1.

MENDOZA VS COMELEC
GR. No. 191084
March 5, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 gubernatorial
race in the Province of Bulacan. Respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan who opposed him filed an
election protest with the COMELEC questioning the election results in all the 5,066 precincts in
the province due to massive electoral fraud that Mendoza allegedly committed .On December 1,
2009 the COMELEC Second Division decided the election protest and proclaimed Pagdanganan
as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. Mendoza opposed Pagdanganan’s motion for execution
of the decision before the Second Division and filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision
with the COMELEC En Banc. On February 8, 2010 the COMELEC En Ban denied Mendoza’s
motion for reconsideration. Reacting to it, he filed an urgent motion to recall the February 8
resolution on the ground, among others ,that the En Banc issued such resolution (a) without the
concurrence of the majority of its members and (b)without conducting a rehearing under Section
6, Rule18 of the COMELEC rules of procedure. Only three Commissioners voted to deny his
motion for reconsideration. A commissioner dissented while three others took no part. On
February 10, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the rehearing of the motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2010. Meanwhile, on February 12 Mendoza filed with this Court
the present petition, raising the same grounds which he cited in the urgent motion to recall that he
earlier filed with the COMELEC En Banc. Following its February 15 rehearing, the members of
the COMELEC En Banc maintained their votes. On March 4, 2010 the En Banc issued an order
directing the immediate execution of the Second Division’s decision. This prompted Mendoza to
file a supplement to his petition before this Court, bringing up the recent developments in the
case

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion under the Rule 18,
sec. 6 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure.

RULING: There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over
election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is
determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is
brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a
majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc,
the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the
instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division,
which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division
ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall
be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one as
original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the
COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process
comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no
conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice
except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has
been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as
an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result,
the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

The petition is GRANTED. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is

hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-28348 December 15, 1967

2. BERNARDINO ABES vs. COMELEC

Petitioners, candidates of the Liberal Party, the Nacionalista Reform Party and the Quezon City
Citizens League for Good Government, first went to the Commission on Elections (Comelec).
Upon the claim that more than 50% of the registered voters were not able to vote during the
elections of November 14, 1967, they prayed for Comelec's declaration that there was failure of
election. They petitioned for suspension of the canvass and the proclamation of winning
candidates. They sought nullification, too, of elections in Quezon City for city officials and asked
that new elections be held. Comelec, in a minute resolution of November 23, 1967, denied the
petition, ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but not to proclaim any
winning candidate for city offices and gave petitioners time "to go to the Supreme Court for the
proper remedy."

Petitioners thus came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction.

Upon the petition and respondents' returns, the case was heard on the merits.

Issue:

whether Comelec has jurisdiction (1) to order the board of canvassers to suspend the canvassing
and proclamation of the, winning candidates; (2) to annul the elections in Quezon City; and (3)
following such annulment, to direct the holding of another election.

1. By way of prefatory statement, it may serve our purpose if we emphasize once again that the
board of canvassers is a ministerial body.2 It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election
returns submitted to it in due form.3 It has been said, and properly, that its power are "limited
generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent
result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the
face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so
ascertained."4 Comelec is the constitutional body charged with the duty to enforce all laws relative
to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers perform its proper function. 5

Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec's powers in pursuance of its
supervisory or administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under the
election code. It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation
based on incomplete returns,6 or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or
proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it
lacked a quorum7 or because the board did not meet at all.8 Neither Constitution nor statute has
granted Comelec or the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look
beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.

2. Petitioners' next prayer is for the annulment of the elections held on November 14, 1967. Their
bases: frauds, terrorism, and other illegal practices committed before and during the elections.

The primary grant of power to Comelec is found in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
 involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as
its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions,
orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Nothing in the foregoing constitutional precept will imply authority for Comelec to annul an
election. So, too, did the Revised Election Code withhold from Comelec the specific power to
annul an election.

