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NO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCESS BETWEEN HER AND HER

HUSBAND AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 255, THE CHILD IS PRIMA


FACIE PRESUMED TO BE ILLEGITIMATE
Antonio Macadangdang v. CA and Elizabeth Mejias
G.R. No. L-49542,September 12, 1980
MAKASIAR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne
in mind:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:


(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception
of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her
husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is
that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not
be proved in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —


(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.

Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical


impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a
way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;

(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the
child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her
husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears
highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For
the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal
case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of Antonio,
which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. And ordered Antonio to
give a monthly support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of
majority. This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The records show that respondent Elizabeth is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio
sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Rolando Macadangdang.The records also disclose that, respondent (then plaintiff)
filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant)
with the Court of First Instance of Davao. Defendant (now petitioner)
Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its
dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing
certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed.
The lower court dismissed the complain.

The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and thus declared minor
Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio.

ISSUE:
Will Rolando be conclusively presumed the legitimate son of spouses Elizabeth
and Crispin?
RULING:
YES. Rolando is conclusively presumed the son of the Spouses herein. The
following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in
mind:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:


(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception
of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her
husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is
that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not
be proved in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —


a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.

Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical


impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:


[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a
way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the
child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her
husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears
highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For
the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal
case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).

Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial
to the resolution of the status of Rolando. What should really matter is the fact
that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the renamed child,no concrete or even substantial proof
was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent
and her spouse. Respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to
Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's
house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her
mother's place. It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner
and right after her delivery, respondent went to her mother's house in Samal for
treatment. Rolando was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after
March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent
and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there
really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent
and Crispin had already four children; hence, they had been married years before
such date. The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days
following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the
alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.

Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate son of respondent and her husband.The fact that the child was born a
mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and
respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from
indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.

Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and
may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of
access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be
caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of
the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the
presumption.

Wherefore, Rolando is the legitimate son of the spouses.

DATILES, JANETH A.
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED
FILIATION BY ANY OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT
AND SPECIAL LAWS, ACCORDING TO THE CIVIL CODE, OR "BY EVIDENCE
OR PROOF IN HIS FAVOR
Casimiro Mendoza v. CA and Teopista Toring Tuñacao
G.R. No. 86302,September 24, 1991
CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the
Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

FACTS:
Teopista claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro, but the latter
denied her claim until his dying day. The trial court believed Casimiro and
dismissed Teopista’s complaint for compulsory recognition. The CA did not and
reversed the judgment of the trial court. The issue is before SC on certiorari.

The complaint was filed by Teopista, daughter of Brigida Toring, and Casimiro,
who is married at that time. She averred that Casimiro recognized her as an
illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and
privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. Casimiro then already 91 years old,
specifically denied the allegations. Teopista testified that it was her mother who
told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with
her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house.
When she married Valentin, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him
to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito, to
build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her
brother, Vicente. Casimiro also opened a joint savings account with her as a
co-depositor. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took
the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing
Margarita. Lolito corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his
grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw
each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to
his house and give him jackfruits. When his grandfather learned that he was
living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's
land.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of
Casimiro and knew Brigida. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart.
Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually
resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista.
Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism.
Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. Isaac
testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father
Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida, so informed him.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida,
declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy,
who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista,
and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted
Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot.

ISSUE:
Is Teopista the illegitimate child of Casimiro?

RULING:
YES. Teofista is the illegitimate child of Casimiro. It should have probed this
matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as
follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro,the court find that she has
nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the CA did not take into account that an illegitimate
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence
or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff
himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the
daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court.

The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely,
the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both
dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the
complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and
Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the defendants and Casimiro has
been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was
mentioned as one of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.

To consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the respondent and
her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the
hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later
sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband,
the permission he gave Lolito to build a house on his land after he found that the
latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings
account Casimiro opened with Teopista, the court can reasonably conclude that
Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

By the virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other


circumstances of this case, 'Teopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as
such. In so holding, to give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family
Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate
children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed
status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the
facilities of modern medicine and technology.

Therefore, Teopista is the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro and entitled to all
the rights appurtenant to such status.

DATILES, JANETH A.
CONCEPTION OF THE CHILD MUST HAVE TAKEN PLACE ABOUT 267 DAYS
BEFORE BIRTH
Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino, the latter represented
herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian v. Ivan Mendez
and CA
G.R. No. 57227, May 14, 1992
BIDIN, J.:

DOCTRINE :
Citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that
"the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception
must be close to 267 days",

FACTS:
The CFI ordered Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael as his
illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3)
to pay complainant Amelita the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages;
and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs. The CA dismissed
Amelita's complaint and set aside the CFI’s resolution. A petition filed for review
on certiorari.

It appears on record that Amelita filed an action for acknowledgment, support


and damages against private respondent Ivan. Amelita alleges, among others,
that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's
Restaurant, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first
meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was
billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that
Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock
in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed,
that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel
room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is
a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which
Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that
Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father
of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because
of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan
is a prosperous businessman of Davao City.As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having
sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her.

ISSUE:
May Amelita claim for an acknowledgment and support of her child to Ivan?
RULING:
NO. Amelita cannot claim for an acknowledment and support, citing medical
science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close
to 267 days".

Amelita has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael. Michael is a full-term baby born on
August 3, 1975. The conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place
about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of
November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in
November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own
evidence, the letter, addressed to Ivan requesting for a conference, prepared by
her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the
attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory,
informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the
period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about
October 11, 1974.

Amelita’s assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend is belied, her own
letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her
attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend.
She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so
she left her work. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her
affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the
complaint must be dismissed.

Hence, Amelita cannot claim for an acknowledgment and support of her child
from Ivan.

DATILES, JANETH A.
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE NOT AN AUTHENTIC DOCUMENT TO PROVE
THE LEGITIMATE FILIATION
Federica Aballe, in her behalf and in behalf of her minor sons, Rodolfo
Santiago and June Jose Santiago v. Fortunato Santiago
G.R. No. L-16307, April 30, 1963
PAREDES, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The canonical baptismal certificates Exhs. A & B, could not help appellants’ cause
at all, for they do not constitute the authentic document to prove the legitimate
filiation of the children.

FACTS:
The lower court finds that Federica has not established any evidence to justify the
claim for support and successional right under Art. 287 of the Civil Code, as well
as the claim for moral damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Thus, Federica
appealed directly to the SC.

Federica has testified, that she and Fortunato, lived together, as husband and
wife. As a consequence of this relation, a baby boy named Rodolfo was born to
her on February 5, 1948, as shown by the baptismal certificate issued by the
Parish Priest of Sagay, Negros Occidental. After the birth of her first child, she
continued cohabiting with the defendant and on June 4, 1953, another baby boy,
named June Jose , was born to her, as shown by baptismal certificate , issued by
Fr. Fortich, Parish Priest of San Sebastian Cathedral, Bacolod City. During all this
period, the defendant was commuting between Bacolod City and Toboso, and
during his absence, he used to send her various notes. After the birth of the
second child, plaintiff learned that the defendant was married, so she separated
from him and since then she had been staying in Barrio Santo Niño, Bacolod City,
in a house that was bought for her by the defendant, sometime in January, 1957.

