Romulo D. Plagata for petitioner.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Manila

For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute R

esolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition for certior
SECOND DIVISION
ari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public respo
ndent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among other

G.R. No. 78648 January 24, 1989 s, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable agai
nst the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as
an indispensable party in the case.
RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner,

vs.
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN, res
pondents.
1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the
law on which it is based;
2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise agre
ement; and
3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA, for short) gravely abu
sed its discretion in denying the lawful claim for separation pay by your
petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was appointed as
Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he was a
dministratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty, mi
sconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Boar
d exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal
Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidenc
e by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No. 5
4, Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petition
er filed Case No. 43, a suit for mandamus and Damages with Preliminar
y Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and t
he Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court of First
Instance in Basilan Province, Branch 1, praying for reinstatement "with full
backwages and other rights inherent in the position." He also filed Cas
e No. 45 with the same Court seeking that he and his wife be paid thei
r back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the De
cision of the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the Sanggu
niang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its Reso
lution No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the
provisions of the Local Government Code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on
the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Muni
cipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of CO
A), entered into a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, tha
t:
l. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and
other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as Municipal
Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from January 1, 198
0 to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves, mi
d-year and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay un
der the Local Government Code, which are reflected in the computation
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof... (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered
as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary considerations mentioned ther
ein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although, co
ncededly, no provision for the same had been included in the Comprom
ise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, P. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in th
e amount of P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the ab
olition of the position of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay i
s provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim t
o the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11 January, 1986, in a First Indors
ement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and prope
r but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the
ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Z
amboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of th
e Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provin
cial Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for separation pay.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission
on Audit (COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, no
t only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but also disallowed th
e other payments made to petitioner. It held:.
Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid bac
k salaries and other emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96 purs
uant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby dire
cts that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the
period when he was no longer in the government service should be dis
allowed in audit without prejudice to his right of recourse against the of
ficials personally liable for his unlawful dismissal. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
 The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the M
unicipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by C
Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L- 17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). T
OA, which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11
hus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salari
May 1988 as heretofore adverted to.
es, P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christ
mas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in the sum of

It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was duly signed P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement benefits

by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguni bad also been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.

ang Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as th

eir lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we uph
reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this Court in
old the ruling of the COA reading in part:
Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33, 113 SCRA 477, Ap
ril 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded
in this case, it being apparent that the officials concerned had been sue
Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the
d in their official capacity.
instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement benefits ea
rlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled from the re
cords is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the service on Janu
It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued petiti
ary 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the service until his position
oner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of man
of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was abolished. In other words, he
damus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back salaries
was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the service when
and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue petitioner
the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his separation from the
in his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and other mu
service was not attributable to the abolition of the position but was due
nicipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the interests of justice
to his dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
and equity, from including them herein as respondents. (at p. 488)
which provides —
 had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly denied by
COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for rei
'Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or em
nstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively dismissed such
ployee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance, the offici
that he could still be considered an incumbent whose position had bee
al or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant position
n abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not having left
without diminution of salary. Should such position not be available, the
his office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable
official or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalen
position and compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs. M
t to one month salary for every year of service over and above the mo
elchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980).
netary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law.'

Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Cou

cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay.
rt under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Articl
Moreover, the fact remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already
e VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
been paid his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His
entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
is offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing
of double retirement benefits to an employee. (p. 4, COA Decision No.
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
388; p. 15, Rollo)

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of th

To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay,
e Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September 24, 1983).
basis therefor.

It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the Compr
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision"
omise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted outright but still
within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is a
pplicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course an
d after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due
course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Res
olution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and t
hus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC,
et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People,
G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of r
ight, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed.
, Vol. IV- B, pp. 4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby P
ARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent Commi
ssion on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First Instan
ce of Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is here
by SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pa
y of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
G.R. No. L-27005 January 31, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPI
NES Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE MILLING CO., INC., HECTOR TORRES, FRA
NCISCO GOMEZ and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Jesus Avanceña for petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines.
C. E. Medina, J. M. Locsin, B. V. Coruna and E. Magtalas for petitioner P
hilippine National Bank.
Araneta and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:chanrobles virtual law library
In their petition herein, the Philippine National Bank and the Developme
nt Bank of the Philippines - hereinafter referred to, respectively, as the P
NB and DBP - pray that writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus b
e issued annulling certain resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
Nos. 35253-R and 35254-R thereof, and prohibiting said Court from ass
uming jurisdiction over these cases, as well as directing the Court to dis
miss the appeal therein taken. Said petitioners prayed, also, that a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued during the pendency of the present c
ase, but such auxiliary relief has not been granted, although the petition
 herein was given due course.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The aforementioned appeals had been taken by the Philippine Milling C
o., Inc., Francisco Gomez, Hector Torres and Federico Santiago, from a d
ecision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 4213
3 and 42322 thereof, entitled, respectively, "Philippine Milling Co. v. Dev
elopment Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Register
of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental", and "Development Ba
nk of the Philippines v. Philippine Milling Co., et al.," dismissing the first
case and ordering the defendants, in the second case, "particularly the S
ecretary of the Philippine Milling Co. ... to transfer in the stock book of
the corporation in the name of the DBP the 15,000 shares of stocks cov
ered by Certificate of Stock No. 32, now in the name of the respondent
s Hector A. Torres and Francisco M. Gomez, and to issue a new certifica
te of stock in lieu thereof in favor of the DBP," with costs against said
defendants in the Court of First Instance and appellants in the Court of
Appeals, but respondent's in the present original action.chanroblesvirtuala
wlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Upon the filing with the Court of Appeals of their printed record on ap
peal, respondents herein were required to submit therein their brief as a
ppellants, within the reglementary period. After securing two (2) extensio
ns thereof, the last of which was to expire on November 11, 1966, respo
ndents moved for a third extension of 15 days, which was granted on N
ovember 14, but for 10 days only, to expire on November 21, 1966. On
November 24, 1966, respondents asked a fourth extension of thirty (30)
days counted from November 26, 1966". On the date last mentioned, th
e DBP - as one of the appellees in the two cases - objected to said ex
tension and moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the ext
ension had been sought late, the previous extension having expired on
November 21, 1966. Without touching upon this opposition and motion t
o dismiss, on November 28, 1966, the Court of Appeals granted the 30-
day extension applied for, counted from November 26, 1966.chanroblesvi
rtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On December 1, 1966, the PNB - another appellee in CA-G.R. No. 35253
-R - moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground relied upon by the
DBP. Both motions to dismiss were denied by the Court of Appeals on
December 2, 1966. Seemingly unaware of the resolution to this effect, o
n December 5, 1966, the DBP filed another motion urging that its motio
n to dismiss be acted upon. The PNB, in turn, filed, on December 7, 19
66, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appe
als of November 28, 1966. This motion for reconsideration was, on Dece
mber 9, 1966, denied by the Court of Appeals. Soon thereafter, or on D
ecember 23, 1966, the PNB and DBP commenced the present action to
annul said resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated December 2 and 9
, 1966, to restrain or prohibit the Court of Appeals from hearing the afo
rementioned cases CA-G.R. Nos. 35253-R and 35254-R, and to compel s
aid Court to dismiss the appeals therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
The petition herein is based upon the premise that, owing to responden
ts' failure to file a motion for extension, on or before November 21, 196
6, when the third extension granted to them expired, "the Court of App
eals already lost jurisdiction to try the case and proceed further, but has
not only the power but also the duty to dismiss the appeal." This prete
nse is clearly untenable, for, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rul
es of Court, "(a)n appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on
its own motion or on that of the appellee" upon the ground, among o
thers, of "failure of the appellant ... to serve and file the required numb
er of copies of his brief," within the reglementary period. Manifestly, this
provision confers a power and does not impose a duty. What is more,
it is directory, not mandatory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual l
aw library
air play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the p
resumption is that it has been so exercised. It was incumbent upon here
in petitioners, as actors in the case at bar, to offset this presumption. Y
et, the record before us does not satisfactorily show that the Court of A
ppeals has abused its discretion, much less gravely. Petitioners' assertion
of abuse of discretion is predicated solely upon the alleged "ministerial"
duty of said Court to dismiss the appeal therein, which is devoid of leg
al foundation. It is inconsistent with our views in Viuda de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo 1 and Alquiza v. Alquiza. 2 chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby dismissed an
d the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to petitioners' assertion that, on November 22, 1966, "it becam

e its (Court of Appeals') ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal and rema
nd the case for execution to the Court of origin," the Court of Appeals
had, under said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss respondents' appeal. Although said discretion must be a s
ound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and f
Today is Tuesday, October 01, 2019home

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
THIRD DIVISION

CORTES, J.:

G.R. No. L-68619 March 16, 1989

The petitioners impugn for grave abuse of discretion the deletion by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of the award of financial a
LOURDES SORIANO, DOROTEA TAMACA, ASUNCION VERA, MARCIANA
ssistance granted by the Labor Arbiter to them.
DE LOS REYES, EVELYN DACALLAS, YOLANDA VILLANUEVA, ANTONIO D
ABE, ZORAIDA DELANTAR, ANITA DANA, and ANACURITA NAVARRO, pe
titioners,
The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent NLRC, are as follows:
vs.

DIEGO P. ATIENZA, GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, and CLETO T. VILLATUYA,

in their capacity as Commissioners of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, SHELLWOOD INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES INCORPORATED, R
AMON PANIQUE and CONCEPCION NUGUID, respondents.
Ernesto R. Arellano for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
x x x
Complainants Lourdes Soriano, Dorotea Tamaca, Asuncion Vera, Marciana
de los Reyes, Evelyn Dacallos, Yolanda Villanueva, Antonio Dabe, Zoraid
a Delantar, Anita Dana and Anacurita Navarro filed this complaint for ille
gal dismissal, unfair labor practice and moral damages against the respo
ndent Shellwood Industries Phils., the employer of the complainants. Ram
on Panique, the president and owner of the company, and Concepcion
Nuguid, former president of the union, Samahan ng Malayang Manggag
awa sa Shellwood Industries.

Neva B. Blancaver for private respondents.

It appears that on February 5, 1981, the union, Samahan ng Malayang M
anggagawa sa Shellwood Industries and the company entered into a co
mpromise, agreement wherein the company agreed to give financial assi
stance amounting to P 20,000.00 in consideration for the union's withdra
wal of Case No. NCR-FSD-J-5-662-79. As the union members became cu
rious, respondent Concepcion Nuguid was asked to explain in a general
o between the union and the company. On August 16, 1982, the ten (10
) complainants were dismissed from the service as per request of the un
ion headed by Concepcion Nuguid.
x x x

meeting held on April 4, 1982 as to what happened to the P 20,000.00.

Instead of making an explanation, Concepcion Nuguid tendered her writt
[Rollo, pp. 29-30.]
en resignation, the acceptance of which was made on April 5, 1982. Afte
r Nuguid's resignation, the union became dormant for more than three (
3) months. The remaining officers then convened a meeting on July 13,
On October 28, 1983, Labor Arbiter Pelagio A. Carpio issued a decision i
1982, wherein three resolutions were passed and approved, namely: 1) af
n this case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
filiating the union to a federation, the National Federation of Labor; 2) g
iving the federation the authority to represent the union on all matters
concerning labor relation problems; and 3) creating a steering committee IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, respondent Shell
to serve and act as union board of officers. On August 5, 1982, the Na wood Industries Philippines, Incorporated should be, as it is hereby, direc
tional Federation of Labor informed the respondent company on the ne ted to reinstate complainants to their former positions as regular worker
w union structure and the affiliation of the local union with the federati s/employees without Backwages within ten (10) days from receipt of this
on. Decision and under the same terms and conditions of employment and
without loss of seniority rights and privileges existing before their dismiss
al.
On July 29, 1982, in a general union meeting conducted by Concepcion
Nuguid, a resolution was approved expelling the complainants from the
union and asked (sic) the company to terminate their services in accorda However, since complainants are not at fault, respondent Shellwood Indu
nce with the provision of the collective bargaining agreement entered int stries, Incorporated should be as it is hereby directed to extend the fina
ncial assistance to the said complainants in an amount equivalent to six
(6) months of their respective salaries.
The complaint for unfair labor practice and moral damages is both dism
issed for lack of merit. [Rollo, p. 27].
On appeal to the NLRC, the aforesaid judgment was affirmed but the a
ward of financial assistance was deleted for having neither legal nor fact
ual basis [Rollo, p. 32]. Hence, the instant petition, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC in deleting the award of financia
l assistance.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the instant special civil actio
n limits the charge of grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC's act of se
tting aside the grant of financial assistance to petitioners. Petitioners do
not assail the order for their reinstatement without backwages Hence, th
ere is no need for the Court to dwell on the order for their reinstateme
nt without any backwages, which was sustained by the respondent NLRC
. Consequently, the sole issue raised in this case is whether the respond
ent Commissioners of the NLRC gravely abused their discretion in deleti
ng the award of financial assistance to the petitioners.
Petitioners' stance is that the company had full knowledge of the fact of
resignation of respondent Nuguid and therefore, of her lack of authorit
y to act for and in behalf of the union. Hence, when it dismissed the p
etitioners pursuant to Nuguid's request, it had participated in their illegal
dismissal through its negligence [Rollo, p. 8]. Petitioners argue that the
company is accordingly liable for financial assistance to compensate the
sufferings and damage sustained by them.
On the other hand, the public respondents justify their deletion of the a
ward of financial assistance on two grounds: 1) that the award has no le
gal basis since there is no law which orders a grant of financial assistan
ce and furthermore, the order of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement
of the petitioners is inconsistent with an award of financial assistance; a
nd 2) that the award has no factual basis since the company acted in g
ood faith in acceding to the request of the union president for the term
ination of the services of the petitioners. Public respondents claim that t
he company was compelled to dismiss the petitioners upon request of t
he union president pursuant to the clear terms of the CBA which is con
sidered the law between the contracting parties. According to the NLRC,
the company was in no position to question the status of Nuguid as un
ion president as the matter pertains exclusively to the Union and its me
mbers [Memorandum for the Public Respondent, pp. 6-9; Rollo, pp. 153-
156].
It should be stressed that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were of
the opinion that the company did not act in bad faith in terminating t
he petitioners. Thus, in directing the reinstatement of petitioners without
backwages but ordering the company to extend financial assistance, the
Labor Arbiter explained:
x x x
The record shows that Concepcion Nuguid unconditionally resigned on
April 4, 1982 (Annex "A" to complainants' position papers), which resigna
tion was formally and unconditionally accepted thru a board resolution o
n April 5, 1982 (Annex "B"). The National President of the National Feder
ation of Labor to which the local union, Samahan ng Malayang Mangga
gawa sa Shellwood Industries, is affiliated wrote a letter to Concepcion
Nuguid calling her attention to a letter dated July 30, 1982 addressed to
the members of the local union and which she circulated, purporting t
o expel from the union 12 ranking officers and members. He informed h
er that she has been divested of all authority to act as president to the
local union so that she no longer has authority to expel any union me
mber. The present leadership of the local union is being exercised by a
steering committee, a collective body, the primary duty of which is to c
ontinue the work which should have been exercised by competent union
officers. This committee was created by a general membership meeting.
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that the dismissal of complainants
has been requested by one who no longer had the authority to do the
same. However, respondent corporation may motu proprio dismiss compl
ainants if there is a legal cause.
In this case, the respondent firm was influenced (sic) by a former union
president who misrepresented herself as still the union president. The res
pondent company, therefore, cannot be deemed to have acted in bad f
aith. However, the complainants, from the foregoing facts, are entitled to
reinstatement because they were blamed for having resigned from or w
ere expelled by their union which is not true. Since the respondent corp
oration did not act in bad faith in dismissing them, it should not should
er the payment of the backwages of complainants and moral damages,
but should extend finance assistance to the ten (10) complainants above-
mentioned in an amount equivalent to six (6) months of their respective
salaries. [Rollo, pp. 2526; Emphasis supplied.]
The NLRC, on the other hand, was even more categorical in declaring t
hat the company acted in good faith in complying with the request of t
he union president:
Under the collective bargaining agreement, any employee who resigns fr
om the union or is expelled therefrom in accordance with the constitutio
n and by-laws for non-payment of union dues or for disloyalty to the u
nion, shall be suspended and/or dismissed by the company upon written
request of the union and upon consent of the company.
Under the circumstances mentioned above, we are inclined to believe th
at the respondent, Shellwood Industries Phils., Inc. has acted in good fait
h in terminating the services of the complainants. Because of the union
security provision of the collective bargaining agreement, said responden
t is duty bound to dismiss them. Although the company had earlier rece
ived a letter from the National Federation of Labor, informing about the
affiliation of the local union with that federation, there is also on record
a petition signed by a majority of the workers in the company, rejecting
the resignation of Concepcion Nuguid as president and giving her the
authority to solve the workers' problems in the company (Exhibit "2-Cn".)
It is significant to note that neither the steering committee on the fede
ration opposed the request of Concepcion Nuguid to terminate the servi
ces of the complainants. On the basis of this lack of opposition, respon
dent Shellwood Industries Phils., Inc. has reason to assume and/or to bel
ieve that Concepcion Nuguid still represented the union or has the auth
ority to act for the union. We consider this as (sic) act of good faith on
the part of respondents, hence, the award of financial assistance to the
complainants equivalent to six months salaries has no basis, factual or l
egal and is hereby deleted [Rollo, pp. 31-32; Emphasis supplied].
The labor officials' findings on this factual matter are conclusive upon th
e Court under the well-settled doctrine that factual findings of quasi-judi
cial agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality if supported
by substantial evidence [Packaging Products Corporation v. National Labo
r Relations Commission, G.R. No. 50383, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 210; Ed
i-Staff Builders International, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 71907, July 30,
1987; Almoite v. Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., G.R. No. 73680, July
10, 1986, 142 SCRA 623].
In view of the aforestated finding of good faith on the part of the com
pany, the Court holds that there is no factual or legal basis for an orde
r against the company to grant either backwages or financial assistance i
n the form of separation pay to petitioners. This is because under settle
d law and jurisprudence, the company is not considered guilty of unfair
labor practice if it merely complied in good faith with the request of th
e certified union for the dismissal of employees expelled from the union
pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agree
ment (CBA) ** [Seno v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-20565, November 29, 1967,
21 SCRA 1124]. To order Shellwood Industries Philippines, Inc. to grant f
inancial assistance to petitioners would in effect be penalizing the comp
any for its lawful compliance with the CBA provisions.
In the light of the foregoing, the NLRC's decision can hardly be conside
red tainted by the arbitrariness or unfairness that is the essence of grav
SO ORDERED.
e abuse of discretion.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

. . . [G]rave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and arbitrary exe
rcise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of juri
sdiction (Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Hamoy v. Secre Feliciano, J., is on leave.
tary of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-13456, January 30, 1960, 106 Phil. 1046). A
n error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitima
te jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion". As a matt
er of fact even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify
the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that purpose, the abuse of discre
Footnotes
tion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretio
n was exercised arbitrarily or despotically . . . (Tavera Luna Inc. v. Nable,
67 Phil. 340; Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278.) [Palma v. Q. & S., Inc., et a
** Section 2 of the CBA between Shellwood Industries Phil. and Samaha
l., G.R. No. L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 97.]
n ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Shellwood Industries provides that "any
employee who resigns from the Union or is expelled therefrom in accor
dance with its constitution and by-laws for non-payment of union dues
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of publ
or for disloyalty to the Union, shall be suspended and/or dismissed by t
ic respondents in deleting the award of financial assistance, the petition
must perforce fail. he company upon written request of the Union and upon consent of th
e Company" [Original Records, p. 32].

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant special civil action for certiorar
i is DISMISSED.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuanc

es Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44001 June 10, 1988

PAZ MERCADO, CAROLINA S. CHICO, LUCIANA CABRERA, JOAQUIN IGN

ACIO, ELMER FLORES, AVELINA C. NUCOM, et al., petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO PUNO, LOLITA C. BULAONG

, FLORENTINO AGULTO, SEVERINO SALAYSAY, SUSANA BERNARDINO, et
al., respondents.

