Relief and Blowdown System (Best Practice) PDF

Eni S.p.A.
Exploration & Production Division
BEST PRACTICE
UNIT 230
RELIEF AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM
10004.HTP.PRC.PRG
Rev. 0 – January 2008
Eni S.p.A. 10004.HTP.PRC.PRG
Sh. 2 of 93
INDEX
ACRONYMS 5
RELIEF AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM – UNIT 230 6
1.1 General .................................................................................................................................. 6

1.2 Systems Description .............................................................................................................. 6
1.3 Relief System Design............................................................................................................. 7
1.3.1 Overpressure Protection Philosophy ........................................................................ 7
1.3.2 Upset Conditions....................................................................................................... 8
1.3.2.1 Blocked Discharge..................................................................................... 8
1.3.2.2 Inadvertent Valve Opening ........................................................................ 9
1.3.2.3 Control Valve Failure ................................................................................. 9
1.3.2.4 Utility Failure .............................................................................................. 9
1.3.2.5 Fire Exposure .......................................................................................... 10
1.3.2.6 Jet Fire ..................................................................................................... 10
1.3.2.7 Entrance of volatile material into the system ........................................... 11
1.3.2.8 Thermal Expansion.................................................................................. 11
1.3.2.9 Tube Rupture........................................................................................... 11
1.3.2.10 Internal Explosion .................................................................................... 12
1.3.2.11 Chemical Reaction................................................................................... 12
1.3.2.12 Hydraulic Expansion ................................................................................ 12
1.3.3 Additional Consideration ......................................................................................... 14
1.3.3.1 Pumps...................................................................................................... 14
1.3.3.2 Compressors ........................................................................................... 15
1.3.3.3 Turbines ................................................................................................... 15
1.3.3.4 Fired Heaters ........................................................................................... 15
1.3.3.5 PSV Operating in Liquid Service ............................................................. 15
1.3.3.6 Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks ...................................... 18
1.3.4 Relief Devices ......................................................................................................... 18
1.3.4.1 Spring loaded relief valves....................................................................... 18
1.3.4.2 Pilot-operated relief valves ...................................................................... 19
1.3.4.3 Rupture disks........................................................................................... 20
1.3.5 Relief Valves Location............................................................................................. 20
1.3.6 Piping Upstream of a Relief Device ........................................................................ 21
1.4 Blowdown System Design ................................................................................................... 23
1.4.1 Determination of Blowdown Requirements............................................................. 24
1.4.2 Sectioning of the Process Systems ........................................................................ 26
1.4.3 Depressuring Device Location ................................................................................ 27
1.5 Layout of Downstream Piping Systems ............................................................................... 28
1.5.1 Common Discharge Systems.................................................................................. 28
1.5.2 Blockage Due to Hydrate Formation in Downstream Piping System...................... 29
1.6 Isolation Valves in Pressure Relief Piping ........................................................................... 29
1.6.1 Isolation Valves Requirements................................................................................ 30
1.6.2 Interlocking Systems ............................................................................................... 33
1.6.2.1 Discharge to Atmosphere ........................................................................ 34
1.6.2.2 Discharge to Closed System ................................................................... 34
1.7 Disposal System .................................................................................................................. 36
1.7.1 General.................................................................................................................... 36
1.7.2 Atmospheric discharge............................................................................................ 37
1.7.3 Disposal by Flaring.................................................................................................. 37
1.7.4 Flaring Versus Venting............................................................................................ 37
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1.7.5 Flare and Vent Structure ......................................................................................... 39

1.7.5.1 Self-supported ......................................................................................... 39
1.7.5.2 Guy-wire supported ................................................................................. 40
1.7.5.3 Derrick supported .................................................................................... 40
1.8 Flare System Design............................................................................................................ 40
1.8.1 Flare Type ............................................................................................................... 41
1.8.1.1 Exothermic Flares.................................................................................... 41
1.8.1.2 Endothermic Flares.................................................................................. 43
1.8.1.3 Enclosed Ground Flares .......................................................................... 44
1.8.2 Flare Sizing ............................................................................................................. 45
1.8.2.1 Evaluation of Flare Diameter ................................................................... 45
1.8.2.2 Evaluation of Flare Height ....................................................................... 45
1.8.3 Segregated flare systems ....................................................................................... 46
1.8.4 Flare Disposal of Hydrogen Sulphide ..................................................................... 47
1.9 Other Flaring Equipment...................................................................................................... 48
1.9.1 K.O. Drum ............................................................................................................... 48
1.9.1.1 K.O. Drum Pump and Instrumentation .................................................... 49
1.9.1.2 K.O. Drum Sizing ..................................................................................... 49
1.9.2 Liquid Seals............................................................................................................. 51
1.9.3 Purge System.......................................................................................................... 51
1.10 Vent System Design ............................................................................................................ 52
1.10.1 Vent Sizing .............................................................................................................. 52
1.10.2 Individual vent outlets.............................................................................................. 53
1.11 Flare Radiation Study .......................................................................................................... 54
1.12 Relief and Blowdown System Highlights ............................................................................. 61
APPENDIX 1 - SIZING OF RELIEF DEVICES .............................................................................. 65
Design Considerations ............................................................................................ 65
Sizing for Gas or Vapour Relief............................................................................... 67
Sizing for Steam Relief............................................................................................ 71
Sizing for Liquid Relief ............................................................................................ 72
Sizing for Two Phase Liquid-Vapour Relief ............................................................ 74
Sizing for Thermal Relief......................................................................................... 74
APPENDIX 2 – HIGH INTEGRITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (HIPS) ............................................ 76
Reference Documents ............................................................................................ 76
HIPS Justification .................................................................................................... 78
HIPS Design............................................................................................................ 79
Advantages and Disadvantages of HIPS................................................................ 84
GLOSSARY 87
REFERENCE 92
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For Main Utilities Best Practice reference shall be made to Eni E&P
internal document No. 10002.HTP.PRC.PRG.
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ACRONYMS
BDV Blowdown valve
CCF Common cause failure
DIERS Design institute for emergency relief system
ESD Emergency shutdown
HIPS High integrity protection system
LHV Lower heating value
PES Programmable electronic system
PRV Pressure relief valve
PSV Pressure safety valve
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented system
SRS Safety requirement specification
S/R VALVE Safety / Relief valve
TSV Thermal safety valve

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RELIEF AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM – UNIT 230
1.1 General
This document sets out the general guidelines for sizing and designing a
relief and blowdown system, for both on-shore and off-shore production
facilities, with particular attention to the flare sizing.
The principal elements of pressure relief systems are the individual
pressure relief devices, the flare piping system, the flare separator drum,
and the flare — including sealing devices, purge and steam injection for
smokeless burning.
Design of relief systems must comply with applicable state and federal
codes and laws as well as the requirements of the insurance covering the
plant or installation. State and federal regulations not only cover safety
but also environmental considerations such as air and water pollution and
noise abatement.
This section presents a convenient summary of relief, depressuring and
disposal systems information obtained from API 520 / 521 / 526 / 537 and
other sources.
1.2 Systems Description
Pressure relieving devices have to be installed to ensure that a process

system or any of its components are not subjected to pressures that
exceed the design pressure. API 521 recommends a depressurization
time (to 7 barg) of 15 minutes (see Paragraph 1.4); therefore, relieving
flowrates can be considered to be continuous rates of limited duration 10
- 15 min. The relieving rate will cease once the source of overpressure is
isolated.
Blow-down depressuring valves are intended to provide for a rapid
reduction of pressure in equipment by releasing vapours, as pressure
safety valves cannot provide depressuring and merely limit the pressure
rise under emergency conditions.
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1.3 Relief System Design
The flowrates to the system can be caused by various operating and

upset conditions not all of which are of emergency type.
Even though the determination of relieving rates for each upset condition
and sizing of the relevant relief device is out of the scope of the work, in
the following is given a brief description of the most common
overpressure causes; moreover, Appendix 1 contains some relief devices
sizing methods. However, for a more rigorous determination of individual
relieving rates and relief devices sizing reference should be made
respectively to Section 5 of API 521 and to API 520.
1.3.1 Overpressure Protection Philosophy
Overpressure is due to a deviation of the normal operating conditions and

it is the result of an unbalance or disruption of the normal flows of
material and energy that causes the material or energy, or both, to build
up in some part of the system. Analysis of the causes and magnitudes of
overpressure is, therefore, a special and complex study of material and
energy balances in a process system.
Overpressure may result from:
(a) heat input, which is indirect pressure input through vaporization
or thermal expansion
(b) direct pressure input from higher pressure sources.
The causes of overpressure are considered to be unrelated if no process
or mechanical or electrical linkages exist among them, or if the length of
time that elapses between possible successive occurrences of these
causes is sufficient to make their classification unrelated.
The simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated causes of
overpressure (also known as double or multiple jeopardy) is not a basis
for design. Example double jeopardy scenarios might be: fire exposure
simultaneous with exchanger internal tube failure, fire exposure
simultaneous with failure of administrative controls to drain and
depressure isolated equipment, or operator error that leads to a blocked
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outlet coincidental with a power failure. On the other hand, instrument air
failure during fire exposure may be considered single jeopardy if the fire
exposure causes local air line failures.
1.3.2 Upset Conditions
Pressure vessels, heat exchangers, operating equipment, and piping are

designed to contain the system pressure. The equipment design is based
on the normal operating pressure at operating temperatures, the effect of
any combination of process upsets that are likely to occur and the
differential between the operating and set pressures of the pressure-
relieving device.
The process systems designer must define the minimum pressure relief
capacity required to prevent the pressure in any piece of equipment from
exceeding the maximum allowable accumulated pressure.
In the following is given a brief description of some common occurrences
that may require overpressure protection. This summary is not intended
to be all inclusive; it is merely recommended as a guide.
1.3.2.1 Blocked Discharge
The inadvertent closure of a block valve on the outlet of a pressure

vessel while the plant is on stream may expose the vessel to a pressure
that exceeds the maximum allowable working pressure.
If closure of an outlet block valve can result in overpressure, a pressure
relief device is required unless administrative procedures to control valve
closure, such as car seals or locks, are in place. In this case, the relief
load is usually the maximum flow which the pump, compressor, or other
flow source produces at relief conditions. The quantity of material to be
relieved should be determined at conditions that correspond to the set
pressure plus overpressure instead of at normal operating conditions.
Instantaneously, the flowrate to be discharged should be higher than the
normal operating flow (e.g. compressor). Moreover, the presence of a
liquid outlet on the vessel (LV) could decrease the flowrate to be
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discharged. However, during design operation the worst case shall be

considered; therefore, only the higher flowrate case (absence of liquid
outlet or closed LV) shall be deeply analyzed for relief device sizing.
1.3.2.2 Inadvertent Valve Opening
The inadvertent opening of any valve from a source of higher pressure,

such as high-pressure steam or process fluids, should be considered.
This action may require pressure-relieving capacity unless provisions are
made for locking or sealing the valve closed.
This overpressure scenario can be due to operator error, who can
operate the valve in the wrong position, or to valve leakage. In these
cases, the relief valve shall be sized considering the maximum valve Cv
declared by the manufacturer and the maximum ∆p across the valve
(valve set pressure – protected equipment design pressure).
1.3.2.3 Control Valve Failure
The failure positions of instruments and control valves must be carefully

evaluated. A valve may stick in the wrong position, or a control loop may
fail. If one or more of the inlet valves are opened by the same failure that
caused the outlet valve to close, pressure-relieving devices may be
required to prevent overpressure. The required relief capacity is the
difference between the maximum inlet and maximum outlet flows.
1.3.2.4 Utility Failure
The consequences that may develop from any utility service loss,
whether local or plantwide, must be carefully evaluated. The normal utility
services that could fail and a partial listing of affected equipment that
could cause overpressure are given in Table 1.3.1.
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Utility Failure Equipment Affected

