Class Action Complaint. A.M. Et Al. v. San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools.

Case 5:19-cv-01944 Document 1 Filed 10/10/19 Page 1 of 45 Page ID #:1
1
Scott E. Rahn, Esq. (SBN 222528)
2 rahns@rmolawyers.com
Sean D. Muntz, Esq. (SBN 223549)
3 muntzs@rmolawyers.com
David G. Greco (SBN 299635)
4 grecod@rmolawyers.com
RMO LLP
5 2029 Century Park East, Suite 2910
Los Angeles, CA 90067
6 Phone: (424) 320-9444
7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the proposed classes.
8 United States District Court
9 Central District of California – Eastern Division
10
A.M., a minor, by and through Case No.: 5:19-cv-01944
11 Guardians Ad Litem Lisa Mendez and
Anthony Mendez; Class Action Complaint
12 Lisa Mendez, an individual; and
Anthony Mendez, an individual, On behalf of the Student Class:*
13 1. Civil Rights Violations Under 42
Plaintiffs, U.S.C. § 1983;
14 2. Violations of the Americans with
v.
15
Disabilities Act;
San Bernardino County 3. Violations of Section 504 of the
16 Superintendent of Schools, a Rehabilitation Act;
government entity, 4. Negligence;
17 5. Negligent hiring, retention, and/or
Defendant.
18
supervision;
6. Civil Rights Violations Under Cal. Civ.
19 Code § 52.1;
On behalf of the Guardian Class:**
20 7. Civil Rights Violations Under 42
21
U.S.C. § 1983;
8. Civil Rights Violations Under Cal.
22 Civ. Code § 52.1; and
9. Negligent Infliction of Emotional
23 Distress.
24
* Defined in paragraph 127.
25
** Defined in paragraph 137.
26
27 Jury Trial Demanded
28
Class Action Complaint

1 A. Introduction
2 1. In February of 2014, Dr. Keith Belton—then the district educational
3 psychologist for Defendant—resigned. In his resignation letter, Dr. Belton wrote that
4 he could no longer work for an organization that worked to silence “employees who
5 expose child abuse” rather than “addressing the systemic problem.”
6 2. Since then, nothing has changed. Defendant continues to maintain and
7 enforce a system-wide culture and policy of allowing and then concealing the abuse
8 of special needs students. This policy and culture is facilitated by Defendant’s failure
9 to adequately audit its practices or meaningfully update its safety standards within
10 the last decade. Defendant’s policies are so outdated that they include standards that
11 have been decisively ruled illegal for many years.
12 3. Defendant employs personnel who do not take the safety of special
13 needs students seriously. In many cases, those employees also abuse these special
14 needs students—who are most vulnerable to harm and have the least ability to speak
15 out—either through direct physical harm, emotional abuse, or gross neglect. When
16 these abuses occur, Defendant does not discipline or remove the employees. Instead,
17 they allow the employees to continue to work with special needs students, without
18 behavioral intervention, additional supervision, or any kind of safeguard.
19 4. Some of the ways in which Defendant’s employees abuse special needs
20 students include but are not limited to: stepping on students’ stomachs; clapping or
21 screaming loudly near students whose disabilities make them sensitive to sound;
22 aggressively grabbing students, sometimes causing extreme bruising; scratching
23 students, sometimes causing permanently disfiguring scars; undressing students;
24 threatening to shock students with a cattle prod; and handling students without proper
25 caution, leading to various harms including bleeding eye sockets and broken legs.
26 5. As Dr. Belton’s letter describes, rather than working to make school
27 safer for special needs students, Defendant and its employees systematically and
28 consistently work to cover up the abuse, including by lying to guardians about the
1
Class Action complaint

1 cause of students’ injuries. Defendant also maintains and enforces a policy and
2 culture that discourages employees from speaking out about abuse of special needs
3 students.
4 6. Some of the techniques Defendant and its employees use to conceal the
5 abuse include but are not limited to: falsifying or altering documents, including
6 retroactively creating incident reports for injuries that happened weeks or months
7 before; lying to guardians when guardians inquire about the cause of students’
8 injuries; withholding student’s records from students’ guardians, advocates, and their
9 attorneys; deliberately allowing evidence to disappear, for example by allowing
10 surveillance footage to be taped over; and manufacturing demonstrably false records
11 to support Defendant and its employees’ false accounts of students’ injuries.
12 7. Plaintiffs seek a ruling from this Court that the systemic culture,
13 policies, and practices of Defendant violate the statutory and constitutional rights of
14 all members of the Student Class and the Guardian Class, both of which are defined
15 below. Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, nominal, compensatory, and punitive
16 relief against Defendant. Plaintiffs pray this Court issue relief directing that
17 Defendant reform its policies in a manner that ends the culture of endangering,
18 abusing, and concealing the abuse of students in Defendant’s educational programs.
19 B. Parties
20 8. Plaintiff A.M. is a minor with disabilities who was enrolled in
21 Defendant’s educational program for special needs students. She is the daughter of
22 Plaintiffs Lisa and Anthony Mendez. She resides in the County of San Bernardino.
23 9. Lisa Mendez is an individual residing in the County of San Bernardino,
24 California. She is mother to and guardian ad litem for Plaintiff A.M.
25 10. Anthony Mendez is an individual residing in the County of San
26 Bernardino, California. He is father to and guardian ad litem for Plaintiff A.M.
27 11. Defendant San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools is a
28 government entity, the function of which is to deliver educational services to students,
2
1 including Plaintiff A.M. Its principal place of operation is in San Bernardino County,
2 California.
3 12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that other entities or persons, whose
4 identities are not yet known, contributed to the injuries giving rise to this complaint.
5 These unknown parties may be individual, corporate, governmental, and/or some
6 other form of existence; they acted as the employees, agents, or other representatives
7 of the named Defendant. Plaintiffs will seek leave of court to amend the complaint to
8 allege the names of these unknown parties, when and if they are ascertained.
9 C. Jurisdiction & Venue
10 13. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
11 28 U.S.C. § 1343, because it involves Federal questions under the Constitution and
12 laws of the United States of America, including but not limited to Section 504 of the
13 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.) and the Fourteenth Amendment
14 to the United States Constitution (under 48 U.S.C. § 1983). The Court has jurisdiction
15 over Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because the state law causes
16 of action arise from the same common nucleus of operative facts as Plaintiffs’ Federal
17 causes of action.
18 14. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because
19 Defendant’s principal place of operation is within the Central District of California
20 and a large portion of the events giving rise to this suit occurred in the Central District
21 of California. Plaintiffs also reside in the Central District of California.
22 D. Facts
23 1. Defendant maintains a system-wide policy of allowing, then concealing,
the abuse of special needs students.
24
25 15. Defendant maintains, encourages, fosters, furthers, and facilitates and

