Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009

AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the
Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as follows:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter
fatal injuries which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment
unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet
down as the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded.
Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas
makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6

On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun
advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a napangas ni
Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7

Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr.
and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the
memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will
finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner
proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there,
decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being
summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka
naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to
pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and
with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.

When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina
about the mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five times but
nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.
He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.

After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;

2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱300,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of
earning, plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.10

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March 13, 2006.

Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE
RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION,
A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.

III.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE
HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.

BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12

In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.

In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who penned
the decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred
from, misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.14

At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries.
Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically,
petitioner disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction. In support, he
amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner
asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.

The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy
was the proximate cause of his death.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to consider
the petitioner’s appeal with favor.

The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to
reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings
of the trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension
of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant case as would justify a departure from the established rule.

Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the determination of the credibility of
witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses.
But while the situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from
the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged
adverse consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a
travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of justice.

We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who
had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot
render a valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the
proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas
Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided
during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.

In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He can
rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of
law.19

The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body embalmed, well preserved.

Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.

Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms.,
upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left hand.

Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right side.

No fractures noted.

Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.

Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia
on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with
the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological findings show mild fibrosis of the
myocardium.

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish
brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show
pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.

Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic
infiltration.1avvphi1

Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially digested food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20

At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on
the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not
cause his death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us with the causal connection
between the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chy’s
myocardial infarction:

ATTY. TUMARU:

Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented
the flowing of blood into the heart?

A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that
made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels
itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22

By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or
the thickening and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing
arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this point:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?

A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness]
of hypertension, no previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement
[cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26

The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or
formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to
coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir, it could be.29

In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death
of the deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?

A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.

Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?

A: It could be, sir.

Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.30

It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate
constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision
are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was
primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.31lawph!l

In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was
previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine
laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:

x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition
of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:

x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the
foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result
of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although
the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the
death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said
condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must
appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have
resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was in good condition.

Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is,
reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight
(8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of
₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account.
For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:42

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the victim at the annual net income which time of this death)
would have been received

by the heirs for support.43

Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At
the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of
₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted
₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted
evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600 as
loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2 (₱127,200)]

= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600

= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600

= ₱1,229,600

We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as stipulated by the parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim.47 However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-
CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and
burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed
the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises,
they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not
injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets
made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
(Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own
spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this
fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should
have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and
finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not
present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in
the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to
punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of
this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible
crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed
and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet
pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that
where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing
to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by
the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the
extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the
crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside
interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within
the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of
the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously
doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers from the
mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create
alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law
of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside.
However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of
attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference
between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable.
Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were
attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is
merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two
categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed
had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made
the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the
latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the
contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal
Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the
Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt
irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender
cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other
hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an
attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.
Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of
criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 77776 June 27, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO AGAPINAY, ALEX AGAPINAY, FORTUNATO AGAPINAY, DANTE AGAPINAY, DELFIN AGAPINAY and
CIRILO AGAPINAY, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Juan T. Antonio for accused-appellants.

SARMIENTO, J.:

On April 11, 1983, the then Acting Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan, Alejandro Pulido, filed an information accusing Romeo, Alex,
Fortunato, Dante, Delfin, and Cirilo, all surnamed Agapinay, of murder, as a consequence of the fatal stabbing of Virgilio
Paino on April 13, 1981. The same reads as follows:

That on or about April 13, 1981, in the municipality of Gonzaga, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Romeo Agapinay, Alex Agapinay, Fortunate
Agapinay, Dante Agapinay, Delfin Agapinay and Cirilo Agapinay, armed with bolos (lilit) and stones,
conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, with treachery
and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack,
chase, stone and stab, one, Virgilio Paino, inflicting upon him wounds on his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law. 1

On arraignment, all six accused pleaded "not guilty." 2

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the Agapinays are brothers, except Romeo, who is Delfin's son, 3and that along with
Virgilio Paino, Amor Flores, and Eufemio Paino, they were hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. On April 12, 1981,
they set out, along with other complement, on a fishing venture in the sea of Batangan, in Gonzaga, Cagayan. They returned to shore
the following day, April 13, 1981, whereupon, they unloaded their catch and spread out their fishnet on the sand to dry. Thereafter,
except for Romeo Agapinay, they mended the net, with thread and small knives, under portable shed. 4 Meanwhile, Virgilio Paino
took the shed and placed it where he and Alex and Cirilo Agapinay were. Moments later, Romeo Agapinay appeared and confronted
Virgilio, and berated him for taking the shed without permission. Virgilio said that they were going to use it. Shortly, the two
exchanged words and tempers apparently flared. Romeo lunged at Virgilio with a hunting knife, six inches long, that hit his right arm.
Virgilio ran away but Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay met him and held on to his arms. Romeo approached him and dealt him a second
stab at the right side of his back. Virgilio, however, managed to extricate himself again and ran away. While he was running, Delfin,
Alex, Fortunate, Dante, and Cirilo took turns in stoning him. All of a sudden Amor Flores appeared and plunged a knife at the back of
Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed. Meanwhile Julia cried, "Kill him and we will bury him." 5
The prosecution also established that Cirilo and Delfin had attacked Eufemio Paino, a brother of Virgilio, with their own knives but
the latter defended himself with a paddle. The former ran away. The rest of the Agapinays likewise fled. 6

