PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc.
Taxicab & Garage, Inc., contended that the collision was not due to
G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)
FACTS: A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front
wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a
breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These
cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the
son and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding
that the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of
the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard
thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new
Civil Code)
HELD: Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the
carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier
from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the
passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment;
hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the
defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering
knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious
person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and therefore the
knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the
carrier from responsibility.
OLEGARIO BRITO SY vs. MALATE TAXI CAB & GARAGE, INC
G.R. No. L-8937, November 29, 1957
Facts: Olegario Brito Sy rode a taxicab operated by Malate Taxicab and
Garage, Inc. to take him from Dewey Boulevard to Dencia's Restaurant on
the Escolta where he was the general manager. Upon reaching the Rizal
Monument, he told the driver to turn to the right, but the taxi driver did not
heed him and instead passed along Katigbak Drive. At the intersection of
Dewey Boulevard and Katigbak Drive, the taxi collided with an army wagon.
As a result Sy suffered injuries and spent P2,266.45 for medical bills and
hospitalization. He then filed an action for damages based upon contract of
carriage.
the negligence of its driver but to the driver of the army wagon. So, a third-
party complaint arose against the driver of the army wagon. However, the
summons and copy of the third-party complaint were never served upon the
driver of the army wagon in view of his continued assignment from place to
place in connection with his army duties. This leads to the disposal of the
issue arising from plaintiff’s complaint.
With regard to the action for damages against Malate Taxicab & Garage,
Inc., the lower court awarded P4,200.00 as damages without making any
express finding as to the fault or negligence of the defendant on the day of
the trial when plaintiff presented his evidence and defendant failed to appear,
Issues:
1. Whether or not the main complaint cannot be decided until the third-
party complaint is decided.
2. Whether or not the trial court needs an express finding as to whether
the Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. was responsible for the fault and
negligence.
Ruling:
1. No. The main case, therefore, is entirely severable and may be
litigated independently. The complaint is based on a contractual
obligation of transportation of passenger which defendant failed to
carry out, and the action is entirely different and independent from
that in the third-party complaint which is based an alleged tortious
act committed by the third-party defendant.
2. No. the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence
on the part of the common carriers. Passengers assumed the express
obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances,
and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. (Article 1756).
“In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in articles 1733 and 1755.”
This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it was therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that
 it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.
JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
FACTS: Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondent’s bus was hit above his eye
by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondent’s personnel lost
no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost
his left eye’s vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as
the stoning in this case?
HELD: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in
the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does
not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers
and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the
law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
xxx
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers
in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers.
xxx
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action
against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent
the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in
the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a
family.
AMPANG VS GUINOO TRANS CO 92 PHIL 1085
Fortuitous Event: Ampang vs. Guinoo Transportation L5044, April 30,
1953
When the defendant bus which carried the passengers capsized after being
bumped on the left side by another bus which caused the defendant’s driver
to swerve his bus to the left so as to prevent it from falling into the canal and
striking a tree, a maneuver which led the bus to skid and capsize. The Court
was of the opinion that this is an instance of fortuitous event where it
resulted from extraordinary circumstances of being struck by the
other bus, independent from the will of, and unforeseen by the defendant’s
driver.
G.R. No. L-5044, April 30, 1953
AMPANG (MORO), AMSIA (MORA) AND LUMPITAN (MORO),
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. GUINOO TRANSPORTATION
CO. AND VICENTE GUINOO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J.:
On March 21, 1948, Moros Lambayong and Amsia were paid passengers in
bus No. 24, bearing TPU plate No. 7629, and belonging to the Guinoo
Transportation Company, on its return trip from Digos to Davao City. When
said bus came to kilometer 44, it capsized on the road, as a result of which
Lambayong died and Amsia suffered physical injuries Amsia, Ampang and