3. As unconvincing is petitioners' prayer that Comelec direct a new election in Quezon City. We
have searched in vain for any constitutional or legal precept that would grant Comelec that power.
All that there is in the statute books is Section 8 of the Revised Election Code, which reads:

Sec. 8. Postponement of Election. — When for any serious cause the holding of an
election should become impossible in any political division or subdivision, the President,
upon recommendation of the Commission on Elections, shall postpone the election
therein for such time as he may deem necessary.12

The remedy, however, lies in Congress. The hiatus in our election law may be filled only
by legislation, not by judicial fiat.

4. The petition before this Court in effect seeks to nullify Comelec's order of November 23, 1967
heretofore adverted to. There was no lack nor excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion
was involved. Correctly did Comelec decline to direct the Quezon City board of canvassers to
suspend canvass and proclamation. Comelec is powerless to annul the election. Nor can it direct
a new election. We cannot compel Comelec to act as petitioners prayed for. Absent Comelec's
legal duty, mandamus will not issue.

For the reasons given, we vote to dismiss the petition. No costs allowed. So ordered.

3. BARBERS VS COMELEC, JUNE 22, 2005

Facts:
Robert Z. Barbers (Barbers) and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the
Philippines inthe 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections(elections).

On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon as the
12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in theMay 10, 2004 national and local
elections, to serve for a term of 6 years, beginning on June 30, 2004 in accordance with Article VI, Section IV
of the Constitution of the Philippines. Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC
stated that this difference will not materially beaffected by the votes in certain precincts where
there was failure of elections.Claiming that Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to
annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC on 7
June2004. In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation was illegal and premature
being based on an incomplete canvass. He asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes
and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections. In his answer, Biazon asserted that: (1) the First Divisionof the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to review, modify, or set aside what the COMELEC sitting
en banc as the NBC for Senators has officially performed; (2) since the COMELEC has proclaimed Biazon and
has taken his oath of office on 30 June2004, the Senate Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC,
has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition.Thus COMELEC through the Special Division,
denied the petition to annul the proclamation of respondent Biazon for lack of merit. The COMELEC
en banc further affirmed the decision and stated that even if private respondents lead was decreased to
three thousand two hundred ninety-nine (3,299)votes even if the special elections are yet to be conducted,
he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful occupant of the 12th slot for the senatorial position. ,
qualifies such powerof the Commission by so stating that a pre-proclamation contest may only
apply in cases where there are manifest errors in the election returns or certificates of
canvass, with respect to national elective positions such as herein case.To prove that the same is
manifest, the errors must appear on the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their administrative proceedings.
Ruling:
The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within
the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against
Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET. In addition, the COMELEC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions affirming
Biazonsproclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results of the special elections to
be held would not materially affect the results of the elections.

4. Beso vs. Aballe

Petitioner Vito Beso and private respondent Rita Aballe (hereafter ABALLE)were candidates for
the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Carayman,Calbayog City, in the barangay elections
of 12 May 1997.In the canvass of the returns of the four precincts of Barangay Carayman,BESO
was credited with four hundred ninety-five (495) votes, while ABALLEobtained four hundred
ninety-six (496) votes. The latter was thus proclaimedthe winning candidate.BESO seasonably
filed a protest with the Municipal Trial Court of CalbayogCity (hereafter MTCC). The case was
docketed as Election Protest No.130. marie After due proceedings, the MTCC, per Judge
Filemon A. Tandico, Jr.,promulgated on 20 January 1998 a decision dated 13 January 1998, in
favor of BESO.On 20 January 1998 ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal manifesting therein thatshe
is appealing from the decision "to the Regional Trial Court, Calbayog City."It likewise appears that
on 22 January 1998, ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal.indicating therein that she was appealing
from the decision "to the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANILA."On 24 April 1998, ABALLE
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City(hereafter RTC) a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with anurgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction (id ., 91) against MTCC Judge Tandinco, Jr. to set asideand
annul the latter’s order of 2 March 1998 denying the motion for inhibition;resolution of 5 March
1998 granting the motion for execution pending appeal;and the resolution of 21 April 1998
denying the motion to reconsider theresolution of 5 March 1998. BESO was impleaded as co-
respondent. The casewas assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC, presided over by public
respondentJudge Roberto A. Navidad, and was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 98-040.On
28 April 1998, Judge Navidad issued a Temporary Restraining Order (id.,104) restraining
respondent Judge Tandinco, Jr. and all persons acting in hisbehalf "from enforcing the Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal." The temporaryrestraining order was "effective within 72 hours only
from its issuance.

WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari in election contests pending in
inferior courts

COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election protests pending before inferior
courts.In Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force
and effect in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1 (should be Section 2) Article IX-C
of the Constitution, the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the election contest in
question. In such cases the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari , prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of
Section 50 reads:The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority tohear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus involving election cases.Under the second
paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, theCommission on Elections has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over,inter alia, contestsinvolving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

5. Lazatin vs. HRET

157 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s
Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests

Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul
his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties
of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election
contests.

Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become
final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-
Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid.
The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if
warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by
the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed
by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the
board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of
the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to
the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of
the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had
been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also
addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

6. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

THE long arm of the law did not catch up with former Dapitan City mayor Dominador G. Jalosjos.
For more than 30 years, that arm was inutile. Even the Sandiganbayan, in a decision in a related
case, was left to wonder why “(d)espite the lapse of 16 years, warrant of arrest was not effected”
against Jalosjos.
That case was People versus Gregorio Bacolod. Greg is a Cebuano (and a friend), who rose from
being Probations Officer in Cebu to administrator of the Parole and Probations Administration.

These are the facts as culled from the decision of the Supreme Court in Jalosjos versus
Comelec (G.R. No. 193237) and of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Pp. vs. Bacolod (Crim.
Cases No. 28118 and 28119):
Jalosjos and three others were charged with robbery in Cebu on Jan. 22, 1969. On April 30,
1970, all the accused were sentenced to suffer a penalty of “prision correcconal minimum to
prision mayor maximum.”

Jalosjos appealed to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on Aug. 9, 1973.

“It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed
a petition for probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court.
But then, on motion filed by his probation officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC
Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued.”

The probation officer who moved to recall the probation was Bacolod. He told the Cebu RTC that
since the start of 1986 up until the time that he filed his motion, Jalosjos has not reported to him.

The Court granted Bacolod’s motion and on March 19, 1987 it revoked the probation and ordered
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Jalosjos in order that he can serve his sentence. For
one reason or another, the warrant was never served. On Jan. 16, 2004 or some 17 years after,
the Court, at the instance of Assistant City Prosecutor Victor Laborte, again ordered the arrest of
Jalosjos.

In the meantime and “anticipating that James Adasa will file a disqualification case against him,
Jalosjos secured from the Parole and Probation Administration a certification that he has fully
served his probation. (Adasa was Jalosjos’s opponent for mayor of Dapitan City).

The PPA issued the certification stating that Jalosjos “has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation and his case is deemed terminated” and that the certification served as a final
discharge and “shall operate to restore to him (Jalosjos) all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction.”

Dated Dec. 19, 2003, the certification was signed by Bacolod, the same officer who earlier asked
the court to revoke Jalosjos’ probation for failing to report to him.

Epilogue: Jalosjos ran for Dapitan City Mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections, won and was
proclaimed. The Comelec, however, disqualified him because of his previous conviction for
robbery, nullified his proclamation and in his place, declared his opponent, Agapito J. Cardino, as
the duly elected mayor. Last Thursday, he informed the helpless police where to find him – in the
hospital.

Bacolod was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt and
Practices Act and of Falsification of Public Document and ordered jailed for six years and one
month to ten years in the graft case and for two years, four months and one day to eight years
and one day for falsification.

I do not know if he has appealed the decision.

The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked;
(2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that
Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in
good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from
which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010
were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August
2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy
when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the
dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC
concluded that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under
Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what
specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of
candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime
penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section
40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether
to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40
of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of
which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of

candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. 21 Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day
he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted
to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election."24 The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the
Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases
so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected
and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
"enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar
from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a
final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED.