Today is Tuesday, October 01, 2019home

Custom Search
NARVASA, J.:
The question presented by this appeal is whether or not the special civil
action of certiorari may be properly resorted to by a party aggrieved b
y a judgment of a Regional Trial Court (or Court of First Instance)—whic
h became final because not appealed within the reglementary period —
to bring about its reversal on the ground that the Court had applied th
e wrong provision of the Civil Code, and had rendered summary judgm
ent at the instance of the defendants without receiving evidence on the
issue of damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs, thereby denying th
em due process.
The private respondents, hereafter simply referred to as the Bulaong Gro
up, had for many years been individual lessees of stalls in the public m
arket of Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972, to be more precise. The m
arket was destroyed by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the B
ulaong Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they t
hereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag.
Sometime in 1972, the members of the group sub-leased their individual
stalls to other persons, hereafter simply referred to as the Mercado Gro
up. After the Mercado Group had been in possession of the market stlls
for some months, as sub-lessees of the Bulaong Group, the municipal
officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong Gr
oup and declared the persons comprising the Mercado Group as the rig
htful lessees of the stalls in question, in substitution of the former. The
municipal authorities justified the cancellation of the leases of the Bulaon
g Group by invoking the provisions of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, date
d December 14, 1964, which prohibited the sub-leasing of stalls by the l
essees thereof, as well as a directive of the Office of the President (cont
ained in a letter of Executive Secretary R. Zamora dated May 29,1973) re
quiring enforcement of said Ordinance No. 14. Recognition of the Merca
do Group's rights over the stalls was subsequently manifested in Municip
al Ordinance No. 49, approved on July 5,1973.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several individual c
omplaints with the Court of First Instance seeking recovery of their stalls
from the Mercado Group as well as damages. 1 Their theory was anchor
ed on their claimed ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their
own expense, and their resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease th
e stalls, and necessarily, to recover them from any person withholding p
ossession thereof from them. Answers were seasonably filed in behalf of
the defendants, including the Municipality of Baliuag,2 after which a pre-
trial was held in the course of which the parties stipulated upon practica
lly all the facts.
The Mercado Group thereafter filed motions for summary judgment, asse
rting that in light of the admissions made at the pre-trial and in the ple
adings, no issue remained under genuine controversion. The Bulaong Gr
oup filed an opposition which, while generally stating that there were "o
ther material allegations in the amended complaint(s)" upon which proof
was needful, actually identified only one issue of fact requiring "formal s
ubmission of evidence," i.e., the claim for actual damages " ... the exact
amount of which shall be proven at the trial." The Bulaong Group then
filed a "Motion to Accept Affidavits and Photographs as Annexes to the
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment," which affidavits and
photographs tended to establish the character and value of the improve
ments they had introduced in the market stalls. As far as the records sh
ow, no objection whatever was presented to this motion by the Mercad
o Group (movants for summary judgment), and the affidavits and photo
graphs were admitted by the Trial Court. Specifically, the Mercado Grou
p never asked, either in their motion for summary judgment or at any ti
me after having received a copy of the motion to accept affidavits and
photographs, etc., that a hearing be scheduled for the reception of evid
ence on the issue of the Bulaong Group's claimed actual damages.
On October 24,1975, respondent Judge rendered a summary judgment i
n all the cases. 3 It rejected the claim of the Municipality of Baliuag tha
t it had automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls constructed a
fter the old stalls had been razed by fire, declaring the members of the
Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession
of the stalls respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified f
or the value thereof. The decision also declared that the Bulaong and M
ercado Groups had executed the sub-letting agreements with full awaren
ess that they were thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they were thus in
pari delicto, and hence had no cause of action one against the other a
nd no right to recover whatever had been given or demand performanc
e of anything undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed (1) the annul
ment of the leases between the Municipality and the individuals comprisi
ng the Mercado Group (the defendants who had taken over the original
leases of the Bulaong Group); and (2) the payment to the individual m
embers of the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the stated, adjudicated v
alue of the stalls, with interest IF —
... the Municipality ... would insist in its right rescind or annul its contrac
ts of leases with the said plaintiffs over the lots on which the stalls in q
uestion are erected; for this purpose, since the private defendants beco
me immediate beneficiaries to a transfer of possession over the stalls in
question, the Municipality .. may require said private defendants .. to pa
y the plaintiffs the aforesaid amounts in the event that said private defe
ndants and the Minucipality .. the lots on which said stalls are contracte
d; however, unless the plaintiffs shall have been fully paid of the value
of their stalls in the amounts mentioned above, they shall have the right
to remain in their respective stalls and in case the private defendants s
hall refuse to pay for the value of the stalls in this event, the ejectment
of the said private defendants from the stalls in question shall be ordere
d .....
The Mercado Group and the Municipality filed on November 14, 1975, m
otions for reconsideration of the summary judgment, notice of which ha
d been served on them on November 3, 1975. These were denied, and
notice of the order of denial was received by them on December 18, 19
75. On January 7, 1976, the Mercado Group filed a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file their record on
appeal. But by Order dated January 9, 1976, the Trial Court directed inte
r alia the execution of the judgment, at the instance of the Bulaong Gro
up and despite the opposition of that Mercado Group, adjudging that it
s decision had become final because the appeal documents had "not be
en seasonably filed." The writ was issued, and the Mercado Group's moti
on to quash the same and to re-open the case was denied.
The Group went to the Court of Appeals, instituting in that court a spec
ial civil action of certiorari and prohibition4 "to annul that portion of the
summary judgment . . awarding damages to private respondents (the B
ulaong Group), and to restrain the respondent Judge and the Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan from enforcing the same." That Court rendered judgm
ent on May 14, 1976, 5 holding that (1) the summary judgment was pro
perly rendered, respondent Judge (having) merely adhered to the proced
ure set forth by the . . . Rule (34);" and if "he committed error in the a
ppreciation of the probative values of the affidavits and counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties, such error is merely one of judgment, and n
ot of jurisdiction;" (2) the Mercado Group had not been denied due pro
cess "for failure of respondent Judge to conduct a formal trial . . (to rec
eive) evidence on the question of damages," since the parties were affor
ded the right, in connection with the motion for summary judgment, to
speak and explain their side of the case by means of affidavits and cou
nter-affidavits; and (3) since the Mercado Group had attempted to perfe
ct an appeal from the summary judgment which was however futile bec
ause their appeal papers "were filed beyond the reglementary period," t
he judgment had become final and certiorari or prohibition could not b
e availed of as a substitute for the group's lost appeal. Once again, the
Mercado Group moved for reconsideration of an adverse judgment, and
once again were rebuffed.
The members of the Mercado Group are now before this Court on an a
ppeal by certiorari, this time timely taken, assailing the above rulings of
the Court of Appeals. Their appeal must fail for lack of merit. No error
can be ascribed to the judgment of the Court of Appeals which is here
by affirmed in toto.
Upon the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, by which this court is
bound, and taking account of well established precedent from which th
ere is no perceivable reason in the premises to depart, there is no ques
tion that the petitioners (the Mercado Group) had failed to perfect an a
ppeal from the summary judgement within the reglementary period fixed
by the Rules of Court. According to the Appellate Court-
The summary judgment rendered by respondent Judge, being a final adj
udication on the merits of the said cases, could have been appealed by
the petitioners. In point of fact, petitioners did attempt to perfect an ap
peal from said judgment, but the attempt proved futile because their no
tice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension of time file record
on appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The record discl
oses that they received copy of the summary judgment on November 3,
1975; that on November 14, 1975, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days
from receipt of said decision, they filed their motion for reconsideration
of said decision; that on December 18, 1975, they received copy of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration; and that they did not fil
e their notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension of time
until January 7, 1976, or twenty (20) days after receipt of the order deny
ing their motion for reconsideration. The notice of appeal, appeal bond
and motion for extension were, therefore, presented one (1) day after th
e expiration of the 30-day period to perfect an appeal. Thus, responden
t Judge correctly disallowed the appeal.
The Appellate Court's computation of the period is correct, and is in acc
ord with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court providing that from th
e 30-day reglementary period of appeal shall be deducted the "time dur
ing which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new tri
al has been pending."6
Significantly, the petitioners have made no serious effort to explain and
excuse the tardiness of their appeal. What they have done and continue
to do is to insist that the special civil action of certiorari is in truth the
proper remedy because the judgment is void. The judgment is void, th
ey say, because they were denied due process, as "respondent Judge gr
anted exorbitant damages, without reliable proof, and without giving peti
tioners the chance to prove their claim that private respondents are not
entitled to damages, and conceding that they are, the damages are muc
h lower than that awarded by the respondent Judge." 7 According to th
em, since the matter of damages was clearly a controverted fact, the Co
urt had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine it on mere affidavits.
There can be no debate about the proposition that under the law, the
Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction not only over the persons of the
parties but also over the subject matter of the actions at bar. The partie
s composing the Mercado Group cannot dispute this; they recognized th
e Court's competence when they filed their answers to the complaints w
ithout questioning the Court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter; indeed n
either at that time nor at any other time thereafter did any one of the
m ever raise the question.
Now, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by any error in the exercise
thereof that might subsequently be committed by the court. Where ther
e is jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of all other questio
ns arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction . 8 And whe
n a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while engaged in
that exercise does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercise when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court woul
d deprive it of jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a vo
id judgment. This, of course, can not be allowed. The administration of j
ustice would not survive such a rule. 9 Moreover, any error that the Co
urt may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, being merely an error
of judgment, is reviewable only by appeal, not by the special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition. 10
The petitioners do not dispute the propriety of the rendition of a summ
ary judgment by the Court a quo, a remedy that they themselves had i
n fact asked for. What they challenge is the inclusion in that judgment
of an award of damages on the basis merely of affidavits, without actual
reception of evidence thereon at a hearing set for the purpose.
The challenge is not however justified by the peculiar circumstances of t
he case at bar. The petitioners, to repeat, were the parties who, as defe
ndants, had moved for summary judgment . They knew or were suppos
ed to know that, as stated by the Rules, their motion would be granted
if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no g
enuine issue as to any material fact and that ... (they are) entitled to a j
udgment as a matter of law." 11 They knew that the private respondents
, as plaintiffs, had in fact opposed their motion and had pointed out pr
ecisely the need for a hearing on the controverted matter of damages.
That they did not join in the move to have a hearing on the issue of d
amages is an indication that they considered it unnecessary, When the r
espondents (plaintiffs)—apparently in view of the Court's and the defend
ants' indifference to the notion of having a hearing on the matter of da
mages, implicitly indicating the belief of the superfluity of a hearing—pre
sented affidavits and depositions to prove the value of the improvement
s, for which they were seeking reimbursement, the petitioners (defendant
s) did not ask that the matter be ventilated at a hearing, or submit cou
nter-affidavits, as was their right. They made no response whatever. They
were evidently quite confident of obtaining a favorable judgment, and t
hat such an eventuality would preclude the claimed reimbursement or re
covery of damages. As it turned out, they were wrong in their prognosti
cation.
In any event, even assuming error on the Court's part in relying on the
unopposed affidavits and photographs as basis for an award of damage
s, it was, as the Appellate Court has opined, not an error of jurisdiction
under the circumstances, but one in the exercise of jurisdiction, to corre
ct which the prescribed remedy is appeal. This is not to say that where
a Court determines the propriety of a summary judgment— which it ma
y do on the basis of the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavit
s submitted by the parties—and discovers that there are genuine issues
of fact, these genuine issues may nonetheless be adjudicated on the bas
is of depositions, admissions or affidavits and not of evidence adduced
at a formal hearing or trial. This is not the rule. 12 The rule is that it is
only the ascertainment of the character of the issues raised in the pleadi
ngs—as genuine, or sham or fictitious—which can be done by depositio
ns, admissions, or affidavits; the resolution of such issues as are found t
o be genuine should be made upon proof proferred at a formal hearin
g. The peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, already pointed out, o
perate to exclude it from the scope of the rule. It is an exception that s
hould however be taken, as affirming and not eroding the rule.
The petitioners' other theory is more tenable, but will not appreciably ad
vance their cause. They suggest that it was a mistake for the Trial Court
to have accorded to the individuals of the Bulaong Group the stalls an
d builders in good faith in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code
. They are correct. It was indeed error for the Court to have so ruled. T
he members of this group were admittedly lessees of space in the publi
c market; they therefore could not, and in truth never did make the clai
m, that they were owners of any part of the land occupied by the mark
et so that in respect of any new structure put up by them thereon, the
y could be deemed builders in good faith. To be deemed a builder in
good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which
he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner,13 and that h
e be unaware "that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any fl
aw which invalidates it. 14 It is such a builder in good faith who is give
n the right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he
has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but als
o for useful expenses.15 On the other hand, unlike the builder in good f
aith, a lessee who "makes in good faith useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased," can only claim payment of "
one-half of the value of the improvements" or, "should the lessor refuse
to reimburse said amount, ... remove the improvements, even though th
e principal thing may suffer damage thereby." 16
But this error does not go to the Trial Court's jurisdiction. It is an error
in the exercise of jurisdiction, which may be corrected by the ordinary r
ecourse of appeal, not by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. It is an
error that in the premises can no longer be set aright
The summary judgment rendered by respondent Judge on October 24, 1
975 was not an interlocutory disposition or order but a final judgment
within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. By that
summary judgment the Court finally disposed of the pending action, lea
ving nothing more to be done by it with respect to the merits, thus put
ting an end to the litigation as its level .17
The remedy available to the petitioners against such a final judgment, as
repeatedly stated, was an appeal in accordance with the aforementione
d Rule 41 of the Rules of Court 18 But as observed in an analogous cas
e recently resolved by this Court.19
. . instead of resorting to ordinary remedy of appeal, ... (the petitioners)
availed of the extraordinary remedy of a special civil action of certiorari
in the ... (Court of Appeals), under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The c
hoice was clearly wrong. The availability of the right of appeal obviously
precluded recourse to the special civil action of certiorari. This is axiomat
ic. It is a proposition made plain by Section 1 of Rule 65 which lays do
wn as a condition for the filing of a certiorari petition that there be 'no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cour
se of law.
In the case at bar, the petitioners lost their right to appeal by failing to
avail of it seasonably. To remedy that loss, they have resorted to the ex
traordinary remedy of certiorari, as a mode of obtaining reversal of the
judgment from which they failed to appeal. This cannot be done. The ju
dgment was not in any sense null and void ab initio, incapable of prod
ucing any legal effects whatever, which could never become final, and e
xecution of which could be resisted at any time and in any court it was
attempted. 20 It was a judgment which might and probably did suffer fr
om some substantial error in procedure or in findings of fact or of law,
and could on that account have been reversed or modified on appeal.
But since it was not appealed, it became final and has thus gone beyon
d the reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect. The reme
dy to obtain a reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is
appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to
the Court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of d
iscretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in its decision. The exi
stence and availability of the right of appeal prescribes a resort to certio
rari, one of the requisites for availment of the latter remedy being preci
sely that "there should be no appeal. 21 There may to be sure, be insta
nces when certiorari may exceptionally be permitted in lieu of appeal, as
when their appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not
promptly relieve a party from the injurious effect of the judgment compl
ained of, or to avoid future litigations, 22 none of which situations obtai
ns in the case at bar. And certain it is that the special civil action of ce
rtiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, specially where the right to ap
peal has been lost through a party's fault or excusable negligence.23
That the judgment of the Trial Court applied the wrong provision of the
law in the resolution of the controversy has ceased to be of any conse
2 The Municipality of Baliuag was made a party in all the cases except
quence. As already discussed, instead of the legal provision governing le
Civil Case No. 431-B.
ssees' rights over improvements on leased realty, the judgment invoked
that relative to the rights of builders in good faith .24 But the error did
not render the judgment void. A judgment contrary to the express provi 3 Rollo, pp. 37-49
sions of a statute is of course erroneous, but it is not void; and if it be
comes final and executory, it becomes as binding and effective as any v
alid judgment; and though erroneous, will henceforth be treated as valid 4 Docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-05002-R.
, and will be enforced in accordance with its terms and dispositions. 25

5 Escolin, J., ponente; Vasquez and Leuterio, JJ., concurring.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

6 Under Sec. 39 to B.P. BLG. 129 (eff. Aug. 14,1981), the period of appea
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. l has been reduced to 15 15 days, counted from notice of the final orde
r, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from, except in habe
as corpus cases, in which the period is set at 48 hours from notice, and
in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple a
ppeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court, in
which the appeal period has been retained at 30 days.
Footnotes

7 Citing Fable v. Ngo Boo Soo 84 Phil. 857 and Ibanez, . v. North Negr
1 Docketed as Civil Cases Numbered 416-B, 417-B, 418-B, 427B, 431-B, as
os Sugar Co., ., G.R. No. L-6790, March 28,1955.
signed to Br. IV of the CFI, Bulacan.

8 Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., Vol. 1, p. 51, citing: Herrera
v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245; Gala v Cui, 25 Phil. 522; De Fiesta v. Llorente, 2
5 Phil. 554; Mapa v. Weissenhagen, 29 Phil. 18; De la Cruz v. Moir, 36
Phil. 213; SEE also Feria, Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 15, citing Herrera v.
Barreto, supra, and Castro v. Peña, 80 Phil.
G.R. No. 169005 : January 28, 2013
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager
of the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS and RUDY C. TESORO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the Decision1 da
ted April 11, 2005 and Resolution2 dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82751.
In February and March, 2003, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) published an Invitation to Pre-Qualify to Bid for the construction
of the GSIS Iloilo City Field Office (GSIS-ICFO) Building with an approved
budget cost of P57,000,000.00.3 Out of the eight (8) pre-qualified contr
actors, only four submitted their financial bids, as follows:cralawlibrary
Embrocal Builders, Inc. - P55,350,000.00
NelsonS. Lee Construction - 55,125,000.00
F. Gurrea Construction - 53,503,013.33
H .S. Oaminal Construction - 51,307,146.30 4
After evaluation of the bids and post-qualification, the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) declared the bid of Embrocal Builders, Inc. (Embrocal)
as the "Lowest Calculated and Responsive Bid." Subsequently, Atty. Henry
S. Oaminal requested that they be awarded the contract for having sub
mitted the lowest responsive bid, while Mr. Felix Gurrea sought clarificati
on of certain bid instructions. Said bidders were informed of their disqua
lification only on December 10, 2003 through a letter signed by GSIS Iloi
lo Field Office Manager, Jesusa Ruby A. Teruel.5?r?l1
In its Resolution No. 01-03 dated November 4, 2003, the BAC recomme
nded to the Senior Vice-President of the Field Operations Group (SVP-F
OG), herein private respondent Rudy C. Tesoro, that the proposed constr
uction of the GSIS-ICFO building be awarded to Embrocal in the amoun
t of P55,350,000.00 for a contract period of 300 days to be reckoned 15
The Report8 dated January 26, 2004 prepared by SVP-FOG Disuanco an
days from the date of Notice to Proceed. The Notice of Award dated
d Alfredo B. Pineda II of the OSVP-FOG concluded that the bidding pro
November 4, 2003 was signed by Manager Teruel, Mateo E. Basa, Jr., V
cess conducted by the BAC was flawed for non-compliance with the stri
P Area II-FOG and private respondent. On even date, the Contract for t
ct provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184. It was further observed tha
he Construction of the GSIS-Iloilo Office Building was executed between
t the field office committed oversights such as the presence of unofficial
GSIS represented by private respondent and Embrocal represented by its
BAC members with no defined roles and the BACs failure to comply wi
President Edgardo M. Brocal. In his letter dated November 20, 2003, M
th the requirement of promptly replying to formal queries in consonance
r. Brocal requested for the release of the 15% mobilization fee pursuant
with the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
to the terms of the contract.6?r?l1