Antonio and Eufemio Paino, brothers of Virgilio, and Artemio Siababa brought the wounded Virgilio to his (Virgilio's) house. 7 The
latter supposedly executed an ante-mortem statement there wherein he implicated the Agapinays as well as Amor Flores, as
responsible for the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to the Don Alfonso Enrile Hospital at Gonzaga. He was dead, however, on
arrival. 8

Police Corporal Rugino Sunico, when informed of the stabbing, went to the scene to investigate but Virgilio had already been brought
to his home. Later, Patrolman Sunico took a supposed confession of Romeo Agapinay who surrendered to him at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of April 13,1981. Meanwhile, Cirilo and Delfin Agapinay proceeded to the police headquarters to complain that Eufemio
Paino also assaulted them. They refused to make any further statement. 9

The cadaver of Virgilio was later autopsied. Dr. Silverio Salvanera's post-mortem examination showed that the late Virgilio Agapinay
suffered the following injuries:

... (a) 2 cm. long, penetrating to the liver, directed upwards and medially, located at the level of the 7th intercostal
space along the mid-clavicular line; (b) 2.5 cm. long penetrating to the lungs, directed upwards and medially, located
at the level of the 7th intercostal space along posterior axillary line; and (c) Thru and thru wound at the medial
aspect between the distal and medial 3rd of the right arm, 2.5 cm. point of entrance, 1.5 cm. point of exit, 6.2 cm.
apart. 10

After the prosecution rested, the accused presented their evidence.

Cirilo Agapinay stated that the incident started when Virgilio Paino grabbed the atal (a piece of wood used to roll boats ashore)
without his, Cirilo's, permission. Cirilo resented this but Virgilio allegedly clubbed him and that he lost consciousness. Delfin and
Fortunato Agapinay brought him to the hospital. 11

Delfin Agapinay, on the other hand, testified that he was with

Cirilo and a certain Jesus Alveza on that fateful morning at the seashore of Batangan mending fishnet. There, Virgilio confronted them
and asked why Cirilo took the atal without his permission. Cirilo declared that he had Virgilio's companions' permission. It was then
that Virgilio clubbed Cirilo until the latter passed out. He claimed that Romeo, Dante, Alex, and Fortunato Agapinay were not around
when the incident happened. 12 He testified, finally, that Virgilio attacked them with a knife and that he, together with Cirilo, sustained
injuries.

Fortunato Agapinay contended that he was asleep aboard the boat at the time and was roused by his nephew, Alfredo Maximo, and
whereupon, he saw men fighting. Cirilo and Delfin Agapinay, together with Amor Flores, were allegedly on their way home, whom he
followed. Upon reaching their house, Romeo Agapinay appeared and confessed that he had stabbed Virgilio Paino. 13

Alex Agapinay testified that he was with Salvador and Mariano Agapinay at that time repairing a lamp. They then saw Fely Rose
Paino running, who informed them that Virgilio Paino had been stabbed, and that Romeo Agapinay was the culprit. Dante Agapinay
corroborated his testimony. 14

Romeo Agapinay, who had been tagged as the knife-wielder, alleged that on April 13, 1981, he was at the shore of Batangan, in
Buguey, mending net. He claimed that he was with his father, Delfin Agapinay, and uncle, Cirilo Agapinay, a certain Martin Maximo,
Jesus Alveza, and unidentified complement. It was then that Virgilio Paino suddenly appeared "uttering bad words to his father
Delfin."15 Virgilio then allegedly struck Cirilo Agapinay and his father with a paddle. He stated that he was forced to stab Virgilio
three times. Virgilio allegedly later went home alone. 16

The defense pictured Virgilio as having been drunk at that time, and that he came on strong without provocation, haranguing the
Agapinays for two hours. 17

The trial judge rejected the accused's claim of defense of relative 18 and convicted all six accused of the crime of murder, attended by
treachery. 19 He also noted that it was not Virgilio who assaulted Cirilo and Delfin Agapinay with a knife, but rather, Eufemio Paino.
He held that the Agapinays can not thus say that they had been defending themselves (against Virgilio).

