Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the
award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or
the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz
as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that
no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore,
the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish
Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el

sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state
a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her
own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita
Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the
defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named
plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita
as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the
amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer
of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco
as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs,
dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from
so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that
feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a
considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber
shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of
June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in
this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted,
as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her
pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
 CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to
China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing
a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good
condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising
to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory
preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano
Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint
Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a
house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular
family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a
second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that
should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had
charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him,
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It
is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before
us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is
not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not
capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in
June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in
the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which
the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed
by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her
womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous.
In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged
her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.

It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the
Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of
indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that
the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In
the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus.
There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by
the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The
facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant
had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts
found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the
defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant.
This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when
the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this
case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the
appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages
to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not
satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point
out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as
to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia
has expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his;
and secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son
of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil
Code.

The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.

Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads
as follows:

Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931

Rev. PADRE:

La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.

(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA

Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to
plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:

Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo
manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."

Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."

Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."

Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."

Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following
cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in

existence.

Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:

Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible
admitir por otro medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el
articulo es terminante y la intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base
5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que
conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion
de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.

No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo

natural, aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso
del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en
 sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la
sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra prueba que la
conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su
paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que
demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos
podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el
juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.

xxx xxx xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta
hacerlo por incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad
indubitada, clara y terminante del padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente
expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de
mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por
objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente
haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento
de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de
base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo
a su numero 2.º

Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs.
Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only
exceptions to this rule are those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of
which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable writing
of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required by said
provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are
necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in
order that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards
deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be
necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by a father of his
paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.

By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein
plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is
coming on June", which the defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to
the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good
care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de
Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and
that it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove
that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations
the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly
constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the documents,
which is prohibited by law.

Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to
constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity
of the child Ismael Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code
provides:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following
cases:
 xxx xxx xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of
the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.

The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the
following facts, as found by the lower court in its decision:

Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar
Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia
su profesion en la Ciudad de Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto
llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San
Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931 asistida por dicho Dr.
Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.

Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con
este y con la demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines,
Manila, entregando a dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del
consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido
electrico en dicha casa.

Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco
has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date
to the birth of said child they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing
possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be
born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs.
Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael
when it was baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.

The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the
witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of
Ismael Loanco as natural child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:

In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:

. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we
find that he visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid
money for the support of the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son;
that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that
when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters
to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a
commercial house.

xxx xxx xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously
the status of a natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the
father of the child, but that it is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the
child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must appear either in writing,
 made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the son has possessed
continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which
comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it
was the intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the
acts performed by him were done with that intention.

Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain says:

En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de

hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el
convencimiento de la paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en
las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino continuedamente,
porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el reconocimiento expreso. lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el

hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado,
quien ademas iba a casa de la demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para
los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los
seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y el de que los
porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba
de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los
menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal
confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que
una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren
su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant
Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son
because there exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his
paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of
the Civil Code.

The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental

Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay
to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is
single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite
the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to
file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty.
Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and
Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan
was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died
during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed
the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same
line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,
since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither
of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were
deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to
the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its
claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the
loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s
"dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner

Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had
occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of
the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a
fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention
was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no
such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used
in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which
the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is
no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance
to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death
benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of
"death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be
equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is
for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point. 20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. 21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of
Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites
for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to
prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define
the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the
CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. 1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him
to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his
unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of
a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same
must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight
of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and
justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163959, August 01, 2018

MARCELINO E. LOPEZ, FELIZA LOPEZ, ZOILO LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ, AND SERGIO F.
ANGELES, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PRIMEX CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 177855, August 1, 2018]

MARCELINO E. LOPEZ, FELIZA LOPEZ, HEIRS OF ZOILO LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ, AND SERGIO F.
ANGELES, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PRIMEX
CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. Any act by the agent subsequent to the
principal's death is void ab initio, unless any of the exceptions expressly recognized in Article 1930 and
Article 1931 of the Civil Code is applicable.

On March 7, 2012, the Court definitively decided this case by promulgating the resolution: 1 (1) noting
the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties; (2) granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw the petition for review on certiorari; and (3) denying the petitions for review on certiorari in
these consolidated appeals on the ground of mootness.

Before Us now is the so-called Urgent Motion to Recall or Reconsider the March 7, 2012 Resolution
Giving Effect to the so-called "Compromise Agreement" submitted by Atty. Sergio Angeles and Primex
President Ang and to Cite Them in Contempt of Court2 filed by the heirs of deceased Marcelino E. Lopez,
one of the original petitioners herein, in order to oppose and object to the Compromise Agreement on
the ground that Atty. Sergio Angeles, a counsel of the petitioners and also a petitioner himself, had
entered into the same without valid authority.

Antecedents

Involved herein is the sale of the 14-hectare property situated in Antipolo City between the petitioners
(Lopez, et al.) and respondent Primex Corporation (Primex).

The Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the antecedents thusly:

On 29 April 1991, plaintiff-appellant Primex Corporation, hereinafter referred to as PRIMEX, filed against
the herein defendants appellees a complaint for injunction, specific performance and damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

In its complaint, PRIMEX alleged that it had, on 12 September 1989, as vendee, entered into a Deed of
Conditional Sale (DCS) relative to a portion of land particularly designated as Lot 15 of subdivision plan,
PSD-328610, containing more or less ONE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND and TWENTY NINE square
meters (140,029 m2) from a mother parcel of land comprising an area of more or less 198,888 square
meters located along Sumilong Highway, Barrio La Paz, Antipolo, Rizal, covered by an
approved Homestead Patent under Survey No. H-138612 and Tax Declaration No. 04-04804, with the
herein defendants-appellees as vendors.

The parties agreed at a purchase price of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P280.00) per square meter,
translating into a total land purchase value of THIRTY NINE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND
AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (P39,208,120.00).

PRIMEX claimed that from the time of the execution of the DCS with the defendants-appellees, the
company had dutifully complied with all its monetary obligations under the said contract and was again
ready to pay another P2,000,000.00 upon presentation by the defendants-appellees, among others, of a
valid certificate of title in the name of one or all of the vendors as sanctioned under paragraph II(d) of
the DCS.

However, instead of delivering a valid title to PRIMEX, the defendants-appellees delivered to the former
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 196256 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The problem with this
certificate according to PRIMEX was that while it was indeed registered under the name of one of the
vendors - Marcelino Lopez, among several others, the title was nonetheless derived from Original
Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 537, which had been declared by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 90380
dated 13 September 1990 as null and void together with all the other TCTs emanating from the said
OCT.

Consequently, PRIMEX refused to accept delivery of [TCT] No. 196256 as a valid and sufficient
compliance with the terms of the DCS which would warrant the release of another P2,000,000.00 in
accordance with the schedule of payments stipulated by the parties in their written covenant.

Despite its failure to deliver a valid title to PRIMEX, the latter averred that the defendants-appellees in
their letter dated 06 March 1991, as well as verbal statements, threatened to sell or mortgage the
subject property to other parties on account of PRIMEX's ostensible refusal to pay part of the purchase
price as scheduled.

Hence, PRIMEX's a complaint for specific performance and preliminary injunction.

