FACTS: REVIEW PAGE 159

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016
declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;

WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law x x x';

WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968,
provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and
taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof,
of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives';

WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of
violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military
outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and
the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other
detainees;

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down
certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government
forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas,
thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this
part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce
the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the
crime of rebellion; and

WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel
groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but
also in other parts of Mindanao.

Within 48 hours, which is the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, Duterte
submitted a written report to Congress that enumerated the circumstances which led him to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao.

Duterte explained that the government initiated a plan to capture high-ranking officers of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group which was “met with resistance.” Violence also extended
not only to civilians but also to government authorities and establishment. The groups were then
able to take control of major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi which led to its
paralysis.

The aforementioned circumstances led the president to believe that the ASG and Maute Group
intended to:
a) establish DAESH wilayat;
b) remove Marawi and eventually the rest of Mindanao from its allegiance to the
Government
c) deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi
City and eventually spread control over Mindanao

While government operations to address the ongoing rebellion are in place, Duterte believed that it
was necessary to implement martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole Mindanao for public safety until the rebellion is quelled.

After receipt of the Report and briefing from the military and the police, the Senate issued PS
Resolution No. 388 in full support of Proclamation 216. They found it “satisfactory, constitutional,
and in accordance with the law.” The Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke
the same."

Likewise, the House of Representatives issued Resolution No. 1050 expressing its full support as it
also finds no reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
PETITIONS

LAGMAN PETITION (G.R. No. 231658)

Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because:

1) There is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or any part of Mindnao, arguing that
“acts of terrorism do not constitute rebellion.” There was said to be no proof that the
groups’ purpose was to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the
Philippines, its laws, or its territory.

The petitioners also pointed out that the conflict was initiated by the government in its
bid to capture the groups’ leaders. Therefore, the resistance was only due to the group
trying to protect its leaders and brothers from the government and not to lay siege on
Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic.

2) The President’s Report contained “false, inaccurate, contrived, and hyperbolic

accounts.”

3) The President mistakenly included past events that took place long before the conflict in
Marawi City began which had been long resolves or with the culprits having already
been arrested.

4) The President failed to consult the military establishment or any ranking official prior to
the proclamation.

5) An earlier presentation before the House of Representatives confirmed that:

a. The military was successful in pre-empting the ASG and Maute’s plan to take
over Marawi City and parts of Mindanao;
b. The absence of hostile plan by the MILF;
c. The “undetermined” or meagre number of foreign fighters who can lend support
to Maute Group

Petitioners call for the Court to (1) "exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and
nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis.

CULLAMAT PETITION (G.R. No. 231771)

Similar to the Lagman Petition, Cullamat Petition moved to nullify Proclamation 216 for being
unconstitutional for lack of sufficient factual basis.

In particular, petitioners pointed out that the supposed rebellion was only happening in Marawi
City and not in the entire region of Mindanao and that there is no lawless violence in other parts of
Mindanao similar to that of Marawi City.

Petitioners also called out the phrase “other groups” in the last Wheareas Clause for being vague as
it failed to identify the aforementioned rebel groups.
The Cullamat Petition, likewise, alleged “inaccuracies, exaggeration, and falsities” in the President’s
Report.

MOHAMAD PETITION (G.R. No. 231774)

The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and should be invoked by
the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. It contends that the extraordinary
powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially (power to call out armed forces, then
power to suspend privilege of habeas corpus, then finally declaration of martial law).

The petitioners also claimed that the presidents’ earlier assumption of ASG and Maute Group’s
political agenda, which is to establish an Islamic State, is bereft of substantiation.

The Mohamad Petition then called for the Court to compel the respondents to “divulge relevant
information” and “present proof on factual basis” of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. They also moved to declare
Proclamation 216 as uncostitional for lack of sufficient factual basis.

All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

OSG IN RESPONSE

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in response, maintained that the burden lies not with the
respondents but with the petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.

The OSG posits that the president could not be expected to personally determine the accurateness
of the contents of the report and that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed based on
the facts available to the president at the time the decision was made.

The OSG also argued that the president need not seek recommendation from the Defense Secretary,
or any official for that matter, because the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the
president as Commander-in-Chief.

The OSG also pointed out that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts as they only
cited news reports as their basis which cannot be admissible and without probative value as they
can be considered “hearsay evidence, twice removed.”
ISSUE

1) Are the petitions (Lagman, Cullamat, Mohamad) sufficient to invoke the Court to review the
president’s decision to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?