The lower court also found that the Agapinays had conspired to kill Virgilio Paino and thus held them, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, "all principals by participation."
In giving credence to the prosecution's evidence, the trial court observed that Virgilio could not have given a valid cause for the
Agapinays to assault him. ("[I]t is hard to believe that the late Virgilio just clubbed accused Cirilo and Delfin without cause." 20 )

Virgilio could not have blamed the Agapinays, as the latter claim, for taking the atal (the act that, as alleged by the Agapinays,
precipitated the fight), because it was Fortunato Agapinay who was the head of the complement, and if any person should begrudge
the Agapinays' act, the logical one was he, Fortunate. ("Thus, there is no plausible reason for the late Virgilio to have clubbed Cirilo
and Delfin as the deceased was not the owner of the atal ..." 21)

The trial court likewise found that Cirilo and Delfin were not defending themselves against Virgilio when they suffered stab wounds
of their own, but rather, against Eufemio Paino. It lent faith and credence to Corporal Sunico's testimony who heard both Cirilo and
Delfin pin the blame on "Temyong" (Eufemio) Paino. 22

The court commanded the Provincial Fiscal to indict Julia Rapada as alleged principal by inducement for having ordered the
Agapinays to "[k]ill Virgilio Paino, " 23 as well as Amor Flores, to account for their crimes. (Neither of them is accused in the
Information.)

It found that no evident premeditation attended the killing but appreciated treachery and conspiracy. The dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds accused Romeo Agapinay, Delfin Agapinay, Cirilo
Agapinay, Fortunato Agapinay, Alex Agapinay and Dante Agapinay, all principals by participation, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder prescribed and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences each of herein accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Virgilio Paino the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS and to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. 24

The six accused now submit that the Decision under appeal should be reversed, and that the trial court erred in the following terms:

FIRST. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT ROMEO AGAPINAY STABBED THE
DECEASED TWICE.

SECOND. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DELFIN

AGAPINAY, ALEX AGAPINAY, FORTUNATO AGAPINAY TOOK TURNS IN STONING THE VICTIM.

THIRD. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING AS PART OF THE EVIDENCE THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (1ST STAGE) CONDUCTED BY THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE.

FOURTH. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF THE
APPELLANTS WHEN THEY COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED.

FIFTH. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY.

SIXTH. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANTS TO THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA.

SEVENTH. — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANTS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO FIND
OUT IF THE EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED CONSTITUTES NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS A BASIS FOR A NEW
TRIAL. 25

We affirm, with modifications, the Decision appealed from.

To begin with, the errors, except the last, assigned by the accused refer to credibility of witnesses, and in a long line of cases, we have
held that "credibility" is the domain of the trial court.
There indeed seems to be no controversy that the Agapinays (that is, the six accused) are guilty of participating in the slay of Virgilio
Paino: (1) Romeo admitted having stabbed him; (2) thereafter, Delfin and Fortunato held him, whereupon, Romeo thrust another stab;
(3) as Virgilio ran away, Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo threw rocks at him.

Although it appears that it was Amor Flores who dealt Virgilio the death blow, the Agapinays can not deny that they had the intent to
kill him, and performed acts to carry that out, for which they should be held accountable under the law. 26

With respect to Amor Flores, we agree with the trial judge that he should be brought to the bar of justice. As regards, however, Julia
Rapada, it is the opinion of this Court, and based on the records, that she can not be held liable (as a principal by inducement). Her
words, " Kill him and we will bury him" 27 amount but to imprudent utterances said in the excitement of the hour or in the heat of
anger (it does not appear whether or not Rapada held a grudge against the deceased), and not, rather, in the nature of a command that
had to be obeyed. It has been held:

xxx xxx xxx

... A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless
act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason
predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his
suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the: expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in
applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be
made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the
determining cause of the crime. 28

xxx xxx xxx

We also believe that conspiracy has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt to hold all six accused as co-principals in the crime of
murder. As the lower court observed, the stabbing happened in the "spur of the moment." 29 Conspiracy means, however, an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it. 30 If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no
conspiracy to speak of.

Hence, the parties' liability should be considered individually. 31

It is our considered opinion that only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of murder. Romeo is
guilty, as he admitted in open court, by direct participation, 32 while Delfin and Fortunate are liable as principals by cooperation. 33 In
holding the victim by his arms, both allowed Romeo to inflict upon him a stab wound. 34

Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, on the other hand, should be held as simple accomplices 35 for their acts of pelting the victim with rocks.
Since the deceased had already sustained two stab wounds, the act of hurling rocks at him was not indispensable to justify holding
them legally liable as principals. 36 There is further no doubt that murder has been committed, but not because of treachery, as ruled by
the trial court. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack, by which the victim is rendered hors d'combat, as in an ambuscade,
or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to
himself. 37 The manner of attack must be shown. 38 There is no such showing here.