26 executes a policy of allowing the abuse and neglect of special needs students. It also
27 maintains, encourages, fosters, furthers, and facilitates and executes a policy of lying
28 to the caretakers and guardians of special needs students, to avoid responsibility for
3
1 the neglect and abuse and to avoid implementing the types of solutions that would be
2 required to correct the large-scale allowance of abuse and neglect.
3 16. This entity-wide systemic policy has allowed and continues to allow the
4 abuse of special needs students. It also has allowed and continues to allow the
5 concealment of the abuse, and the concealment of Defendant’s failure to adequately
6 correct its policies and procedures.
7 17. Several of Defendant’s employees have been involved in and/or
8 overseen the abuse of multiple special needs students and the later attempts to cover
9 up that abuse. That includes: Paul McCluskey, Diane Hannett, Thomas Hannett,
10 Randy Elphic, Dawn Menge, Mary Johnson, Ted Alejandre, and Terri Williams.
11 18. Prior employees of Defendant have testified under oath that they were
12 instructed to conceal child abuse. For example, former employee Rose Szliagyi
13 testified in a workers’ compensation proceeding that Thomas Hannett instructed her
14 to not discuss any child abuse issues with students’ guardians.
15 19. The following are known examples of Defendant’s implementation of
16 this policy, to the detriment of special needs students and their guardians.1 In addition
17 to the below, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that other students in A.M.’s
18 classroom and in Defendant’s educational program have suffered physical abuse,
19 emotional abuse, and neglect.
20 a. Jordan W.
21 20. Jordan W. was a special needs student enrolled in Defendant’s
22 educational program.
23 21. In November of 2013, a surveillance camera captured Snowline
24 employees physically and emotionally abusing Jordan W. Specifically, the
25
26
1
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs note that some of the victims discussed in this
27 complaint have filed and sometimes settled lawsuits and other claims related to
the abuse they suffered. The abuse and the cover-up, however, is still evidence of
28 Defendant’s system-wide culture, practice, and policy of allowing and concealing
abuse of special needs students.
4
1 employees pushed him, bent his fingers backwards, took off his clothes, yelled at
2 him, grabbed his face, and referenced a cattle prod.
3 22. Defendant’s employees withheld the details and video of the incident
4 from school psychologist Dr. Belton for eighteen days. When he finally did see it,
5 Dr. Belton wrote a report detailing the abuse. Dr. Belton’s supervisors told him he
6 could not show the videotape to Jordan’s parents. Jordan’s parents requested to see
7 the video at a meeting between them and school officials. Snowline employee Dianne
8 Hannett told Jordan’s parents they could not view the video without a warrant.
9 23. Dr. Belton shared his report with Jordan’s parents, who had not
10 previously been notified of this incident.
11 24. Despite the videotaped abuse of Jordan W., Defendant continued to
12 allow the same employees to supervise Jordan—leaving him in danger of further
13 abuse. Defendant removed the abusive employees from supervising Jordan W. only
14 after Dr. Belton notified Jordan W.’s parents about the incident.
15 25. Defendant’s employees accused Belton of failing to fill out a Child
16 Protective Services report related to the Jordan W. abuse. These employees knew that
17 Dr. Belton had been told that such a report had already been prepared by Karyn
18 Stemrich, Director of Transportation for Snowline Joint Unified School District. As
19 such, no report was required, and accusing Dr. Belton of failing to complete the report
20 was improper. Dr. Belton believes that this accusation was designed to discredit him
21 after he reported Jordan’s abuse to Jordan’s parents. The accusation was further
22 proved spurious because another employee of Defendant—Mr. Vaughn—had
23 similarly not filed a duplicate report yet received no discipline.
24 26. Defendant’s employees also accused Dr. Belton of endangering the
25 confidential information of Jordan W. because Dr. Belton took the videotape of the
26 abuse home so he could prepare the report that he shared with Jordan W.’s parents.
27 This was again a spurious accusation designed to intimidate Dr. Belton and retaliate
28 against him for sharing with Jordan. W.’s parents that Jordan. W. had been abused.
5
1 27. Defendant’s employees further reprimanded Dr. Belton for including the
2 following phrase in the report he prepared about Jordan W.’s abuse: “It is the
3 professional judgment of this case manager that the behavior of the school staff on
4 [November 14th] was abusive and worth of reporting to proper authorities and
5 Jordan’s parents.”
6 28. Defendant also accused Dr. Belton of failing to “protect fellow
7 employees from intentional embarrassment or disparagement.” Dr. Belton’s response
8 to this accusation accurately summarizes why the accusation is retaliatory:
9 [The accusation] suggests that part of my duty was to cover
up the wrongdoing of fellow employees. It further
10 demonstrates that part of the reason I was subjected to
administrative leave and now have received a letter of
11 reprimand was because I refused to do so. The same is true
of [the] statement that I did not follow the Code of Ethics
12 which required me to “act in a spirit of collaboration with
fellow colleagues.” I cannot imagine collaborating with the
13 staff in mistreating a student.
14 29. Defendant also reprimanded Dr. Belton for not representing Defendant
15 in a “positive light.”
16 30. The above-discussed accusations are only a sample of the problems that
17 Defendant alleged toward Dr. Belton, in retaliation for notifying Jordan W.’s parents
18 that Jordan W. had been abused.
19 b. Zoe D.
20 31. Zoe D. was a student enrolled in Defendant’s educational program. She
21 was transported to and from school by Snowline Joint Unified School District’s
22 transportation department. Snowline Transportation is part of Defendant San
23 Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools.
24 32. In December 2013, Snowline Transportation Director Karyn Stemrich
25 alerted Dr. Belton to another incident of physical abuse of a student that had been
26 recorded on a school bus. The student’s initials were Z.D. Stemrich told Dr. Belton
27 that she believed Dr. Belton was the only person who would do something about it.
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1 33. Stemrich described the video to Dr. Belton. When Dr. Belton went to
2 view the video, Stemrich told him that she had received several phone calls and had
3 been instructed not to meet with him. Dr. Belton recounted the conversations he had
4 with Stemrich in an email to several of Superintendent’s and Snowline’s employees.
5 Dr. Belton stated that Superintendent “may have a systemic problem with staff
6 abusing special needs children . . . .” He further wrote that “[i]nstead of wasting
7 valuable time and efforts attempting to silence mandated reporters’ [sic] of child
8 abuse, [Defendant] may want to strongly consider addressing the problem head-on
9 and training staff.”
10 34. After the incidents involving Jordan W. and Zoe D., Defendant placed
11 Dr. Belton on administrative leave, accusing him of “unprofessional conduct.”2
12 35. Defendant took no action to correct its policies or practices in response
13 to Dr. Belton’s resignation letter.
14 c. Maya S.
15 36. Maya S. was a student enrolled in Defendant’s educational program.
16 37. In 2014, Maya’s mother, Mark Clark, filed a complaint stating that
17 Defendant had violated state and/or federal education law. See 34 C.F.R.
18 300.153(b)(1).
19 38. The complaint stated that Maya “came home with black and purple
20 marks” on the back of her left arm, and scrapes with bleeding.” The complaint states
21 that, the next day, Ms. Clark went to her daughter’s classroom to speak with the
22 teacher, Jay Anderson. The complaint states that Anderson admitted to utilizing a
23 “wrist lock” procedure. The complaint also stated that educational providers were
24 pressing down on Maya’s stomach in order to elicit a bowel movement.
25 39. When Defendant began its investigation of Maya S.’s injuries, the
26 California Department of Education (“CDOE”) scheduled an interview with her
27
2
While he was on administrative leave, Dr. Belton came into possession of an email
28 sent by the parent of a disabled child. The email expressed concerns that the
parent’s special needs child was being physically mishandled.
7
1 mother, Mary Clark. Ms. Clark insisted on having an attorney with her during the
2 interview. Rather than let Ms. Clark conduct the interview with her attorney present,
3 the CDOE refused to proceed. Its report read:
4 On October 29, 2014, an interview was scheduled with the
Complainant at a mutually agreeable location. Although the
5 Complainant appeared as arranged, she was accompanied by an
attorney. As she insisted on having her attorney present during the
6 interview, the investigators decided not to proceed with the
interview.
7
8 40. Because the interview did not proceed as planned, Ms. Clark was unable
9 to provide the names of persons who could corroborate her account of the abuse her
10 daughter suffered.3
11 41. Defendant ultimately denied any liability and refused to provide further
12 information to Ms. Clark about Maya’s injuries.
13 d. Joseph B.
14 42. Joseph B. was, and may still be, a special education student enrolled in
15 Defendant’s educational services.
16 43. Around May of 2018, Defendant’s employee Dawn Menge grabbed
17 Joseph’s arm and dragged it across a table in the classroom. This contact resulted in
18 a cut on Joseph’s arm.
19 44. Rather than fill out an incident report, as is required by Defendant’s
20 policy, Menge forced Joseph to fill out the report himself.
21 45. No action was taken to discipline or coach Menge after this injury or the
22 other issues discussed above.
23 e. Alexandra V.
24 46. Alexandra is a special needs student. She is non-verbal. Mr. and Mrs.
25 Varela are Alexandra’s parents. Paul McCluskey was Alexandra’s teacher during the
26
3
27 The CDOE did not find evidence sufficient to support Ms. Clark’s allegations.
However, this is because Defendant’s employees lied to investigators about,
28 among other things, the causes of bruises and scratching on students and the
intervention techniques used in the classroom.
8
1 2015–2016 school years. Thomas Hannett is a Principal and employee of Defendant.