Pumps for cooling water circulation or any other
service such as boiler feed, reflux, etc.
Air cooler fans, cooling tower
Electric
Compressors (for air, vacuum, refrigeration, etc.)
Instrumentation
Motor-operated valves
Condensers and coolers
Cooling Water
Jackets on rotating equipment
Transmitters / Controllers / Alarms
Instrument Air
Regulating valves
Turbine drivers
Reboilers
Steam
Reciprocating pumps
Direct steam injection equipment
Boilers
Engine drivers
Fuel
Compressors
Gas Turbines
Seals
Inert Gas
Purge System
Table 1.3.1 – Possible utility failure and relevant equipment affected.
1.3.2.5 Fire Exposure
Even if fire is not usually the condition that may create the greatest
relieving requirements, it is the most common case.
Various empirical equations have been developed to determine relief
loads from vessels exposed to fire. Formula selection varies with the
system and fluid considered (see API 521, Section 5).
1.3.2.6 Jet Fire
Jet fire is a fire created when a leak from a pressurized system ignites
and forms a burning jet. Jet fires can occur when almost any combustible
/ flammable fluid under pressure is released to atmosphere. Equipment
failure during a jet-fire is due to a localized and instantaneous
overheating without a significant pressure increase in the equipment (the
relief device set point isn’t often reached). This is due to the localized
nature of heating whereby the bulk fluid temperature might not increase
appreciably. Hence, a relief device might not prevent vessel failure from
jet fire impingement.
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Instead of a pressure-relief system, protection against jet fires focuses on

prevention of leaks through proper maintenance and/or mitigation
systems such as fireproofing, depressuring systems, isolation of leaks,
equipment and/or flange orientation and minimization and emergency
response.
1.3.2.7 Entrance of volatile material into the system
Entrance of water or light hydrocarbons into hot oil, causing a great and
instantaneous expansion in volume, can cause system overpressure.
Normally, a pressure relieving device is not provided for this contingency.
Proper design and operation of the process system are essential in
attempts to eliminate this possibility.
1.3.2.8 Thermal Expansion
If isolation of a process line on the cold side of an exchanger can result in

excess pressure due to heat input from the warm side, then the line or
cold side of the exchanger should be protected by a pressure safety
valve (PSV). If any equipment, item or line can be isolated while full of
liquid, a PSV should be provided for thermal expansion of the contained
liquid.
1.3.2.9 Tube Rupture
When a large difference exists between the design pressure of the shell
and tube sides of an exchanger, provisions is required for relieving the
low pressure side (it could be required either on shell side or on tube
side). Because the test pressure is normally about 150% of the design
pressure, a “2/3 rule” is established from it. The rule is this: pressure relief
for tube rupture is not required where the low pressure exchanger side
(including upstream and downstream systems) is designed at or above
the 2/3 criteria. Because ASME changed the hydrostatic test pressure for
pressure vessels from the 150% design pressure to a new standard of
130% design pressure, the existing “2/3 rule” changed to a “10/13 rule”.
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As a general rule, the required relief capacity is based on twice the tube
cross section area, and the assumption that high pressure fluid can flow
through both the tube stub and the other end of the tube.
1.3.2.10 Internal Explosion
Where overpressure protection against internal explosions (excluding

detonation) caused by ignition of vapour-air mixtures is to be provided,
rupture discs or explosion vent panels, not relief valves, should be used.
Relief valves cannot be used in this case because they react too slowly to
protect the vessel against the extremely rapid pressure build-up caused
by internal flame propagation.
1.3.2.11 Chemical Reaction
The rapid evolution of an exothermic reaction (runaway) or the

degradation reaction which generates gas products can cause the vessel
rupture. Exothermic reactions become dangerous only when the
produced heat is greater than the removed heat and the temperature
increase causes a reaction rate increase.
Protection against reaction runaway or gases “generation” should be
provided. The methodology for determining the appropriate size of an
emergency vent system for chemical reactions was established by DIERS
(Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems).
1.3.2.12 Hydraulic Expansion
Hydraulic expansion is the increase in liquid volume caused by an

increase in temperature. It can result from:
(a) Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are filled with cold
liquid and are subsequently heated.
(b) An exchanger is blocked-in on the cold side with flow in the hot
side.
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(c) Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are filled with liquid at
near-ambient temperatures and are heated by direct solar
radiation.
Provisions are required for relieving the equipment. The capacity
requirement is not easy to determine. Since every application will be
relieving liquid, the required capacity of the thermal safety valve (TSV)
will be small; specifying an oversized device is, therefore, reasonable. A
3⁄4” ÷ 1” nominal pipe size (NPS 3⁄4 ÷ NPS 1) relief valve is commonly
used.
Proper selection of the set pressure for these relieving devices should
include a study of the design rating of all items included in the blocked-in
system. The TSV pressure setting should never be above the maximum
pressure permitted by the weakest component in the system being
protected.
3⁄4” ÷ 1” size is not adequate for long pipelines of large diameter in
uninsulated aboveground installations and large vessels or exchangers
operating liquid-full; in these cases, in order to evaluate the relief device
proper size, the following equation must be applied:
αV ⋅ φ
q= (1)
1000d ⋅ c
Where:
q volume flowrate at flowing temperature [m³/s]
αV cubic expansion coefficient for the liquid at the expected
temperature [1/°C]
φ total heat transfer rate [W]
d relative density referred to water (d = 1.00 @15.6°C)
c specific heat capacity of trapped fluid [J/kgK]
For aboveground pipelines protection, a system with multiple TSVs shall

be provided. The distance from one TSV to the other is specified on
mechanical standard documents.
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If the liquid being relieved is expected to flash or form solids while it

passes through the relieving device, the procedure described in API 520
is recommended.
1.3.3 Additional Consideration
In the following is given a short summary for sizing the relief devices for
those equipment, such as pumps, compressors, atmospheric and low
pressure storage tanks, etc., which are not included in the API 520 and
API 521. This paragraph is also intended to give a brief description about
pressure safety valve operating in liquid service.
1.3.3.1 Pumps
Alternative pumps, in order to avoid the motor pump overheating and to

protect the piping downstream from pressures greater than design
pressure, require a safety valve on the discharge. Therefore, because of
the double function of the relief valve (protection against overpressure
and overheating), this devices shall be sized for both overpressure and
overheating. For overheating considerations, the pump manufacturer
shall be consulted.
Normally, these devices are piped back to the vessel or piping upstream
of the pump rather than to the flare system.
For a preliminary estimation of the valve set pressure, the following
equation shall be applied. The valve set pressure is calculated using both
equations; the chosen value is the greater between the two results.
p set = 1.1 ⋅ p delivery (2)
p set = 1.7 + p delivery (3)
Where:
pset Valve set pressure [bar]
pdelivery Pump delivery pressure [bar]
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For valves sizing a flowrate value equal to the pump flowrate (or pump
maximum flowrate in case of pumps with variable motor) must be taken
into consideration.
Lines and equipment downstream a centrifugal pump have always a
design pressure equal to the pump shut-off pressure. Wherever this rule
is not applied, the piping and / or equipment downstream the pump shall
be protected with a relief device.
1.3.3.2 Compressors
In order to protect rotary compressors and lines, a relief valve upstream

of the block and check valves shall be provided on the compressor
delivery and, if foreseen, on each of the intermediate stages.
1.3.3.3 Turbines
A special pressure relief valve shall be foreseen at the turbine outlet in

order to prevent overpressure phenomena at the condenser in case of
cooling water loss or other system failure.
This kind of valve, without spring, acts against atmospheric back-
pressure and requires water for seals.
1.3.3.4 Fired Heaters
If there is a possibility that the process side of a fired heater may be

blocked-in, then a relief valve should be provided to protect the heater.
1.3.3.5 PSV Operating in Liquid Service
For those relief valves protecting equipment operating in liquid service,

the set pressure shall be evaluated taking into consideration the liquid
head and the elevation of the valve itself.
During the first engineering phase, the valve elevation could be uncertain;
in these cases, the designer shall evaluate the valve set pressure
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supposing a reasonable valve height. For valve elevation preliminary

estimate the following method shall be applied:
a) Considering a relief header laying on the pipe-rack at an
elevation of 10 m and equipment with an upper tangent line lower
than 10.5 m, the safety valve set pressure shall be evaluated
supposing a PSV elevation of at least 10.5 m aboveground.
Figure 1.3.1 – PSV in liquid service.
b) For all the equipments whose upper tangent line is higher than
10.5 m (or above the relief header upper tangent line), the
following considerations shall be applied:
b.1) If the equipment is inside a structure, the PSV shall be
positioned 1.5 m above the first level over the equipment upper
tangent line. This level is 3 m above the upper tangent line.
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Figure 1.3.2 - PSV in liquid service.
b.2) If there isn’t a level over the equipment, the PSV shall have a
minimum elevation above the upper tangent line.
Figure 1.3.3 - PSV in liquid service.

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1.3.3.6 Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
In this paragraph is given a short description of relief devices required for

storage tanks designed for operation at pressure from vacuum to 15 psig
(103.4 kPag) overpressure protection. For more rigorous information
about atmospheric and low pressure overpressure protection, reference
shall be made to API 2000.
Common overpressure causes for this kind of storage tank (with or
without weak roof-to-shell attachment) are listed in the following:
• Liquid movement into or out of the tank;
• Tank breathing due to weather changes;
• Fire exposure
• Other circumstances such as equipment failure or operating
errors.
In case of tanks with fixed roof, the PSV to be installed shall be sized
considering the most severe overpressure condition.
Tanks with weak roof-to-shell attachment, as better specified in API 650,
are designed with a roof-to-shell connection which fails in case of fire and
protect the equipment itself. Hence, for a tank built to these
specifications, a relief device for protecting the equipment exposed to fire
is not required. However, an overpressure protection for the most severe
condition identified among the remaining overpressure causes is
required. The PSV to be installed shall be sized for the most severe
condition and assuming the blanketing valve fully opened.
1.3.4 Relief Devices
1.3.4.1 Spring loaded relief valves
A conventional pressure relief valve is a self-actuated spring-loaded

pressure relief valve which is designed to open at a predetermined
pressure and protect a vessel or system from excess pressure by
removing or relieving fluid from that vessel or system.
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Conventional spring-loaded relief valves shall be installed where back-

pressure does not exceed 10% of the set pressure (see API 520, Section
3, Paragraph 3.3.3.1)
A balanced pressure relief valve is a spring loaded pressure relief valve
which incorporates a bellows or other means of balancing the valve disc
to minimize the effects of back pressure on the performance
characteristics of the valve.
Balanced pressure relief valves should be considered where the built-up
back pressure (back pressure caused by flow through the downstream
piping after the relief valve lifts) is too high for a conventional pressure
relief (see API 520, Section 3, Paragraph 3.3.3.1).
In general, balanced pressure relief valves are suitable for back-
pressures ranging from 10% to 50% of the set pressure. They can be of
two main types: balanced piston and balanced bellows. Balanced bellows
shall be given preference where the fluid is corrosive or fouling.
1.3.4.2 Pilot-operated relief valves
A pilot-operated pressure relief valve consists of the main valve, which

normally encloses a floating unbalanced piston assembly, and an
external pilot.
Pilot-operated relief valves shall be selected rather than conventional
spring-loaded relief valves when any of the requirements listed
hereinafter is present: low accumulation rates, calibration without
removing the valve, handling of large flows, higher pressure in the
downstream piping is required etc.
It shall be ensured, before selecting a pilot-operated relief valve, that
there is no possibility of blockage of the pilot valve or sensing line due to
hydrates, ice, wax or solids. There shall be no low points in the sensing
line or its take off, and all fine bore elements exposed to process fluids
shall be heat-traced and insulated if non-blockage cannot be guaranteed.
Filters shall not be used in the sensing line to the pilot valve because they
can increase the risk of blockage.
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1.3.4.3 Rupture disks
Rupture disk devices are non-reclosing pressure relief devices used to

protect vessels, piping and other pressure containing components from
excessive pressure and/or vacuum. Rupture disks are used in single and
multiple relief device installations. They are also used as redundant
pressure relief devices.
With no moving parts, rupture disks are simple, reliable and faster acting
than other pressure relief devices. Because of these, rupture disks are
used in any application requiring overpressure protection where a non-
reclosing device is suitable.
Moreover, because of their light weight, rupture disks can be made from
high alloy and corrosion-resistant materials that are not practical in
pressure relief valves.
These devices can be specified for systems with vapour or liquid
pressure relief requirements. Also, rupture disk designs are available for
highly viscous fluids. The use of rupture disk devices in liquid service
should be carefully evaluated to ensure that the design of the disk is
suitable for liquid service. The user should consult the manufacturer for
information regarding liquid service applications.
Rupture disks can be of various types; for more details see API 520.
1.3.5 Relief Valves Location
To ensure protection of the whole system, the relief assembly should be

located, where practical, in the upstream part, i.e. where the highest
pressure occurs, and as close as possible to the source of overpressure.
Relief valves shall be connected to the protected equipment in the vapour
space above any contained liquid or to piping connected to the vapour
space. An exception can be made if the vessel is fitted with a demister
mat. In this case the relief connection shall be upstream of the mat,
unless the relieving capacity is of the same order of magnitude as the
normal operating flow through the demister mat.
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The pressure drop of the piping between protected equipment and its
relief valve shall not exceed 3% of the set pressure.
The inlet and outlet piping shall be installed without pockets to ensure
that liquid does not accumulate at the relief valve outlet or inlet.
Relief valves discharging to atmosphere should be located at the
maximum practical elevation to keep discharge piping (to safe location)
as short as possible. In case of multiple relief valves (including one
spare), each relief valve shall have an individual discharge pipe (see also
API 521).
Relief valves connected to a closed relief system shall be located above
the relief header. Relief valve outlet lines should be connected to the top
of the header, or at least so that the header cannot drain back into outlet
lines even with the header full of liquid. If the valves cannot be put above
the header, they shall be lined up to discharge into a local drain vessel.
Alternatively, if the problem of elevation is confined to a few valves, outlet
lines to the header shall be heat-traced from the relief valve to the highest
point of the line. Heat tracing isn’t permitted for relief valves which
discharge a medium which can leave a deposit.
Relief valve systems require periodic inspection and maintenance and
hence they should be easily accessible.
1.3.6 Piping Upstream of a Relief Device
In order to ensure safe disposal of flared and vented streams, certain