7. Soriano vs. COMELEC

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to nullify the Orders dated 26 June
2004 of the Commission on Elections’ First Division (COMELEC First Division).

The Facts

Petitioners and private respondents were candidates for City Council for the First and Second
Districts of Muntinlupa City in the 10 May 2004 elections.

After the elections, the Muntinlupa City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondents as
the duly elected Councilors of the Muntinlupa City Council. Petitioners individually and separately
filed election protest cases against private respondents, contesting the results of the elections in
all the 603 precincts of the First District and the 521 precincts of the Second District of Muntinlupa
City. The election protest cases for the Second District of Muntinlupa City were docketed as EPC
Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39, and 2004-40 while those for the First District were
docketed as EPC Nos. 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and 2004-45.

Issue:

The issues raised are:

1. Whether a writ of certiorari will lie in this case; and

2. Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated 26 June 2004.
Held:

The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated
directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the
members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.

Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they
be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition
of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This
does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the
motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if
in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as
where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is
the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which
was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is the Kho case.

This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro,15that "it is the decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the
Constitution,16 may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." The exception provided
in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed
interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The
assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the
interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already
consolidated.

The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order dated 31
May 2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38,
2004-39, 2004-40, 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and 2004-45 for failure of the
protestants and protestees to pay the required cash deposits. 17 Thus, we have this peculiar
situation where the interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is pending before this
Court but the main case has already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This
situation is precisely what we are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that
an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition and DENY the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

SO ORDERED.

8. Douglas Cagas VS COMELECG.R. No. 194139January 24, 2012

Facts: The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista were candidate for Governor of the Province of Davao del
Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. On may 14, 2010, canvassing of votes were cast
in favor of the petitioner. Alleging anomalies in the conduct of the election, Bautista filed an electoral
protest on May 24, 2010. In his answer the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did
not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division issued the first order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether
the protest specified the alleged irregularities. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC First Division issued its second
order, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was
contrary to law. Hence, petitioner commenced the present special civil action.

Issue: whether or not Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

Held: No. Though Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution grants SC the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of COMELEC, this however is limited only to a
final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by
a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling
of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made
in Ambil v. Commission on Elections24 are enlightening, viz:

To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed
in the Constitution, as follows:

"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." [emphasis supplied]

"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division,
certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the
Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be

reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing
of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx25

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First
Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal
the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other
errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc,
this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order
dated February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made
which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en
banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided first
in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and
February 28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-
protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they
merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-
protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done
before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to
resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders,
falls on the division itself, and not on the Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly provides for this,

Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx

xxx

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved
by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be
resolved by the division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)

Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the
subject case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can take
cognizance of. It reads as follows:

Section 2. The Commission en banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a
Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an
action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission
may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where a division
is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.

In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is
not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Courtvia a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of
the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en
banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can
directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the
COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of
the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the
1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the
resolution and determination of election controversies. 27 The breadth of such powers
encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election
protest and to decide based on such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with
the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH

THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or

platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens

who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral

parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or

coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party,
organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the
election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days
from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before
election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days
before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-
list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on
election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or

coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list
of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or
a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have
been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.

Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for
candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second,
a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the
party-list system shall be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating
the electorate on the matter of the party-list system.

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall
tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them
according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against
the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if
he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he
shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or
organization.

Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the
vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the
order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve
for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall
submit additional nominees.

Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to

the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be
provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996
under the General Appropriations Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for
purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

Republic of the Philippines

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Electoral Tribunal Building
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City

THE 2011 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal hereby adopts and promulgates the following Rules
governing its proceedings as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of Member of the House of Representatives, pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution.

TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION

RULE 1. Title. – These Rules shall be known and cited as the 2011 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, or HRET Rules. The word Tribunal whenever used alone or without
qualification in these Rules, shall refer to the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

RULE 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally constructed in order to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every contest brought before the
Tribunal.

THE TRIBUNAL

RULE 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine (9) Members, three (3) of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six (6) shall
be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairperson.