Fortunato, on the other hand, denied the whole testimony of Federica . He


declared that the minors, Rodolfo and June Jose, surnamed Santiago, were not
his children; that the notes were not written by him and that he had not
acknowledged or done any act tending to acknowledged the two minors, the
rights of whom are under consideration, as his illegitimate children.

The lower court dismissed the action, without costs. Federica appealed directly to
this Court.

ISSUE:
May the baptismal certificate constitute as an authentic document to prove the
legitimate filiation?
RULING:
NO. The baptismal certificate do not constitute as an authentic document to
prove the legitimate filiation, the canonical baptismal certificates Exhs. A & B,
could not help appellants’ cause at all, for they do not constitute the authentic
document to prove the legitimate filiation of the children.

The material evidence presented by Federica regarding the fact that she became
the common-law wife of Fortunato in 1947 up to an including 1952 ; the paternity
of the minors Rodolfo and June Jose ; and of the fact that the said minors were
supported by Fortunato since their birth until March, 1957 not being denied by
Fortunato are deemed impliedly admitted by him. . .

Fortunato stated that he had no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the


truth of the averments contained therein and specifically denied the said three
causes of action. At the trial, the defendant denied all the statements made by
Federica , as well as the documentary evidence presented. This being the fact,
there is no way of applying the provisions of the rule and the jurisprudence,
regarding admission by silence, cited by Federica.

The fact that Federica appealed directly to this Court, and are deemed to have
waived all factual issues, thus submitting the case on questions of law only. The
factual findings and conclusions of the lower court perforce will have to be
admitted. And the trial Judge, dismissed the complaint because the canonical
baptismal certificates Exhs. A & B, could not help appellants’ cause at all, for they
do not constitute the authentic document to prove the legitimate filiation of the
children , appears to be envelopes addressed to the defendant, crumpled, soiled
and empty, which could have been secured by Federica from anywhere, without
the knowledge and consent of the defendant; are fragmentary pencil notes on
different papers and are without any signature on them, except some illegible
initials; contains a writing which reads "darls" meaning "darling" and has a
complimentary ending "darling", but no signature appears below them. As found
by the trial judge, none of these papers mentions the two minor plaintiffs to be
the illegitimate children of the defendant, and no amorous manifestations,
pretensions or references between the parties are shown in them; the plaintiff
failed to prove that the handwriting on them belonged to the defendant; that the
testimony of the plaintiff, uncorroborated as it was, had been denied by the
defendant; and notwithstanding her allegation that in 1952, she learned that the
defendant was a married man, she did not take immediate action against him; it
was only on June 18, 1959 (almost seven years) that she filed her present
complaint, after having been given, according to her, a house by the defendant in
1957 — all of which had compelled the trial judge to dismiss the complaint.

Wherefore, baptismal certificate do not constitute as an authentic document to


prove the legitimate filiation of the children.

DATILES, JANETH A.
THE RIGHTS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AROSE NOT BECAUSE SHE WAS
THE TRUE OR REAL CHILD OF HER PARENTS BUT BECAUSE UNDER THE
LAW, SHE HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED OR ACKNOWLEDGED AS SUCH A
CHILD
Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v. CA, Cipriano Naval and Benita C.
Naval
G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:
Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or any authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary
recognition already established which did not need any judicial pronouncement
(Gut, 68 Phil. 385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061). In Javelona v. Onteclaro,
74 Phil. 393, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between voluntary
recognition and compulsory recognition. In the first place, a voluntary
recognition is made in a public document, whereas in the indubitable writing
under Article 135 is a private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The father
would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a public document than in
a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of the child as his in a public
document deserves full faith and credit. In the second place, in an action on
Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural child merely asks for a share in the
inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such, and is not trying
to compel the father or his heirs to make the acknowledgment, whereas the
action based on Article 135 is to compel the father or his heirs to recognize the
child. In the former case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of the document makes judicial
pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter case, recognition is yet to be
ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty
and higher authenticity of a public document is not self- executory. A judgment in
favor of the status of a natural child according to Art. 135 must therefore be
based on an express recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing.
At this juncture, it is to be noted that an action based on voluntary
acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father, but not an action
to compel acknowledgment, as a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows
the liberality of the law as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness toward
compulsory acknowledgment.

FACTS:
The lower court and CA declared Benita a duly acknowledged and recognized
illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro, therefore, entitled to participate in the
partition of the properties left by by his father Eustaquio. A petition for review
on certiorari filed to SC, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
It appears that defendant Benita , a child of Eustaquio and Pricola , was born on
March 27, 1919 . Eustaquio , who caused the registration of said birth gave the
date indicated in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita’s baptismal
certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio and Pricola. When
Eustaquio died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the
family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita . On this score, the
plaintiffs admitted that Benita is the forced and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio
Castro in other 2 Civil Cases filed by the plaintiffs . Pricola, the natural mother of
Benita , was wedded to Felix de Maya against her wishes on May 23, 1913. While
the celebration of the wedding was going on, the guests soon found out that
Pricola surreptitiously left the party and went to the house of her first cousin
Bernarda, and there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix . That
evening Pricola united with her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of
Benita. After the death of Pricola, Benita was only five years old, she continued to
live with her father Eustaquio until his death on August 22, 1961. Moreover, when
Benita got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio who gave her away in
marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of by her father.

During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in this
case is as to whether or not defendant Benita is the acknowledged natural child of
Eustaquio . In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita was allowed to introduce
evidence to show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of
Eustaquio .

ISSUE:
Is Benita was acknowledged and recognized by Eustaquio?

RULING:
YES. Benita was acknowledged and recognized by Eustaquio. Recognition shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any
authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary recognition already
established which did not need any judicial pronouncement (Gut, 68 Phil. 385;
Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061). In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the
Supreme Court clarified the distinction between voluntary recognition and
compulsory recognition. In the first place, a voluntary recognition is made in a
public document, whereas in the indubitable writing under Article 135 is a private
document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The father would ordinarily be more careful
about what he said in a public document than in a private writing, so that even an
incidental mention of the child as his in a public document deserves full faith and
credit. In the second place, in an action on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the
natural child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having
been acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to
make the acknowledgment, whereas the action based on Article 135 is to compel
the father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the former case, acknowledgment
has been formally and legally accomplished because the public character of the
document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter case,
recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking
the stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is not self-
executory. A judgment in favor of the status of a natural child according to Art.
135 must therefore be based on an express recognition so found and declared by
the court after hearing. At this juncture, it is to be noted that an action based on
voluntary acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father, but. not
an action to compel acknowledgment, as a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code)
which shows the liberality of the law as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness
toward compulsory acknowledgment.
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she
must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal
principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights
from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation
or blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent. In other
words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true or
real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.

A birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be


signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother
alone otherwise she may be penalized. Applying the more liberal provisions of the
new Family Code considering the facts and equities of this case. First, Benita is
unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio . From her birth on March 27,
1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with
her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no
special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola were the only
immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a
legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita. Third, it was Eustaquio
himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no
indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart
from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and
seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal
steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural
child during the reglementary period to do so. Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave
away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano. The couple continued to live with the
father even after the wedding and until the latter's death. Fifth, the certificate of
baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may
not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code but they add to the
equities of this case favoring the petitioner.

Therefore, Benita is an acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio.

DATILES, JANETH A.
ACTION TO IMPUGN THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD
De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Dizon
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
VITUG, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if
the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his
heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of
the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for
bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan
G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in March 1992,
leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory
and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent,


including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina
de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon
entitled to inherit from him

RULING:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
valid marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also
identified Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and
in proper cases Article 171,of the Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners,


in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself
establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it
is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

LAROSA, MAYETT S.
JURISDICTION OF ACTION FOR PARTITION
Salud Divinagracia, Emilia Divinagracia, Dolores Divinagracia,, Rosario
Divinagracia and Juanita Divinagracia v. Judge Josue N. Bellosillo, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch VII Court of First Instance, Iloilo
City, and Camillo Divinagracia
G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986
PARAS, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Actions for partition should be filed in the RTC of the province where the property
or part thereof is situated. If several distinct parcels of land are situated in
different provinces, venue may be laid in the RTC of any of said provinces.
Because the issues to be determined by the court are incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the action shall be filed in the RTC and since it is an action which
involves interest in real property, it shall be brought in the place where the
property is situated.

FACTS:
This case is a sequel to Divinagracia vs. Roviro, L-42615, August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307.

Respondent filed a separate action before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
against herein petitioners, alleging substantially that he is the acknowledged
illegitimate child of Feliciano Divinagracia, who died intestate on February 1,
1964 at Iloilo City; that the said Feliciano Divinagracia left a considerable estate.
Court of First Instance of Iloilo; that in the project of partition in the said estate,
he was preterited and the estate was divided among the petitioners, and praying
that the said project of partition be annulled and petitioners be ordered to submit
a new partition to include private respondent or in the alternative, to deliver to
private respondent his share in the said estate, together with the fruits of the
same, and to order petitioners to pay said private respondent moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
that the complaint states no cause of action, because he has not yet proven his
status as an heir; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the complaint and/or over the nature of the action because the determination of
Camilo's status as spurious child falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo; and (3) that private
respondent's action has prescribed, because it was not brought during the
lifetime of Feliciano Divinagracia.

The motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners returned to this
Court on December 3, 1977 on the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, alleging that respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to
dismiss, and praying that a restraining order or a preliminary injunction
restraining respondent Judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 10963,
and after hearing, that judgment be rendered annulling the said order denying
the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Wether or not respondent court has jurisdiction over the action for partition.

RULING:
Yes, the petition is dismissed,

The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has jurisdiction over the
case because: (1) Camilo claims he is already an acknowledged spurious child
(that is already voluntarily acknowledged thru an "authentic writing," and not a
person seeking compulsory recognition); if this be true he is entitled to obtain his
hereditary share in the estate; (2) at any rate, there are no more Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts today under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. Their
functions have been transferred to the Regional Trial Court.

LAROSA, MAYETT S.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD ON THE BASIS OF A
STATEMENT IN A DEED OF DONATION
Gono-Javier vs. CA
G.R. No. 111994, December 29, 1994
VITUG:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 278 of the NCC: “Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.”

FACTS:
Petitioners are the children of deceased Catalino Gono. They claim ownership
over five parcels of land left by their natural grandfather Juan Casocot upon his
on 1964. They are opposed by the nephews and nieces of deceased Juan Casocot.
Catalino Gono was the natural child of Juan Casocot with his common law wife but
petitioners alleged that Catalino was acknowledged by Juan Casocot on the basis
of a statement in a deed of donation of one of the disputed lands in favor of
Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino Gono, to the effect that among the reasons
for making the donation was the fact that the donee "is the surviving spouse of
my son with my common law wife." The donation was made on March 29, 1954,
about 11 years after the death of Catalino Gono in 1942 or 1943.

ISSUE:
Wether or not petitioners are entitled by intestate succession to the lands left by
their natural grandfather in lieu of the alleged “acknowledgment” through the
donation?

RULING:
No. Since this case came about in 1954, the New Civil Code was applicable.

Under Art. 278 of the NCC: “Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.”

In the case at bar, the statement made in the deed of donation, a public
document, is considered as a valid recognition by virtue of the doctrine of
incidental recognition. Unfortunately, the recognition was too late as this was
made after the death of Catalino. Under the provision of the NCC, voluntary
acknowledgment can only be effected only during the lifetime of both the
acknowledging parent and the acknowledged illegitimate child.

The reason behind the lifetime rule is that the due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code) is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required), albeit not
prohibited, to yet have it declared as such.
LAROSA, MAYETT S.
QUANTUM OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH LEGITIMACY AND FILIATION
Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R. Dezoller v. Court of Appeals and
Teodora Domingo
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.

FACTS:
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. On January
2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo. Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation. Petitioners want to inherit as the nephew and niece of the late
Teodora Dezoller. During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, w/ the following documentary evidence offered to
prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt: a family picture;
baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death
certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification
of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of
Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth
of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela
Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these
exhibits to which a Comment was filed by herein private respondent.

Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that


petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero. On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. CA
affirmed the decision saying the evidence for filiation was insufficient.
ISSUE:
Wether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article
172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation

RULING:
YES. With regard to legitimacy, both the trial court and CA overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. Well settled is the rule that
the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the husband can
contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs
- can impugn legitimacy. Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved
in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the
benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is
disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that
its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy.
And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates
must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an
entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it is
rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and
support a finding or decision. When private respondent opted not to present
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a
demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such
fact.
With regard to their filiation to Teodora Guerrero, the primary proof to be
considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule
130 of the ROC, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
Of the four, only (3) remains disputable, so the question remains if the evidence
was enough to corroborate w/ each other. Court holds that all the evidence
presented, can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship
between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule
that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the
relationship is required.

LAROSA, MAYETT S.
RECOGNITION OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD ORDERING TO GIVE
SUPPORT, BUT NOT CUSTODY OF, THE CHILD.
Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P. Miguel in the
latter’s custody. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese
national and is presently residing in Japan. In the school year 2000-2001, the
petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc.
in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.

As alleged by Petitioner, respondents came to the house of the petitioner in


Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at a mall.
They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised
by them. After efforts to recover custody of the child proved futile, Petitioner filed
a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner, as the natural father, should have custody of the child.

RULING:
No. Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as
there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a
legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
father’s recognition of him.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child


by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not
custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative
father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and
having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.
She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that
right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in the cases
authorized by law.”

LAROSA, MAYETT S.
PROOF OF FILIATION: BIRTH CERTIFICATE, MUST BE SIGNED BY THE
FATHER; BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE, NOT PROOF OF PATERNITY.
Iluminada Ponce Berciles et al., v. Government Service Insurance
System
G. R. No. 57257, March 5, 1984
GUERRERO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and
void. A birth certificate, to evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of
Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging parent or parents.
As to the baptismal certificate, the rule is that although the baptismal record of a
natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of
the record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held
to be a voluntary recognition of parentage.