On 15 May 1991, instead of filling an answer, defendants-appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss PRIMEX's
complaint on the ground of improper venue and litis pendencia. As it turned out, the defendants-
appellees had on 18 April 1991 earlier filed a complaint for Rescission of Conditional Sale and Damages
against PRIMEX. The motion to dismiss was, however, subsequently denied by the trial court on 09
December 1991.

Defendants-appellees thereafter filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim on 07 February 1992.

Defendants-appellees countered that they have fully complied with paragraph II (d) of the DCS. That
contrary to PRIMEX's allegations, it was actually the latter who violated the terms of the DCS by
obstinately refusing to pay the amount of one (1) million pesos pursuant to paragraph II (b) of the DCS
despite fulfillment of the defendants-appellees of the conditions thereof. The defendants-appellees aver
that PRIMEX's concern over the validity of TCT No. 196256 was merely an imagined defect and a
deliberate ploy to delay payments.
As compulsory counterclaim, the defendants-appellees on the basis of PRIMEX's allegedly serious and
wanton breach of the terms of the DCS, sought for the rescission of the contract. The defendants-
appellees also asked for damages and the dismissal of PRIMEX's complaint.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the afore-mentioned case, the defendants-appellees delivered to
PRIMEX TCT No. 208538. This certificate of title now contained the exact portion and area of the subject
property sold to PRIMEX, and had already been allegedly acceptable to the latter, so much so that on 30
March 1992, the parties finally executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the piece of property.

The defendants-appellees further acknowledged that in the interim, and as of 07 March 1993, PRIMEX
already released several payments amounting to P24,892,805.85 for the subject property, excluding a
separate P4,150,000.00 loan covered by a real estate mortgage it extended to the defendants-appellee,
Rogelio Amurao for the purpose of funding additional expenses incurred in relation to the fulfillment of
the defendants-appellees obligations under the DCS.

In light of these developments, defendants-appellees on 06 June 1993 again asked the court for the
dismissal of the case.

On 14 June 1993, PRIMEX filed an Opposition to the afore-stated motion to dismiss and claimed
that TCT No. 208358 submitted by the defendants-appellees was insufficient to comply with their
obligations considering that there were still pending claims against the defendants appellees and the
subject property.

In its Supplemental Opposition dated 18 February 1994, PRIMEX emphasized that despite the delivery
of TCT No. 208358, and its subsequent transfer in the name of two of the defendants-appellees, Rogelio
Amurao and Sergio Angeles under TCT No. 216875, which in tum had been thereafter successively and
finally transferred in the name of PRIMEX under new TCT No. 216876, still, the defendants-appellees
failed to comply with their obligation to deliver the title to the property free from any lien and
encumbrance.

As a matter of fact, PRIMEX divulged that there were still two (2) pending cases involving the subject
property one before the Court of Appeals which arose from Civil Case No. 677-A in the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, and another one with the Bureau of Lands docketed as PLAN H-138612. In fact,
the lis pendens evidencing the pendency of the court case was carried over to TCT No. 216876 now
under PRIMEX's name. The inscription oflis pendens had been annotated on TCT No. 196256 (the
precursor of PRIMEX's TCT No. 216876) as early as 08 February 1992.

On 17 May 1995, the trial court declared PRIMEX non-suited for failing to appear during the scheduled
pre-trial hearing on even date. The defendants-appellees were therefore allowed to present their
evidence ex parte.

On 11 August 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the defendants-appellees and ordered
PRIMEX to pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, plus interests, damages and
costs of suit.

Aggrieved by the decision, PRIMEX timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 08 April 1999, this Court through its then Special Sixth Division promulgated a Decision setting aside,
among others, the trial court's appealed decision dated 11 August 1995, and remanding the case for
trial de novo.

After trial, the court a quo rendered anew a decision in favor of the herein defendants-appellees, which
in gist, dismissed the herein plaintiff-appellant's complaint, declared the parties' Deed of Conditional
Sale and Deed of Sale covering the subject property rescinded, and ordered the mutual restitution
between the parties and the payment of damages and interests to the winning party.3

After the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment on January 30, 2004,4 the petitioners as the
plaintiffs filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal on Possession and Compensatory
Damages.5 The RTC granted their motion through the special order dated March 15, 2004.6

Aggrieved, the respondents assailed the special order in the CA through a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ
of preliminary injunction on the ground of the RTC thereby gravely abusing its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction (G.R. No. 163959). Nonetheless, on May 31, 2004, the CA granted the
petition, and annulled the special order.7

The petitioners then brought their own petition for certiorari in this Court to annul the resolution issued
by the CA in GR. No. 163959.

Meanwhile, on January 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its assailed decision resolving the appeal of the
judgment of the RTC in Pasig City (G.R. No. 177855) by reversing and setting aside the judgment, and
ordering the respondent to pay the petitioners the full balance of the purchase price of the property
with legal interest of 6% per annum.8

It is noted at this juncture that because the petitioners had engaged the services of two different
attorneys, Atty. Sergio Angeles and Atty. Martin Pantaleon, another issue concerning the timeliness of
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners arose. Atty. Pantaleon received a copy of the CA
decision in G.R. No. 177855 on January 30, 2007, while Atty. Angeles received it on February 23, 2007.
Atty. Pantaleon would have had until February 14, 2007 within which to file the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration but failed to do so. On his part, Atty. Angeles had until March 10, 2007, and filed
a Motion for Reconsideration on March 6, 2007.

The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, and declared its
decision dated January 23, 2007 final and executory as of February 14, 2007.9

The respondent moved to declare the decision of January 23, 2007 as final and executory, and to
remand the case to the RTC for execution.

The petitioners appealed to the Court for the review of the adverse decision dated January 23, 2007. In
its resolution promulgated on April 16, 2008, the Court gave due course to the appeal, and required the
parties to submit their memoranda.

On February 21, 2012, the parties submitted the Compromise Agreement with Joint Motion to Dismiss
and Withdrawal of Petition.10
On March 7, 2012, the Court issued the resolution being challenged by the heirs of the late Marcelino
Lopez: (1) noting the Compromise Agreement with Joint Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal of Petition;
(2) granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal of Petition; and (3) denying the petitions for
review on certiorari on the ground of mootness.

Thereafter, the heirs of Marcelino Lopez tiled their oppositions arguing that Atty. Angeles no longer had
the authority to enter into and submit the Compromise Agreement because the special power of
attorney in his favor had ceased to have force and effect upon the death of Marcelino Lopez.11

Ruling of the Court

1.
The authority of Atty. Angeles was
terminated upon the death of Marcelino Lopez

By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another with the consent or authority of the latter.12 For a contract of
agency to exist, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be consent
coming from persons or entities having the juridical capacity and capacity to act to enter into such
contract; (2) there must exist an object in the form of services to be undertaken by the agent in favor of
the principal; and (3) there must be a cause or consideration for the agency.13

One of the modes of extinguishing a contract of agency is by the death of either the principal or the
agent.14 In Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation,15 the Court declared that because death of
the principal extinguished the agency, it should follow a fortiori that any act of the agent after the death
of his principal should be held void ab initio unless the act fell under the exceptions established under
Article 193016 and Article 193117 of the Civil Code. The exceptions should be strictly construed. In other
words, the general rule is that the death of the principal or, by analogy, the agent extinguishes the
contract of agency, unless any of the circumstances provided for under Article 1930 or Article 1931
obtains; in which case, notwithstanding the death of either principal or agent, the contract of agency
continues to exist.