2) In declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus, is the president required
to:
a. Be factually correct
b. Obtain favourable recommendation from the Secretary of Defense
c. Take into account only the situation at the time of proclamation even if subsequent
events prove that they may not been accurately reported

3) Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216 independent of the actual actions taken by Congress?

4) Is there factual basis for the proclamation of martial law and suspending the writ of habeas
corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5) Does the court have the power to calibrate the powers granted to the President as
Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law

6) Can Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 be considered vague and null and void for:
a. Inclusion of “other rebel groups”
b. Having no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region

7) Does the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation 216 provide sufficient basis to prove
the:
a. Existence of actual rebellion
b. Necessity of declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region

8) Is terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion which would

warrant the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on grounds of public safety

9) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017:

a. Recall Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. Nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
RULING

1. Were the petitions (Lagman, Cullamat, Mohamad) sufficient to invoke the Court to review
the president’s decision to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus?

Yes. Section 18 of Article VII provides that any citizen, even non-tax payers, may file the
appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. S/He need not prove that s/he
sustained a direct and personal injury as a consequence of questioned Presidential act/s.

The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing refers to any action initiated by a citizen for
the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter
to be resolved by the Court.

2. In declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus, is the president
required to:
a. Be factually correct
b. Obtain favourable recommendation from the Secretary of Defense
c. Take into account only the situation at the time of proclamation even if
subsequent events prove that they may not been accurately reported

No. The President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts given the
urgency of the situation. Such a scenario would not only place the President in peril but would also
defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him.

No. The recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-
ranking military officials, is not necessary for the powers to declare martial law and suspend the
writ of habeas corpus is on the sole discretion of the president as indicated on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution.

Yes. The determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis is based only on
facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as
these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.

Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written
report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long
as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that
there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension.

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand
during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the
Court's review is concerned.

3. Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216 independent of the actual actions taken by Congress?
Yes. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. The Court can simultaneously
exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress.

4. Is there factual basis for the proclamation of martial law and suspending the writ of
habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?

Yes. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion
exists.

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
1) Actual rebellion or invasion;
2) Public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and
3) There is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion. In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince
himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a
rebellion was committed or is being committed

The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which
was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there
is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of
his emergency powers

To emphasize, the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the
facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince
the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be
accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

5. Does the court have the power to calibrate the powers granted to the President as
Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law?

No. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield (call out
power, suspension of privilege of habeas corpus, or declaration of martial law) in a given set of
conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President.
The Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis.

The Court’s review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the
bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of
the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

6. Can Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 be considered vague and null and void for:
a. Inclusion of “other rebel groups”
b. Having no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the
entire Mindanao region

No. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.

No. Proclamation 216 cannot be described as vague on the ground that it has no guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. These guidelines
are also meant to serve as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.

To reiterate, the judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or
known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension and the review will
only be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.

Therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in
violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should
be resolved in a separate proceeding.

The vagueness doctrine also has a special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216
on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.

7. Does the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation 216 provide sufficient basis to
prove the:
a. Existence of actual rebellion
b. Necessity of declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region

The parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient
factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety
requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion
exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes that there is probable cause
that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. It, too,
is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more
informed understanding of what is happening on the ground.

In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and
events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.

The Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire
Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial
law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually
transpired.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger
of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi
City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different
parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is
actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the
exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both
for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao.

8. Is terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion which would

warrant the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on grounds of public safety?

No. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope
covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by
which terrorism can be committed.

However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-
defined. The objective of a "terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of
widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and
beheading, among others.

In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as
terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government."

Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the
existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017:

a. Recall Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. Nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

No. The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state
of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55.

The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it
may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS
sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as
CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
HOLDING:

[The Court dismissed the three petitions and held that President Rodrigo Duterte had sufficient factual
basis to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
Region.

The first paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that it is the sole
discretion of the president to exercise his extraordinary powers (which means to call for power,
suspend the privilege of habeas corpus, or declare martial law – not necessarily in that order) in case
of (1)actual rebellion or invasion and (2) when the public safety requires it in the Philippines or any
part thereof. Given the perceived urgency of the situation, the president need not seek consent from the
Defense Secretary, Congress, or any official. The Congress, however, voting majority, can revoke such
proclamation.

