[G.R. No. 108619.
July 31, 1997] At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded
EPIFANIO LALICAN, Petitioner, v. HON. FILOMENO A.
VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession
of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of
"timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705
(The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to
warrant the quashal of an information charging the former
offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed
by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner
Epifanio Lalican,1 Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo
before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal
Case No. 9543, the information reads:
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz,
Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted
species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger
jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705
refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber,"
and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is
sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said
decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is
"vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or
the legal documents required by existing forest laws and
regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information
should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the law.2
chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that
it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to
set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that
the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or
derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution
was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy
circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from
any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal
prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by
petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.3
c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
On September 24, 1991, the lower court,4 guided by the
principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the
state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that
the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor
a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two
terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest
product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished
wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or
collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of
"lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by
the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court
categorically stated that:
1
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses
no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected
or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68
cannot be made to apply to lumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional
issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be
resolved on some other grounds or issues.5
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this
Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of
the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber
is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and
manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to
facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a
person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally
liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when
apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit
No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that
while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the
product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps
bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of
transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the
product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have
presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in
case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation
from one point to another.6 c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending
that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous
because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber."
The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear
legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts
penalized under that section.7 chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was
subsequently assigned to Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court8 issued the herein questioned
Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It
declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought
to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal
documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It
stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest
product and possession thereof without legal documents is
c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the
definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower
court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower
court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his
motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No.
705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber
or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277
which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C.
Aquino, provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
2
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring
supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the
places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b)
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,9this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:
"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
'Processing plant,' which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the
market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should
we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of
lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons
for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are
the following:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive
to present situations and realities; x x x"
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in
Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should
not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is
prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity
to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law.10 After all, the phrase
"forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in
Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court
said:
"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus
not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that
lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal
documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3
(q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x
3
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the
definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather
tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber,
then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He
could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into
lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow
an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the
loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x
x x.
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to
imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from
lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents
contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession
of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and
penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act
of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products
without lawful authority."
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information.
The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued
only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross
abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.11 Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of power.12 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is
not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.13 Where the
court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of
law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.14 As this
Court said:
"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action
of certiorari."15
chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge's findings and conclusions.16 chan roble svirtuall awlib rary
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of
prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what
petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is
the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against
him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the
proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The
accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his
part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion
and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered,
to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.17 c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an
information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to
proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is
impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor
can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.18 The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.19 An interlocutory order may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.20 However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate
the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of
justice but also would unduly burden the courts.21 chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
4
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v.
Himalaloan22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash
may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an
entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The
information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the
offense charged has prescribed,23 this case may not be
considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the
denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705

which petitioner would have this Court consider,24 this Court has
always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even
if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter
are present in a case,25 this Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if
the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the
application of the statute or general law.26chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem
of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious
effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and
properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the
lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be
favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is
equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the
people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court
must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of
interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing
interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code.
This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering
that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process
and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to
have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is

hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with
dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This
Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

5
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY
TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).
Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.
L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of
the Local Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided,
That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That
any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision
within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the
ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee,
or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four
oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise
known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.1
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial
Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been
observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.2
The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for
non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed
to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision.3 However, on
motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the
decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance
of the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
6
incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a
law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against
him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article
X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in
all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than
on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is
usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,
or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion.5
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged
with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such
a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187
of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it
empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between
control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter
or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the
Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by
the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his
view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4
thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in
invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a
basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was
an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this,
and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
7
The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application
here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local
Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not
supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows:
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day
after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide
otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of
Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity
of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days
after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion,
the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is
contrary to declared national economy policy, and when
the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity
of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or
as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which
period the local legislative body may either modify the
tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an
appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise,
the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared
suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter,
the local legislative body may not reimpose the same
tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the
suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the
effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied
was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of
these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and
not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or
limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never
questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is
not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do
is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without
the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two
grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions
and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written
notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that
were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of
the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes
were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been
held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in
prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the
Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not
translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people
for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the
Code.
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove
such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it
only five days within which to gather and present to him all the
evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion
of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits.
We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree
with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been
observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties
as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are
found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila
Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
8
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits
Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but
this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication
in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement
applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila

Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the
present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the

challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but
AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

9
 G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., Respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Raymundo T. Nagrampa for private respondents.
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of
certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for the
widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section,
Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of
the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents,
however, demand that the just compensation for the property
should be based on fair market value and not that set by
Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on
the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared
valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial
Court ruled for the private respondents. When elevated to it, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et
al., 1this Court held the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared
Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including
Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as
unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of
judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic
was reiterated in subsequent cases.2
The petition for review, despite the aforesaid pronouncement by
this Court, has been given due course upon the pleas of the
Solicitor General to have us address the following concerns:
Ic han robles v irt ual law li bra ry
c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry
c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
VITUG, J.:
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
chan roble s virt u al law lib rary
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY;
EFFECT ON A PENDING APPEALED CASE WHERE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED BEFORE
COURT A QUO.
II c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
IN EPZA VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL
29, 1987) DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID,
BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
III chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR
EXPROPRIATION AS APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE
USED AS PRELIMINARY BASIS FOR THE TEN PER CENT (10%)
DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED ENTRY
THEREON.
The last item is not an issue; being merely provisional in
character, the matter has not been questioned by the private
respondents. 3We will thus limit ourselves to the first two issues
which, in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of
nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not
retroactive, application. The petitioner proposes the
affirmative.chan roblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Instruction is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, whose words we quote -
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced
in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it
10
had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute
books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the
parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter
invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the
court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The
court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law,
but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment
against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may
operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books;
it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The
parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one
else is bound. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code,
providing that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. . . . 4
cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is
declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and
purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never
existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per
se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case,
however, that a law is constitutionally faultyper se. Thus, it may
well be valid in its general import. but invalid in its application to
certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid law
may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to
operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it
vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive
application may be so declared invalid as impairing the
obligations of contracts. 5
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not
necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void
act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions
on the moratorium laws, 6we have been constrained to recognize
the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of
chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to
simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So
also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be
described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further
inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of
nullity of a governing statute. chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from
any of the above exceptional cases. To this day, the controversy
between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue
of just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the
instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision
appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the expropriation
cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when
the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said
parties.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case
committed no error in its appealed decision. chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs. chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
SO ORDERED.
c hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
11
 n 2003
(Chief model
Justice)
[A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC - July 31, 2012]
Toyota 136,500.0 151,000.00 14,500.00
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Grandia, 0
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the 2002
Supreme Court.
model
RESOLUTION
Toyota 115,800.0 156,000.00 40,200.00
Camry, 0
PER CURIAM:
2001
model
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated
July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria,
Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Ruben T. Toyota 579,532.5 580,600.00 1,067.50
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These Reyes Camry, 0
(Associate 2005
Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be Justice) model
used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the Toyota 117,300.0 181,200.00 63,900.00
government properties they used during their tenure. Grandia, 0
2003
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS model

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Angelina Toyota 115,800.0 150,600.00 34,800.00
Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit S. Grandia, 0
(COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
Gutierrez 2002
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their (Associate model
incumbency in the Court, to wit:
ς ηα ñrοb lεš ν ιr†υαl l αω lιb rαrÿ
Justice)

Adolfo S. Toyota 536,105.0 543,300.00 9,195.00

Valuation Azcuna Camry, 0
under (Associate 2005
Valuatio
Items COA Differenc Justice) model
Name of n under
Purchase Memorandu e
Justice CFAG
d m (in pesos) Toyota 117,300.0 145,000.00 27,700.00
(in pesos)
No. 98-569A Grandia, 0
(in pesos) 2002
model
Artemio Toyota 341,241.1 365,000.00 23,758.90
Panganiba Camry, 0 Sony TV 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10