The fact that Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not demonstrate treachery. Rather,
what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken
advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured. 39

Abuse of superiority qualifies the taking of the life of another into murder. 40 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's Decision insofar
as it found Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunate, all surnamed Agapinay, guilty as co-principals of murder. We however, find Alex, Dante,
and Cirilo, also all surnamed Agapinay, guilty as accomplices in the commission of the same offense.

Anent the last error assigned, that the lower court erred in not allowing a new trial, we sustain the action of His Honor, Judge Felipe
Tumacder. As he held, the appeal having been perfected, "[t]he Court ... has no more jurisdiction to entertain" 41 any incident.

The counsel for the accused alleges that "the only reason why the Notice of Appeal was filed was because on January 30, 1987, the
Motion for New Trial had not been formally resolved or denied, hence, the motion was filed as a precautionary measure not to lose the
right to appeal which was set to expire on February 3, 1987. 42 The accused's counsel has apparently ignored the fact that "[t]he time
during which a motion ... for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted ... 43 and hence, he faced no risk of losing the right to
appeal in the event his motion was denied. 44

As we noted, the trial court repudiated the accused's posturing of defense of relatives, so also do we. "Defense of relatives" requires
the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation have been given by the person
attacked. 45 Of these three requisites, "unlawful aggression" is said to be the most essential and primary, without which any "defense"
is not possible or justified. Thus: "If there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel." 46 In that event, not
even incomplete self-defense can be validly invoked. 47

The Court is not persuaded that Virgilio Paino had acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the Agapinays' deadly
wrath. The records show that all that Virgilio did was to address offensive language to Delfin Agapinay. 48 In one case, this Court held
that 'injurious words or threats 49 do not amount to unlawful aggression. Assuming that Virgilio did strike Delfin and Romeo Agapinay
with a paddle, the expedients reveals that thereafter and upon having been stabbed in the right arm by Romeo, he, Virgilio, ran away.
It has also been ruled that: "Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray." 50

The Court finds, however, that the accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation 51 (or vindication of a
grave offense 52 or passion or obfuscation. 53) since clearly, the deceased uttered offending words ("vulva of your mother, if you are
talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts" 54) that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently. While the
trial court disregarded this particular piece of evidence, the entire picture seems to indicate that Virgilio Paino did say bad words that
made the Agapinays act in retaliation.

WHEREFORE, Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunate, all surnamed Agapinay, are ORDERED to undergo an indeterminate sentence of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, 4 months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum. Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, also surnamed Agapinay, are ORDERED to undergo an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum. All six accused are also ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Virgilio Paino, the
sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31139 October 12, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENATO MORAL, ABRAHAM ANTONIO, and LEOPOLDO PEDRIGOSA, defendants, ABRAHAM ANTONIO and
LEOPOLDO PEDRIGOSA, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon A. Gonzales for defendant Leopoldo Pedrigosa.

Felix Falgin for defendant Abraham Antonio.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

In Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-160-Rizal (19290) of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, the State charged Renato Moral, as
principal, and Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio, as accomplices, of the crime of murder committed, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1969, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Renato Moral, conspiring and confederating
together with his principal co-accused, Alexander Moral, who is still at large, and both the two of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, at night time, a circumstance deliberately sought to insure success in the
commission of the crime, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and by means of treachery did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with knives one Teodoro Casa who, as a result thereof,
sustained stab wounds on the vital parts of his body which directly caused his death;

That the accused accomplices, Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in
the commission of the crime by the principal accused by simultaneous acts, that is, by then and there throwing
stones at said Teodoro Casa.

The People's version of the facts of the case is, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Ang usapin ay nagpatuloy laban kina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa at Abraham Antonio lamang, sapagkat si
Alexander Moral ay hindi pa nadarakip hanggang sa kasalukuyan.

Ang panig ng taga-usig na Pamahalaang Pampurok na Tagausig na si Cornelio M. Melendres, ay nagharap ng mga
katibayan upang patunayan ang kasalanang pagpatay na ibinibintang sa mga nasasakdal. Na noong ika-siyam at
kalahati (9:30) ng gabi, ika-3 ng Mayo, 1969, si Teodoro Casa ay nasawi dahilan sa mga tinamong sugat na bunga
ng pananakit ng mga nasasakdal na sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio, at Alexander Moral,
na ang hull ay nakakalaya pa hanggang sa kasalukuyan.

