Case No # 4

PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs . FRANCISCO

JARQUE, JOSE COROMINAS, and ABOITIZ & CO., defendants. JOSE
COROMINAS, in his capacity as assignee of the estate of the
insolvent Francisco Jarque, appellee. Date | G.R number & PHIL no.| Topic in syllabus

Plaintiff-appellant: PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., INC

Defendants-appellee: FRANCISCO
JARQUE, JOSE COROMINAS, and ABOITIZ & CO., and JOSE
COROMINAS, in his capacity as assignee of the estate of the
insolvent Francisco Jarque

DOCTRINE: A vessel is a personal property, with the only difference is that a record of documents affecting
the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry

FACTS:
1. Pertinent Facts, Really important facts, lower court’s decision, parties’ contentions, etc. Mas organized i
think kung may sequence.
2. On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three (3) Mortgages on
the vessels Pandan and Zaragoza.
3. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu
and each was considered a “chattel mortgage”.
4. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarqu and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and
was entered in the chattel mortgage registry.
5. On July 2, 1932, a petition was filed with the CFI of Cebu in which it prayed that Francisco Jarque be
declared an insolvent debtor, which was later on granted.
6. Later on, Judge Hontiveros decline to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained
the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. Hence this petition

ISSUE:
1. Whether a vessel is considered a personal property?
2. Whether a vessel as a personal property is treated the same as any other personal property with respect to the
Chattel Mortgage Law?

HELD:
1st issue: Yes, vessels are considered as personal property under the Civil Code. Since the term “personal property”
includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. A long line
of precedent case would have that vessels are considered as chattels.

2nd issue: No, the court held that although a vessel mortgage is considered as a chattel mortgage, there is a very slight
difference when it comes to procedural matters. It is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel
be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgement affirmed, the costs of this instance to be paid by the appellant.
Case No # 5
THE UNITED STATES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . IGNACIO CARLOS , defendant-appellant.
Date | G.R number & PHIL no.| Topic in syllabus

Petitioners: The United States

Respondent: Ignacio Carlos

DOCTRINE: The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is
corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner

FACTS:
1. Pertinent Facts, Really important facts, lower court’s decision, parties’ contentions, etc. Mas organized i
think kung may sequence.
2. Ignacio Carlos was accused of committing the crime of theft.
3. That he carried away 2,273 kilowatts of electric current, of the value of 909 pesos which is the property of
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company.
4. The trial court found him guilty, and hence he appealed and contends that, among others, that the lower
court erred in declaring that electrical energy may be stolen.

ISSUE: Whether electrical energy is property therefore can be stolen?

HELD:
1. Yes, appellant insists that only corporeal property can be the subject of the crime of Larceny (theft of personal
property).
2. The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
3. It is well-settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of larceny, even in the absence of a statute so
providing. Electricity, similar to gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property and is capable of appropriation by another.

DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment being strictly in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Case No #15
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO,
SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
Date | G.R number & PHIL no.| Topic in syllabus

Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: When a piece of land becomes foreshore due to the course of nature, it now passes to the realm
of public domain.

FACTS:
1. Pertinent Facts, Really important facts, lower court’s decision, parties’ contentions, etc. Mas organized i
think kung may sequence.
2. Respondent Morato’s Application for Free Patent was approvd and consequently, he was issued an Original
Certificate of Title.
3. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandates that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered
within five years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
4. However, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, not suitable to vegetation.
5. Moreover, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondent spouses Nenita Co and
Antonio Quilatan who constructed a house thereon.
6. Another portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula wherein a warehouse was also constructed.
7. On these grounds, petitioner filed a case for the cancellation of Morato’s title and reversion of the land to
the public domain.
8. The lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against alienating or
encumbering the land because the land was merely leased.
9. It was also established that the mortgage to spouses Quilatan covered only the improvement and not the
land itself.

NOTE: The land radically changed sometime in 1937 up to 1955 due to a strong earthquake
followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the land. From 1955 to 1968, gradual
reclamation was underten by the lumber company owned by the Moratos. Having restored the
land, the area continued to be utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in
1965. On March 17, 1973, another strong earthquake caused destruction on the area of the land
and subsequently a strong typhoon added to the destruction.

ISSUE: Whether the land in question is part of a disposable public land and not a foreshore land?

HELD: The sentence or sentences that answer the issue or issues. (ex. For the first issue, the court held that NO, the
promissory note in question is NOT A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. For the second issue, etc.)

1. It reverts to the public domain. The encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of
the subject land was invaded by the waves and sea advances.
2. While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water,
however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had permanently
invaded a portion of subject land, which eventually became foreshore.
 3. When a land becomes foreshore it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act.
Consequently, under Article 420, when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed Decision
of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato
and the subsequent Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No
costs.

Case No #
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PASCUAL
A. BERCILLES, Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District,
and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of
 Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau of
Lands, respondents.
Date | G.R number & PHIL no.| Topic in syllabus

Petitioners: Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc

Respondent: Hon. Bercilles

DOCTRINE: A property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the state.

FACTS:
1. Pertinent Facts, Really important facts, lower court’s decision, parties’ contentions, etc. Mas organized i
think kung may sequence.
2. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, declared the terminal portion of M.Borces Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road.
3. Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu authorized the Acting City Mayor to sell
the land through a public bidding.
4. The land was eventually awarded to the herein petitioner.
5. By virtue of the deed of sale, petitioner filed an application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu to have
its title to the land registered.
6. The Assistant Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property
sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain
and therefore outside the commerce of man.
7. The trial court dismissed the petitioners application for registration, hence, this case.

ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which
may be the object of a common contract?

HELD: The sentence or sentences that answer the issue or issues. (ex. For the first issue, the court held that NO, the
promissory note in question is NOT A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. For the second issue, etc.)

1. Yes, since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner’s application for registration of title was
withdraw from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can
be the object of an ordinary contract.
2. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State”.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948,
LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing
of the petitioner's application for registration of title.
Case No. 2
ARMILYN MORILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, respondents.
9 Dec. 2015 | G.R. No. 198270 | BP22 Jurisdiction of the Court

Petitioners: Morillo
Respondent: People

DOCTRINE: BP 22 is a continuing crime. A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. The court of the place where
the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with Jurisdiction to try cases involving BP22.

FACTS:
.
1. Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name RB Custodio Construction,
purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic freeport zone from petioner Armilyn
Morilo, who is the owner of Amasea general Merchandize and Construction Supplies
2. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the
first delivery, and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five(35) days after the last
delivery
3. To be paid via post-dated checks.
4. Later on, petitioner delivered the construction materials.
5. After the last delivery, respondent paid in cash and issued two(2) post-dated checks.
6. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks but it was bound to be dishonored.
7. Again, due to the dishonoring of the two checks, respondent issued another two (2) post-dated checks
which was again eventually dishonored.
8. As a result petitioner filed a complaint.
9. The local prosecutor filed an information charging respondent with Estafa (Art. 315, p2(d)) as well as BP22
on a separate information.
10. MeTC found that the prosecution proven all elements of violation of BP22 were present.
11. On appeal to the RTC, respondent contends that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, alleging that
since the checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, and therefore, the Makati City
MeTC has no jurisdiction.
12. The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling on the reason that the MeTC had jurisdiction due to the check being
dishonored happened in Makati City.
13. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling stating that the deposit of a check is not an essential
element of BP22 therefore the crime was not partly done in Makati City

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeal erred when it ruled that the MeTC of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: The sentence or sentences that answer the issue or issues. (ex. For the first issue, the court held that NO, the
promissory note in question is NOT A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. For the second issue, etc.)

1. Yes. It is well settled that violations of BP22 cases are considered as transitory or continuing crimes,
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
 2. A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.
3. The court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with
Jurisdiction to try cases involving BP22. The fact that the check subject of the case was drawn, issued, and
delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case.
4. It is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of
Equitable PCIBank.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case
Nos. 08-1876-77, which arrmed the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Case No. 9
People vs. Lagon
May 18, 1990 | G.R. No. 45815 | Interruption of period of prescription by institution of criminal action

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent: LIBERTAD LAGON AND HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY
COURT OF ROXAS CITY

DOCTRINE: It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the
law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

FACTS:

1. On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City, charging private
respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of Estafa under Article 315 Paragraph 2(d).
2. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as
payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the
check, which check subsequently bounced.
3. The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.
4. However, in an order, the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed
by law for the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority to impose.
5. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime.
6. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested
by law in the City Court.
7. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Hence this petition
ISSUE: Whether the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction?

Held:

1. No, Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended it states that
"[m]unicipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ."
2. Even though the commission of the offense tok place in 1975, when the penalty imposable was only arresto
mayor; however, the criminal prosecution began on 1976, when the penalty imposable for the offense was
increased due to PD No. 818.
3. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly
measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law
in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December
1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Case No. 18
Aliwaya v. Court of Appeals (Janine)
July 3, 1992 | G.R. No. 102342 | Interruption of period of prescription by institution of criminal action

Petitioners: MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and

SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C INSP.
MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD
RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO
SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR.

DOCTRINE: (1) the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial,
city and state prosecutors.

(2) there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the
custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had
no authority to do so.

FACTS:

1. On 18 September 2001, petitioners filed a complaint accusing respondents police with kidnapping for
ransom.
 2. Petitioners allege that in September 11 2001 in the morning, while petitioners were driving along UN
Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind; that when they went out of their vehicle to
assess the damage, several armed men alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and
forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they were brought to an office which eventually led to the
policemen demanding p700,000 plus two vehicles from petitioners.
3. The money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of the same day, and that they were released the
next day in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration of papers of the two vehicles.
4. On January 24, 2002, the State prosecutor filed an information with the RTC of Manila for kidnapping for
Ransom.
5. Meanwhile on February 18, 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that
“the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so”
6. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that the ruling in people v. Mapalao, an accused
who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief.
7. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman are not exclusive but shared or
concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file
the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.

Issue:

(1) Whether the officer who filed the information had authority to do so?
(2) Whether a motion to quash can be valid when the accused had not been arrested?

Held:

Issue #1:

1. Yes, in the case of Honasan II V. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the department of justice, the
court held that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees
is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors.

Issue #2:

1. Yes, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be
under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the
information had no authority to do so.
2. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person
3. At any rate, the accused's motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the >ling oEcer, would
have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman's power to investigate offenses
involving public oEcers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, to independently evaluate
or assess the merits of the case to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. SO
ORDERED.