Atty. Angeles asserted that he had been authorized by the Lopezes to enter into the Compromise
Agreement; and that his authority had formed part of the original pre-trial records of the RTC.

Marcelino Lopez died on December 3, 2009, as borne out by the Certificate of Death18 submitted by his
heirs. As such, the Compromise Agreement, which was filed on February 2, 2012, was entered into more
than two years after the death of Marcelino Lopez. Considering that Atty. Angeles had ceased to be the
agent upon the death of Marcelino Lopez, Atty. Angeles' execution and submission of the Compromise
Agreement in behalf of the Lopezes by virtue of the special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Marcelino Lopez were void ab initio and of no effect. The special power of attorney executed by
Marcelino Lopez in favor of Atty. Angeles had by then become functus officio. For the same reason, Atty.
Angeles had no authority to withdraw the petition for review on certiorari as far as the interest in the
suit of the now-deceased principal and his successors-in interest was concerned.

The want of authority in favor of Atty. Angeles was aggravated by the fact that he did not disclose the
death of the late Marcelino Lopez to the Court. His omission reflected the height of unprofessionalism
on his part, for it engendered the suspicion that he thereby tried to pass off the Compromise
Agreement as genuine and valid despite his authority under the special power of attorney having
terminated for all legal purposes.

Accordingly, the March 7, 2012 resolution granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal of
Petitionis set aside, and, consequently, the appeal of the petitioners is reinstated.

2.
The CA did not err in declaring its decision
final and executory on the ground of non-appeal

By their petition for review on certiorari dated June 25, 2007,19 the Lopezes seek the review and reversal
of the decision of the CA promulgated on January 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83159, and the nullification
of the resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.20

We note that the CA thereby reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC rescinding the
parties' Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed of Sale covering the property in litis and ordering mutual
restitution between the parties; and instead directed Primex to pay the petitioners the full balance of
the purchase price of the property plus legal interest of 6% per annum.

In the assailed resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration for having been
filed out of time; and declared its decision dated January 23, 2007 final and executory as of February 14,
2007.

The petitioners submit that the CA thereby erred considering that Atty. Angeles had until March 10,
2007 within which to file the Motion for Reconsideration, which he did on March 6, 2007.

We find and hold that the CA correctly acted in issuing the assailed decision and resolution.

Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court expressly states that if a party has appeared by counsel, service
shall be made upon his counsel or one of them. Considering that there is no question that the
petitioners had engaged the services of two counsels, namely: Atty. Angeles and Atty. Pantaleon, notice
to either of them was effective notice to the petitioners.21 Considering that there was no notice of
withdrawal or substitution of counsel shown to have been made, the notice of the decision to either
Atty. Angeles and Atty. Pantaleon was, for all purposes, notice to the petitioners.22 This is because the
CA could not be expected to itself ascertain whether the counsel of record had been changed.23

Atty. Pantaleon received the CA's decision on January 30, 2007, while Atty. Angeles received it on
February 23, 2007. The service of the decision on Atty. Pantaleon started the running of the period for
seeking the reconsideration of the decision or for perfecting an appeal notwithstanding that Atty.
Angeles had yet to receive the copy of the decision. Under the circumstances, the petitioners effectively
had until February 14, 2007 within which to seek the reconsideration or to perfect their appeal, but they
failed to do either. They appear to have filed their Motion for Reconsideration only on March 6, 2007,
which was too late for being already 35 days from notice of the decision.

It is axiomatic that a party who fails to assail an adverse decision through the proper remedy within the
period prescribed by law for the purpose loses the right to do so; hence, the decision becomes final and
binding as to such party.24 Similarly, where the motion for reconsideration is filed out of time, the order
or decision sought to be thereby reconsidered attains finality.25 The failure of the petitioners' counsel to
timely file the Motion for Reconsideration or to appeal rendered the judgment of the CA final and
executory.

We reiterate that the right to appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but is a mere
statutory right. The party seeking to avail himself of the right to appeal must comply with the
procedures and rules governing appeals set by law; otherwise, the right may be lost or squandered.26 In
other words, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.27 Execution of the judgment then follows, for just as a losing party has the privilege to appeal
within the prescribed period, so does the winner have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision.28

In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in denying the Motion for Reconsideration and in declaring
its decision as final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the COURT:

(1) DECLARES the Compromise Agreement VOID;

(2) SETS ASIDE the resolution granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal of
Petitionpromulgated on March 7, 2012; and

(3) AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 23, 2007.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on leave.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, Petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,

deceased, Respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez,
rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission
held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a
proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two
and one-half (2-�) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante
was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the
case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of
two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City",
subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-
34).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with

law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by

evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries
of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased
demand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy
with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate
the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him
that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P
35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would
certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of
Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not
lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was
property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the
estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits
(page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate
as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his
estate and judicial administrator after his death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of
the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of
special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise
it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the
possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply
with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for
and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience - the evidence established that the public
needed the ice plant - was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic
ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of
public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal
conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that
such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the
deceased".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice
of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were
alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public
Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the
decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of
the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other
things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus
line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the
State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the
man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to
defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that
the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The
Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a
decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person
in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term,
and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal.
304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection
or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only
to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje &
L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the
authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn
vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and
this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in
avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an
interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural
persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the
name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having
intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in
it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of
their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, - the estate - and not the
natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail
prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting
the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during
his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample
precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality
independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro
Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and
Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of
a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by
virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs.
Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the
Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well
as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure
in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or
the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes
vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood - the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the
decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator,
to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for
indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court
of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons
recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having
rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as
amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and
the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong
entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which,
for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such
legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially
the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as
announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of
rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less
than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite
course.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any
debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised
for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying
the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for
the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The
outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors
and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more
than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of
such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice
of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment
amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses
occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its
provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no
justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of
this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record,
he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation
has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does
not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the
simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of
the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and
decreed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the
laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines,
nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by
which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They
inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for
their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been
devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the
citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are
Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it
should be reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an
alien.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946, be
set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and
render a new decision accordingly.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Castillo & Castillo for appellants.

Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case
the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer
solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the
sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).

Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final,
the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety
bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under
the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.

The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in
the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his
own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug
court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio
Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).

The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case
No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No.
T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662,
was filed.

Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against
Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction
over Oria.

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants
in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted
in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had
acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that
decision the plaintiffs appealed.

The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the
validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the
other world, was never served with summons.