Ang nasawing si Teodoro Casa ay nakatira sa itaas ng isang paupahang bahay sa daang General del Pilar, Bangkal,
Makati, Rizal na kasama ang kanyang kapatid na si Luz Casa at ang asawa niyang si Ceferino Cerbo, sa bahay na ito
ay umuupa rin sa silong ang magkapatid na Moral, mga kabilang sa mga nasasakdal sa usaping ito.

Tatlong linggo bago nasawi si Teodoro Casa, ang mga akusadong sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham
Antonio at si Alexander Moral, ay nagkaroon ng inuman ng alak sa silong ng bahay na kanilang inuupahan. Sila ay
qqqnag inuman hanggang sa sila ay mangagkalasingan at ang bawat isa sa kanila ay sumisigaw at kumakanta tanda
ng kanilang kalasingan. Ang isa sa pangkat ay nagsabi pa ng ganito: 'Putang ina ninyong lahat, hinahamon namin
kung sino ang magsasabi na kami ay nakatira sa bahay ng manok.' Ang mga kaguluhang bunga ng pag-iinuman ng
alak ng pangkat na ito ay hindi minabuti ng kanilang kasambahay na si Teodoro Casa dahilang sila ay nabubulahaw
lalung-lalo na ang kanyang kapatid na si Luz Casa na may anak na apat na buwan ang gulang. Dahil dito ay
kinausap ni Teodoro Casa ang mga akusadong sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio, at si
Alexander Moral, at kanyang pinakiusapan na huminahon sila at itigil ang kanilang pag-iingay, subalit ipinagwalang
bahala ang pakiusap na ito at ang nasabing pangkat ay nagpatuloy sa kanilang pag-iingay. Ang ginawa ni Teodoro
Casa ay nagtungo sa bahay ng may-ari ng bahay na kanilang inuupahan upang ipaalam ang bagay na iyon. Hindi
nagtagal, ang may-ari ng bahay ay dumating at nakiusap din sa mga akusado na huwag gagawa ng anumang
kaingayan na nakabubulahaw sa mga kasambahay nila. Subalit sa kabila ng mga pakiusap na ito ng may-ari ng
bahay, ang mga nasasakdal na sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio, at si Alexander Moral ay
nagpatuloy sa kanilang madalas na pag-iinuman at panggugulo sa loob ng kabahayan. At noon ngang ika-siyam at
kalahati (9:30) ng gabi, Sabado noon ng ika-3 ng Mayo, 1969, habang ang nasabing pangkat ay nag-iinuman na
naman ng alak, si Luz Casa ay nakarinig ng salita buhat kay Renato Moral, na ganito ang sinasabi, "Yayariin natin si
Teodoro Casa." Di naglaon ay dumating buhat sa pagtatrabaho ang nasawing si Teodoro Casa at bago siya
naghapunan ay nagtungo muna siya sa kanilang palikuran. Samantalang si Luz Casa, sa pangambang isagawa ng
pangkat ang kanilang masamang balak ay sinundan niya ang kanyang kapatid. Nakita niya na nang lumabas mula sa
palikuran ang kapatid niyang si Teodoro Casa, ito ay sinalubong ni Renato Moral na may hawak na patalim at
kapagdaka ay sinaksak si Teodoro Casa, kasabay ang sabing, 'Yayariin kita Bagamat sugatan si Teodoro Casa
nakuha pa rin niyang tumakbo ng palabas ng bahay. Siya ay sinundang mull ni Renato Moral, sumugod na rin ang
kapatid niyang si Alexander Moral pati ang mga kasabwat na sina Leopoldo Pedrigosa at Abraham Antonio. Nang
abutan ng magkapatid na Moral si Teodoro Casa, sinaksak ni Alexander Moral sa likod ang nasawi samantalang
sinaksak muli sa harapan ni Renato Moral si Teodoro Casa. Nang nakadapa na sa lupa ng pasubsob ang nasawi ay
siya'y pinagpupukpok ng bato at bote sa ulo ni Abraham Antonio, samantalang ang isa pang kasabwat na si
Leopoldo Pedrigosa ay pinagpupukpok din ng bote ang iba't ibang bahagi ng katawan ng biktima. Dahilan sa
kabiglaanan at matinding pagkatakot, walang nagawa si Luz Casa kundi ang magsisigaw at magtitili ng paghingi ng
saklolo sa mga kalapit-bahay. Ang mga pangyayaring unang nababanggit ay sa ngayon sa pahayag ni Luz Casa
pangunahing saksi ng taga-usig.
 Ang panig ng taga-usig ay nagharap ng iba pang mga saksi na nagpapatunay at kumikilala na pinaslang ng mga
nasasakdal si Teodoro Casa. Ang mga saksing ito ay sina Andres Guinanao at Ceferino Cerbo, ang huli ay bayaw ng
nasawi. Kinilala nila na ang sumaksak sa nasawi ay ang mga magkapatid na Moral, sina Renato at Alexander.
Kinilala rin nila na matapos masaksak ang nasawi, si Abraham Antonio ay pinagbabato at pinagpupukpok ng bote sa
ulo ang nasawi, samantalang si Leopoldo Pedrigosa ay tuwirang tumulong din sa pamamagitan ng pagpukpok ng
bote sa iba't ibang bahagi ng katawan ng nasawi. Ipinahayag pa rin ni Ceferino Cerbo, bayaw ng nasawi na tinangka
niyang awatin at pigilin ang mga magkapatid na Moral pati ang mga kasabwat nila sa pananakit sa kanyang bayaw,
ngunit sa halip ay siya'y binigwasan ng saksak ng magkapatid na Moral at siya'y nasugatan, katunayan nagprisinta
ng isang certifico ng pagkakagamot ang nasabing saksi, na ngayon ay bahagi ng mga kasulatan ng usaping ito.