factors shall be taken into consideration when designing the pipework
upstream of the relief device.
Piping upstream of a relief device should be designed with as few
restrictions to flow as possible and should not be pocketed.
The flow area through all pipe and fittings between a pressure vessel and
its relief valve shall be at least the same as that of the valve inlet (e.g.
isolation valves shall be full bore).
Depending on the actual relief valve capacity, the pressure drop of the
inlet piping and fittings shall not exceed 3% of the valve set pressure (this
is to avoid chatter, which will result in significant seat damage and loss of
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capacity). Exceptions to this requirement are only allowed in the case of a

pilot-operated valve with a suitably arranged remote pilot connection
close to the source of overpressure.
The above is especially applicable to relief valves handling gas or vapour.
Relief valves in pure liquid service require special attention, since in this
case chatter may also be caused by the acceleration of the (non
expandable) liquid in the inlet piping: a change in pressure amounting to
more than 3% of the set pressure will readily occur and cause valve
chatter. In this case the likelihood of chatter can be limited by installing a
relief valve with a special liquid trim (linear flow characteristic) thereby
avoiding the need to take the relief valve capacity to determine the
pressure drop of the inlet piping. For PSV sizing in liquid service see
paragraph 1.3.3.5.
When two or more relief valves (spares not counted) are fitted on one
connection, the cross-sectional area of this connection shall be at least
equal to the combined inlet areas of the valves, and the above pressure
drop requirement shall apply for the combined flow of the valves.
Relief valves on cold process streams shall have an uninsulated inlet line
of sufficient length to prevent icing of the relief valve, in particular the disk
and spring. Alternatively, heat tracing may be required. Special attention
shall be paid in this respect to valves which discharge into the
atmosphere, i.e. in those having open outlets which may become blocked
with ice.
To avoid the need for special high temperature materials, relief valves on
hot process streams may be installed using an uninsulated length of inlet
line, creating a cold dead ended leg between the process stream and the
relief valve.
A pressure safety valve typical scheme is shown in Figure 1.3.4.
Sh. 23 of 93
Figure 1.3.4 – PSV typical scheme.
1.4 Blowdown System Design
Because of a relief valve cannot depressurize a system but can only limit
the pressure rise to the set point during upset conditions, a dedicated
depressuring system is required to mitigate the consequences of a vessel
leak by reducing the leakage rate or to reduce the failure potential for
scenarios involving overheating (e.g. fire).
When metal temperature is increased due to fire or exothermic or
runaway process reactions, the metal temperature may reach a level at
which stress rupture could occur. This may be possible even though the
system pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable accumulation.
In this case, depressuring reduces the internal stress thereby extending
the life of the vessel at a given temperature.
In order to be effective, the depressuring system must depressure the
vessel such that the reduced internal pressure keeps the stresses below
the rupture stress. API 521 suggests depressurizing to 6.9 barg or 50% of
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vessel design pressure, whichever is the lower, within 15 minutes.

Moreover, Eni E&P internal standard, see doc. no. 20199.VON.SAF.SDS,
suggests reaching the 50% of vessel operating pressure within 5 minutes
and then depressurizing to 7 barg within the next 10 minutes. Even
though API 521 suggests this criterion for carbon steel vessels with a wall
thickness of approximately 1” or more, the above described depressuring
criterion is also applied for vessels with thinner walls.
Depressuring is assumed to continue for the duration of the emergency.
The valves should remain operable for the duration of the emergency or
should fail in a full open position. Fireproofing of the control signal and
valve actuator may be required in a fire zone.
As per API 521, emergency depressuring for the fire scenario should be
considered for large equipment operating at or above 250 psig (aprrox.
1700 kPag). Depressuring criteria other than those given above can be
used depending upon the specific circumstances and user-defined
requirements. For example, if there is a reactive hazard or other
exceptional hazard that can cause loss of containment due to over-
temperature, emergency depressuring can be appropriate for equipment
designed for a wider range of pressures than that noted above.
1.4.1 Determination of Blowdown Requirements
As mentioned above, blowdown systems are principally required to

reduce the risk of loss of equipment integrity during a fire or to reduce a
local loss of containment arising from a leak when such an occurrence
could create an unacceptable safety hazard.
In assessing whether or not blowdown valves (BDV) are required,
particular attention should be paid to equipment location with respect to
other equipment, buildings and personnel, and the contents of the
equipment in terms of quantity and composition. Figure 1.4.1 shows a
typical BDV scheme.
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Figure 1.4.1 – Typical BDV scheme.
In performing the depressuring analysis it shall be ensured that

throughout depressuring the system pressure never exceeds the load
bearing capacity of the equipment. Account shall therefore be taken of
the reduction of strength with increasing temperature.
As per API 521, the depressuring system shall reduce the pressure of the
equipment within a fire zone to 50% of the design pressure or 6.9 barg
within 15 minutes. This does not imply that the depressuring stops after
15 minutes. Rotating equipment represent an exception because, due to
the loss of seal pressure, depressuring may be required in much less
than 15 minutes.
The depressuring calculation shall take into account the following:
• Vaporization of the liquid due to the reduction in pressure;
• Change in density of the vapour in the equipment due to the
pressure reduction and temperature increase;
• Vaporization due to heat input from the external fire.
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In general, for depressuring system sizing, an initial pressure equal to

safety relief valve set pressure shall be taken into account. Compressor
systems have instead an initial depressuring pressure equal to
compressor settle out pressure. In order to evaluate compressor settle
out pressure, the following equations shall be applied:
p suction ⋅ Vsuction + p disch arg e ⋅ Vdisch arg e

psettle out = (4)
Vtot
and for a preliminary estimate
p settle out = 2 / 3 ⋅ p suction + 1 / 3 ⋅ p disch arg e (5)
Sizing of depressuring valves shall be based on the assumption that,

during a fire, all input and output streams to and from the system are
stopped and all internal heat sources within the process have ceased. It
shall also be assumed when calculating the vapour load generated that
fire is in progress throughout the depressuring period.
To determine the vapour depressuring flowrates it is necessary to
establish a liquid inventory and the vapour volume of the system. This
shall include all facilities located in the fire area and all equipment outside
the fire area which, under normal operating conditions, are in open
connection with the facilities located within the fire area.
1.4.2 Sectioning of the Process Systems
In large plants, in order to reduce the design blowdown flow rate, process
sectionalizing may be considered.
Process sectionalizing is a philosophy applied to split an installation into a
number of smaller fire zones. Potential fire areas shall be identified and
clearly shown on a plot plan. For process units, depending on the
drainage design of the plot, a typical fire area of 300 m² should be
assumed.
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Each zone shall be isolated by emergency shutdown (ESD) valves. Each

zone shall be provided with its own depressurizing facilities, such that
each zone can be depressurized sequentially, thereby reducing the
design peak rate.
After initiating depressurisation of the first zone, that of other zones may
be initiated as soon as the flowrate of the first zone has decayed such
that a second zone may be initiated without exceeding the design
capacity of the flare/vent system. This strategy requires equipment in an
adjacent fire zone to be adequately protected by a combination of
appropriate layout, fire walls, fire proof insulation, such that the risk of a
loss of integrity of equipment in a fire zone adjacent to the first affected
zone is insignificant.
This approach is not usually practical on an integrated offshore
production platform or in small plants; in these cases, during an ESD, all
blowdown valves open simultaneously and sequenced depressurization
using time delays is not used. Moreover, the sectioning of the process
system and time delays shall not be applied in those plants where a
single event can cause the simultaneous opening of the entire system
blowdown valve.
1.4.3 Depressuring Device Location
The location of depressuring valves shall be governed by the same

considerations as relief valves and they may discharge into the same
disposal system as the relief valves on the equipment under
consideration.
Particular attention should also be paid to the position of non-return
valves when locating depressuring valves, to ensure that equipment
downstream of the non-return valve cannot be isolated from the
depressuring valve.
Depressuring devices require periodic testing and hence the
depressuring device should be located to allow easy access.
Sh. 28 of 93
1.5 Layout of Downstream Piping Systems
1.5.1 Common Discharge Systems
It is usually simpler and more economic to combine discharges from a

number of facilities into a common discharge system served by a central
vent or flare.
In the normal configuration of a common discharge system designed for
venting or flaring gas at an elevated height, a knock-out drum situated
close to the stack is required to recover liquid hydrocarbon or slugs. The
relief valves or depressuring valves will discharge via plant sub-headers
with connections into a main header running outside the battery limits. If
this is not possible the flare/vent piping should at least be routed through
areas where there is little possibility of a dangerous situation due to local
failure of the flare/vent piping (i.e. where possible all piping should be
welded).
The flow area through all pipe and fittings downstream a relief valve, shall
be at least the same as that of the valve outlet. The disposal piping shall
be self-draining towards the knock-out drum. In general, in order to avoid
liquid accumulation, all the relief headers shall slope continuously
towards the vent or flare K.O. drum.
If possible, connecting sub-headers shall be connected to the top of the
header; in any case, they shall drain into the headers. The sub-headers
shall be connected in such a way that there are no welds in the lower one
third of the circumference of the header.
As per API 521, the discharge piping system should be designed so that
the built-up back pressure, caused by the flow through the valve, does
not reduce the capacity below that required of any pressure-relief valve
that can be relieving simultaneously. Where conventional pressure relief
valves are used, the relief manifold system should be sized to limit the
built-up back pressure to approximately 10% of the set pressure of each
pressure-relief valve that can be relieving concurrently.
With pilot-operated valves, higher manifold pressures can be used. The
capacity of these balanced valves begins to decrease when the back
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pressure exceeds 30% to 50% of the set pressure due to subsonic flow
and/or physical responses to the high back pressure. Refer to API 520-I
for the effects of this back pressure.
1.5.2 Blockage Due to Hydrate Formation in Downstream Piping System
The blockage of discharge piping downstream of a relief or emergency

depressuring valve is not a problem under relieving or depressuring
conditions if the discharge is correctly designed.
The correct design of the discharge system should include:
• sufficiently large diameter pipework (velocity < 0.7 Mach);
• short length tail pipes;
• the avoidance of restrictions.
To prevent hydrate or ice formation due to small leaks across the valve or
low ambient temperatures, heat tracing shall be installed.
1.6 Isolation Valves in Pressure Relief Piping
Where possible, the approach should be to use a relief valve

arrangement which does not utilise any isolation valves. This approach
eliminates the possibility of a relief valve being isolated in error. However,
for those relief devices which could have problem of plugging or other
severe problems which affect their performance, isolation and sparing of
the relief devices may be provided.
Block valves may be used to isolate a pressure relief device from the
equipment it protects or from its downstream disposal system and to
facilitate PSV / BDV inspection and maintenance without shutting down
the whole system (blowdown system included).
Since improper use of a block valve may render a pressure relief device
inoperative, the design, installation, and management of these isolation
block valves should be carefully evaluated. The ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Appendix M, discusses proper
application of these valves and the administrative controls which must be
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in place when isolation block valves are used. Local jurisdictions may
have other requirements.
1.6.1 Isolation Valves Requirements
As per API 520 Part II, all the isolation valves located in relief system
piping shall meet the following requirements:
a) Valves shall be full bore.
b) Valves shall be suitable for the line service classification.
c) Valves shall have the capability of being locked or car sealed
open.
d) When gate valves are used, they should be installed with stems
oriented horizontally or, if this is not feasible, the stem could be
oriented downward to a maximum of 45° from the horizontal to
keep the gate from falling off and blocking the flow.
An isolation valve can be used either to isolate the individual relief valve
or to isolate a complete plant section. If isolation valves are used to
isolate relief valves, there is a basic difference between the need for an
inlet valve or for an outlet valve. An inlet valve is needed if the process
cannot be shut down, whereas an outlet valve is needed if the relief
header cannot be taken out of service. Thus a single relief valve (without
a spare) connected to a relief header which cannot be shut down will
have only an outlet isolation valve.
When isolation valves are installed in pressure relief valve discharge
piping, a means to prevent pressure build-up between the pressure relief
valve and the isolation valve should be provided (for example, a bleeder
valve), see Figure 1.6.1.
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Figure 1.6.1 – Typical pressure relief valve installation with an isolation valve.
A multiple relief valve arrangement with a 100% design relieving capacity