FACTS:
Judge Pascual G. Berciles died in office caused by cardiac arrest due to cerebral
vascular accident. Having served the government for more than thirty-four (34)
years, twenty-six (26) years in the judiciary, he was eligible for retirement under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 so that his heirs were
entitled to survivors benefits. Such benefits are now being claimed by two
families, both of whom claim to be the deceased’s lawful heirs.

Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin and her four children filed an application for
survivors benefits as the legal spouse and legitimate children of the late Judge
Berciles, duly supported by the required documents. The other set of claimants
are Flor Fuentebella, and her four children, and supporting documents were also
submitted with their claim.

Pursuance to the Office of the Court Administrator’s recommendation of


transmittal to the GSIS of the retirement papers of the late Judge Pascual
Berciles, in resolving under its Resolution No. 431 to approve the
recommendation of the Committee on Claims Settlement that private respondent
Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged natural child and that the other
private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Villareal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and
Rhoda Berciles are illegitimate children of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles in the
absence of substantial evidence through competent and admissible proof of
acknowledgment by and filiation with said deceased parent as required under the
law.

Both families, raising grave abuse of discretion, question the legality of the GSIS
Resolution based on the same undisputed facts, the petitioners herein claiming
they are the legal heirs, whereas, according to private respondents, they are the
ones legally entitled to the retirement benefits. The issue here then is one of law
which the contending parties concede in their respective pleadings and thus
correctable by certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. May birth certificate be relied upon as sufficient proof of Judge Bercilies’
voluntary recognition of paternity and filiation?
2. Is baptismal certificate an evidentiary basis for the acknowledgement of
illegitimate children of Judge Berciles?

RULING:
1. No, birth certificate may not be relied upon as sufficient proof of Judge Berciles’
voluntary recognition of paternity and filiation. Under our jurisprudence, if the
alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by
the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Such registration would not be
evidence of paternity. The mere certificate by the registrar without the signature
of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit v.
Piccio, 92 Phil. 729). A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public
instrument. (Pareja v. Pareja, Et Al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth certificate, to evidence
acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear the signature under
oath of the acknowledging parent or parents.

2. No, baptismal certificate is not an evidentiary basis for the acknowledgement


of illegitimate children of Judge Berciles. As to the baptismal certificate, the rule
is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of
the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no
intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the
authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate
filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to
which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by
himself or in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the
parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require
separate and concrete evidence.

"The filiation of illegitimate children, other than natural, must not only be proven
but it must be shown that such filiation was acknowledged by the presumed
parent. If the mere fact of paternity is all that needs to be proven, that
interpretation would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals to take advantage
of the death of the presumed parent, who would no longer be in a position to deny
the allegation, to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the
deceased to inquiries affecting his character."

Hence, the birth certificate and baptismal certificate of Flor Fuentebella’s four
children cannot be used to prove filiation of late Judge Berciles.
LICUDINE,MARY ANNE G.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD
Antonio Macadangdang v. The Honorable Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980
MAKASIAR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Under Art. 255 of the New Civil Code, children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate. Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.

FACTS:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24,1967.

The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed
a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with
the Court of First Instance of Davao. In its decision rendered on February 27,
1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint.

Mejias appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
lower court's decision and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son
of Antonio Macadangdang. The Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit. So, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the child Rolando a legitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang?

RULING:
No, the child Rolando is not a legitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. The child
Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.
Under Art. 255 of the Civil Code, this presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only
one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.

It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child
is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for
two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the
wife may have made this declaration (Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the
article is established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should
not be under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband whose
honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the
guilty spouse by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the
child which may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of
vengeance and spite, may declare the as not her husband's although the
statement be false. But there is another reason which is more powerful,
demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the
moment of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during
the same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being possible
that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).

Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not
be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain
some benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10
C.J.S. 77).

The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and
purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife
became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with
his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App.
158,191 N.E. 100).

With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on


the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her
child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino,
citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).
Hence, the child Rolando is not a legitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang.

LICUDINE,MARY ANNE G.
NAMING OF THE FATHER ON PUBLIC RECORDS, NOT A COMPETENT
EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY
John Paul E. Fernandez et al. v. The Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
PUNO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born outside
wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for recognition and support against the private
respondent (Carlito S. Fernandez) before the RTC of Quezon City. Violeta P.
Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners,
Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met sometime in 1983, at the
Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast,
Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's
father served as tennis instructor.

Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. To bolster their case,
petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of
live birth and the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro and John Paul, which
also state that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken
during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and
Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.

Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners.

On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint was dismissed on
the ground that the proof relied upon by the trial court is inadequate to prove the
(private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners). Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
May birth certificates and baptismal certificates of Claro and John Paul be given
with probative value to prove filiation?

RULING:
No. The public records offered by the petitioners are insufficient to prove their
filiation.
The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent
participated in its preparation.

On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984): as to
the baptismal certificates, the rule is that although the baptismal record of a
natural child describes her as a child of the record the decedent had no
intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute
the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate
filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to
which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by
himself or in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the
parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require
separate and concrete evidence.

The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as


their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again,
the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court
is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil.
1050 (1958), viz:

. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born outside
wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only
by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.

Hence, the birth certificates and baptismal certificates of Claro and John Paul
cannot be given with probative value to prove filiation.

LICUDINE,MARY ANNE G.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO OBLIGE A FATHER TO RECOGNIZE
HIS CHILD
Artemio G. Ilano v The Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994
NOCON, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides: In
any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.

FACTS:
Petitioner Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife and a child
named Merceditas S. Ilano (respondent) was born on December 30, 1963 at the
Manila Sanitarium. The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash and sometimes in the form of a check.

During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he
showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at
the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods as her parent. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he
was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a
father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child
enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to
sleep. They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they
finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June,
1971 when he stopped coming home.

After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial
court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Should Artemio be obliged to recognize Merceditas as his child?

RULING:
Yes. Artemio is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his child. Under the then
prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1)
Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new
Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry
each other on account of certain legal impediments.

Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code
provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article
269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given
these rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed
by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born with a social
handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing
them through the misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be
availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by
court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious
child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because
his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his
acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child
arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under
the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.

The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.

While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to


recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case,
petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision
should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)


children . . . under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or
proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.

Wherefore, Artemio is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child.

LICUDINE,MARY ANNE G.
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN SHALL USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
Republic Of The Philippines v. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
QUISUMBING, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and
reasonable cause" for which the change is sought. The assailed decision as
affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the
applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which
requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia was born from the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe
Esperanza de Vega Leabres. After a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio never
reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to
the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres and her children. After the Court granted the
petition for declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, petitioner's mother and
Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony.

Petitioner filed a petition for change of name by the trial court, the OSG
manifested that it was opposing the petition.Disregarding the OSG's contention,
the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying the petition. Thus, it
granted the change of surname of private respondent from Vicencio to Yu.