Lumpitan instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Davao, to recover from the Guinoo Transportation Company and its
manager, Vicente Guinoo, P2,000.00 as damages for the death of
Lambayong and P1,000.00 as damages suffered by Amsia for the physical
injuries. After hearing, the court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: "Sin embargo, del contenido de la declaracion jurada suscrita por
Amsia Puna y Lumpitan Dumingay se infiere claramente, que el accidente
que causo la muerte de Lambayong, las lessiones causadas en la persona de
Amsia, y la imposibilidad de los pasajeros de llegar a su destino, se debio' a
un caso forfuito que estaba fuera del alcance de los demandados y del chofer
Quirino Piezas." The plaintiffs have appealed.
It appears that the case was submitted for decision practically on the
pleadings and the meager stipulation of facts entered into by the parties in
open court, without any attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to show by
proper evidence that the accident in question was due to any fault of the
defendants' driver, and not to a fortuitous event. Upon the other hand, the
records show that, as a result of the accident, a criminal case was filed in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz against the driver, Quirino Piezas, but
said case was dismissed upon the joint affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan. This
affidavit was presented in evidence and the lower court based its decision
mainly thereon. In said affidavit Amsia and Lumpitan declared as follows:
"That as the HABACCO bus No. 39 was overtaking the QUITRANCO bus
we felt that the HABACCO bus struck the QUITRANCO bus somewhere on
its left side, thus suddenly pushing the said QUITRANCO bus toward the
canal on the right side of the road, and the driver of the QUITRANCO bus
swerved the truck to the left in order to prevent the truck from falling into the
canal, and striking a tree standing on the side of the road, and the
HABACCO bus which was running very fast proceeded on its way.
"Then when the driver of the truck of the QUITRANCO suddenly swerved
the truck to the left in order to prevent it from falling to the canal and striking
a tree on the side of the road, the truck skidded, thereby turning the truck
upside down and as a result of which we suffered injuries including
Lamayong Mantuching who later died because of the injuries she received."
It is obvious from these statements that the accident could not be attributed in
any manner to any fault or omission of the defendants' driver. Of course, it is
now pretended by counsel for the appellants that "After investigation made
by the PC officers and policemen in charge of the case, the negligence
imputed to the driver of the HABACCO truck No. 39 was found not true,
because no sign or mark of any collision was found on said two trucks and
the driver of the Habacco truck and the passengers of said two trucks denied
that any such collision has ever taken place." However, this allegation cannot
be given any weight, there being nothing in the record to sustain it. Upon the
other hand, the affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan was introduced at the
hearing without any objection from counsel for appellants.
It is urged for the appellants that the appellees are liable under their contract
as transport safely passengers Lambayong and Amsia to their destination,
regardless of any fault or negligence that cause the accident, reliance being
placed on the case of Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657. This authority, however,
comes to the aid of the appellees, because the carrier is thereunder excused
from liability if the accident is due to a fortuitous event, and this was the
ruling in the appealed decision. This Court, in interpreting "fortuitous event",
stated that "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is
an essential element of a caso fortuito." From the facts of the case at bar it is
clear that the defendants' bus which carried Lambayong and Amsia capsized
after being bumped on the left side by Habacco bus No. 39, which caused the
defendants' driver to swerve his bus to the left so as to prevent it from falling
into the canal and striking a tree, a maneuver which led the bus to skid and
capsize. This, in our opinion, resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of
being resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of being struck by the
Habacco bus, independent of the will of, and unforseen by the defendants'
driver, in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
Maranan vs Perez practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.
2. NO. Plaintiff’s action was predicated on breach of contract of
Doctrine: carriage and the driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is
covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final
The common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its judgment.
employees upon its passengers. (Art. 1759)

Facts:

Rogelio was a passenger in a taxi owned and operated by Perez, when he

was stabbed and killed by the driver, Valenzuela. Valenzuela was
prosecuted for homicide. He was found guilty.

Maranan, Rogelio’s mother, filed an action to recover damages from

Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the
deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by
stabbing him from behind. Perez further claimed that the death was a caso
fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

Issue/s:

1. Whether Perez is liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.

2. Whether the dismissal of the claim against Valenzuela is correct.

Held:

1. YES. Unlike the old Civil Code, the New Civil Code expressly makes
the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its
employees upon its passengers (Art. 1759). This rule was adopted
from Anglo American law, where the majority view, as distinguished
from the minority view based on respondeat superior, is that the
carrier is liable as long as the assault occurs within the course of the
performance of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the
carrier's orders. The carrier's liability is absolute in the sense that it