Custodio vs.

CA An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
Doctrine:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part
of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely
constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of
their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse
of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the
following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present
in this case.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where
the damage was not a result of an injury is called damnum absque injuria and
the plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle
of abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must
concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury
to the plaintiff.

Facts:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way
going into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their
properties which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners
claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property
from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an
easement be created.
Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision
of the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages
(p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition.
Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the
property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

Held:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The
mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must
be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a
damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom. Damages are merely a part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
Algarra vs. Sandejas
G.R. No. L-8385; March 24, 1914
Facts:
Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries received from a car collision due
to the negligence of Sandejas causing him to be hospitalized for 10 days. After
being discharged, he could not work because he continued to receive
medical treatment. He also paid the doctor and medicine, with total P110.
Algarra sells the products of a distillery and earns 10% commission which
averages to P50/month. He had around 20 regular customers which took him 4
years to build. His wife tried to keep the business but only 4 customers remained.
Lower court: refused to allow him anything for his injury on the ground that the
doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco is opposed to such allowance and Viada which
does not pertain to personal injuries
Issue:
W/N there is actual or compensatory damage despite absence of malicious
intent (since negligence)? How is the damage measured?
Held:
YES. The plaintiff is awarded for medical expenses, his enforced absence from
his business, and for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits.
The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is to repair the wrong that
has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted, and not to impose a
penalty not dependent on nor graded by the intent with which the wrongful
act is done. It shall be construed to include all damages that the plaintiff may
he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession, or
occupation, and no other damages whatever.
Proceeding from a sense of natural justice, indemnity comprises, not only the
value of loss suffered, but also that of the prospective profit that was not
realized, and the obligation of the debtor in good faith is limited to such losses
and damages as were foreseen or might have been foreseen at the time the
obligation was incurred and which are a necessary consequence of his failure
of fulfillment
Evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in
reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an
essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical
certainty.
When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady
average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption
to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have
continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of that
nature.
When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further
shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the
cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt
that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant.
In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just
prior to the accident, but we also have its value to him after the accident.
The value of such a business depends mainly on the ordinary profits derived
from it. Such value cannot be ascertained without showing what the usual
profits are; nor are the ordinary profits incident to such a business contingent or
speculative, in the sense that excludes profits from consideration as an element
of damages. What they would have been, in the ordinary course of the
business, for a period during which it was interrupted, may be shown with
reasonable certainty. What effect extraordinary circumstances would have
had upon the business might be contingent and conjectural, and any profits
anticipated from such cause would be obnoxious to the objection that they are
merely speculative; but a history of the business, for a reasonable time prior to
a period of interruption, would enable the jury to determine how much would
be done under ordinary circumstances, and in the usual course, during the
given period; and the usual rate of profit being shown, of course the aggregate
becomes only a matter of calculation.
Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on commission, it
must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business to its former
proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those
he was receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he
should be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in much less time
than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident. One year should
be sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from
the business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury
to plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary,
there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages
to plaintiff's business at P250.
Packing vs. CA Heirs Of Borlado vs. Vda. De Bulan
G.R. No. 115117; June 8, 2000 G.R. No. 114118, August 28, 2001

Facts:
The Integrated Packaging Corp agreed to deliver to Fil-anchor paper co., inc.
3,450 reams of printing paper. Materials were to be paid within 90 days. The
Integrated entered into a contract with Philippine Appliance Corporation
(Philacor) to print three volumes of "Philacor Cultural Books." However, only 1,097
had been delivered so it wrote to Fil-anchor that delay will prejudice them.
In 1981, Fil-anchor delivered amounting to P766,101.70 of printing paper and
Integrated paid P97,200.00 which was applied to its back accounts covered by
delivery invoices. Integrated entered into an additional printing contract with
Philacor but it failed to comply so Philacor demanded compensation for the
delay and damage it suffered on account of Integrated's failure. Fil-anchor filed
a collection suit of P766,101.70 against Integrated representing unpaid
purchase price of printing paper bought on credit.
Facts:
In 1942, Serapio Borlado sold a lot to Francisco Bacero. in 1948, Francisco’s
widow Amparo, as legal guardian of her minor children, sold the lot to the
Spouses Bienvenido and Salvacion. They declared the lot in the name of Bulan
for Tax Declaration purposes and obtained the continuous, peaceful,
uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until November 4,
1972 when heirs of Simeon Borlado forcibly entered and wrested physical
possession from them.
The Spouses filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment and the MTC ruled in
favor of the spouses. The heirs were ordered to vacate the lot and pay 100
cavans of palay annually from 1972 until they vacate the premises and P5K for
attorney’s fees and cost of suit. The RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of cause
of action and the CA affirmed.

