r ......~~~.
C/l •
~ ~
X"'Tj
' ~ [
C/l Ill
~ ~
COMBINED DATABASES C/l '"d
3 ::r'
g tJ
;;-e
... z
~(/)
"
.g
CD...._,_
~
,, C/l
l Check failure causes of incidents in CDS, discard those 1

CD6
not caused by rainfall. I
lr
Apply Threshold Set 1 to CD6, maximise prediction of

Result Set 2
dates on which landslides occur. I
,,
From CDS produce database with single landslide
I CD7
l incidents per gauge per date. I
'
Statistical analysis of CD? for rainfall thresholds causing Threshold
landsliding. Set 2
F igure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study methods r

. - ... _ .. - - -
Apply Threshold Set 2 to CD?, maximise prediction of
Results Set 2
dates on which landslides occur. -...)
00
00
STAGE V ~~
~ Cb
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT ~ .....
"':>;" .'-<
-·
'Tj
> s·
"'-
1 :20,000 MAPS OF HONG KONG ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF FEATURES "' llJ
"'"' '<
~
~
3 '"d ;:r
g C1
;-c
...., z
~Vl
0 ~
Plot locations of rain gauges on ~'--'
M1
Hong Kong Island on relevant maps
"'
Determine boundaries of areas Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study

covered by each gauge. Subdivide
methods identifying data M2
Hong Kong Island into zones of
streams, analyses and outputs.
different development intensity.
Find the area of each zone per

Zone areas
gauge per 1 :5,,000 area map.
Estimate the relative density of Relative densities of

features in each zone. features
Calculate the equivalent areas

Equivalent areas
containina features.
Estimate numbers of features in

Map features
each 1:5,00.0 map area.
Estimate the number of features per Number of features
gauge per gauge -....!
00
\0
STAGE V (continued) ~~
0 (t
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT ::0 ....
..... '-<
"'?>'"rj
.
~ [
COMBINED DATABASES ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF FEATURES "'"' '<~'"'
0
a ::r-
"' 'i:l
?
Estimate the number of features per Number of features g.... ,........,
tJ
gauge per gauge 0 c:::
....,z
~(/J
0 ~
I Subset CD6 for 8r storm incidents. l CD 8 ~---

"'
Subset CD6 for 92 morning

CD 9
downpour incidents.
Subset CD6 for 92 afternoon

I downpour incidents.
CD 10
Pool CD 8 and CD 10. CD 11
i :
: Pool CD 8 and CD 9.
w CD 12
Calculate the proportions of failed Failed slope

slopes for CD 8 -CD 12 . proportions
•
Conduct statistical analyses of
CD 8 -CD 12 to obtain the best
predictor of the proportion of failed
Result
Set 4
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study methods identifying slopes given a particular rainfall
data streams, analyses and outputs. event. -.I

1.0
0
STAGE VI ;2~
(\) ~
RAINFALL DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT ::d
............ ..... ...........
"';:>;"" .'Tj
'
~--
~ [
Jan 89-Dec 92 Jan 93-Jun 94 Jun 83-Dec 88 "'
(\) ll)
'<
"' ~
sg
"'
tJ
'1:i
::r
.... ,-....
~- Convert R data from
0
. . c:::z
.~C/)
R6 .g ~
ASCII to binary format. (1)'--'
Extract 5 minute record for

"'
H01-H22, R14,convertto R7
binary format. I
.t
Extract 5 mtnute record for
H01-H22, R14, in binary I R8
format.
C '
Combine R6-R8 to form one continuous file.
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study methods identifying

data streams, analyses and outputs.
STAGE VII >-3 ~
P" .....
(1) (1)
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT :::0 ....
...... '-<
"';>;"'"rj
.
84-88, 93 LANDSLIDE
RAINFALL DATA COMBINED DATABASES '~
"'
'< j:>)
INCIDENTS "'"'(1) ~
a '"d
::r
g 0
(;'2
,....,z
~Ul
.g
(1)
~
'--"
"'
with known failure date.
14
Identify their closest and
second closest rain gauge.
From R9 compile running

values for all rainfall variables R10
for H01-H22, R14.
Produce files of rainfall events

R11
for H01-H22, R14.
Produce comoined database

Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study CD13
from 13 and RS.
methods identifying data
streams, analyses and outputs. -.)
\0
N
STAGE VII (continued) ~~
(1) (t
:;d ....
.....
(ll
......
•
:;>\'Tj
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS OUTPUT ~ §:
i:l)
(ll
(1)
(ll
'<:
v
"::!
a
(ll
::r
84-88, 93 LANDSLIDE
RAINFALL DATA COMBINED DATABASES
g 0
,_ ..........
INCIDENTS 0 c:::
... z
~(/J
0 ~
]'-'
•
Produce comt:iined database
CD13
(ll
from 13 and R5 .
•
Check failure causes of
incidents in CD13, discard CD14
those not caused by rainfall.
From CD14 produce database

with single landslide incidents CD15
per gauge.
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study •

Statistical analysis of CD15 for
methods identifying data ---.... rainfall thresholds causing Threshold Set 3
streams, analyses and outputs. landsliding. -..1
ID
VJ
STAGE VIII ~ri'
OUTPUT
Cl> ct
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS ~
.....
....
'-<
"' .
~'Tj
COMBINED DATABASES ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF FEATURES

Ft[
"'~ ~
~
"' '"d
Number of features
3 =::""
START Estimate the number of features g...... 0
.--...
per gauge per gauge 0 c
-z
~(/l
•
Subset CD14 for storm incident set 1. CD16
0
]---
~
I Subset CD14 for storm incident set 2. I

I
CD17
't
[Subset CD14 for s\orm incident set N. I COM
w
I Pool relevant COs. l cox
w
Calculate the proportions of Failed slope
failed slopes . proportions
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study

•
Conduct statistical analyses to
obtain the best predictor of the Result
methods identifying data proportion of failed slopes given a Set 6
-..)
streams, analyses and outputs. particular rainfall event. \0
""'"
STAGE IX ~~
~ 0
OUTPUT
DATA STREAMS ANALYSIS
-·
::0 .....
"' ......
.
~'"rj
1984-93 ANNUAL REPORTS COMBINED DATABASES ~ 2:

"'
~ PJ
'<
"' ~
g 'tJ""
"'3
START ::r
c;-c
....,z
~(IJ
w .g ~
Extract the longest duration rain ~'-'
Extract storm events "'
events corresponding to the storm S01
for each year.
events.
'
Check remainin·g rain events to
ensure no major storm events have
been left out.

Result
.... calculate the predicted landslide
numbers on a gauge by gauge Set 7
basis.
It
Compute base siatistics for storm
... events, spatially incorporating all S02
rain gauges .
Figure E3.1(continued) Flowchart of study

..
Result
methods identifying data predict landslide numbers based on
Set 8
streams, analyses and outputs. spatially combined data. -...1
\0
Vl
APPENDIX E4
RAINFALL THRESHOLD VALUES
E4.1 Threshold Sets for the 1989-92 Study Period

The study method used to obtain the threshold sets is detailed in Appendix
E3. Threshold Sets 1, 2 and 3 are listed in Tables E4.1 to E4.4 below. Table E4.1
contains Threshold Set 1 with threshold values derived from 40 incidents with
known dates, times and nearest gauges in 1988-92. Table E4.2 contains
thresholds derived for all rainfall events having an individual landslide incident
reported on the event date in 1989-92. There are 569 such events in the entire
1989-92 study period. These threshold values are not representative as a
number of rainfall events occur on any landslide incident date, hence the data is
significantly biased towards the low values. Table E4.3 contains Threshold Set 2
with thresholds derived for rainfall events with the longest duration on any one
date having only one landslide reported on that date. There are 91 such events in
the 1989-92 study period. These thresholds are considered to be the most
representative for the 1989-92 study period. Table E4.4 contains thresholds
derived for rainfall events with the longest duration on any one date having one
landslide reported on that date for the 1984-93 study period for comparison. It
can be seen that these are similar to threshold sets 1 and 2.

Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived from 40 incidents with known
dates, times and nearest gauges (1989-92 study period).
Rainfall values (mm)
Variable for percentiles
0 10 25
M15 7.0 9.6 12.6
H1 17.0 26.0 28.5
H3 29.5 34.0 50.1
H12 59.0 68.5 75.4
H24 84.5 85.2 103.1
D3 88.0 129.5 142,0
D7 126.0 132.5 197.5
D15 149.0 175.7 227.1
D30 205.0 218.3 251.8
Table E4.2 Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for all rainfall events having an
individual landslide incident reported on the event date (1989-92
study period).

Variable
0 10 25 50 75 100
M15 0.5 0.5 2.5 7 13 26.5
H1 0.5 0.5 5.5 12 27.5 79
H3 0.5 1 9.5 19 38 120
H12 0.5 5.5 14 35 82 278.5
H24 0.5 8.5 26.5 65.5 117.5 360.5
03 7.5 38 65.5 121.5 204.5 416
07 13.5 56.5 92 159 285.5 440
015 17 102 141 196.5 356.5 491.5
030 17 138.5 190 295.5 465.5 751

Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for rainfall events of the longest
duration having only one landslide reported on that date (1989-92
study period).

Variable
0 10 25 50 75 100
M15 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 26.5
H1 0.5 0.5 1 2 6 79
H3 0.5 0.5 1.5 6 17 120
H12 0.5 2.5 9.5 24.5 41 278.5
H24 0.5 7 21 41 86 360.5
03 0.5 24 52 106.5 170 434
07 0.5 43.5 80.5 152 224.5 440.5
015 5 63 127 182.5 281.5 492.5
030 16.5 119.5 190 270.5 375.5 751

Threshold rainfall (in mm) derived for rainfall events of the longest
duration having more than one landslide reported on that date
(1984-93 study period).

VAR
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
M15 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.5 6.5 8.5 10.5 13.0 16.0 21.0 40.5
H1 0.5 2.0 5.0 9.7 15.0 18.5 23.0 29.0 37.0 50.5 80.0
H3 0.5 2.5 9.0 17.2 24.2 33.0 41.3 50.4 62.4 84.0 136.5
H12 0.5 5.1 17.1 30.5 43.2 52.0 64.8 79.9 93.7 127.5 366.0
H24 0.5 7.1 30.5 48.5 68.6 90.0 107.0 126.4 149.8 188.2 367.0
03 0.5 30.6 53.5 82.5 107.7 131.0 149.5 181.5 206.5 246.9 526.0
07 1.0 52.9 86.6 121.5 147.9 170.8 195.1 226.9 260.4 359.0 601.5
015 16.5 94.4 156.1 182.3 212.2 241.3 277.2 312.9 384.5 439.9 745.0
030 22.0 151.2 206.5. 266.0 310.1 368.8 423.2 483.0 539.7 625.9 764.0
E4.2 Selection of Threshold Values

The threshold values for rainfall variables trialed were selected from the
statistical percentile values of the threshold database. Their sources are listed
in Table E4.5. The values are shown in Table E4.6. They are:
T1 Minimum values from initial threshold database of 40 incidents with
known failure times and dates (Threshold Set 1),
T2 Threshold values derived by the optimisation procedure run on the
unedited date database (included in Threshold Set 1),
incidents (Threshold Set 2),
incidents (Threshold Set 2), and
incidents (Threshold Set 2).
Table E4.5 Sources of Threshold Values.
Source Source
Threshold
Threshold Incidents Percentiles
Values
Set Sets
T1 1 12 0
T2 1 CDS Optimised 1
T3 2 CD? 25
T4 2 CD? 50
TS 2 CD? 75
Notes: Values derived by the opLimisaLion procedure run
on Lhe unediLed daLe daLabase.
I Incident database
CD Combined database
Table E4.6 Trial rainfall values used in thresholds.
Threshold Rainfall (mm)

Rainfall
Set 1 Set 2
Variable
T1 T2 T3 T4 TS
M15 7.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.5
H1 17.0 7.0 1.0 2.0 6.0
H3 29.5 2.2 1.5 6.0 17.0
H12 59.0 36.0 9.5 24.5 41.0
H24 84.5 52.6 21.0 41.0 86.0
03 88.0 87.6 52.0 106.5 170.0
07 126.0 0.0 80.5 152.0 224.5
015 149.0 0.0 127.0 182.5 281.5
030 205.0 43.7 190.0 270.5 375.5
E4.3 Maximisation of Landslide Prediction Using Threshold

Combinations
E4.3.1 Identifying Dates Where Rainfall Exceeds Threshold Values

The threshold sets 1 and 2 were applied to the combined rainfall event and
landslide incident database. The objective was to maximise the number of dates
on which landsliding was correctly predicted. With this in mind a particular
combination of threshold values was trialed. The database used was the
database of dates of rainfall events, the corresponding rainfall variables and the
number of slides reported on the day.
The database for each gauge was scanned using the threshold values, and
the rainfall event values exceeding the threshold values were bracketed. An
example ofthe database with bracketed values is shown in Table E4.7. Next an
selected combination of threshold values was selected. An example of a
combination might be that Hi, H24 andD30 values are all required to exceed the
threshold variable values for a particular rainfall event in order for the
threshold to be considered exceeded. If on a particular date all threshold values
were exceeded by the corresponding rainfall values selected in the combination,
the date was labelled with aT (for Total threshold combination exceedance),
otherwise an F was recorded. The number of slides recorded on that date was
placed in from of the label. Thus for example the entry OT on 22/4/89 for gauge
H06 signifies that no landslides were reported on that date near gauge H06 but
all the threshold values specified in a combination were exceeded (this indicates
a poor prediction). For a particular gauge, the threshold combination is
successful in predicting landsliding if the entry contains NT (where N is an
integer greater than zero). A false alarm is obtained if the entry is OT, whereas
no warning is given if the entry is NF. Blanks indicate that no landslides were
reported and the threshold combination not exceeded on that date.
Extending these concepts to the entire area of Hong Kong Island, a date in
the file for the entire set of 22 rain gauges is classified as "Correct Warning" if at
least one NT entry appears in the row. This means that at least near one gauge
the threshold combination was exceeded and landsliding was reported - a
successful prediction for the particular threshold combination. If thresholds
were exceeded but no landsliding reported on a particular date the date was
classified as a "False Alarm". If a date had reported landslides but the threshold
combination was not exceeded at any gauge (ie all entries in the row are either
NF or blanks) it was classified as a "No Warning" date. "No Warning" is possibly
the worst case because no landslide warning would have been issued if the
particular threshold combination was used, yet landslides would have occurred
on that date. The three classes of dates are thus mutually exclusive, and cover all
the possible combinations.
An example of a file for the entire area of Hong Kong Island produced for a
trial threshold combination is reproduced in Table E4.8. The top of the file
identifies the threshold combinations and values used in the run. The columns
correspond to individual gauges, while the rows identify specific dates. The last
column is the total number oflandslides reported for the gauge on the particular
date. At the end of the file "Correct Warning", "False Alarm" and "No Warning"
classes are expressed as percentages. These summarise the results for the
threshold combinations and values used in the run. A large number of these files
was produced, and the results are summarised further on in this appendix.
E4.3.2 Trial Threshold Combinations
Many trial combinations were run to minimise the percentage of "No

Warning" and "False Alarm" dates and so maximise "Correct Warning". It
became clear that the four combinations shown in Table E4.9 were most
effective in the maximisation, and were used subsequently in the trial runs.
E4.3.3 Weighting of Rainfall Variables
It was recognised that not all rainfall variables had equal effect in
discriminating between dates where some or no landsliding was reported. The
most important variables were M 15, H 1, and H24. The others, particularly the
longer durations such as DiS and D30 were less effective. Thus each variable
was assigned a weighting (point score), and in order for the threshold
combination to be exceeded a specified sum of scores had to be exceeded. This is
a less rigid system than the straight combination of threshold values discussed
above, as no one specific set of rainfall variables is specified. All rainfall
variables are potentially available for selection, but the weighting biases the
selection towards the most important variables. Two sets of point scores, P1 and
P2, their total sums and the corresponding sums required to be exceeded are
shown in Table E4.10.
E4.3.4 Technique for Optimising the Weighting Scores and