On January 28, 2004, Ma. Josefina V. Rivas, Regional Cluster Director, Co

On November 24, 2003, petitioner Winston F. Garcia, then GSIS Presiden
mmission on Audit (COA), GSIS-Iloilo City, submitted her observations to
t and General Manager, issued Office Order No. 104-03 reassigning priva
Manager Teruel recommending that her office explain the reason for the
te respondent and designating him as SVP, Corporate Services Group (S
release of mobilization fee to Embrocal despite non-issuance of the No
VP-CSG), while SVP-CSG Enriqueta P. Disuanco was designated/reassigne
tice to Proceed, contrary to Section IB 10.10 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.
d to his post. The said reassignment order, received by the Office of th
D.) No. 1594. Rivas also noted that per their ocular inspection conducted
e SVP-FOG on November 27, 2003, was to take effect immediately. Mea
in late December 2003 at the project site, there was no discernible maj
nwhile, private respondent had approved and signed the Disbursement V
or construction activity nor deliveries of construction materials or presenc
oucher for the amount of P7,430,737.50 as mobilization fee (net of taxes
e of construction crew except for two security guards.9?r?l1
) for the GSIS-ICFO building construction contract. Embrocal received the
check payment and issued the corresponding receipt on November 27,
2003. However, due to several letters from losing bidders and the protes Under Memorandum dated February 6, 2004, private respondent along
t filed by F. Gurrea Construction, Inc. questioning the conduct of the bid with other branch officers were directed by the GSIS Investigation Unit t
ding, SVP Disuanco investigated the matter.7?r?l1 o submit within three days from receipt their Counter-Affidavit/Comment
explaining why no administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon them,
pursuant to Section 11 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in t
he Civil Service (URACCS). Private respondent and Mateo E. Basa, Jr. sub
mitted their written explanation under oath on February 11, 2004.10?r?l1
On February 16, 2004, the GSIS Investigation Unit submitted its Prelimina
ry Investigation Report11 recommending that administrative charges be fil
ed against the following branch officials and employees: private respond
ent, Basa, Jr., Teruel, Branch Attorney Catherine Portia P. Corteza, Financ
e Division Chief Adelaida J. Jamantoc, Senior General Insurance Specialist
Jose Ma. C. Capalla and Administrative Division Chief Lita L. Sonalan. It
was further recommended that said officials be placed under preventive
suspension.
On February 19, 2004, private respondent was formally charged with Gro
ss Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct and/or Violation of Reasonable Of
fice Rules and Regulations as provided under Section 46, paragraphs (3),
(4) and (12), Chapter 6, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of Executive Order N
o. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," in relatio
n to Section 52 (A), paragraphs (2) and (3), and (C), paragraph (3), Rule
IV of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACCS). Th
e Formal Charge12 reads as follows:cralawlibrary
That on or about November 4, 2003, you approved the award for the c
onstruction of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Iloilo City
Field Office (ICFO) building to Embrocal Builders, Inc. and thereafter ent
ered into contract with the same to the disadvantage of GSIS in view of
the fact that Embrocal Builders, Inc. had submitted the HIGHEST BID du
ring the bid opening conducted at the ICFO on September 19, 2003;
That on November 27, 2003 you approved the payment of 15% mobiliza
tion fee in the amount of Eight Million Three Hundred Two Thousand Fi
ve Hundred Pesos (P8,302,500) to Embrocal Builders, Inc. in excess and/
or without authority and contrary to the Manual on Signing Authorities f
or Disbursement Voucher and Check approved by the Board of Trustees
of GSIS per Resolution No. 383 dated December 18, 2002. The records s
how that effective November 24, 2003 you were already effectively reassi
gned to the Office of Corporate Services pursuant to Office Order No. 1
04-03 dated November 24, 2003;
That you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal Bu
ilders, Inc. prior to the issuance of the Notice to Proceed in violation of
Section 30.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 40; and
That you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal Bu
ilders, Inc. contrary to Section 91 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the "
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines." It was shown that on No
vember 27, 2003 you were not anymore authorized to approve the pay
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent RUDY C. TESORO, is here
ment in behalf of the GSIS Field Operations Group.
by found GUILTY OF GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GRAVE MISCONDU
CT pursuant to Section 46 (b) (3) and (4), Chapter 7, Book V, Title I, Su
btitle A of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administra
Private respondent was also placed on preventive suspension for a perio
tive Code of 1987", in relation to Section 52 (A)(2) and (3), Rule IV of th
d of ninety (90) days. On February 23, 2004, he filed his Answer to the
e Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). C
charges, in addition to the previous joint explanation dated February 9,
onsequently, respondent is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FRO
2004 submitted to the Investigation Unit.
M THE SERVICE, WITH PERPETUAL PROHIBITION FROM REEMPLOYMENT
IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS

However, on March 15, 2004 during the pendency of formal investigatio AND CANCELLATION OF HIS ELIGIBILITY.

n being conducted by GSIS, private respondent filed before the CA a Pe

tition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Prelim
SO ORDERED.16?r?l1
inary Injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 82751)13 In his petition, private

The Board of Trustees of GSIS through Resolution No. 118 dated May 26
respondent questioned the legality of the formal charge which he claime
, 2004, approved the draft decision. Copy of the decision was served on
d was issued without going through the process of preliminary investigat
private respondent on June 2, 2004 but was returned to the Investigati
ion. He thus prayed that petitioner be permanently enjoined from "enfor
on Unit because private respondent has not reported for work since Jun
cing and implementing the said illegally issued Formal Charge with the
e 1, 2004.17?r?l1
order of preventive suspension."14?r?l1

On May 24, 2004, petitioner rendered his Decision15 finding private resp
ondent administratively liable, as follows:cralawlibrary
On June 28, 2004, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
from the May 24, 2004 Decision but it was denied by petitioner in his
In the meantime, upon reevaluation the GSIS Physical Resources Bids an
Resolution dated July 5, 2004.18?r?l1
d Awards Committee (PRBAC) declared a "failure of bidding" pursuant to
Section 41 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 918
4. Embrocal and its counsel were advised that the contract for the const
In his Comment19 filed before the CA on June 11, 2004, petitioner conte
ruction of the GSIS-ICFO building entered into with private respondent
nded that private respondents petition for certiorari is already moot and
was null and void ab initio, and hence Embrocal should return the amo
academic with the rendition of the decision in the administrative case. P
unt of mobilization fees illegally released to it.21 The COA Regional Lega
etitioner also pointed out that private respondent is misleading the appe
l and Adjudication Office later issued a Notice of Disallowance of the a
llate court when the petition alleged that the Formal Charge was issued
mount released to Embrocal as mobilization fee. Private respondent alon
without any preliminary investigation. Further, petitioner asserted that pri
g with Teruel, Jamantoc, Corteza, Sonalan, Capalla and Basa, Jr. were all
vate respondent violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative re
found liable for the disallowed sum. Private respondent has not filed any
medies when he filed the petition for certiorari despite the availability of
motion for reconsideration of the said disallowance.22?r?l1
appeal.

On April 11, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision23 which decree
Private respondent filed his Reply to which a Rejoinder was filed by the
d, as follows:cralawlibrary
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed Formal Cha

Aside from the petition filed in the CA, private respondent also appeale
rge dated 19 February 2004 of the respondent, and his Decision dated
d the order of preventive suspension, as well as the Decision dated May
24 May 2004, are hereby MODIFIED as follows:cralawlibrary
24, 2004 finding him administratively liable for gross neglect of duty an
d grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).20?r?l1
(a) The administrative offense of gross neglect of duty and grave miscon
duct and/or violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which
SO ORDERED.24?r?l1
petitioner is charged is hereby set aside, and modified to the lower ad
ministrative offense of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.

Petitioner received a copy of the above decision on April 22, 2005, and
thus had only until May 7, 2005 within which to file a motion for recon
(b) The Decision dated 24 May 2004 of herein respondent, the dispositiv
sideration. However, on May 4, 2005, it filed a Motion for Extension of
e portion of which reads:cralawlibrary
Time to File the Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the lawyer in c
harge of the case, Atty. Violeta C.F. Quintos of the Investigation Unit, ha
d to immediately take a flight to Cebu City on April 24, 2005 because
x x x ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
her father died; she is expected to report for work on May 5, 2005. The
motion for reconsideration was filed on May 16, 2005.25?r?l1

is hereby set aside, and a new one is hereby rendered, finding the petit
ioner RUDY C. TESORO, GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY pursuant
Private respondent filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of Exe
to Section 52 (B) (I), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
cution asserting that the decision had attained finality for failure of petiti
the Civil Service (URACCS). Consequently, petitioner is hereby meted the
oner to file a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal.26 He likewise
penalty of suspension for six (6) months, without pay, the period for whi
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal in CSC Adm. Case
ch he was preventively suspended and subsequently dismissed shall be c
No. 04-001 (Preventive Suspension and Illegal Dismissal)27?r?l1
redited for the purpose of serving the penalty hereof. Accordingly, the r
espondent is directed to immediately reinstate the petitioner to his last
position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with payme
By Resolution dated July 20, 2005, the CA, citing the case of Habaluyas
nt of backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits from the tim
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson28 denied petitioners motion for extension to fi
e of his suspension and dismissal exceeding six (6) months until actual r
le a motion for reconsideration and merely noted private respondents m
einstatement. The petitioner is further sternly warned that a repetition of
otion.
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 E. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to appreciate
and apply the principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies when i
The present petition filed on August 10, 2005 alleges that
t gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent;

A. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting

F. There is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy available to petitioner
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled on the merits of the case
.29?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
despite the fact that it did not have the complete records of the case
thus depriving petitioner of due process;

In his Comment,30 private respondent argues that with the denial by th

e CA of petitioners motion for extension to file a motion for reconsidera
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
tion, the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA is already final and executory.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it went beyond the Pe
Hence, he prays for the outright dismissal of the present petition.
tition for Certiorari filed by respondent and proceeded to rule on the fo
rmal charge and the merits of the case;

As to the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, private res

pondent contends that this case falls under the recognized exceptions to
C. Factual errors and misapplication of law were committed by the Hon
the said rule considering the purely legal issue involved and the violati
orable Court of Appeals even as the evidence does not support the dec
on of his right to due process. He further asserts that no grave abuse o
ision;
f discretion was committed by the CA when it modified the charge agai
nst him considering that: (1) there was no document or evidence showin

D. Petitioners notice to the Court of Appeals of the Decision in the adm g that he received the November 24, 2003 reassignment order on the d

inistrative case rendered the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent m ate he signed the disbursement voucher (November 25, 2003) for the re

oot and academic; lease of the 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal; (2) even assuming he wa
s informed immediately on November 24, 2003 regarding his transfer, hi
s act of signing the check and disbursement voucher was still valid and
legal since he has not assumed the duties of the new position (SVP-CS
G) at that time; (3) he was not in a position to overturn the decision an
d recommendation of the BAC and the previous signatories to the check
and voucher; (4) he cannot be charged with gross neglect of duty in r
elying on the expert recommendation of the BAC members and his sub
ordinates.
Petitioner counters that the private respondent may not deprive this Cou
rt of appellate jurisdiction over the CAs April 11, 2005 Decision, citing Ba
rnes v. Padilla.31 He reiterates that the CA gravely abused its discretion
when it ruled on the merits of the administrative case despite the absen
ce of complete records and transformed the petition for certiorari filed b
y private respondent into an appeal. The CA also ignored the more tha
n substantial evidence showing that private respondent was guilty of gro
ss neglect of duty and grave misconduct that would justify the impositio
n of a higher penalty.
Petitioner stresses that contrary to private respondents assertions, he was
the final approving authority who could accept, modify or completely di
sregard the BACs recommendation after evaluation of the bidding proce
ss. The CA decision, in fact, had confirmed petitioners finding that privat
e respondent was really remiss in his job and is actually to be blamed f
or the anomalous award to the highest bidder. Moreover, BAC members
were not appointed for their expertise in the bidding process but are e
mployees designated to said committee by virtue of their positions in th
e Iloilo City Field Office Department (ICFOD). Private respondents supervi
sion over the ICFOD-BAC, as SVP-FOG, includes authority over their reco
mmendations. On his continuing claim that he signed the disbursement
voucher and check on November 25, 2003 prior to his receipt of the tr
ansfer order, petitioner cites the affidavit of Manager Teruel stating that
the disbursement voucher and check were hand-carried from the Iloilo C
ity Field Office to the OSVP-FOG for private respondents signature on N
ovember 27, 2003.
The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a m
otion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the C
A does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterp
rises, Inc. v. Japson.32 However, in previous cases we suspended this rul
e in order to serve substantial justice.33?r?l1
In Barnes v. Padilla,34 we exempted from the operation of the general r
ule the petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion f
or reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004, w
e held that:cralawlibrary
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural
infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the p
etitioner. Petitioners counsel was understandably confused with the absen
ce of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of A
ppeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is no
n-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyers n
egligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitio
ner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.
More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No
. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219, as both are paten
tly erroneous. x x x
Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by t
he suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a ques
tion of law, involving the issue of forum-shopping, and not a factual ma
tter involving the merits of each partys respective claims and defenses r
elating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an
option to purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Ever
y party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the prop
er and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technic
alities.35 (Emphases supplied)
After a conscientious review, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is
warranted in this case since the delay of one week and two days in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration was not occasioned by negligen
ce on the part of petitioners lawyer in charge of the case, the latter hav
ing a valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her f
athers sudden demise. Additionally, the merits of the case impel us to a
dopt a more liberal stance. There is likewise no showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. As we said in Barnes v. Padilla:3
6?r?l1
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, w
hich would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than prom
ote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Cour
t reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules ca
n be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself had already declared to be final.
x x x
 A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The
special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford ever
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
y party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determin
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of pr
ation of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
ocedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court.37
As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors comm

While private respondent filed his answer to the Formal Charge issued b itted in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than

y petitioner, he filed a petition for certiorari in the CA questioning its va mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for revie

lidity and the order of preventive suspension, even before the hearing p w under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,38 and not a petition for certior

roper was conducted. The CA found no jurisdictional ground to invalidat ari.

e the Formal Charge, and did not make any ruling on the issue of whet
her grave abuse of discretion attended the imposition of the preventive
Considering that the CA did not declare any act of the petitioner to hav
suspension order. However, the CA proceeded to review the merits of th
e been exercised without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abus
e administrative charge against private respondent, concurring with petiti
e of discretion, the grant of relief to private respondent by sentencing h
oners finding that private respondent was remiss in his duties and respo
im to a lower offense with reduced penalty cannot be sustained. Wheth
nsibilities but declaring private respondent liable for the lesser offense of
er the private respondent may be held liable for Gross Neglect of Duty
Simple Neglect and imposing on him the lower penalty therefor. The C
as stated in the Formal Charge or for the lower offense of Simple Negl
A thus exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction when it reviewed the alleged e
ect of Duty should be properly threshed out in Adm. Case No. 04-001 a
rrors of the disciplining authority not only in finding a prima facie case
nd thereafter in a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not in
against the private respondent but also in determining his guilt. This des
the certiorari proceedings before the CA seeking nullification of the For
pite the fact that the rendition of the decision in Adm. Case No. 04-001
mal Charge and preventive suspension order.
by the disciplining authority (GSIS) was earlier brought to the attention
of the CA.

In the case of People v. Court of Appeals,39 accused-respondents were

convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705 and accordingly sentenced with the prescribed penalty of i
mprisonment. Instead of appealing the RTC judgment after the denial of
their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorar
i under Rule 65 with the CA, praying for the reversal of their conviction.
The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record,
its findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The
CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient o
n which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted one of the r
espondents of the crime charged.
On appeal by the People to this Court, we reversed and set aside the
CAs decision ordering a re-promulgation of the RTC decision against the
two respondents and acquitting one respondent. Addressing the issue o
f whether the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction
when it acquitted one of the respondents in a petition for certiorari for
the nullification of the trial courts decision, we held:cralawlibrary
x x x. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the r
espondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the dec
ision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction an
d the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being
merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents
alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It be
hooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giv
ing it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record,
its findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The
CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on
which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent
Almuete of the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ven
tured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in th
e certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the t
rial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are corre
ctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the
CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a
court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case
only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to
which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The
lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized to enter
tain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.40
(Emphasis supplied)
 ng, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the ge
neral power in respect of it are wanting.42 The supervisory jurisdiction o
In this case, records showed that private respondent appealed the May
f the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to revi
24, 2004 Decision of petitioner finding him administratively liable for gro
ew the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either
ss neglect of duty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of di
upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that
smissal from service, to the CSC. He also separately appealed the preve
there is reason for the Court to annul the decision of the concerned tr
ntive suspension order to the CSC. Later, however, private respondent fil
ibunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Cour
ed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal (both the preventive
t in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assaile
suspension and illegal dismissal cases) with the CSC on May 25, 2005,
d decision or resolution.43?r?l1
without mentioning the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA modifying the
Formal Charge and the aforesaid May 24, 2004 Decision of petitioner.

Since petitioner is vested with the requisite legal authority to issue the F
ormal Charge, after due investigation in accordance with existing rules a
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction
nd regulations of the Civil Service, and to commence administrative proc
if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is exc
eedings against the private respondent,44 and in the absence of grave
ess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power t
abuse of discretion in the exercise of such powers, it behooved the CA
o determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. Ther
to dismiss the petition instead of giving it due course and granting it. In
e is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a ca
resolving the merits of the decision rendered in the administrative case
pricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its ju
despite the pendency of private respondents appeal before the CSC assa
dgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abus
iling the correctness of the same decision, the CA clearly exceeded its c
e of discretion is not enough.41?r?l1
ertiorari jurisdiction.

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the
that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or offi
writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The Decision dated April 11, 200
cer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceedi
5 and Resolution dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R EN BANC
. No. SP No. 82751 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

February 21, 2017

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 224302

SO ORDERED.
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DA
NILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBA
NG, JR., and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners

vs.

HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EX

Today is Tuesday, October 01, 2019home
ECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L.
Custom Search MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SA
NDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE RO
MERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M
. ALAMEDA, and HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Responden
Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, III, et al., G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017 ts

♦ Decision, Leonardo-De Castro, [J]

♦ Separate Opinion, Velasco, [J] Leonen, [J] Caguioa, [J] R E S O L U T I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: I

THE JBC MOTIONS

In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc held:

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) successively filed a Motion for Reconsi
deration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 2
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petiti
7, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decisio
on for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. Th
n dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
e Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar C
ouncil UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associ
ate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, t
At the outset, the Court notes the revelation of the JBC in its Motion fo
ogether with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sa
r Reconsideration-in-Intervention that it is not taking any position in this
ndiganbayan, as VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Interve
particular case on President Aquino's appointments to the six newly-crea
ntion of the Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition, but ORDER
ted positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court quotes the r
S the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate administrative mat
elevant portions from the Motion, as follows:
ter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council which th
e Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item No. 2: t
he deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's pronouncement that th
the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item e former's act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was unconstitutiona
No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supre l. Whether the President can cross-reach into the lists is not the primary
me Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in p concern of the JBC in this particular case. At another time, perhaps, it
ages 3 5 to 40 of this Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial a may take a position. But not in this particular situation involving the ne
nd Bar Council to file its comment on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thi wly created positions in the Sandiganbayan in view of the lack of agree
rty (30) days from notice.1 ment by the JBC Members on that issue.
What the President did with the lists, for the purpose of this particular
dispute alone as far as the JBC is concerned, was the President's exclusi
ve domain.2
Nonetheless, the JBC did not categorically withdraw the arguments raise
d in its previous Motions, and even reiterated and further discussed said
arguments, and raised additional points in its Motion for Reconsideratio
n-in-Intervention. Hence, the Court is still constrained to address said ar
guments in this Resolution.
In its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for Inhibition of the Pone
nte) the JBC argues as follows: (a) Its Motion for Intervention was timely
filed on November 26, 2016, three days before the promulgation of the
Decision in the instant case; (b) The JBC has a legal interest in this cas
e, and its intervention would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties; (c) Even assuming that
the Motion for Intervention suffers procedural infirmities, said Motion sho
uld have been granted for a complete resolution of the case and to aff
ord the JBC due process; and (d) Unless its Motion for Intervention is gr
anted by the Court, the JBC is not bound by the questioned Decision b
ecause the JBC was neither a party litigant nor impleaded as a party in
the case, the JBC was deprived of due process, the assailed Decision is
a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem, and a decision re
ndered in violation of a party's right to due process is void for lack of j
urisdiction.
On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting six short li
sts for six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and
unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitutio
n for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its indepen
dence as a constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom t
o perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with th
e Constitution. According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in f
act, is more in accord with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointm
ent process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has
to choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy. Otherwise,
the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby completely dis
regard the purpose for the creation of the JBC. The JBC clarifies that it
numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of precedence, but f
or practical reasons, i.e., to distinguish one list from the others and to a
void confusion. The JBC also points out that the acts invoked against th
e JBC are based on practice or custom, but "practice, no matter how lo
ng continued, cannot give rise to any vested right." The JBC, as a consti
tutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its prac
tice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.
Lastly, the JBC moves for the inhibition of the ponente of the assailed D
ecision based on Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Cond
uct for Philippine Judiciary.4 The JBC alleges that the ponente, as consul
tant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had personal knowledge of the votin
g procedures and format of the short lists, which are the subject matter
s of this case. The ponente was even present as consultant during the
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that the DECISIO
N dated 29 November 2016 be reconsidered and set aside and a new o
ne be issued granting the Motion for Intervention of the JBC.
It is likewise prayed that the ponente inhibit herself from further particip

meeting on October 26, 2015 when the JBC voted upon the candidates ating in this case and that the JBC be granted such other reliefs as are

for the six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan creat just and equitable under the premises.5

ed under Republic Act No. 10660. The JBC then expresses its puzzlemen
t over the ponente 's participation in the present proceedings, espousing
The JBC subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (
a position contrary to that of the JBC. The JBC questions why it was o
Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016), praying at the very beginnin
nly in her Decision in the instant case did the ponente raise her disagre
g that it be deemed as sufficient remedy for the technical deficiency of
ement with the JBC as to the clustering of nominees for each of the six
its Motion for Intervention (i.e., failure to attach the pleading-in-interventi
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The JBC fur
on) and as Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of its
ther quoted portions of the assailed Decision that it claims bespoke of t
Motion for Intervention.
he ponente 's "already-arrived-at" conclusion as to the alleged ill acts an
d intentions of the JBC. Hence, the JBC submits that such formed infere
nce will not lend to an even-handed consideration by the ponente shoul
The JBC, in its latest Motion, insists on its legal interest, injury, and stan
d she continue to participate in the case.
ding to intervene in the present case, as well as on the timeliness of its
Motion for Intervention.