2 Hannett was McCluskey’s supervisor.
3 47. During the 2015-2016 school year, Mrs. Varela asked McCluskey eight
4 separate times about bruising to Alexandra. In or around late November or early
5 December of 2015, Alexandra suffered bruising to her right arm. The bruising
6 spanned from the upper quarter of Alexandra’s forearm all the way down to her wrist.
7 When interviewed by police officers about the bruising, McCluskey opined that
8 Alexandra could have caused the bruising herself by “fighting against” the straps on
9 her wheelchair that keep her arms in place. Forensic child abuse physician Dr. Amy
10 Young determined that it was not plausible that Alexandra caused the bruise herself.
11 48. In January of 2016, Alexandra came home with bruising to her right
12 hand. McCluskey told the police that he did not recall seeing this bruising. In
13 February of 2016, Alexandra suffered large unexplained bruising on her right arm.
14 McCluskey told police officers he was not familiar with the February 11, 2016
15 bruising.
16 49. In May 2016, Alexandra came home with five deep scratches on her
17 arm. Forensic child abuse physician Dr. Amy Young determined that the deep
18 scratches were not likely to have been self-inflicted, because Alexandra lacks
19 movement in her hands and her arm could not have bent downward far enough to
20 cause the wounds.
21 50. Mrs. Varela spoke to McCluskey about the scratches in the morning of
22 May 4, 2016.
23 51. McCluskey has provided inconsistent explanations about the deep
24 scratches. He wrote a total of three incident reports about the injury. Hannett did not
25 sign the “Incident Report” that McCluskey filled out about the scratches, despite that
26 it is standard practice to do so.
27
28
9
1 52. Initially, McCuskey told Mrs. Varela that Alexandra caused the deep
2 scratches herself by banging her arm against the table. Later, McCluskey alleged that
3 Alexandra caused the scratches herself with her own fingernails.
4 53. McCluskey told police that bus driver Daryse Clites first pointed out to
5 him that the deep scratch wounds allegedly matched Alexandra’s fingernails.
6 Alexandra’s bus arrived to collect children at 2:00 p.m. every day. However, at
7 1:13 p.m. on May 4 2016, McCluskey sent an email to Hannett stating that “it appears
8 that Alexandra had likely made the marks herself. The marks and her rather long
9 fingernails line up perfectly.” None of McCluskey’s three incident reports listed
10 Clites as a witness. McCluskey’s statement to the police could not have been true,
11 because Mrs. Varela showed him the scratches on the morning of May 4, 2016 and
12 McCluskey sent the email to Hannett before he could have spoken to Clites.
13 54. McCluskey’s documentation of the above incidents raised serious
14 suspicions about its content and authenticity. Many of McCluskey’s documents
15 contained altered dates, appeared to be back-dated, and/or appeared to have been
16 lifted from one another. Additionally, Hannett’s signature never appeared on any of
17 the incident reports that McCluskey generated, despite that it was policy for Hannett
18 to review and sign such reports. Further, the backside of several incident reports are
19 stamped with dates that do not match the dates McCluskey claimed to have created
20 the documents.
21 55. On May 6, 2016, McCluskey caused Alexandra’s leg to make contact
22 with the leg of a table while he was wheeling her out to the bus for the day.
23 McCluskey stated that Alexandra’s leg got caught on the table. Alexandra “yelped”
24 and/or gave a “startled response.” McCluskey removed Alexandra’s boot and viewed
25 Alexandra’s leg. In-classroom nurse Cindy Edeza asked McCluskey whether he
26 wanted her to examine Alexandra’s leg. McCluskey declined. McCluskey wrote a
27 note about the incident and placed it in Alexandra’s backpack. McCluskey then
28 wheeled Alexandra outside and loaded her onto the bus.
10
1 56. McCluskey claimed that he called Hannett and left a message with
2 Hannett’s assistant after McCluskey had transferred Alexandra to the bus.
3 McCluskey also recorded this alleged call in some incident reports. McCluskey
4 initially claimed that he made this telephone call using his classroom phone. The
5 telephone logs for McCluskey’s classroom show that no phone calls were made from
6 McCluskey’s classroom phone on May 6, 2016. When confronted with the call log,
7 McCluskey changed his assertion to state that he may have used his cellular phone to
8 make the call. McCluskey later stated under oath that his cellular phone records
9 indicate that no phone calls were made from his cellular phone on May 6, 2016. As
10 such, McCluskey’s testimony on this topic cannot be true. The documents where
11 McCluskey recorded this alleged call are also, at least to that extent, false.
12 57. Hannett learned of the May 6, 2016 incident on May 10, 2016. Snowline
13 Transportation Director communicated with Hannett the same day. Despite this, no
14 one retained the footage of Alexandra’s bus ride home on May 6, 2016. The first
15 people to request the footage were police officers, on May 18, 2018.
16 58. Bus footage is kept only for as long as the hard drive can store it unless
17 someone takes step to preserve it. The hard drive can store approximately two to three
18 days’ worth of footage. The logical inference is that the Hannett could have obtained
19 the Friday May 6, 2016 on Tuesday May 10, because the cameras would not have
20 been recording over the weekend, when the buses were not running. (To overwrite
21 the footage, two to three additional school days beyond May 6 would have had to
22 have passed.) Hannett apparently neglected or deliberately refused to obtain the
23 footage, despite that he had learned about the incident by no later than May 10, 2016.
24 59. Throughout all of the events described in this section, Defendant and its
25 employees repeatedly refused to turn over records to the Varelas or provide additional
26 information about how Alexandra suffered all of these injuries.
27
28
11
1 f. Davon M.
2 60. McCluskey continued to work with special needs students after
3 Alexandra suffered the spiral fracture to her tibia. On September 6, 2016, McCluskey
4 left a student, Davon M., unattended on a table while McCluskey went to adjust the
5 air conditioning. Davon M. rolled off the table and hit his head on an adjacent
6 computer desk. McCluskey thought it was “quite a serious incident” because the
7 student was bleeding from the head.
8 61. To date, McCluskey has not been disciplined for any injuries to students.
9 62. Additionally, in 2003, McCluskey was investigated by police for
10 bruising the arm of a special needs student.
11 g. Aryan G.
12 63. Aryan G. was a special needs student at Silverado High School, which
13 is within Defendant’s purview.
14 64. In 2018, Defendant’s employees—a maintenance worker and security
15 guards—verbally and physically assaulted Aryan. The incident began when the
16 maintenance worker began verbally harassing Aryan. Aryan attempted to leave the
17 situation but the worker and security guards stopped Aryan, pressed Aryan into the
18 ground, and jammed their knees into Aryan’s back. They also pepper sprayed Aryan.
19 Aryan suffered severe injuries, burns, scrapes, and emotional distress.
20 65. Video cameras captured this assault.
21 66. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that no employee has been
22 disciplined for this incident.
23 h. Patricia J.
24 67. Patricia J. was a special needs student enrolled in Defendant’s
25 educational program. She was a student in Chaffey Joint Union High School District.
26 Patricia was nonverbal. She passed away between the events described below and the
27 filing of this complaint.
28
12
1 68. In August 2014, Patricia suffered trauma to her to her arm and shoulder.
2 Patricia’s arm was fractured and she displayed bruising and swelling. Defendant’s
3 employees never notified Patricia’s guardians of the incident, and instead sent her
4 home while she was suffering pain from the fracture.
5 69. In late August, Patricia’s mother requested a meeting with Patricia’s
6 teacher and principal to determine the cause of Patricia’s injuries.
7 70. Defendant’s employees provided no explanations. They refused to
8 provide the results of an internal investigation into Patricia’s injuries. At one point
9 Defendant’s employees hypothesized that Patricia may have fallen from her
10 wheelchair. However, no employee remembered this fall, and Patricia would have
11 required physical assistance to get back into her chair if such a fall had occurred.
12 i. Armaad W.
13 71. Armaad W. was a special needs student enrolled in Defendant’s
14 educational program, through the Victor Valley Union High School District.
15 72. In June of 2018, Armaad boarded a Victor Valley bus destined for
16 school. For an unknown reason, the bus driver refused to drop Armaad off at his
17 school, and instead drove him back to the bus depository. The bus driver left Armaad
18 unsupervised in a bus, in the bus yard.
19 73. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant failed to respond to
20 or investigate this matter. For example, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the
21 security footage from this bus was not retained. Plaintiffs also believe that Defendant
22 failed to discipline the bus driver for this incident.
23 j. J.A.
24 74. J.A. is a student with special needs, enrolled at Granite Hills. He was
25 placed in the same classroom as Plaintiff A.M.
26 75. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that J.A. has suffered
27 physical abuse in A.M.’s classroom. For example, Defendant’s employees have
28 pressed their foot against J.A.’s stomach.
13
1 76. J.A. has come home from school with scratching and bruises, which
2 J.A.’s guardians have documented.
3 77. Additionally, Defendant’s employees falsely reported to the police that
4 J.A. had been sexually abused by his family members. Because of this, police were
5 required to perform an invasive search of J.A.’s body. The police found nothing.
6 78. J.A.’s family has never been provided with information regarding why
7 this report was made, who made it, or what facts led to the filing of this report. This
8 stonewalling was part of Defendant’s systematic culture of denying information to
9 guardians of special needs’ students. Defendant has provided no explanation of
10 what—after the police determined that J.A.’s family had not abused him—injuries
11 Defendant’s employees believed he had suffered.
12 79. J.A.’s guardians have attempted to visit J.A. in the classroom and to
13 discuss the issues with J.A.’s teachers, but Defendant’s employees have told J.A.’s
14 guardians that the guardians may not visit the classroom unannounced and must
15 instead schedule an appointment to visit. The purpose of this is to stage the classroom
16 to ensure that it appears Defendant’s employees are taking care of J.A. and the other
17 students, when a guardian is present—when in reality, the daily classroom setting is
18 unsafe and permeated with abuse and neglect.
19 80. J.A.’s guardians took him to a physician to discuss the issues that J.A.
20 was having in school. The physician expressed concern that J.A.’s family was one of
21 multiple families who had expressed concern about the safety of students in
22 Defendant’s educational program.
23 2. Defendant has had ample notice of its own failures, from its own
employees, students, and students’ guardians.
24
25 81. On February 11 2014, Dr. Belton resigned via a letter. In pertinent part,
26 he wrote:
27 Due to the retaliatory manner in which I was treated by
[Defendant’s employees] after reporting the physical abuse of two
28 special needs students Jordan W. and Zoe D. by school staff
14
1 members, I have no choice but to resign my position immediately