Threshold Variable Values
The final step for producing the maximum percentage of "Correct

Warning" dates was to optimise both the weighting scores and the threshold
variable values with this objective in mind. A Fortran program was written by
the School of Civil Engineering's P. K. Maguire to perform this task. The
technique used was the Neider and Mead (1965) Simplex method combined with
Simulated Annealing (Press et al, 1992; Otten and Van Ginneken, 1989). The
program took several days to run, and the results were useful in indicating
important rainfall variables and their appropriate point scores. Point score set
P3 in Table E4.10 is the result of this procedure. The negative values are not
physically meaningful. However, one can see that H24 and H 1 are indicated to
be the most important rainfall threshold variables (ie have the highest
optimised point score) in point score set P3. Thus the optimisation program
confirmed the results of the other analyses discussed above.
~ ;1~
0" ~ (;"
EVENTS FOR GAUGE H17 -
~ :;o'"'
~- ~
tr:! :>;"'Tj
•
~ ~
fi,
.....
;:l
THRESHOLDS 7.0 17.0 29.5 59.0 84.5 88.0 126.0 149.0 205.0 -....J (/l s;
~
(/l
'<
~
DATE TIME DATE TIME 15 MIN 1 HOUR 3 HOUR 12 HOUR 24 HOUR 3 DAY 7 DAY 15 DAY 30 DAY 0 ~ 8 tr:! ~
(/l
g
'""
07/05/92 10:40 07/05/92 11:00 2.0 -2 2.0 0 2.0 0 2.0 0 2.0 0 2.5 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 (256.00) 0 "0
0
=-=0" 3
r;· ~ ;:l"-'
~ c
07/05/92 12:3o 07/05/92 14:20(25.0 -7) (52.o -7) (5s.o o> (6o.o o> 6o.o o so.5 o 61.5 o 61.5 o (314.00) o ::::: ; s· "0 ~ z
07/05/92 14:30 07/05/92 15:10 1.0 -1 (27.5 --8) (60.5 0) (62.5 0) 62.5 0 63.0 0 64.0 0 64.0 0 (316.50) 0 g ~ ~ ;- 0 ~
07/05/92 15:20 07/05/92 15:30 0.5 0 3.0 -1 (61.0 -1) (63.0 0) 63.0 0 63.5 0 64.5 0 64.5 0 (317.00) 0 ='i ~ c.. ~ ~ '-"
07/05/92 19:45 07/05/92 19:55 o.s o o.5 o o.5 o (63.5 o> 63.5 o 64.o o . 65.o o 65.o o (317.5-2} o ~ ;- a a (/l
~5/92 04:55 08/05/92 05:15 1.0 -2 1.0 0 1.0 0 1.5 0 64.5 0 64.5 0 66.0 0 66.0 0 (290.00) 17 c.. ~ :;·
~5/92 05:45 08/05/92 09:10{31.0 -21} (90.0 -20) (202.Q-1) (204.00) (267.50) (267.50) (269.00} (269.00) (491.50) 17 ;. ~ t:;'
08,l05/92 10:00 08/05/92 10:10 0.5 0 0.5 0 (136.0-2) {204.50) (268.00) (268.00) (269.50} (269.50) (492.00) 17 : ~ ;;
oe,.tl5/92 10:25 08/05/92 11:25 3.5 -3 7.0 -1 (95.0 -12) (211.50) (273.00) (275.00) (276.50) (276.50) (499.00) 17 ~ (j ;g
08,l05/92 11:35 08/05/92 12:30(7.5 -0) 15.5 -5 23.0 -11 (226.50) (288.Q-1) (290.00) (291.50) (291.50) (514.00) 17 ~- ~ ::s
08,()5/92 12:40 08/05/92 13:10 1.5 -1 14.0 ~ 24.5 0 (229.00) (287.~) (292.50) (294.00) (294.00) (516.50) 17 ~ • ~
08,l05/92 13:20 08/05/92 16:15(2s.o -26> (49.o -24} (91.5 -6) (32o.oo> (320.50) (383.50) (385.oo) (3ss.oo> (591.o-7} 11 c.. ~ a
~5/92 16:30 08/05/92 16:40 0.5 0 4.0 -2 (86.5 -2) (320.50) (321.00) (384.00) (385.50} (385.50) (580.5-2) 17 ;. ~ ~
C»/05/92 02:55 09/05/92 03:05 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 33.0 -2 (321.00) (384.50} (386.00) (386.00) (573.50) 1 ~ ~ c
~/92 12:05 09/05/92 14:00(7.0 -13) 10.5 -7 13.5 0 14.0 0 (103.D-9) (398.00) (398.50) (399.50) (586.50) 1 =-
"' Qj
r'l ~
cr.l
C»/05/92 18:05 09/05/92 19:15 1.5 -10 3.5 -2 4.0 0 17.5 0 18.0 0 (402.00) (402.50) (403.50) (583.00) 1 S: @ :t
00/05/92 19:25 09/05/92 19:35 0.5 0 2.0 -1 4.5 0 18.0 0 18.5 0 (402.50) (403.00) (404.00) (583.5-1) 1 r'l ;;- ~
OSMlS/92 23:35 09/05/92 23:45 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 18.5 0 19.0 0 (403.00) (403.50) (404.50) (583.00) 1 0 ~ 0
1~/92 04:50 10/05/92 05:00 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 5.5 0 19.0 0 (403.50) (404.00) (405.00) (561.00) 1 ~ ::.. ~
1~/92 05:35 10/05/92 o5:45 o.5 o 1.o o 1.o o 6.o o 19.5 o {404.oo) (404.50) (4os.50) (557.50) 1 a· ; 1
1~/92 06:1010/05/92 06:20 0.5 0 1.0 0 1.5 0 5.5 -2 20.0 0 (404.50) (405.00) (406.00) (558.00) 1 ;., :. ~
10r\:)5/92 15:10 10/05/92 15:55 2.5 -2 4.0 0 4.0 0 5.5 0 10.5 0 (345.50) (409.00) (410.00) (554.00) 1 0 ::s Ul
1~/92 16:10 10/05/92 16:45 1.0 -6 4.0 -6 5.5 0 7.0 0 12.0 0 (347.00) (410.50) (411.50) (555.00) 1 ::s c..
"' r;· -t:;
1~192 17:25 10/05/92 11:ss o.5 o 1.0 -1 6.o o 1.0 -1 12.5 o (347.so> (411.oo> (412.00) (555.o-1) 1 ;- a ~
1~/92 20:25 10/05/92 20:35 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 6.5 0 8.5 0 {347.50) (411.50) (412.50) (504.0-2) 1 ~ ~ -·
::s ~ ::s
Qj
.....
~
::s
..... ..... =-
.....
=-~ "' '

00
0
N
Table E4.8 Example of a trial threshold run file showing the selection criteria,
the output of dates and events, and the prediction statistics.
THE SELECTION CRITERIA IS ON THE FOLLOWING rHRESttOLOS: 1 IIOUR & J HOuR & 12 HOUR & 24 HOUR & J DAY
THRESHOLDS 7.0 17.0 29.5 59.0 84.5 88.0 126.0 149.0 205.0
DATE HOI 1102 HOO H~ 1105 HOG H07 1108 H09 HIO Hit H12 HIJ Hl4 H15 Hl6 H17 HIS tll9 H20 t-121 1122
22ft)4189 or or 0
02/015189 or or or or OT 2r 0T OT OT or OT or OT IT OT or OT 3
~IU5/8g Or IF I
CS/0!!{89 OT 0
20/05189 5T 2T 4T 2T 4T 3T JT lOT IT IT or 2T JT 2T 5r or JT or IT IT S2
21/05119 or 0
2.f/05119 IT
l0r'05/89 or 0
31/05(1!9 or 0
0111l6/811 or 0
22Jil6/89 OT OT IF
18107/119 or ·or or or or or oT or or or or or or OT OT 0
111/07/119 or 0
05tl:l8I8V IT
27102190 or
17~ or
04/C5/Il0 or
01/06190 OT OT OT OT OT or Or 0
171Q!/90 or or OT 2T OT OT or OT OT or or 2
30/06190 or oT or or or or or or or or or or 0
03/08190 1F or
10109190 or or or oT or or oT or or or 0
11/09/90 or oT 1T or or IT oT or or or or oT or or or or or or or or OT 2
lg{Og/VO or IF OT tiT IF or
:10.041111 or
01/05191 IF
oam'!ll If 2F
Oli/06191 OT OT OT OT OT OT 1T OT 1T OT OT OT OT IF IT OT OT OT OT OT 4
1C1/061111 OT or or o
1Ml6/lll OT OT OT IF I
201061111 OT or 0
tl2/07/111 or
OO,V7/91 OT 0
23/07/VI IF
24/07181 IF
1110&'91 2F 1F IT IF
1~8/111 JF or
14108/VI OT or OT OT or or OT OT or OT 0
15101i/81 OT or or or or or 0
14/1~1 or or 0
1511®1 or or or or 0
IS/1®1 IF IF IF IT IF 2T OT IT IT II
03103182 OT OT OT oT oT oT oT oT or or or 0
~103182 IF I
2611:Xl(92 OT 0
Cl5ii:WU2 or or or oT oT oT oT oT oT oT oT oT oT oT or 1T OT OT or OT I
08/041112 IF 3F IF 5
07/04192 IF IF 2
011/04112 1F .tiiF IF
1C1104/112 3T .r or n 3T or oT IT OT OT or OT OT IF Or 2T OT or IT 16
11104182 2F 2F IF IF IF 7
08/05192 12T 22T 32T 3T 16T liT 5T IJT 8T JT 2T 2r 6T 1ST 3T 16T 17T 8T 2T 5T lOT 216
011/05192 tF 2F IF
15I'QIW2 IF I
07/06192 OT OT or or or or 0
11/06192 IF IF
1~2 OT IT OT 2
14/081112
2F or or or oT or or oT or JT or e
IF 1
1Ml6/112 or or 0
21f06/92 OT OT OT OT OT or or or or or or or or or or or or or or or 0
07/07182 2F or OT OT IT OT 1T IF OT or OT OT 5
18107182 IF OT IT OT or or or 2r or or or or or oT or tF or
22/07182 IF IF
26 32 44 a 20 22 2
11 :19 17 2 II 22 12 21 29 II 20 9
5452042114000228231 0 6
TOTAL FAILURES • 374 TOTAl. FAII.UAES NOT REACHING THRESIIOI.O. e3 PERCENTAGE • 16.84%
FALSE AILARt,IS •. 28 PERCI;NTAGE • 44.44%
CORRECT WARNINGS • 21 PERCENTAGE • 33.33%
NO WARNING • 14 PERCENTAGE • 22.~


exceeded in order for the threshold to be deemed to be exceeded.
Threshold Rainfall Threshold Variables

Combination M15 H1 H3 H12 H24 03 07 015 030
C1
• • • •
C2
• • • • •
C3
• • • •
e
C4
• • • • •
indicates inclusion of variable in the combination.
obtained from a Simplex optimisation technique.
Point Scores
Rainfall Variable
P1 P2 P3
M15 13 4 -17
H1 13 6 12
H3 4 6 -10
H12 5 7 0
H24 13 9 28
03 10 8 11
07 5 3 0
015 0 2 0
030 0 1 0
Total available 63 46 24
Minimum point score
21 15 22
threshold
E4.4 Results Obtained from Analysis

Tables E4.11 to E4.13 contain the results of the analyses maximising the
prediction of dates with various rainfall threshold combinations on the date
database. Result Set 1 was obtained from the analysis of Combined Database 5
(CDS). Result Sets 2 and 3 were obtained from the analysis of Combined
Database 6 (CD6). The results are discussed in section 8.2 of the main body of
the thesis.

Summary of results of threshold trials on Combined Database 5.

Threshold o;o
Combination Warning% Alarm% Warning%
C1 24 30 46 100
C2 23 29 48 100
T1
C4 24 28 48 100
P2 22 61 17 100
C4 33 57 10 100
T2 P2 6 94 0 100
P3 32 45 22 100
Table E4.12 Result Set 2..


Threshold
C1 32 47 21 100
C2 33 45 22 100
C3 35 46 18 100
T1
C4 33 44 22 100
P1 17 82 1 100
P2 21 78 1 100


Threshold
C4 22 77 1 100
T3
P2 6 94 0 100
C4 8 92 0 100
T4
P2 8 92 0 100
C4 30 30 40 100
TS
P2 16 84 0 100
E4.5 Thresholds obtained from the 1984-93 Study Period
When the threshold analyses described in E4.1 were completed, the author
received the fulll984-93 rainfall data and was able to calculate the thresholds
for this period also. Threshold Set 3 is listed in Table E4.4 and is calculated from
a data subset containing only one landslide near a particular rain gauge on a
certain date. Table E4.14 for more than one failure and Table E4.15 lists
thresholds for all the data for comparison. The percentile values in these tables
are higher than those of Threshold Set 3 as would be expected.
When the author compared Threshold Set 3 to Threshold Sets 1 and 2 he
found that they were similar. Hence the author could not justify further work on
the maximisation of the prediction of dates with failures for the entire 1984-93
study period using trial threshold values from Threshold Set 3.
failure on a particular date (1984-93 study period).

VAR
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
M15 0.5 4.9 9.0 10.5 12.1 14.0 15.9 18.9 27.7 31.5 41.0
H1 0.5 11.2 17.0 26.2 30.5 33.0 36.0 42.8 52.5 87.2 131.0
H3 0.5 18.3 36.3 49.7 64.5 73.5 79.4 84.0 104.7 152.2 218.0
H12 13.0 34.2 75.9 97.6 117.6 147.0 177.0 219.1 234.0 256.7 384.5
H24 18.0 67.9 113.0 135.2 166.0 219.5 258.7 258.7 316.4 335.6 386.0
03 38.0 106.3 151.2 181.6 220.3 268.5 297.6 341.0 376.7 408.5 513.5
07 38.0 134.9 183.4 234.1 270.9 314.0 349.5 378.1 400.0 435.0 587.0
015 38.5 170.0 246.0 279.0 308.1 352.0 377.3 400.0 441.9 541.0 741.5
030 76.0 251.5 382.0 445.4 476.0 486.5 524.0 556.4 587.5 649.1 842.5
period).