The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court, which held that
it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname be changed. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
May Cynthia Vicencio's petition for change of surname, from "Vicencio" to "Yu" be
allowed?

RULING:
No, Cynthia Vicencio is not allowed to change his surname to “Yu.” The
touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and
reasonable cause" for which the change is sought." The assailed decision as
affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the
applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which
requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and
Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the
surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a
privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name
and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage
because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal
consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father's
surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While previous decisions have
allowed children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even
without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the
present case.

In Calderon vs. Republic, and Llaneta vs. Agrava, this Court allowed the
concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation
in the present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases
the children were not of legitimate parentage.

In Moore vs. Republic, where the circumstances appears to be similar to the


present case before us, the Court upheld the Republic's position:
We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born
out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of
the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce,
there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change
may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

LICUDINE,MARY ANNE G.
ARTICLE 338 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THAT A NATURAL
CHILD MAY BE ADOPTED BY HIS NATURAL FATHER OR MOTHER.
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto
Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik, Leopoldo
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 338 of the Civil Code which allows the adoption of
a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother.
In adoption, the relationship established is limited only to the adopting parents
and the adopted child.

FACTS:
The parties involved were Leopoldo Prasnik, as the appellant in a Special
Proceeding for adoption of Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes
Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik as the minor children of Prasnik and the Office of
the Solicitor General representing the State as the oppositor.
This case is a review of the case decided by the Court of first Instance of Rizal
which allowed petitioner to adopt his own children.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code
allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who
has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a
natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be
an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art.
335.

ISSUE:
Does the law allow the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or
mother?

RULING:
1. Yes. The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or
not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children,
Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged
natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending
that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to
acquire these rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends
to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an
acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is
equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and
following the words of the law. Hence, they should be allowed adoption.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


IF ONE OF THE SPOUSES IS AN ALIEN, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE SHALL
JOINTLY ADOPT. OTHERWISE, THE ADOPTION SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED.
Republic Of The Philippines v. The Honorable Court Of Appeals And The
Spouses James Anthony Hughes And Lenita Mabunay Hughes
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
VITUG, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 186.of the Family Code which provides that:
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

FACTS :
The parties involved were James Anthony Hughes who is a natural born US citizen,
Lenita Mabunay Hughes who is a naturalized Filipino Citizen who filed a joint
petition and the Solicitor General as the petitioner.
This case is a review of the case decided by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City which granted the joint petition of Spouses Hughes which granted the
petition for adoption of Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria who are nephews and niece of
Lenita Mabunay Hughes.
The Office of the Solicitor General assigned a lone error on the part of the
respondent trial court. It assailed that the lower court erred in granting the
petition for adoption of spouses James Anthony Hughes and Lenita Mabunay
Hughes because they are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law specifically
under EO 209 Art. 8 and did not comply with the requirement of the law on
inter-country adoption.

ISSUE:
Is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court proper when it granted the adoption
where the adopter is an alien?

RULING:
1. No. The court erred in affirming the grant of adoption and theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the
proceedings. The court ruled that adoption creates a status that is closely
assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and
duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined
to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the
adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that
obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties. The Family Code
has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of
parental authority, can aptly find governance.
"Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses in accordance with this Code."
Hence, the adoption is no proper, the RTC erred in its decision in allowing the
petition by Sps. Huhges.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


ADOPTION OF A CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK SHALL COMPLY WITH
R.A. 8552 (DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT)
Rosario Mata Castro And Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro, A.K.A.
"Maria Socorro M. Castro" and "Jayrose M. Castro v. Jose Maria Jed
Lemuel Gregorio and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
LEONEN, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552 which requires that the adoption
by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.

FACTS:
The parties involved were Atty. Jose G. Castro as the adopter, Joanne Benedicta
and Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), daughters of Jose Castro herein appellants
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which decided in favor of Castro.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, dismissing the petition instituted by the children of Castro moving for the
annulment of the decision of the adoption case involving the illegitimate children
of Castro.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document
purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed
and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is
Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further
alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth.

ISSUE:
1. Can an adoption take place even without the consent of the wife and it’s
children?

RULING:
No, as a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible
to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt. The law also
requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law.
It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Hence, the decision of the RTC granting adoption in this case is null and void for
the reason that adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


THE RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BY THE ADOPTION DOES NOT
EXTEND TO THEIR OTHER RELATIVES, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED BY LAW.
In The Matter of the Adoption of the Minor, Edwin Villa Y Mendoza, Luis E.
Santos, Jr. And Edipola V. Santos v. Republic Of The Philippines
G.R. No. L-22523, September 29, 1967
ANGELES, J..:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 338 of the Civil Code which allows the adoption of
a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother.
In adoption, the relationship established is limited only to the adopting parents
and the adopted child.

FACTS:
The parties involved were Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos as appellants
in a Special Proceeding, Edwin Villa y Mendoza as the adopted minor and the
state as the oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor
Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8,
1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared
their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Petitioners do not have a child of their own
blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of
them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of Edipola Santos (appellant)
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people
who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or
dual relationship should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity,
are prohibited from adopting one another.

ISSUE:
1. Can an elder sister adopt a younger brother?
2. Will the adoption create dual relationship between the adopter and the
adoptee?

RULING:
1. Yes. a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the
adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the
relation of parent and child already exists by nature.
To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are
related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law.
The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed
so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear
and educate them
Hence, Petitioner-Appellant, can adopt her minor brother.

2. No, the relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting


parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. The adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain
impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter
Hence, there can be no dual relationship between the parties.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST JOINTLY ADOPT EXCEPT IN CASES
ENUMERATED UNDER THE LAW.
Republic Of The Philippines v. Honorable Rodolfo Toledano
G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
PUNO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 184 par. 3 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child.

FACTS:
The parties involved were spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse as adoptees, Solomon
Joseph Alcala the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse and the
Office of the Solicitor General representing the state.
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I.
The private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino who became a naturalized citizen
of the United States of America in Guam.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and
educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned found that
private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and
welfare of the minor.
OSG appealed the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:
1. Can private respondents who are aliens adopt under the Philippine Law?

RULING:
1. No. Alvin Clouse is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the
United States of America and that Evelyn Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen.
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.
Article 184 par. 3 of the Family Code expressly enumerates the persons who are
not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:


(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application.
Joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
Note:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when
husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be
qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the alien spouse must comply
with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


A PERSON WHO HAS AN ILLEGITIMATE SPURIOUS CHILD OR AN
ADOPTED CHILD CAN STILL ADOPT.
In The Matter of the Adoption of the Minor Santiago Señeres, Dr.
Fernando P. Hofileña, and Corazon De Guia-Hofileña v. Republic Of The
Philippines
G.R. No. L-26476. August 31, 1970
DIZON, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 335 of the Civil Code which enumerates individuals
who may not adopt which read as follows: (1) Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction

FACTS:
The parties involved were spouses Fernando P. Hofileña, and Corazon De
Guia-Hofileña as petitioners in a Special Proceeding, Santiago Señeres as the
adopted minor and the state as the oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila in Special Proceedings No. G-00100 dismissing the petition filed
by the therein petitioners — hereinafter referred to as appellants — for the
adoption of the minor Santiago Señeres.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on On March
23, 1966, the lower court rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition
upon the ground that the provisions of Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil
Code prohibits the intended adoption because appellants had already previously
adopted the two minors mentioned heretofore. In the present appeal, therefore,
the sole question to be resolved is whether or not a person who already has an
adopted child may still legally adopt another.
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people
who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or
dual relationship should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity,
are prohibited from adopting one another.