as school psychologist . . . .
2
. . . I cannot and will not continue to work for an organization in
3 which those in leadership positions are more concern [sic] with
silencing and harassing management employees who expose child
4 abuse by staff than addressing the systemic problem.
5 On paper, [Defendant] claims to be an organization that puts the
safety and well-being of students a priority. However, this
6 experience has taught me, as well as sends a message to other
school staff members, that safety of our children is not of utmost
7 importance. Under the auspices of an “investigation”
[Defendant’s employees] used [their] public school positions of
8 authority to conduct a fishing expedition and conjure up
unsubstantiated allegations against me. [Defendant’s employees]
9 intimidated and attempted to discredit me, a public school
employee who first exposed and reported the problem of child
10 abuse by staff to SBCSS management and parents.
11 82. In addition to Dr. Belton, several other employees have spoken out about
12 Defendant’s failure to correct its systematic policy of neglect, abuse, and
13 concealment. As discussed above, an employee has testified that she was instructed
14 to not speak about child abuse.
15 83. Plaintiffs are informed and believe other employees have been similarly
16 silenced. For example, a former employee of Defendant told Mrs. Varela that she was
17 instructed to not speak out about child abuse that occurred in Defendant’s schools.
18 84. Plaintiff is informed and believes that, to date, none of Defendant’s
19 employees have been disciplined for any of the child abuse and neglect which they
20 committed, oversaw, and then concealed. Instead, the only discipline that has
21 occurred is to employees who speak out about this abuse.
22
3. Defendant has failed to audit or update its safety policies or practices in a
23 manner sufficient to satisfy the modern standard of care.
24 85. Despite notice that its safety procedures were inadequate, Defendant has
25 not corrected or updated its safety policies in any meaningful way for years. As
26 further discussed below, the failure to update Defendant’s policies is evidenced by
27 antiquated mandates that have long been considered inadequate and illegal. Plaintiffs
28
15
1 are informed and believe that the failure to update these policies was deliberate, in
2 order to prevent abusers and their enablers from facing accountability.
3 86. There are publicly-available sources that provide guidance on the
4 applicable standard of care. These publicly-available sources are illustrative of the
5 difference between Defendant’s policies and policies that would meet the standard of
6 care. To the extent that Defendant’s written policies do comply with the modern
7 standard of care—which they extensively do not—Defendant’s true policies and
8 practices are often in contradiction with the modern standard of care. Where
9 Defendant has a written policy that deviates from its true, executed, system-wide,
10 policy and practice, that deviation is indicated.4
11 87. For purposes of this complaint, Plaintiffs utilize the Emergency First
12 Aid Guidelines for California Schools. This is for illustrative purposes only, and
13 Plaintiffs do not contend that EFA is the sole source of policies that comply with the
14 applicable standard of care. Plaintiffs further do not contend that the below list of
15 failures is exhaustive.
16 88. The Emergency First Aid Guidelines for California Schools (“EFA”)
17 was originally published in 1994. It has been revised in, at least, 2004 and 2013. The
18 following guidelines originate from the 2013 revision. It is available at:
19 https://bit.ly/2LHJcNq.
20 89. Nursing Staff & Emergency Response. In an emergency situation,
21 employees should: “[n]otify the responsible school nurse or administrator designated
22 to handle emergencies. Upon arrival this person should take charge of the
23 emergency.” Defendant failed to implement this policy when it, as discussed in
24 paragraph 112 below, failed to provide a nurse staff member every day that students
25
4
26 Another example of how outdated Defendant’s policies are is that they contain
blatant First Amendment violations that prohibit “Satanist attire.” E.g., Howard v.
27 United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1994). While that provision is
not at issue here, it reveals the neglect with which Defendant has treated its school
28 safety policies and procedures.
16
1 were at school. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that many schools in Defendant’s
2 purview have violated this standard of care by not employing a full time nurse or—
3 in some cases—not providing nursing staff at all.
4 90. Notification to Guardians. “The responsible school nurse, administrator,
5 or a designated employee should notify the parent/legal guardian of the emergency
6 as soon as possible to determine the appropriate course of action.” Defendant
7 maintains a written policy to this effect. However, its true internal policy and practice
8 is to conceal injuries from guardians’ knowledge. Often, Defendant’s employees will
9 not notify guardians of injuries, or will do so in manners insufficient to provide
10 adequate notice or manners incongruent with the gravity of the situation. For
11 examples, see paragraphs 23, 44, 55, 56, and 68.5
12 91. Contacting Emergency Medical Services. In appropriate circumstances,
13 school employees are to “call Emergency Medical Services (EMS 9-1-1), if
14 appropriate, or arrange for transportation of the ill or injured person, if necessary.
15 Provide EMS personnel with copies of physician/parents’ signed record of medical
16 instructions for emergencies (i.e., pupil emergency card).” Defendant maintains a
17 written policy to this effect but its true policy and practice is different—to act as
18 though no injuries occurred and send students home in pain. For examples, see
19 paragraphs 23, 44, 55, 56, and 68.
20 92. Injury Reports. School employees must “[f]ill out a report for all injuries
21 and illnesses requiring above procedures if indicated by school policy.” Defendant
22 maintains a written policy to this effect, but its true policy and practice is different.
23 Defendant’s true policy and practice is to not fill out incident reports unless and until
24 an investigation from an outside source ensues, and then Defendant instructs its
25 employees to backdate and otherwise falsify injury reports. For example, see
26 paragraph 54.
27
5
28 Groups of examples are not meant to be exhaustive lists.
17
1 93. Organization and Review of Injury Reports. EFA states that the standard
2 of care includes steps that ensure all “injuries are documented in a standard format
3 and maintained in an organized manner. Injury reports are reviewed on a regular basis
4 to revise the emergency plan and remedy hazards.”
5 a. Defendant has no standard emergency or injury report form, and
6 instead has multiple forms that somewhat overlap with one another. No clear
7 guidance is provided on which forms are required at what time. Additionally,
8 Defendant’s employees’ practice is to not use forms, but to (if injury reports
9 are generated), use blank paper, a notepad, or a word processing program.
10 b. Defendant does not maintain its injury reports in any cognizable
11 or organized fashion. Defendant’s risk manager Joseph Sanchez has testified
12 in prior litigation that various injury reports are stored in different offices and
13 that he has been “unable” to locate these reports when asked to do so. Other
14 employees of Defendant, including Snowline Joint Unified School District
15 Risk Manager Robert Chacoan, has given similar testimony. Efforts to obtain
16 these records have often been entirely unsuccessful, including but not limited
17 to efforts to respond to document production requests in other litigation.
18 c. Defendant does not review its injury reports or use the injury
19 reports to update its safety practices. First, Defendant cannot even locate its
20 injury reports. Second, Defendant has made no effort to update its practices
21 despite the significant number of injuries that have been reported and litigated.
22 94. Planning for Persons with Special Needs. EFA provides various
23 guidelines for planning for the safety and care of persons with special needs.
24 Defendant does not comply with virtually any of them.
25 a. Creation of an Adequate Emergency Plan. According to EFA, the
26 applicable standard of care requires that appropriate emergency plans be made
27 available to school employees at all times. EFA recommends a standard form
28 available from the American College of Emergency Physicians. Defendant
18
1 (1) does not maintain a form that complies with the current standard of care;
2 (2) does not create emergency plans that conform to the current standard of
3 care; (3) does not enforce the deficient emergency plans that it does have; and
4 (4) does not make the emergency plans readily available to school staff.
5 b. Escape plans Related to Persons with Disabilities. EFA mandates
6 that schools develop plans to ensure that, in an event such as a fire or tornado,
7 an adequate plan is in place to ensure students with special needs—including
8 those in wheelchairs—are able to exit the building safely. Defendant has no
9 such plan.
10 95. Child Abuse Training. EFA mandates that school employees are
11 provided with comprehensive and competent child abuse training. Defendant utilizes
12 training by a company called TargetSolutions. That training is inadequate. It is an
13 online, slideshow-type program with a multiple-choice test at the end. That training
14 does not sufficiently provide Defendant’s employees with the tools or knowledge
15 required to handle child abuse, as is evidenced by the failures itemized throughout
16 this complaint.
17 96. Medication Administration. EFA recommends that schools develop
18 protocols to ensure that medication is properly administered to students. Defendant
19 has no such protocols, and medication often goes un-administered. For example, see
20 paragraph 111.
21 4. Defendant denied Plaintiff A.M. a safe school environment and has
allowed her to suffer abuse, which led to physical and emotional harm.
22
23 97. A.M. is a student enrolled at Granite Hills High School in San

24 Bernardino County. Defendant oversees Granite Hills. It is part of Apple Valley
25 Unified School District. Apple Valley provided A.M.’s transportation to and from
26 school. A.M.’s bus has surveillance cameras. On information and belief, A.M. alleges
27 that the surveillance footage is retained for no longer than three schooldays and is
28 automatically overwritten.
19
1 98. A.M. is nonverbal, visually impaired, and has significant orthopedic