12

Set
Ma. Alicia 5,800.002
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of
the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997
and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc
dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied
the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5,
1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her
Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that
the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned
the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these
were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving
two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the
CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the
Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full
autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in
the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary s resources, based on its own
determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority
to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in
the course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute
the Court s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an
encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
OUR RULING
We find Atty. Candelaria s recommendation to be well-taken.
The COA s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional
bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
ςrα lαω
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court s fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial
independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these
matters.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation
of powers, as follows:ςrαl αω
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.9 ςrν ll
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on
the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch;
the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose,
the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.11
ςrν ll
Under the Judiciary s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the
idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve
justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the
discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from
the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution
itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct
concepts: decisional independence and institutional
13
independence."13Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law."14 On the other hand, institutional
independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government."15 Simply put,
institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the
judiciary as a body."16ςrν ll
In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and
21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts
of judicial independence in the following manner: ς rα lαω
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each
particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with
autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least
without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal
morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of
independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence
and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the
maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours
Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of
government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to
determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,18no less than the
Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained.
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the
Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of
the members of the judiciary.19 The Constitution also mandates that the
judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,20 and grants the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
Jurisprudence21 has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive,
noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.22
ς rνll
The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by
prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in
office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of
the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their office."24With these guarantees, justices and
judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on
by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of
the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives.25 ςrν ll
All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial
independence, not only by clearly stating the Court s powers, but also by
providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of
government to interfere with the Court s affairs.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not
prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by
physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the
Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,26 the
courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general
proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first
instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the
Executive on the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check
on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate
resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush
appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence27 and is
expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal
autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states: ςrαlαω
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and
extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:
ς rα lαω
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
14
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court
says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters
and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory
platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In
the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of
autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)
In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino s veto of
particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary s
constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court
ruled:ςrαlα ω
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the
funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use
of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in
other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on
how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30 ς rνll
The Court s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations;31real fiscal autonomy
covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its
funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief
Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of
administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the
Court En Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01
reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing
the sale of the Judiciary s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme
Court and the appellate courts: ςrαlα ω
WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in
Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the
Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";
WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or
Members of appellate courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at
retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been
recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and cralawli bra ry
WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that
respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she
officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the
need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward
long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously
recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege
as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its
officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to
administer the Judiciary s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to
handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its
personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.33 ςrνll
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
15
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its
extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the guidance.
parameters of the Court s granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor. SO ORDERED.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice
and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary s own affairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501
of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:
ςrαl αω

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment.

The full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal
of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or
instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of
the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the local
government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of
incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate committee or body to
undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the
Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest
and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office,
he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this
case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is
exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc.
However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves
no room for interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the

appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative
Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution
No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated
March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid.

16
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE
JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988
from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor"
forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated
14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for
"comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan
had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc
in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st
Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an
anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court"
addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The
second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco
addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to
pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme
Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr.
Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr.
Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive
pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned
Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M
Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988
of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco
v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court
Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against
Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the
Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he
should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious
accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco,
the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr.
Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading
relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as
Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this
pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution
dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion
for Reconsideration.
It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved.
This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A
public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of
the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who
may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any
offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988
in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for
disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and
may be removed from office only by impeachment
(Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumbent
and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate
theat Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation
17
 to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in
relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the
Commission on Audit who are not certified public
accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are
constitutionally required to be members of the
Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this
matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the
respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers
and employees, including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those
declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, and the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions shall
be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, other high crimes, or
graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from
office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by
any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer
who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office, would be
violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative
dissertation on the New Constitution, states that
"judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to
removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and
punishment, in accordance with law. The above
provision is a reproduction of what was found in the
1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit
character of the above provision that the effect of
impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit
under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party
this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and
thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can
be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as
to the scope of the impeachment process (The
Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear
implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment
proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and
that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal
action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above
in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
18
 subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according
to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it
Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are
entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability
may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court
must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus
terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial

independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because
judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule,
Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any
number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority
by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer

should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against
a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate
grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this

Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.