RULE 4. Organization. – (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the
Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of the immediately preceding paragraph, pending the
election of the Members of the House of Representatives who shall sit in the Tribunal, the tree
(3) Justices already designated shall have the authority to act on administrative and
interlocutory matters subject to confirmation by the Tribunal upon its organization.

(c) The Tribunal may constitute itself into three (3) divisions for the purpose of allocating and
distributing its workload. Each division shall be composed of one (1) Justice and two (2)
Members of the House of Representatives.

Each division shall act on such matters as may be assigned to it by the Tribunal En Banc, including the
appreciation of contested ballots, returns and election documents pertaining to the particular contested
precincts assigned to it by raffle and the submission to the Tribunal En Banc of its findings and
recommendations thereon within the time specified therefor.

RULE 5. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in between Regular Meetings. –
(a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at the call of the
Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The presence of at least one (1) Justice and four (4)
Members of the Tribunal shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson,
the next Senior Justice shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present shall take the
Chair.

(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the
Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an
Executive Committee to act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that
its action shall be subject to confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a
quorum is present.
 (c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its
Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice-Member, who may sit as the
Executive Committee, may act on the following matters requiring immediate action by the
Tribunal:

1. Any pleading or motion,

(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial

damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or
action concerned;

(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of
the adverse party, such as one for extension of time to comply with an
order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a prohibited
pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and

(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any
other similar pleading from any of the parties or their attorneys; and

2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the

appropriations of the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the
immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.

RULE 6. Place of Meetings. – The Tribunal shall meet in the Conference Room of the Tribunal at its
main office or at such other place in Metro Manila as it may designate. When in its judgment the
interest of justice so requires, it may also hold sessions outside of Metro Manila.
RULE 7. Exclusive Control of Functions. – The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.
RULE 8. Express and Implied Powers. - The Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are
vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as may be necessary or incidental to
the accomplishment of its purposes and the effective exercise of its functions
RULE 9. Inherent Powers. – When performing its functions, the Tribunal shall have inherent power to,
inter alia:
(1) Preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) Enforce order in proceedings before it or before any of its officials acting under its
authority;
(3) Compel obedience to its judgments, orders, resolutions and processes;
(4) Compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in any case or
proceeding before it;
(5) Administer or cause to be administered oaths in any case or proceeding before it, and in
all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
(6) Control its processes and amend its resolutions or orders to make them conform with law
and justice;
(7) Authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used in lieu
of the original, and restore and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings; and
(8) Promulgate its own rules of procedure and amend or revise the same.
RULE 10. The Chairperson; Powers and Duties. – The Chairperson shall have the following powers
and duties:
(1) Act as the Chief Executive Officer of the Tribunal;
(2) Exercise administrative supervision over the Tribunal, including the Office of the Secretary
of the Tribunal and the administrative staff of the Tribunal;
(3) Issue calls for the sessions and meetings of the Tribunal and preside thereat, and preserve
order and decorum during the same; and pass upon all questions of order subject to such
appeal as any member may take to the Tribunal;
(4) Take care that the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the Tribunal are enforced;
 (5) Appoint, dismiss or otherwise discipline the personnel of the Tribunal in accordance with
Civil Service laws and regulations. The confidential employees of every Member shall serve at
the pleasure of such Member and in no case beyond the tenure of such Member; and
(6) Perform such other functions and acts as may be necessary or appropriate to ensure the
independence and efficiency of the Tribunal.
RULE 11. Administrative Staff. – The Tribunal shall have a Secretary and a Deputy Secretary. Unless
the Tribunal otherwise provides, the administrative staff of the Tribunal shall function in eight (8)
services, namely:
(1) Legal Service;
(2) Canvass Board Service;
(3) Information System and Judicial Records Management Service;
(4) Human Resource Management Service;
(5) General Service;
(6) Finance and Budget Service;
(7) Accounting Service; and
(8) Cash Management Service.
RULE 12. Duties of the Secretary of the Tribunal; the Deputy Secretary of the Tribunal. – The
Secretary of the Tribunal shall have the following duties:
(1) Receive all pleadings and other documents properly presented, indicating on each such
document the date and time when it was filed, and furnishing each Member of the Tribunal a
copy thereof;
(2) Keep a judicial docket wherein shall be entered in chronological order the contests and
cases brought before the Tribunal, and the proceedings had therein;
(3) Prepare the calendar of contests and cases;
(4) Attend the sessions or meetings of the Tribunal and, whenever necessary, of its divisions,
and keep the minutes thereof which shall contain a clear and succinct account of all business
transacted;
(5) Certify under his signature and the seal of the Tribunal all notices, orders, resolutions and
decisions of the Tribunal;
(6) Implement the orders, resolutions, decisions and processes issued by the Tribunal;
(7) Keep a judgment book containing a copy of each decision and final order or resolution
rendered by the Tribunal in the order of its dates, and a Book of Entries of Judgments
containing in chronological order entries of the dispositive portions of all decisions and final
orders or resolutions of the Tribunal;
(8) Keep an account of the funds received and disbursed relative to the cases;
(9) Subject to the authority of the Tribunal and the Chairperson, oversee the performance of
the line and support (adjudicatory and administrative) functions of the various divisions of the
administrative staff;
(10) Keep and secure all ballot boxes, election documents, records, papers, files, exhibits, the
office seal and other public property belonging to or officially brought to the Tribunal;
(11) Perform such other duties as are prescribed by law for clerks of superior courts; and
(12) Keep such other books and perform such other duties as the Tribunal or the Chairperson
may direct.
The Deputy Secretary of the Tribunal shall assist the Secretary of the Tribunal; act as Secretary of the
Tribunal in the absence of the latter; and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned
by the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or the Secretary of the Tribunal.
RULE 13. The Seal. – The seal of the Tribunal shall be circular in shape and shall contain in the upper
part the words "House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal," in the center, the coat of arms of the
Republic of the Philippines; and at the base, the words "Republic of the Philippines."
The seal of the Tribunal shall be affixed to all decisions, orders, rulings or resolutions of the Tribunal,
certified copies of official records, and such other documents which the Tribunal may require to be
sealed.
THE TRIBUNAL