By way of counterclaim, Fil-anchor alleged the delivery was short of 2,875 reams Issue:
so it suffered actual damages and failed to realize expected profits and that W/N the 100 cavans of palay is an acceptable form of damages
complaint was prematurely filed.
Held:
RTC ruled against Integrated. CA reversed. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable to pay
respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they
Issue: vacate the premises of the land in question.
W/N Integrated should be awarded compensatory and moral damages.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We
Held: YES. CA affirmed cannot sustain the award. Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.
Suspension of its deliveries to Integrated whenever the latter failed to pay on
time, as in this case, is legally justified under the second paragraph of Article
1583 of the Civil Code hence the Fil-anchor did not violate the order
agreement. Fil-anchor is not a party to the agreement between Philacor neither
is it a contract pour autrui so no direct bearing indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered, that is to say actual damages
(damnum emergens), but also profits which the obligee failed to obtain,
referred to as compensatory damages (lucrum cessans).

However, to justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary

to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual
amount of loss. Trial court in arriving at the amount are mere estimates or self-
serving claim of unrealized profit prepared by Integrated deletion of the award
of moral damages is proper, since private respondent could not be held liable
for breach of contract. Moral damages may be awarded when in a breach of
contract, the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.
Finally, since the award of moral damages is eliminated, so must the award for
attorney's fees be also deleted.
Ramos v CA
G.R. No. 124354; December 29, 1999
Facts:
ACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall
bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them
that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as
planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the
anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda
to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was
witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist
saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to
undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist omitted to exercise due care in
intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
“good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for
the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC
were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused
the comatose condition of Ramos.
Held:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages. Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact
of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case. This doctrine finds application in this case. On the
day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the
private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart
from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after
the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the
thing speaks for itself!
CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents
the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner
Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000
attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
.
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when
both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these
damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard
care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly
inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate
damages would therefore be reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would
also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which
her body would normally undergo through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been
in a comatose state for over fourteen years now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The
family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of
P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.
2002: MR Ruling
The Court enumerated the issues to be resolved in this case as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT DR. ORLINO HOSAKA (SURGEON) IS LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENCE;
Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as a
surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. That there is a trend in
American jurisprudence to do away with this doctrine does not mean that this
Court will ipso facto follow said trend. From the facts on record it can be
logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very
least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda. First, it
was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of
Erlinda. Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the
patient, Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team.
The counsel for Dr. Hosaka admitted that in practice, the anesthesiologist would
also have to observe the surgeon’s acts during the surgical process and calls
the attention of the surgeon whenever necessary in the course of the treatment.
It is quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the patient,
which responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the
condition of the patient.
Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner Erlinda promptly, he
arrived more than (3) hours late for the scheduled operation. He also scheduled
two procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at
different hospitals. The long period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him
certainly aggravated the anxiety that she must have been feeling. It could be
safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the administration of anesthesia
on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the patient’s anxiety usually causes the
outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high blood pressure or
disturbances in the heart rhythm.
Dr. Hosaka’s conduct is violative, not only of his duty as a physician "to serve the
interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude, giving them always his best
talent and skill," but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person,
in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.
2. WHETHER OR NOT DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE;
appropriate prescription of preoperative medications as necessary to the
conduct of anesthesia.
Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda.
As she herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation itself, one hour before the scheduled operation.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act was, therefore, an act of exceptional
negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence
and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s
centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is,
therefore, a clear indicium of her negligence.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HOSPITAL (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) IS
LIABLE FOR ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY THEIR VISITING
CONSULTANT SURGEON AND ANESTHESIOLOGIST.
Respondent DLSMC’s was initially held as solidarily liable with respondent
doctors under Article 2180 of the Civil Code since there exists an employer-
employee relationship. DLSMC however contends that applying the four-fold
test, DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of the respondent doctors.
The Court ruled in favor of DLMC: As explained by respondent, that the
admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC’s medical staff is first decided
upon by the Credentials Committee thereof. The Credentials Committee then
recommends to DLSMC’s Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of
the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the
committee’s recommendation. The medical director/hospital administrator
merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee.
Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants
for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients.
Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his
patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital
and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by
the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the
hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory
personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.
Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner
Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for
hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment.

The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation,

whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed with. This involves taking
the patient’s medical history, reviewing his current drug therapy, conducting
physical examination, interpreting laboratory data, and determining the