19
 [G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.]
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional
Trial Court, Antique, Petitioner, v. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, Respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney’s Office for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER
OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner
also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases
despite this Court’s ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan, since the offense
charged arose from the judge’s performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court
disagrees with the first part of petitioner’s basic argument. There is nothing
in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a
judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO
OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN
AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with
petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN
REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE;
PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner’s certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether
said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine,
where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT
AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this
Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing
pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before
Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of
time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of
service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved
by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman
could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s
certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidences. cha nrob les vi rtua l lawlib ra ry
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney’s Office
alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth
and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5)
civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and
August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September
1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this
Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
20

Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said
case despite this Court’s ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the
offense charged arose from the judge’s performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner’s basic argument. There
is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him,
report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet
been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is
hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative SO ORDERED
action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the

Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers

granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. cha nrob les.c om.ph : virt ual law li bra ry

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates
of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its
records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.

Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been

21

G.R. No. 137354 July 6, 2000
SALVADOR M. DE VERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City; and EVALUATION AND
INVESTIGATION BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
"It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and he who acts as
his own lawyer has a fool for a client."
In Re: Joaquin Borromeo
241 SCRA 408 (1995)
The case is a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 assailing the
Evaluation Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of
the Ombudsman, dated October 2, 1998 referring petitioner’s
complaint to the Supreme Court and its Memorandum, dated January
4, 1999,2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We state the relevant facts.
Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing some awareness of
legal principles and procedures, he represents himself in this petition.
On August 28, 1996, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig City a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to enjoin the municipal trial court from proceeding with
a complaint for ejectment against petitioner.3 When the Judge originally
assigned to the case inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to
respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo.4
On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s application for a
temporary restraining order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The
court denied the same on September 1, 1998.5
On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint6 against Judge Pelayo, accusing
him of violating Articles 2067 and 2078 of the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 3019.9
On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer, Erlinda S.
Rojas submitted an Evaluation Report recommending referral of
petitioners’ complaint to the Supreme Court. Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendation.10 We quote the
decretal portion of the report:11
"FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in accordance with the ruling in
Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, it is respectfully recommended
that the instant complaint be referred to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action. The same is hereby considered CLOSED and
TERMINATED insofar as this Office is concerned."
On October 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case
to the Court Administrator, Supreme Court.12
On November 6, 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
Evaluation Report.
On January 4, 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration.13
Hence, this petition.14
The issue is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
entertain criminal charges filed against a judge of the regional trial
court in connection with his handling of cases before the court.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence15 cited by the Office of the
Ombudsman as erroneous and not applicable to his complaint. He
insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a
judge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme
22
Court to resolve whether a crime was committed and the judge This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in
prosecuted therefor. accordance with law and jurisprudence when he referred the cases
against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
The petition can not succeed.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent, we
The Ombudsman did not exercise his power in an arbitrary or despotic DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Evaluation Report of the
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.16 There Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman dated
was no evasion of positive duty. Neither was there a virtual refusal to October 2, 1998 and its memorandum, dated January 4, 1999, in toto.
perform the duty enjoined by law.17
No costs.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed
no grave abuse of discretion warranting the writs prayed for.18 The SO ORDERED.
issues have been settled in the case of In Re: Joaquin
Borromeo.19 There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal
action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must
first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision
or order in question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result
from either:20

(a).....an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court

impugning the validity of the judgment; or

(b).....an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court

against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment
or order.

Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed

the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.21

"To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the

prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or
decision -- whether final and executory or not -- and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative
complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone (underscoring ours)."22

23
 [G.R. NO. 167916 : August 26, 2008]
SARAH P. AMPONG, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, CSC-Regional Office No. 11, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES R.T., J.:
CAN the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly assume
jurisdiction over administrative proceedings against a judicial
employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher,
committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary?
c ra lawlib ra ry
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the CSC's
exercise of administrative jurisdiction over petitioner.
The Facts
The following facts are uncontroverted:
On November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET)2 was held in Davao City. A certain Evelyn Junio-
Decir3 applied for and took the examination at Room 16, Kapitan
Tomas Monteverde Elementary School. She passed with a rating
of 74.27%.4
At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P.
Ampong (nee Navarra) and Decir were public school teachers
under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS).5 Later, on August 3, 1993, Ampong
transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani
Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir
went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao
City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During
the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that
the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the
Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was confirmed
that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one
who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took
and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined
the existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. On August 23, 1994, they were
formally charged and required to file answers under oath. The
formal charge reads:
That sometime before the conduct of the November 10, 1991
Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), a certain
Ms. Evelyn B. Junio (now Decir) took the said examination at
Rm. 16 Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School, Davao
City, with a passing rate of 74.27%; That on July 5, 1994 she
appeared before the CSC Region XI Office to get her Guro
Certificate; That upon verification, it was found out that the
picture attached in the Picture Seat Plan, marked as Annex "A"
and "A-1," respectively, were not the same compared to the
picture attached in the CSC Form 212 of Evelyn Junio-Decir
marked herein as annex "B," "B-1," respectively. There was also
a marked difference in the signatures affixed in the said
annexes; That further investigations revealed that it was the
pictures of Ms. Sarah Navarra, wife of her husband's first cousin,
who took the said examination in behalf of Ms. Evelyn Junio-
Decir, a provisional teacher; That the said act of Mesdames Decir
and Navarra are acts of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service; that in (sic) taking the CS
examination for and in behalf of another undermines the sanctity
of the CS examinations; All these contrary to existing civil
service laws and regulations. (Emphasis supplied) cralawli bra ry
In her sworn statement dated November 3, 1994, Decir denied
the charges against her. She reasoned out that it must have
been the examination proctor who pasted the wrong picture on
the PSP and that her signatures were different because she was
still signing her maiden name at the time of the examination. In
her Answer, Decir contended that:
24
2. The same accusation is denied, the truth being:
A. When I took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers
(PBET) in the year 1991, I handed my 1x1 I.D. picture to the
proctor assigned in the examination room who might have
inadvertently pasted in the Seat Plan [the] wrong picture instead
[of] my own picture;
b. With respect to the marked difference in my signature both
appearing in the aforesaid Seat Plan and also with the Form 212,
the disparity lies in that in the year 1991, when I took the
afroresaid examination, I was still sporting my maiden name
Evelyn B. Junio in order to coincide with all my pertinent
supporting papers, like the special order (s.o.), appointment and
among others, purposely to take said communications. However,
immediately after taking the PBET Examination in 1991, I started
using the full name of Evelyn Junio-Decir.6
Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily
appeared at the CSRO on February 2, 1995 and admitted to the
wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail herself of the
services of counsel, petitioner voluntarily waived said right.
On March 13, 1995, petitioner gave another admission in the
following tenor:
Q: Now, what is then your intention in coming to this Region
inasmuch as you are still intending to file an answer to the
formal charge?cra lawlib rary
A: I came here because I want to admit personally. So that I
will not be coming here anymore. I will submit my case for
Resolution.
Q: So, you intend to waive your right for the formal hearing
and you also admit orally on the guilt of the charge on the
Formal Charge dated August 24, 1994? cra lawl ibra ry
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What else do you want to tell the Commission? cra lawl ibra ry
A: x x x Inasmuch as I am already remorseful, I am repenting
of the wrong that I have done. I am hoping that the Commission
can help x x x so that I will be given or granted another chance
to serve the government.
x x x
Q: Now inasmuch as you have declared that you have
admitted the guilt that you took the examination for and in
behalf of Evelyn Junio Decir, are you telling this to the
Commission without the assistance of the counsel or waiver of
your right to be assisted by counsel.
A: Yes, Ma'am. I am waiving my right.7 (Emphasis supplied)
c ralawl ibra ry
Petitioner reiterated her admission in her sworn Answer dated
March 16, 1995:
3. That, during the commission of the act, I was still under the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Teacher in-
charge of San Miguel Primary School, Malungon North District,
way back in 1991, when the husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, my
husband's cousin came to me and persuaded me to take the
examination in behalf of his wife to which I disagreed but he
earnestly begged so that I was convinced to agree because I pity
his wife considering that she is an immediate relative, and there
was no monetary consideration involved in this neither a
compensatory reward for me, as I was overcome by their
persuasion;
4. That, despite the fact that I was a teacher, I was not aware
that the acts I was charged, is a ground for disciplinary action
and punishable by dismissal;
5. That I should not have conformed to this anomalous
transaction considering that I was born in a Christian family, and
was brought up in the fear of Lord, and had been a consistent
officer of the Church Board, had been a religious leader for so
25
many years, and had been the organizer of the Music Festival of
the Association of Evangelical Churches of Malungon, Sarangani
Province, thus I was devoted to church work and was known to
be of good conduct; and that my friends and acquaintances can
vouch to that, but I was just forced by circumstances to agree to
the spouses Godfre and Evelyn Decir.8(Emphasis added)
CSC Finding and Penalty
On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir
guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. The
dispositive part of the CSC resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Evelyn J. Decir and
Sarah P. Navarra guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are
meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties.
The PBET rating of Decir is revoked.9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the
issue of jurisdiction.10 She argued that the exclusive authority to
discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme
Court; that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it
continued to exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty
as a judicial employee. She contended that at the time the case
was instituted on August 23, 1994, the CSC already lost
jurisdiction over her. She was appointed as Interpreter III of the
RTC, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province on August 3, 1993.
The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.11 According to
the Commission, to allow petitioner to evade administrative
liability would be a mockery of the country's administrative
disciplinary system. It will open the floodgates for others to
escape prosecution by the mere expedient of joining another