2 impairments and health needs. A.M. uses a wheelchair, and works toward additional
3 mobility by using a gait trainer and stander. A.M. has deficits in the areas of
4 communication, language, fine motor skills, gross motor skills, social-emotional
5 skills, adaptive skills, self-help skills, activities of daily living, and all areas of
6 academics. Though she is nonverbal, A.M. can communicate by shaking her head yes
7 and no, she can point, and she has worked to achieve communication through use of
8 electronic devices.
9 99. A.M.’s disabilities render her extremely sensitive to loud noises. At
10 times, loud noises will cause A.M. to suffer a seizure or emotionally shut down.
11 Triggering loud noises include yelling and clapping.
12 100. Because of her disabilities, A.M. suffers from severe dehydration if she
13 is not carefully monitored and provided with regular assistance with drinking water.
14 She also must be monitored while she is drinking to ensure she does not choke.
15 101. While A.M. was enrolled in Defendant’s educational program, she
16 suffered abuse and neglect at the hands of Defendant’s employees. Lisa and Anthony
17 Mendez began to suspect that A.M.’s school environment was not safe after A.M.
18 began coming home unhappy and lethargic.
19 102. Defendant’s employees regularly neglected to provide A.M. with the
20 assistance she requires to remain hydrated. While she was enrolled in Defendant’s
21 program, A.M. came home dehydrated and lethargic on a regular basis.
22 103. Defendant’s employees—the ones who supervise A.M.’s classroom—
23 regularly make loud noises, included clapping, yelling at students, slamming hands
24 on desks, and playing loud music. They do this despite knowing that A.M. and other
25 children in her classroom are sensitive to noise because of their disabilities, and that
26 these loud noises cause severe physical pain and emotional harm to A.M. and the
27 other students in her class. Because of this behavior, A.M. has suffered seizures.
28
20
1 104. Defendant’s employees also neglected A.M.’s care by allowing her to

2 remain soiled rather than changing her. Sometimes. A.M. would be placed on the bus
3 completely soiled and would arrive at home still in need of being changed. When
4 Defendant’s employees did change A.M., they failed to attach the diapers correctly,
5 which led to discomfort and other sanitary issues.
6 105. Further, A.M. regularly suffered bruising and scratching at school.
7 Defendant’s employees did not document these incidents. They filled out no incident
8 reports, despite that Defendant’s policies require them to do so. To date, Defendant’s
9 employees have not explained how A.M. suffered the bruising and scratching.
10 106. As mentioned above, A.M. suffered seizures as a result of the loud
11 noises in her classroom. In addition, A.M. had an increase in seizure activity during
12 the 2018-2019 school year. The increase in seizure activity was a result of the neglect
13 and abuse she suffered at Defendant’s employees’ hands.
14 107. Defendant’s employees habitually left A.M. unattended in situations that
15 could result in further harm. When Lisa Mendez visited A.M.’s classroom, she saw
16 that A.M. was left sleeping on the edge of a bean bag. This was a dangerous situation
17 because of A.M.’s seizures. If she were to suffer a seizure while on the edge of the
18 bean bag, she could have fallen. Due to A.M.’s orthopedic issues, such a fall could
19 lead to severe injuries including broken bones. Defendant’s employees also regularly
20 leave A.M. in the corner of the classroom to “get her out of the way,” rather than
21 providing A.M. with the supervision and care she needs.
22 108. Though she is nonverbal, A.M. understands language as well as tone.
23 Lisa and Anthony Mendez are informed and believe that Defendant’s employees
24 demean A.M. and that A.M. understands this. For example, Defendant’s employees
25 demean A.M.’s hair, teeth, and family. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that, at one
26 point, one of Defendant’s employees told A.M. that they were going to “high five
27 [A.M.] right in the forehead,” and then laughed about it.
28
21
1 109. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant’s employees also
2 have not taken proper steps when A.M. suffered seizures at school. Instead, they
3 stated that A.M. “just wants attention.” Defendant’s employees do not document the
4 seizures despite that they are required to do so.
5 110. Defendant’s employees also “play catch” with A.M. and other students
6 whose disabilities prevent them from engaging in this activity. These games of catch
7 are harmful emotionally and physically to A.M. and other students in her classroom.
8 111. A.M.’s dentist has prescribed swabs for A.M.’s teeth. Plaintiffs are
9 informed and believe that Defendant’s employees throw the swabs away and lie to
10 Lisa and Anthony Mendez about having actually completed the swabbing.
11 112. During the summer school session, Defendant failed to employ a
12 fulltime nurse on staff. Instead, the nurse worked only Monday through Thursday,
13 despite that summer school was Monday through Friday. This staffing failure put
14 A.M. and other students at even greater risk of harm, because no medical professional
15 could have attended to serious issues that may have arisen on a summer Friday.
16 113. In A.M.’s case, nurse assistance was required if A.M. suffered a seizure
17 that lasted longer than five minutes. Had this happened on a summer Friday, A.M.
18 would not have received the care that she needed.
19 114. Defendant never made any guardians aware that they had made this
20 staffing reduction. Lisa and Anthony Mendez discussed this with the principal of
21 A.M.’s school, who responded with only, “I don’t know.”
22 5. Defendant has caused emotional distress to Lisa and Anthony Mendez, by
enforcing its system-wide policy of concealing abuse and withholding
23 information from the guardians of special needs students.
24 115. As discussed above, Defendant and its employees have concealed the
25 abuse of many special needs students in Defendant’s educational program. Defendant
26 executed on this entity-wide systemic policy during its interactions with Lisa and
27 Anthony Mendez.
28
22
1 116. Lisa and Anthony Mendez would repeatedly ask why A.M. was coming
2 home lethargic, depressed, dehydrated, bruised, scratched, and in other conditions
3 indicating she had been mistreated at school. Defendant’s employees always feigned
4 ignorance about the cause of A.M.’s injuries and worsened moods. In reality, as
5 described throughout this complaint, Defendant’s employees were aware of the
6 causes of these injuries and maladies—because they caused them through physical
7 abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect.
8 117. Defendant implemented a policy disallowing guardians from visiting
9 special needs students in the classroom without prior notice and authorization.
10 Defendant told Lisa and Anthony Mendez, and other guardians, that they could not
11 drop by unannounced to check on their special needs children. Instead, they had to
12 seek permission to come by, and Defendant’s employees would limit the number of
13 visits and/or number of hours that guardians were allowed to see their children in this
14 classroom. The purpose of this limitation is to enable Defendant’s employees to stage
15 the classroom for guardians’ visits—to make it look as though Defendant’s
16 employees are providing adequate and compassionate care to students. When
17 Defendant’s employees are not on notice that a guardian may be visiting, their
18 behavior is abusive and neglectful.
19 118. As discussed in paragraph 114, Defendant’s employee refused to
20 provide information about why staffing had been reduced to eliminate a nurse on
21 Fridays over the summer.
22 119. As discussed in paragraph 111, Defendant’s employees lied to Lisa and
23 Anthony Mendez about providing the dental care prescribed by A.M.’s dentist.
24 120. Each day, A.M.’s educators—Defendant’s employees—-are obligated
25 to record the day’s events in a journal for A.M. Defendant’s employees would
26 regularly record that A.M. had a good a day and was happy. However, Plaintiffs are
27 informed by a reliable source and therefore believe that these records were false. In
28
23
1 reality, A.M. was unhappy, abused, and neglected during the day, often crying and
2 expressing other discomfort while in the classroom.
3 121. All of the above behavior occurred in spite of Lisa and Anthony
4 Mendez’s attempts to notify Defendant of its failures and to get more information
5 about the circumstances of A.M.’s care. Defendant’s employee Ted Alejandre, who
6 was (and may still be) the superintendent of schools, has been included on
7 correspondence detailing the above abuses and concealment, and has not taken any
8 action to correct it.
9 122. Eventually, Lisa and Anthony Mendez became so fearful for their
10 daughter’s wellbeing that they removed her from school.
11 6. Plaintiffs have satisfied all exhaustion requirements.
12 123. On March 22 2019, Plaintiffs sent a form containing all the information
13 required by California Government Code § 945.4 to Defendant. The certified mail
14 tracking information indicates that the mail was received by Defendant on March 25,
15 2019. Defendant’s deadline to respond to the claim was May 6, 2019. Defendant did
16 not respond to the claim form, so Plaintiffs’ claim was deemed rejected on that date.
17 124. A plaintiff need not comply with state administrative exhaustion
18 requirements for Federal causes of action. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134
19 (1988); Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 842 (1976). Thus, causes of action 1, 2,
20 3, and 7 are exempt from any exhaustion requirement.
21 125. Similarly, a plaintiff need not exhaust his or her administrative remedies,
22 when “structural, systemic reforms are sought.” See Hoeft v. Tuscon Unified School
23 Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiffs seek system-wide reform
24 for every school district within Defendant’s purview. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek
25 relief requiring Defendant, its subsidiary school districts, and their employees, to
26 undergo comprehensive redevelopment of their child abuse prevention, reporting,
27 and investigation practices.
28
24
1 126. Further, a plaintiff need not exhaust any administrative remedies for a
2 Section 504 claim when the relief sought is not available under the Individuals with
3 Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”). Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137
4 S.Ct. 743 (2017). As outlined in the prayer below, Plaintiffs do not seek any relief
5 that is available under the IDEA or that is otherwise related to the provision of a free
6 appropriate public education.
7 E. Class Allegations—the Student Class
8 1. Definitions
9 127. The Student Class is defined as:
10 All students, whether minors or adults, who, during the
Class Period (a) were or are on an Individualized Education
11 Plan or 504 plan; and (b) were or are enrolled in any
educational program administered or supervised by
12 Defendant.
13 128. A.M. is a member of, and the class representative for, the Student Class.
14 129. The Class Period is defined as: two years preceding the date of the filing
15 of the original complaint in this matter, through the date of judgment in this case.
16 2. The Student Class satisfies F.R.C.P. 23(a)(1)-(4).
17 130. First, the Student Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
18 impracticable under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(1). On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege
19 that there are hundreds or thousands of students in the Student Class. Having several
20 hundred or several thousand individuals appear in one action would be unmanageable
21 and a waste of judicial resources. Joinder is impracticable.
22 131. Second, there are multiple questions of law and fact common to the
23 Student Class, under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(2). A.M. and the proposed members the Student
24 Class have suffered the same legal wrong, as a consequence of the same system-wide,
25 uniform policy and acts/omissions by Defendant. A.M. and the members of the
26 Student Class have the same legal relationship with Defendant, and have all suffered
27 damages of the same type. It would be impossible to prove A.M.’s claims without
28
25
1 simultaneously proving the Student Class members’ claims. Nearly every question of
2 law or fact in this action is common to the class and to A.M..
3 132. Third, the claims of A.M. are typical of the Student Class under F.R.C.P.
4 23(a)(3). A.M. and all members of the Student Class have the same claim that arises
5 from the same foundation: that they are victims of Defendant’s uniform, system-wide
6 policy that discriminates against and endangers special needs students. There is no
7 material deviation between the facts and law giving rise to A.M.’s claims and those
8 of the Student Class.
9 133. Fourth, A.M., as a representative plaintiff, with the assistance of Lisa
10 and Anthony Mendez, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Student
11 Class under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs have undertaken significant time and effort
12 to obtain information in this action and to facilitate the filing of this case.
13 3. The Student Class satisfies F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3).
14 134. The Student Class can be maintained under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), because
15 there are not only common questions of law or fact, but those common questions
16 predominate over any individual issues. Those common questions of law and fact
17 include but are not limited to: whether Defendant maintains a system-wide policy of
18 allowing and then concealing child abuse; whether Defendant’s policies and practices
19 conform to the modern standard of care; whether Defendant enables discrimination
20 against the Student Class based on their status as disabled persons.
21 135. Moreover, the class action device is most appropriate for the fair and
22 efficient adjudication of this controversy, because it will combine this litigation into
23 one forum, there are no other large-scale actions that have been filed, and no unique
24 difficulties exist in the management of this action.
25 136. Defendant’s conduct has caused and continues to cause A.M. and the
26 Student Class great harm, including extreme emotional distress.
27
28
26
1 F. Class Allegations—the Guardian Class