(including a spare relief valve), as the ones shown in Figure 1.6.2 and
Figure 1.6.3, will have an inlet isolation valve and outlet isolation valve.
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Figure 1.6.2 – Typical pressure relief valve installation with 100% spare relieving
capacity and a three-way valve.
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Figure 1.6.3 – Typical pressure relief valve installation with 100% spare relieving
capacity.
Periodic inspections of isolation valves located in relief piping should be

made which verify the position of valves and the condition of the locking
or sealing device.
1.6.2 Interlocking Systems
Where block valves are fitted upstream and/or downstream of relief

valves a system shall be in place to ensure that the required relief
capacity is always available. One method of achieving this consists in
installing of an interlocking system which makes it impossible to block off
the operating S/R valve until other similar relief capacity has been
connected to the system.
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Two situations, discharge to atmosphere or discharge to a closed system,

can occur. The following paragraphs describe correct operation to allow a
safe removal of an S/R valve for maintenance.
1.6.2.1 Discharge to Atmosphere
Spared relief valves discharging directly to atmosphere (via individual

pipes) require block valves only in the inlet pipes of the valves. These
block valves shall each be provided with a single lock, but with only one
key in total. During operation the key shall be trapped in the lock of the
closed block valve of the installed spare S/R valve. The key shall be
retractable from the lock only by locking open the block valve. Hence only
one block valve can be in the closed position at any time. The piping
between the upstream block valve and the relief valve shall be fitted with
a vent connection in order to allow depressuring before the removal of
the relief valve.
Figure 1.6.4 – Typical interlocking System for pressure relief valves with atmospheric
discharge.
1.6.2.2 Discharge to Closed System
Spared relief valves discharging to a closed system require block valves

in both the inlet and outlet pipes. The outlet block valves shall be
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provided with single locks, while the inlet block valves shall have double
locks. As per atmospheric discharge, the piping between the upstream
block valve and the relief valve shall be fitted with a vent connection in
order to allow depressuring before the removal of the relief valve.
Each relief valve shall be provided with a unique key which fits Lock 1 of
its inlet block valve and the lock of its outlet block valve. The key of the
outlet block valve shall be retractable only when the outlet block valve is
locked open. The key of Lock 1 of the inlet block valve shall be
retractable only when the switch key is inserted in Lock 2 of the same
inlet block valve.
Each relief valve shall be provided with a single switch key which fits
Lock 2 of all inlet block valves. The switch key shall be retractable only
when the inlet block valve is locked open. This shall only be possible
when the key of Lock 1 is inserted in the lock. During operation, only the
inlet block valve of the installed spare S/R valve will be in the locked
closed position. All other block valves will be locked open. Locking open
the outlet block valve of the installed spare S/R valve (or its replacement
spool piece) prevents pressure build-up in case the inlet block valve
should leak.
The keys of the locks of the block valves of the relief valves in operation
will be trapped in Lock 1 of the inlet block valves. The switch key will be
trapped in Lock 2 of the closed inlet block valve of the spare valve. Since
the switch key is needed to unlock and close an inlet block valve, only
one block valve can be in the closed position at any time.
The key of Lock 1 of the inlet block valve of the spare valve shall be
stored in the control room which shall only be accessible to authorized
personnel.
Sh. 36 of 93
Figure 1.6.5 – Typical interlocking System for pressure relief valves with discharge to
a closed system.
Notice that also outlet valve could be subjected to a key interlock system:
in this case the key system could avoid to close outlet valve if the inlet
valve is open (that means that outlet valve could be closed only if the inlet
valve is closed; i.e. PSV in maintenance and an other PSV in service).
1.7 Disposal System
1.7.1 General
Streams requiring disposal are:

• Relief vapour and/or liquids;
• Depressuring vapours;
• Any operational waste streams that do not have a more suitable
outlet.
The selection of a disposal method is subject to many factors that may be
specific to a particular location or an individual unit. Disposal systems
generally consist of piping and vessels. All components should be
suitable in size, pressure rating, and material for the service conditions
intended.
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In selecting a means of disposal for these streams it is important to find a

solution in which all streams are handled with the smallest number and
diversity of systems and individual outlets.
Wherever possible disposal streams shall be collected in a closed system
and directed to a flare or vent system.
1.7.2 Atmospheric discharge
In many situations, pressure-relief vapour streams may be safely

discharged directly to the atmosphere if environmental regulations permit
such discharges.
Where feasible, this arrangement (atmospheric safe discharge) offers
significant advantages over alternative methods of disposal because of
its inherent simplicity, dependability, and economy.
1.7.3 Disposal by Flaring
The primary function of a flare is to use combustion to convert flammable,

toxic, or corrosive vapours to less objectionable compounds. Selection of
the type of flare and the special design features required will be
influenced by several factors, including the availability of space; the
characteristics of the flare gas, namely, composition, quantity, and
pressure level; economics, including both the initial investment and
operating costs; and public relations. Public relations may be a factor if
the flare can be seen or heard from residential areas or navigable
waterways.
1.7.4 Flaring Versus Venting
Considerations to be made in deciding whether to vent or flare the

disposal streams are:
• Impact on the environment;
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• Safety and integrity of the disposal system, taking into account

that disposal streams could contain products which are not
combustible;
• Local regulations;
• Economic evaluations.
Considerations indicating whether venting is allowed are:
• If the vapours temperature is below the auto-ignition temperature
and if they are lighter than air. Gases shall be considered to be
lighter than air if the actual density of the gas after release, taking
into account the cooling associated with expansion, is less than
0.9 times the density of the air in the area at 15 °C.
• If the vapours are heavier than air because of low temperature
but are in locations where the installation of a flare is
impracticable (e.g. product storage areas, marketing depots) or
where potential ignition sources are remote. In these cases the
vapours discharge velocity shall be at least 152 m/s. However,
discharge velocity shall not exceed the 80% of the sonic velocity.
• If concentrations of toxic and/or corrosive components in the
dispersed vapour cloud do not reach harmful or irritating levels on
nearby work levels (platforms) and outside property limits. In
order to evaluate environmental impact, calculations of effluent
emissions are required.
• If the risks and consequences of accidental plume ignition (e.g.
generation of shock waves) are acceptable.
In addition to the above, streams which are not foreign to the atmosphere
may be vented without environmental reservations. However, safety near
the point of discharge shall be considered, i.e. factors such as
temperature, noise, local concentrations of carbon dioxide and nitrogen,
etc.
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1.7.5 Flare and Vent Structure
The type and height of the structures supporting flare or vent stacks
depend on the following operational and environmental aspects:
• Required availability of the flare and relief system;
• Acceptable heat radiation levels;
• Acceptable dispersion levels;
• Acceptable noise levels;
• Wind velocity.
There are three common stack support methods as shown in Figure
1.7.1.
The type selection is based on economical and operational grounds. A
brief structure description is given in the following.
Figure 1.7.1 – Flare structures.
1.7.5.1 Self-supported
Self-supported stacks are normally the most desirable. However, they are
also the most expensive because of greater material requirements
needed to ensure structural integrity. They are normally limited
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(economically versus alternatives) to a stack height of 200 to 300 feet

(60-90 m).
1.7.5.2 Guy-wire supported
These are the least expensive but require the largest land area due to the
guy-wire radius requirements. Typical guy-wire radius is equal to one-half
the overall stack height.
1.7.5.3 Derrick supported
Used only on larger stacks where self-supported is not practical, or

available land area excludes a guy-wire design.
1.8 Flare System Design
Disposal of combustible gases, vapours, and liquids by burning is

generally accomplished in flares. Flares are used for environmental
control of continuous flows of excess gases and for large surges of gases
in an emergency.
The flare is usually required to be smokeless for the gas flows that are
expected to occur from normal day-to-day operations. This is usually a
fraction of the maximum gas flow, but some environmentally sensitive
areas require 100% smokeless or even a fully enclosed flare.
Various techniques are available for producing smokeless operation,
most of which are based on the premise that smoke is the result of a fuel-
rich condition and is eliminated by promoting uniform air distribution
throughout the flames.
To promote air distribution throughout the flames, energy is required to
create turbulence and mixing of the combustion air within the flare gas as
it is being ignited. This energy may be present in the gases, in the form of
pressure, or it may be exerted on the system through another medium
such as injecting high-pressure steam, compressed air, or low-pressure
blower air into the gases as they exit the flare tip.
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1.8.1 Flare Type
1.8.1.1 Exothermic Flares
The following descriptions are for flare equipment to dispose of exothermic

flare gases; that is, gases that have a high enough heating value (usually
greater than 200 Btu/Scf (7370 kJ/Sm³) for unassisted flares and 300
Btu/Scf (11050 kJ/Sm³) for assisted flares) to sustain combustion on their
own without any auxiliary fuel additions.
Utility / Pipe Flare: This is the simplest flare tip; this plain design has no
special features to prevent smoke formation, and consequently should
not be used in applications where smokeless operation is required unless
the gases being flared are not prone to smoking.
Flare tips of this style, as a minimum, should include a flame retention
device (to increase flame stability at high flowrates) and one or more
pilots (depending upon the diameter of the tip).
Smokeless Flare:
Steam Injection: Flare tips which use steam to control smoking are the
most common form of smokeless flare tip. The steam can be injected
through a single pipe nozzle located in the centre of the flare, through
a series of steam/air injectors, through a manifold located around the
periphery of the flare tip, or a combination of all three. The steam is
injected into the flame zone to create turbulence and/or aspirate air
into the flame zone via the steam jets. The amount of steam required
(see API 521, 5th Edition, Table 11) is primarily a function of the gas
composition, flowrate, and steam pressure and flare tip design.
Although steam is normally provided from a 100 to 150 psi (690-1034
kPa) supply header, special designs are available for utilizing steam
pressure in the range of 30 psi (2.07 kPa). The major impact of lower
steam pressure is a reduction in steam efficiency during smokeless
turndown conditions.
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HP Air Injection: HP air injection can also be used to prevent smoke

formation. This approach is less common because compressed air is
usually more expensive than steam. However, in some situations, it
may seem preferable, for example, in arctic or low-temperature
applications where steam could freeze and plug the flare tip/stack.
Also, other applications include desert or island installations where
there is a shortage of water for steam, or where the waste flare gas
stream would react with water. The same injection methods described
for steam are used with compressed air. The air is usually provided at
100 psi (690 kPa) and the mass quantity required is approximately
200% greater than required by steam since the compressed air does
not produce the water-gas shift reaction that occurs with steam.
HP Water Injection: High-pressure water is also used to control

smoking, especially for horizontal flare applications and when large
quantities of waste water or brine are to be eliminated. One pound of
water (at 345 to 690 kPa) is usually required for each pound of gas
flared.
LP Forced Air: A low-pressure forced air system is usually the first

alternative evaluated if insufficient on-site utilities are available to aid in
producing smokeless operation. The system creates turbulence in the
flame zone by injecting low-pressure air supplied from a blower across
the flare tip as the gases are being ignited, thus promoting even air
distribution throughout the flames. Usually air at 0.5 to 5 kPa pressure
flows coaxially with the flare gas to the flare tip where the two are
mixed. This system has a higher initial cost due to the requirement for
a dual stack and an air blower. However, this system has much lower
operating costs than a steam-assisted design (requiring only power for
a blower). The additional quantity of air supplied by the blower for
smokeless operation is normally 10% to 30% of the stoichiometric air
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required for saturated hydrocarbons and 30% to 40% of the

stoichiometric air required for unsaturated hydrocarbons.
HP Flare: A high-pressure system does not require any utilities such

as steam or air to promote smokeless flaring. Instead, these systems
utilize pressure energy available within the flare gas itself (typically 35
to 140 kPa minimum at the flare tip) to eliminate fuel rich conditions
and resulting smoke within the flames. By injecting the flare gas into
the atmosphere at a high pressure, turbulence is created in the flame
zone, which promotes even air distribution throughout the flames.
Since no external utilities are required, these systems are normally
advantageous for disposing of very large gas releases, both from the
economics of smokeless operation and the control of flame shape.
Maintaining sufficient tip pressure during turndown conditions is critical
and often requires that a staging system be employed to
proportionately control the number of flare tips in service with
relationship to the gas flowing.
1.8.1.2 Endothermic Flares
Endothermic gases may be disposed of in thermal incineration systems;

however, there are situations where the preferred approach is to use a
special flare design. These flares utilize auxiliary fuel gas to burn the flare
gases. With small gas flow rates, simple enrichment of the flare gases by
adding fuel gas in the flare header to raise the net heating value of the
mixture may be sufficient.
In other situations, such as gases with high CO2 content and small
amounts of H2S, it may be necessary to add a fuel gas injection manifold
around the flare tip (similar to a steam manifold) and build a fire around
the exit end of the flare tip that the gases must flow through.
Sh. 44 of 93
1.8.1.3 Enclosed Ground Flares
In general, any of the flare tips or systems discussed above may be

mounted atop an elevated stack or mounted at grade. In general, ground
flares are primarily designed for low release rates and are not effective
for emergency releases.
With increasingly strict requirements regarding flame visibility, emissions,
and noise, enclosed ground flares (see Figure 1.8.1) can offer the
advantages of hiding flames, monitoring emissions, and lowering noise.
However, the initial cost often makes them undesirable for large releases
when compared to elevated systems.
A significant disadvantage with a ground flare is the potential
accumulation of a vapour cloud in the event of a flare malfunction; special
safety dispersion systems are usually included in the ground flare
system. For this reason, instrumentation for monitoring and controlling
ground flares is typically more stringent than with an elevated system.
These flares are typically the most expensive because of the size of the
shell or fence and the additional instrumentation which may be required
to monitor these key parameters. Another significant limitation is that
enclosed ground flares have significantly less capacity than elevated
flares.
Figure 1.8.1 – Enclosed ground flare.