VAR
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
M15 0.5 1.5 3.5 6.0 8.5 10.5 12.5 14.0 18.5 24.1 41.0
H1 0.5 3.0 8.3 13.5 18.0 24.0 28.9 34.0 42.5 53.5 131.0
H3 0.5 4.5 14.0 22.0 32.0 41.5 51.9 66.0 78.1 98.0 218.0
H12 0.5 8.5 24.5 40.0 52.0 70.5 82.9 104.7 138.5 226.8 384.5
H24 0.5 17.8 42.0 64.7 95.0 111.5 131.8 160.6 200.3 300.3 386.0
03 0.5 40.9 74.3 105.2 131.0 153.5 186.5 218.0 272.5 375.7 526.0
07 1.0 64.2 100.8 145.7 170.5 197.5 234.7 268.8 349.2 400.1 601.5
015 16.5 111.4 168.3 199.0 240.5 274.5 304.9 366.5 407.3 455.9 745.0
030 22.0 166.9 239.3 302.3 366.6 422.0 476.0 504.7 557.0 626.8 842.5
APPENDIX E5
ESTIMATION OF THE NUMBER OF FEATURES PER
EACH RAIN GAUGE ON HONG KONG ISLAND
E5.1 Zoning of Hong Kong Island by the Level of Development
The zoning of Hong Kong Island into areas of different levels of

development intensity was necessary as the number of features (per unit area)
in each such area is quite different. The word features here applies to only
man-made or man-modified slopes, ie cuts, fills and retaining walls. In a flat
foreshore development area or in an undeveloped area of a country park no
features will be found, whereas in the highly developed areas such as Central or
the Mid-Levels a large concentration of features exists. The zones of
development used and the factors representing relative numbers of features in
each are listed in Table E5.1. The initial factors were determined by measuring
road lengths per unit area in each zone. These were then somewhat adjusted by
the author to reflect the relative density of features considering the types of
buildings in the zone, and so on.
Table ES.l Zones of development together with the estimated relative density of
features in each. The adjusted factors were used in the study.
F
ZONE DESCRIPTION Raw Adjusted
factor< 1> factor< 2>
0 Foreshore Development 0(3) Q(3)
1 High Density development, eg Central 6.8 6
2 Medium density development, eg Mid-Levels 3.0 4
3 Low density development, eg Mt Kellett 2.8 2
4 Road development only 1.5-2.0 1.5
5 No development, eg Country Park Q(3) Q(3)
Notes:
1. Estimated be measuring road length for the identically sized areas in each
zone.
2. The author felt that the factors in zones 1 and 2 should be closer together
as not only the road length but the intense high-rise building development
in these zones generated a higher number of features than those contained
in zones 3 and 4.
3. No features exist in zones 0 and 5.
E5.2 Estimation of the Number of Features per 1:5,000 Map Area

The author had access to the 141:5,000 scale topographic maps that cover
Hong Kong Island. The number of features in each map area was estimated by
counting the number of registered features for each rna p area (from the Register
of Slopes), and then multiplying it by a factor to arrive at the total number of
slopes in each map area. The factors were obtained from the GEO's estimates of
total features in the whole territory (Finlay and Fell, 1995). The estimated
numbers are in Table E5.2.
E5.3 Calculation of Features per Gauge

The zones were mapped on four maps of Hong Kong Island. These maps
(reduced to A4 paper size) can be found in Figures E5.1 to E5.4. The estimates of
the numbers of features were then calculated by the author from the Register of
Slopes. These calculations are shown in Table E5.3. The area of each zone for
each gauge for each 1:5,000 map area was measured by the author using a
planimeter. If one denotes such an area value by Azgm, with the subscripts z, g
and m standing for zone, gauge and map respectively, the modified areas A ~gm
(representative of feature densities) are obtained by multiplying each Azgm by
the factor F (from Table E5.1). The modified area per each gauge per each map
area is then calculated, ie A 'mg =.LA ~mg· Denoting the estimate of features per
map area asNm, and the number offeatures per map area per gauge asNmg. one
Nmg A'mg A'mg
knows that ~ = ~ and so Nm can be found, ie N mg = -A,
m m m
and then Ng, the number of features per gauge, can be found by adding all the
Nmg values, ie Ng = 2:' N mg. These calculations are shown in Tables E5.4 and
E5.5.
Table E5.2 GEO estimates of the number of features on Hong Kong Island per
type of feature (Finlay and Fell, 1995).
FEATURE CUTS FILLS RETAINING

TOTALS
TYPE (C, CR) (F, FR) WALLS (R)
Registered 2,818 907 2,290 6,015
Unregistered 1,075 176 186 1,437
TOTAL 3,893 1,083 2,476 7,452
Table E5.3 Estimates of features per each 1:5,000 map of Hong Kong Island.
RETAINING
CUTS (C, CR) FILLS (F, FR) NUMBER OF
MAP WALLS (R)
FEATURES
Reg'd Total Reg'd Total Reg'd Total
11SWA 350 484 93 111 824 891 1,487
11SWB 275 380 116 138 729 789 1,307
11SWC 333 460 104 124 110 119 703
11SWD 610 843 170 204 282 305 1,351
11SEA 258 356 70 83 122 132 571
11SEB 123 169 28 34 22 24 227
11SEC 152 211 57 69 38 41 320
11SED 161 223 77 92 29 31 346
15NWA 12 16 3 3 0 0 19
15NWB 71 99 34 40 15 16 155
15NEA 220 304 53 63 73 79 446
15NEB 98 136 44 53 15 16 205
15NEC 123 169 49 58 29 31 259
15NED 32 44 8 10 2 2 56
TOTAL 2,818 3,893 907 1,083 2,290 2,476 7,452
~ .. f
Figure ES.l Zoning of levels of development on Hong Kong Island (map

llSE).
Figure E5.2 Zoning of Jevels of development on Hong Kong Island (map

llSW).
Figure E5.3 Zoning of levels of development on Hong Kong Island (map

lSNE).
Figure E5.4 Zoning of levels of development on Hong Kong Island (map

15NW).
Table E5.4 Calculation of modified areas per each 1:5,000 map of Hong Kong
Island.
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,.J oao~~o o!§~~o o o o o o o o~~$1So o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

~~+++++4~~~~~~+++++444~~~~~~++++~~~~~~~
~~ o o o R i " 21l:1'1JRi o o o o 5ti:l~io o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o c o o o c o o
Table E5.4 (continued) Calculation of modified areas per each 1:5,000 map of
Hong Kong Island.
00> . .. :! 0
"'"
.... :!o 0 .. . .. :! 0 0 .. .... :! 0 0 .. . . :2 0 0 .. . .. :! 0 0 .. .. "' :2 0 0 0 .. .. :! c
00 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 &l "'
; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 c c c 0 c 0 c c oc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IQ !!~ 0 c 0 0 c c c 0 0 0 0 c
0 0 c 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 co 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c c co c 0 c c 0 0 c 0 0
~ !! 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c c 0 c
0 0 0 0 00 oo 00 00 00 0 00 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.
9 9 ~ 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0
0 0 0 oc 0 0 0 00 0 0 c 0 0 0 oc 0 0 0 0 00 c 0 0 ~ ~ c c 0 0!:! f; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0
c c 0 c 0 c c 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 c 0 c 0 c ac c R 12 ~ co 0
-
2 ~ ;; c c c c c c 0 0 0 c 0 c
0 0 0 oo 0 00 oo 00 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oo 0 0 Ro 0 0 0
~ "'~ c 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c c c &11 00 c ~§ Mc c 0 c 0 0 oc 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 c c 0 0 .. 0 0 .. 0 ooo 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 oo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 .. 0 0 0
0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c
0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 oo oo 0 0
c 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ooo 0 0 ~ ~~0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 oc 000 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 ~ 0 8 ~ . §I ~ 0 0 0 c 0 c c c c 0 oc 0 c 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 c oc 0 00 0 c 0 0 0 c c c c c c c c 0 c c 0 ~ c c 0 0 c c 0 c 0 0 c oc 0 0 c 0 c 0
0 0 0 0 00 c 0 0 cc 0 0 0 c 0 co 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0
~tl c c 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 00 c 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 oc 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 c ooc 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
0 ooo o o o 000 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 c 000 0 0 c 0 0 0 c co c 0 c 0 c c 0 0 c

0 0
000 0 c 0 0 0 oc 0 0 c 0 oc 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 c 0 c c 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 00 00 0 0
oc ooc 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 oco 00 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 00 ooo 00 oo 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 c c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.. "'
~ ~0 00 c 000
co c c c c c o ... c ooo 00 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 oc ~JJ:! oo oc 0 0

0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 oa ;a 0 0 0 0 l;j 0 0 0 0 0 oo 0 0 0 0 '!! 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

~~ 0
0 0 R8 :)o .
0 0 0 :! ¥1~ 00 0 0 ;! .. c 0 0 0 00 0 0 c 0 2 0 c 0 0 0 c c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c a !! ~ 0 0 . ; :R R
00 c c 00 oo 00 0 0 0 i 0 oco 0
a251 0 0 0 0 Ia 0 00 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0
~ ~ 12 0 c
c 0 co 00 co co 0 0 !!! ~0 0 oc 0 :R .,IQo 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 . IC r! ~ 0 0
c c
000 ~~a o 00 ! li ~0 o ! i ~ oc 0 8 i a3o 0 ooo 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0
gA co ~2 ~!!! c c c c c c c 0 c c c c c c c 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 c 0 0
~¥!!!! i fl flo ii 0
.... _ . ., ....
00
...... . .. . . - .. . . ..
0 0 0
-. ...... _.,., .... -"'., . .

c 0 ., c ... 0 ~ 0
.
~
"'
..
0 -
..
0 0
0
% f x i" i x x• t:
l:
Table E5.4 (continued) Calculation of modified areas per each 1:5,000 map of
Hong Kong Island.
Table E5.5 Calculation of features per each gauge on Hong Kong Island. ~~
C1> Ft
::0 ....
...... ......
"'?>"'Tj
.
~ §:
MAP "'~ ~
':'!
GAU 11SWA 11SWB 11SWC 11SWD 11SEA 11SEB 11SEC ag
"' '"0
::r
0
GE A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F ;c:
--z
HOf-103--160 76 0 0 0 170 348 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~Vl
H02 272 563 268 0 0 0 20 30 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .g
(1)......,
~
H03 0 0 0 0 0 0 525 990 299 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 "'
H04 260 820 390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H05 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 50 15 955 1020 461 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HOG 0 0 0 68 350 157 0 0 0 505 745 337 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H07 0 0 0 305 940 422 0 0 0 50 100 45 230 550 96 0 0 0 45 100 24
HOB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 560 675 305 45 100 17 0 0 0 1000 708 171
H09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 777 1561 272 0 0 0 20 8 2
H 10 90 133 63 0 0 0 155 83 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H11 130 318 151 0 0 0 20 21 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H12 220 860 409 30 90 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H13 90 273 130 85 400 180 10 15 5 5 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 740 360 87
H15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H16 0 0 0 0 0 0 315 363 109 255 278 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H17 0 0 0 140 520 233 135 193 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 555 1028 179 6 18 7 215 68 16
H19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 40 7 300 563 220 80 30 7
H20 0 0 0 0 0 0 182 206 62 40 80 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 80 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 385 53 13
H22 0 0 0 242 611 274 35 35 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i2L. 1165 3126 1486 870 2911 1307 1647 2332 703 2435 2988 1351 1629 3279 572 306 581 227 2485 1325 320
00
A Actual area, M modified area, F number of features ......
-....!
Table E5.5 (continued) Calculation of features per each gauge on Hong Kong Island. ~~
(1) ct
::d
...........
'"1
.
"')';"'Tj
~ §.:
MAP "'~ ~
':.<
GAU 11SED 15NWA 15NWB 15NEA 15NEB 15NEC 15NED 3"' 'ij
::r
GE A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F A M F ....g 0 ;-...
0
R01 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . c:::z
.~C/l
H02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .g
(ll
~
...._,
H03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 "'
H04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HOS 0 0 0 0 0 0 215 208 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HOG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H14 1620 1665 318 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 30 14 670 285 75 0 0 0 0 0 0
H15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 511 411 187 600 490 129 720 985 260 450 238 56
H16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H19 203 145 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H20 0 0 0 95 30 20 380 385 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H21 0 0 0 0 0 0 182 161 33 1245 538 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TO-
TAL 1823 1810 346 95 30 20 777 753 155 1841 978 446 1270 775 204 720 985 260 450 238 56
00
A Actual area, M modified area, F number of features ......
00
_....
Table ES.S (continued) Calculation of features per each gauge on Hong Kong
Island.
TOTALS
GAUGE Number of
Actual Area Modified Area
Features
H01 273 508 181
H02 292 593 277
H03 525 990 299
H04 260 820 390
H05 1250 1278 519
H06 573 1095 494
H07 630 1690 587
HOB 1605 1483 493
H09 797 1569 274
H10 245 215 88
H11 150 339 157
H12 250 950 449
H13 190 698 318
H14 3115 2340 494
H15 2281 2123 632
H16 570 640 235
H17 275 713 292
H18 776 1114 203
H19 605 777 262
H20 697 701 198
H21 1877 831 327
H22 277 646 285
TOTAL 17513 22108 7452
APPENDIX E6
PREDICTION OF NUMBER OF LANDSLIDES PER
RAIN GAUGE (1989-92 PERIOD)
E6.1 Analysis and Results
The prediction of the number oflandslides per rain gauge for the 1989-92
study period is detailed herein. A series of plots generated initially per each
gauge showed the numbers of landslides versus the rainfall variables and their
values. The plots showed that the shorter duration rainfall variables such as
Hl-D3 appeared higher for a larger number of landslides. These larger
numbers oflandslides were caused by large rainfall events, hereafter referred to
as storms. Hence it became apparent that for the prediction oflarge numbers of
landslides over an area rather than isolated incidents in specific locations data
had to be extracted from major storms. In the 1989-92 study period the only
two major storm events available occurred on 20-21 May 1989 and 8 May 1992.
The 8 May 1992 storm had separate morning and afternoon downpours.
The generation of the databases for analyses is detailed in Appendix E3. In
brief, the numbers of features per gauge were first estimated. The calculations
are in Appendix E5. The longest duration rainfall events for the corresponding
storms for each gauge were selected as representative of the rainfall on the day,
and the proportion of failed features was calculated. Thus a database with
proportions of failed features (in each gauge area) for the different storms was
obtained. The database was statistically analysed for the best models to predict
the proportion of failed features.
The results of statistical analyses (multiple linear regressions) are
presented in Table E6.1. The storms are labelled 89 (20-21 May 1989 storm),
92am (8 May 1992 storm morning downpour) and 92pm (8 May 1992 storm
afternoon downpour). Pool1 combines the 89 and 92am storm data, similarly
Pool2 combines the 89 and 92pm storm data. The two methods of regression are
Enter (when all rainfall variables are modelled) and Stepwise (where the
program selects variables that best explain the data). The model curves were
fitted through the origin. The measure of goodness of fit, the coefficient of
determination R 20 is defined in Appendix C2. The models in Table E6.1 have a
reasonable to good fit.

datasets for models through the origin.
REGRESSION MODEL
STORM VARIABLES USED
METHOD FIT R 20
Enter M1~H1,H3,H12,H24, 03, 01~030 0.92
89 Enter M15, H1, H24, 07 0.82
Stepwise H1 0.76
Enter M15, H1, H3, H12, 07, 030 0.61
92am Enter H1 0.56
Stepwise H12 0.60
Enter M15, H1, H3, H12, H24, 07, 030 0.71
92pm
Stepwise H1 0.63
Enter M15,H1,H3,H12,03, 015,030 0.60
Pool1
Stepwise H3 0.59
Enter M15,H1,H3,H12,H24,03,0~ 015 0.64
Pool2
Stepwise H1 0.55
The above results indicate that models through the origin are useful in the
prediction of the proportion of failed features given a particular rainfall event.
Also the variable Hl was frequently selected in the models through the origin as
the single variable best explaining most of the data variance. This result is
indeed encouraging as the maximum hourly rainfall features as one of the
important (if not the most important variable) in the GEO's and other
publications on rainfall and landslides. Given the small increases in model fits
for the pooled data when all rainfall variables were used instead of just Hl for
modelling, a more detailed regression analysis was done on fitting polynomial
model curves using H 1 only. Since the Pool 1 and Pool 2 databases are similar,
further analysis was done for the Pool 2 dataset only. The results are
summarised in Table E6.2. All models are through the origin and use R 20 values.
Table E6.2 shows that best way to maximise the model fit is to remove
outliers more than two standard deviations from the mean rather than
subtracting threshold values or using a logarithmic transformation, which is not
unexpected. A quadratic function fits better than a linear function for all cases.
A cubic curve fits only slightly better than a quadratic. Figures E6.1 to E6.4
show the quadratic and cubic model curves together with the 95% confidence
intervals plotted over the raw data.
The added complexity of the cubic model is not really warranted by the
. barely perceptible increase in model fit, and hence the quadratic model through
the origin would appear to be a simple, yet sufficiently sophisticated model given
the data scatter. When the data outliers more than two standard deviations from
the mean are removed a much improved model is fit obtained with a
corresponding substantial reduction in the prediction uncertainty band.
However, insufficient data exists for the author to be able to justify the removal
of these statistical outliers. Hence the author prefers the quadratic model with
outliers in Figure E6.1 as the curve for the prediction of the number oflandslides
given a particular rainstorm event using the 1989-92 data.

derivatives) as the only independent variable. The 1989 dataset is
included for comparison.
Variables
1989 storm Pool2 data
MODEL
H11ess H1 without
H11 H1 H1 log (H1)
Threshold Set 1 outliers
Linear 0.09 0.76 0.55 0.58 0.48 0.72
Log 0.12 0.77 0.48 - - -
Inverse 0.14 0.55 0.24 - - -
Quadratic 0.20 0.79 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.75
Cubic 0.21 0.80 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.75
Power 0.19 0.86 0.27 - - -
S curve 0.23 0.88 0.48 - - -
Exponential 0.13 0.77 0.16 - - -
Notes: 1. Model with constant, R2.
0.120
0>
§ 0.100
~
II)
<I> 0.080
0.
..Q
II)
0 0.060
c
0
t 0.040
8.
....
0
a..
0.020
0.000
20 30 40 so 60
H1 (mm)
Figure E6.1 Quadratic model through the origin, R20 =0.60.