Likewise, the third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution gave the Court
authority to review the sufficiency of actual basis of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus upon appropriate proceeding filed by a citizen. The Constitution, however,
does not require the Court to look into the accuracy, fairness, or arbitrariness of such imposition or
suspension.]

Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
COMMENTARY:

Velasco, Bersamin, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Jardeleza and Caguioa, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Martires, and Tijam concurred with the Chief Justice Makalintal.

Sereno, Carpio, and Leonen each had dissenting opinions.

DISSENTING OPINION: SERENO

I vote to declare that the President had sufficient factual basis for the issuance of Proclamation No.
216 only insofar as it covers the following provinces: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu.

The use of the phrase "when public safety requires it" can only mean that the Court must ask
whether the powers being invoked is proportional to the state of the rebellion, and corresponds
with its place of occurrence.

The military has said as much: there are places in Mindanao where the Mautes will never gain a
foothold. If this is so, why declare martial law over the whole of Mindanao? When the military
states that present powers are sufficient to resolve a particular violent situation, then the Court
must deem them as sufficient, and thus martial law should be deemed unnecessary.

It is important to explain that martial law is not, under our Constitution, justifiable by the presence
of violence alone.

Since the Court is unanimous in affirming that only actual rebellion and not the imminence of
rebellion is required for the declaration of martial law, then it follows as a matter of course that
martial law can only be declared where the actual rebellion is taking place. This Court is required
not only to determine the existence of actual rebellion, but also, the time for and the place over
which martial law can be declared. The intensity of the rebellion, the areas over which it is being
waged are matters that the Court must carefully examine

Further, this Court must ensure that any decision it will render does not unwittingly give the
Maute gang of criminals a legal status higher than that of common local criminals or terrorists, or
give them international notoriety that will facilitate financial and moral support from like-minded
criminals. he characterization of the conflict in Marawi is exceptionally significant with respect to
our obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It is therefore important for this
Court, the President, the military and other government officials to exercise the utmost prudence in
characterizing the Maute group and describing the nature of the ongoing conflict. Lack of precision
in this regard may trigger the provisions of IHL and unwittingly elevate the status of the members
of the Maute group from common criminals to combatants or fighters under IHL.

DISSENTING: CARPIO

I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, and DECLARE
Proclamation No. 216 UNCONSTITUTIONAL as to geographic areas of Mindanao outside of Marawi
City, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Proclamation No.
216 is valid, effective and CONSTITUTIONAL only within Marawi City.
Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report to Congress do not contain any evidence
whatsoever of actual rebellion outside of Marawi City. In fact, the Proclamation itself states that the
Maute-Hapilon armed fighters in Marawi City intended to remove "this part of Mindanao," referring
to Marawi City, from Philippine sovereignty. The Proclamation itself admits that only "this part of
Mindanao" is the subject of separation from Philippine sovereignty by the rebels. The President's
Report did not mention any other city, province or territory in Mindanao, other than Marawi City,
that had a similar public uprising by a rebel group, an element of actual rebellion. Thus, the
President's Report concludes that "based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and
the PNP, there exists a strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City."

The President's Report expressly states that the Maute-Hapilon armed fighters were waging
rebellion first in Marawi City as a prelude or "precedent" to waging rebellion in the rest of
Mindanao. This is a clear admission that the rebellion was only in Marawi City and had yet to
spread to the rest of Mindanao.

In addition, the Court cannot simply trust blindly the President when he declares martial law or
suspends the privilege of the writ. While the 1987 Constitution vests the totality of executive power
in one person only, the same Constitution also specifically empowers the Court to "review" the
"sufficiency of the factual basis" of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ if it is subsequently questioned by any citizen.

It is also the Government that must justify the resort to extraordinary powers that are subject to the
extraordinary review mechanisms under the Constitution. This is only logical because it is the
Government that is in possession of facts and intelligence reports justifying the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Ordinary citizens are not expected to be in
possession of such facts and reports

The Court must never allow the 1972 debacle to be ever repeated again. The Court should not
mercilessly inflict on the Filipino people the constant fear of a recurrence of the nightmarish
martial law of Marcos. Immediately after issuing Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte
announced to the entire nation and to the world that his martial law "will not be any different from
what Marcos did.” The Court must take this public and official statement seriously for this is no
trivial matter.

DISSENTING: LEONEN

I read the situation as amounting to acts of terrorism, which should be addressed in a decisive but
more precise manner. The military can quell the violence. It can disrupt many of the
planned atrocities that may yet to come. It can do so as it had on many occasions in the past with
the current legal arsenal that it has.