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1.8.2 Flare Sizing
1.8.2.1 Evaluation of Flare Diameter
Flare stack diameter is generally sized on a velocity basis, although

pressure drop should be checked.
Generally, for design proposal, a velocity of 0.5 Mach for a peak, short-
term, infrequent flow, with 0.2 Mach maintained for the more normal and
possibly more frequent conditions for low-pressure flares, is chosen.
However, sonic velocity operation may be appropriate for high-pressure
flares. Moreover, experience has shown that a properly designed and
applied flare burner can have an exit velocity of more than Mach 0,5, if
pressure drop, noise and other factors permit. Many pipe flares, assisted,
unassisted or air-assisted flares have been in service for many years with
Mach numbers ranging from Mach 0,8 and higher.
The Mach number is determined as follows:
⎛ W ⎞ z ⋅T
Mach = 3.23 ⋅ 10 −5 ⎜ ⎟ (6)
⎜ P ⋅d2 ⎟ k ⋅ MW
⎝ atm f ⎠
Where:
W Flow [kg/h]
Z Compressibility factor at flowing condition
T Temperature at vapour outlet [K]
df Flare diameter [m]
k Specific heat ratio, Cp/Cv
1.8.2.2 Evaluation of Flare Height
The flare stack height is generally based on the radiant heat intensity
generated by the flame. For flare radiation study, reference shall be made
to paragraph 1.11.
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1.8.3 Segregated flare systems
Depending on various factors such as plot plan, equipment design

pressures, etc., it may prove desirable to provide two or more flare
systems, such as separation of high pressure and low pressure headers.
Multiple flare system arrangements may offer significant advantages or
prove mandatory on analysis of the streams that require disposal.
Segregated flare systems may be required in order to:
• Segregate sources of release into high and low pressure
systems. This may be required to enable a high pressure low
radiation tip to be used with a consequent saving on flare
structural requirements. This may also mean that only the low
pressure gas requires assistance in order to burn cleanly. As a
general rule, all pressure relief devices with an operating
pressure lower than 10 barg are collected and disposed in an LP
flare system.
• Segregate sources with widely differing potentials for liquid
release.
• Segregate sources of cold, dry gas from significant quantities of
warm, moist gas and thereby avoid the possibility of freezing and
hydrate formation. A relief header after passing a cold stream will
be cold. If a warm, moist gas then passes, hydrates could be
formed and block the relief header.
• Segregate corrosive or potentially corrosive fluids (e.g. CO2 and
H2S) from non-corrosive or moist fluids.
The selected design should use the minimum practicable number of
separate systems but remain operable and safe under all foreseeable
conditions. The systems installed may be totally independent, or may
share common facilities such as flare knock-out drums and flare tips in
certain circumstances.
When considering the requirement for a high and low pressure disposal
system it is necessary to consider the relief valve set pressures present in
the system. If there are a large number of high pressure sources with
large gas volumes and a relatively few low pressure sources, then
Sh. 47 of 93
generally it would be more economical to install one high pressure relief

header and one low pressure relief header. An economical analysis is
usually required to ascertain the optimum number of flare systems, and to
which system each relief device should discharge.
1.8.4 Flare Disposal of Hydrogen Sulphide
Streams which are rich in hydrogen sulphide shall not be discharged into
a common HC flare or vent system unless it has been designed for this
purpose. This prevents the spreading of sour gas throughout the entire
main flare system and also avoids corrosion attack by hydrogen sulphide
and the subsequent accumulation of deposits of (pyrophoric) ferrous
sulphide.
These streams shall have a separate line-up, preferably a separate flare
stack equipped with a tip of the air pre-mix type. Alternatively, the gas
may be lined up to the bottom (downstream of the water seal) of the
hydrocarbon flare stack, but this should only be done if the hydrogen
sulphide rich flow constitutes a minor additional load.
The installation of a separate sour gas flare relief system implies
additional capital expenditure. From this point of view it is always better to
exclude such a system.
For a preliminary evaluation, the following factors should be considered
before deciding that a separate H2S flare relief system need to be
installed or not. Sour gas release can be tied into the HC flare system in
case of:
1) continuous HC release with an H2S content < 2% by volume;
2) intermittent HC release (only during startup and shutdown) with
an H2S content < 20% by volume, provided this stream is less
than 10% by volume of the total continuous HC release rate;
3) emergency HC release (e.g. PSV, emergency depressuring) with
an H2S content < 50% by volume.
When hydrogen sulphide rich gas has to be flared, incomplete
combustion can cause a hydrogen sulphide smell resulting in complaints
Sh. 48 of 93
by people in the vicinity. Moreover, the presence of un-combusted

hydrogen sulphide shall be dangerous for human being in the proximity of
the plant.
At a low exit velocity back burning will occur, causing sulphide stress
corrosion, especially below the refractory. This means that when H2S rich
gas has to be released into the HC flare system more purge gas has to
be injected as well on account of the larger size of the flare, which could
offset the saving on capital expenditure.
If a hydrogen sulphide flare relief system is used, this shall be heat-traced
up to 4 m below the top of the stack. Header materials shall be carbon
steel, except for the top 4 metres of the hydrogen sulphide stack, which
shall be of AISI 310 S or equivalent.
Since no water seal vessel has to be installed, the design pressure of the
knock-out drum shall be 7 barg. To prevent flashback and consequential
detonation purge gas shall be used.
1.9 Other Flaring Equipment
1.9.1 K.O. Drum
Gas streams from relief headers are frequently at or near their dewpoint,
where condensation may occur.
A knockout drum is usually provided near the flare/vent base, and serves
to recover liquid hydrocarbons, prevent liquid slugs, and remove liquid
particles. The knockout drum reduces hazards caused by burning liquid
that could escape from the flare stack.
As mentioned above, all lines downstream a relief/blowdown device
should be sloped toward the knockout drum to permit condensed liquid to
drain into the drum for removal. The locating of the flare/vent knockout
drum also needs to take into account radiation effect from the burning
flare/accidental ignition of the vent.
The economics of drum design may influence the choice between a
horizontal and a vertical drum. When a large liquid storage capacity is
desired and the vapour flow is high, a horizontal drum is often more
Sh. 49 of 93
economical. Also, the pressure drop across horizontal drums is generally

the lowest of all the designs. Vertical knock out drums are typically used
where the liquid load is low or limited plot space is available. They are
well suited for incorporating into the base of the stack.
1.9.1.1 K.O. Drum Pump and Instrumentation
As just mentioned, knockout drums may be of the horizontal or vertical

type; and they should be provided with a pump or draining facilities and
instrumentation to remove the accumulated liquids to a tank, sewer, or
other location. The actual type of disposal used will depend on the
characteristics and hazards associated with the liquids removed.
In the simplest system, the vessel may have only a manually operated
drain valve and a liquid-level sight glass for reference. Moreover, a liquid-
removal pump is frequently used on knock-out drums.
More elaborate arrangements may foresee high- and low-level alarms
and level controls that operate a motorized drain valve or a liquid-removal
pump. A high-level alarm to monitor the liquid level during flaring
situations should be installed to alert the operators of abnormal knock-out
conditions.
Minimum levels in knock-out drums should be maintained to ensure
sufficient free volume is available in the event of a flaring situation.
1.9.1.2 K.O. Drum Sizing
It is important to realize as part of the sizing considerations, the maximum

vapour release case may not necessarily coincide with the maximum
liquid. Therefore, the knock-out drum size should be determined through
consideration of both the maximum vapour release case as well as the
release case with the maximum amount of liquid.
In general, the diameter of a vertical knockout drum can be calculated
from the maximum allowable vapour velocity using the following equation:
g ⋅ D ⋅ ( ρ L − ρV )
U d = 1.15 ⋅ (8)
ρV ⋅ C
Sh. 50 of 93
Where:
Ud Maximum allowable vapour velocity for vertical vessels [m/s]
g Acceleration due to gravity, 9.81 m/s2
D Particle diameter [m]
ρL Liquid density [kg/m³]
ρV Vapour density [kg/m³]
C Drag coefficient determined using Figure 1.9.1
0.13 ⋅ 10 8 ⋅ D 3 ( ρ L − ρV )
C (Re) 2 =
µ2
µ Gas viscosity [cP]
Figure 1.9.1 – Determination of drag coefficient.
This equation may be used to calculate the allowable velocity based on a

particle size of 300 to 600 µm.
For sample calculations, see API 521 Section 7.
Moreover, tilted stacks requirements for liquid droplets sizing outgoing
from the K.O. drum are more stringent than the ones for vertical stack.
Table 1.9.1 shows the droplets size limit for each flare stack in case of an
offshore installation. Onshore installation requires a maximum droplet
size of 600 µm for both vertical and tilted stacks.
Sh. 51 of 93
Vertical Stack 150 µm

Tilted Stack > 45° 150 µm
Tilted Stack ≤ 45° 400 µm
Table 1.9.1 – Droplets size requirements for different flare stacks.
1.9.2 Liquid Seals
Liquid seals are very common components in flare systems.

Liquid seal purpose is to prevent any flashback originating from the flare
tip from propagating back through the flare system and to maintain a
positive system pressure to ensure no air leakage into the flare system.
Liquid seals are located between the main knock-out drum and the flare
stack and are quite often incorporated into the base of the stack. They
are to be sized for the maximum vapour release case.
Water seals are not recommended where there is a risk of obstructing the
flare system due to an ice plug. Alternate sealing fluids such as
glycol/water mixture may be considered. Alternatively, heating the seal
fluid or draining the seal when cold temperature is detected have been
used.
1.9.3 Purge System
For safety purposes, a pre-commissioning and subsequent continuous

purge with a non-condensable oxygen free gas is required through the
flare system.
The pre-purge displaces any existing air from the stack, and the
continuous purge ensures that atmospheric air does not enter the stack
through the flare tip during low-flow conditions.
The requirements for a continuous purge might be eliminated if a liquid
seal is located near the base of the stack. This requires special
precautions in the design of the stack to assure viability in the event of an
internal space explosion.
Sh. 52 of 93
1.10 Vent System Design
As mentioned above, pressure-relief vapour streams may be safely

discharged directly to the atmosphere; it is not unusual to relieve non-
flammable and non-toxic materials, such as air, steam, carbon dioxide,
and water directly to the atmosphere. To protect personnel, precautions
need to be taken in venting hot, cold, or high pressure materials.
In certain cases, also hydrocarbon relief vapour streams may be
discharged to the atmosphere. However, the decision to discharge
hydrocarbons or other flammable or hazardous vapours to the
atmosphere must ensure that disposal can be accomplished without
creating a hazard, such as formation of flammable mixtures at grade level
or on elevated structures, exposure of personnel to toxic or suffocating
atmosphere, ignition of relief streams at the point of emission, excessive
noise levels, corrosion, or air pollution.
1.10.1 Vent Sizing
The size of a vent stack is determined by the available pressure drop and
by any minimum velocity required to prevent hazardous conditions due to
combustible or toxic material at grade or working levels. Therefore, in
order to avoid the formation of flammable mixtures and to provide an
excellent dispersion, vent size is selected to have a discharge velocity of
at least 500 ft/s (152 m/s). Moreover, vent size should be checked to
ensure that sonic flow is not established.
The height of the vent stack is selected so that the concentration of
vapour at a point of interest is well below the lower flammable limit of the
vapour. Flammability consideration can be satisfied with 0.1 times to 0.5
times the lower flammable limit.
The radiant heat intensity for vent stacks should also be checked in the
event that a relieving vapour should ignite. This is done by the same
means used for flare stacks, and the same limits apply for radiant heat
intensity. Radiant heat levels sometimes take precedence over dispersion
in determining stack height.
Sh. 53 of 93
Another factor that must be taken into account when sizing a vent stack is
the noise level. Eni E&P internal standard, see doc. no
04927.PKG.MEC.SPC, suggests, in the worst operating conditions, the
noise level shall be no higher than 85 dB (A) for a radius of 50 m around
the base of the flares and property limits. For vent stack noise specific
calculation, see API 521, Section 7, Paragraph 7.3.4.3.
1.10.2 Individual vent outlets
Where it is impractical to route discharges to a common centralised vent

or flare, consideration may be given to individual local vents.
The location of the vent outlet should be chosen such that:
• Concentration of any toxic products is diluted to a safe level at
any area in the vicinity where personnel are likely to be present.
• In the event of accidental ignition of the vent, flames will not
impinge upon adjacent equipment and the heat radiation to
equipment or personnel will be within the limits (see Table
1.11.2).
• Flammable vapours emanating from the vent outlet will be
sufficiently diluted.
• Noise requirements are met.
Where the atmospheric vent handles combustible vapours, the outlet
from the vent should be elevated approximately 10 ft (3 m) above ground
or deck within an 8 m radius. Provisions should be made for drainage of
each vent pipe so that liquid cannot accumulate in the vent.
The vent velocity should be as high as practicable; whenever feasible not
less than ≈150 m/s (500 ft/s) at the required relief capacity, as per API
521, Section 7. For a common vent outlet the diameter shall not be
smaller than the outlet of the largest connected relief valve, and is
otherwise only governed by back pressure considerations.
Sh. 54 of 93
1.11 Flare Radiation Study
As mentioned above, the flare stack height is generally based on the

radiant heat intensity generated by the flame.
Table 1.11.1 gives exposure times necessary to reach the pain threshold
as a function of radiation intensity.
Table 1.11.1 - Exposure times necessary to reach the pain threshold.
Since the allowable radiation level is a function of the length of exposure,

factors involving reaction time and human mobility should be considered.
In emergency releases, a reaction time of 3–5 seconds may be assumed.
Perhaps 5 seconds more would elapse before the average individual
could seek cover or depart from the area, which would result in a total
exposure period ranging from 8 to 10 seconds. In evaluating the
exposure time/radiation intensity consideration may also be given to an
exposed individual becoming incapacitated during an attempt to exit the
area.
As a basis of comparison, the intensity of solar radiation is in the range of
250–330 Btu/h ft² (0.79–1.04 kW/m²) depending on geographical location
and time of year. Solar radiation may be a factor for some locations, but
its effect added to flare radiation will have only a minor impact on the
acceptable exposure time.
The flare owner/operator shall determine the need for a solar-radiation-
contribution adjustment to the values given in Table 1.11.2 on a case-by-
Sh. 55 of 93
case basis. While an adjustment of 0,79 kW/m2 to 1,04 kW/m2 to a 6,31