0.120
OJ 0.100
c
:§
Ul
Q)
o.oeo
a.
..Q
t
Ul
c
0
0.060
~
. ----- ---
8.
0.040
. - ----:-.. . ~
e
a_
0.020
0.000
20 30
... ... .
J
-r--
40
-
. . .L
~
. -.- - -
50
LOWER 95°;,
60 70
Ht (mm)
R20 =0.75.
0.120
I
0>
. / /
0.100
~
§ UPPE ~95y /
Ul 0.080
v
·~EAN
Q)
--
a.
..Q
Ul
0.060 ~.
0
t
c
0
0.040
.
/
0
a. /·.
0
.....
/
·---
a_ LOWER 95%
. .. ...
0.020
--;-.
0.000
. .. ...
l /
v-
20 30 40 50 60 70
Ht(mm)
Figure E6.3 Cubic model through the origin, R20 =0.61.

0.120
0.100
L
Cl
~
:§ 0.080
/
(/)
Cll
0.
0
iii 0.060
UPPER 95°/c / L
0
~ ~
----·
c
t0 ,.....
0.040
. ..
8.
e
. . ~
.
. .. . -.---:-- . ~
a.. 0.020
0.000
20
.
30
•
l
40 so 60
-
_LOWER 95%
70
H1 (mm)
Figure E6.4 Cubic model through the origin, data without outliers, R20 =0.75.
The rainstorm event is characterised simply by the maximum rolling one

hour rainfall (ie rainfall variable H 1) as the X axis. The predicted proportion of
failed features for a particular rain gauge area is read from theY axis using the
storm Hl value at the same rain gauge. The number of landslides expected is
obtained by multiplying the proportion of failed features by the population of
features in the area of the rain gauge. The total number of landslides expected
for Hong Kong Island or the entire Territory of Hong Kong is then obtained by
summing the number oflandslides for all the rain gauges in the area of interest.
If one disregards the spatial distribution of rainfall intensities and simply
multiplies theY axis of Figure E6.1 by the total number of features, one obtains a
gross overestimate of the number of landslides that will occur. The reason for
the overestimation becomes apparent when one looks at the distributions of Hl
intensities for all the rain gauges on Hong Kong Island for the two major rain
events in the 1989-92 study period (Figure E6.5). One can see that the
intensities ranged from 15 mm/hr to 40 mm/hr for the 1989 storm, but from
20 mm/hr up to 140 mm/hr for the 1992 storm (morning downpour). Thus the
spatial distribution of rainfall intensities will heavily influence the number of
landslides caused.
100
90
/( ~~
~
~
80
( ./
I 1992 STORM I
>-
0
zw 70 I 1989 I I Morning I
I STORM I
::::> If
aw 60
(
/
a:
lL
w
>
~
50
40
I
1992
STORM
Afternoon
I
r
....J 30
I
/ )
r-: -
::::>
--
~ 20
::::>
0
10 I
r /
w
0
20 40 60 80 1 0 1 0 1 0 1I 0
H1 (mm)
storm events in the 1989-92 study period.
Subsequent to this analysis the author received the 1984-93 rainfall data,
and thus derived curves predicting the number of landslides near a particular
rain gauge using the full data. This analysis is described in section 8.2. 7.2 of the
main body of the thesis.
APPENDIX E7
DETAILS OF STATISTICAL MODELS PREDICTING
RAINFALL EXTREMES
E7.1 Details of Statistical Models Predicting Rainfall Extremes

The details of statistical models predicting rainfall extremes based on
Hong Kong Island rainfall data for the years 1983-93 are listed in this appendix.
Details of linear regression Gumbel models predicting rainfall extremes are
given in Table E7.1. Details of linear regression Pearson models predicting
rainfall extremes are given in Table E 7.2. Each table contains the values for the
linear model. The X value is the Gumbel extremal coefficient. The label COE
denotes the coefficient and CON the constant value in the linear equation. The
predicted value (in mm) is labelled VAL. The calculations are shown for all the
rainfall variables. They are carried out for the lower 95 percentile value (LCI),
the mean value (MEAN) and the upper 95 percentile value (UCI).

extremes.
PE- MODEL
VAR RIOO INT
(yrs) X VAL
20
MtS 50
100
20
Ht 50
100
Table E7.1 (continued) Details of linear regression Gumbel models predicting rainfall extremes.
PE-
VAR RIOD INT
(yrs)
20
H3 50
100
20
H12 50
100
20
H24 50
100
20
03 50
100
20
07 50
100
20
015 50
100
20
030 50
100
Table E7.2 Details of Pearson linear regression models predicting rainfall

extremes.
PE-
VAR RIOD INT
(yrs) X
20
M15 50
100
20
H1 50
100
20
H3 50
100
20
H12 50
100
20
H24 50
100
20
03 50
100
20
07 50
100
Table E7.2 (continued) Details of linear regression Pearson models predicting rainfall extremes
PE- MODEL
VAR RIOD INT
(yrs)
20
015 50
100
20
030 50
100
APPENDIX E8
SIGNIFICANT STORM EVENTS IN HONG KONG
DURING 1984-93
E8.1 Listing of Significant storm Events in Hong Kong During

1984-93
The listing of significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93 is
shown in Table E8.1. The numeric label of the storm, its starting and finishing
dates, and the number oflandslides recorded for the corresponding period across
the entire Territory of Hong Kong and on Hong Kong Island are shown.
Table ES.l Significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93.
Number of Landslides
Storm Start Date End Date
Territory of Hong Kong Hong Kong Island
1 17/4/84 17/4/84 0 0
2 17/5/84 18/5/84 1 0
3 30/5/84 30/5/84 15 7
4 4/6/84 4/6/84 0 0
5 16/6/84 16/6/84 8 0
6 25/6/84 25/6/84 1 0
7 9/7/84 917/84 3 0
8 4/8/84 5/8/84 1 1
9 11/8/84 11/8/84 3 1
10 1/9/84 2/9/84 3 2
11 10/10/84 11/10/84 3 0
12 7/2/85 8/2/85 4 1
13 29/3/85 29/3/85 0 0
15 9/4/85 10/4/85 15 4
16 12/4/85 13/4/85 2
18 25/6/85 25/6/85 31 7
19 8/7/85 917/85 0 0
20 18/7/85 18/7/85 0 0
21 14/8/85 14/8/85 0 1
22 16/8/85 16/8/85 4 0
23 19/8/85 19/8/85 0 1
24 21/8/85 22/8/85 1 0
26 26/8/85 27/8/85 25 13
27 29/8/85 29/8/85 0 4
28 5/9/85 6/9/85 19 8
29 10/9/85 10/9/85 0 2
30 20/9/85 21/9/85 0 0
31 21/4/86 21/4/86 7 3
32 11/5/86 12/5/86 19 3
... continued
Table E8.1 (continued) Significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93.
33 19/5/86 20/5/86 1 0
34 6/6/86 6/6/86 35 8
35 25/6/86 26/6/86 0 2
36 3/7/86 4/7/86 5
37 11/7/86 12/7/86 48 14
38 10/8/86 11/8/86 7 1
39 6/9/86 7/9/86 2 3
40 16/9/86 16/9/86 0 0
42 16/3/87 17/3/87 17 10
43 5/4/87 6/4/87 12 6
44 12/4/87 13/4/87 0 2
45 715187 8/5/87 0
46 16/5/87 17/5/87 4
47 2215187 23/5/87 15 10
48 27/5/87 28/5/87 0 1
49 4/6/87 5/6/87 12 7
50 18/6/87 19/6/87 0 0
51 2217187 23/7/87 4 0
52 25/7/87 26/7/87 1
53 28/7/87 29/7/87 4 7
54 29/7/87 30/7!87 111 13
55 21/9/87 22/9/87 0 0
56 28/10/87 29/10187 0 1
57 23/6/88 24/6/88 2 3
58 26/6/88 26/6/88 4
59 19/7/88 20/7/88 41 10
60 14/8/88 15/8/88 3
61 17/8/88 18/8/88 5
62 30/8/88 31/8/88 1 2
63 7/4/89 8/4/89 7 1
64 1/5/89 2/5/89 120 3
65 20/5/89 21/5/89 340 54
66 21/6/89 22/6/89 2 0
67 18/7/89 18/7/89 7 0
68 28/7/89 29/7/89 0 0
69 22/8/89 23/8/89 0
70 6/9/89 719189 1 0
71 16/9/89 17/9/89 0 0
72 22/2/90 23/2/90 2 1
73 3/4/90 4/4/90 0 0
74 11/4/90 12/4/90 4 0
75 1/6/90 1/6/90 5 2
76 16/6/90 17/6/90 3 1
77 30/6/90 1/7/90 16 0
78 13/7/90 14/7/90 0 0
79 30/7190 31/7/90 0 0
80 1/8/90 2/8/90 2
81 10/9/90 11/9/90 10 2
82 19/9/90 19/9/90 3 3
83 4/10/90 5/10/90 0 0
84 8/6/91 8/6/91 4 5
... continued
Table E8.1 (continued) Significant storm events in Hong Kong during 1984-93.
85 9/6/91 9/6/91 9 3
86 10/6/91 10/6/91 2 0
87 23/7/91 24/7/91 5 2
88 31/7/91 31/7/91 1 0
89 14/8/91 15/8/91 5 5
90 15/8/91 16/8/91 7 3
91 14/9/91 15/9/91 0
93 14/10/91 16/10/91 13 9
94 3/3/92 3/3/92 3 2
95 4/4/92 5/4/92 3 1
96 6/4/92 7/4/92 6 8
97 7/4/92 8/4/92 8 7
98 10/4/92 11/4/92 45 24
100 7/5/92 8/5/92 352 239
101 15/5/92 15/5/92 2 0
102 29/5/92 30/5/92 0 0
103 7/6/92 716192 3 0
104 13/6/92 14/6/92 40 9
105 28/6/92 28/6/92 0 0
106 6/7/92 7/7/92 4 8
107 18/7/92 18/7/92 40 5
108 20/4/93 21/4/93 1
109 1/5/93 2/5/93 21 0
110 9/5/93 9/5/93 0
111 24/5/93 25/5/93 4 4
112 10/6/93 11/6/93 19 1
113 15/6/93 16/6/93 108 24
114 22/7/93 22/7/93 0 0
115 13/9/93 13/9/93 0 0
116 17/9/93 17/9/93 7 2
117 23/9/93 24/9/93 0 1
118 24/9/93 25/9/93 4 2
119 26/9/93 26/9/93 104 31
120 27/9/93 27/9/93 0 12
121 13/10/93 14/10/93 6 3
122 4/11/93 5/11/93 377 0
APPENDIX SERIES F
ACCEPTABLE RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION
(THE EVALUATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK)
AppendixFl
Raw Questionnaire Response Frequencies .......................... 834
AppendixF2
Results of Correlation Cross-Tabulations .......................... 849
AppendixF3
Results of Factor Analyses of Questionnaire Data ................... 868
APPENDIX Fl
RAW QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE FREQUENCIES
Fl.l Raw Questionnaire Response Frequencies

This Appendix contains the raw questionnaire response frequencies. The
frequencies for section 1 are presented in Table F1.1, those for section 2 in Table
F1.2, and sections 3 to 14 in Table F1.3.
Table Fl.l Raw questionnaire response percentage frequencies for section 1.
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.1
Never 19 29 25 44 31 66 81 32 81 20
Once a year 44 45 60 19 31 25 15 28 17 25
Once every three months 6 13 5 23 21 5 3 8 1 15
Once a month 13 0 5 8 12 0 1 12 0 10
Once a week 6 3 5 4 5 3 0 20 0 30
Every day 13 10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2
Causes me stress and worry 9 6 5 2 0 0 0 4 0 0
Causes me stress and worry 21 25 15 17 7 40
30 3 8 3
sometimes
I know it's a proble but am not 61 66 65 48 50 36 26 60 36 30
especially worried about it
I am not worled about It 9 3 0 35 33 58 71 28 61 30
1.3
No lnformaton 0 0 0 8 14 19 58 0 48 0
Personal experience 45 25 5 8 19 24 3 28 4 80
Family and friends 0 3 10 5 7 7 5 4 3 10
Media 70 63 85 33 36 29 37 12 45 30
Official reports 42 22 25 71 60 49 10 88 4 55
Geotechnical reports 45 25 25 37 31 12 4 68 3 80
Other 3 6 5 4 0 2 0 24 6 10
1.4HK
Yes 19 100 100
No 81 0 0
1.5HK
Yes 39 9 25
No 61 91 75
1.4AU
Yes 80 83 56 6 88
No 20 17 44 94 13
1.5AU
Yes 15 7 5 0 17
No 85 93 95 100 83
1.6AU
Yes 21 24 12 0 25
No 79 76 88 100 75
1.7AU
Yes 12 14 3 0 29
No 88 86 97 100 71
Table F1.2 Raw questionnaire response frequencies for section 2. ~~
(1> (b
~ ...,
.....
Group Hazard Work Smoke Plane Traffic Petrochem leal Landslide Pedestrian
"';>';" .'-<
"''1
Number %
1 Work - 6 10 1 8 7 4 36 5.22 ~ §:
"' Ill
Smoke
Plane
27
23
-
9
24
-
10
2
15
10
15
7
12
3
103
54
14.95
7.84
~
"'3 .,::r
':;<:
Traffic 32 23 31 - 26 25 19 156 22.64

g ,--..
tJ
....
Petrochemical
Landslide
24 17 22 7 - 9 7 86 12.48 0
. ., cz
.!:(2\.ll
26 18 26 8 23 - 7 108 15.67
Pedestrian 29 21 30 14 26 26 - 146 21.19
.g
(1>
~
'-"
n:33 689 100.00 "'