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion
vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there
was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have
validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul
the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against
that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in
good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-
662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land
covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial
Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-
55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD
VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and
NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order and/or
injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No.
88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11
October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988,
a petition for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City)
alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape,
Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was
filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas
Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died
on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious
sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her
body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of
the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the
petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b)
of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas
corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases')
alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the
dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was
finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent
court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de
Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17
November 1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners
as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was
already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29,
1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body
of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the
reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
reads as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
 (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital

relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:

xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is
within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on
17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over
the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a
separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition
for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article
294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the
custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly
finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an
action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of
all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. .
. . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody
over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure
questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence,
the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a
resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently
establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a
decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the
dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the
new Family Code) which states:

Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary
rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations
therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper
relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised
in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief.
However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking
into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make
full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects
in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have
been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous
relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez
against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has
 expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may
not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not
allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in
the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the
court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is
that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to
avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its
real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary
expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by
respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of
the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo
had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse
used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he
is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru
Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children
During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse',
the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-
a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and

left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of
the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188944 July 9, 2014

SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT, Petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE C. SIAPNO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 29 January 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No.
87995.1 The assailed CA Decision affirmed with modification the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 2004-
0246-D issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region of Dagupan City, Branch 42.
The RTC Decision allowed the foreclosure of a mortgaged property despite the objections of
petitioners claiming, among others, that its registered owner was impleaded in the suit despite being
deceased.

THE FACTS

Considering that there are no factual issues in this case, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA, as
follows:

On May 23, 2002, Macaria Berot (or "Macaria") and spouses Rodolfo A. Berot (or "appellant") and
Lilia P. Berot (or "Lilia") obtained a loan from Felipe C. Siapno (or "appellee") in the sum of
₱250,000.00, payable within one year together with interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum
from that date until fully paid.

As security for the loan, Macaria, appellant and Lilia (or "mortgagors", when collectively)mortgaged
to appellee a portion, consisting of 147 square meters (or "contested property"), of that parcel of land
with an area of 718 square meters, situated in Banaoang, Calasiao, Pangasinan and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1123 in the names of Macaria and her husband Pedro Berot (or "Pedro"), deceased.
On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.

Because of the mortgagors’ default,appellee filed an action against them for foreclosure of
mortgageand damages on July 15, 2004 in the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 42).
The action was anchored on the averment that the mortgagors failed and refused to pay the
abovementioned sum of ₱250,000.00 plus the stipulated interest of 2% per month despite lapse of
one year from May 23, 2002.

In answer, appellant and Lilia (or "Berot spouses", when collectively [referred to]) alleged that the
contested property was the inheritance of the former from his deceased father, Pedro; that on said
property is their family home; that the mortgage is void as it was constituted over the family home
without the consent of their children, who are the beneficiaries thereof; thattheir obligation is only
joint; and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no summons was
served on her as she was already dead.

With leave of court, the complaint was amended by substituting the estate of Macaria in her stead.
Thus, the defendants named in the amended complaint are now the "ESTATE OF MACARIA
BEROT, represented by Rodolfo A. Berot, RODOLFO A. BEROT and LILIA P. BEROT".

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated June 30, 2006, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment allowing the foreclosure of the subject mortgage.
Accordingly, the defendants are hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff within ninety (90) days from
notice of thisDecision the amount of ₱250,000.00 representing the principal loan, with interest at two
(2%) percent monthly from February, 2004 the month when they stopped paying the agreed interest
up to satisfaction of the claim and 30% of the amount to be collected as and for attorney’s fees.
Defendants are also assessed to pay the sum of ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses and another sum
of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages for their refusal to pay their aforestated loan obligation. If
within the aforestated 90-day period the defendants fail to pay plaintiff the above-mentioned
amounts, the sale of the property subject of the mortgage shall be made and the proceeds of the
sale to be delivered to the plaintiff to cover the debt and charges mentioned above, and after such
payments the excess, if any shall be delivered to the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied per order dated
September 8, 2006. Hence, this appeal interposed by appellant imputing errors to the lower court in
–

1. SUBSTITUTING AS DEFENDANT THE ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT WHICH HAS NO

PERSONALITY TO SUE AND TO BE SUED;

2. APPOINTING RODOLFO BEROT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF THE

DECEASED MACARIA BEROT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE OTHER HEIRS, GRANTING FOR
THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT HAS A PERSONALITY TO
SUE AND BE SUED;

3. NOT FINDING THE MORTGAGE NULL AND VOID, WHICH WAS ENTERED INTOWITHOUT
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE FAMILY HOME WHO WERE OF
LEGAL AGE;

4. MAKING DEFENDANTS LIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION OF PH250,000.00, WHEN

THE OBLIGATION IS ONLY JOINT;

5. IMPOSING ATTORNEY’S FEE(S) IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION WITHOUT MAKING A

FINDING OF THE BASIS THEREOF IN THE BODY; and

6. IMPOSING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.

Appellant contends that the substitution of the estate of Macaria for her is improper as the estate has
no legal personality to be sued.3
On 29 January 2009, the CA, through its Seventh Division, promulgated a Decision that affirmed the
RTC Decision but with modification where it deleted the award of exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation. The appellate court explained in its ruling that petitioners correctly
argued that a decedent’s estate is not a legal entity and thus, cannot sue or be sued. However,it
noted that petitioners failed to object to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of
Macaria when the latter was impleaded by respondents by amending the original
complaint.4 Adopting the rationale of the trial court on this matter, the CA held:

As aptly observed by the trial court:

It may be recalled that when the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint substituting the estate of
Macaria Berot in place of Macaria Berot as party defendant, defendants made no objection thereto.
Not even an amended answer was filed by the defendants questioning the substitution of the estate
of Macaria Berot. For these reasons, the defendants are deemed to have waivedany objection on
the personality of the estate of Macaria Berot. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that,
‘Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. (Order dated September 8, 2006)5 [Underscoring supplied]

The CA also found the action of respondent to be procedurally correct under Section 7, Rule 86 of
the Rules ofCourt, when it decided to foreclose on the mortgage of petitioner and prove his
deficiency as an ordinary claim.6The CA did not make a categorical finding that the nature of the
obligation was joint or solidary on the part of petitioners.7 It neither sustained their argument that the
mortgage was invalidfor having beenconstituted over a family home without the written consent of
the beneficiaries who were of legal age.8 However, it upheld their argument that the award of
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor ofrespondent was improper for lack of basis,9 when
it ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision, but their motion was denied through a
Resolution dated 9 July 2009.11 Aggrieved by the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, they now
come to us through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, proffering purely questions of
law.

THE ISSUES

The following are the issues presented by petitioners for resolution by this Court:

The Court of Appeals erred in:

1. Holding that the intestate estate of Macaria Berot could be a proper party by waiver expressly or
impliedly by voluntary appearance;

2. In not holding that the obligation is joint12

THE COURT’S RULING

We DENYthe Petition for lack of merit.

Petitioners were correct when they argued that upon Macaria Berot’s death on 23 June 2003, her
legal personality ceased, and she could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure
suit. It is also true that her death opened to her heirs the succession of her estate, which in this case
was an intestate succession. The CA, in fact, sustained petitioners’ position that a deceased
person’s estate has no legal personality to be sued. Citing the Court’s ruling in Ventura v.
Militante,13 it correctly ruled that a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
madea defendant in a case:

A deceased person does not have suchlegal entity asis necessary to bring action so much so that a
motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent’s
estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity;
such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being
nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued isa correlative of the
capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be named a party defendant in a court action.