kW/m2 (level has a relatively small impact on flare cost, the same
adjustment to a 1,58 kW/m2 level results in a significant increase in cost.
This determination can include, among other things, an analysis of the
frequency of maximum radiation flaring, the probability of personnel or
the public being near the flare during a maximum flaring incident, the
probability of the sun and flame being aligned in such a manner as to
have additive intensities and the ability of the personnel or the public to
avoid or move away from the exposure.
Table 1.11.2 – API 521 recommended design thermal radiation for personnel.
Flare system design and plant equipment layout should minimize the
need for operator attendance and equipment installed in locations of high
radiant heat intensity.
Personnel are commonly protected from high thermal radiation intensity
by restricting access to any area where the thermal radiation can exceed
6.31 kW/m2. The boundary of a restricted access area can be marked
with signage warning of the potential thermal radiation exposure hazard.
Personnel admittance to, and work within, the restricted access area
should be controlled administratively. It is essential that personnel within
the restricted area have immediate access to thermal radiation shielding
or protective apparel suitable for escape to a safe location.
Sh. 56 of 93
The effects of thermal radiation on the general public, who can be

exposed at or beyond the plant boundaries, should be considered.
In most cases, equipment can safely tolerate higher degrees of heat
density than those defined for personnel. However, if any items
vulnerable to overheating problems are involved, then the effect of
radiant heat on them may need to be evaluated.
A common approach to determining the flame radiation to a point of
interest is to consider the flame to have a single radiant epicentre (see
Figure 1.11.3) and to use the following empirical equation by Hajek and
Ludwig.
τ ⋅ F ⋅Q
D= (7)
4π ⋅ K
Where:
D Minimum distance from the epicentre of the flame to the object
being considered [m]
τ Fraction of the radiated heat transmitted through the atmosphere
F Fraction of heat radiated
Q Heat release [kW]
K Radiant heat intensity [kW/m²]
Another factor to be considered is the effect of wind in tilting the flame,

thus varying the distance from the centre of the flame, which is
considered to be the origin of the total radiant heat release, with respect
to the plant location under consideration.
API 521 Section C presents examples of the two methods used to size
subsonic flare stacks based on the effects of radiation.
The first method covered is the simple approach that has been used for
many years. It uses Figure 1.11.1 to determine an estimated flame
length. Supposing to have a flare which releases 4.40E+09 W, the
relevant flame length, using Figure 1.11.1, shall be about 100 m
Sh. 57 of 93
Figure 1.11.1 – Flame length vs. Heat release.
The wind tilts the flame in the direction the wind is blowing. As mentioned
above, assuming that a flame can be modelled by a single point source
for radiation, the wind effect is obtained from Figure 1.11.2, which relates
horizontal and vertical displacement of the flame to the ratio of lateral
wind velocity to stack velocity. A wind velocity ( u ∞ ) of 9 m/s (20 mph) is a
common assumption for most radiation calculations. The flame radiation
epicentre is located at the centre of a straight line drawn between the
flare tip and the end of the flame.
Sh. 58 of 93
Figure 1.11.2 - Approximate flame distortion due to lateral wind on jet velocity from
flare stack
The second method presented in API 521 appendix C is another

approach to calculating the probable radiation effects, using the more
recent method of Brzustowski and Sommer. The principal difference
between these methods is the location of the flame centre. The curves
and graphs necessary to simplify the calculations are included in the
following.
Sh. 59 of 93
Figure 1.11.3 – Dimensional reference for flare stack sizing.
Figure 1.11.4 – Flame centre for flares and ignited vents — Horizontal distance.
Sh. 60 of 93
Figure 1.11.5 – Flame centre for flares and ignited vents — Vertical distance.
The Excel Calculation Sheet (Doc. No. MOD.PRC.DDP.001) attached to

this document applies the above mentioned two methods for flare sizing.
For a proper application of these two methods, the following parameters
shall be known:
• Disposal gas flowrate;
• Disposal gas molecular weight and lower heating value;
• Gas discharge temperature, pressure and compressibility factor;
• Disposal stream specific heat ratio;
• Lower explosive limit concentration of flare gas in air;
• Mach number;
• Fraction of heat radiated;
• Fraction of the radiated heat transmitted through the atmosphere
(only for the 1st method);
• Air temperature and relative humidity (only for the 2nd method);
• Wind velocity;
• Radiant heat intensity at the point being considered;
Sh. 61 of 93
• Minimum distance from the epicentre of the flame to the object

being considered.
1.12 Relief and Blowdown System Highlights
In the following is given a short description of the main characteristic that

must be taken into consideration during relief and blowdown system
sizing and designing.
• General:
In general, the study for unit 230 sizing shall be divided in three
main phases: the first one involves a PSVs study, the second one
is related to BDVs, headers and flare sizing and the third one
concerns with the above mentioned flare radiation study. Each
phase requires care in evaluating relief / blowdown valves’
position, flowrate, etc. and during headers, K.O. drum and flare
sizing. The study consists in producing a list for all plant PSVs
and BDVs; the list shall contain the valve flowrate (for each valve)
for each upset condition. Once determined the most severe
overpressure condition (in most cases fire represents the worst
overpressure condition) for each plant section, the study may
proceed in headers, K.O. drum and flare sizing. Finally, the flare
radiation study shall be used to determine the flare thermal
radiation intensity and to evaluate the flare stack height.
• Relief devices sizing:
Set pressures and maximum relief pressures, expressed in
relation to the design pressure of the protected equipment, all
expressed in gauge pressures, shall not exceed the values given
in the following table (strictly related to ASME VIII).
Sh. 62 of 93
Relief Valves Set Pressure

Single Valve Multiple Valves
Max.
Max. Allowable
Set Allowable Set
Accumulated
Pressure Accumulated Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Other than fire
exposure
• 1st valve 100 110 100 116
• Additional valves NA NA 105 116
Fire exposure only

• 1st valve 100 121 100 121
• Supplemental valve NA NA 110 121
Characteristic of safety relief valves for vessel protection.
• Relief valves type:

A conventional pressure relief valve is a self-actuated spring-
loaded valve generally installed where back-pressure does not
exceed 10% of the set pressure.
A balanced pressure relief valve is a spring loaded pressure relief
valve which incorporates a bellows to minimize the effects of
back pressure. In general, balanced pressure relief valves are
suitable for back-pressures ranging from 10% to 50% of the set
pressure.
• Relief valves location:
During relief valves handling gas or vapour location, in order to
avoid chatter and consequent seat damage, the pressure drop
between protected equipment and its relief valve shall not exceed
the 3% of the set pressure. Exception to this rule is represented
by pilot-operated relief valves with a suitably arranged remote
pilot connection close to the source of overpressure.
Relief valves connected to a closed relief system shall be located
above the relief header or lined up to discharge in a local drain
vessel.
Sh. 63 of 93
• Relief valves piping:

The flow area through all pipe and fittings between a pressure
vessel and its relief valve shall be at least the same as that of the
valve inlet. In case of two or more relief valves fitted on the same
connection, the cross-sectional area shall be at least equal to the
combined inlet areas of the valves.
The inlet and outlet piping shall be installed without pockets to
ensure that liquid does not accumulate at the relief valve outlet or
inlet.
In case of multiple relief valves (including one spare) discharging
to the atmosphere, each valve shall have its individual discharge
pipe. The discharge piping (to safe location) shall be designed as
short as possible.
• Blowdown system:
API 521 suggests depressurizing to 6.9 barg or 50% of vessel
design pressure, whichever is the lower, within 15 minutes.
Moreover, Eni E&P internal standard (doc. no.
20199.VON.SAF.SDS) foresees depressurization to 50% of
vessel operating pressure within 5 minutes and then to reach 7
barg within the next 10 minutes.
• Blowdown valves location:
The location of depressuring valves is governed by the same
considerations as relief valves.
Particular attention shall be paid to the position of non-return
valves, to ensure that equipment downstream the non-return
valve cannot be isolated from the depressuring valve.
• Common discharge systems:
Relief and blowdown valves will discharge via common plant sub-
headers into a main header connected to a K.O. drum and finally
to the vent / flare. This disposal piping shall be self-drained
towards the K.O. drum.
In case of conventional relief valve use, the relief manifold shall
be sized in order to limit the built-up back pressure to
Sh. 64 of 93
approximately 10% of the set pressure of each pressure relief

valve that can be relieving concurrently. In case of pilot operated
valves use, higher manifold pressure can be observed (back
pressure exceeds 30 to 50% of the set pressure).
• Flaring vs. Venting:

Environmental and safety considerations in conjunction with local
regulations and economic evaluation must be taken into account
when deciding whether to vent or flare the disposal streams.
In general, venting is allowed if a) disposal streams are not
foreign to the atmosphere; b) the vapours temperature is below
the auto-ignition temperature and if they are lighter than air; c)
concentrations of toxic and/or corrosive components in the
dispersed vapour cloud do not reach harmful or irritating levels on
nearby work levels (platforms) and outside property limits; d) the
risks and consequences of accidental plume ignition (e.g.
generation of shock waves) are acceptable.
For more details reference shall be made to paragraph 1.7.4.
• Typical Mach number:
In order to avoid hydrate formation, headers and sub-headers
shall be designed in order to have a Mach number < 0.7.
Flare stack diameter is generally sized on a velocity basis in
order to have a velocity of 0.5 Mach for a peak, short-term,
infrequent flow and to maintain a velocity of 0.2 Mach for the
more normal and possibly more frequent conditions.
Sh. 65 of 93
APPENDIX 1 - SIZING OF RELIEF DEVICES
To establish the size of a pressure relief device, the designer must first
determine the conditions for which overpressure protection may be
required. Reasonable care should be exercised in establishing the
various contingencies that could result in overpressure. The size of the
relief valve and the inlet and outlet piping shall be determined using the
largest relief load.
Pressure relief valves may be initially sized using the equations
presented in the following paragraphs, as appropriate for vapours, gases,
liquids, or two phase fluids.
The designer can then use API 526, Flanged Steel Pressure Relief
Valves, to select a pressure relief valve. This standard lists specific valve
configurations specified by inlet/outlet size and flange configuration,
materials of construction, pressure/temperature limits, inlet and outlet
centre to face dimensions, and effective orifice designation.
Design Considerations
As mentioned above, the size of a relief device shall be determined for

the most severe individual relief condition.
Set pressures and maximum relief pressures, expressed in relation to the
design pressure of the protected equipment, all expressed in gauge
pressures, shall not exceed the values given in Table 1 (strictly related to
ASME VIII).
Sh. 66 of 93
Relief Valves Set Pressure

Single Valve Multiple Valves
Max.
Max. Allowable
Set Allowable Set
Accumulated
Pressure Accumulated Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Other than fire
exposure
• 1st valve 100 110 100 116
Fire exposure only

• 1st valve 100 121 100 121
• Supplemental valve NA NA 110 121
Table 1 – Characteristic of safety relief valves for vessel protection.
The overpressure used for the calculation of the relief valve can be
derived from the maximum allowable accumulated pressure. This
overpressure is the maximum allowable accumulated pressure minus the
set pressure and the pressure drop of the piping connecting the relief
valve and the vessel. The pressure drop shall not exceed 3% of the set
pressure. This shall be based on the relief valve capacity.
It shall also be ensured that the blowdown pressure is above the
maximum operating pressure. However, if the blowdown pressure is set
too close to the set pressure the relief valve may open and close rapidly
causing damage to the valve. For most services the blowdown pressure
will usually be 5-7% below the valve set pressure.
For equipment protected by a pressure relieving device, either on the
equipment itself or elsewhere within the pressure system containing the
equipment, there shall be an adequate margin between the set pressure
and the maximum operating pressure.
Sh. 67 of 93
Sizing for Gas or Vapour Relief
The flowrate through a relief valve nozzle is dependent on the upstream

pressure and is independent of the downstream pressure as long as the
downstream pressure is less than the critical-flow pressure. However,
when the downstream pressure increases above the critical flow
pressure, the flow through the relief valve is materially reduced. For
evaluation of the critical flow-pressure, the following equation shall be
used:
k
⎛ 2 ⎞ k −1
PCF = P1 ⎜ ⎟ (9)
⎝ k + 1⎠
So, the sizing equations for pressure relief devices in vapour or gas
service fall into two general categories depending on whether the flow is
critical or sub-critical.
Critical Flow (P2 ≤ PCF) — Safety valves in gas or vapour service may be
sized using the following equations:
131.6W T1 Z
A= (10)
CK d P1 K b K c MW
5.875QV T1 ZMW
A= (11)
CK d P1 K b K c
k +1
⎛ 2 ⎞ k −1
C = 520 k ⎜ ⎟ (12)
⎝ k + 1⎠
Where:
A = required effective discharge area of the device, [cm²]
W = flow, [kg/hr]
Sh. 68 of 93
QV = flow through the device, [Nm³/hr]

C = coefficient determined from an expression of the ratio of the specific
heats (k = CP/Cv) of the gas or vapour at standard conditions. See
Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Kd = effective coefficient of discharge. For preliminary sizing a value of
0.975 could be used.
P1 = upstream relieving pressure, [kPaa]. Set pressure plus the allowable
overpressure plus the atmospheric pressure.
Kb = capacity correction factor due to back pressure. It can be obtained
from the manufacturer’s literature or estimated. More details can be
found in API 520.
Kc = combination correction factor for installations with a rupture disk
upstream of the pressure relief valve ( = 1.0 when a rupture disk is
not installed, = 0.9 when a rupture disk is installed)
T1 = gas temperature at upstream pressure [K]
Z = compressibility factor at flowing conditions
MW = molecular weight of the gas or vapour
V = gas velocity [m/sec].
Sub-critical Flow (P2 > PCF) — For downstream pressures greater than the
critical-flow pressure, the relief valve orifice area can be calculated from
the following equations:
0.179W T1 Z
A= (13)
F2 K d K c MWP1 ( P1 − P2 )
Where:
P2 = downstream pressure at valve outlet [kPaa].
F2 = coefficient for sub-critical flow.
For a proper sizing Figure 1 or the following equation shall be
used.
Sh. 69 of 93
Figure 1– Values of F2 for sub-critical flow.
⎛ k ⎞ (2 ⎡ (1 − r (k −1) k ) ⎤
F2 = ⎜ ⎟⋅r
k)
⋅⎢ ⎥
⎝ k − 1⎠ ⎣ (1 − r ) ⎦
Where:
r = P2 / P1
Sh. 70 of 93
Figure 2 – Gas Properties.