ISSUE:
1.Does the law prohibit a person who previously adopted, adopt another?

RULING:
1. No. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise the
rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subject of statutory interpretation. The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil
Code in enumerating the persons who "cannot adopt" appear to be clear and
unambiguous and have a clearly defined meaning in law.
In this case "adopted children" do not fall within the meaning of anyone of the
above kinds of descendants seems to be clear. Spouses Hofilena may have a prior
adoption of Reynaldo Yusay but it does not in any manner prohibit the Spouses
from adopting another, which in this case is Santiago Seneres.
Therefore, the spouses Hofileña are not disqualified by law to adopt. The
appealed decision is reversed and set aside as a result, judgment is rendered
allowing appellants to adopt the minor Santiago Señeres.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


THE RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BY THE ADOPTION DOES NOT
EXTEND TO THEIR OTHER RELATIVES, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED BY LAW.
In Re petition for Adoption of Nora Divino and Aurora Paulino, both
surnamed Belen. Socorro S. Paulino V. Nicasio A. Belen And Walfrido P.
Belen
G.R. No. L-22523, January 30, 1971
BARREDO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The ruling is based on Article 338 of the Civil Code which allows the adoption of
a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother.
In adoption, the relationship established is limited only to the adopting parents
and the adopted child.

FACTS:
The parties involved were Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos as appellants
in a Special Proceeding, Edwin Villa y Mendoza as the adopted minor and the
state as the oppositor-appellee.
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor
Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8,
1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared
their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Petitioners do not have a child of their own
blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of
them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of Edipola Santos (appellant)
OSG who argues for the state in this case contends that adoption among people
who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that “incongruity” or
dual relationship should not result and that that relatives, by blood or by affinity,
are prohibited from adopting one another.

Issue:
1. Can an elder sister adopt a younger brother?
2. Will the adoption create dual relationship between the adopter and the
adoptee?

Ruling:
1. Yes. a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the
adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the
relation of parent and child already exists by nature.
To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are
related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law.
The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed
so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear
and educate them
Hence, Petitioner-Appellant, can adopt her minor brother.

2. No, the relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting


parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. The adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain
impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter
Hence, there can be no dual relationship between the parties.

REYES, KARL MARXCUZ


THE VALIDITY OF THE ADOPTION IN QUESTION BEING ASAILED
COLLATERALLY IN INTESTATE PROCEEDING
Paulina Santos et.al, v. Gregoria Aranzanso et.al.
G.R. No. L-23828 , February 28, 1966
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

DOCTRINE:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a
cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in
pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the
requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found such facts in favor of
jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases,
when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven.

FACTS:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio
Santos and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949.
Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both
parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in
spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been
abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been
continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption
has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due
publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a
decision, Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio Santos and
Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos
Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines,
hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations to their natural
parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the petitioners.

Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating
among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of
the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among
others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of
the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned
them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and
mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the
pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral


attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent
of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab
initio.

ISSUE:
Is the validity of the adoption in question could be assailed collaterally in the
intestate proceedings?

RULING:
No. The validity of the adoption in question could NOT be assailed collaterally in
the intestate proceedings. In general, therefore, where the right of the court to
assume jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the
ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby
impliedly adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found
such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether erroneous
or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises
in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven.

Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned,
consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part


of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal
depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the
determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack,
the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children
had abandoned them.

WHEREFORE The validity of the adoption in question could NOT be assailed


collaterally in the intestate proceedings.

ROZSA- QUISMUNDO, MONALISA


THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY BEING RETROACTIVELY
TRANSFERRED TO ADOPTING PARENTS WHO HAD NO ACTUAL OR
PHYSICAL CUSTODY
Macario Tamargo, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. 85044 , June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and
which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.

FACTS:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case
No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without
discernment.

On 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition
to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was grunted on,
18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.

ISSUE:
Is the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto?
RULING:
No. the spouses Rapisura are NOT the indispensable parties to actions committed
by Adelberto. Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been


retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a
decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural


parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by
petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the
indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE the spouses Rapisura are NOT the indispensable parties to actions
committed by Adelberto.

ROZSA- QUISMUNDO, MONALISA


THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT BEING IN PARI DELICTO CLAIMING
FOR SUPPORT
Hipolita Almacen v. Teodoro N. Baltazar
G. R. No. L- 10028, May 23, 1958
ENDENCIA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The general principle that when two persons acted in bad faith, they should be
considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be applied to the
instant case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the
latter cannot claim the adultery of the former as defense to evade the obligation
to give her support.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering the defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee a monthly support of
P50.00 beginning with the month of August, 1955.
The plaintiff and defendant were legally married on March 24, 1923; that in 1937,
plaintiff committed adultery with one named Jose Navarro, a cousin of defendant.
The defendant separated from the plaintiff after the latter's infidelity and while
estranged from her he lived maritally with another woman by the name of
Lourdes Alvarez; that after their separation there has been a reconciliation
between them or at least a condonation by defendant of the acts committed by
the wife as shown by the fact that he has been sending her money for her support;
that husband and wife were in pari delicto and, therefore, defendant is bound to
support the plaintiff because he has likewise been unfaithful to her.

ISSUE:
Is the lower court erred in not taking plaintiff's adulterous act of infidelity as
defense against her claim for support and in not exempting him from the
obligation to give such support?
RULING:
No, there is no error in the decision appealed from. The general principle that
when two persons acted in bad faith, they should be considered as having acted
in good faith, which principle may be applied to the instant case to the effect that
plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the adultery
of the former as defense to evade the obligation to give her support.
Under Art. 97, one of the causes for legal separation is "adultery on the part of
the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband", as defined in the Penal
Code. Accordingly, if the plaintiff was the only one who committed adultery which
is a good cause for disinheritance and legal separation, defendant's theory would
seem to be correct; but, in the present case, we agree with the lower court's
ruling that defendant is still bound to support his wife, firstly, because plaintiff
and defendant were both guilty of infidelity and before the filing of the action they
had a reconciliation or, at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness,
for which reason we may apply Art. 922 of the aforesaid Code which provides that
"a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, aid renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made;" secondly, the law on support (Title IX,
Book I, Arts. 290-304, Civil Code) contains no provision squarely applicable to
the present case in which both parties had committed infidelity, neither is there
any provision to the effect that when both spouses committed marital offenses
against one another, one can no longer ask support from the other;
WHEREFORE the lower court did not erred in not taking plaintiff's adulterous act
of infidelity as defense against her claim for support and in not exempting him
from the obligation to give such support.