When respondent filed the foreclosure case on 15 June 2004 and impleaded Macaria Berot as
respondent, the latter had already passed away the previous year, on 23 June 2003. In their
Answer14 to the Complaint, petitioners countered among others, that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over Macaria, because no summons was served on her, precisely for the reason that she
had already died. Respondent then amended his Complaint with leave of court and substituted the
deceased Macaria by impleading her intestate estate and identified Rodolfo Berot as the estate’s
representative. Thereafter, the case proceeded on the merits at the trial, where this case originated
and where the Decision was promulgated.

It can be gleaned from the records ofthe case that petitioners did not object when the estate of
Macaria was impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure case. Petitioner Rodolfo Berot did not
object either when the original Complaint was amended and respondent impleaded him as the
administrator of Macaria’s estate, in addition to his being impleaded as an individual respondent in
the case. Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in ruling that, indeed, petitionersimpliedly
waived any objection to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their persons at the inception of
the case. In resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners as defendants in Civil Case No.
2004-0246-D, the RTC was in point when it ruled:

It may be recalled that when the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint substituting the estate of
Macaria Berot in place of Macaria Berot as party defendant, defendants made no objections thereto.
Not even an amended answer was filed by the defendants questioning the substitution of the estate
of Macaria Berot. For these reasons, the defendants are deemed to have waivedany objection on
the personality of the estate of Macaria Berot. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that,
"Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. x x x. (Underscoring ours)15

Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one that may bewaived
by a party to a case. In order to avail of that defense, one must timely raise an objection before the
court.16

The records of the case show that on 9 November 2004, a hearing was held on the Motion for Leave
to Filefiled by respondent to have her amended Complaint admitted. During the said hearing, the
counsel for petitioners did not interpose an objection to the said Motion for Leave. 17 On 18 March
2005, a hearing was held on respondent’s Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, wherein counselfor
petitioners again failed to interpose any objection.18 Thus, the trial court admitted respondent’s
Amended Complaint and ordered thata copy and a summons be served anew on petitioners.19
In an Order20 dated 14 April 2005, the RTC noted that petitioners received the summons and the
copy of the amended Complaint on 3 February 2005 and yet they did not file an Answer. During the
trial on the merits that followed, petitioners failed to interpose any objection to the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria Berot. Clearly, their full participation in the
proceedings of the case can only be construed as a waiver of any objection to or defense of the trial
court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over the estate.

In Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Panlalapi, Inc.,21 we held that a party’s appearance in a
case is equivalent to a service of summons and that objections must be timely raised:

In this regard, petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a
defendant’svoluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Further,
the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. If he does not wish to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object
thereto.

It should be noted that Rodolfo Berot is the son of the deceased Macaria22 and as such, he is a
compulsory heir of his mother. His substitution is mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Notably, there is no indication inthe records of the case that he had other siblings
who would have been his co-heirs. The lower and appellate courts veered from the real issue
whether the proper parties have been impleaded. They instead focused on the issue whether there
was need for a formal substitution when the deceasedMacaria, and later its estate, was impleaded.
As the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real party in interest in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. At the time of the filing of the complaint for
foreclosure, as well as the time it was amended to implead the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo – as
heir – who is the real party in interest. He stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the
suit.

Rodolfo is also Macaria’s co-defendant in the foreclosure proceedings in his own capacity as co-
borrower ofthe loan. He participated in the proceedings of the case, from the initial hearing of the
case, and most particularly when respondent filed his amended complaint impleading the estate of
Macaria. When respondent amended his complaint, Rodolfo did not file an amended Answer nor
raise any objection, even if he was also identified therein as the representative ofthe estate of the
deceased Macaria. The lower court noted this omission by Rodolfo in its Order dated 8 September
2006 ruling on his Motionfor Reconsideration to the said court’s Decision dated 30 June 2006. Thus,
his continued participation in the proceedings clearly shows that the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the heir of Macaria.

In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, 23 we ruled that:

[W]e have to point out that the confusion in this case was brought about by respondents themselves
when they included in their complaint two defendants who were already dead. Instead of impleading
the decedent’s heirs and current occupants of the landholding, respondents filed their complaint
against the decedents, contrary to the following provision of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure:

RULE V

PARTIES, CAPTION AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

SECTION 1. Parties in Interest. Every agrarian case must be initiated and defended inthe name of
the real party in interest. x x x.
A real party in interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of a suit." The real parties in interest, at the time the
complaint was filed, were no longer the decedents Avelino and Pedro, but rather their respective
heirs who are entitled to succeed to their rights (whether as agricultural lessees or as farmers-
beneficiaries) under our agrarian laws. They are the ones who, as heirs of the decedents and
actualtillers, stand to be removed from the landholding and made to pay back rentals to respondents
if the complaint is sustained.

Since respondents failed to correcttheir error (they did not amend the erroneous caption of their
complaint to include the real parties-ininterest), they cannot be insulated from the confusion which it
engendered in the proceedings below. But at any rate, notwithstanding the erroneous caption and
the absence of a formal substitution of parties, jurisdiction was acquired over the heirs of Avelino
and Pedro who voluntarily participated in the proceedings below. This Court has ruled that formal
substitution of parties is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated,
and presented evidence during the proceedings.

As such, formal substitution of the parties in this case is not necessary.

In Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals24 we ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in place of
the deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and participated in the
proceedings of the case. In the cited case, we explained the rationale of our ruling and related it to
the due process issue, to wit:

We are not unaware of several cases where we have ruled that a party having died in an action that
survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or
substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the
trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution of heirs is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented
evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all, are these
particular circumstances which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible claim of
violation of her rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general
rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent
judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs
and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because
non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who,
though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in this light, the Court of Appeals,in the resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, thus expounded:

Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it
should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements.
The original party having died, he could not continue, to defend himself in court despite the fact that
the action survived him. For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for
the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would beaffected by the judgment. It could be
the administrator or executor or the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes.
Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is
important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such
substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called
the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know
that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively
participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is
the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and
gives effect to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive
aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may he considered substantial
compliance.Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be
deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense
ofthe deceased after his death:

1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think that the
lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees. The lawyer
continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two more
years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that
the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to
continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was rendered;

2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even testified in
the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew therefore that there was a
litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest and those of her children were
involved;

3. This petition for annulmentof judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided against the
defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the decision was rendered
(even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that she was notaware that an appeal
had been made);

4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction byestoppel.
This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject matter was being
questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction
over the person may be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the person in court as did
herein petitioner appear;

5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de Gonzales, etal.)
cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention relative to nonacquisition of
jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita Gonzales was not served notice and, more
importantly, she never appeared in court, unlike herein petitioner who appeared and even testified
regarding the death of her husband.

In this case, Rodolfo’s continued appearance and participation in the proceedings of the case
dispensed with the formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased Macaria. The failure of
petitioners to timely object to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria Berot
amounted to a waiver on their part. Consequently, it would be too late for them at this point to raise
that defense to merit the reversal of the assailed decision of the trial court. We are left with no option
other than to sustain the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s Decision on this matter.

On the second issue of whether the nature of the loan obligation contracted by petitioners is joint or
solidary, we rule that it is joint.

Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the general rule is that when there is a
concurrence of two or more debtors under a single obligation, the obligation is presumed to be joint:
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, orthat each one of the
latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires
solidarity.