Ultimately, the JBC prays:

The JBC proffers several reasons for not immediately seeking to interven
e in the instant case despite admitting that it received copies of the ap
pointments of the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the Office
of the President (OP) on January 25, 2016, to wit: (a) Even as its individ
ual Members harbored doubts as to the validity of the appointments of
respondents Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi) and Geraldine Faith A.
Econg (Econg) as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the JBC agreed as
a body in an executive session that it would stay neutral and not take a
ny legal position on the constitutionality of said appointments since it "d
id not have any legal interest in the offices of Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan"; (b) None of the parties prayed that the act of clusterin
g by the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and (c) The JBC believed that
the Court would apply the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
discharge by the JBC of its official functions and if the Court would hav
e been inclined to delve into the validity of the act of clustering by the
JBC, it would order the JBC to comment on the matter.
The JBC impugns the significance accorded by the ponente to the fact t
hat Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno), Chairperson of th
e JBC, administered the oath of office of respondent Econg as Sandigan
bayan Associate Justice on January 25, 2016. Chief Justice Serena's act s
hould not be taken against the JBC because, the JBC reasons, Chief Justi
ce Sereno only chairs the JBC, but she is not the JBC, and the administr
ation of the oath of office was a purely ministerial act.
The JBC likewise disputes the ponente 's observation that clustering is a
totally new practice of the JBC. The JBC avers that even before Chief Ju
stice Sereno's Chairmanship, the JBC has generally followed the rule of
one short list for every vacancy in all first and second level trial courts.
The JBC has followed the "one list for every vacancy" rule even for app
ellate courts since 2013. The JBC even recalls that it submitted on Augus
t 17, 2015 to then President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino) four
separate short lists for four vacancies in the Court of Appeals; and prese
nt during the JBC deliberations were the ponente and Supreme Court A
ssociate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Velasco) as consultants, who nei
ther made any comment on the preparation of the short lists.
On the merits of the Petition, the JBC maintains that it did not exceed i
ts authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with the literal langua
ge of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, when it prepared si
x short lists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. It cites the cases
of Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections6 and Ocampo v. En
riquez,7 wherein the Court allegedly adopted the textualist approach of
constitutional interpretation.
The JBC renounces any duty to increase the chances of appointment of
every candidate it adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications. It
asserts that while there might have been favorable experiences with the
past practice of submitting long consolidated short lists, past practices c
annot be used as a source of rights and obligations to override the dut
y of the JBC to observe a straightforward application of the Constitution.
 ame, i.e., there were 14 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Perez
and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Brion.
The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational neces
sity for the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for mak
ing short lists. It presents different scenarios which demonstrate the nee
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and p
d for clustering, viz., (a) There are two different sets of applicants for th
ossibly unique situations, there can be no general rule against clustering.
e vacancies; (b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the int
Submitting separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the onl
erval in the deliberations on the vacancies as the House of Representativ
y way for the JBC to observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list
es and the Senate alternately occupy the ex officio seat for the Legislatu
for every vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of competence, independ
re; (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignmen
ence, probity, and integrity for every such vacancy.
t in the Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appea
ls because of the location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain p
ersonalities; (d) The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first and second It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach on the Pr
level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to be inherited in the appellate co esident's power to appoint members of the Judiciary. The JBC alleges th
urt are overwhelming so the JBC chooses nominees for those particular at its individual Members gave several reasons why there was an appare
posts with more years of service as against those near retirement. nt indication of seniority assignments in the six short lists for the six vac
ancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, particularly: (a) The JBC can
best perform its job by indicating who are stronger candidates by giving
To the JBC, it seems that the Court was in a hurry to promulgate its D
higher priority to those in the lower-numbered list; (b) The indication c
ecision on November 29, 2016, which struck down the practice of cluster
ould head off the confusion encountered in Re: Seniority Among the Fo
ing by the JBC. The JBC supposes that it was in anticipation of the vaca
ur Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of th
ncies in the Court as a result of the retirements of Supreme Court Asso
e Court of Appeals;8 and (c) The numbering of the lists from 16th to 21
ciate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Brion) on Dece
st had nothing to do with seniority in the Sandiganbayan, but was only
mber 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively. The JBC then claims
an ordinal designation of the cluster to which the candidates were inclu
that it had no choice but to submit two separate short lists for said va
ded.
cancies in the Court because there were two sets of applicants for the s
 2. the Court delete the treatment as a separate administrative matter of
the alleged new rules and practices of the JBC, particularly the following:
The JBC ends with a reiteration of the need for the ponente to inhibit h
(1) the deletion or non-inclusion of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 in JBC
erself from the instant case as she appears to harbor hostility possibly a
No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council; and (2)
rising from the termination of her JBC consultancy.
the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Co
urt as consultants of the JBC, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of the Deci

The prayer of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention r sion. And as a consequence, the Court excuse the JBC from filing the re

eads: quired comment on the said matters.9

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that JBC's Motion II

for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, Motion for Intervention and Motion THE RULING OF THE COURT
for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition of Justice Teresita J. Leona
rdo-De Castro of the JBC be granted and/or given due course and that:
There is no legal or factual basis for the

ponente to inhibit herself from the instant

1. the Court's pronouncements in the Decision dated 29 November 2016
with respect to the JBC's submission of six shortlists of nominees to the case.
Sandiganbayan be modified to reflect that the JBC is deemed to have f
ollowed Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution in its practice of submi
tting one shortlist of nominees for every vacancy, including in submitting The Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente filed by the JBC is denied.

on 28 October 2015 six lists to former President Benigno Simeon C. Aq

uino III for the six vacancies of the Sandiganbayan, or for the Court to
The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with Rule 8, Secti
be completely silent on the matter; and
on 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,10 which requires that "
[a] motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall st
ate the grounds therefor." Yet, even if technical rules are relaxed herein,
there is still no valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente.
There is no ground11 for the mandatory inhibition of the ponente from
the case at bar.
The ponente has absolutely no personal interest in this case. The ponent
e is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm that is or was the
counsel in the case; the ponente or her spouse, parent, or child has no
pecuniary interest in the case; and the ponente is not related to any of
the parties in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinit
y, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of re
cord in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discu
ssed and decided to adopt the unprecedented method of clustering the
nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice into six separate short lists, one for every vacancy. The ponente
does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering met
hod of nomination for appellate courts and even the Supreme Court.
With due respect to Chief Justice Sereno, it appears that when the JBC
would deliberate on highly contentious, sensitive, and important issues, it
was her policy as Chairperson of the JBC to hold executive sessions, w
hich excluded the Supreme Court consultants. At the JBC meeting held
on October 26, 2015, Chief Justice Sereno immediately mentioned at the
beginning of the deliberations "that, as the Council had always done in
the past when there are multiple vacancies, the voting would be on a p
er vacancy basis."12 Chief Justice Sereno went on to state that the mann
er of voting had already been explained to the two ex officio members
of the JBC who were not present during the meeting, namely, Senator
Aquilino L. Pimentel III (Pimentel) and then Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. Caguioa (Caguioa).13 Then the JBC im
mediately proceeded with the voting of nominees. This ponente was not
consulted before the JBC decision to cluster nominees was arrived at a
nd, therefore, she did not have the opportunity to study and submit her
recommendation to the JBC on the clustering of nominees.
It is evident that prior to the meeting on October 26, 2015, the JBC had
already reached an agreement on the procedure it would follow in voti
ng for nominees, i.e., the clustering of the nominees into six separate sh
ort lists, with one short list for each of the six newly-created positions o
f Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. That Senator Pimentel and DOJ Secret
ary Caguioa, who were not present at the meeting on October 26, 2015,
were informed beforehand of the clustering of nominees only proves th
at the JBC had already agreed upon the clustering of nominees prior to
the said meeting.
Notably, Chief Justice Sereno inaccurately claimed at the very start of th
e deliberations that the JBC had been voting on a per vacancy basis "as
the Council had always done," giving the impression that the JBC was
merely following established procedure, when in truth, the clustering of
nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in a collegiate
court was a new practice only adopted by the JBC under her Chairmans
hip. In the Decision dated November 29, 2016, examples were already ci
ted how, in previous years, the JBC submitted just one short list for sim
ultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts, including th
e Supreme Court, which will again be presented hereunder.
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold executive
sessions when taking up sensitive matters. The ponente and Associate Ju
stice Velasco, incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court and then JBC co
nsultants, as well as other JBC consultants, were excluded from such exe
cutive sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco
were unable to participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC proceed
ings/decisions, particularly, on matters involving the nomination of candid
ates for vacancies in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The
matter of the nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court
Associate Justice FRANCIS H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which became the su
bject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno,14 was taken up by the JBC in such
an executive session. This ponente also does not know when and why t
he JBC deleted from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial
and Bar Council," what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the former JBC
Rules, which gave due weight and regard to the recommendees of the
Supreme Court for vacancies in the Court. The amendment of the JBC R
ules could have been decided upon by the JBC when the ponente and
Associate Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno o
f their duties as consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have similarly tak
en up and decided upon the clustering of nominees for the six vacant
posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice during one of its executive ses
sions prior to October 26, 2015.
Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were ad
mittedly present during the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering
of the nominees· for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan A
ssociate Justice was already fait accompli. Questions as to why and how
the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no longer o
n the table for discussion during the said meeting. As the minutes of th
e meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out, the JBC proceedings focused
on the voting of nominees. It is stressed that the crucial issue in the pr
esent case pertains to the clustering of nominees and not the nominatio
n and qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had the
opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of no
minees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate co
urts in her ponencia in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme
Furthermore, it appears from the admitted lack of consensus on the part
Court, the ponente is duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter tha
of the JBC Members as to the validity of the clustering shows that the
t has grave constitutional implications.
conclusion reached by the ponente did not arise from personal hostility
but from her objective evaluation of the adverse constitutional implicatio
ns of the clustering of the nominees for the vacant posts of Sandiganba
Neither is there any basis for the ponente 's voluntary inhibition from th
yan Associate Justice. It is unfortunate that the JBC stooped so low in c
e case at bar. Other than the bare allegations of the JBC, there is no cl
asting aspersion on the person of this ponente instead of focusing on s
ear and convincing evidence of the ponente 's purported bias and preju
ound legal arguments to support its position. There is absolutely no fact
dice, sufficient to overcome the presumption that she had rendered her
ual basis for the uncalled for and unfair imputation of the JBC that the
assailed ponencia in the regular performance of her official and sacred
ponente harbors personal hostility against the JBC presumably due to he
duty of dispensing justice according to law and evidence and without fe
r removal as consultant. The ponente 's removal as consultant was the
ar or favor. Significant herein is the following disquisition of the Court o
decision of Chief Justice Sereno, not the JBC. The ponente does not bea
n voluntary inhibition of judges in Gochan v. Gochan,15 which is just as
r any personal grudge or resentment against the JBC for her removal as
applicable to Supreme Court Justices:
consultant. The ponente does not view Chief Justice Sereno's move as
particularly directed against her as Associate Justice Velasco had been si

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice milarly removed as JBC consultant. The ponente has never been influenc

, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, ed by personal motive in deciding cases. The ponente, instead, perceives

must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of the removal of incumbent Supreme Court Justices as consultants of the

their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weigh JBC as an affront against the Supreme Court itself as an institution, sinc

ed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to a e the evident intention of such move was to keep the Supreme Court i

dminister justice fairly and equitably - both to the poor and the rich, th n the dark on the changes in rules and practices subsequently adopted

e weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected. (Emphasis su by the JBC, which, to the mind of this ponente, may adversely affect th

pplied.) e exercise of the supervisory authority over the JBC vested upon the Su
preme Court by the Constitution.

All the basic issues raised in the Petition
had been thoroughly passed upon by the
Court in its Decision dated November 29,
2016 and the JBC already expressed its
disinterest to question President Aquino's
"cross-reaching" in his appointment of the
six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Even if the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-i
n-Intervention of the JBC, praying for the grant of its Motion for Interve
ntion and the reversal of the Decision dated November 29, 2016, are ad
mitted into the records of this case and the issues raised and argument
s adduced in the said two Motions are considered, there is no cogent r
eason to reverse the Decision dated November 29, 2016, particularly, in
view of the admission of the JBC of the lack of unanimity among the JB
C members on the issue involving the clustering of nominees for the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their di
sinterest to question the "cross-reaching" or non-observance by President
Aquino of such clustering.
Hence, the Court will no longer belabor the issue that only three JBC M
embers signed the Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsiderati
on and only four JBC Members signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in
-Intervention, as well as the fact that Chief Justice Sereno, as Chairperso
n of the JBC, did not sign the three Motions.
To determine the legal personality of the signatories to file the JBC Moti
ons, the Court has accorded particular significance to who among the JB
C Members signed the Motions and to Chief Justice Sereno's act of ad
ministering the oath of office to three of the newly-appointed Sandiganb
ayan Associate Justices, including respondent Econg, in resolving the pen
ding Motions of the JBC. However, in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-I
ntervention, the JBC now reveals that not all of its Members agree on t
he official position to take in the case of President Aquino's appointmen
t of the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Thus, the position of
the JBC on the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vaca
ncies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice rests on shaky legal ground.
The JBC takes exception as to why the Court allowed the Petition at bar
even when it did not strictly comply with the rules, as it was filed beyo
nd the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The Court, in its
Decision dated November 29, 2016, gave consideration to petitioners' ass
ertion that they had to secure first official copies of the six short lists b
efore they were able to confirm that President Aquino, in appointing the
 six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, actually disregarded the clust
ering of nominees into six separate short lists. While the Court is hard-p
ressed to extend the same consideration to the JBC which made no im
mediate effort to explain its failure to timely question or challenge the a
ppointments of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associ
ate Justices whether before the OP or the courts, the Court will neverth
eless now allow the JBC intervention by considering the issues raised an
d arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the JBC in the interest of substantial ju
stice.
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the JBC reproaches the Court f
or supposedly hurrying the promulgation of its Decision on November 2
9, 2016 in anticipation of the impending vacancies in the Supreme Court
due to the retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion in Decemb
er 2016. On the contrary, it appears that it was the JBC which hurriedly
proceeded with the two separate publications on August 4, 2016 and Au
gust 18, 2016 of the opening of the application for the aforesaid vacanci
es, respectively, which was contrary to previous practice, even while the i
ssue of clustering was set to be decided by the Court. Moreover, a scru
tiny of the process the Petition went through before its promulgation ne
gates any haste on the part of the Court. Bear in mind that the Petition
at bar was filed on May 1 7, 2016 and petitioners' Reply, the last plead
ing allowed by the Court in this case, was filed on August 3, 2016. The
draftponencia was calendared in the agenda of the Supreme Court en b
ane, called again, and deliberated upon several times before it was actu
ally voted upon on November 29, 2016. Indeed, it appears that it was t
he JBC which rushed to release the separate short lists of nominees for
the said Supreme Court vacancies despite knowing the pendency of the
instant Petition and its own filing of a Motion for Intervention herein on
November 28, 2016. The JBC went ahead with the release of separate sh
ort lists of nominees for the posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice vi
ce retired Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 2, 2016 and
December 9, 2016, respectively.
Even if the Court allows the intervention of the JBC, as it will now do in
the case at bar, the arguments of the JBC on the merits of the case fa
il to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 29,
2016.
a. The clustering of nominees for the
six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan
by the JBC impaired the President's
power to appoint members of the
Judiciary and to determine the
seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Noteworthy is the fact that the Court unanimously voted that in this cas
e of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the
JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees i
nto six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and maintains
that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short list
s. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without l
imits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly
-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain t
he strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitutio
n espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appoint
ing power.
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the cluste
ring impinged upon the President's appointing power in the following w
ays: The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to
seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a no
minee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the ot
her nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nomin
ees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any
of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the J
BC failed to explain why one nominee should be considered for appoint
ment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondin
gly, the nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the conside
ration of the one cluster in which they were included, even though they
applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies. Moreover,
by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established
the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 160616), rules (Rule II, Section 1 (b) of the Revised Internal R
ules of the Sandiganbayan17), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among th
e Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices o
f the Court of Appeals18), vest exclusively upon the President.
b. Clustering can be used as a device to
favor or prejudice a qualified
nominee.
The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointme VACANCY IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
nt of every candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualific
ations for a judicial post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC suc
h duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and PERSON APPOINTED

equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nomin

ees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts c
SHORT LISTED FOR
an actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A fav
ored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong conten
der to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be pla
FORMER POSITION HELD
ced in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chanc
es of appointment.

16th Associate Justice

Without casting aspersion or insinuating ulterior motive on the part of t

he JBC - which would only be highly speculative on the part of the Co Michael Frederick L. Musngi
urt - hereunder are different scenarios, using the very same circumstanc
es and nominees in this case, to illustrate how clustering could be used
to favor or prejudice a particular nominee and subtly influence President 21st Associate Justice

Aquino's appointing power, had President Aquino faithfully observed th

e clustering.
Undersecretary for Special Concerns/ Chief of Staff of the Executive Secr
etary, OP, for 5 years

The six nominees actually appointed by President Aquino as Sandiganba

yan Associate Justices were the following:
17th Associate Justice
 Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega

Reynaldo P. Cruz

17th Associate Justice

19th Associate Justice

Judge, RTC, Malolos Bulacan, for 10 years

Undersecretary, Office of the Executive Secretary, OP, for 4-1/2 years

20th Associate Justice

18th Associate Justice

Karl B. Miranda

Geraldine Faith A. Econg

20th Associate Justice

21st Associate Justice

Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for 15 y

ears
Former Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, for 6 years Chief of Offi
ce, Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJ
A)
21st Associate Justice

19th Associate Justice

Zaldy V. Trespeses
 together in the same cluster, then only one of them would have been a
ppointed. Also, had the JBC clustered the nominees for the vacancies re
18th Associate Justice
sulting from the retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura (Nachura) and Conchita Carpio Morales (Carpio Mo

Judicial Staff Head, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ), Supreme Court, for rales), and if Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (Reyes) and ESTELA

2 years M. Perlas-Bernabe (Perlas-Bernabe) were together in the same cluster, th

en the appointment of one of them would have already excluded the ot
her.
It would be safe to say that all the aforementioned six nominees were s
trong contenders. If all six nominees were placed in the same cluster, th
en only one of them would have been actually appointed as Sandiganb c. There are no objective criteria,

ayan Associate Justice and the other five could no longer be considered standards, or guidelines for the
for the still unfilled vacancies. If then Atty. Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses)
clustering of nominees by the JBC.
, Judicial Staff Head, OCJ, was included in the cluster with respondent E
cong, PHILJA Chief of Office for PMC, and respondent Musngi, Undersec
retary for Special Concerns and Chief of Staff of the Executive Secretary,
The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal, objectiv
OP, then he would have lesser chance of being appointed as he would
e, and rational basis for determining which nominee shall be included in
have to vie for a single vacancy with two other strong contenders; and
a cluster. Simply saying that it is the result of the deliberation and voti
only one of the three would have been appointed. Evidently, the appoin
ng by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory. A review of the votin
tments to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Ju
g patterns by the JBC Members for the six simultaneous vacancies for S
stice would have been different by simply jumbling the clusters of nomi
andiganbayan Associate Justice only raises more questions and doubts th
nees. Even if we go back in history, had the JBC clustered the nominees
an answers. It would seem, to the casual observer, that the Chief Justice
for the posts vacated by Supreme Court Associate Justices Leonardo A.
and the four regular JBC Members exercised block voting most of the
Quisumbing (Quisumbing) and Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Chico-Nazario), a
time. Out of the 89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total
nd if Associate Justices Perez and Jose Catral Mendoza (Mendoza) were
of 3 7 qualified nominees spread across six separate short lists. Out of t
he 37 qualified nominees, the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Me
mbers coincidentally voted for the same 28 nominees in precisely the sa
me clusters, only varying by just one vote for the other nine nominees.
It is also interesting to note that all the nominees were listed only once
in just one cluster, and all the nominees subsequently appointed as San
diganbayan Associate Justice were distributed among the different cluster
s, except only for respondents Econg and Musngi. Was this by chance o
r was there already an agreement among the Chief Justice and the regu
lar JBC Members to limit the nomination of a candidate to a specific clu
ster for one specific vacancy, thus, excluding the same candidate from a
gain being nominated in a different cluster for another vacancy? It is un
derstandable that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members w
ould agree on whom to nominate because their nominations were base
d on the qualifications of the candidates. What is difficult to comprehen
d is how they determined the distribution of the nominees to the differe
nt clusters in the absence of any criteria or standard to be observed in
the clustering of nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any
of its Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case. Res
ultantly, the Court also asks why were respondents Econg and Musngi n
ominated in a single cluster? And why was then Atty. Trespeses not incl
uded in the same cluster as respondents Econg and Musngi, or the clus
ters of then Undersecretary Reynaldo P. Cruz, RTC Judge Maria Theresa
V. Mendoza-Arcega, or Assistant Solicitor General Karl B. Miranda? Furth
ermore, what criteria was used when Chief Justice Sereno and the other
four regular JBC Members voted for then Atty. Trespeses for only one p
articular cluster, i.e., for the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and n
owhere else? Atty. Trespeses did not receive any vote in the other clust
ers except for the lone vote for him of an ex officio JBC Member for th
e vacancy for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well a
s the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all vacant pos
ts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual
is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qu
alified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the
vacant posts. It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire t
o be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other vac
ant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution
nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description for
each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any co
gent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assignin
g a nominee to a particular cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that wi
thout objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which no
minees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees f
or specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. T
he lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering
to manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
 not challenged before the Court.

d. There is technically no clustering of

nominees for first and second level As an example of previous clustering in a collegiate court, the JBC attac
hed to its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention a transmittal letter
trial courts.
dated August 1 7, 2015 of the JBC addressed to President Aquino, which
divided the nominees into four clusters for the four vacancies for Court

The Court further points out that its Decision dated November 29, 2016 of Appeals Associate Justice. The JBC contends that during the delibera

only discussed vacancies in collegiate courts. The constant referral by the tions on said nominations, the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Ju

JBC to separate short lists of nominees for vacant judgeship posts in fir stice Velasco were both present as JBC consultants but did not raise any

st and second level trial courts as proof of previous clustering is inapt. objection.