The present Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was constituted under the Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of members of the Senate of the Philippines. It is an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal composed of nine (9) members, Three
(3) members are Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. As
envision by the framers of the Constitution, they serve to neutralize the partisanship that
may arise from the political affiliation of the other six (6) members, who are Senators of
the Philippines chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties
represented in the Senate. The Tribunal is chaired by the most senior Justice-Member.
The current tribunal is composed of:
 Hon. Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Chairman
 Hon. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Member
 Hon. Justice Arturo D. Brion, Member
 Hon. Senator Loren B. Legarda, Member
 Hon. Senator Manuel ‘Lito’ M. Lapid, Member
 Hon. Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II, Member
 Hon. Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr., Member
 Hon. Senator Capanera Pia S. Cayetano, Member
 Hon. Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, Member
The Senate Electoral Tribunal functions under the vision of steadfastly upholding the true
will of the electorate as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate. Its mission is to resolve all electoral contests
brought within its jurisdiction through just, expeditious, and inexpensive proceedings. Its
avowed value is love of fellowmen and country as manifested by:

Integrity, which is defined as consistency of thoughts and feelings with words and actions
honesty and transparency in all dealings;

Commitment or dedication of self to the realization of the SET vision and to excellence in
public service;

Impartiality; i.e. neutrality and faithful adherence to fairness and justice;

Prudence, meaning care and foresight in the utilization and management of resources;
and,

Personnel Empowerment defined as the optimization of employee capability and

potentials.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1793

AN ACT CONSTITUTING AN INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL TO TRY,