2 1. Definitions
3 137. The Guardian Class is defined as follows:
4 All parents, familial caretakers, guardians, or other persons
who have acted in loco parentis to any member of the
5 Student Class during the Class Period.
6
138. The Class Period is the same as that described in paragraph 129.
7
139. Lisa Mendez and Anthony Mendez are members of & representative
8
plaintiffs for the Guardian Class.
9
2. The Guardian Class satisfies F.R.C.P. 23(a)(1)-(4).
10
140. First, the Guardian Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
11
impracticable under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(1). On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege
12
that there are hundreds or thousands of students in the Student Class, and by extension
13
hundreds or thousands of members of the Guardian Class. Having several hundred or
14
several thousand individuals appear in one action would be unmanageable and a
15
waste of judicial resources. Joinder is impracticable.
16
141. Second, there are multiple questions of law and fact common to the
17
Guardian Class, under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(2). Lisa Mendez, Anthony Mendez, and the
18
proposed members the Guardian Class have suffered the same wrong, as a result of
19
the same system-wide, uniform policy and acts/omissions by Defendant. Lisa
20
Mendez, Anthony Mendez, and the members of the Guardian Class have the same
21
legal relationship with Defendant, and have all suffered damages of the same type.
22
It would be impossible to prove Lisa and Anthony Mendez’s claims without
23
simultaneously proving the Guardian Class members’ claims. Nearly every question
24
of law or fact in this action is common to the class and to Lisa and Anthony Mendez.
25
142. Third, Lisa and Anthony Mendez’s claims are typical of the claims of
26
the Guardian Class under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(3). They and all members of the Guardian
27
Class have the same claims that arise from the same foundation: that they are victims
28
27
1 of Defendant’s uniform, system-wide policy that discriminates against and endangers

2 special needs students and conceals that discrimination, abuse, and endangerment
3 from the students’ guardians. There is no material deviation between the facts and
4 law giving rise to Lisa and Anthony’s claims and those of the Guardian Class.
5 143. Fourth, Lisa and Anthony, as representative plaintiffs, will fairly and
6 adequately protect the interests of the Guardian Class under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(4).
7 Plaintiffs have undertaken significant time and effort to obtain information in this
8 action and to facilitate the filing of this case.
9 3. The Guardian Class satisfies F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3).
10 144. The Guardian Class can be maintained under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), because
11 there are not only common questions of law or fact, but those common questions
12 predominate over any individual issues. Those common questions include but are not
13 limited to: whether Defendant maintains a system-wide policy of discrimination
14 against disabled students; and whether Defendant conceals this policy and the abuse
15 that results from this policy from the members of the Guardian Class.
16 145. Moreover, the class action device is most appropriate for the fair and
17 efficient adjudication of this controversy, because it will combine this litigation into
18 one forum, there are no other large-scale actions that have been filed, and no unique
19 difficulties exist in the management of this action.
20 146. Defendant’s conduct has caused and continues to cause Lisa Mendez,
21 Anthony Mendez, and the Guardian Class harm, including emotional distress.
22 G. Causes of Action
23 1. First Cause of Action: Civil Rights Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
On behalf of the Student Class
24
25 147. Defendant is a state actor for purposes of section 1983 based on the
26 specific facts of this case.
27 148. Specifically, Defendant is acting under the color of state law because it
28 is serving as a provider of education, as mandated by 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Cf.,
28
1 e.g., K.H. v. Antioch Unified School District et al., 2019 WL 2744721, at *5 (N.D.
2 Cal. July 1, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss because charter school could be
3 considered government entity when it acts as provider of educational services).
4 149. The relationship between Defendant and the State are sufficiently close
5 such that Defendant was acting under color of state law. Defendant was engaged to
6 provide a traditionally government function, the provision of education, which
7 requires certain acts be done in compliance with state and federal law.
8 150. A government entity assumes an affirmative duty under the Fourteenth
9 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to provide reasonable care to, and to protect
10 from harm, a child or disabled adult with whom it has formed a special relationship.
11 151. The foregoing actions and inactions of Defendant constitute a policy,
12 pattern, practice, and/or custom that is inconsistent with the exercise of accepted
13 professional judgment and amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutionally
14 protected liberty and privacy interests of all of the members of the Student Class.
15 Defendant is well aware of the policies and practices in place, which prevent these
16 class members from receiving adequate protection from physical and psychological
17 harm after Defendant has formed a special relationship with them. As a result, the
18 named Plaintiff and all of the members of the class of students to whom Defendant
19 owes a special duty, students who have a special relationship with Defendant, have
20 been, and are, at risk of being deprived of their substantive due process rights
21 conferred upon them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
22 152. The substantive due process rights include, but are not limited to:
23 a. The right to investigations of abuse and neglect, and for those
24 investigations to conform to reasonable professional standards;
25 b. The right to safe school conditions and supervision by educators
26 and other personnel who act according to the applicable standards of care;
27 c. The right to freedom from abuse and neglect—whether repeated
28 or isolated—while in Defendant’s and Defendant’s employees’ care;
29
1 d. The right to protection from unnecessary intrusions into students’

2 emotional wellbeing by Defendant and Defendant’s employees, who have a
3 special relationship with the students;
4 e. The right to services necessary to prevent unreasonable risk of
5 harm;
6 f. The right to treatment and care consistent with the purposes and
7 assumptions of attending and being supervised by Defendant and Defendant’s
8 employees; and
9 g. The right to be free from an environment permeated with
10 negligent supervision, when that negligent supervision results in their injury.
11 Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1983)
12 (explaining ”agency could be held liable under section 1983 if its top
13 supervisory personnel . . . exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury,
14 a known risk, or a specific duty, and their failure to perform the duty or act to
15 ameliorate the risk or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s deprivation
16 of rights under the Constitution.”).
17 153. Because of these violations, the Student Class, including A.M., have
18 suffered emotional distress, physical harm, and other damages.
19 154. The Student Class is entitled to injunctive and compensatory relief,
20 among other remedies.
21 155. Defendant’s and Defendant’s employees’ conduct—including but not
22 limited to that of Paul McCluskey, Diane Hannett, Thomas Hannett, Randy Elphic,
23 Dawn Menge, Mary Johnson, Ted Alejandre, and Terri Williams—was malicious,
24 oppressive and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ and the Classes’ rights, such that
25 an award of punitive damages is warranted.
26
27
28
30
1 2. Second Cause of Action: Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act