Sh. 71 of 93
Figure 3 – Values of coefficient C.
Sizing for Steam Relief
Valves in steam services are sized using the following equation

(modification of Napier equation):
1.904W
A= (14)
P1 K d K b K c K n K SH
Where:
Kn = Napier’s equation correction factor.
Kn shall be evaluated using the following equation:
Sh. 72 of 93
0.02764 ⋅ P1 − 1000
• If 10340 kPaa < P1 < 22057 kPaa: Kn =
0.03324 ⋅ P1 − 1061
• If P1 < 10340 kPaa: Kn = 1
KSH = superheat steam correction factor (see Figure 4). For saturated
steam, for any pressure, KSH = 1.
Figure 4 – Superheat correction factor – KSH.
Sizing for Liquid Relief
For relief valves sizing for liquid service, the following equations shall be
used:
7.07 ⋅ Vl G
Turbulent flow: A= (15)
K d K c K w K v ( P1 − Pb )
Sh. 73 of 93
Where:
Vl = flowrate at flowing temperature and pressure, [lt/sec].
G = relative density of liquid at flowing temperature, referred to water at
standard condition.
Kv = capacity correction factor due to viscosity.
Kw = capacity correction factor due to back pressure. If the back pressure
is atmospheric, use a value for Kw of 1.0.
Pb = back pressure, [kPag]
Laminar flow (Re < 4000): For liquids with laminar flow, the valve shall be
first sized using the above equation assuming Kv = 1. The so obtained
discharge area, A, is compared with manufacturer standard orifice sizes
and from manufacturer this is chosen the next larger orifice A’. Then, A’ is
used for Reynolds number determination:
112654 ⋅ Vl ⋅ G
Re = (16)
µ A'
With the just calculated Reynolds, using Figure 5, a first tentative value
of Kv shall be obtained.
Figure 5 – Capacity correction factor, Kv, due to viscosity.

Sh. 74 of 93
In order to have an area value corrected for viscosity, A’ shall be divided

by Kv. If the corrected area exceeds the standard orifice area chosen, this
procedure must be repeated using the next larger standard orifice.
Sizing for Two Phase Liquid-Vapour Relief
For a preliminary sizing of a two phase relief valve, the following method
shall be considered:
• Determining gas and liquid relieving rates.
• Calculating the orifice area required to gas relieving.
• Calculating the orifice area required to liquid relieving
• Summing total areas calculated for liquid and vapour to obtain the
total required orifice area.
However, for a more rigorous solution, DIERS (Design Institute for
Emergency Relief Systems) proposed an alternative method based on
the classical homogeneous equilibrium model assuming no slip between
the liquid phase and the vapour phase.
Sizing for Thermal Relief
In case of liquid relieving rates of liquids expanded by thermal forces

without vapour generation at valve set pressure and maximum
temperature, the following equation shall be used.
B ⋅Q
Vl = (17)
1000 ⋅ G ⋅ S
Where:
Q = Heat input, [W]
S = Specific heat, [kJ/kg°C]
B = Liquid expansion coefficient at relieving temperature, [1/°C], see
Figure 6.
Sh. 75 of 93
Figure 6 - Typical values of liquid expansion coefficient - B.
After calculating the flowrate, Vl, the relief device shall be sized applying
equation (13).
In order to evaluate the flowrate, in case the heat input is due to solar
radiation, the interested surface area and the radiation (780-1040 W/m²)
must be determined.
Sh. 76 of 93
APPENDIX 2 – HIGH INTEGRITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (HIPS)
Traditional methods of pressure relief employ a mechanical device such

as a relief valve for reducing the likelihood of overpressure of vessels and
piping systems. API 14C, API 521, and ASME Section VIII, Division 1 and
2 provide alternatives in the design of overpressure protection systems
and suggest, as a different approach to overpressure protection, the use
of an instrumented system.
Any instrumented system used to provide overpressure protection is a
safety-related system, since its failure would result in the rupture of the
pipeline/vessel or in overloading the flare. As a safety-related system, the
instrumented system must meet the international standard IEC 61508.
Reference Documents
The High Integrity Protection System shall be in accordance with the

following standards:
API 521 recommends the use of High Integrity Protection System (HIPS)
only when the use of pressure relieving devices is impractical (e.g. due to
extreme field investments).
API 14C (standard for offshore production platform safety systems)

provides a design exemption for the substitution of HIPS for pressure
relief valves (PRV) in wellhead, header and pipeline applications. API
14C does not provide a specific exemption for pressure vessels.
ASME Code Case 2211 sets the conditions under which overpressure
protection may be provided by an instrumented system instead of a
pressure relief valve (PRV). This ruling is intended to enhance the overall
safety and environmental performance of a facility by utilizing the most
appropriate engineered option for pressure protection. While there are no
specific performance criteria in the Case Code, the substitution of the
HIPS for the PRV should provide a safer installation. Consequently, the
Sh. 77 of 93
substitution is generally intended for limited services where the PRV may
not work properly due to process condition, e.g. plugging, multiple
phases, raising temperature above thermal decomposition point and
causing an internal detonation or fire, etc.
The overpressure protection can be provided by a Safety Instrumented
System (SIS) in lieu of a pressure relieving device under the following
conditions:
a) The vessel is not exclusively in air, water, or steam service.
b) The decision to utilize overpressure protection of a vessel by
system design is the responsibility of the user. The manufacturer
is responsible only for verifying that the user has specified
overpressure protection by system design, and for listing Code
Case 2211 on the Data Report.
c) The user must ensure the maximum allowable working pressure
of the vessel is higher than the highest pressure that can
reasonably be expected to be encountered by the system.
d) A quantitative or qualitative risk analysis of the proposed system
must be made addressing all credible overpressure scenarios.
e) The analysis in (c) and (d) must be documented.
IEC 61508 The objective of these standards is to define the design and
documentation requirements for SIS.
One of the most important criteria for SIS design is the requirement that
the user assigns and verifies the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for the SIS.
The assignment of SIL is a corporate decision based on risk
management philosophy and risk tolerance.
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) should be designed to meet a safety
integrity level, which is appropriate for the degree of hazard associated
with the process upset. Safety integrity levels per IEC 61508 are
designated in the following table:
Sh. 78 of 93
Safety
Availability Probability to Fail
Integrated 1/PFD
Required on Demand (PFD)
Level (SIL)
4 > 99.99% E-005 to E-004 100000 to 10000
3 99.90 ÷ 99.99% E-004 to E-003 10000 to 1000
2 99.00 ÷ 99.90% E-003 to E-002 1000 to 100
1 90.00 ÷ 99.00% E-002 to E-001 100 to 10
Table 2 – Safety integrity level.
HIPS Justification
A decision tree can be utilized to facilitate the justification for HIPS in the
process industry.
Figure 7 is a simplified decision tree showing the key steps in assessing
and designing a HIPPS.
Figure 7 – Simplified design tree.

Sh. 79 of 93
HIPS Design
Once the decision is made to implement HIPS, a safety requirement

specification must be developed to address various overpressure
scenarios and the actions required to mitigate the scenario.
The frequency of overpressure of vessels is often high, due to process
upsets or inadvertent block-in of vessels. When the frequency and
consequence are considered, SIL 3 is often selected. In other words,
when all of the layers of protection are considered, the availability of the
HIPS should be sufficiently high to cause the overpressure of the vessel
to be essentially a “non-credible” event.
A HIPS is a trip system consisting of three basic elements: the field input
devices, the logic solver and the final elements. As with other trip
systems, the purpose of HIPS is to protect life, to protect the environment
and/or assets and production. They do differ from a regular trip system in
the high level of availability required. This is achieved through the
redundancy in system components. Since the HIPS results in process
shutdown, there is often significant economic impact to the plant due to
loss of production when there is a spurious trip. Consequently, these
systems also have high reliability requirements.
A quantitative verification of the SIL should be performed to ensure that
the target SIL is met. The important parameters when considering HIPS
design are as follows:
• Voting
• Field input devices
• Logic solver
• Final control elements
• Diagnostics
• Testing, and
• Common cause failures.
It is also absolutely critical to quantify the availability of the system. In fact
IEC 61508 highly recommend a quantitative evaluation of SIL. This
verification can also be used to establish the required testing and
Sh. 80 of 93
maintenance program for each HIPS once the device, architecture, and
voting have been selected.
Voting Configurations: The purpose of using a voting scheme is to

increase the integrity of the system and/or to minimize spurious trips.
A two-out-of-three (2oo3) voting scheme is frequently used in HIPS.
One-out-of-two (1oo2) voting will improve availability of a system but will
significantly increase the nuisance trip rate.
Two-out-of-two (2oo2) voting will improve the reliability of the system but
will decrease the safety factor or availability of the system.
Two-out-of-three (2oo3) voting (see Figure 8) combines the benefits of
high availability and high reliability. The voting system works by initiating
the trip function only when at least two of the input devices are in the trip
state. Spurious trips are reduced and, if testing procedures are properly
written and followed, inputs can be tested without bypassing.
Field Input Devices: The process variables commonly measured in HIPS

are pressure, temperature and flow.
Traditionally, switches were used as the process sensor in SISs.
Nowadays, with the evolution of Programmable Electronic System (PES)
technology, the use of transmitters to measure these variables is now
preferred.
Switches only give a change in output when they are activated and can
“stick” or experience some other failure mode that is revealed only when
the switch is tested or a demand is placed on it. Redundant transmitters
are not subject to these same covert failures and their use has a positive
effect on the system. Moreover, transmitters can be continuously
monitored and the operability of the transmitters readily observed. With
transmitter redundancy employed, out-of-range/deviation alarming and
median select can be implemented to ensure a high level of availability.
Most HIPS applications require 2oo3 transmitters on all field inputs,
utilizing median select and deviation alarming from the median.
Sh. 81 of 93
Separate process connections (see Figure 8) are also recommended to

decrease common cause faults, such as plugged impulse lines.
Figure 8 – 2oo3 transmitters’ typical scheme.
Logic Solver: This hardware must meet the required SIL, which often
means that it must comply with SIL-3 performance requirements, as
provided in IEC 61508.
The logic solver can be relays, solid state or Programmable Electronic
Systems (PES). If a PES is used, it must provide a high level of self-
diagnostics and fault tolerance. Redundancy of signal paths and logic
processing is necessary, and the trip output function must be configured
as de-energize to trip.
IEC 61508 requires that the safety logic be separate and independent
from the basic process control system; therefore, in order to reduce the
probability that both functions would become contemporary unavailable,
HIPS is separated from the Basic Process Control System.
Final Control Elements: The final control elements in HIPS are usually
two shutdown valves in series working in a 1oo2 configuration. On-line
testing provisions should be provided to permit each valve to be function
tested independently.
Sh. 82 of 93
Solenoid valves, configured as de-energize to trip, are used to actuate

the block valves. Solenoids can be configured 1oo2 to maximize safety
availability, but spurious trips are a problem (see Figure 9). These
valves can be configured 2oo2 or 2oo3 to reduce spurious trips (see
Figure 10). The 2oo2 configuration will require more frequent testing
than a 2oo3 configuration to maintain acceptable availability. The
solenoids should be mounted as close to the valve actuator as possible,
to decrease the required transfer volume for valve actuation. Finally, the
exhaust ports should be as large as possible to increase the speed of the
valve response.
Figure 9 - Final Control Elements showing 1oo2 solenoids.