Kabilang pa rin sa mga saksi ng taga-usig ay si Cpl. Manolo Dizon, Kagawad ng Kagawaran ng Pulisya ng bayan ng
Makati, Rizal, na siyang nag-imbestiga sa krimeng naganap at siya'y nagbigay ng ulat na nagpapatunay na ang mga
may kagagawan sa naganap na krimen ay ang mga magkapatid na Moral, na sina Renato at Alexander, at ang mga
kasabwat nilang sina Abraham Antonio at Leopoldo Pedrigosa, ito ay napapaloob sa nasabing ulat na may markang
'Exhibit C'. Si Pfc. Conrado de Gamo, Kagawad ng nasabing Kagawaran ng Pulisya ay nagpahayag din na kanyang
naaresto si Renato Moral na natagpuan niyang nagtatago sa ilalim ng kama ng bahay na pinagtataguan.

Dahilan sa mga malulubhang sugat na tinamo ni Teodoro Casa bunga ng mga pananakit ng mga nasasakdal, siya ay
namatay ng oras ding yaon, at hindi na nagkaroon ng pagkakataong Idulog sa pagamutan upang iligtas ang buhay
niya, ng mga kaanak nito.

Ang bangkay ng nasawing si Teodoro Casa ay sinuri ni Dr. Dario C. Nalagan isang opisyal ng Medico-Legal ng
"National Bureau of Investigation". Ayon sa kanyang "Necropsy Report", na may markang "Exhibit A" ang nasawi
ay nagtamo ng mga sugat na sumusunod: ...

The accused Renato Moral denied having inflicted the wounds on Teodoro Casa which resulted in the latter's death. He declared that
on May 3, 1969, he was working as a mason in White Plains, Quezon City. After washing up at the end of the working day, he got his
wages and went to the house of Rodolfo Reodique at Bangkal, Makati, Rizal, arriving thereat at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
From there, he and Alexander Moral and his cousin, Abraham Antonio, went to the house of Alexander Moral at Gen. del Pilar Street,
also at Bangkal, Makati, Rizal. Upon arrival at the house of Alexander Moral, at about 9:00 o'clock that evening, he requested
Abraham Antonio to buy some rice for their supper. When Abraham Antonio returned with the rice, he (Renato Moral) went to the
faucet at the back of the house in order to wash it. While at the faucet, the deceased Teodoro Casa, who was with his brother-in-law
Ceferino Cerbo, hit him repeatedly with a beer bottle on the head. He tried to parry it, but he did not know if Teodoro Casa was hit by
his "stab". His face was bloody and he tried to run towards the street, but his way was blocked by Andres Ginanao who was holding a
piece of wood. When Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo caught up with him, he was again hit several times by Teodoro Casa. Then,
he fainted. When he regained consciousness, he ran towards the house of his friend Rodolfo Reodique. 1

The accused Abraham Antonio, for his part, invoked defense of stranger, claiming that when he saw his friend Renato Moral being
attacked by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, he came to the succor of his friend by throwing a stone at the latter's assailants, His
testimony reads, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Q On May 3, 1969 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening do you know where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A I was with Renato Moral and Alexander Moral, Sir.

Q Where?

A At Bangkal, Makati, Rizal, Sir.

Q Where did you come from on May 3, 1969 before you go to Bangkal, Makati, Rizal?

A From White Plains, Sir.

Q And where did you proceed when you go to Bangkal?

A After we have came from White Plains, we proceeded to the house of Rodolfo Reodique, Sir.

Q After coming from the house of Rodolfo Reodique, where did you go?

A We went to the house of Alexander Moral, Sir.

Q Were you able to reach the house of Alexander Moral?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And when you reached the house of Alexander Moral, what did you do?