2
3 156. Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act after it found that
4 “society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” and that
5 such forms of discrimination continue today. “Individuals who have experienced
6 discrimination on the basis of disability often had no legal recourse to redress such
7 discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
8 157. Thus, Congress sought “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
9 the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” 42 U.S.C.
10 § 12101(b)(1).
11 158. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act entitles Plaintiff and the
12 Class to the protections of the “public services” provision, which prevents
13 discrimination by any “public entity,” including any state or local government, as
14 defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
15 159. Defendant qualifies as a public entity because it is charged with
16 providing education, which is traditionally a government function.
17 160. At all relevant times, A.M. and the Student Class were individuals with
18 disabilities.
19 161. Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a person
20 with a disability from participating in, or denying the benefits of, the goods, services,
21 programs and activities of the entity or otherwise discriminating against a person on
22 the basis of his or her disability.
23 162. Accordingly, Defendant must provide the Student Class an equal
24 opportunity to attend a school environment that is safe and to be free from emotional
25 abuse, physical abuse, and neglect.
26 163. Defendant must also “make reasonable modifications in policies,
27 practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
28 on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
31
1 modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or

2 activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
3 164. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of the ADA,
4 the Student Class have been and are at risk of being placed in an environment that
5 subjects them to unnecessary trauma because of their disabilities, as discussed above.
6 The Student Class will continue to suffer injury until Defendant is required to, and
7 does, come into compliance with the requirements of the ADA.
8 3. Third Cause of Action: Violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
9
10 165. “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United

11 States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
12 participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
13 program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
14 166. Any person who is subjected to discrimination in violation of this statute
15 may bring a civil action seeking compensatory, injunctive, and other appropriate
16 relief. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
17 167. Defendant has violated Section 504 by affirmatively discriminating
18 against the Student Class. Specifically, Defendant has denied the Student Class a
19 school environment where they are safe from abuse and neglect, and has subjected
20 the Student Class to abuse and neglect due to the Student Class’s disabilities.
21 168. The Student Class has suffered and continues to suffer damages
22 including physical harm, emotional distress, and exposure to further unnecessary
23 abuse, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct and the conduct of
24 Defendant’s employees.
25 169. The relief sought in this complaint could not be achieved under the
26 Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), because that act does not
27 allow recovery for tort damages, punitive damages, or system-wide injunctive relief.
28
32
1 Plaintiffs are not seeking relief related to the educational services provided to the
2 Student Class or any services governed by the IDEA.
3 4. Fourth Cause of Action: Negligence
4
5 170. “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an

6 enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury,
7 the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure
8 to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable
9 diligence to discharge the duty.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6. Courts find a mandatory
10 duty when the statute contains “explicit and forceful language.” Guzman v. County
11 of Monterey, 46 Cal.4th 887, 894 (2009). When it comes to schools, courts must
12 assess the existence of a duty “in light of the fundamental public policy favoring
13 measures to ensure the safety of California’s public school students.” C.A. v. William
14 S. Hart Union High School District, 53 Cal. 4th 861, 870 n.3. (2012). The California
15 Supreme Court emphasizes that “a school district and its employees have a special
16 relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory
17 charter of school attendance and comprehensive control over students exercised by
18 school personnel . . . .” Id. at 869.
19 171. The following provisions of the statutes—among others—impose
20 mandatory duties on Defendant:6
21 a. Education Code § 32281(a). “Each school district and county
22 office of education is responsible for the overall development of all
23 comprehensive school safety plans for its schools operating kindergarten or
24 any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive.”
25 b. Education Code § 32282. “(a) The comprehensive school safety
26 plan shall include, but not be limited to, both of the following: . . .(2)
27 Identifying appropriate strategies and programs that will provide or maintain a
28
6
See C.A., 53 Cal. 4th at 870 n.3 (analyzing prior version of Education Code).
33
1 high level of school safety and address the school’s procedures for complying
2 with existing laws related to school safety, which shall include the
3 development of all of the following: (A) Child abuse reporting procedures
4 consistent with Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 11164) of Chapter 2 of
5 Title 1 of Part 4 of the Penal Code. (G) Procedures for safe ingress and egress
6 of pupils, parents, and school employees to and from school. (H) A safe and
7 orderly environment conducive to learning at the school.”
8 c. Education Code § 32287. “If the Superintendent of Public
9 Instruction determines that there has been a willful failure to make any report
10 required by [Education Code § 32280, et seq.], the superintendent shall” notify
11 the school district or county office of the violation and assess a fine against the
12 school district.
13 d. Education Code § 44807. This section mandates that school
14 employees exercise over students a level of care sufficient to prevent injury.
15 See Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1320
16 (2008).
17 e. Education Code § 49400. “The Governing Board of any school
18 district shall give diligent care to the health and physical development of
19 pupils, and may employ properly certified persons for work.”
20 f. Education Code § 56521.2(a)(1). Educational entities are
21 prevented from utilizing any intervention that is designed to, or likely to, cause
22 physical pain.
23 g. Penal Code § 11164, et seq. These provisions require that public
24 entities and their employees report and respond to suspected child abuse. Randi
25 W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 1087 (1997).
26 172. “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or
27 omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if
28 the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
34
1 against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2. A
2 public employee bears liability “for injury caused by his act or omission to the same
3 extent as a private person.” A government entity is liable for injury that the
4 government employee causes “within the scope of his employment” if the act or
5 omission would “have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” Cal.
6 Gov. Code § 820(a).
7 173. “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a tortious act
8 or omission of an independent contractor of the public entity to the same extent that
9 the public entity would be subject to such liability if it were a private person.” Cal.
10 Gov. Code § 815.4.
11 174. Defendant and its employees have a duty to the Student Class to ensure
12 that the members of the Student Class were kept safe at school. This duty includes
13 but was not limited to the obligation to enact and enforce policies that would
14 meaningfully prevent instances of child abuse against members of the Student Class.
15 It includes the duty not to commit abuse or neglect on members of the Student Class.
16 175. Defendant and its employees breached that duty by failing to enact or
17 enforce policies that conform to the applicable standards of care, including by failing
18 to update its safety policies or utilize publicly-available resources to reform its
19 policies and practices.
20 176. The Student Class was harmed by this breach, as each of them suffered,
21 or was put at great risk of suffering, physical abuse, emotional abuse, and/or neglect.
22 They suffered great emotional and physical distress, as well as medical costs and
23 other damages.
24 177. This breach was a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by the
25 Student Class.
35
3 5. Fifth Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Retention and/or Supervision
4
5 179. The laws discussed in paragraphs 170-173, above, apply equally to this
6 cause of action.7
7 180. Defendant and its employees hired, retained, employed, contracted with,
8 and otherwise caused an agency relationship with persons to be in contact with and
9 have caretaking authority over members of the Student Class. The persons that
10 Defendant and its employees hired, retained, employed, or otherwise caused to be
11 their agents, were unfit to perform the duties for which they were engaged.
12 181. Defendant and its employees knew or should have known that these
13 agents posed a risk to members of the Student Class. This notice arose from—at least
14 but not necessarily only—the following: multiple lawsuits against Defendant for
15 abuse to special needs students; multiple injuries caused by the same employees of
16 Defendant (e.g. Paul McCluskey) to different special needs students; guardians’
17 complaints, concerns, and other communications about injuries their students
18 suffered; Dr. Keith Belton’s resignation letter and other protests; police reports
19 detailing prior investigations into employees’ abuse of special needs students; and
20 the repeated attempts by high-level employees (e.g. Thomas Hannett, Diane Hannett,
21 etc.) to conceal child abuse and neglect.
22 182. The unfitness of Defendant’s employees was a substantial factor in
23 harming the Student Class—each of them suffered, or was put at great risk of
24 suffering, physical abuse, emotional abuse, and/or neglect. They suffered great
25 emotional and physical distress, as well as medical costs and other damages.
26
27
7
Cross-references are not meant to alter the rule that every pleading must be read as
28 a whole. Cross-references are not an intent to limit certain causes of action to items
discussed in paragraphs that are cross-referenced.
36

6 6. Sixth Cause of Action: Civil Rights Violations—Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1
7
8 184. “Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

9 Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or
10 laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as
11 described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and
12 on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to,
13 damages under [Cal. Civil Code § 52], injunctive relief, and other appropriate
14 equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights
15 secured, including appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern
16 or practice of conduct . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1
17 185. The laws, liberties, and considerations in paragraphs 147-152 apply
18 equally to this cause of action.
19 186. Additionally, the California Constitution guarantees that “persons will
20 not be deprived of due process or equal protection of law on the basis of
21 developmental disability alone.” In re Hop, 29 Cal. 3d 82, 89 (1981). “Personal
22 liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself.” Id. (citations omitted,
23 punctuation altered).
24 187. The rights that have been violated include, but are not limited to:
25 a. The right to investigations of abuse and neglect, and for those
26 investigations to conform to reasonable professional standards;
27 b. The right to safe school conditions and supervision by educators
28 and other personnel who act according to the applicable standards of care;
37
1 c. The right to freedom from abuse and neglect—whether repeated