Sh. 83 of 93
Figure 10 - Final Control Elements showing 2oo2 solenoids.
Diagnostics: The ability to detect failures of components on-line

significantly improves the availability of the HIPS; therefore, diagnostic
capability should be designed into all HIPS.
Testing: Testing is performed to uncover failures. If safety system

components are not tested, dangerous failures reveal themselves when a
process demand occurs, causing an unsafe event that the safety system
was designed to prevent.
The appropriate testing of a SIS utilized as a HIPS is key to ensure that
the availability requirements are satisfied. Architecture, redundancy and
device integrity have a significant effect on the probability to fail on
demand and therefore testing frequency requirements.
To determine the appropriate testing frequency, a quantitative risk
assessment shall be done; ISA TR84.02 (1998) recommends one of the
following methods:
• Markov Models
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
• Simplified Methods
Sh. 84 of 93
Common Cause Failures (CCF): CCF in HIPS design should be

assessed. A CCF occurs when a single fault results in the corresponding
failure of multiple components. Thus, CCFs can result in the HIPS failing
to function when there is a process demand placed on it. CCFs must be
identified during the design process and the potential impact on the HIPS
functionality understood.
There is a great deal of disagreement among the experts on how to
define CCF and what specific events comprise a CCF. The following are
often cited as examples of common cause faults:
• Miscalibration of sensors
• Plugging of common process taps for redundant sensors
• Incorrect maintenance
• Improper bypassing
• Environmental stress on the field device
• Process fluid or contaminant plugs valve
The most critical failure is that the safety requirement specification (SRS)
is incorrect at the beginning of the design process and the HIPS cannot
effectively detect the potential incident.
Advantages and Disadvantages of HIPS
It is poor safety practice to install and rely on pressure relief devices in

services where the sizing of the device is poorly understood or known to
be inadequate due to chemical reactions, multiphase fluids, or plugging.
In these applications, alternatives, such as HIPS, should be examined to
ensure mitigation of overpressure events.
Industry is increasingly moving towards utilizing HIPS to reduce flare
loading and prevent the environmental impact of pressure venting. They
are becoming the option of choice to help alleviate the need to replace
major portions of the flare system in existing facilities when adding new
equipment or units.
Sh. 85 of 93
If the header and flare system must be enlarged, significant downtime is

incurred for all of the units that discharge to that header. The capital and
installation cost associated with HIPS is attractive when compared to the
downtime or equipment cost of flare modification. Another benefit is that
the process unit will not flare as much as a process unit designed for full
flare loading. In some areas of the world, this is becoming important as
regulatory agencies place greater restrictions on flaring of process gases.
The main disadvantage of HIPS is the careful documentation, design,
operation, maintenance, and testing to ensure standard’s compliance.
Specific regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction requirements must be
determined. In some instances, approval of local authorities is required.
Regulatory and standards requirements must be understood by all
parties, including facility management and instrumentation and electrical,
operations, and maintenance personnel.
Any justification for HIPS must be thoroughly documented through a
hazard analysis, which identifies all potential overpressure scenarios and
demonstrates that the HIPS can adequately address each scenario.
HIPS systems are more complex, requiring the successful functioning of
multiple devices to achieve the performance of a single pressure relief
device. The user must verify that HIPS will work from a process
standpoint and that the HIPS design results in an installation as safe as
or safer than a conventional design. The effectiveness of the system is
highly dependent on the field design, device testing, and maintenance
program. Consequently, the user must understand the importance of
application-specific design aspects, as well as the associated costs of the
intensive testing and maintenance program whenever a HIPS is utilized.
When a pressure relief device is not installed or is undersized based on
conventional design, the HIPS becomes the “last line of defence,” whose
failure potentially results in vessel rupture.
Finally, there is no “approved” rubber stamp in any regulation or standard
for the use of HIPS for reduction in the size of relief devices and
associated flare system for pressure vessels or pipelines. Substantial
cautionary statements are made in the standards and recommended
Sh. 86 of 93
practices, concerning the use of HIPPS. No matter what documentation is

created, the user still has the responsibility to provide a safe and
environmentally friendly operation.
Sh. 87 of 93
GLOSSARY
ACCUMULATION Pressure increase over the maximum allowable working

pressure of the equipment being protected during discharge through the
pressure relief valve. Expressed in pressure units or as a percentage of
MAWP or design pressure.
ACTUAL DISCHARGE AREA Net area of a selected orifice which dictates

the pressure relief valve relieving capacity.
ATMOSPHERIC DISCHARGE Release of vapours and gases from

pressure-relieving and depressuring devices to the atmosphere.
BACK PRESSURE Pressure existing at the outlet of a relief device as a

result of the pressure in the discharge system. It is the sum of the
superimposed and built-up back pressures.
BALANCED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE Spring-loaded pressure-relief

valve that incorporates a bellows or other means for minimizing the effect
of back pressure on the operational characteristics of the valve.
BLOWDOWN Depressurization of a plant or part of a plant, and

equipment.
BUILT-UP BACK-PRESSURE It is the increase in pressure at the relief

device outlet that develops as a result of flow after the pressure relief
device opens.
COEFFICIENT OF FLOW (CV) Defined as the actual flow performance in

U.S. gallons of water per minute at 60 °F when inlet pressure is 1 psig
and outlet pressure is atmospheric (14.7 psia).
CONSTANT BACK PRESSURE Superimposed back pressure which is

constant with time.
Sh. 88 of 93
DESIGN PRESSURE Value selected for the design of equipment for the
most severe condition of coincident pressure and temperature expected

in normal operation, with provision for a suitable margin above these
operating conditions to allow for operation of the pressure relief valve.
EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE AREA A nominal or computed area used with an
effective discharge coefficient to calculate the minimum required relieving

capacity for a pressure relief valve.
ELEVATED FLARE Flare where the burner is raised high above ground
level to reduce radiation intensity and to aid in dispersion.
ENCLOSED FLARE Enclosure with one or more burners arranged in such
a manner that the flame is not directly visible.
FLARE Device or system used to safely dispose of relief gases in an
environmentally compliant manner through the use of combustion.
FLARE BURNER / FLARE TIP Part of the flare where fuel and air are
mixed at the velocities, turbulence and concentration required to establish
and maintain proper ignition and stable combustion.
FLARE HEADER Piping system that collects and delivers the relief
gases to the flare.
GROUND FLARE Non-elevated flare.
HIPS High integrity protection system. Instrumented system used for

overpressure protection as an alternative to traditional relief devices.
HYDRATE Solid, crystalline compound of water and a low-boiling-point

gas, in which the water combines with the gas molecule to form a solid.
Sh. 89 of 93
JET FIRE Jet fire is a fire created when a leak from a pressurized
system ignites and forms a burning jet. Jet fires can occur when almost
any combustible / flammable fluid under pressure is released to
atmosphere.
KNOCKOUT DRUM Vessel in the effluent handling system designed to
remove and store liquids.
LIQUID SEAL / WATER SEAL Device that directs the flow of relief gases
through a liquid (normally water) on the path to the flare burner, used to
protect the flare header from air infiltration or flashback, to divert flow, or
to create back pressure for the flare header.
MACH NUMBER Ratio of a fluid’s velocity, measured relative to some

obstacle or geometric figure, divided by the speed at which sound waves
propagate through the fluid.
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE WORKING PRESSURE Pressure determined by

employing the allowable stress values of the materials used in the
construction of the equipment. It is the least value of allowable pressure
value found for any component part of a piece of equipment for a given
temperature. It is the maximum gauge pressure permissible at the top of
a completed vessel in its normal operating position at the designated
coincident temperature specified for that pressure.
OPERATING PRESSURE Pressure expected during normal system

operation.
OVERPRESSURE The pressure increase over the set pressure of the

relieving device.
Sh. 90 of 93
PILOT-OPERATED PRESSURE-RELIEF VALVE Pressure relief valve in

which the major relieving device or main valve is combined with and
controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary pressure-relief valve (pilot).
PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE A device actuated by inlet static pressure

and designed to open during an emergency or abnormal condition to
prevent a rise of internal fluid pressure in excess of a specified value.
PRESSURE-RELIEF VALVE Valve designed to open and relieve excess

pressure and to reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal
conditions have been restored.
PURGE GAS Fuel gas or non-condensable inert gas added to the flare
header to mitigate air ingress and burn-back.
RADIATION INTENSITY Local radiant heat transfer rate from the flare
flame, usually considered at grade level.
RELIEVING CONDITIONS Inlet pressure and temperature on a pressure-
relief device during an overpressure condition.
REQUIRED DISCHARGE AREA A nominal, or computed, area of a pressure

relief valve used in recognised flow formula to determine the size of the
valve. It will be less than the actual discharge area.
RUPTURE-DISK DEVICE Non-reclosing pressure-relief device actuated by

static differential pressure between the inlet and outlet of the device and
designed to function by the bursting of a rupture disk.
SET PRESSURE Value of increasing inlet static pressure at which a

pressure relief valve begins to open.
SIL Safety Integrity Level.

Sh. 91 of 93
SIS Safety Instrumented System.
SET PRESSURE Inlet gauge pressure at which a pressure-relief device

is set to open under service conditions.
SUPERIMPOSED BACK PRESSURE is the static pressure that exists at the

outlet of a pressure relief device at the time the device is required to
operate. It is the result of pressure in the discharge system coming from
other sources and may be constant or variable.
VAPOUR DEPRESSURING SYSTEM Protective arrangement of valves and

piping intended to provide for rapid reduction of pressure in equipment by
releasing vapours.
VENT HEADER Piping system that collects and delivers the relief
gases to the vent stack.
VENT STACK Elevated vertical termination of a disposal system that
discharges vapours into the atmosphere without combustion or

conversion of the relieved fluid.
Sh. 92 of 93
REFERENCE
The following documents have been the main reference for the
development of Unit 230 Best Practice.
2007 ANSI / API Standard 521

5th Edition, January 2007
Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring System
2005 Eni E&P Internal Standard

Doc. No. 04927.PKG.MEC.SPC
Rev. 01, January 2005
Gas Plant – Atmospheric Vent Flares – Extinguishing System
2004 GPSA – Engineering Data Book

12th Edition (Electronic), 2004
2003 API Standard 537

1st Edition, September 2003
Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service
2001 Protect Plants against Overpressure

Wing Y., UOP LLC
Chemical Engineering, 2001, Vol. 108, n° 6, p. 66 – 73
2001 Eni E&P Internal Standard

Doc. No. 20199.VON.SAF.SDS
Rev. 01, August 2001
Installazioni a terra – Criteri generali di sicurezza
2000 API Recommended Practice 520 Part I – Sizing and Selection

7th Edition, January 2000
Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries
Sh. 93 of 93

5th Edition, April 1998
Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks

4th Edition, June 1995
Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves
1994 API Recommended Practice 520 Part II – Installation

4th Edition, December 1994
Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries

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RELIEF AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM – UNIT 230 6

1.1 General .................................................................................................................................. 6

1.7.5 Flare and Vent Structure ......................................................................................... 39

BDV Blowdown valve

CCF Common cause failure

DIERS Design institute for emergency relief system

ESD Emergency shutdown

HIPS High integrity protection system

LHV Lower heating value

PES Programmable electronic system

PRV Pressure relief valve

PSV Pressure safety valve

SIL Safety integrity level

SIS Safety instrumented system

SRS Safety requirement specification

S/R VALVE Safety / Relief valve

TSV Thermal safety valve

RELIEF AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM – UNIT 230

1.2 Systems Description

Pressure relieving devices have to be installed to ensure that a process

1.3 Relief System Design

The flowrates to the system can be caused by various operating and

1.3.1 Overpressure Protection Philosophy

Overpressure is due to a deviation of the normal operating conditions and

1.3.2 Upset Conditions

Pressure vessels, heat exchangers, operating equipment, and piping are

1.3.2.1 Blocked Discharge

The inadvertent closure of a block valve on the outlet of a pressure

discharged. However, during design operation the worst case shall be

1.3.2.2 Inadvertent Valve Opening

The inadvertent opening of any valve from a source of higher pressure,

1.3.2.3 Control Valve Failure

The failure positions of instruments and control valves must be carefully

1.3.2.4 Utility Failure

Utility Failure Equipment Affected

1.3.2.5 Fire Exposure

1.3.2.6 Jet Fire

Instead of a pressure-relief system, protection against jet fires focuses on

1.3.2.7 Entrance of volatile material into the system

1.3.2.8 Thermal Expansion

If isolation of a process line on the cold side of an exchanger can result in

1.3.2.9 Tube Rupture

1.3.2.10 Internal Explosion

Where overpressure protection against internal explosions (excluding

1.3.2.11 Chemical Reaction

The rapid evolution of an exothermic reaction (runaway) or the

1.3.2.12 Hydraulic Expansion

Hydraulic expansion is the increase in liquid volume caused by an

For aboveground pipelines protection, a system with multiple TSVs shall

If the liquid being relieved is expected to flash or form solids while it

1.3.3 Additional Consideration

Alternative pumps, in order to avoid the motor pump overheating and to

p set = 1.1 ⋅ p delivery (2)

p set = 1.7 + p delivery (3)

In order to protect rotary compressors and lines, a relief valve upstream

A special pressure relief valve shall be foreseen at the turbine outlet in

1.3.3.4 Fired Heaters

If there is a possibility that the process side of a fired heater may be

1.3.3.5 PSV Operating in Liquid Service

For those relief valves protecting equipment operating in liquid service,

supposing a reasonable valve height. For valve elevation preliminary