HEAR AND DECIDE PROTESTS CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND
THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF
HEARING THE SAME.
Section 1. There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to be composed of eleven
members which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. It shall be
composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice
shall be its chairman. If on account of illness, absence, or incapacity upon any of the grounds
mentioned in section one, Rule one hundred and twenty-six of the Rules of Court, of any member of
the Tribunal, or whenever, by reason of temporary disability of any member thereof, or vacancies
occurring therein the requisite number of members of the Tribunal necessary to constitute a quorum or
to render a judgment in any given contest, as hereafter provided, is not present, or for any other good
reason for the early disposal of the contest, the Chief Justice may designate any retired justice or
justices of the Supreme Court as may be necessary, to sit temporarily as Member of the Tribunal, in
order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said contest is reached: Provided, however, That if no
retired justices of the Supreme Court are available or the number available is not sufficient, justices of
the Court of Appeals and retired justices of the Court of Appeals may be designated to act as Member
of the Tribunal.

Section 2. A majority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, it may promulgate its own rules and regulations
governing the procedure to be followed in the filing and hearing of such contest, and may authorize
any three of its members to receive evidence.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall hear and decide in banc all presidential election contests
brought under this Act and the concurrence of at least seven members of the Tribunal shall be
necessary for a final decision thereon.

Section 3. The Presidential Electorial Tribunal shall decide the contest within twenty months after it is
filed, and within said period shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or, in the proper
case, that none has been elected, and in case of a tie between the candidates for president or for vice-
president involved in the contest, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-President, as the case
may be, by a majority vote of the members of the Congress in joint session assembled.

The party who, in the judgment, has been declared elected, shall have the right to assume the office
as soon as the judgment becomes final which shall be ten days after promulgation. The promulgation
shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties
or their attorneys, personally or by registered mail or by telegraph. No motion shall be entertained for
the reopening of a case but only for the reconsideration of a decision under the evidence already of
record, No party may file more than one motion for reconsideration, copy of which shall be served
upon the adverse party who shall answer it within five days after the receipt thereof. Any petition for
reconsideration shall be resolved within ten days after it is submitted for resolution. As soon as a
decision becomes final, a copy thereof shall be furnished both houses of the Congress.

Section 4. The Tribunal shall have a Clerk of the Tribunal and such other subordinate officers and
employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and duties, all of whom
shall be appointed by the Tribunal in accordance with the Civil Service Law and Rules. The
Presidential Electoral Tribunal may designate the Chief Attorney of the Commission on Elections to act
as Clerk of the Tribunal, and may assign other employees of the Commission on Elections and of the
Supreme Court as may be necessary to perform duties in connection therewith. Such officials and
employees when so assigned by the Tribunal, shall perform their duties and functions under the
exclusive supervision and control of the Tribunal.

Section 5. Any registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received
not less than five hundred thousand votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a petition of contest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

Before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall take cognizance of a petition of contest or counter-
contest, the contestant or counter-contestant shall file a bond with two sureties satisfactory to the
Tribunal and for such amount as it may fix, to answer for the payment of all expenses and costs
incidental to said contest, or shall deposit with the Tribunal cash in lieu of the bond, or both, as the
Tribunal may order. Within five days from the filing of the contest or counter-contest, the Tribunal shall
fix the amount of the bond or the cash deposit or both and if the contestant or counter-contestant fails
to file the required bond or cash deposit or both within ten days from notice, his petition of contest or
counter-contest, shall be dismissed. The Tribunal may, for good reason, order from time to time that
the amount of the bond or the cash deposit be increased or decreased, or order the disposition of such
deposit as the course of the contest may require. In case the party who has paid the expenses and
costs wins in the contest, the Tribunal shall assess, levy and collect the same as costs from the losing
party.

Section 6. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall have and exercise the same powers which the law
confers upon the courts or justice, including the issuance of subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, the
taking of depositions, the arrest of witnesses for the purpose of compelling their appearance; the
production of documents and other evidence, the compulsory payment of the costs and expenses
which may have been assessed against the parties and their bonds and the enforcing of said payment
through the officers charged with the enforcement of judicial orders.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal or any of its Members shall have the power to punish contempts
provided for in Rules 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein and exercised by superior courts.

The telegrams and correspondence of the Tribunal shall be transmitted free of charge.

Section 7. The sum of two hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated to carry out the purposes
of this Act.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 21, 1957