2 or isolated—while in Defendant’s and Defendant’s employees’ care;
3 d. The right to protection from unnecessary intrusions into students’
4 emotional wellbeing by Defendant and Defendant’s employees, who have a
5 special relationship with the students;
6 e. The right to services necessary to prevent unreasonable risk of
7 harm;
8 f. The right to treatment and care consistent with the purposes and
9 assumptions of attending and being supervised by Defendant and Defendant’s
10 employees; and
11 g. The right to be free from an environment permeated with
12 negligent supervision, when that negligent supervision results in their injury.
18 7. Seventh Cause of Action: Civil Rights Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
On behalf of the Guardian Class
19
20 189. The right of parents and guardians to make decisions concerning the
21 care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected
22 by the Due Process Clause. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, (2000) (plurality
23 opinion) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
24 Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
25 the care, custody, and control of their children.”); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
26 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, (1925); Brittain v. Hansen,
27 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that noncustodial parents have the same
28 fundamental liberty interest).
38
1 190. Defendant has intentionally deprived the Guardian Class of that civil
2 right, by concealing the realities of the abusive and neglectful environment that
3 Defendant is actually providing to the Student Class. By intentionally and
4 systematically ensuring that guardians are deprived of information, Defendant has
5 usurped the guardians’ rights to make decisions concerning the care of their children.
6 See Phyllis v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1196 (1986).
7 191. Defendant and its employees engaged in this deprivation when they
8 enacted and enforced the entity-wide systemic policy of concealing child abuse and
9 neglect and providing false information to guardians including members of the
10 Guardian Class. Examples of the execution of this system-wide policy are discussed
11 above and include but are not limited to: postdating and otherwise falsifying incident
12 reports; allowing and encouraging the destruction of surveillance video that would
13 provide insight into injuries to special needs students; concocting stories of how
14 injuries occurred; and attempting to document those false stories.
15 192. The Guardian Class would not have decided to let the children in their
16 care attend school in Defendant’s educational program had they not been deceived
17 into believing that the environment was safe. The Guardian Class would not have
18 continued to send their children to school if they had been provided with accurate
19 information about injuries to their children. The Guardian Class would not have sent
20 their children to school in Defendant’s program if they knew that their children—
21 many of whom are nonverbal and cannot speak for themselves—were being abused
22 and neglected at the hands of Defendant’s employees.
23 193. As a result of Defendant’s violation of the Guardian Class’ substantive
24 due process, procedural due process, and liberty interest rights, the Guardian Class
25 has suffered harm including but not limited to emotional distress, medical expenses
26 for their students, and other costs.
27 194. The Guardian Class is entitled to injunctive and compensatory relief,
39

6 8. Eighth Cause of Action: Civil Rights Violations—Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1
7
8 196. “Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

9 Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or
10 laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as
11 described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and
12 on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to,
13 damages under [Cal. Civil Code § 52], injunctive relief, and other appropriate
14 equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights
15 secured, including appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern
16 or practice of conduct . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1
17 197. The laws, liberties, and principles discussed in paragraph 189 apply
18 equally to this cause of action.
19 198. Additionally, the California Constitution protects “the fundamental
20 right” of guardians “to direct the upbringing of their children.” American Academy
21 of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 416 (1997). This right is “a compelling
22 one, ranked among the most basic civil rights.” In re B.G. 11 Cal.3d 679, 688 (1974).
23 199. Defendant has intentionally deprived the Guardian Class of that civil
24 right, by concealing the realities of the abusive and neglectful environment that
25 Defendant is actually providing to the Student Class. By intentionally and
26 systematically ensuring that guardians are deprived of information, Defendant has
27 usurped the guardians’ rights to make decisions concerning the care of their children.
28 See Phyllis, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1196.
40
1 200. Defendant and its employees engaged in this deprivation when they
2 enacted and enforced the entity-wide systemic policy of concealing child abuse and
3 neglect and providing false information to guardians including members of the
4 Guardian Class. Examples of the execution of this system-wide policy are discussed
5 above and include but are not limited to: postdating and otherwise falsifying incident
6 reports; allowing and encouraging the destruction of surveillance video that would
7 provide insight into injuries to special needs students; concocting stories of how
8 injuries occurred; and attempting to document those false stories.
17 202. These acts have caused and continue to cause harm to the Guardian
18 Class, in the form of emotional distress and monetary costs.
19 203. The Guardian Class is entitled to injunctive and compensatory relief,
26
27
28
41
1 9. Ninth Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

2
3 205. The laws discussed in paragraphs 170-173, above, apply equally to this
4 cause of action.
5 206. A child’s caretaker bears the duty to disclose and not conceal known
6 threats to the child’s safety, because the caretaker shares a special relationship with
7 the child. Phyllis, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1196; see also Doe v. Superior Court, 237 Cal.
8 App. 4th 239, 246-248 (2015); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d
9 916 (1980). The purpose of this duty is to enable the parent to prevent further harm
10 to the child. That duty is heightened in the context of special needs students, because
11 many of them cannot verbally communicate what happens to them while they are in
12 Defendant’s employees’ care.
13 207. Defendant and its employees breached that duty when they enacted and
14 enforced the entity-wide systemic policy of concealing child abuse and neglect and
15 providing false information to guardians including members of the Guardian Class.
16 Examples of the execution of this system-wide policy are discussed above and
17 include but are not limited to: postdating and otherwise falsifying incident reports;
18 allowing and encouraging the destruction of surveillance video that would provide
19 insight into injuries to special needs students; concocting stories of how injuries
20 occurred; and attempting to document those false stories.
42
1 209. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiffs and

2 the Guardian Class have suffered damages, including emotional distress.
8 H. Prayer
9 Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
10 1. An order certifying the classes defined in paragraphs 127 and 137 above,
11 and/or any other classes or sub-classes the Court deems appropriate;
12 2. An order permanently enjoining Defendant from subjecting the Classes
13 to practices that violate their rights, including but not limited to the
14 practices described in in this complaint;
15 3. An order declaring Defendant’s acts unconstitutional and unlawful;
16 4. An order mandating that Defendant, under Court supervision for no less
17 than a period of seven years: (a) undergo a system-wide audit, by a third
18 party, of all policies related to child abuse and neglect; (b) adopt new
19 policies related to child abuse and neglect based on the recommendation
20 of the third-party auditor; (c) provide public reports of this process; and
21 (d) retrain all employees in compliance with the new policies;
22 5. An order awarding compensatory or nominal damages to both classes;
23 6. An order awarding punitive damages to both classes;
24 7. An order awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
25 the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), Federal Rules
26 of Civil Procedure 23(e) and (h), California Civil Code § 52.1(i),
27 California Civil Procedure Code § 1021.5, and any other statutes
28 allowing fees for the claims asserted in this complaint;
43
1 8. For costs of suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil
2 Procedure 23(h);
3 9. For interest on the judgment, to the extent allowed by law; and
4 10. For all other relief this Court deems just and proper.
5 I. Demand for Jury Trial
6 Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.
7
Dated: October 10, 2019 RMO LLP
8
9
/s/ David Greco
10 David Greco
11
Scott E. Rahn, Esq. (SBN 222528)
12 rahns@rmolawyers.com
Sean D. Muntz, Esq. (SBN 223549)
13 muntzs@rmolawyers.com
David G. Greco (SBN 299635)
14 grecod@rmolawyers.com
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2910
15 Los Angeles, CA 90067
Phone: (424) 320-9444
16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
17
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Class Action Complaint. A.M. Et Al. v. San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools.

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Case 5:19-cv-01944 Document 1 Filed 10/10/19 Page 1 of 45 Page ID #:1

8 United States District Court

9 Central District of California – Eastern Division

27 Jury Trial Demanded

Class Action Complaint

25 15. Defendant maintains, encourages, fosters, furthers, and facilitates and

1 2015–2016 school years. Thomas Hannett is a Principal and employee of Defendant.

1 members, I have no choice but to resign my position immediately

23 97. A.M. is a student enrolled at Granite Hills High School in San

1 98. A.M. is nonverbal, visually impaired, and has significant orthopedic

1 104. Defendant’s employees also neglected A.M.’s care by allowing her to

1 F. Class Allegations—the Guardian Class

1 of Defendant’s uniform, system-wide policy that discriminates against and endangers

1 d. The right to protection from unnecessary intrusions into students’

1 2. Second Cause of Action: Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act

1 modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or

10 165. “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United

5 170. “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an

1 183. Defendant’s and Defendant’s employees’ conduct—including but not

8 184. “Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

1 c. The right to freedom from abuse and neglect—whether repeated

1 195. Defendant’s and Defendant’s employees’ conduct—including but not

8 196. “Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

1 9. Ninth Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

1 209. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiffs and

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