The separate short lists in such situations are technically not clustering a
s the vacancies happened and were announced at different times and c
While it may be true that the JBC already observed clustering in 2015, it
andidates applied for specific vacancies, based on the inherent difference
is still considered a relatively new practice, adopted only under Chief Ju
s in the location and jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifi
stice Sereno's Chairmanship of the JBC. The clustering then escaped scru
cations of nominees to the same, hence, justifying a separate short list f
tiny as no party questioned the appointments to the said vacancies. The
or each vacant post.
view of the consultants was also not solicited or requested by the JBC.
The Court now observes that the vacancies for Court of Appeals Associa

e. While clustering of nominees was te Justice in 2015 were not all simultaneous or closely successive, most
of which occurring months apart, specifically, vice the late Associate Justi
observed in the nominations for
ce Michael P. Elbinias who passed away on November 20, 2014; vice reti
vacancies in the Court of Appeals in red Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, who opted for early reti
rement effective on January 31, 2015; vice Associate Justice Hakim S. Ab
2015, it escaped scrutiny as the
dulwahid, who compulsorily retired on June 12, 2015; and vice Associate
appointments to said vacancies were
Justice Isaias P. Dicdican who compulsorily retired on July 4, 2015. Even
so, the JBC published a single announcement for all four vacancies on
March 15, 2015, with the same deadlines for submission of applications a
nd supporting documents. This is in stark contrast to the two-week inter
val between the compulsory retirements of Supreme Court Associate Just
ices Perez and Brion on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, res
pectively, for which the JBC still made separate publications, required su
bmission of separate applications, separately processed the applications,
and submitted separate short lists. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the
nominations for the four vacant posts of Court of Appeals Associate Just
ice were contained in a single letter dated August 1 7, 2015, addressed t
o President Aquino, through then Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., whereas in the case of the Sandiganbayan, the JBC submitted six sep
arate letters, all dated October 26, 2015, transmitting one short list for e
ach of the six vacancies. The separate letters of transmittal further reinfo
rce the intention of the JBC to prevent the President from "cross-reachin
g" or disregarding the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies for S
andiganbayan Associate Justice and, thus, unduly limit the President's ex
ercise of his power to appoint members of the Judiciary.
f. The separate short lists for the
current vacancies in the Supreme
Court are not in issue in this case,
but has been brought up by the JBC
in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention.
The Court takes the occasion herein to clarify that the application of its
ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2017 to the situation involvin
g closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court may be properly addr
essed in an actual case which squarely raises the issue. It also bears to
stress that the current vacancies in the Supreme Court as a result of the
compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion are not in
issue in this case, but has been brought to the fore by the JBC itself i
n its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Therefore, the Court will
refrain from making any pronouncements on the separate short lists of
nominees submitted by the JBC to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (Duter
te) on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016 so as not to preempt t
he President's decision on how to treat the separate short lists of nomin
ees for the two current vacancies in the Supreme Court. The Court will
only address the statements made by the JBC in relation to said short li
sts by reciting some relevant historical facts relating to the filling-up of
previous vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The JBC avers that it had no choice but to submit separate short lists o
f nominees to President Duterte for the vacancies for Supreme Court As
sociate Justice vice Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who retired on D
ecember 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively, because there w
ere different sets of applicants for each, with 14 applicants for the seat
vacated by Associate Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacate
d by Associate Justice Brion. The situation is the own doing of the JBC,
as the JBC announced the expected vacancies left by the compulsory ret
irements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion, which were merely two w
ancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice following the retirements of
Associate Justices Quisumbing and Chico-Nazario in 2009. Pertinent porti
ons of the JBC publication are reproduced below:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening, for applicatio

eeks apart, through two separately paid publications on August 4, 2016 n or recommendation, of the: two (2) forthcoming vacant positions of A

and August 18, 2016, respectively, in newspapers of general circulation; i SSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT vice Hon. Leonardo A. Qui

nvited the filing of separate applications for the vacancies with different sumbing and Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario, who will compulsorily retire

deadlines; and separately processed the applications of candidates to the on 6 November and 5 December 2009, respectively, x x x

said vacancies. The JBC would inevitably end up with two different sets
of nominees, one set for the position vacated by Justice Perez and anot
Applications or recommendation for the two (2) positions in the Suprem
her set for that vacated by Justice Brion, notwithstanding that the JBC u
e Court must be submitted not later than 28 September 2009 (Monday)
ndeniably found all nominees in both sets to be qualified to be appoint
x x x to the JBC Secretariat, 2nd Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme Court, P
ed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as they all garnered at le
adre Faura St., Manila (Tel. No. 552-9512; Fax No. 552-9607; email addre
ast four votes.
ss jbc _supreme court@yahoo.com.ph or jbc@sc.judiciary.gov.ph). Applica
nts or recommendees must submit six (6) copies of the following:

There had been no similar problems in the past because the JBC jointly
announced simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in the Supreme
x x xx
Court in a single publication, invited the filing by a candidate of a singl
e application for all the vacancies on the same deadline, jointly processe
d all applications, and submitted a single list of qualified nominees to th
The JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
e President, thus, resulting in a simple, inexpensive, and efficient process
submitted to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a si
of nomination. Such was the case when the JBC announced the two vac
ngle short list dated November 29, 2009 with a total of six nominees fo
r the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which, Pr
esident Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Associate Justices Perez and Mendo
za.
The JBC again announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associat
e Justice due to the retirements of Associate Justices Nachura and Carpi
o Morales, thus:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening, for applicatio
n or recommendation, of the following positions:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (vice Hon. Antonio Edu
ardo B. Nachura and Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, who will compulsoril
y retire on 13 and 19 June 2011, respectively);
x x xx
Applications or recommendations for vacancies in nos. 1-3 must be filed
on or before 28 March 2011 (Monday) x x x to the JBC Secretariat, 2nd
Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme Court, Padre Faura St., Manila (Tel. No. 55
2-9512; Fax No. 552-9598; email address jbcsupremecourt@yahoo.com.ph
. Those who applied before these vacancies were declared open must m
anifest in writing their interest on or before the said deadline. In case of
recommendations, the recommendees must signify their acceptance eith
er in the recommendation letter itself or in a separate document.
New applicants or recommendees for positions in the appellate courts m
ust submit the following on or before 4 April 2011 (Monday) x x x:
x x xx
The single short list dated June 21, 2011, submitted by the JBC, under th
e Chairmanship of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, prese
nted, for President Aquino's consideration, six nominees for the two vaca
nt posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice, with President Aquino subs
equently appointing Associate Justices Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe.
How the new procedure adopted by the JBC of submitting two separate
lists of nominees will also affect the seniority of the two Supreme Cour
t Associate Justices to be appointed to the current vacancies is another
issue that may arise because of the new JBC procedure. Unlike the pres
ent two separate lists of nominees specifying the vacant post to which t
hey are short-listed for appointment, the short list of nominees submitte
d by the JBC before did not identify to which of the vacant positions, w
hen there are more than one existing vacancies, a qualified candidate is
nominated to as there was only one list of nominees for all vacancies s
ubmitted to the President. Correspondingly, the appointment papers issu
ed by the President, as in the cases of Supreme Court Associate Justices
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, did not specify the particul
ar vacant post to which each of them was appointed. The appointment
papers of the afore-named Supreme Court Associate Justices were all si
milarly worded as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed AS
SOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of th
e duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil S
ervice Commission with copies of your Oath of Office.
As earlier stated, the Court makes no ruling on the above-mentioned di
vergence between the procedures in the nomination for existing vacanci
es in the Supreme Court followed by the JBC before and by the present
JBC as it may be premature to do so and may prejudge whatever acti
on President Duterte may take on the two separate short lists of nomin
ees for the current Supreme Court vacancies which were submitted by t
he JBC.
g. The designation by the JBC of
numbers to the vacant
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
posts encroached on the President's
power to determine the seniority of
the justices appointed to the said court.
The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that it
s individual members have different reasons for designating numbers to
the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. The varying reason/s
of each individual JBC Members raises the concern whether they each fu
lly appreciated the constitutional and legal consequences of their act, i.e.
, that it encroached on the power, solely vested in the President, to det
ermine the seniority of the justices appointed to a collegiate court. Each
of the six short lists submitted by the JBC to President Aquino explicitly
stated that the nominees were for the Sixteenth (16th), Seventeenth (17th
), Eighteenth (18th), Nineteenth (19th), Twentieth (20th), and Twenty-First
(2 Pt) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, respectively; and on the faces of
said short lists, it could only mean that President Aquino was to make t
he appointments in the order of seniority pre-determined by the JBC, an
d that nominees who applied for any of the vacant positions, requiring t
he same qualifications, were deemed to be qualified to be considered fo
r appointment only to the one vacant position to which his/her cluster
was specifically assigned. Whatever the intentions of the individual JBC
Members were, they cannot go against what has been clearly establishe
d by law,19 rules,20 and jurisprudence.21 In its Decision dated November
29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of
the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their ac
tual appointment by the President.
It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power
to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appoint
ed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said mem
bers' appointment or commission papers. By already designating the nu
merical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniori
ty or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices e
ven before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogati
ng unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.22
It is also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion f
or Reconsideration, the clustering of nominees for simultaneous vacancie
s in collegiate courts into separate short lists can rid the appointment pr
ocess to the Judiciary of political pressure; or conversely, how the previo
us practice of submitting a single list of nominees to the President for s
imultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the same qualificatio
ns, made the appointment process more susceptible to political pressure.
The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the
President can only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submi
tted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the app
ointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nom
inees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbay
an Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the app
ointment process and encroached on the President's power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, bey
ond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced
in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power to recommend of t
he JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appo
int as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she consider
s worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As
long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the J
BC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the senior
ity of appointees to a collegiate court.
Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated No
vember 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the ground that it is not
a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion for Reconsideration and Moti
on for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other reliefs and remedies,
for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29,
2016 denying the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case.
However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the
JBC in this case, by taking into consideration the issues raised and argu
ments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsi
deration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious.
To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's appoint
ment of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Jus
tices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for t
he six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate s
hort lists. The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated November
29, 2016 that:
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint me
mbers of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees i
nto six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely
maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount
Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganba
yan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in
one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Co
nstitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least
three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the mi
nimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees
per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for th
e six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum re
quirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the
President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six ne
wly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitut
ion. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well
as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and
do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.23
The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC
for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new
positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional w
as only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by su
ch clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan A
ssociate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not req
uire the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the iss
ue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandig
anbayan Associate Justice was concerned.
 consideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016)
of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.
As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the
Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a separate administrativ
e matter (viz., Item No. 2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016
Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the se
-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Secti
parate short lists of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council
on 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Asso
to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte for the present vacancies in the Supre
ciate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Ba
me Court resulting from the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices
r Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision dated Novembe
Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these were not in issue nor
r 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to submit its
deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the decision
comment and be heard on the same. The administrative matter was alr
the President may take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of
eady raffled to another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same
his power to appoint members of the Judiciary under the Constitution.
should be consolidated in the said administrative matter.

SO ORDERED.
Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa, it must be
pointed out that he has conceded that the President did not commit a
n unconstitutional act in "disregarding the clustering done by the JBC" w teresita j. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
hen he chose Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of the "
Associate Justice
clustered" lists provided by the JBC.

WE CONCUR:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for interv
ention, which the Court has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideratio
n (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and the Motion for Re
No part
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO* Associate Justice I concur in the result and also join the separate
opinion of J. Leonen
Chief Justice

Chairperson

Today is Tuesday, October 01, 2019home

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Custom Search
Senior Associate Justice, Presiding I concur in the result. (Please see
separate opinion. The November 29, 2016 Decision does not apply to cl
osely successive vacancies like those created with the retirement of Justic
es Brion and Perez.
Republic of the Philippines
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
SUPREME COURT
Associate Justice
Baguio City
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

EN BANC
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
(ON LEAVE)
vs.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.

OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:

D E C I S I O N

2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career

Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch
SERENO, CJ.:
shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge
their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have

Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under been accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been ap

Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A. de Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust res pointed or designated, whichever comes first, unless they are reappointe

pondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position of assistant g d in the meantime.4

eneral manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Devel

opment Authority (MMDA).
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, is
sued Office Order No. 106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-ch

On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed peti arge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to

tioner as AGM0.1 His appointment was concurred in by the members of the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager.

the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution No. 09-10, Series of 2009 The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were

.2 He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani withdrawn and assigned to other employees.

F. Fernando.3

Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated re

Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued O spondent as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum

ffice of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as

amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010.

basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA pay his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter addressed to the Office of t
roll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010. he President on 17 December 2010.10

Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) as to the proper classification of the position of AGMO. In her r
eply,8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones (Executive Director All
ones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been class
ified and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive
Service (CES). She further stated that a perusal of the appointment pape
However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President A
quino) appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10
January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.
Hence, the instant Petition.

rs of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position.

In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed
1 and 2.
its Comment on 19 August 2011.12 However, upon motion of petitioner,
it was disqualified from representing respondent. Thus, a private law firm

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public 13 entered an appearance as counsel for respondent and adopted the C

Health and Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down th omment filed by the OSG.14

e offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payr

oll,9 petitioner sent a letter on 5 December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, ass
ISSUES
istant general manager (AGM) for Finance and Administration; and Lydia
Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an
action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for
Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court
: o the CES; thus, in order to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be
(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by Presi
dent Aquino to the position of AGMO of the MMDA;
(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position
of AGMO; and
(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and fin
ancial benefits he received during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the M
MDA.
THE COURT’S RULING
Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitutio
n guarantees the security of tenure of employees in the civil service. He
further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered by OP Me
morandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined
by the CESB.
On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs t
a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains that the
function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus, conside
ring that petitioner is a non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is cover
ed by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raise
s the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme
Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hier
archy of courts.
Hierarchy of Courts
As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to t
his Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest, particul
arly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection
of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than
the President of the Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner do
ubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect
of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidenti
al appointment.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly pr
ovides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the
jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of t
he Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitione
r unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16 The hierarchy of cour
ts must be strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition."17 A disregard
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright di
smissal of a petition.18
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there
are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set fo
rth in a petition.19 The rationale behind this policy arises from the neces
sity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention o
f the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.20
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court o
nly when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the
procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present
Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protectio
n of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarch
y of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that wo
uld allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and
doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not
and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus,
the Petition must be dismissed.
Nature of the AGMO Position
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible,
the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of
a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the hol
der from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if
his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action i
s filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right t
o the undisturbed possession of the office.22
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular N
os. 1 and 2, which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in
all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers
that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the A
GMO of the MMDA is a non-CES position.
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the natu
re of the contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.
Career vs. non-career
Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924,23 otherwise known as the M
MDA Charter, specifically created the position of AGMO. It reads as follo
ws:
Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.
x x x x
The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by
the President and who shall continue to hold office at the discretion of
the appointing authority. He shall be vested with the rank, rights, privile
ges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.
The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant Gen
eral Manager for Finance and Administration, an Assistant General Mana
ger for Planning and an Assistant General Manager for Operations, all of
whom shall be appointed by the President with the consent and concu
rrence of the majority of the Council, subject to civil service laws and re
gulations. They shall enjoy security of tenure and may be removed for c
ause in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Adminis
trative Code of 1987, provides for two classifications of positions in the c
ivil service: career and non-career.24
Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure,25
as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is cotermin
ous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s pleas
ure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a parti
cular project for which purpose the appointment was made.26
 tor, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other o
fficers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive S
Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds th
ervice Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
at an AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charte
r specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core cha
racteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who
position.
are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in
the Department of Foreign Affairs;

CES vs. non-CES

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which
shall maintain a separate merit system;
Career service includes the following:

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in
performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under
an appropriate examination is required;
the non-career service; and

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nat
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.27 (Emp
ure; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and u
hasis supplied)
niversities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research i
nstitutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO,28 the Court

clarified the positions covered by the CES:
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assi
stant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Direc
Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to
be covered by the CES, two elements must concur. First, the position
must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsecti
on A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., U
ndersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Direc
tor, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department S
ervice, or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identifi
ed by the Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal r
ank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee
. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered
as one covered by the third-level or CES. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered
as CES:
1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitl
e A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a p
osition of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by the CESB t
o be such position of equal rank; AND
2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. Records show t
hat in reply29 to Chairperson Tolentino’s query on whether the positions
of general manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered by the CES,3
0 the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones – categorically stated that t
hese positions are not among those covered by the CES.
Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter,31 the CESB similarly res
ponded that the AGMO’s position could not be considered as belonging
to the CES.32 Additionally, Executive Director Allones said that petitione
r was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, to wit:
A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does
not bear any indication that you are holding a coterminous appointment
. Neither your position as AGMO can be considered as created in exces
s of the authorized staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that created
the MMDA clearly provided for such position. As further stated above, y
our position will not fall under paragraph No. 2 of OP MC 1 because it
is not yet considered as belonging to the CES. Hence, we posit that you
are not covered by OP MC 1 and 2.33
However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, thr
ough Resolution No. 799 already declared certain positions meeting the
criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.
It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 Ma
y 2009, even prior to petitioner’s appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreov
er, as early as 31 May 1994, the above classification was already embodi
ed in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC Memorandum Cir
cular 21, Series of 1994.
Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the
coverage of the CES:
a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Di
rector (department-wide and bureau-wide), Assistant Regional Director (d
epartment-wide and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department Service;
b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions
in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporatio
ns with original charters are embraced within the CES provided that they
meet the following criteria:
i.) The position is a career position;
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,
iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of
executive and managerial functions.
Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in
the above-cited paragraph(a) but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) con
sidering that it belongs to a government-owned and controlled corporati
on with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the provi
sions of the MMDA Charter.
First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position th
at enjoys security of tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter.
Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the divisio
n chief level, which is equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary with
Salary Grade 29.34
Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties an
d responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive an
d managerial functions.
Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 79 d. Operate a central radio communication system.
24 provides the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGM
O, as follows:
He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the a
bove functions or as may be assigned from time to time.
12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations

An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises

The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the followin
g functions:
a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delive
ry of metro-wide basic services;
management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes function
s like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overs
eeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of m
anagerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsi
bilities involving functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage
b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the imple of the CES.
mentation of approved policies, plans and programs for the developmen
t of Metropolitan Manila;
In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointment
s require examinations, are grouped into three major levels:35
c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive depart
ments or agencies of the national government, and the private sector in
the delivery of metro-wide services; and
Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positi
ons in the career service appointment to which requires examinations sh
all be grouped into three major levels as follows:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service
positions which involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a n
on-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of c
ollegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific p
ositions which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-s
upervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief levels; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (
Emphasis supplied)
Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities.
36 Those at the third level (CES positions) require career service executiv
e eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment.37
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by thir
d-level career service within the CES. In this case, petitioner does not ha
ve the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment to the
position of AGMO was merely temporary.
Amores v. Civil Service Commission38 is instructive as to the nature of t
emporary appointments in the CES. The Court held therein that an appo
intee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity without the requir
ed CES eligibility:
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence t
hat a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person
who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment
is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto.
An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the require
ments for the position to which he is being appointed, including the ap
propriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee
meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate
civil service eligibility.
x x x x
With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES x x x x
), the requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES e
xaminations administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferm
ent of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acq Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a p

uires eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to t ermanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations

he CES position to which he has previously been appointed, or he beco administered by the CES Board x x x.

mes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position provided on

ly that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Veri
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the
ly, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that w
position of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure
hich will make an appointment in the career executive service a perman
in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and "
ent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot
co-terminus with the appointing authority."39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Cou
be said that his appointment to the position was permanent.
rt ruled that "one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed ten
ure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the

Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CE appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is

S eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of approp for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of security of tenure when pe

riate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public servic titioner was replaced by respondent upon the latter’s appointment to th

e to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appoint e position of AGMO by President Aquino.

ment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the

subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule, according
Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is y
to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Phili
et to be classified by the CESB, petitioner’s appointment is still deemed
ppine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariabl
coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14 June 201
e even though the given appointment may have been designated as per
1, which reads:
manent by the appointing authority.
WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PC
SO v. CSC, G.R. NO. 185766 and G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage o
2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enu
f positions belonging to the CES to positions requiring Presidential appoi
merated above, a classification of positions is necessary which shall be c
ntments.
onducted by the Board, upon request of the head of office of the gove
rnment department/agency concerned, to place them under the coverag
e of the CES provided they comply with the following criteria:
WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymo
us to third level positions by virtue of the said ruling.

i.) The position is a career position;

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it i

s hereby RESOLVED, to issue the following guidelines to clarify the polic
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,
y on the coverage of CES and its classification:

iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance

1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments express
of executive and managerial functions.
ly enumerated under Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely:

All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified a

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Dire
ctor, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Departm
ent Service, no classification of position is necessary to place them unde
r the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in w
hich case a position classification is required, in consultation with the De
partment of Budget and Management (DBM).
s part of the CES would be deemed co-terminus with the appointing au
thority. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President
Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office w
as also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino.
Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by a ANTONIO T. CARPIO
nother non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person sui
Associate Justice
ng must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unla
wfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualificatio
n or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.41 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for Associate Justice
disregarding the hierarchy of courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of ac
ARTURO D. BRION
tion against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he has undist
urbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA. Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

SO ORDERED. Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Chief Justice G.R. No. 181186, February 03, 2016

WE CONCUR:
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO LAW OFFICES, Petitioner
s, v. HON. NORMA CHIONLO-SIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUD
GE OF BRANCH 56 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY,
AND THE TESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED SUSANO RODRIGUEZ, REPRES
ENTED BY THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
JARDELEZA, J.:
We resolve the core issue of whether a law firm acting as counsel for o
ne of the parties in the intestate proceedings a quo can file a petition f
or certiorari before the Court of Appeals to protect its own interests.
I
Petitioner Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) acte
d as counsel for Remedios N. Rodriguez (Remedios) when she commenc
ed an action for the intestate settlement of the estate of her deceased
husband Susano J. Rodriguez before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of L
ucena City. Her action was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4440.1 During the
pendency of the intestate proceedings, Remedios asked for the payment
of widow's allowance. This, however, was denied by the RTC in an Orde
r dated August 8, 1983.2 On review, the Court of Appeals (CA) promulg
ated a decision reversing the RTC's Order and granted Remedios a mon
thly widow's allowance of P3,000.00 effective August 1982.3
On February 29, 1988, while the case was pending before the CA, Reme
dios executed a Deed of Sale of Inheritance (Deed of Sale) wherein she
agreed to sell all her rights, interests and participation in the estate of S
usano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio M. Gerardo (Gerardo) in consid
eration of P200,000.00.4
As a condition subsequent to the sale, Remedios, on March 1, 1988, exe
cuted a special power of attorney5 (SPA) authorizing Gerardo to, among
others, "receive from any person, entity, government agency or instrum
entality, or from any court, any property, real or personal, cash, checks
or other commercial documents which may be due to me or payable to
me by virtue of any contract, inheritance or any other legal means," an
d to "receive said property... in his own name and for his own account
and to deposit the same at his sole discretion for his own account, and
dispose of [the] same without any limitation."6 Gerardo later on execute
d a document titled as "Substitution of Attorney-in-Fact,"7 where he desi
gnated SRMO as substitute attorney pursuant to the power of substitutio
n granted to him in the earlier SPA. Gerardo subsequently executed his
own SPA authorizing SRMO "[t]o appear... and represent [Gerardo] in an
y and all proceedings and incidents in the aforementioned case."8
After the CA's decision regarding the widow's allowance became final an
d executory, SRMO, on April 24, 1991, accordingly filed a motion with th
e RTC for the payment of the allowance then amounting to a total of P
315,000.00.9 A few months after, the Estate of Deceased Susano J. Rodri
guez (Estate) remitted to SRMO three (3) checks totaling this amount.10
A Partial Project of Partition of the Estate dated January 10, 199711 was
approved by the RTC on January 20, 1997.12 Sometime in 2002, Remedi
os filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion and Notice of Termination of the S
ervices of Petitioner's Counsel of Record."13 Therein, Remedios questione
d the RTC's Order approving the partition and denied the execution of t
he Deed of Sale in favor of Gerardo. She also demanded that SRMO re
turn the amount it received from the partition.14 Before the motion coul
d be resolved, however, Remedios filed a Notice of Withdrawal of the s
ame motion.15
The withdrawal of the motion notwithstanding, the RTC, in an Order dat
ed August 21, 2003, motu proprio directed SRMO to reimburse the Estat
e the amount of P315,000.00 representing the widow's allowance it recei
ved in 1991.16
In its Explanation with Motion to Excuse Reimbursement,17 SRMO moved
to be excused from reimbursing the Estate. According to SRMO, when i
t sought the payment of the widow's allowance, it was merely seeking t
he enforcement of a judgment credit in favor of its client, Remedios, wh
o had, in turn, sold her interests to Gerardo, also represented by SRMO.
18
In its Order dated December 22, 2003, the RTC denied SRMO's motion.1
9 It disagreed with SRMO's position because (1) "the sale of inheritance
was never made known" to the RTC and that (2) the sale cannot compr
ehend a widow's allowance because such allowance is "personal in natur
e."20
Aggrieved by the RTC's orders, SRMO elevated the case to the CA thro
ugh a petition for certiorari.21 SRMO argued that it merely acted as rep
resentative of Gerardo, Remedios' successor-in-interest, when it received
the sum corresponding to the widow's allowance.22 Without going into
the merits of the case, however, the CA denied SRMO's petition on the
ground that the latter was not a party in the case before the lower cou
rt and therefore had no standing to question the assailed order.23 The
CA later denied SRMO's motion for reconsideration.24
SRMO is now before this Court contending that while it was not a party
in the intestate proceedings, it is nevertheless an "aggrieved party" whic
h can file a petition for certiorari. It claims that the RTC's order of reim
bursement violated SRMO's right to due process. SRMO further argues t
hat the RTC erred in ordering it to reimburse the widow's allowance sin
ce SRMO received said allowance only in favor of Gerardo as buyer of
Remedios' interests pursuant to the Deed of Sale.
In its Comment, the Estate maintains that SRMO has no standing to file
the petition for certiorari as it is not "the real party in interest who stan
ds to lose or gain from the verdict [that] the Court may hand in the ca
se at bar."25 Having only acted in the proceedings below as counsel for
Remedios and, upon transfer of interest, for Gerardo, SRMO had no pe
rsonality independent of its client.26 Recognizing that SRMO received th
e amount not for its own benefit but only in representation of its client,
the Estate claims that SRMO is only being made to return the amount
it received for and in behalf of its client; it is not being made to pay o
ut of its own pocket.27 The Estate also asserts that since Remedios alrea
dy sold her share in the estate to Gerardo on February 29, 1988, she w
as no longer entitled to any widow's allowance from that time on.28cha
nroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides in full:chanRoblesvirtual
Lawlibrary
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer e
xercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in exces
s of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting t
o lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, sp
eedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person agg
rieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging t
he facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and gra
nting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgm
ent, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and docu
ments relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-fo
rum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
(Emphasis supplied.) ourt can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigati
on would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisi
The "aggrieved party" referred to in the above-quoted provision is one
ons of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedin
who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the origin
gs before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsid
al action for certiorari under Rule 65. In Tang v. Court of Appeals,29 we
eration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise ha
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ve no standing to question the said order or decision before the appell
Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of ce ate court via certiorari.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
rtiorari may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or deci
sions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be eonstrued
to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court's order o (Emphasis supplied.)
r decision can question the said court's disposition via certiorari. To sanc
The general rule, therefore, is that a person not a party to the proceedi
tion a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous a
ngs in the trial court cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the CA
nd endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of co
or the Supreme Court to have the order or decision of the trial court r
urt dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who pre
eviewed. Under normal circumstances, the CA would have been correct i
vailed in the lower court.
n dismissing a petition for certiorari filed by a non-party. The peculiar fa
cts of this case, however, call for a less stringent application of the rule.

In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent

adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" refe
The facts show that SRMO became involved in its own capacity only wh
rred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil acti
en the RTC ordered it to return the money that it received on behalf of
on of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings bef
its client. The order of reimbursement was directed to SRMO in its pers
ore the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleane
onal capacity—not in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gera
d from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed
rdo. We find this directive unusual because the order for reimbursement
motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for
would typically have been addressed to the parties of the case; the cou
reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower co
nsel's role and duty would be to ensure that his client complies with th
urt. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower c
e court's order. The underlying premise of the RTC's order of reimburse
ment is that, logically, SRMO kept or appropriated the money. But the p
remise itself is untenable because SRMO never claimed the amount for i
ts own account. In fact, it is uncontroverted that SRMO only facilitated t
he transfer of the amount to Gerardo.31
Section. 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, th
e action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the c
ourt upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred
to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.cralawlaw
library

Otherwise stated, unless the court upon motion directs the transferee pe
ndente lite to be substituted, the action is simply continued in the name
Under the law of agency, an agent is not personally liable for the oblig
of the original party. For all intents and purposes, the Rules already co
ations of the principal unless he performs acts outside the scope of his
nsider Gerardo joined or substituted in the proceeding a quo, commenci
authority or he expressly binds himself to be personally liable.32 Otherwi
ng at the exact moment when the transfer of interest was perfected bet
se, the principal is solely liable. Here, there was no showing that SRMO
ween original party-transferor, Remedios, and the transferee pendente lit
bound itself personally for Gerardo's obligations. SRMO also acted within
e, Gerardo.35
the bounds of the authority issued by Gerardo, as the transferee pende
nte lite of the widow's interest, to receive the payment.33

Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC was unjustified in ordering SR
MO, in its own capacity, to return the money to the Estate despite the
It appears that the RTC's primary justification for ordering SRMO to retu
fact, as certified to by Gerardo's heirs, that SRMO had already accounte
rn the money from its own pocket is due to the latter's failure to forma
d for all monies or funds it had received on its client's behalf to Gerard
lly report the transfer of interest from Remedios to Gerardo.34 While it
o.36 If the RTC was convinced that the Estate had a right to reimburse
certainly would have been prudent for SRMO to notify the RTC, the Rul
ment, it should have ordered the party who ultimately benefited from a
es of Court do not require counsels of parties to report any transfer of
ny unwarranted payment—not his lawyer—to return the money.
interest. The Rules do not even mandate the substitution of parties in c
ase of a transfer of interest. Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of Court pr
ovides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the general rule laid down in Tang (which limits the availability of
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 only to parties in the proceeding
s before the lower court) must be strictly adhered to, it is not without e
xception. In Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,37 we allowed the wife of a respond
ent in two cases filed by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to
challenge via certiorari the inquiry orders issued by the respective region
al trial courts. There, we found that the wife had adequately demonstrat
ed her joint ownership of the accounts subject of the inquiry orders. Th
us, notwithstanding the fact that she was not named as a respondent in
the cases filed by the AMLC or identified as a subject of the inquiry or
ders, we ruled that her joint ownership of the accounts clothed her with
standing to assail, via certiorari, the inquiry orders authorizing the exam
ination of said accounts in violation of her statutory right to maintain sai
d accounts' secrecy.38
Considering that the RTC's order of reimbursement is specifically address
ed to SRMO and the established fact that SRMO only received the subj
ect money in its capacity as counsel/agent of Gerardo, there is then mo
re reason to apply the exception here. Unlike Tang, which involved neig
hboring lot owners as petitioners, SRMO's interest can hardly be conside
red as merely incidental. That SRMO is being required to reimburse fro
m its own coffers money already transmitted to its client is sufficient to
give SRMO direct interest to challenge the RTC's order. Neither can SRM
O be considered a total stranger to the proceedings. We have stated in
one case that "a counsel becomes the eyes and ears in the prosecution
or defense of his or her client's case."39 This highly fiduciary relationship
between counsel and client makes the party/non-party delineation presc
ribed by Tang inadequate in resolving the present controversy.
As a corollary, we have, in a number of instances, ruled that technical r
ules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate, the cause
of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to fa
cilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application m
ay, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subor
dinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal
cause.40 In this case, ordering SRMO to reimburse the widow's allowanc
e from its own pocket would result in the unjust enrichment of Gerardo,
since the latter would retain the money at the expense of his own cou
nsel. To avoid such injustice, a petition for certiorari is an adequate rem
edy available to SRMO to meet the situation presented.
Another important consideration for allowing SRMO to file a petition lor
certiorari is the rule on real party in interest, which is applicable to priva
te litigation.41 A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefite
d or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the av
ails of the suit."42 In Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,43 we state
d:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
..."Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an int
erest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequenti
al interest.44ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarycralawlawlibrary
Simply put, a real party in interest is the person who will suffer (or has
suffered) the wrong. In this case, it is SRMO who stands to be injured b
y the RTC's order of reimbursement considering that it is being made to
return money received on behalf of, and already accounted to, its clien
t.
III
Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court45 provides for the allowance g
ranted to the widow and family of the deceased person during the settl
ement of the estate. This allowance is rooted on the right and duty to
support under the Civil Code. The right to support is a purely personal
right essential to the life of the recipient, so that it cannot be subject to
attachment or execution.46 Neither can it be renounced or transmitted
to a third person.47 Being intransmissible, support cannot be the object
of contracts.48 Nonetheless, it has also been held that support in arrear
s is a different thing altogether. It may be compensated, renounced and
transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title.49
The Estate contends that since Remedios already sold her Estate to Gera
rdo on February 29, 1988, she was no longer entitled to any widow's all
owance from that point on.50 SRMO, on the other hand, maintains that
the right of Remedios to receive widow's allowance remains from 1988 u
p to 1991 because she remained a nominal party in the case, and that t
his formed part of the interests sold to Gerardo.51
However, neither of the parties to the Deed of Sale is impleaded in the
present petition; hence, this particular issue cannot be fully resolved. Foll
owing the principle of relativity of contracts,52 the Deed of Sale is bindi
ng only between Remedios and Gerardo, and they alone acquired rights
and assumed obligations thereunder. Any ruling that affects the enforcea
bility of the Deed of Sale will therefore have an effect on their rights as
seller and buyer, respectively. Both are, therefore, indispensable parties i
nsofar as the issue of enforceability of the Deed of Sale is concerned.53
The failure to implead them is fatal to the Estate's challenge on this fr
ont.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 24, 2007 Decision
and December 28, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83082 are SET ASIDE. The Orders dated August 21, 2003 and D
ecember 22, 2003 issued by Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Lu
cena City in Sp. Proc. No. 4440 are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016

MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA, PROVINCE OF CEBU; THE SANGGUNIANG

BAYAN OF CORDOVA; AND THE MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CO
RDOVA, Petitioners, v. PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
TOPANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which petitioners Municipality

of Cordova, Province of Cebu, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cordova, and
the Mayor of the Municipality of Cordova filed seeking to reverse the C
ourt of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated March 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No.
06193 and to order the trial court to proceed to the second stage of th
e proceedings for the determination of the proper valuation of the expr
opriated properties.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case, as borne by the rec
ords, are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryRespondent Pathfinder Development Corporatio
n (Pathfinder) is the owner of real properties in Alegria, Cordova, Cebu:
(1) Lot No. 692 covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 190002-02765 with
an area of 1,819 square meters (sq.m.), and (2) part of Lot No. 697 cove
red by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-95706 and TD No. 19000
2-02902 with an area of 50,000 sq.m., while respondent Topanga Develo
pment Corporation (Topanga) owns Lot No. 691 covered by TCT No. 109
337 and TD No. 190002-02761 with an area of 29,057 sq.m., and part of
Lot No. 697 covered by TD No. 190002-02901 with an area of 15,846 s
q.m.
On February 8, 2011, petitioner Sangguniang Bay an of the Municipality
of Cordova enacted Ordinance No. 003-2011 expropriating 836 sq.m. of
Lot No. 692, 9,728 sq.m. of Lot No. 697, 3,898 sq.m. of Lot No. 691, an
d 1,467 sq.m. of Lot No. 693 owned by one Eric Ng Mendoza, for the
construction of a road access from the national highway to the municip
al roll-on/roll-off (RORO) port. It likewise authorized petitioner Mayor of
Cordova (the Mayor) to initiate and execute the necessary expropriation
proceedings.
On February 17, 2011, the Mayor of Cordova filed an expropriation comp
laint against the owners of the properties. Later, the Mayor filed a moti
on to place the municipality in possession of the properties sought to b
e expropriated.
On March 4, 2011, Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaratio
n of Nullity of the Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Co
urt (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, claiming that no offer to buy ad
dressed to them was shown or attached to the expropriation complaint,
thereby rendering the Ordinance constitutionally infirm for being in violat
ion of their right to due process and equal protection. On July 13, 2011,
they likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on
prejudicial question in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Ordi
nance.
On August 12, 2011, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, Branch 27 issued an Order2 de
nying the corporations' motion for suspension of the proceedings and g
ranting the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of the municipality.
Pathfinder and Topanga moved for reconsideration, but the same was d
enied. Hence, they elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certior
ari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On March 28, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawli
brary
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders issued by the
Regional trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 53 and Branch 27, Lapu-
Lapu City in Civil Case No. R-LLP-11-05959-CV, dated May 26, 2011, Aug
ust 12, 2011 and August 22, 2011, are REVERSED, [ANNULLED] and SET A
SIDE.
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu
City for the reception of evidence de novo on the determination of the
authority of the respondent municipality to exercise the power of emin
ent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts i
nvolved in the suit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners Municipality, Sangguniang Bayan, and Mayor of Cordova then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same proved to be futile.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue before the Court is whether or not the CA committed a
reversible error in giving due course to the petition under Rule 65.
The petition deserves merit.
The municipality argues that the CA seriously erred when it allowed the
companies' Petition for Certiorari despite the available remedy of appeal
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
While there exists a settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy agains
t the final order when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may b
e allowed when: (a) the broader interest of justice demands that certiora
ri be given due course to avoid any grossly unjust result that would oth
erwise befall the petitioners; and (b) the order of the RTC evidently cons
titutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In t
he past, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despit
e the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of la
w. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court has
declared that "the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any pla
in, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits o
f exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable da
mages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a
failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and in
sufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where publi
c interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency."5chanrobleslaw
If appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy, the availability of appeal as a remedy cannot constitute sufficie
nt ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari.
It is mere inadequacy, not the absence of all other legal remedies, and
the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must determine the
propriety of certiorari. A remedy is said to be plain, speedy and adequ
ate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of t
he judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is un
derstood, then, that a litigant need not resort to the less speedy remed
y of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being
patently void. And even assuming that certiorari is not the proper reme
dy against an assailed order, the petitioner should still not be denied th
e recourse because it is better to look beyond procedural requirements
and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powe
rs in order that a void order of a lower court may be made conformabl
e to law and justice.6chanrobleslaw
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be strictly define
d, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness
of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion
of the Court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiora
ri is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in
the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior co
urt is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as t
he ends of justice may require. Therefore, when, as in this case, there is
an urgent need to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial just
ice, the writ will be granted.7chanrobleslaw
The foregoing notwithstanding, the CA erred when it held that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriat
e private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an i
ndispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary
duty of government to serve the common need and advance the gener
al welfare.8 The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty
being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government
. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first,
that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.9chan
robleslaw
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may
be validly delegated to local government units. The basis for its exercis
Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are com
e by the Municipality of Cordova, being a local government unit, is gran
prised of two stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plainti
ted under Section 19 of Republic Act 7160, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibr
ff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exe
ary
rcise in the context of the surrounding facts, and (2) the determination
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chi of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The first
ef executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of condem
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of nation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursua sought to be condemned, for public use or purpose.11chanrobleslaw
nt to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, ho
wever, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and s Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an Order of

uch offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government Condemnation of the properties without previously conducting a proper

unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing o hearing for the reception of evidence of the parties. However, no hearin

f the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the pr g is actually required for the issuance of a writ of possession, which de

oper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of t mands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form and substance

he property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be of the complaint, and (b) the required provisional deposit. The sufficienc

expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expro y in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be deter

priated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the mined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint.12 H

fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. ere, there is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject properties
as these would provide access towards the RORO port being constructe
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is limite
d in the municipality. The construction of the new road will highly benef
d to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensati
it the public as it will enable shippers and passengers to gain access to
on, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of t
the port from the main public road or highway.
he purpose of the taking.10chanrobleslaw
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a compla
int for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and the deposit of
the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
Upon compliance with these requirements, the petitioner in an expropria
tion case is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right13 and t
he issuance of the writ becomes ministerial.14 Indubitably, since the com
plaint was found to have been sufficient in form and substance and the
required deposit had been duly complied with, the issuance of the writ
had aptly become ministerial on the part of the RTC. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it fou
nd the taking of the properties of Topanga and Pathfinder proper.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. T

he Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. S
P No. 06193 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Re
gional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu, Branches 53 and 27, in Civil Case No. R
-LLP-11-05959-CV, dated May 26, 2011, August 12, 2011, and August 22,
2011, are hereby REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 The facts of the case follow:

[G.R. No. 189402 : May 06, 2010] On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda (Francis), the son of respondent Domingo
Orda, Jr., was shot to death in Parañaque City. He was then twenty y
ears old and an engineering student.[4]
LIGAYA SANTOS AND ROBERT BUNDA, PETITIONERS, VS. DOMINGO I.
ORDA, JR., RESPONDENT.
A certain Gina Azarcon (Gina) executed her sworn statement that she sa
w three male persons perpetrate the crime; two of them, later identified
D E C I S I O N as Rolly Tonion (Rolly) and Jhunrey Soriano (Jhunrey), shot Francis inside
his car. The City Prosecutor of Parañaque City thus filed an Informatio
n for the crime of murder against Rolly and Jhunrey, docketed as Crimi
NACHURA, J.:
nal Case No. 01-0425. They pleaded "Not Guilty" during arraignment.[5]

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Two more witnesses, Ernesto Regala (Ernesto) and his son, Dennis, surfac
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decisi
ed. Dennis testified that before Francis was shot to death, the former w
on[1] dated May 20, 2009 and its Resolution[2] dated September 10, 200
ent to the office of Ligaya, who was then a Barangay Chairperson, to d
9. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Orders dated Septe
eliver collections from the public toilet. When Dennis failed to return ho
mber 30, 2005 and December 28, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC
me, Ernesto proceeded to fetch him. They then saw Ligaya hand a gun
) of Parañaque City, Branch 274,[3] while the assailed Resolution denie
to accused Rolly, saying, "Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyas
d the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Ligaya Santos (Ligay
o, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda." They learned the following day t
a) and Robert Bunda (Robert).
hat, instead of respondent, it was Francis who was killed. Thereafter, Roll
y asked Dennis to return to Ligaya the gun that Rolly used, but Dennis
rebuffed such request. Ligaya later instructed Dennis to monitor the activ
ities of respondent.[6] Hence, the Information was filed against Ligaya an
d a certain Edna Cortez. Upon further testimony of Gina, an Amended I
nformation was filed implicating more accused, including petitioner Rober
t.[7]
Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. On June 11, 20
02, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Joint Resolution directing t
he City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Informations for murd
er against the accused, holding that the prosecution witnesses' testimoni
es were not credible because of their recantation. On motion of the pro
secution, the RTC, Branch 258, issued an Order dated July 5, 2005, allow
ing the withdrawal of the Informations against the accused and consequ
ently recalling the warrants for their arrest.[8]
Respondent elevated the matter to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962. Th
e CA nullified the aforesaid Order, declaring that RTC, Branch 258, com
mitted grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Infor
mations without making an independent evaluation on the merits of the
case. On final review, this Court affirmed the CA decision in G.R. No. 15
8236 on September 1, 2004. Unsatisfied, Ligaya filed a motion for recons
ideration.[9]
Pending the resolution of her motion, Ligaya filed an Urgent Petition for
Bail before the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257, where the cases
were subsequently re-raffled to upon the inhibition of the Presiding Judg
e of Branch 258. In opposition to the motion, the prosecution presented
anew two witnesses, Sabino Frias (Sabino) and Jonas Agnote (Jonas). Sa
bino testified that, on that fateful day, he heard gunshots and saw three
armed men run towards the parked van where Ligaya was. Jonas, on t
he other hand, revealed that Ligaya approached him to contact a hired
killer who would be willing to assassinate respondent. He then contacted
a certain "Dagul" to do the job. Jonas was likewise tasked to change t
he plate number of Ligaya's van. On December 29, 2004, the RTC debu
nked the petition for bail. [10]
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 158236, the Court finally resolved petitioners' mot
ion for reconsideration, holding that the RTC, Branch 258,[11] must make
an independent evaluation of the records before allowing the withdrawal
of the Informations against petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file befo
re the RTC, Branch 257, an Urgent Motion to Resolve Anew and on the
Merits Previous Motion to Withdraw Criminal Informations Pursuant to th
e DOJ Finding on Lack of Probable Cause.[12]
The aforesaid incidents were assigned for resolution to the RTC, Branch
274, to which the case was re-raffled upon the inhibition of the Presidin
g Judge of Branch 257.[13]
On September 30, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[14] dismissing the cas
e for murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them
for their crime. Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrests and
ordered their immediate release from detention. The prosecution's motio
n for reconsideration was denied on December 28, 2005.[15]
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, claimi
ng that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no
probable cause existed against the accused.
On May 20, 2009, the CA granted the petition, the dispositive portion o
f which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders
dated 30 September 2005 and 28 December 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Paranaque City, Branch 274, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City is DIRE
CTED to cause the re-raffle of Criminal Case No. 01- 0921 for appropriat
e proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The CA concluded that the RTC turned a deaf ear to the crucial testimo
nial evidence of the prosecution that, more likely than not, the crime ch
arged was committed by the accused. It specifically pointed out that Sab
ino positively identified the accused and related in detail their supposed
participation in killing Francis. The court could not also ignore the state
ments made by Jonas at the risk of incriminating himself. With these, th
e CA found it necessary that a full blown trial be conducted to unearth
the truth behind their testimonies. In disregarding the evidence presente
d by the prosecution, the CA declared that, indeed, the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion. It, however, clarified that, in making the abov
e pronouncements, the court was not enunciating that the accused were
guilty of the crime charged.[17] For possible bias and prejudice, the cou
rt likewise ordered the inhibition of the Presiding Judge and the subseq
uent re-raffle of the case.[18]
On motion of petitioners, the CA clarified that the reversal of the RTC
Orders carried with it the reversal of the trial court's finding that petitio
ners were entitled to bail.[19]
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
(a) Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court defines what are to be appeale
d. "Appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completel
y disposes of the case." The September 30, 2005 order of the RTC of P
arañaque City dismissing the information for murder "disposes of the a
ction in its entirety and leaves nothing more to be done to complete th
e relief sought." Hence, the remedy of the People of the Philippines is a
ppeal. [Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, L-25461, October 4, 1968, 25 SCRA 431] T
he People and the private complainant did not appeal the September 3
0, 2005 Joint Order. Hence, the same became final and executory.
(b) "Once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it ca
nnot lawfully alter or modify the same especially where the alteration or
modification is material or substantial." [Samson vs. Montejo, 9 SCRA 419
; De la Cruz vs. Plaridel Surety and Insurance Co., 10 SCRA 727; Ocamp
o vs. Caluag, 19 SCRA 971]
(c) On March 24, 2006, two (2) months after the September 30, 2005 fi
nal order has become final and executory, the private complainant Fiscal
Domingo Orda, Jr. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certior
ari questioning the orders of September 30, 2005 and December 28, 20
05. Certiorari could not be a substitute for a lost appeal. "Where petitio
ner has failed to file a timely appeal from the trial court's order, it coul
d not longer avail of the remedy of the special civil action for certiorari
in lieu of his lost right of appeal." [Mabuhay Insurance & Guaranty, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 245; Mathay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 312
SCRA 91]
(d) The findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City t
hat there is no probable cause to warrant the filing of the information a
gainst the petitioners cannot be reviewed in the petition for certiorari be
cause only jurisdictional issues may be raised in a certiorari proceedings.
In a certiorari petition, "the court is confined to question of jurisdiction.
The reason is that the function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inf
erior court within its jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure
or mistakes in the judge's finding or conclusion." [Pacis vs. Averia, 18 SC
RA 907; Albert vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, Brancg VI, 23 SCRA
948; Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890]
(e) Moreover, "the findings and conclusions of the trial court command
great respect and weight because the trial court has the opportunity to
see and observe the demeanor of witnesses which the appellate court d
oes not have." [People vs. Cristobal, L-13062, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 1
51; Medina vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-151113, January 28, 1961, 1
SCRA 302; Tuason vs. Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc., L-13541, Januar
y 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 189; People vs. Sarmiento, L-19146, May 31, 1963, 8 S
CRA 263]
(f) The Joint Order of September 30, 2005 was issued by the Regional T
rial Court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court that th
Simply put, the issues for resolution are: 1) whether a special civil action
e trial court must act on the issue of probable cause using its own disc
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy
retion. Reversing the September 30, 2005 Joint Order is like reversing th
in assailing the RTC decision allowing the withdrawal of the Informations
e Supreme Court.
and consequently dismissing the case for lack of probable cause; and 2)
whether the CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against
petitioners.
(g) The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration citing S
ec. 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court providing "that an order dismissing
the action without prejudice is not appealable." The Court of Appeals rul
We grant the petition.
ed that the remedy from the finding of fact and final order dismissing t
he information "is to file a special civil action under Rule 65."

(h) The final order of September 30, 2005 does not state that the dismi
ssal is "without prejudice." There is nothing in the order of September 3
0, 2005 from which we could derive that the dismissal of the action is "
without prejudice." While it may be true that the defense of double jeo
pardy may not be invoked by the petitioners simply because they were
not yet arraigned, it does not follow that another information for murde
r could be filed against them on the same evidence that the court dism
issed the information for lack of probable cause. A new information coul
d still be filed against the petitioners but the same must not be based
on the same evidence already repudiated in the September 30, 2005 or
der.[20]
On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under R
ule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the
Order of the RTC, granting the motion of the prosecution to withdraw t
he Informations and ordering the case dismissed, is final because it disp
osed of the case and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothin
g to be done by the court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal.[21]
Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not becaus
e it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him
under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an
ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari
 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter reme
dy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 6
The task of the Presiding Judge when an Information is filed with the c
5 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or
ourt is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of a
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such se
s a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.[22]
t of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or a
ny offense included therein has been committed by the person sought t
To be sure, a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong re
o be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs t
medy. Indeed, we have noted a number of exceptions to this general ru
he facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the ru
le, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
les of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on c
dictate; 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires; 3) when the
ommon sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evide
writs issued are null and void; 4) when the questioned order amounts t
nce showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed an
o an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5) when, for persuasive rea
d that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more
sons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not co
than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify convictio
mmensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or
n.[25]
6) in other meritorious cases.[23]

Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information o

None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, we
n the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the D
apply the general rule. Respondent not having availed himself of the pr
OJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an indepen
oper remedy to assail the dismissal of the case against petitioners, the d
dent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdicti
ismissal has become final and executory.[24]
on over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and shoul

For reasons that will be discussed below, even on the merits of the cas d embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion.[26]

e, the CA erred in reversing the Orders of the RTC.

Records show that the RTC, on motion of the prosecution, allowed the
withdrawal of the Informations for murder, holding that the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies were not credible. Pursuant to the Court's Decision
in G.R. No. 158236, the RTC reviewed anew the records of the case an
d made an independent evaluation of the evidence presented to ascertai
n the existence or non-existence of probable cause to indict the petition
ers. After such evaluation, the court, on September 30, 2005, dismissed t
he case for murder against the accused, including petitioners herein, rati
ocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime.
Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrest and ordered their im
mediate release from detention. The prosecution's motion for reconsidera
tion was denied on December 28, 2005.
A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the Presiding Jud
ge allowed the withdrawal of the Informations, consequently dismissed t
he case against petitioners, and lifted the warrants for their arrest on th
e following grounds: 1) the incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina,
Ernesto and Dennis because of their subsequent recantation;[27] 2) the
improbability that Dennis and Ernesto saw and heard the conversations
of the accused in view of the counter-evidence submitted by Ligaya, sho
wing the physical set-up of her residence or building, the kind of door
she maintained thereat, and the inner private room she had;[28] 3) the l
ack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes
of determining probable cause;[29] and 4) the incredibility of the testimo
nies of Sabino and Jonas because of the absence of corroborating evide
nce.[30]
Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC did not err in finding that no
probable cause existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder
. Neither did it gravely abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. T
here was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discr
etion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refu
sal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law on the part of the Presiding Judge.[31] On the contrary, he came
to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for petitioners to c
ommit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, a
llegations and evidence on record. Said conclusion was thoroughly explai
ned in detail in the lengthy Order dated September 30, 2005. We would
like to stress that the purpose of the mandate of the judge to first det
ermine probable cause is to insulate from the very start those falsely ch
arged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a publi
c trial.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court o
f Appeals Decision dated May 20, 2009 and its Resolution dated Septem
ber 10, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 274, dated September 30, 2005 and December 28, 2
005 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE P
HILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CO
NCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUN
A PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GEN
ERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PAR
TY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTO
R VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,

vs.

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FL
ORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND vs.
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND EXECUTIVE SE
CRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

G.R. No. 209135

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 209155
vs.

FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPART

MENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN MAGTUN
AO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE P
HILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; AND
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD
, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 209136

G.R. No. 209164

MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED B
Y DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND LEONOR
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE AND
M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON. FLOREN
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE PHIL
CIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
IPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON; T
HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SE
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE

G.R. No. 209260 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PUR

ISIMA; AND THE BUREAU OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V.
DE LEON, Respondents.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,

vs.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AN
D MANAGEMENT (DBM), Respondent.
G.R. No. 209517

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN CEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST VICE
G.R. No. 209442 PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA NARTATES, FOR
HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED UNIO
N OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (CUENHA); MANUEL
BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFA
RE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF S
OCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAP-DSWD
CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC), REPRESENTED
BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIO , SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, R

N (DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF espondents.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION (

EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF T
D E C I S I O N
HE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA
(KKKMMDA), Petitioners,

vs. BERSAMIN, J.:

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND HON.
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AN
of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circul
D MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
ar (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget a
nd Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
G.R. No. 209569
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of a
n appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges
posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contrave
ned this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money po
oled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencie
s in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority und
er Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings
to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of
the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the inte
rjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside
of the Executive.
Antecedents
What has precipitated the controversy?
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privileg
e speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as "i
ncentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the
DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part
of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds released to
the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the D
BM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified
that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters
of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases fr
om the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been institut
ed in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had cause
d the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He ex
plained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unrele
ased appropriations under Personnel Services;2 (2) unprogrammed funds;
(3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to s
upport faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases
had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) t
he pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Servic
es4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zer
o based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allot
ments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier
released to the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of sa
vings,6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, whic
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuance
h granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his offi
s relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G
ce in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Sa
.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on
vings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure A
October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas),8 on October 16, 2013; G.R.
ppropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Ad
No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on
ministrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAA
October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R.
s) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of
No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE),
savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in th
on November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 201
e use of savings.
3.

As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s atten
as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained i
tion NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdra
n the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
wal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging th
at NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the
agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing a
DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first ti
nd current allotments.
me, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues agains
t the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger
over Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spend
In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through
ing meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
money to a representative’s district"7 – excited the Nation as heatedly a
s the pork barrel controversy.
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issu
es raised and joined.
Issues
Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of t
he parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to w
it:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper rem
edies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acce
leration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all
other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP. Subsumed in
this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determinati
on, and the standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitu
tion, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury exce
pt in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuan
ces allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 198
7 Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments w
ithdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used in
Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2
013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs no
t provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2)
the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public accou
ntability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes
the release of funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a tempor
ary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No
. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogram
med funds in order to support its argument regarding the President’s p
ower to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing un
programmed funds to support projects under the DAP was considerably
discussed. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209
442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their respective memo
randa. Hence, an additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as foll
ows:
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP
was in accord with the GAAs.
During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court direct
ed Sec. Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that h
ad been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or aban
doned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certifi
ed copy of the President’s directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in
NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to the DA
P.9
In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:
(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 2
5, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances a
nd their Realignment);10
(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to t
he DAP, namely:
a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Fun
ds for FY 2011);
b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of
Funds for FY 2012);
c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 3
0, 2012);
d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Fu
nds for FY 2013);
e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Tr
eatment of Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);
f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Gui
delines on the Submission of Quarterly Accountability Reports on Appro
priations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);
g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund
Release System in the Government).
(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from disco
ntinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation from 2011 t
o 2013
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on
January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents not
yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Mem
bers, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understandi
ng the factual bases of the DAP, to wit:
(1) First Evidence Packet11 – containing seven memoranda issued by the
DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the 116 D
AP identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as foll
ows:
a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Prop
osed Disbursement Acceleration Program (Projects and Sources of Funds)
;
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus A
uthority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment);
c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authori
ty to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);
d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of
funds for other priority projects and expenditures of the Government);
e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed P
riority Projects and Expenditures of the Government);
f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authorit
y to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to Fu
nd the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration Program); and
g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding f
or the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).
(2) Second Evidence Packet12 – consisting of 15 applications of the DAP,
with their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and
appropriation covers;
(3) Third Evidence Packet13 – containing a list and descriptions of 12 pr
ojects under the DAP;
(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 – identifying the DAP-related portions of th
e Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for 2011 an
d 2012;
(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 – containing a letter of Department of Transp
ortation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to Se
c. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from his agency, inclusiv
e of annexes; and
(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 – a print-out of the Solicitor General’s visual
presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.
On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence Packet,
18 which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses o
f such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal base
s thereof.
On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in f
urther compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:
(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury
to the effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue
targets for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising fro
m sources not considered in the original revenue targets, which certificat
ions were required for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provi
ded in Special Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI, and Article XL
V of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savi
ngs of the Executive Department for the use of the Constitutional Com
missions and other branches of the Government, as well as the fund rel
eases to the Senate and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
RULING
I.
Procedural Issue:
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and inclu
de applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunc
tion or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the
petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition
G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari
G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition
The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe f
or adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the parties;19
that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations
were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of
the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their bein
g taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal st
anding to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the
DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the t
axing or spending power of Congress;20 and that even if the petitioners
 had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity
of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA
) or in the trial courts.21
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohi
bition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality an
d validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances i
mplementing the DAP.22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no
authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or co
ntroversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the const
itutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; t
hat for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any
act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that
court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that,
in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and
NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opi
nion that no court can validly render.23
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual sit
uations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in t
he COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of t
he trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial
courts by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final
order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of t
he Rules of Court.24
The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue ar
e bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforcea
ble, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such low
er courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congr
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settl
ess concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that cour
e actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable
t, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of th
and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cann
e repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constituti
ot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband compla
onally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise
ined that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Co
of the legislative power.
urt said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that sh
e is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to
discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the court
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by ac
s of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
tual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity." This is
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
why the first part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Ju
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack o
dicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies inv
r excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of t
olving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable…
he Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforcea
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical q
ble.
uestions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has
, also, another important function. The powers of government are gener
ally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and indep
the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
endent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine w
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a fo
hether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
rmer Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed
provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:–
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the age
ncies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In o
ther words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without juri
sdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdi
ction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton
matters of this nature.
which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse
to decide those political questions. But do I understand it right that this
is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases which are not
actual yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition f
or declaratory relief.
May I ask the Commissioner’s opinion about that?