A When we reached there I was asked to buy rice, Sir.

Q Did you buy rice?

A Yes, sir.

Q After buying rice, what did you do?

A After I have bought rice Alexander Moral and Renato Moral washed the rice, Sir.

Q Did they wash the rice?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What about you, what did you do?

A I was pumping the gas stove, Sir.

Q When Renato Moral and Alexander Moral were washing the rice and you were pumping the gas
stove, do you know what happened, if any?

A I heard a shout at the side of the house, Sir.

Q And when you heard that shout, do you know who shouted?

A I do not know whose voice, I just heard the word, 'aray', Sir.

Q What did you do when you heard that shout?

A I went out, Sir.

Q When you went out, what did you see outside?

A I saw somebody ran around the house of Alexander Moral, Sir.

Q Do you know the person who was running around the house of Alexander Moral?

A I do not know him, Sir.

Q And where did you go when you heard somebody shouted and you saw somebody was running
around the house?

A I went to the road because the person who was running around the house went to that direction,
Sir.
 Q When you went to the direction of the road, did you see that person whom you said that running
around the house and went to the direction of the road?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who was that person?

A I saw Renato Moral being hit by someone, Sir.

Q Did you know the person who was hitting Renato Moral?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who?

A Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, Sir.

Q When this Renato Moral was being hit by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, what happened to
Renato Moral?

A When I saw the two, Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo hitting Renato Moral I got a stone and
threw at, Sir.

Q When you threw stone, did you hit somebody?

A I do not know if somebody was hit because Teodoro Casa chased me, Sir.

Q What about Alexander Moral, do you know where was he at that time?

A He was there, Sir.

Q Do you know what Alexander Moral doing at that time, if any when Renato Moral was being
molded (mauled) by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo?

A No, Sir.

Q What about Leopoldo Pedrigosa, do you know where he was at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where was he?

A He was at the house of Rodolfo Reodique, Sir.2

The accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime and interposed the defense
of alibi. According to him, he remained in the house of Rodolfo Reodique, a place about 20 meters away from the residence of
Teodoro Casa where the stabbing incident took place, after Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio went to the house of Alexander
Moral and came to know of the incident only when Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio, who were both wounded, returned to the
house of Rodolfo Reodique.3

The trial court, however, rejected the defendants' claims and found them guilty of the charge and sentenced each of them to suffer the
death penalty; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.

On September 18, 1975, the accused Renato Moral died while confined at the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinglupa, Rizal, and the case
against him was dismissed. 4

The death sentence having been imposed, the case is now before the Court for mandatory review.
The accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa insists on his innocence and assails the trial court for believing the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution which he claims to be unreliable and untrustworthy in view of contradictions and discrepancies in their testimonies
which impair their credibility. He further claims that the imposition of the death penalty is unwarranted as he had only been charged
and found guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime and not as a principal thereof.

The accused Abraham Antonio also assails the trial court for giving credit to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
which are allegedly biased and inherently weak; and for sentencing him to suffer the death penalty since he, like his co-accused
Leopoldo Pedrigosa, had only been charged and found guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime.

After examining the record of the case, We find no compelling reasons to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. The testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses regarding the participation of the accused in the commission of the crime are clear, precise, positive and
straightforward and included details consistent with human nature and experience. There was also no doubt as to their ability to
Identify the assailants as the place was illuminated and the deceased, as well as the accused, are well known to them. While it may be
true that there were flaws or discrepancies in their statements, concerning the incident, the said flaws or discrepancies refer to minor
details and are not of such magnitude as to destroy their credibility or the veracity of their declaration.

The defense of alibi interposed by the accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa is weak and unconvincing. According to him, he was in the house
of his friend, Rodolfo Reodique, when the incident complained of happened and came to know of the stabbing incident only when
Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio returned to the house of Rodolfo Reodique. However, the house of Rodolfo Reodique was only
20 meters away from the residence of the victim, Teodoro Casa, where the incident happened so that it was not physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Moreover, the actual participation of Leopoldo Pedrigosa in the
commission of the crime was vividly described by witnesses for the prosecution. His denial cannot stand against the positive
declarations of the said witnesses.

The defense of Abraham Antonio that he acted in defense of stranger is untenable. In order to invoke defense of strangers, the accused
must prove unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused; that there was a reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. In the instant case, it had been established that when the deceased Teodoro Casa descended from their second floor apartment
to answer a call of nature at their backyard, he was followed by the accused Renato Moral who, without any provocation, stabbed the
deceased saying: "Yayariin kita"; that when the said deceased tried to escape by running away, he was pursued by Renato Moral and
Alexander Moral who took turns in stabbing him, as a result of which, he fell to the ground; that while the deceased was lying
prostrate on the ground, Abraham Antonio hit him on the head with a bottle and a stone; that, not to be outdone, Leopoldo Pedrigosa
also hit the victim on various parts of his body with a stone; and that it was only when Renato Moral said: "Bagsak na iyan. Patay na
iyan" that they stopped.