branch of government. In upholding its jurisdiction over
petitioner, the CSC differentiated between administrative
supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and administrative
jurisdiction granted to the Commission over all civil service
employees:
Moreover, it must be pointed out that administrative supervision
is distinct from administrative jurisdiction. While it is true that
this Commission does not have administrative supervision over
employees in the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent
jurisdiction over them. Such jurisdiction was conferred upon the
Civil Service Commission pursuant to existing law specifically
Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides as follows:
"(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
through it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointment, and review decisions and actions of its offices and
of the agencies attached to it x x x."
The fact that court personnel are under the administrative
supervision of the Supreme Court does not totally isolate them
from the operations of the Civil Service Law. Appointments of all
officials and employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil
Service Law (Section 5(6), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
(Emphasis supplied) cra lawlib rary
CA Disposition
Via Petition for Review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the
matter to the CA.12 She insisted that as a judicial employee, it is
the Supreme Court and not the CSC that has disciplinary
jurisdiction over her.
In a Decision dated November 30, 2004,13 the CA denied the
petition for lack of merit.
The CA noted that petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction
until after the CSC ruled against her. Rather, she willingly
appeared before the commission, freely admitted her
wrongdoing, and even requested for clemency. Thus, she was
estopped from questioning the Commission's jurisdiction. The
appellate court opined that while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before a court, tribunal or body will estop such party
from assailing its jurisdiction.
26
The CA further ruled that a member of the judiciary may be
under the jurisdiction of two different bodies. As a public school
teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil
service, subject to its rules and regulations. When she committed
acts in violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC was clothed
with administrative jurisdiction over her.
Issue
Petitioner, through this petition, assigns the lone error that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals-First Division decided a question
of substance in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence,
gravely erred in facts and in law, and has sanctioned such
departure and grave error because it ignored or was not aware
of Garcia v. De la Peña, 229 SCRA 766 (1994) and Adm. Matter
No. OCA I.P.I. 97-329-P (CSC v. Ampong) dated January 31,
2001, which reiterate the rule that exclusive authority to
discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the
Supreme Court, in issuing the questioned decision and
resolution; which grave error warrant reversal of the questioned
decision and resolution.14
Put simply, the issue boils down to whether the CSC has
administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary for
acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive
or Education Department.
Our Ruling
The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but
We rule against the petition on the ground of estoppel.
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the
civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
government-owned or controlled corporations.15 Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
"control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations."16 This authority grants to the CSC the right to
take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with
the examinations.17
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme
Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over
all courts and judicial personnel.18 By virtue of this power, it
is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It
may take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.19 Thus, this Court ruled that the
Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.20
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,21 this Court held that
impersonating an examinee of a civil service examination is an
act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court
validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v.
Julaton,22involving judicial employees who also impersonated
civil service examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the
necessary charges before the OCA because respondents were
judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and
meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that
"respondents' machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of
integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as
public servants and employees of the judiciary."23
Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a
similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee.
But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the
27
time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under
the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the
civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner
surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of
another person. When she did that, she became a party to
cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its
complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA. Records
show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the
present case.
However, We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC
based on the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of
petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of
the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction
of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure
an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.24 As this Court declared
in Aquino v. Court of Appeals:25
In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice
cannot be tolerated. If we are to sanction this argument, then all
the proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of
Appeals while valid in all other respects would simply become
useless.26
Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to
adopt a different theory on appeal to impugn the court's
jurisdiction.27 In Emin v. De Leon,28 this Court sustained the
exercise of jurisdiction by the CSC, while recognizing at the same
time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school
teachers belongs to the appropriate committee created for the
purpose as provided for under the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.29 It was there held that a party who fully participated
in the proceedings before the CSC and was accorded due process
is estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction.
Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and
adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed with it
her answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC
found her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling.
These circumstances all too clearly show that due process was
accorded to petitioner.
Petitioner's admission of guilt stands. Apart from her full
participation in the proceedings before the CSC, petitioner
admitted to the offense charged - that she impersonated Decir
and took the PBET exam in the latter's place. We note that even
before petitioner filed a written answer, she voluntarily went to
the CSC Regional Office and admitted to the charges against her.
In the same breath, she waived her right to the assistance of
counsel. Her admission, among others, led the CSC to find her
guilty of dishonesty, meting out to her the penalty of dismissal.
Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given
without aid of counsel. In police custodial investigations, the
assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial
confession to be made admissible in evidence against the
accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the
waiver should have been made with the assistance of counsel.30
But while a party's right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in
proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such requirement in
administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,31 this Court
ruled that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under
no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement.32
Petitioner's admission was given freely. There was no
compulsion, threat or intimidation. As found by the CSC,
28
petitioner's admission was substantial enough to support a highest court of the land and erode the faith of the people in the
finding of guilt. judiciary.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized x x x