ROZSA- QUISMUNDO, MONALISA


THE SPECIAL DEFENSE OF ADULTERY MAY A DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT
Maria Quintana v. Gelasio Lerma
G.R. No. L-7426, February 5, 1913
PER CURIAM :

DOCTRINE:
The special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the
original and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and
sustained will defeat the action.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of money due
upon a contract between the plaintiff and defendant husband and wife, for
support.

The action is by a wife against her husband for support. It is based upon a written
contract. The evidence shows that the parties were lawfully married in 1901 and
that in February, 1905, they entered into a written agreement of separation
whereby each renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the
conjugal property between them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of
the premises to pay the plaintiff within the first three days of each month the sum
of P20 for her support and maintenance.

In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her
right to support by committing adultery. However, this special defense was
stricken out by the court on the ground that under Art. 152 of the Civil Code,
adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases.

The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant
reentered it in his amended complaint.

ISSUE:
1. Is the written agreement made by the parties is void?
2. Is adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for
support?

RULING:
Yes. The agreement is void. In Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that “in
default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the
property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a
judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50.” However, the wife has
a right of action against defendant under the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the
defendant may also set up adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved
and sustain will defeat the wife’s action.

WHEREFORE the written agreement made by the parties is void and adultery may
be permitted as a special defense against action for support.

ROZSA- QUISMUNDO, MONALISA


AN ACTION BY THE WIFE AGAINST HER HUSBAND FOR SUPPORT AND
MAINTENANCE
Agustin Mercado v. James A. Ostrand
G.R. No. L-13291, November 20, 1917
JOHNSON, J. :

DOCTRINE:
The husband is under legal obligation to support his wife.

FACTS:
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court to obtain the writ
of certiorari against the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.

An action by the wife against her husband for support and maintenance, to
render a judgment requiring the husband, in addition to a judgment for a
reasonable sum for the support and maintenance of the wife, an amount
sufficient to cover costs and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Is a judge of the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction, in an action by the wife
against her husband for support and maintenance?

RULING:
Yes. The husband is under legal obligation to support his wife.

That an action had been commenced by the said wife against the said husband
for maintenance and support is admitted. That during the pendency of that action,
on the 8th day of September, 1917, the Honorable James A. Ostrand, judge,
rendered a judgment against the said husband requiring him to pay to the wife
the sum of P100 for the purpose of covering judicial costs and attorney’s fees is
the fact of which complaint is made in the present petition.
That the husband, under the conditions mentioned in the complaint, is under the
legal obligation of supporting his wife is not denied. That being true, it would
seem to be perfectly reasonable and just and within the sound discretion of the
court if the husband makes it necessary for the wife to resort to the courts for the
purpose of enforcing said legal obligation, that then and in that case he should be
required to pay the expenses necessarily incurred by her for the purpose of
enforcing her legal rights. Judicial costs and a reasonable amount for attorney’s
fees are necessary results of litigation.
Admitting the premises that the husband, under the facts stated in the complaint,
is under a legal obligation to support his wife, he is also under the legal obligation
to pay such expenses as may become necessary for the wife to enforce her legal
rights. No question is raised with reference to the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the amount allowed.
WHEREFORE The husband is under legal obligation to support his wife and
maintenance.

ROZSA- QUISMUNDO, MONALISA


WIFE HAS ALL THE RIGHT TO MANAGE COMMON PROPERTY ABSENCE OF
THE HUSBAND
Peyer v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-3500, January 12, 1951
Tuason, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a natural right like his
right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a mere privilege or
preference given him by law on the assumption that he is better able to handle
the administration. It results that when his supposed superiority over the woman
totally disappears, the privilege vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his
co-partner should take control.

FACTS:
It appears that Teresa Fanlo Peyer is the wife of Robert C. Peyer, who left the
Philippine with one Grace Ryle allegedly to escape trial for concubinage with
which he and Ryle were to be charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Teresa Fanlo Peyer brought an action in the court of first instance against the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to compel that Bank to cancel a
real state mortgage executed in its favor by Robert C. Peyer over the conjugal
house at 150 V. Mapa, Manila, and upon payment of the outstanding mortgage
debt in the sum of P15,000, to surrender to the plaintiff the Torrens certificate of
title to that house, Manufacturer's Life Insurance policy, and certain shares of
stock or corporate securities, all of which admittedly are owned in common by the
spouses.

It was alleged that Robert C. Peyer formerly had an indebtedness of P120,000,


more or less, by way of overdraft in current account with the said bank, that as
security for the payment of his indebtedness Robert C. Peyer executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of the Bank on the conjugal home aforementioned and
also pledged the said insurance policy and shares of stock or securities. The
defendant Bank made a motion for compulsory joinder of Robert C. Peyer as an
indespensable party.

The trial court ordered the defendant bank to execute a deed of cancellation of
the real estate mortgage over the house at 150 V. Mapa, upon payment of the
amount of P15,000, and thereafter to surrender to the plaintiff the corresponding
title and to deliver to the same plaintiff the Manufacturer's Life Insurance Policy
No. 683258 and the shares of stock and/or securities.

The law firm of Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha, as attorneys for Robert C.
Peyer filed a motion to intervene, to reopen the case and to set aside the
judgment. The last motion having been denied, the said attorneys instituted the
instant proceedings, alleging that the respondent Judge acted not only without or
in excess of his jurisdiction, but also unlawfully excluded petitioner, without his
presence, from the use and enjoyment of his managerial rights over the conjugal
properties to which he is by law entitled.

ISSUE:
Is the husband under the circumstances of the case entitled to the management
of the property?

RULING:
No, Robert C. Peyer was not an indispensable or necessary party and the trial
court properly proceeded in trying and deciding the case without him being joined.
It likewise follows that the lower court did not err in disallowing his motion to
intervene.

Art. 1441. The management of the property belonging to the marriage


shall transferred to the wife:
1. Whenever she may be the guardian of her husband in accordance
with article 220;
2. When she institutes proceedings to have her husband adjudged an
absentee, in accordance articles 183 and 185;
3. In the case provided for by the first paragraph of article 1436.
The courts shall also confer the management upon the wife, with such limitation
as they may deem advisable, if the husband should be a fugitive from justice or
should have been adjudged in default in a criminal case, or, if, being absolutely
disqualified for the administration, he should have taken no steps with respect
thereto.

These provisions refer to permanent transfer of management of the community


property, and it is doubtful if they contemplate temporary administration such as
that granted the wife by the respondent Judge. Supposing however that they are,
by analogy, applicable, then the wife's cause is rendered the stronger by reason
thereof; for the article permits the wife to assume the management, with the
authority of a court of competent jurisdiction, when the husband is absent or
otherwise unfit to discharge his duties as administrator. The plaintiff and the
court below did just that.

There was no possible injury to the husband's interest flowing from his omission
for which he could not obtain redress in other ways, nor was there any valid
objection to the proceeding which he could make. As long as he stays away we
can not see any substitute for the wife's management which he could offer. Upon
the principles set out the decisions herein before quoted, nothing short of his
physical presence in the country or his ready availability personally to administer
the conjugal property should stop the wife from replacing him in the
administration. It is only upon these conditions that he can keep the
management under the Civil Code. Managing the conjugal property by remote
control over the opposition of his wife who has an equal share in the property
would not do.