2 Work - 10 8 4 12 7 7 48 7.16
Smoke 22 - 21 6 14 13 9 85 12.69
Plane 24 11 - 4 12 15 8 74 11.04
Traffic 28 26 28 - 19 22 22 145 21.64
Petrochemical 20 18 20 13 - 16 13 100 14.93
Landslide 25 19 17 10 16 - 9 96 14.33
Pedestrian 25 23 24 9 19 22 - 122 18.21
n:32 670 100.00 i
3 Work - 1 5 1 4 4 1 16 3.81
Smoke 19 - 15 6 10 6 3 59 14.05
Plane 15 5 - 5 8 3 4 40 9.52
Traffic 19 14 15 - 16 13 10 87 20.71
Petrochemical 16 10 12 4 - 8 6 56 13.33
Landslide 16 14 17 7 12 - 8 74 17.62
Pedestrian 19 17 16 10 14 12 - 88 20.95
n:20
_L_
420 100.00
... continued
00
U-l
0\
Table F1.2 (continued) Raw questionnaire response frequencies for section 2. ~~
Group Hazard Work Smoke Plane Traffic Petrochemical Landslide Pedestrian Number % o ct
:;d ....
4 Work - 5 41 ...........
3 15 42 10 116 6.58 "'~'TI .
Smoke 79 - 80 40 60 75 45 379 21.51 ;;;- [
Plane 43 4 - 0 18
Traffic 81 44 84 - 61
48
77
1
67
114
414
6.47
23.50
"'
"'"'0 '<
."0
"'
3 ::r
Petrochemical 69 24 66 23 - 71 27 280 15.89 g tJ
Landslide
Pedestrian
42
74
9
39
36
83
7
15
13
57
-
73
11
-
118
341
6.70
19.35
;;-c
... z
~(/]
n=84 1,762 100.00 ,g0 ~
5 Work - 9 18 1 15 30 7 80 9.29 "-"'
Smoke 32 - 35 22 32 37 27 185 21.49

"'
Plane 23 6 - 0 15 31 1 76 8.83
Traffic 40 19 41 - 35 41 36 212 24.62
Petrochemical 26 9 26 6 - 34 8 109 12.66
Landslide 11 4 10 0 7 - 2 34 3.95
Pedestrian 34 14 40 5 33 39 - 165 19.16
n=42 861 100.00
6 Work - 7 31 1 23 37 14 113 9.28
Smoke 51 - 52 29 46 54 35 267 21.92
Plane 27 6 - 3 22 42 8 108 8.87
Traffic 57 29 55 - 44 54 41 280 22.99
Petrochemical 35 12 36 14 - 49 21 167 13.71
Landslide 21 4 16 4 9 - 6 60 4.93
Pedestrian 44 23 50 17 37 52 - 223 18.31
~-
n=59 1,218 100.00
... continued
00
UJ
-....1
Table F1.2 (continued) Raw questionnaire response frequencies for section 2. ~ ~
Group Hazard Work Smoke Plane Traffic Petrochemical Landslide Pedestrian Number % ('!> ct
7 Work
Smoke
- 7 30 5 22 40 11 115 7.50 -·
!:d ...,
"':>;"'Tj
.
.......
66 - 61 35 54 66 44 326 21.27 ~§.:
Plane 43 12 - 4 21 55 12 147 9.59
Traffic 68 38 69 - 59 70 55 359 23.42 "'~ ~
~
Petrochemical 51 19 52 14 -
s
"' '"0
::r
60 18 214 13.96 g ti
..... ..-._
Landslide 33 7 18 3 13 - 5 79 5.15
Pedestrian 62 29 61
0 c
,..,.,z
18 55 68 - 293 19.11
~C/'l
n:74 1,533 100.00 0 ::E
8 Work - 0 9
]'---/
0 4 10 0 23 4.21
Smoke 26 - 25 11 22 21 13 118 21.61
"'
Plane 17 1 - 0 7 19 1 45 8.24
Traffic 26 15 26 - 22 25 19 133 24.36
Petrochemical 22 4 19 4 - 21 5 75 13.74
Landslide 16 5 7 1 5 - 2 36 6.59
Pedestrian 26 13 25 7 21 24 - 116 21.25
n:26 546 100.00
9 Work - 7 25 4 17 38 8 99 6.93
Smoke 61 - 62 28 47 59 34 291 20.38
Plane 43 6 - 5 17 49 7 127 8.89
Traffic 64 40 63 - 57 63 54 341 23.88
Petrochemical 51 21 51 11 - 61 21 216 15.13
Landslide 30 9 19 5 7 - 6 76 5.32
Pedestrian 60 34 61 14 47 62 - 278 19.47
n:70 1,428 100.00
10 Work - 2 13 0 13 17 6 51 12.14
Smoke 18 - 20 13 19 19 18 107 25.48
Plane 7 0 - 0 12 16 2 37 8.81
Traffic 20 7 20 - 17 20 19 103 24.52
Petrochemical 7 1 8 3 - 15 3 37 8.81
Landslide 3 1 4 0 5 - 2 15 3.57
Pedestrian 14 2 18 1 17 18 - 70 16.67
~~-- n=20 420 100.00 00
w
00
Table F1.3 Questionnaire response percentage frequencies for sections 3 to 14.
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3.1
1 0 13 10 4 2 4 3 4 10 0
2 0 0 5 4 7 4 7 0 7 0
3 3 0 0 1 5 2 3 0 6 0
4 12 23 20 11 10 13 13 8 7 5
5 6 10 5 7 0 13 13 8 11 5
6 21 23 0 17 20 18 18 23 17 15
7 58 32 60 57 56 48 44 58 41 75
3.2
1 0 3 5 2 0 4 1 0 1 0
2 6 0 5 0 4 3 0 3 15
3 26 6 10 4 7 2 7 4 3 30
4 19 32 30 12 27 14 24 15 11 15
5 19 16 20 6 7 11 6 15 4 20
6 23 19 10 32 24 25 23 19 29 15
7 6 23 20 43 34 41 37 46 49 5
3.3
1 12 10 10 17 20 13 10 23 6 30
2 24 10 35 20 17 16 15 27 20 25
3 24 29 10 24 20 29 15 23 16 30
4 15 26 25 8 15 18 14 8 16 5
5 9 23 15 11 12 9 8 4 14 5
6 3 3 5 10 10 5 21 12 19 5
7 12 0 0 11 7 11 15 4 10 0
3.4
1 0 0 5 10 10 14 15 4 4 0
2 9 10 20 21 24 29 31 12 11 20
3 39 23 40 37 41 30 23 27 27 60
4 15 23 15 15 10 11 11 19 20 15
5 21 10 5 5 7 5 8 15 16 0
6 3 13 15 10 2 4 4 12 13 5
7 12 22 0 2 5 7 7 12 9 0
3.5
1 0 3 0 5 4 3 0 3 0
2 12 0 5 14 17 14 13 0 7 0
3 24 23 15 31 32 36 13 42 23 20
4 18 39 25 33 32 34 32 35 19 30
5 33 26 50 15 7 9 28 19 39 10
6 12 6 5 5 0 2 8 4 7 35
7 0 3 0 0 7 2 3 0 3 5
4.1
1 9 16 25 58 37 47 61 46 50 10
2 3 0 5 12 10 7 13 12 6 0
3 9 3 5 6 15 11 8 19 0 0
4 9 23 0 11 10 23 14 8 31 0
5 21 13 10 4 22 2 3 4 4 5
6 21 16 35 7 5 4 1 4 3 35
7 27 29 20 2 2 7 0 8 6 50
... continued
Table F1.3 (continued) Questionnaire response percentage frequencies for sections 3-14.
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4.2
1 0 3 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0
2 0 0 5 2 0 4 1 0 3 5
3 6 3 0 10 7 3 0 1 15
4 16 26 10 19 17 16 18 8 19 10
5 6 19 15 4 12 4 4 15 4 35
6 35 16 30 18 15 11 13 19 17 25
7 35 32 40 56 46 54 58 58 56 10
4.3
1 0 0 0 7 22 14 7 4 10 5
2 6 3 5 18 10 5 3 15 4 5
3 12 6 15 10 24 9 10 4 10 20
4 12 29 40 31 27 46 45 38 30 15
5 24 19 15 12 10 7 17 15 14 40
6 27 23 15 15 5 12 11 12 9 10
7 18 19 10 7 2 7 7 12 23 5
4.4
1 0 0 0 5 10 12 7 0 4 5
2 3 3 10 8 17 7 8 4 7 25
3 9 9 20 7 17 28 18 19 7 0
4 3 13 0 19 17 11 28 4 14 5
5 18 26 10 11 12 16 11 23 13 25
6 33 16 10 19 10 11 10 19 20 30
7 33 32 50 31 17 16 17 31 34 10
4.5
1 27 0 5 7 9 3 0 3 0
2 18 0 0 17 27 12 8 12 0 5
3 6 6 5 10 17 18 17 19 4 15
4 21 19 10 24 34 33 27 27 9 15
5 12 35 20 23 10 19 28 27 40 15
6 9 23 30 20 2 2 13 15 31 45
7 6 16 30 6 2 7 4 0 13 5
5.1
1 27 23 40 45 53 44 39 46 46 25
2 18 10 15 7 3 11 10 4 6 15
3 6 3 5 6 5 9 6 15 1 10
4 21 29 15 11 10 18 23 15 30 10
5 12 16 20 8 13 2 8 15 4 20
6 9 10 0 11 3 9 4 4 7 15
7 6 10 5 12 15 9 10 0 4 5
5.2
1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0
2 3 0 0 8 2 1 0 5
3 6 13 5 4 0 5 0 4 4 0
4 19 19 25 23 23 18 21 12 17 0
5 13 13 35 5 8 7 6 19 6 15
6 26 19 5 23 13 16 15 15 13 40
7 32 35 30 44 50 47 55 50 57 40
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.3
1 3 0 5 7 5 2 0 0 6 0
2 3 3 0 10 8 9 3 8 7 15
3 9 13 30 11 13 7 10 19 6 10
4 18 23 35 18 18 23 14 8 21 15
5 12 13 10 13 15 25 21 19 17 15
6 24 19 5 15 23 23 15 27 14 25
7 30 29 15 26 20 12 37 19 27 20
5.4
1 6 3 5 6 13 7 4 0 6 0
2 0 6 10 5 10 7 13 15 7 0
3 9 10 10 11 13 28 15 15 13 15
4 6 23 5 17 18 14 14 15 16 0
5 18 3 10 11 20 11 11 19 10 10
6 15 23 15 24 13 11 28 15 26 60
7 45 32 45 27 15 23 14 19 21 15
5.5
1 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
2 0 3 5 4 8 7 7 15 0 30
3 9 3 20 10 8 11 11 19 9 30
4 9 26 10 18 20 19 17 23 11 15
5 21 6 25 32 50 33 32 38 31 20
6 39 26 20 21 8 21 24 4 33 5
7 21 32 20 14 8 7 8 0 13 0
6.1
EH 97 97 90 87 92 85 60 96 92 100
VH 3 3 5 10 5 10 10 4 5 0
H 0 0 5 4 3 4 3 0 2 0
M 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0
L 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
VL 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0
6.2
EH 88 56 55 58 74 48 45 60 65 60
VH 9 31 30 31 21 29 16 36 28 40
H 3 13 5 4 5 17 14 4 5 0
M 0 0 10 6 0 4 5 0 2 0
L 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 0 2 0
VL 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0
6.3
EH 55 41 20 29 41 29 26 8 40 35
VH 30 19 45 32 33 25 22 64 37 20
H 12 25 15 21 18 25 19 24 15 45
M 3 16 10 10 5 12 17 4 6 0
L 0 0 10 6 3 8 3 0 2 0
VL 0 0 0 2 0 2 12 0 0 0
6.4
EH 30 13 10 10 15 15 10 4 12 0
VH 33 34 25 31 36 8 29 28 35 45
H 18 19 25 27 31 42 21 52 34 15
M 27 28 25 14 10 23 17 12 11 40
L 3 22 10 11 8 4 16 4 8 0
VL 0 6 5 7 0 8 7 0 0 0
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6.5
EH 9 3 0 5 8 4 3 0 3 0
VH 24 28 15 8 13 10 19 4 15 0
H 27 13 30 25 31 15 26 36 29 40
M 27 25 15 24 23 37 21 44 35 25
L 12 22 30 19 15 23 22 12 12 35
VL 0 6 10 19 10 12 9 4 5 0
6.6
EH 3 0 0 2 3 2 5 0 0 0
VH 12 6 15 4 8 2 14 0 3 0
H 18 28 10 10 21 13 17 12 17 0
M 27 16 25 19 13 13 21 36 25 30
L 30 28 20 27 33 38 28 36 38 35
VL 9 19 30 38 23 31 16 16 17 35
6.7
EH 0 3 0 2 14 0 0 0
VH 3 0 1 3 0 7 0 0 0
H 12 13 6 10 4 9 0 6 0
M 15 3 6 13 8 10 12 9 0
L 30 31 20 21 15 16 32 23 25
VL 39 47 65 54 71 45 56 62 75
7.1
1 9 26 25 17 11 21 9 5 20
2 12 19 25 17 11 24 20 5 0
3 24 16 10 20 15 21 31 10 40
4 12 13 15 10 41 15 11 30 0
5 27 10 10 14 11 3 6 25 20
6 12 6 5 7 7 15 9 25 20
7 3 10 10 15 4 0 14 0 0
7.2
1 6 6 5 2 7 3 6 0 0
2 18 13 25 14 26 9 11 30 40
3 18 35 10 19 26 21 34 15 0
4 30 26 20 26 4 21 20 25 40
5 12 10 10 17 26 18 14 5 20
6 12 6 15 6 7 18 11 10 0
7 3 3 15 15 4 9 3 15 0
7.3
1 21 13 5 10 11 12 6 30 0
2 21 16 20 15 11 15 14 10 0
3 15 35 30 26 19 15 11 20 60
4 9 26 20 18 19 21 31 20 40
5 24 10 10 13 26 21 31 15 0
6 6 0 15 14 11 9 6 5 0
7 3 0 0 4 4 6 0 0 0
7.4
1 36 19 35 37 37 33 37 45 60
2 39 42 15 18 30 18 20 25 40
3 12 3 30 18 15 12 9 15 0
4 9 6 15 13 11 21 11 0 0
5 3 13 0 6 4 9 11 5 0
6 0 6 5 6 4 3 9 10 0
7 0 10 0 2 0 3 3 0 0
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
7.5
1 10 3 0 10 0 3 6 5 20
2 7 3 10 7 0 6 9 15 0
3 10 0 5 10 11 9 0 5 0
4 11 19 15 11 11 9 11 10 0
5 18 26 30 18 4 21 17 10 40
6 30 19 25 30 26 27 26 30 20
7 15 29 15 15 48 24 31 25 20
7.6
1 3 13 10 5 4 0 6 5 0
2 3 6 5 7 11 9 11 0 0
3 15 3 5 4 15 9 11 25 0
4 12 0 0 11 7 6 3 10 20
5 9 6 20 12 11 15 9 25 0
6 30 35 15 29 30 12 23 5 0
7 27 35 45 33 22 48 37 30 80
7.7
1 21 19 20 21 30 27 31 10 0
2 3 0 0 20 11 18 14 15 20
3 15 6 10 4 0 12 3 10 0
4 6 10 15 12 7 6 11 5 0
5 9 26 20 20 19 12 11 15 20
6 12 26 20 8 15 15 17 15 60
7 33 13 15 14 19 9 11 30 0
8,9 Property damage
8.1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 6 5 1 3 0 3 0 5 0
3 16 13 15 14 9 11 2 24 5 20
4 25 23 25 27 26 15 22 32 13 40
5 34 29 30 29 50 32 31 16 26 35
6 22 23 15 17 9 19 20 28 23 5
7 3 6 10 12 3 23 22 0 28 0
8.2
1 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 8 5 0
3 16 6 5 8 9 4 3 4 0 20
4 22 26 30 26 29 17 12 38 11 15
5 28 29 30 20 32 23 22 21 10 45
6 28 19 20 29 21 29 29 25 34 15
7 6 10 10 14 9 27 31 4 38 5
8.3
1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 6 10 5 0 2 0 0 2 0
3 10 16 20 5 9 8 10 12 3 5
4 16 10 5 17 21 4 3 4 3 25
5 23 16 10 20 32 13 12 44 8 15
6 29 23 30 29 18 27 28 20 31 35
7 19 26 25 25 21 46 47 20 52 20
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8.4
1 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 3 5 1 3 2 3 4 3 0
3 13 3 5 4 12 7 7 8 0 0
4 3 6 10 10 18 2 2 16 3 25
5 13 16 10 17 18 9 7 24 7 15
6 37 13 20 30 27 24 29 24 21 35
7 30 48 40 39 21 57 52 24 66 25
8.5
1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 6 5 2 0 4 0 0 3 0
3 6 10 20 1 6 4 7 4 2 5
4 10 3 0 8 15 4 2 20 2 10
5 13 23 10 20 21 7 9 24 8 25
6 32 13 35 26 36 26 33 24 18 25
7 35 45 25 42 21 54 50 28 67 35
8.6
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 16 5 0 3 0 0 4 2 0
3 13 0 15 10 15 2 2 0 2 5
4 16 19 15 14 9 10 5 28 5 15
5 19 29 20 24 32 25 17 36 18 35
6 23 23 25 32 38 31 38 28 28 40
7 29 13 20 20 3 31 38 4 46 5
8.7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 0 10 10 0 9 0 2 4 2 0
3 13 3 25 2 6 6 5 8 2 0
4 3 10 15 6 12 6 2 8 3 5
5 10 19 5 18 15 13 16 20 10 40
6 52 23 25 30 41 19 28 28 15 20
7 23 35 20 44 18 56 48 32 67 35
9
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0
2 0 3 5 2 12 0 4 0 2 5
3 13 16 15 7 3 10 4 4 7 5
4 7 6 15 20 24 8 14 24 7 25
5 20 26 10 19 30 19 14 24 13 20
6 33 19 35 26 27 19 32 28 25 20
7 27 29 20 24 3 44 33 20 44 25
8,9 Loss of life
8.1
1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 3 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0
3 6 10 0 5 6 6 3 0 3 5
4 24 3 30 10 15 4 7 24 2 15
5 18 19 15 26 29 6 10 12 5 35
6 24 42 25 25 32 38 37 36 31 40
7 24 23 25 33 18 45 41 28 59 5
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8.2
1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 0 10 0 2 6 0 0 4 0 0
3 23 3 10 6 6 4 2 4 2 10
4 6 10 25 15 15 6 10 25 7 15
5 35 39 25 14 38 21 17 25 10 35
6 26 19 20 39 9 23 28 17 15 35
7 10 19 15 23 26 46 43 25 66 5
8.3
1 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 3 5 2 3 2 3 0 0 0
3 10 10 10 3 2 5 4 2 0
4 6 10 15 14 21 6 2 4 2 0
5 13 16 0 11 18 6 5 24 3 25
6 29 16 15 24 18 23 17 16 15 35
7 42 39 50 48 38 60 67 52 79 40
8.4
1 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 3 5 3 2 5 4 2 0
3 10 3 10 2 3 7 3 4 2 0
4 0 3 0 7 24 0 2 8 2 5
5 20 16 15 12 18 4 5 20 2 15
6 27 19 20 20 21 22 22 16 16 40
7 40 45 40 57 30 65 62 48 77 40
8.5
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 6 5 2 0 4 3 8 3 0
3 10 3 15 0 6 0 5 0 5 0
4 3 n 0 5 12 2 0 8 0 0
5 16 6 15 10 9 9 2 8 3 10
6 19 13 10 26 27 9 17 24 7 40
7 52 58 55 57 45 76 72 52 82 50
8.6
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 10 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
3 3 6 5 6 12 4 2 4 0 0
4 19 6 15 7 12 4 2 16 2 10
5 13 23 20 20 26 13 16 16 10 20
6 26 19 30 35 26 25 33 44 25 50
7 35 35 25 32 21 54 48 20 64 20
8.7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 6 10 15 0 6 2 3 8 2 0
3 3 6 15 2 9 2 3 4 0 0
4 3 6 5 6 12 6 2 0 3 0
5 10 6 5 5 9 13 7 16 2 10
6 29 19 25 20 26 6 14 28 10 35
7 48 52 35 67 38 71 71 44 84 55
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9
1 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 3 0
2 3 0 0 2 6 2 4 4 0 0
3 7 13 5 6 0 6 11 4 3 0
4 3 6 15 13 27 4 2 8 3 5
5 17 16 10 14 18 13 4 20 7 20
6 30 26 25 20 27 15 25 32 13 35
7 40 39 40 43 21 60 56 32 70 40
10 1st part
Yes 91 100 100 95 98 84 99 88 96 80
No 9 0 0 5 2 16 12 4 20
10HK
The local community 24 25 10
Resident who Is a tenant 3 0 20
Resident who Is an owner 3 3 20
Owner but not tenant 6 9 15
Government 78 66 85
Legislative council 30 3 30
Housing authority 18 25 50
Hong Kong Housing Society 9 19 30
GEO 79 78 90
Experts 48 59 55
An international body 6 22 15
Other 0 0 0
11HK
The developer 64 78 65
Previous owners 27 13 0
Present owners 48 25 55
Government 45 84 65
Insurance companies 18 6 15
Other 6 0 0
12HK
Government 61 75 80
Other 3 3 0
13HK
Government 42 63 50
Other 6 0 0
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10AU
The local community 13 20 12 4 13 16 25
Land owners 8 33 14 11 13 16 5
Local council 65 63 67 78 74 61 55
State government 44 38 27 36 26 43 45
Federal government 19 25 10 26 22 36 5
Experts 78 78 78 69 61 71 65
An international body 3 8 4 10 13 10 0
Other 0 4 4 0 0 0
11AU
The local community 4 2 2 0 0 1 0
Land owners 60 83 72 83 96 77 80
Local council 45 38 18 29 9 21 20
Insurance companies 5 7 9 7 9 3 10
12AU
The local community 4 2 0 0 0 5
Land owners 32 48 33 40 83 64 70
Local council 57 55 30 40 13 31 30
Insurance companies 4 12 12 6 4 0 5
The institution bringing them 26 35 46 49 22 37 45
in
13AU
The local community 2 2 0 3 0
Land owners 31 50 42 35 87
Local council 74 67 53 72 30
State government 45 36 26 36 52
Federal government 14 17 9 19 9
Insurance companies 10 14 25 17 9
14.1
15-25 years 24 9 50 4 0 5 3 8 9 0
25-40 years 42 69 25 26 37 21 29 46 50 10
40-60 years 33 22 25 56 39 54 56 46 33 85
>60 years 0 0 0 14 24 19 13 0 9 5
14.2
Male 91 94 85 68 54 75 65 69 43 100
Female 9 6 15 32 46 25 35 31 57 0
14.3
Smokers 6 6 5 19 24 16 22 12 29 5
Non-smokers 94 94 95 81 76 84 78 88 71 95
Time In dwelling
<5 years 77 63 26 25 30 29 20 27 24 20
5-15 years 13 28 53 37 38 36 28 50 46 60
15-25 years 10 6 21 33 25 25 46 23 30 20
>25 ~ears 0 3 0 5 7 11 6 0 0 0
Time of future stay in dwelling
<5 years 46 24 38 13 13 5 4 9 13 25
5-15 years 27 34 38 50 53 34 51 59 40 30
15-25 years 15 17 24 30 22 39 38 18 31 35
>25 years 12 24 0 7 12 21 7 14 16 10
... continued
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of children living in the dwelling
0 55 53 35 49 65 45 31 55 17 20
1 10 19 10 8 8 9 22 5 16 25
2 39 31 5 24 17 27 25 27 40 40
3 3 3 20 15 5 11 18 14 21 15
>3 3 0 0 4 5 9 4 0 6 0
HK14.4
Yes 48 69 30
No 52 31 70
HK14.5
Yes 94 100 71
No 6 0 29
HK14.11a
GEO 79 84 5
Non-GEO 21 16 95
HK14.9
Primary 6 0 0
Secondary 0 48 30
Tertiary 94 52 70
HK14.10
<40% GOP 10 0 12
40-80% GOP 0 3 0
80-170% GOP 10 19 47
170-340% GOP 7 53 24
>340% GOP 72 16 18
AU education
Year10 29 22 29 18 7 17 0
Year12 33 33 35 48 21 23 5
TAFE, other college 18 22 26 25 29 33 0
Unlversitl: 13 19 3 9 29 11 74
AU Income
<120% GOP 29 22 29 18 7 17 0
120-200% GOP 33 33 35 48 21 23 5
200-300% GOP 18 22 26 25 29 33 0
300-500% GOP 13 19 3 9 29 11 74
>500% GOP 7 4 6 0 14 0 21
APPENDIX F2
RESULTS OF CORRELATION CROSS-TABULATIONS
F2.1 Content Description