The law further provides that to consider the obligation as solidary in nature, it must expressly be
stated as such, or the law or the nature of the obligation itself must require solidarity. In PH Credit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,25we held that:

A solidaryobligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of
the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the
debtors. On the other hand, a jointobligation is one in which each debtors is liable only for a
proportionate part of the debt, and the creditor is entitled to demand only a proportionate part of the
credit from each debtor. The wellentrenched rule is that solidary obligations cannot be inferred
lightly. They must be positively and clearly expressed. A liability is solidary "only when the obligation
expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires."

In the instant case, the trial court expressly ruled that the nature of petitioners’ obligation to
respondent was solidary.26 It scrutinized the real estate mortgage and arrived at the conclusion that
petitioners had bound themselves to secure their loan obligation by way of a realestate mortgage in
the event that they failed to settle it.27But such pronouncement was not expressly stated in its 30
June 2006 Decision. This was probably the reason why, when the trial court Decision was appealed
to it, the CA did not squarely address the issue when the latter ruled that:

It is noteworthy that the appealed decision makes no pronouncement that the obligation of the
mortgagors is solidary; and that said decision has not been modifiedby the trial court. Hence, it is
unnecessary for US to make a declaration on the nature of the obligation of the
mortgagors.28 However, a closer scrutiny of the records would reveal that the RTC expressly
pronounced that the obligation of petitioners to the respondent was solidary. In resolving petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration to its 30 June 2006 Decision, the trial court categorically ruled that:

Defendants [sic] obligation with plaintiff is solidary. A careful scrutiny of the Real Estate
Mortgage(Exh. "A") will show that all the defendants, for a single loan, bind themselves to cede,
transfer, and convey by way of real estate mortgage all their rights, interest and participation in the
subject parcelof land including the improvements thereon in favor of the plaintiff, and warrant the
same to be free from liens and encumbrances, and that should theyfail to perform their obligation the
mortgage will be foreclosed. From this it can be gleaned that each of the defendants obligated
himself/herself to perform the said solidary obligation with the plaintiff.29 We do not agree with this
finding by the trial court.

We have scoured the records of the case, but found no record of the principal loan instrument,
except an evidence that the realestate mortgage was executed by Macaria and petitioners. When
petitioner Rodolfo Berot testified in court, he admitted that heand his mother, Macaria had contracted
the loan for their benefit:

Q: On the Real Estate Mortgage, you and your mother obtained a loan from Mr. Siapno in the
amountof ₱250,000.00, now as between you and your mother whose loan is that?

A: It is the loan of my mother and myself, sir.30

The testimony of petitioner Rodolfo only established that there was that existing loan to respondent,
and that the subject property was mortgaged as security for the said obligation. His admission of the
existence of the loan made him and his late mother liable to respondent. We have examined the
contents of the real estate mortgagebut found no indication in the plain wordings of the instrument
that the debtors – the late Macaria and herein petitioners – had expressly intended to make their
obligation to respondent solidary in nature. Absent from the mortgage are the express and
indubitable terms characterizing the obligation as solidary. Respondent was not able to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that petitioners' obligation to him was solidary. Hence, applicable to this
case is the presumption under the law that the nature of the obligation herein can only be considered
as joint. It is incumbent upon the party alleging otherwise to prove with a preponderance of evidence
that petitioners' obligation under the loan contract is indeed solidary in character. 31

The CA properly upheld respondent's course of action as an availment of the second remedy
provided under Section 7, Rule 86 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. 32 Under the said provision for
claims against an estate, a mortgagee has the legal option to institute a foreclosure suit and to
recover upon the security, which is the mortgaged property.

During her lifetime, Macaria was the registered owner of the mortgaged property, subject of the
assailed foreclosure. Considering that she had validly mortgaged the property to secure a loan
obligation, and given our ruling in this case that the obligation is joint, her intestate estate is liable to
a third of the loan contracted during her lifetime. Thus, the foreclosure of the property may proceed,
but would be answerable only to the extent of the liability of Macaria to respondent. WHEREFORE,
the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 87995 sustaining the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2004-
0246-D is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the obligation of petitioners and the
estate of Macaria Berot is declared as joint in nature.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014

FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA
ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D.
ADRIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision1 and the May 9, 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino
(Valino) was entitled to the remains of the decedent.

The Facts:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office,
married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons,
Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1)
adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned
about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were
not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was
buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than
twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together,
he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that,
unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he
got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying,
Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his
remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents.
Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Decision of the RTC

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well
that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that
Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded
that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed
all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that
he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.4

In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty.
Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City,
would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected. 5 Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains
of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their
expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to
the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the
law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year
separation in fact.

Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good
intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were
in the United States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.

The Sole Issue

The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of
Atty. Adriano.

The Court’s Ruling

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the
persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the
same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

[Emphasis supplied]

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent
of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body of
a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon
the persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;

x x x x. [Emphases supplied]

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law
partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and
sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter
forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.

In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should
be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-
law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr.
Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children
During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to
'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-
a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied]

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately
from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of
the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased.
As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the
Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to
Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in
their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s
claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed
burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true
wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption
can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with
Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband
when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased
husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there
be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here,
Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family
plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In
case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.

From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites"
that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty
to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199
of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among
those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino),
an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to
the wishes of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. 10 As
Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with
Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.

At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are
not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:

The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law.
They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition
of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the
ceremony to be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the
Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with
the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly
explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:

The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano
Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend
to the provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased
to be interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what
to do with the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving
spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally
preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not
even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-
in-fact and had been living apart for more than 30 years.12
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty.
Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot
in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by
law, but it also disrespects the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family
plot of his live-in partner.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However,
the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a
decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest
in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead,
also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in
its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having
this right may recover the corpse from third persons.13

All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano
during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind
to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:

The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino,
who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and
caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of
his remains when he had died.

On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-
appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent
burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be
recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty. In this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of
actual damages.

Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
1âwphi 1

recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the
damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although
incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any
intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if
claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would
appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.

As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item
of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the
New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this
case, we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of
attorney's fees.14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a
deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity
which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies that the
Code Commission saw it best to include the provisions on "Funerals."15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join Justice Leonen's dissent.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I dissent. See separate opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.

Leonardo Abola for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary
settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo
handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision,
modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians
by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to
have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of
Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.

It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The
importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or
vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the
present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of
the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.

The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals
as follows:

"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and
Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in
the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San
Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at
the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were
hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to
abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused
to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning
edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the
bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin.

"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid
shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to
leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in
San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.

"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about
67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her
brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and
25."

The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who
miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between
the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is
uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's
reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:

"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death
of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other
had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect
that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company
of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the
shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we
may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the
instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from
the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German
Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have
been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice,
overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for
certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after
her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone
cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back
upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of
survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who
was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether
she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the
contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for
the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same
battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of
cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle,
some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards
episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of
survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family
met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the
mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no
doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."

Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now
section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889,
now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on
the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.

The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute
necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions
is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it
is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it
can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following rules:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who
would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the
same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are
not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the
situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By
hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no
evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the
law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence,
1940 ed., 483.)

In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect
to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec.
1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:

When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one
died before the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by
one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The
statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show,
probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96
Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship
contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules
of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise,
 speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left
to probably, then the statue of the presumption."