Hence, petition is dismissed.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE A MATTER OF RIGHT
Sanchez v. Zulueta
G.R. No. 45616, May 16, 1939
Avancena, C.J.:

DOCTRINE:
The wife and her child is entitled of support from her husband even living
separately, save in cases where there is a valid ground under the law that
disqualifies her or her child.

FACTS:
Certain Josefa Diego filed a petition for support pendente lite against the herein
petitioner Feliciano Sanchez in favor of her and their Son Mario Sanchez. She
alleged that petitioner abandoned them without any justifiable cause and now
refuses to allow them to live with them.

On the otherhand, petitioner allege as a apecial defense that his wife abandoned
their conjugal home without his knowledge or consent, because she committed
adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit
relationship, a child which is Mario Sanchez.

The court favorably acted upon the application of support pendente lite without
acceding to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his allegation.

ISSUE:
Did the court properly acted on the application?

RULING:
No , The court erred in not allowing the defendant to present evidence for the
purposes of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application.

Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.
Cosequently, as to the child, it is the fruit of such adulterous relations,for in that
case, it would not be entitled for support as such.

Hence, the decision rendered is reversed and ordered that the petitioner be given
opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


IMMORALITY OF THE WIFE A GOOD DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT TO BE
DENIED
Mangoma v. Macadaeg
G.R. No. L-5153, December 10, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The wife and her child is entitled of support from her husband even living
separately, save in cases where there is a valid ground under the law that
disqualify her such as immorality on her part.

FACTS:
Private respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action for separation of property
against her husband Glicerio Mangogma. She also filed petition for support
pendente lite in favor of her and her daugther.

Petitioner move to dismis the support grounded on the allege immorality of his
wife which was denied by the court on the basis of evidence presented by the
private respondent and approved the petition for support pendente lite.

ISSUE:
Did the court properly decided the case.

RULING:
No, facts of the case show that petitioner has not been given an opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of his defense against the petition for support. Such
allegation of the wife immorality would tend to disfrancise her prayer for support.

The case was remanded to lower court in order that reception of evidence of
petitioner in support of his allegation be made.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


IMMORALITY OT THE WIFE MUST BE PROVED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
G.R. No. L-48219, February 28, 1979
Fernandez, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The wife and her child is entitled of support from her husband even living
separately, save in cases where there is a valid ground under the law that
disqualify her or her child such as adultery on the part of the wife. The same must
be proven with competent evidence showing immorality of the wife.

FACTS:
Celia Ilustre Reyes filed a case for legal separation against the petitioner Manuel
Reyes on the ground that petitioner attempted to kill her. She also asked for
support pendente lite for her and their three children.

Petitioner opposed the application on the ground that his wife committed
adultery with his physician.
The court granted the application for support pendente lite which was affirmed by
the CA.

ISSUE:
Did the CA ruled correctly when it affirms the decision of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court?

RULING:
Yes, the allegation that the wife committed adultery must be proved by
competent evidence otherwise it will not bar her from the right to recieve support
pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained
will defeat the action.

In the instant case, at the hearing of application for support pedente lite before
the JDRC the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove his allegation that
his wife committed adultery with any person.

Hence, petition is denied.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Gan v. CA
G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002
Bellosillo, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Support pendente lite is immediately executory and cannot be stayed by appeal
absence of good and urgent reasons to do so.

FACTS:
Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding
support for their child. Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An
exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a
complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.

Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated
her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of
support. His motion, however, was denied by the trial court. Despite denial of his
motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Hence,
the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.

Petitioner seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered
thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied. Which, however
denied by the Court of Appeals on the basis that support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any
to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly ruled the case.

RULING:
Yes, CA ruled correctly.

Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the
trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which
provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and
that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor.

A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this
Court to barred the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground
that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion.

Hence,the petition is denied.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


URGENCY AND JUSTICE SHOULD BE CONSIDER IN DECIDING CASES
De leon v. Soriano
G.R. No. L-7648, September 17, 1954
Montemayor, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The court in deciding the case should consider paramount and compelling
reasons of urgency and justice.

FACTS:
Spouses Dr. Felix deleon and Asuncion Soriano owned extensive properties such
as rice lands in the provinces of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. Spouses had no
common children while the husband had three acknowledge natural children the
herein petitioners.

Assuncion Soriano and the three acknowledge natural children entered into a
compromise settlement where the children will took over the rice lands and
deliver some portion of the harvest palay to Asuncion Soriano. The petitioners
failed to deliver what they had agree for several years and invoking that the same
is through force majuere which is outside of their control.

The trial court ruled in favor of the 75 years old widow and ordered the petitioners
to pay the respondent certain amount and ordered the delivery of certain cavans
of palay.

Petitioners again contend that the order is frivolous because they had security of
their supersedeas bond and the premature execution would cause irreparable
damage to them. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the court ruled validly.

RULING:
Yes, Even after the filing of supersedeas bond by the appellant, intented to stay
the execution, the trial court may in its descretion disregard said supersedeas
bond and ordered immediate execution provided that there is special compelling
reasons justifying immediate execution.

In the instant case, Asuncion needs of and rigth to immediate execution of the
decision in her favor amply satisfy the requirement of a paramount and
compelling reasons of urgency and justice. Asuncion may yet have to wait for
four to five years before this case is finally terminated and she is afraid that
considering her delicate health and her age of 75 years old she may not live that
long. She is nearing the end of his life span.
Hence, the foregoing consideration as to the necessity of immediate execution of
the judgement the petition is hereby denied.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO


CAPACITY RESOURCES INDESPENSABLE IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT
Lam v. Chua
G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The court in determining the amount of support the court should consider the
capacity and resources of both the parties who are jointly obliged to support their
children and the monthly expenses incuured for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transfortation of the child.

FACTS:
The case started upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Adriana alleged in the petition that she and Jose were married, out of said
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul. Repondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but
said incapacity was not then apparent. Psychological incapacity of Jose became
manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to
go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as,
mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains.

The Pasay RTC rendered its Decision which declares the marriage between
petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being
bigamous by nature. Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a
monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration, He argued that there was already a
provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision dated February 28,
1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute
₱250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.

Pasay RTC denied Jose Lam’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the Makati
RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is
of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter
court.
CA affirms the decision of the Pasay RTC in all respects.

ISSUE:
Is the ruling of the CA which affirms the order of Pasay RTC correct.

RULING:
No, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support awarded
to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
The trial court’s action of merely ordering in open court during the hearing that a
prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition filed by respondent
Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose.
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of due process when the trial
court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to re-open and render judgment
without giving Jose the requisite notice and the opportunity to refute the new
claim against him.

Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to
be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and
202 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,


clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses
in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.

Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced
or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
furnish the same.

Hence, the petition is granted. the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are hereby set aside.

TUZARA, ABEL TOLLEDO

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