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that t MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant decl

he courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this natur aratory judgments.

e, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold em

phasis supplied)26
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judici
al power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lo

Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion wer courts as may be created by law.

clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:–

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the d

uty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies…" The term "actual
controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to ide
ntify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a differe
nce.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases
but where there is a question as to whether the government had auth
ority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court
has the duty to decide.27
Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power o
f judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaini
ng the allocation of powers among the three great branches of Govern
ment. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission,28 Justic
e Jose P. Laurel intoned:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great lan
dmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not ent
irely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several department and among the int
egral or constituent units thereof.
x x x x
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitutio
n itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the ration
al way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional bound
aries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it do
es not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only a
sserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitutio
n to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which th
at instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the po
wer of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x29
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amountin
g to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrume
ntality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining
and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibitio
n, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exis
ts under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the jud
gments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections a
nd the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present
system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Tru
st Company:30
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the wr
it of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, comman
ding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a c
ause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and spee
dy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine fro
m an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment was
rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if all
owed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner
to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted with
out authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of l
aw. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court
was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding accordi
ng to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial
or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains
much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, h
owever, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largel
y regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of C
ourt in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an infe
rior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingl
y provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:
x x x x
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of juris
diction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amo
unting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is
not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial pow
er was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passio
n or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board e
vaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jur
isdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact tha
t it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action o
f an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the l
ower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court its
elf.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of p
rohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:33
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an ex
traordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function
s, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings whe
n said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s j
urisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and ther
e is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial funct
ions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, t
he purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the l
imits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice i
n orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief agai
nst usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in
the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizan
ce the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law,
or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course
of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief s
ought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action f
or its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respon
dents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in
excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial co
urt through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohi
bition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certio
rari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction commit
ted not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judici
al, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and r
estrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, eve
n if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial funct
ions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second p
aragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the act
s of legislative and executive officials.34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right a
nd undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exc
ess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, t
he Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the c
hallenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Cou
rt has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with
both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, t
he validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustmen
t is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barr
el, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty.
We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in
order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chi
ef Executive’s spending power.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review were
complied with
The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the fol
lowing, namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable controversy
before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for a
djudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest oppor
tunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.36
The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power by the Court.37 An actual case or controversy,
in the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38
x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of op
posite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforc
ed on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requir
ement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already
ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act b
eing challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challen
ging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the pictur
e, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threa
tened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts
will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions
, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questio
ns."
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. T
he incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionali
ty of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a co
nflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requi
site ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already
being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitio
ners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of
the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that
public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an act
ual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.
It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral ar
guments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Hon
ors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully serv
ed its purpose, the Administration’s economic managers have recommen
ded its termination to the President. x x x."39
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP
as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the c
hallenges to the DAP’s constitutionality, viz:
DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present case
s brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge s
hould no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, b
ut at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements und
er the now defunct policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and cho
ose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full deta
ils we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cauti
ous in limiting the constitutional authority of the President and the Legis
lature to respond to the dynamic needs of the country and the evolving
demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our elected r
epresentatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure an
d democratic principles.40
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable c
ontroversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41
 e concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,44 where the Court said:
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program
was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated case
s. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with th
despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening e
e determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-pr
vents, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
esent need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court t
when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
o correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the e
paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requir
fficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public servic
ed the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar
e. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stak
and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet eva
e in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Phi
ding review.42
lippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:

Assuming that the petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged suc
ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely com
h a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
e under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from ex
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon wh
ercising its power of judicial review.
ich the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. H
Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
e must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act i
s invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaini

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to ng some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely tha

"a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."43 Th t he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the pers
on complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privile
ge to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected t
o some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted
the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public act
ion had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would
assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial inte
rest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury a
s a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, M
anila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese Leag
ue of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being
a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exerci
se of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the C
ourt liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental import
ance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the dir
ect injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Aranet
a v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court d
ecided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far reac
hing implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the s
uit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been
adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators
, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests
on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Altho
ugh such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action com
plained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstra
tes in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Co
urt in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen o
r taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the iss
ue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities no
netheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" s
tanding in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beaucha
mp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in
a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, th
e plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the lat
ter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by th
e New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter
of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at le
ast the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public gri
evance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan hel
d that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in co
urts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied."45
The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc.46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitu
tional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other go
vernment act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest."
Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners h
ave invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issua
nce and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved t
he illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing t
he further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287
(Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens
to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitati
ons on the political branches of the Government.47
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recogni
zed its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawye
r. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty
to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the questi
on in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association
of all lawyers in this country."49
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has establis
hed sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer lo
cus standi on each of them.
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the pow
er of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of tra
nscendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Court’s ex
ercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious con
stitutional questions raised."50

II.
Substantive Issues
1.
Overview of the Budget System
An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the C
ourt in properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.
a) Origin of the Budget System
The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that
had derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse).51
In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act)
defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government f
or a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated rec
eipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to b
e effective based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal
years. The term was given a different meaning under Republic Act No.
992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of
the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the public t
ogether with the estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or
benefit.52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified
as the financial plan of the Government,53 or "the master plan of gover
nment."54
The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economie
s. In reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed
from the creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory a
nd sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions
that required public expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public ex
penditures were spent for war activities, preservation of peace and order
, security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods
and services.56 In order to finance those expenditures, the State raised r
evenues through taxes and impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became neces
sary to allocate public revenues for specific government functions.58 The
State’s budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years wit
h the growing functions of its government and changes in its market ec
onomy.
The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western pu
blic financial institutions. This is because of the country’s past as a colon
y successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time.
Many aspects of the country’s public fiscal administration, including its B
As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget
udget System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and exp
procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
eriences of the western public financial institutions. At any rate, the Phili
enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by President
ppine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that
Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to
are vital to the development of a progressive democratic government,
serve as the agency that carried out the President’s responsibility of pre
namely: (1) to carry on all government activities under a comprehensive
paring the budget.62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect
fiscal plan developed, authorized and executed in accordance with the C
on January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The la
onstitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public manag
w also provided a line-item budget as the framework of the Governmen
ement; and (2) to provide for the periodic review and disclosure of the
t’s budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance of a "balanced
budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons entru
budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing revenues.
sted by law with the responsibility as well as the enlightened citizenry ca
n determine the adequacy of the budget actions taken, authorized or pr
oposed, as well as the true financial position of the Government.59 CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4,
1954 of Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced perform
ance-budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in
b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System
terms of expected results.64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the role of the
Budget Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government.65

The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of th
e American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A Bud
The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series
get Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones L
of budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177 t
aw to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the responsibility
hat President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued
to assist in the preparation of an executive budget for submission to th
on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission i
e Philippine Legislature.60
nto the Ministry of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet me
mber.
The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Ma
nagement (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM pursua
nt to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.
c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66
Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budg
et Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Acco
untability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they ove
rlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
c.1.Budget Preparation67
The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a
Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters e
arlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) a
s well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies i
n the preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget
Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addres
sed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a C
orporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and
-controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (G
FIs).
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and
agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. T
o boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the v
arious departments and agencies to partner with civil society organizatio
ns and other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budg
et Proposals, which proposals are then presented before a technical pan
el of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various depart
ments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend their budget pr
oposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals an
d come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board, comp
rised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials. The discussio
ns of the Executive Review Board cover the prioritization of programs an
d their corresponding support vis-à-vis the priority agenda of the Nation
al Government, and their implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the
National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and S
ources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for
 each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and
is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected P
rograms and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs in
the NEP, especially those in line with the National Government’s develo
pment plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of
each department and agency, including the number of positions and am
ounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC
to the President and the Cabinet for further refinements or reprioritizatio
n. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the
Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for submission to Co
ngress. The budget documents consist of: (1) the President’s Budget Mes
sage, through which the President explains the policy framework and bu
dget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution,68 which contains the macroeconomic assumptions, public se
ctor context, breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the
fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categ
ories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current oper
ating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulne
ss lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Go
vernment, including investments in the capital of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.69 Current operating expen
ditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption
the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal year.70 The two
components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS),
and those for maintenance and other operating expenses(MOOE).
Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their function
s into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agri
culture and natural resources, transportation and communications, comm
erce and industry, and other economic development efforts);71 (2) social
services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on e
ducation, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and others);72 (
3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expe
nditures for the general government, legislative services, the administratio
n of justice, and for pensions and gratuities);73 (4) national defense exp
enditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security expenditures and expend
itures for the maintenance of peace and order);74 and (5) public debt.75
Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of
funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund.76
On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and
cover all income or receipts of the government treasury used to suppo
rt government expenditures.77
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on t
wo principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defray…the neces
sary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund
which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which
is independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the re
venue of the people."78 Adam Smith’s classification relied on the two as
pects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with
an artificial personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or entity p
ossessing supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold p
roperty and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi pri
vate income or revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereig
voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its operati
on on specific purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do
not require any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient);82 (
4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by
government corporations and local governments and the receipts and sh
ares in income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts);83
and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generall
y with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of the Government i
n general, including the National Government and its political subdivision
s).84
More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows:85
General Income

n." Under the second aspect, the State could collect by imposing charge 1. Subsidy Income from National
s on the revenues of its subjects in the form of taxes.79
Government

2. Subsidy from Central Office

In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the followi
3. Subsidy from Regional
ng sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to finan
ce government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales Office/Staff Bureaus
of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and gains o
4. Income from Government
n such sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equ
Services
ipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3) grants(i.e.,
5. Income from Government 1. Income Taxes

Business Operations 2. Property Taxes

6. Sales Revenue 3. Taxes on Goods and Services

7. Rent Income 4. Taxes on International Trade and

8. Insurance Income Transactions

9. Dividend Income 5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue

10. Interest Income 7. Other Specific Income

11. Sale of Confiscated Goods and

Properties c.2. Budget Legislation86

12. Foreign Exchange (FOREX)

Gains The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the ti
me Congress receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the N
13. Miscellaneous Operating and
EPand the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA. This phase i
Service Income s also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the signifi

14. Fines and Penalties-Government cant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.

Services and Business Operations

15. Income from Grants and Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representativ
es’ Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations Com
Donations
mittee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget he
Specific Income arings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter
, the House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GA Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct veto,91 or ar
B).87 e identified for conditional implementation.

The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Represe If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
ntatives’ Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary sessi the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal ye
on. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before t ar shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until
he House of Representatives’ version is transmitted to the Senate.88 the GAB is passed by the Congress.92

After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on t c.3. Budget Execution93
he GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committe
e hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives’ deliberation
s. The Senate’s Finance Committee and its Sub-Committees may submit With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the impleme

the proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate onl ntation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the funct

y after the House of Representatives has formally transmitted its version ion of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, n

to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on T amely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds;

hird Reading.89 (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release a
llotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.

The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel ea

ch to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of disc The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by t

ussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the he DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are require

GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the Pr d to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and

esident for approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the
 monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of
obligations that are not yet due and demandable.
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a
Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments issued i
n general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly
and annual disbursement levels.
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issu
ed by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in t
hat the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotme
nts may be released in two forms – through a comprehensive Agency B
udget Matrix (ABM),94 or, individually, by SARO.95
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized t
o incur obligations96 on behalf of the Government in order to impleme
nt their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of
personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services,
and using utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issu
es a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment
of the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically i
ssued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which issua
nce is based upon an agency’s submission of its Monthly Cash Program
and other required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum amount
of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for th
e period indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cas
h Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a
Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas operation
s to allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their o
perating requirements.
Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Bu
dget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the Modified
Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the
National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability98
Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensur
es that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently utilize
d to achieve the State’s socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to
assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the purpo
se of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1)
performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)
review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commissi
on on Audit(COA).
2.
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Admin
istration.99 The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress represents the Administration’s "blueprint for public policy" and
reflects the Government’s goals and strategies.100 As such, the national
budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Gover
nment in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for w
hich specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.101 Em
bodied in every national budget is government spending.102
When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made
efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus o
f his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fis
cal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to
July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government project implem
entation and payment schedules.103 The World Bank observed that the
Philippines’ economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth co
uld be weakened should the Government continue with its underspendin
g and fail to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The econ
omic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved the way for t
he development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package i
ntended to fast-track public spending and to push economic growth by
investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "saving
s" generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds.105 I
n that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-makin
g" to stimulate the economy by way of accelerated spending.106 The Ad
ministration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) strea
mlining the implementation process through the clustering of infrastructu
re projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) a
nd the Department of Education (DepEd),and (2) front loading PPP-relate
d projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108
Did the stimulus package work?
 How the Administration’s economic managers conceptualized and develo
ped the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains unknown
The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial i
because the relevant documents appear to be scarce.
mplementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially successfu
l. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points t
o GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011.110 The continued impleme
The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was t
ntation of the DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while inf
he memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the approv
rastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 34% growt
al of the President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum,
h as of September 2013.111
which contained a list of the funding sources for ₱72.11 billion and of th
e proposed priority projects to be funded,115 reads:

The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a pol

icy instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies t
EN BANC
owards growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on p
ublic infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability
for prospective investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chos G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
en for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy
and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3)
translation into disbursements.114 FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NE
W BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AN
D BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
b. History of the implementation of

the DAP, and sources of funds

D E C I S I O N
under the DAP
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this
Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Decla
ratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Co
uncil (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts b
efore they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the groun
d that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discreti
on.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Ju
dge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblaci
on, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. O
n September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Ju
dge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selecti
on and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in
the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitio
ner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his
non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclu
sion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a lett
er3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was dul
y noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his na
me in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing
policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, a
mong others, incumbent judges who have served in their current positio
n for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only
for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the pe
titioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed th
e qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) t
he JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due pro
cess clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement
violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights f
or Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that t
he requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and sh
ould be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualific
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring fi
ations for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress,
ve years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practi
as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
ce of law.

Ruling of the Court

In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC
7 and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8separately submitted thei Procedural Issues:

r Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they
essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the ass
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary t
ailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process claus
o first determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and
es. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot iss
mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was pr
ue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
oper.
Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the reme
dy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The presen
has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal prote
t Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and corre
ction clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judg
cting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictio
es who have served at least five years and those who have served less
n. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and b
than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (
oth are governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Caroli
4) there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal i
na P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,10 t
n nature.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
his Court explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohi
The Issue bition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certio
rari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction commit
ted not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judici
al, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and r
estrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, eve
n if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial funct
ions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second p
aragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the act
s of legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a t
ribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted
in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any perf
ormance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the form
ulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's cons
titutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virt
ue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provi
des that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the auth
ority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that
the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity a
re observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules
are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do t
hey have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to confor
m to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution
of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it t
hat the rules are followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and proced
ures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the C
ourt, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inq
uire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rul
es.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner i
n assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper
because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of c
andidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusi
on in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct inju
ry.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be t
he imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.13 The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal rig
ht to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty
on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mand
amus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discreti
on and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise
of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems
to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The
function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judici
al positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot
claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial
vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that o
ne's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. O
ne's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of
the JBC, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qua
lifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlemen
t or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of candidat
es for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a rec
ommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the fo
rmer to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its discr
etion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Ind
eed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list
of candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduc
ed to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening,
and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but also imprope
r. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in
the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the sel
ection of nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusi
on is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege t
he conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, th
at is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second level court. There
is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-
level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not prop
erly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of s
ound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for decl
aratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will
, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected b
y a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of th
e parties' rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is
to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enf
orcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged
breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsoun
d policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that
the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants alth
ough he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Co
urt reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constituti
on to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. T
he opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and
not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any p
erson. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the inciden
ts of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot
claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief e
ven if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of de
claratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RT
C pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdictio
n over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set
aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.c
hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recom
mend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC
in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the l
atter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with
a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines
the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987
Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and pr
ocedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
s the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities ex
pected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year require
ment policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and inci
dental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and in

cidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending n There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basi

ominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. s to screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed

However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among

that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carr the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual o

ying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standard r class.

s/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, sub
ject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the uni
law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessaril
versal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction;
y requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit a
what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined accordi
mong the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled licen
ng to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law n
se to act in performing its duties.
either burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classi
fication stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitim

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up ate government end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administr

ation of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish
a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meet
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification o
f individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary."22 "The mere f
act that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of perso
ns or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement
and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven compet
ence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of
these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been task
ed to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain
that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitab
ly best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shiel
ded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undese
rving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualifie
d."25
number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine prov
en competence which may be measured by experience, among other fac
tors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less than five year
s, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows:chanroblesvirtual
lawlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely
under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed
with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refe
r to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level c
ourt, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a di
rect adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a
premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applyin
g one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member
of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining competence,
the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and performan
ce.

Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommen

Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of
ded appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection cl
first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to s
ause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years o
econd-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as indicativ
f service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The
e of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is consid
ered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills fo
r the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved proced
ures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work envir
onment, and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integri
ty, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JB
C's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, an
d reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct
, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisi
ons must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rect
itude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of pr
omotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to as
sess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the b
ench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only
factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be a
ppointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither aut
omatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The ap
plicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated base
d on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned
policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rat
ional basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist
between lower court judges with five year experience and those with le
ss than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitima
te purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not in
fringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classif
ication intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. The
refore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due pr
ocess for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (O
NAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying j
udges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not
be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR
is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive b
ranch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervisi
on of the Supreme Court,28 it is not covered by the publication require
ments of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as ju
dges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second
-level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication
is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules t
hat are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding fo
rce and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requiremen
t of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely inter
nal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative ag
ency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the r
ules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performan
ce of their duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assaile
d policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determi
ne proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, b
ecause if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the
JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawy
ers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to ser
ve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a n
atural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to pre
pare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the
Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writi
ng and listed the guidelines in determining competence, independence, i
ntegrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides
that applicants for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should,
as a general rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judg
e, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN T
HE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Counc
il should consider the following in evaluating the merits of applicants for
a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a
judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he has in his favor outstand
ing credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive scholastic or educa
tional record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputati
on for honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least ver
e-year requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional provisi
on requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not preju

y satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years preceding the filing diced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the

of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate j petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for j

udgeship. udicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legall
y demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a ju
x x x x (Emphasis ours) dicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discreti
on of the JBC.30
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been
duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of genera
l circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere inte
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completi
rnal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be pu
on of the prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or p
blished. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for d
romotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petitio
etermining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and s
n, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that
hould have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did
JBC unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guideli
nes for applicants to the RTC.

Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed poli
cy violates the constitutional provision under social justice and human ri
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute shoul
ghts for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG explained:chanroble
d be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the fiv
svirtuallawlibrary
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportu
nities. The constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the J
udiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As
with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is
no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the constitutional an
d legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigoro
us screening and selection process. They must submit themselves to the
selection criteria, processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has
the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a
fair opportunity is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the
basis of their individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established
a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Th
e petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position
of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for tha
t office nor to be selected and included in the list to be submitted to t
he President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has t
he power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post.
To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only b
e chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, pros
pective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable
right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not j
ustified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, scre
ening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to t
he Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perfor
m such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues
various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evalua
tion of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensur
e that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its dis
cretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensu
re that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influ
ence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five
years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potent
ial applicants, however, should have been informed of the requirements
to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and co
mply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons t
o do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's
powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
latter.cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,
however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the pub
lication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of expe
rience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judi
cial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.