It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision
that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or
inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and
sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to
detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by
the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."

Lopez testified:

Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.

Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters away
from the building but I could see what was going on.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the
shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could
not say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.

Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. Possible,
but not probable.

Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes
after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them,
including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact
that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not
give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in
the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw
 and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died
there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr.
Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the
Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be
roasted.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.

Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance, because
most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape,
and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left
the place? — A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the
people inside especially those trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There were
many people shot because they were trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain
that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.

It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption
out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and
reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that
this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts
that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in
front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated
that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of
the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the
clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard
to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but
the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but
these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by
Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape.
She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
themselves to gun fire.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same
time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and
daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of
death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the
collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of
Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was
"minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that
Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired

The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs.
Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the
known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her
refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form
protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was
no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the
premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building
was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not
cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's
departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123
does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be
certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not
mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of
fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199
N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have said, it is
enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re
Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the
cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the
existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The
same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person
who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot
about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but
rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than
do the facts of the case at hand.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely
on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite
theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can
not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous,
where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired
was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore
on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which
has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our
judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of
Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness
or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed.
856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the
evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the
construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or
where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions
drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."

The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked
is a question of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least
evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on
the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN,

ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA
CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages.

The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service.
The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render
military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because
of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and
pointless speech."1

On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. 2

On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of Donation," 3 wherein Feliciano
allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property
described, viz:

A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs
of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the
West by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.

The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 180804 to
Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained
in Feliciano’s name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.5

On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No.
45636 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On
December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court
appointed People’s Bank and Trust Company as Feliciano’s guardian.8 People’s Bank and Trust
Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI).

On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property,
registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan. 9

On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus
Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on
February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. 11

On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property
registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida
Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of
the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12

On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against the herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had
truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of
Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus
Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone.
BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the
death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages
and litigation expenses.

On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his
heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.

On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the
presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due
execution of the donation in question must be upheld.14 It rendered judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in
question which is now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorney’s fees of ₱10,000.00, and to pay the
Costs.(sic)

SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court and held, viz:

In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-
appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the
precise moment when the property in dispute was donated.

Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled with
compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property
under Article 749, which provides:

xxx

Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her
ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the
concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).

The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees’ Folder of Exhibits) of
the property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be
upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less
apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan
does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution
(Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant
(Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.17

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R.

CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR
MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT
WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED";

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT

"S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE;
 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R.
CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES
CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND

LACHES.18

Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano’s competence to donate property to Mercedes had
been rebutted because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First,
they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October
20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved
that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence,
petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which
incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997.
Petitioners contend that Feliciano’s marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not
prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that
the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also
cannot prove his competency because these donations were approved and confirmed in the
guardianship proceedings.19 In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and
fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was registered only on February
20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus
Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be
innocent purchasers of the property in question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not
barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed
their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after Feliciano’s death on August 14,
1997 had begun.21

The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent
in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion
of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. 23 The parties'
intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the
donation voidable.24

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at
the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent
freely given.25 However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it;
if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.26

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented
by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when
he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as
early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the
incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of
attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public when, in the
late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and "catatonia" with
certain paranoid states and called the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss
psychiatrist, modified Kraepelin’s conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook
and in 1911 renamed the condition "schizophrenia." According to medical references, in persons
with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly
bizarre as the disease progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and
1avvphi1

worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other
patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd speech
habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter
refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers.27 It has been
proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications
help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce
delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse.28Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimer’s
disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration
of intellect.29

From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the
existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the
lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition
continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. 30 Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give
consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared
him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the
property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of
marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in
their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his
illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue
influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown.32

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little
bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is
that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its
execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.

Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on
appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal had
prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained
binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.34

IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.

Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed
by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay
the costs of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the
complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters
Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu,
a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her
paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot,
municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended
complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters,
through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910,
said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of
P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz,
notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-
half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-
fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and
Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per
annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received
said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be
rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the
plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased
mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their
equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each
and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-
matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its
owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of
her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a
portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that
subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his
capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis
Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of
seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being
still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating
a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age,
executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted
integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de
retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father
Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and
perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their
deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was
unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been
caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be
rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and,
besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial
be charged against them.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in
special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-
complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years
fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they
be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.

After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case
and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper
bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this
court.

As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17,
1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the
decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and
therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in
case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding,
attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the
annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the contract,
in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of
the land sold.

The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of
the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59
centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands
passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the
partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-
seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares.
Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children,
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu,
who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land
described in the complaint.

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths
of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and
which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant
excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered
by 21 cavanes of seed.

It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed
by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land
now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on
account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser
Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public
documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party
Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and
those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and
therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his
aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower
Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the
same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land
that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a
part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain
funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having
died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters
Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal
status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17,
1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the
sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the
land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area
equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano
Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on
the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the
Sapang-Maitu stream.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that
on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further
reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining
their consent for the execution of said deed.

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in
Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost
or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which
she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages
396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4,
1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment
of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year
1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be
appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the
instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been,
respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.

The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and
sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle
Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in
interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B,
pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that
she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed
of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to
her uncle Luis Espiritu.

The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who
directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria
Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not
know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his
sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to
the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and
minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as
compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two
sisters' share was 764 cavanes.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to
them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand
Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to
court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had
not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for
witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter,
testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under
witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion
of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894,
utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's
death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing
an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held same
until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year
1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other
relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the
Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediate
in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When
shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its
contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao
Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a
parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could
identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was
presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the
ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or
pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis
Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado
denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up
any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the
house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said
document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose
names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as
well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever
having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose
of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the
document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the
sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the
certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said
purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of
the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan;
and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum
of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in
perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch
as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.

So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel
or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of
the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or
mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at
an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as
follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400,
collected by the plaintiffs.

In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to
her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her
brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3,
which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality
of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in
perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the
record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any
violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed
it.

Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates,
Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and
also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to
obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned,
without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts
hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or
simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner
by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May,
1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of
the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate
is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed,
by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in
consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in
lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership
was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other
portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment
or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime,
received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document
Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is
therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and
absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the nature
of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of
the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs.
(Civ. Code, art. 1218.)

The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita
Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes
of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 —
an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and
register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past
revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony
recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing
he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he
had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said
conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his
own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the
plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is
false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs'
father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore
properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date
of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet
attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that
the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were
presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence
whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the
testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births
of the said Domingo and Josefa.

However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it
cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time
they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3
is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of
seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan
from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully
sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to
have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the
judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules
established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860,
July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis
Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing
the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of
May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in
order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14,
1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these
facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it,
they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no
supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not
occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document
Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to
secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to
P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the
plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received
through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the
creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received
as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received
and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by
Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter
and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser
as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was
not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the
true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.

But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement, in the
prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's representations
as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to
believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.

The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases cited in
the prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like instances
by many of the courts in the United States.

For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish and
American, recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at this
time; and in this connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with rather
less favor than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the doctrine, doubtless because
the cases wherein it may properly be applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where
majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not ordinarily attained until
the infant reaches the age of 25.

Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:

If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about
that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and
should no (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age
when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and
not the deceivers.
In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following:

(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem,
tunc adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in
dolo, quo casu competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde ast ac si
nullus fuiset in dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act.
empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. adde Albericum
tenentem, quabndo per aspectum a liter constaret, in authent. sacramenta puberum, col. 3.
C. si advers vendit.

(2) Engoñosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam
legem Partitarum, que non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talem assertionem faciat,
videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in
princ. D. de jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum contrahit, se esse
puberem, et postea etiam juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum
dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi
Paul. de Cast. multum commendans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si tamen teneamus illam
opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax obligatur ex juramento, non esset ita miranda
dicat, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum
expresse sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo:
Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. C. si minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11.
illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon. in summa
illius tit. in fin. Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi
probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum
dicit, si lo faze engoñosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in
fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate asserat se mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur
dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu
scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut ibi; et per
quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr.
s. quis autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem
aliquas notabiles quaestiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor ex
tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de aetate,
D. de minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia.

In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent
illustration of the conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the
following resolution therein set forth.

Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years
of age and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are married, or have
administration of their property, or on account of other special circumstances affecting them,
the other parties to the contract believe them to be of legal age.

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p.
610), supported by numerous citations of authority.

Estoppel to disaffirm — (I) In General. — The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general
rule applicable to infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have
created an estoppel against him to disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be
estopped by the acts or admissions of other persons.
(II) False representations as to age. — According to some authorities the fact that an infant
at the time of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt
that he had attained the age of majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the
infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the defense of infancy against the
enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that such false
representations will create an estoppel against the infant, and under the statutes of some
states no contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor's representations as to
his majority, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.
Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to his age, the mere fact that the
person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age, even though his belief was warranted
by the infant's appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the infant knew of such
belief, will not render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.

Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.

Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is
alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in
question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y
Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in this
case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July
17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by
intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who
threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not
decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being
void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor,
which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the
land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband
Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong
in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was
P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included that
described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the
latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No.
496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration
that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1
alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the
vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37
Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him
pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend
to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who
purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in
1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by
the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in
the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado
and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed
upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.

The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula
Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the
defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in
question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by the
plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950

SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,

vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.

Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso
Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was
then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan)
received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that
Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by
Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney
of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots
to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.

On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of
land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan
and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter
two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of
Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not
binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly
sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from
December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the
complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally
covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia
Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.

It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931,
showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not pretend and
there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This
conclusion is decisive and very obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the
resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when
informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest
beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly
indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the
feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of
Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.
 As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees
were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was completed.
(Resolution.)

Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their
interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of appellant's
minority. (Resolution.)

. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a
minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees of his client's
desire to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)

The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract
was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it unless the
period fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing of the complaint. . . .
(Decision.)

In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants
invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title
19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the
purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)

The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not
actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason
of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing
indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals
erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-
existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself
to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the
contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was
admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it
should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate
the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the
appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract executed by
parties with full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the
appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had
already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the
contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner
had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the
sum of P500.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age
of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The suggestion, while
perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of
the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing the
appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the
choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be
invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position is
untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with which a
notice to disaffirm is made.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from
the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the result not upon the grounds stated in the majority opinion but for the following
reasons: The deed of sale executed by Ramon Alcantara on 3 August 1931 conveying to Sia Suan
five parcels of land is null and void insofar as the interest, share, or participation of Ramon Alcantara
in two parcels of land is concerned, because on the date of sale he was 17 years, 10 months and 22
days old only. Consent being one of the essential requisites for the execution of a valid contract, a
minor, such as Ramon Alcantara was, could not give his consent thereof. The only
misrepresentation as to his age, if any, was the statement appearing in the instrument that he was of
age. On 27 August 1931, or 24 days after the deed was executed, Gaw Chiao, the husband of the
vendee Sia Suan, was advised by Atty. Francisco Alfonso of the fact that his client Ramon Alcantara
was a minor. The fact that the latter, for and in consideration of P500, executed an affidavit, whereby
he ratified the deed of sale, is of no moment. He was still minor. The majority opinion invokes the
rule laid down in the case of Mercado et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215. The rule laid down by this
Court in that case is based on three judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain on 27 April
1960, 11 July 1868, and 1 March 1875. In these decisions the Supreme Court of Spain applied Law
6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which expressly provides:

"Diziendo o ortogando el que fuese menor, que era mayor de XXV años, si ouiesse persona
que paresciesse de tal tiempo, si lo faze enganosamente, valdria el pleyto que assi fuere
fecho con el e non deue ser desatado despues, como quier que non era de edad quando lo
fizo: esto es, porque las leyes ayudan a los enganados, e non a los enganadores. . . ."
(Alcubilla, Codigos Antigous de España, p. 613.)

The contract of sale involved in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu, supra, was executed by the minors
on 17 May 1910. The Law in force on this last-mentioned date was not Las Siete Partidas, 1 which
was the in force at the time the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Spain
referred to, but the Civil Code which took effect in the Philippines on 8
December 1889. As already stated, the Civil Code requires the consent of
both parties for the valid execution of a contract (art. 1261, Civil Code). As a
minor cannot give his consent, the contract made or executed by him has no
validity and legal effect. There is no provision in the Civil Code similar to that
of Law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which is equivalent to the common law
principle of estoppel. If there be an express provision in the Civil Code similar
law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida, I would agree to the reasoning of the
majority. The absence of such provision in the Civil Code is fatal to the validity
of the contract executed by a minor. It would be illogical to uphold the validity
of a contract on the ground of estoppel, because if the contract executed by a
minor is null and void for lack of consent and produces no legal effect, how
could such a minor be bound by misrepresentation about his age? If he could
not be bound by a direct act, such as the execution of a deed of sale, how
could he be bound by an indirect act, such as misrepresentation as to his
age? The rule laid down in Young vs. Tecson, 39 O. G. 953, in my opinion, is
the correct one.
Nevertheless, as the action in this case was brought on 8 August 1940, the same was barred,
because it was not brought within four (4) years after the minor had become of age, pursuant to
article 1301 of the Civil Code. Ramon Alcantara became of age sometime in September 1934.

Moran, C.J. and Bengzon, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959

ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.

Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.

R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of
Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum
of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.

The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay
him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or
as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.

Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.

In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received
P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties and
their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms above
described.

There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority
of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors.
However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be
responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo
and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found
them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not
yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their
incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his
money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the
case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and
willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to
Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in
fact they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs.
Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same
promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted
thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to
Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;

. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as

part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other
authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on the
theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or
that the enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an
indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud
must be actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a
contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
decit. (Emphasis Ours.)

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief
that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose
his age is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)

The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed
therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement.
In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in
this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive)
misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the
application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority which
incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.

We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally
bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.

It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in 1951,
and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it because
more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of
majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to
annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached
majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however,
that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in
October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this
defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of
the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for
any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for
annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because
of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they
received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used
for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they
had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively
established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were
equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.

Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now return
P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be enforced, as
already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is
presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the
Civil Code.

Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay
1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo
Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest
beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia,
JJ., concur.