As could be seen, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Teodoro Casa since it was the accused Renato Moral
who stabbed the deceased without any provocation and, hence, the aggressor. There was also no reasonable necessity of the means
employed since the deceased was unarmed at the time, 5 and was already lying prostrate on the ground and bleeding from his wounds
inflicted upon him by Alexander Moral and Renato Moral when the accused Abraham Antonio hit him with a stone. Accordingly, the
accused Abraham Antonio cannot be said to have legally acted in defense of a stranger when he hit the deceased with a stone.

The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery, since the deceased Teodoro Casa was stabbed suddenly and unexpectedly by
Alexander Moral and Renato Moral as he came out of the toilet after answering a call of nature. The attack was such that the deceased
was unable to prepare a defense for himself thus enabling his assailants to accomplish their criminal act without any risk to themselves
arising from the defense that the deceased might put up. The accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa were correctly
adjudged guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime. It is an established fact that after Renato Moral and Alexander Moral
had delivered mortal stab wounds upon the deceased Teodoro Casa, the accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa took turns
in hitting him with beer bottles and stones. It has been held that the infliction of wounds by a co accused after the principal accused
had delivered the fatal blows is guilty thereof as an accomplice. 6

The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, nocturnity, abuse of superior
strength, and intoxication in fixing the penalty imposed upon the accused. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
cannot be considered against the accused since there is no evidence of a plan to kin the victim and that sufficient time had elapsed
from the conception of the plan and its execution to allow the accused to cooly reflect upon the consequences of their act and permit
their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will In the instant case, Luz Casa declared that she heard the accused Renato
Moral remark: "Yayariin natin si Teodoro Casa pagdating niya" while the accused were drinking, which started at about 5:30 o'clock
in the afternoon, and sometime before Teodoro Casa arrived at 9:30 o'clock that night. 7 She was not precise, however, as to the exact
hour when she heard Renato Moral utter those words, so that only a few hours, if not minutes, had elapsed from the time Renato
Moral made the remark up to the arrival of Teodoro Casa.
Nocturnity cannot also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance since there is no evidence that the accused had purposely sought
the cover of the darkness of the night to commit the crime; nor is there evidence that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime.
Besides, Andres Ginanao declared that the place where the stabbing incident took place was illuminated by a big bulb from a Meralco
Street post.8 Ceferino Cerbo also declared that the back of their house where the toilet was situated was well lighted. 9

Abuse of superior strength cannot also be appreciated in fixing the penalty since abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery. 10

The alternative circumstance of intoxication was also appreciated by the trial court as an aggravating circumstance. Said the
Court: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Napatunayan din na ang mga nasasakdal ay may ugaling umiinom ng alak at sinadya nila ang pagiinuman ng alak
ng araw na isagawa nila ang krimen.

The record, however, does not show excessive and habitual use of intoxicating drinks, or that the accused purposely got drunk in order
to commit the crime. Luz Casa merely declared that the accused were drinking liquor on the night in question and were telling
stories, 11 and that they were singing, laughing, and shouting and were very jolly. 12 While she further said that the accused used to
drink liquor every Saturday night, her testimony is not competent proof that the accused are drunkards whose habit is to get drunk, and
whose inebriety has become habitual, in order that intoxication may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the
fact that the accused were intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime should instead, be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.

The trial court further erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio who were
merely charged, and found guilty, as accomplices in the commission of the crime. Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consumated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the
commission of the consummated felony. Since the imposable penalty upon the principal of a consumated crime of murder is reclusion
temporal, in its maximum period, to death, 13 the penalty to be imposed upon the accomplice is not death, as decreed by the trial
court, but, the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period,
or from 10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance to offset it, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty should be from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED with the modification that the accused Abraham
Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa are ordered to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased
is hereby increased to P30,000.00. With proportionate costs against the accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee, Actg. CJ., Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the
canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide)
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed
ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him
from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San
Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-
legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for
the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close
relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all
the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated
anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm
which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis
 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been
re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of
Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring
water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some companions;
 That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33,
Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch
incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the
hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful
act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded
to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the
deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death
was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for
all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v.
Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to
work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the
first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the
predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction
of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of
the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
 prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his
death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate
approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally,
but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their
mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive
name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called
risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of
patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle
groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As
in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous
and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately
severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp.
1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking
him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty
of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier
forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather
unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No.
74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only
by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It
will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause
for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.