The group committing atrocities in Marawi are terrorists. They are not rebels. They are committing
acts of terrorism. They are not engaged in political acts of rebellion. Terrorism does not merit a
vague declaration of martial law and in a wide undefined geographical area containing other
localities where no act of terrorism exists.

Respondents did not show how the available legal tools magnified by the call out of the armed
forces would not be sufficient. Public safety is always the aim of the constitutional concept of police
power. Respondents failed to show what martial law would add. Martial law is not the
constitutionally allowed solution to terrorism. It is an emergency grant of power in cases where
civilian authority has been overrun due to actual hostilities motivated by a demonstrable purpose
of actually seizing government. As an emergency measure, the capability and commitment of the
lawless group must also be shown.

The actual acts of the criminal elements in Marawi are designed to slow down the advance of
government forces and facilitate their escape. They are not designed to actually control seats of
governance.

The provincial and city governments are existing and are operating as best as they could under the
circumstances. They are not rendered inutile such that there is now a necessity for the military to
take over all aspects of governance. Civilians are also helping recover other civilians caught in the
crossfire as well as attend to the wounded and the thousands displaced. Even as we decide this
case, a masterplan for the rehabilitation of Marawi is in the works. At no time was there any doubt
that our armed forces would be able to quell the lawlessness in Marawi.

Even by their own definition, the armed forces do not seem to believe martial law to be necessary.
Certainly, no civilian government in Mindanao is failing to function.

In addition, while this Court cannot state the parameters for the President's martial law, this
Court's constitutional role implicitly requires that the President provide the parameters himself,
upon declaring martial law. The proclamation must contain the powers he intends to wield.

This Court has the power to determine the sufficiency of factual basis for determining that public
safety requires the proclamation of martial law. The President evades review when he does not
specify how martial law would be used.

I disagree with the proposed ponencia's view that the vagueness of a Presidential Proclamation
on martial law can only be done on grounds of alleged violation of freedom of expression. The
vagueness of a declaration of martial law is, in my view unconstitutional as it will evade review of
the sufficiency of facts required by the constitutional provision.

The doctrine of void for vagueness is a ground for invalidating a statute or a governmental
regulation for being vague. The doctrine requires that a statute be sufficiently explicit as to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.

The proclamation that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended is a clear
act that needs no further explication. A declaration of a state of martial law is not so clear. It is
comparable to congress passing a law that says, "Congress has passed a law," without providing the
substance of the law itself. The nation is left at a loss as to how to respond to the proclamation and
what conduct is expected from its citizens, and those implementing martial law are left unbridled
discretion as to what to address, without any standards to follow.

General Order No. 1 directs law enforcement agencies to arrest persons committing unspecified
acts and impliedly imposes a gag order on media.

Proclamation No. 216 and General Order No. 1 also not only authorize, but command, law enforcers
to immediately arrest persons who have committed, are committing, or attempting to commit, any
and all acts in relation to rebellion and lawless violence in Mindanao, without any guidelines for the
citizens to determine what conduct they may be arrested for
While clear about what martial law does not include, it does not define what the President will
want to actually do as a result of the proclamation. A broad declaration of martial law therefore will
not be sufficient to inform. It will thus immediately violate due process of law.

Furthermore, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine the sufficiency of the facts to
determine when "public safety requires" martial law if the powers of martial law are not clear.

This Court must put itself in the place of the President and conduct a reassessment of the facts as
presented to him. The Constitution requires not only that there are facts that are alleged. It
requires that these facts are sufficient. Sufficiency can be seen in two (2) senses:

The first sense is that the facts as alleged and used by the President is credible. This entails
an examination of what kinds of sources and analysis would be credible for the
President as intelligence information.

The bases on which a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus are grounded must factually be correct with a satisfactory level of
confidence at the time when it is presented. Any action based on information without basis
or known to be false is arbitrary.

Reports containing intelligence information should be shown to have undergone a rigorous

process to ensure their veracity and credibility. To be sufficient, the facts alleged by the
respondents cannot be accepted as per se accurate and credible.

The second sense is whether the facts found to be supported with credible sources of
information or evidence sufficiently establishes a conclusion that (a) there is an actual
rebellion and (b) public safety requires the use of specific powers under the rubric of
martial law allowable by our Constitution.

In my view, respondents have failed to show what additional legal powers will be added by
martial law except perhaps to potentially put on the shoulders of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines the responsibilities and burdens of the entire civilian government over the entire
Mindanao region.