This Appendix presents the results of correlation cross-tabulations
referred to in sections 9.2.3.8(D) and 9.2.3.8(E) of the main body of the thesis.
The cross-tabulations presented are:
o between demographic variables (question 14) and expressed
acceptable landslide risk magnitudes (questions 6, 8 and 9) in tables
F2.1 to F2.30, and
o between demographic variables (question 14) and expressed
acceptable landslide risk magnitudes (questions 6, 8 and 9) in tables
F2.31 to F2.50.
The tables contain Pearson's correlation coefficient, R, which is a measure of the
linear association between the two variables in question. R =-1 indicates
perfect negative correlation, R = + 1 indicates perfect positive correlation, and
R=O no association.
F2.2 Correlation Between Demographic Variables and Expressed

Acceptable Landslide Risk Magnitudes
Table F2.1 Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic variables and

question 6, group 1.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE -.32 -.27 -.41 -.49 -.40 -.37 -.31
SEX .00 -.09 .01 .13 .14 .16 .19
SMOKE .00 .07 .04 -.07 -.08 -.10 -.21
CHILD -.21 -.37 -.36 -.41 -.24 -.25 -.26
EDU
INCOME -.13 -.06 -.29 -.43 -.41 -.40 -.31
LIVED .19 .34 .25 .00 -.05 -.19 -.21
STAY -.28 -.11 .02 -.12 -.13 -.23 -.30
OWN FLAT -.25 -.06 -.13 -.16 -.27 -.26 -.22
WORK .29 .40 .38 .35 .29 .22 .23

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .21 .21 .17 .32 .10 .17 .30
SEX .03 .05 .02 .10 .03 -.02 .09
SMOKE -.03 -.05 .09 .11 .05 .02 -.09
CHILD -.12 -.14 -.21 -.04 -.21 -.18 -.13
EDU .07 -.29 -.28 -.25 -.16 -.16 -.14
INCOME .04 .16 .03 .17 -.02 -.03 -.01
LIVED .03 .13 .18 .19 .18 .14 .02
STAY .07 -.07 -.10 -.03 -.10 -.08 .00
OWN FLAT -.07 -.12 -.18 -.09 -.16 -.13 .03
WORK .03 .05 -.06 .00 .1 0 .14 .04

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE -.05 .05 .04 .21 .09 .05 -.12
SEX -.13 -.17 -.16 -.27 -.21 -.39 -.20
SMOKE .07 -.07 .09 .03 .17 .15 .11
CHILD -.21 -.14 -.07 .00 -.03 .07 -.17
EDU .20 .15 .06 -.03 -.06 -.14 -.02
INCOME -.18 -.31 -.34 -.18 -.23 -.25 -.32
LIVED .50 .50 .49 .34 .34 .30 .19
STAY -.14 .04 .13 .20 .39 .39 .36
OWN FLAT -.20 -.15 -.20 -.03 -.06 -.01 -.07
WORK .12 -.04 -.24 -.30 -.36 -.35 -.21

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .02 -.08 -.11 -.16 -.14 -.09 -.12
SEX .25 .27 .31 .24 .19 .11 .03
SMOKE -.22 -.31 -.32 -.30 -.32 -.22 -.11
CHILD .11 .04 -.08 .01 .01 -.05 -.07
EDU -.23 -.22 -.15 -.12 -.14 -.10 -.12
INCOME .01 -.03 -.12 -.14 -.14 -.14 -.10
LIVED .10 -.08 -.09 -.12 -.24 -.28 -.27
STAY -.11 -.09 -.10 -.13 -.14 -.09 -.02

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .19 .07 -.06 .03 -.01 .05 -.01
SEX .05 .15 .30 .24 .20 .13 .06
SMOKE .03 -.03 -.32 -.19 -.13 -.04 .04
CHILD -.07 -.18 .05 .09 .12 .06 .06
EDU -.09 -.05 -.01 .03 .07 .19 .27
INCOME .08 -.01 -.09 -.03 .02 .07 .26
LIVED -.14 -.23 -.32 -.22 -.19 -.11 -.05
STAY .08 .10 .05 .03 .04 .06 .09

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .07 .12 .06 .03 .04 .07 .14
SEX .00 .08 .17 .25 .24 .24 .22
SMOKE .12 .19 .17 .21 .22 .24 .22
CHILD .24 .08 .07 .02 .04 .09 .03
EDU -.07 -.01 -.01 .05 .09 .20 .26
INCOME .04 -.13 -.10 -.10 -.06 -.02 .03
LIVED .13 .25 .18 .09 .07 .08 .10
STAY .08 .01 .01 .06 .14 .19 .24

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .00 -.16 -.17 -.18 -.23 -.21 -.11
SEX -.01 -.04 .02 .02 .00 .02 .00
SMOKE -.14 -.23 -.23 -.29 -.28 -.23 -.16
CHILD .17 .22 .23 .22 .26 .33 .34
EDU .00 .04 .01 -.11 -.13 -.11 -.13
INCOME -.06 -.11 -.04 -.07 .02 .08 .11
LIVED .00 -.04 -.09 -.13 -.17 -.18 -.19
STAY -.03 -.07 -.10 -.10 -.13 -.14 -.12

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .11 .09 .10 .05 .00 -.03 .04
SEX .12 .08 -.03 -.15 -.14 -.13 .00
SMOKE -.36 -.36 -.17 -.18 -.20 -.23 -.18
CHILD .03 -.30 -.03 -.05 -.08 -.10 -.01
EDU .04 -.09 .07 .25 .33 .34 .39
INCOME .40 .22 .28 .25 .16 .21 .30
LIVED .00 -.10 -.01 .00 .05 .03 .04
STAY .39 .32 .29 .23 .21 .19 .24

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE .03 -.11 -.19 -.22 -.29 -.30 -.36
SEX .02 .04 .02 .03 .04 .04 .06
SMOKE .05 .05 .02 .06 .1 0 .03 -.07
CHILD -.10 .19 .13 .12 .09 .06 .00
EDU .01 -.01 .11 .09 .08 .09 .12
INCOME -.13 -.21 -.15 -.10 -.07 .00 .06
LIVED -.26 -.19 -.25 -.19 -.23 -.27 -.34
STAY .18 .14 .08 .07 .13 .15 .09

VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

AGE -.16 .16 .28 .29 .33 .23
SEX
SMOKE -.28 -.23 -.01 -.01 .01 -.13
CHILD .00 -.12 -.14 -.27 -.22 -.06
EDU
INCOME .17 .01 .00 .05 .12 .05
LIVED .01 .12 .18 .14 .11 -.01
STAY .42 .33 .31 .28 .27 .22

question 8 and 9, group 1, property damage.
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE .10 .28 .12 .18 -.06 .04 .04 .00
SEX .26 .13 .25 .26 .19 .15 .20 .17
SMOKE -.08 -.05 -.15 .32 -.17 -.14 .08 -.09
CHILD -.10 -.11 -.10 .16 .11 .06 -.09 -.02
EDU
INCOME -.13 .03 -.09 -.09 -.19 -.11 -.13 -.20
LIVED -.17 -.04 -.27 -.26 -.47 -.31 -.18 -.25
STAY -.19 -.08 -.38 -.19 -.21 -.20 -.16 -.11
OWN FLAT -.13 .02 .05 -.04 -.21 -.16 .03 -.13
WORK .07 .01 .03 -.22 .04 .10 .08 .01

question 8 and 9, group 1, loss of life.
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE .36 .10 .22 .29 .04 .08 .04 .08
SEX .25 .19 .20 .21 .21 .22 .22 .22
SMOKE -.04 -.05 -.14 .22 -.15 -.18 -.16 -.18
CHILD .12 -.13 .07 .24 .25 .14 -.06 .14
EDU
INCOME .11 -.04 .08 .02 -.06 -.04 -.11 -.07
LIVED -.26 -.01 -.38 -.31 -.48 -.33 -.27 -.39
STAY -.24 -.09 -.44 -.13 -.21 -.16 -.21 -.25
OWN FLAT .07 -.07 -.02 .03 -.15 -.08 .02 -.11
WORK -.21 .08 -.07 -.25 .00 .06 .09 -.07

VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE -.08 .14 .05 .15 .07 .01 -.05 .05
SEX .08 .00 .15 .20 .14 .22 .05 .17
SMOKE .01 .08 .05 .09 .16 -.01 .1 0 .19
CHILD .36 .29 .38 .44 .35 .42 .29 .38
EDU -.01 -.13 -.07 -.18 -.05 -.03 -.06 .07
INCOME .23 .32 .26 .27 .34 .11 .03 .29
LIVED .17 .03 -.07 -.18 -.24 -.26 -.13 -.22
STAY .45 .34 .51 .44 .37 .45 .29 .39
OWN FLAT .26 .30 .40 .55 .44 .49 .26 .37
WORK .25 .05 .10 -.05 .00 .06 .12 .03

VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE -.23 .04 .01 .00 .07 .00 -.03 .02
SEX -.14 .08 .17 .15 .14 .18 .10 .19
SMOKE .06 .07 .08 .08 .16 .03 .03 .07
CHILD .10 .28 .36 .33 .31 .34 .26 .33
EDU .20 .01 -.06 -.04 -.04 .02 .04 .05
INCOME .01 .26 .26 .18 .32 .07 .04 .27
LIVED .01 -.04 -.15 -.21 -.25 -.31 -.16 -.26
STAY .30 .41 .48 .42 .37 .42 .34 .38
OWN FLAT .17 .35 .40 .45 .43 .37 .31 .33
WORK .24 .12 .03 .05 .02 .07 .17 .04

VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE .11 .05 .10 .25 .25 .04 .20 .09
SEX .12 .16 .15 .14 .02 -.01 .08 .15
SMOKE -.07 .14 .27 .32 .03 -.12 .01 .36
CHILD -.11 -.05 -.26 -.12 -.29 -.42 -.19 -.24
EDU -.07 -.09 .02 -.16 -.09 -.12 .08 -.06
INCOME .26 .26 .41 .35 .51 .37 .44 .42
LIVED -.64 -.58 -.59 -.68 -.66 -.51 -.45 -.66
STAY -.20 -.12 -.07 -.05 -.12 -.33 -.06 -.09
OWN FLAT .32 .28 .27 .27 .34 .07 .32 .21
WORK .01 .00 .10 -.17 -.03 -.08 .12 -.07

VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 09 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7

AGE .09 .01 .16 .19 .28 .27 .13 .22
SEX .14 .42 .06 -.06 .02 -.10 .00 .05
SMOKE .02 .12 .16 .22 .03 -.04 .05 .25
CHILD -.06 .03 -.24 -.22 -.22 -.45 -.40 -.23
EDU .27 .14 .00 -.13 -.17 -.06 .16 -.05
INCOME .28 .24 .44 .25 .49 .43 .38 .34
LIVED -.68 -.70 -.71 -.58 -.65 -.63 -.49 -.53
STAY -.30 -.25 -.18 -.05 -.17 -.24 -.33 -.21
OWN FLAT .31 .20 .26 .28 .25 .27 .26 .14
WORK .24 .22 .00 -.15 -.19 -.12 .21 -.15

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .15 .17 -.02 .02 .08 -.01 .10 -.02
SEX .04 .08 .18 .07 .15 .20 -.07 .15
SMOKE .14 -.09 .00 -.15 .02 -.14 -.03 -.01
CHILD -.14 -.19 -.08 .09 -.05 .09 .14 -.16
EDU -.01 -.06 .02 -.04 -.05 .09 -.04 .05
INCOME .06 -.11 .02 .01 .00 -.10 -.16 .00
LIVED .05 -.07 .00 -.11 -.04 .04 .20 -.12
STAY -.16 -.12 -.11 -.05 -.08 -.03 .07 -.01

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.03 -.05 -.10 -.01 .04 -.11 .05 -.07
SEX .09 .07 .09 .02 .08 .08 -.12 .06
SMOKE .05 -.02 .03 -.05 .07 -.03 .09 .06
CHILD -.17 -.13 -.02 .05 -.14 -.02 .11 -.22
EDU -.07 -.01 .07 .08 .03 .17 .05 .08
INCOME .10 -.05 .16 .11 .13 .01 .02 .06
LIVED -.15 -.10 -.15 -.11 -.14 -.06 .07 -.14
STAY -.09 -.24 -.04 -.10 -.05 -.11 .05 .04

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.25 -.20 -.33 -.41 -.34 -.32 -.28 -.26
SEX .23 .23 .33 .40 .36 .29 .23 .26
SMOKE -.27 -.21 -.29 -.26 -.20 -.19 -.13 -.20
CHILD .03 .07 .09 .21 .13 .25 .17 .29
EDU -.07 -.13 -.03 .03 .02 .06 .10 .20
INCOME -.01 .02 .00 .06 .15 .09 .14 .15
LIVED -.14 -.05 -.10 -.03 -.02 -.12 -.02 .00
STAY -.01 -.09 .05 .14 .12 -.20 -.10 -.11

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.26 -.32 -.36 -.35 -.33 -.29 -.28 -.31
SEX .35 .26 .38 .36 .32 .32 .23 .26
SMOKE -.24 -.35 -.29 -.28 -.15 -.19 -.07 -.17
CHILD .22 .12 .18 .21 .12 .25 .19 .27
EDU -.13 -.12 .00 -.04 .02 .01 .02 .01
INCOME .03 .00 .05 .06 .17 .1 0 .13 .12
LIVED -.15 -.21 -.15 -.04 -.01 -.16 -.03 -.16
STAY -.03 -.04 .09 .17 .03 -.17 -.08 -.03

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .23 .18 .13 .13 .09 .12 .17 .12
SEX .06 .13 .16 .06 .09 .18 .16 .17
SMOKE .00 .11 .12 .04 .02 .07 .10 .06
CHILD -.12 -.16 -.11 -.22 -.13 -.08 -.07 -.17
EDU -.04 .1 0 .11 .11 .13 .14 .19 .15
INCOME .14 .13 .21 .08 .13 .21 .24 .25
LIVED .01 .05 -.02 .03 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.07
STAY -.01 .09 .11 -.09 -.08 .04 .07 .02

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .10 .12 .12 .12 .13 .04 .11 .14
SEX .16 .12 .19 .07 .09 .22 .19 .20
SMOKE .02 .13 .09 .02 .05 .07 .06 .08
CHILD -.11 -.06 -.16 -.20 -.19 -.02 -.08 -.16
EDU .16 .04 .17 .15 .08 .19 .17 .20
INCOME .21 .21 .14 .11 .12 .22 .14 .14
LIVED -.02 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.12 -.07 -.01
STAY .02 .12 .06 -.06 -.09 .04 .07 .02

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.10 -.09 -.07 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.08 -.05
SEX .18 .21 .14 .10 .13 .23 .12 .15
SMOKE -.08 -.01 .02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 .01
CHILD .28 .21 .20 .21 .19 .19 .16 .16
EDU -.05 -.14 -.11 -.02 -.07 -.09 -.05 -.13
INCOME .13 .10 .04 .07 .07 .05 .05 .05
LIVED -.12 -.13 -.19 -.16 -.19 -.28 -.21 -.17
STAY -.11 -.13 -.14 -.07 -.13 -.18 -.14 -.19

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.01 -.06 -.01 -.02 .00 -.05 -.04 -.02
SEX .15 .20 .08 .08 .08 .19 .09 .07
SMOKE .05 -.03 .04 .01 .04 .00 .02 .07
CHILD .15 .23 .19 .21 .18 .15 .11 .13
EDU -.06 -.11 -.07 -.02 -.11 -.10 -.01 -.15
INCOME .04 .06 .00 .04 .01 .07 .03 .05
LIVED -.12 -.11 -.14 -.14 -.16 -.15 -.18 -.12
STAY -.15 -.17 -.14 -.08 -.14 -.13 -.15 -.15

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .33 .20 .19 .14 .19 -.10 .17 .28
SEX .07 .44 .28 .21 .24 .30 .18 .21
SMOKE .38 .36 .23 .04 .01 .41 -.13 .23
CHILD .15 .07 .35 .15 .14 .36 .14 .34
EDU -.52 -.44 -.04 -.11 -.10 -.10 -.21 -.52
INCOME -.23 -.14 -.11 -.17 -.05 -.19 -.13 -.10
LIVED .08 .47 .33 .11 .21 .16 -.02 .10
STAY .08 .28 .12 .01 .18 -.27 -.03 -.02

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .08 .18 .03 .04 .03 .1 0 .01 .15
SEX .28 .42 .22 .18 .33 .28 .10 .16
SMOKE .10 .44 -.02 -.07 -.04 .05 -.14 .01
CHILD .33 .38 .29 .15 .00 .23 .07 .18
EDU -.11 -.21 .14 .03 -.07 .00 -.07 -.31
INCOME -.12 -.06 .07 -.07 .00 -.15 -.16 -.12
LIVED .09 .40 .04 -.02 .09 .25 -.10 -.14
STAY -.08 .10 -.01 -.06 .08 .12 -.16 -.18

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.09 -.11 -.19 -.18 -.19 -.17 -.12 -.02
SEX .24 .07 .18 .11 .09 .15 .12 .04
SMOKE .03 .06 .00 -.01 -.02 -.02 .00 -.01
CHILD .20 .13 .19 .17 .12 .17 .21 .15
EDU .13 .18 .23 .25 .25 .25 .28 .12
INCOME .06 -.02 .04 .04 .04 .08 .13 .15
LIVED .15 .13 .18 .19 .16 .1 0 .16 .20
STAY .17 .30 .21 .23 .26 .28 .16 .22

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.12 -.17 -.19 -.23 -.18 -.18 -.24 -.09
SEX .12 .08 .07 .06 .06 .06 .02 .01
SMOKE .08 .09 .03 .00 .00 .03 -.02 .00
CHILD .14 .13 .15 .11 .10 .12 .09 .16
EDU .22 .24 .20 .20 .25 .25 .27 .15
INCOME .11 .03 .07 .06 .15 .12 .14 .16
LIVED .16 .14 .18 .15 .16 .11 .13 .18
STAY .19 .21 .19 .21 .23 .22 .22 .21

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE -.12 -.15 -.28 -.28 -.25 -.10 -.16 -.25
SEX .21
SMOKE -.21 -.06 -.31 -.29 -.24 -.18 -.27 -.29
CHILD -.22 -.05 .04 .09 .11 -.08 -.03 .11
EDU
INCOME -.08 .02 -.12 -.24 -.37 -.27 -.40 -.34
LIVED -.27 -.28 -.17 -.19 -.14 -.03 -.01 -.19
STAY .23 -.09 -.22 -.04 -.04 -.01 -.19 -.11

GROUP 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09

AGE .17 -.11 -.31 -.28 -.31 -.03 -.11 -.27
SEX
SMOKE .06 .02 -.25 -.23 -.21 -.05 -.19 -.23
CHILD -.19 -.04 .16 .21 .31 .12 .19 .12
EDU
INCOME .22 .05 .08 -.15 -.36 -.13 -.35 -.40
LIVED -.45 -.46 -.31 -.28 -.23 -.28 -.17 -.27
STAY -.03 -.04 -.05 .16 .09 .14 -.01 -.01
F2.3 Correlation Between Cognitive Variables and Expressed

Acceptable Landslide Risk Magnitudes
Table F2.31 Pearson correlation coefficients between question 4 and question 6,

group 1.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .00 .08 -.13 -.22 -.04 -.04 .02
04.2 .20 .18 .18 .28 .28 .23 .13
04.3 .25 .09 .09 .17 .18 .24 .31
04.4 .18 .07 .06 .08 -.03 -.01 .09
04.5 .17 .21 .27 .23 .05 -.01 -.04

group 2.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 -.16 -.26 -.37 -.26 -.37 -.29 -.22
04.2 .19 .07 -.05 -.11 .04 .02 .01
04.3 .00 -.15 -.23 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.03
04.4 .19 .11 .03 .06 .14 .07 .18
04.5 .08 -.02 -.11 .00 .02 .00 .15

group 3.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 -.47 -.40 -.41 -.41 -.42 -.45 -.34
04.2 .18 .13 .09 .1 0 .08 -.08 -.12
04.3 -.21 -.27 -.21 -.07 -.03 .03 -.26
04.4 .03 .05 .15 .31 .27 .29 .27
04.5 .31 .05 -.11 -.18 -.19 -.16 -.04

group 4.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .03 .13 .14 .11 .13 .08 .01
04.2 -.04 -.02 .03 .01 .00 -.01 .07
04.3 .14 .16 .03 .05 .05 .02 -.01
04.4 -.02 .13 .02 .00 -.01 -.05 -.09
04.5 -.03 .04 .08 .08 .18 .18 .17

group 5.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 -.08 -.12 -.05 .11 .12 .14 .26
04.2 .20 .22 .09 .16 .20 .15 .11
04.3 .19 .21 .37 .37 .26 .19 .08
04.4 -.13 -.19 .06 .08 .14 .13 .07
04.5 .03 .03 -.11 -.09 -.09 -.04 -.01

group 6.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .07 .07 .02 .08 .06 .07 .08
04.2 .02 .03 .05 .17 .20 .17 .26
04.3 .27 .21 .21 .19 .20 .30 .33
04.4 .28 .33 .33 .39 .30 .30 .28
04.5 .17 .25 .24 .29 .31 .35 .32

group 7.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .12 .18 .19 .23 .26 .26 .23
04.2 .21 .23 .22 .26 .25 .20 .15
04.3 .05 .05 .00 .02 .02 -.02 -.05
04.4 .07 .05 .07 .05 .13 .08 .05
04.5 -.10 .00 .05 .03 .03 .03 -.02

group 8.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .12 .17 .14 .08 .1 0 .13 .15
04.2 .14 .16 .41 .40 .36 .21 .21
04.3 .01 .10 .17 .14 .16 .04 .06
04.4 .09 .18 .48 .63 .60 .52 .42
04.5 .12 .07 .10 .04 .00 .02 -.10

group 9.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 -.05 .07 .11 .13 .04 .04 .05
04.2 -.13 -.03 -.07 -.03 .05 .07 .09
04.3 .03 .06 .05 .09 .13 .11 .16
04.4 -.07 -.07 -.09 .05 .04 .06 .05
04.5 .15 .18 .19 .24 .24 .26 .28

group 10.
VAR 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 06.5 06.6 06.7

04.1 .14 .13 .03 .06 .14 .18
04.2 .06 -.16 -.09 -.05 -.18 -.30
04.3 -.39 -.34 -.26 -.31 -.36 -.29
04.4 .00 .00 .04 .08 -.08 -.15
04.5 -.27 -.45 -.48 -.39 -.32 -.45
Table F2.41 R between q4 and q8, 9, group 1.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.23 -.23 -.28 -.36 -.35 -.33 -.42 -.19
04.2 .30 .11 .18 .30 .40 .29 .31 .23
04.3 .24 .27 .35 .06 .01 .00 .01 -.06
04.4 .33 .1 0 .21 .32 .41 .27 .29 .30
04.5 -.09 -.30 -.27 -.14 -.15 -.09 -.06 -.26
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.30 -.28 -.28 -.31 -.28 -.34 -.36 -.14
04.2 .23 .33 .27 .34 .36 .37 .32 .21
04.3 .41 .18 .38 .16 .09 .11 .11 -.04
04.4 .20 .37 .27 .47 .42 .42 .34 .31
04.5 -.30 -.08 -.32 -.17 -.20 -.08 -.19 -.32
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 06.7 09
04.1 .27 .33 .28 .16 .19 -.03 .28 .22
04.2 .41 .33 .27 .08 .40 .28 .37 .17
04.3 .28 .17 .31 .27 .27 .03 .22 .29
04.4 .15 .03 .08 -.04 .12 -.06 -.09 .06
04.5 -.04 -.21 -.09 -.11 -.06 -.13 -.19 -.07
Table F2.42 (continued) R between q4 and q8, 9, group 2.
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .18 .31 .29 .15 .15 .09 .26 .16
04.2 .39 .39 .27 .04 .40 .31 .30 .23
04.3 .07 .22 .27 .22 .20 .13 .14 .30
04.4 -.07 .02 .03 -.10 -.03 -.05 -.17 -.01
04.5 -.24 -.23 -.13 -.16 -.11 -.14 -.21 -.12
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .39 .28 -.24 -.05 .24 -.05 -.05 -.05
04.2 .09 -.01 .07 -.08 -.02 .20 .03 -.07
04.3 .18 .11 .05 -.04 .04 .10 .18 .09
04.4 .04 -.19 -.42 -.40 -.24 -.20 -.34 -.14
04.5 .16 .06 -.06 -.24 -.06 .03 -.15 -.34
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .07 .13 -.04 -.06 -.04 -.21 -.26 .01
04.2 -.09 -.11 -.14 -.23 -.08 .04 -.13 -.07
04.3 .00 .01 -.02 .00 -.09 -.13 -.04 .03
04.4 -.23 -.19 -.37 -.33 -.39 -.35 -.39 -.34
04.5 -.05 -.01 -.27 -.36 -.35 .02 -.38 -.32
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.10 .05 .09 -.03 -.01 .05 .07 -.08
04.2 .01 .05 .05 .01 .16 .13 -.14 .20
04.3 .01 .02 -.13 -.08 -.05 -.02 -.15 -.11
04.4 -.15 -.01 -.13 -.16 -.13 -.06 -.16 -.13
04.5 -.10 .08 -.04 -.06 -.10 -.02 -.14 -.12
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.09 -.01 .05 -.10 -.02 -.03 -.12 -.09
04.2 .17 .1 0 .19 .07 .30 .19 -.06 .20
04.3 .03 .05 -.20 -.06 -.15 -.07 -.20 -.04
04.4 -.04 -.03 -.10 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.07 -.05
04.5 -.03 .00 -.10 -.03 -.10 -.03 -.10 -.09
Table F2.45 R between q4 and qS, 9, group 5.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .31 .31 .26 .34 .32 .45 .41 .59
04.2 .43 .38 .37 .21 .25 .35 .25 .17
04.3 .12 .1 0 .02 -.07 -.13 .14 .18 .17
04.4 .16 .20 .16 .11 .04 .30 .27 .31
04.5 .12 .22 .11 .02 .06 .10 .01 -.03
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .40 .24 .35 .31 .36 .52 .45 .51
04.2 .37 .30 .26 .23 .18 .27 .19 .17
04.3 .18 .18 .09 -.01 -.08 .21 .17 .21
04.4 .21 .25 .20 .09 .07 .27 .20 .25
04.5 .04 .04 -.02 -.09 -.01 .01 -.06 -.07
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.22 -.10 .03 .06 .01 -.13 -.05 .04
04.2 .35 .39 .34 .36 .38 .42 .44 .47
04.3 .29 .32 .26 .35 .37 .34 .36 .32
04.4 .19 .24 .20 .15 .18 .28 .26 .28
04.5 -.10 .07 .13 .07 .14 .17 .10 .05
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.19 -.11 -.02 .03 .04 -.16 -.04 .04
04.2 .49 .40 .41 .37 .36 .50 .49 .45
04.3 .40 .30 .35 .35 .35 .38 .38 .36
04.4 .24 .20 .21 .16 .15 .34 .33 .31
04.5 -.07 .05 .07 .05 .09 .17 .08 -.01
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .06 .11 .00 .02 .05 -.03 -.04 .00
04.2 .02 -.15 -.02 -.05 -.03 .06 .00 -.08
04.3 .00 -.04 -.05 -.03 .01 -.05 -.10 -.09
04.4 .03 .02 .01 -.05 .00 .00 -.02 -.14
04.5 .08 .04 .03 -.04 -.01 .00 -.07 -.02
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .02 .08 .01 .01 .04 -.01 -.02 .02
04.2 -.02 -.05 -.02 .00 -.05 -.04 -.02 -.05
04.3 -.04 .03 -.04 -.07 -.03 -.05 -.06 -.10
04.4 -.02 .07 -.02 -.07 -.01 -.04 -.07 -.15
04.5 .07 .11 .04 .01 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.05
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .07 -.11 -.27 -.20 -.11 -.08 -.06 -.06
04.2 .26 .44 .49 .31 .38 .35 .12 .01
04.3 -.01 .23 .17 .01 .02 .06 -.01 -.18
04.4 -.14 -.06 .01 -.19 -.19 .24 -.25 -.33
04.5 .22 .24 .15 .15 .26 .13 .11 .34
Table F2.48 (continued) R between q4 and qS, 9, group 8.
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.19 -.23 -.12 -.18 .00 -.17 .00 .04
04.2 .19 .45 .25 .15 .06 .25 .04 -.06
04.3 -.01 .09 .06 .06 .03 .09 -.01 -.16
04.4 -.41 -.10 -.15 -.20 -.20 -.24 -.20 -.37
04.5 .12 .20 .19 .16 .22 .24 .12 .20
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.06 .07 -.01 .03 .02 -.02 -.09 -.01
04.2 .20 .23 .25 .25 .24 .26 .27 .17
04.3 .09 .07 .10 .10 .09 .22 .10 .08
04.4 .17 .12 .20 .17 .14 .21 .16 .06
04.5 .31 .18 .30 .28 .26 .33 .32 .21
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 -.01 .03 .03 .04 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.04
04.2 .19 .28 .23 .24 .21 .21 .25 .21
04.3 .15 .13 .09 .11 .04 .12 .05 .08
04.4 .15 .13 .16 .17 .11 .17 .13 .05
04.5 .28 .27 .23 .22 .22 .26 .23 .21
Table F2.50 R between q4 and qS, 9, group 10.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .11 .23 .15 .17 .12 .22 .08 .18
04.2 .29 .35 .15 .07 .02 .10 -.05 .09
04.3 -.15 -.29 -.31 -.37 -.22 -.43 -.30 -.25
04.4. -.27 -.31 -.35 -.26 -.15 -.27 -.23 -.24
04.5 -.17 .09 -.05 -.01 -.10 .01 -.01 -.10
LOSS OF LIFE
VAR 08.1 08.2 08.3 08.4 08.5 08.6 08.7 09
04.1 .34 .25 .11 .27 .19 .29 .23 .07
04.2 .18 .37 .34 .32 .38 .24 .27 .26
04.3 -.24 -.19 -.26 -.33 -.07 -.19 -.14 -.10
04.4 -.32 -.31 -.39 -.33 -.16 -.33 -.26 -.27
04.5 .21 .32 .19 .27 .19 .20 .13 .13
APPENDIX F3
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSES OF
QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
F3.1 Content Description

This Appendix presents the results of factor analyses for the landslide risk
perception questionnaire data referred to in section 9.2.4.2 of the main body of
the thesis. Figure F3.1 illustrates how the raw data was converted into the
presentation format for a three factor (m=3) analysis. Tables F3.1 to F3.9
present the results of two factor analyses (m=2), and Tables F3.10 to F3.15
present the results of three factor analyses(m=3).
Figure F3.1 Sample derivation of 3 factor table for group 6 from raw output.
GROUP: 6.00
FACTOR A N A L Y S I S
Analysis number l Replacement of missing values with the mean
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC)
Initial Statistics:
Variable Communality E'actor Eigenvalue Pet of Var: Cum Pet
*
Q4 l 1.00000 1.92536 38.5 38.5
-
Q4 2 1.00000 2 1.11422 22.3 60.8
*
Q4 3 1. 00000 3 . 8 9313 17.9 78.7
Q4 4 1.00000 * 4 .56937 11. 4 90.0
-
Q4 5 1.00000 5 .49793 10.0 100.0
PC extracted 3 factors.
Factor: Matrix:
E'actor: E'actor: 2 Factor J
Q4 1 -.29107 .58095 .75530
-
Q4 2 .11621 -.82831 . 4 9280
-
Q4 3 . 77253 .21812 .02236
-
Q4 4 .76453 -.07616 .27091
-
Q4 5 .80363 . 192 9 7 -.07692
-
E'inal Statistics:
Variable Communality * E'actor: Eigenvalue Pc~. of Var Cum Pet
Q4 1 .99270 1. 92536 38.5 38.5

-
Q4 2 .94245 2 1.11422 22.3 60.8
Q4 3 .64488 3 .89313 17.9 78.7
Q4 4 .66370
-
Q4 5 .68897 *
VARIMAX rotation l for extraction 1 in analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
V~I~ converged in 5 iterations.
Rotated Factor Matrix:
Factor 1 Factor 2
~
Q4 1 -.07446
-
Q4 2 7
Q4 3 .79869 -.07883
Shade in box for any
-
Q4 4 .75661 .30163 absolute value of
- loading ~ 0.35
Q4 5 .81236 -.11175
-
E'actor
2 Factor 3
Factor 1 .11084 -.21271
Factor 2 -.81264 .54293
Factor 3 .57212 .81239
GROUP:
T 0 R A N A L Y S I S
PC ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

ROUP? GROUPS GROUP9 GROUP10
2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
F3.2 Results of Factor Analyses for m =2
Table F3.1 PC Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.

GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP 8 GROUP 9
VAR 1
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.2 PC Analysis, EQUAMAX Rotation.
PC ANALYSIS, EQUAMAX ROTATION

04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP 6 GROUP 7 GROUP 8 GROUP 9 GROUP 10
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.3 PC Analysis, QUARTIMAX Rotation.
PC ANALYSIS, QUARTIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.4 PC Analysis, OBLIMIN Rotation.
PC ANALYSIS, OBLIMIN ROTATION

04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.5 ULS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.
ULS ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
ULS ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.6 GLS Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.
GLS ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
GLS ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR 1
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.7 MLAnalysis, VARIMAX Rotation.
ML ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

GROUP1 GROUP 2 GROUP3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5
VAR 1 2
04.1 NA NA
04.2 NA NA
04.3 NA NA
04.4 NA NA
04.5 NA NA
ML ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.8 PAF Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.
PAF ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

GROUP1 GROUP 2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP 5
VAR 1 2 2 2 2
04.1 NA NA
04.2 NA NA
04.3 NA NA
04.4 NA NA
04.5 NA NA

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.9 ALPHA Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.
ALPHA ANALYSIS, VARIMAX ROTATION

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP6 GROUP 7 GROUP 8 GROUP 9 GROUP10
VAR 1 2
04.1 NA NA
04.2 NA NA
04.3 NA NA
04.4 NA NA
04.5 NA NA
F3.3 Results of Factor Analyses for m =3
Table F3.10 PC Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.

GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP 5
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP6 GROUP7 GROUPS GROUP 9 GROUP10
VAR 1 2 3 2 2 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.11 PC Analysis, EQUAMAX Rotation.
PC ANALYSIS, EOUAMAX ROTATION

GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP 3 GROUP4 GROUP 5
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP6 GROUP7 GROUPS GROUP9 GROUP10
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.12 PC Analysis, QUARTIMAX Rotation.

GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP 5
VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

GROUP6 GROUP7 GROUP 8 GROUP9 GROUP10
VAR 2 2 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5
Table F3.13 PC Analysis, OBLIMIN Rotation.

VAR
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.S

VAR 1 2 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.S
Table F3.14 PAF Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.

VAR 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.S

VAR 1 2 2 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.S
Table F3.15 ALPHA Analysis, VARIMAX Rotation.

GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP 4 GROUPS
VAR 1 2 3 2 2 3
04.1 NA NA NA
04.2 NA NA NA
04.3 NA NA NA
04.4 NA NA NA
04.5 NA NA NA

GROUP 6 GROUPS GROUP9 GROUP10
VAR 2 2 3 3
04.1
04.2
04.3
04.4
04.5

Finlay PHD Thesis The Risk Assessment of Slope

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THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF SLOPES

Peter J. Finlay B.E. (Civil) Hons

A thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for

11-llfftemll)'ll-' 11 I NI.AY ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ........................... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

FOR OFFICK USK ON I.Y D11t of c:ompledo11 ofrequlremenll for Award:

A landslide risk assessment framework is developed for Hong Kong using

2.1.5.3 Methods of Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3 FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSLIDE RISK MANAGEMENT . . 61

4 DATA SOURCES, STUDY SCOPE AND METHODS . . . . . . . 69

5 PROBABILITY OF LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

5.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

5.4.6.2 Estimation ofF( for fill slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

6 VULNERABILITY TO LANDSLIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

7 CALCULATION OF LANDSLIDE RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

7 .3.3 General Effect of Landslide Zoning .................... . 350

8.1.3 Statistical Analysis of Rainfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

9 ACCEPTABLE RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION

9.1.2.1 World-Wide Landslide Losses................... 481

10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE

Table 5.14 Hong Kong- Occurrence of landslip related

Table 8.5 Properties of Pearson frequency curves (Cornish, 1970). . . 389

t;~~a8fs!~~~:.l.l~~~~l~~~ -~e.~t~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~...........

Table F2.5 Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic variables

Table F2.32 Pearson correlation coefficients between question 4 and

Figure 5.8 Frequency distribution of the number of berms (VlO _8)

Figure 6.5 Comparison of velocity profiles for different debris

Figure 6.13 Comparison of Japanese landslide and rock avalanche

Figure 6.16 The mobility of waste dump failures (Golder Associates,

Figure 6.60 Natural hillside debris flow initiated by

Figure 8.15 Regions in f3 1. /3z plane for various Pearson distributions

Figure 9.32 Maximum acceptable probabilities of landsliding for

Figure C4.1 7 K31A (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734

Symbol Description Section

C(h) The moment estimator of the ACF of a soil property

Symbol Description Section

Symbol Description Section

Symbol Description Section

Symbol Description Section

Symbol Description Section

Symbol Description Section

Abbreviation Description Section

Abbreviation Description Section

Abbreviation Description Section

Abbreviation Description ~:.

1.1 Background to Research

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 Objectives and Research Scope

o Outline a generic landslide risk assessment framework.

1.4 Layout of Thesis

The review of literature pertaining to the risk assessment of slopes is

2.1 General Risk Literature Review

2.1.1 Introduction to Risk

Figure 2.1 Age-standardised annual deaths per 100,000 in Australia

2.1.2 Overview of Definitions Used

196519751985 1995 1965197519851995

....-----. . - - - - Total risk of dying

~~~ Would have died anyway

A Total economic losses

20 A. Total insured losses

Frequency of great natural disasters

The inconsistencies in the definitions of risk reflect different frames of

A selection of reasonably representative definitions in the main areas is given

2.1.2.1 United Nations (1991)

t;a8fs!~:.l.l~~l~ -~e.~t~ ~ ~~~~~...........