as "an act which includes the procurement and/or use of
fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to As a final point, we take this opportunity to emphasize that no
ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which any employee to follow and conform to the rules and regulations
amounts to any violation of the Civil Service enunciated by this Court and the Commission on Civil Service,
examination."33 Petitioner impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, should be tolerated. The Court, therefore, will not hesitate to rid
to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an
intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, effective and efficient system of justice.37 (Emphasis added)
their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.34
We will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, from all its employees.38 Hindi namin papayagan ang
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong kawani.
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."35Petitioner's dishonest act as a civil servant renders her WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that
petitioner should not have been appointed as a judicial employee
SO ORDERED.
had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she
committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
petitioner's present status as a judicial employee is not a
hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office

charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a
heavy burden or responsibility. The image of a court, as a true
temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowest of its personnel.36 As the Court held in another
administrative case for dishonesty:

x x x Any act which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of

the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. We have
not hesitated to impose the utmost penalty of dismissal for even
the slightest breach of duty by, and the slightest irregularity in
the conduct of, said officers and employees, if so warranted.
Such breach and irregularity detract from the dignity of the

29
 G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION)
AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March
25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public
respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which
granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order)
preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees
of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b)
the Resolution5dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further
enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting
the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal
and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
(Makati Parking Building).13
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of
Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an
investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st
Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015,
the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents
(OMB Cases).19
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in
anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction
phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous
and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of
Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's
Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release
of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80
on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3)
P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28,
2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90
on July 7, 2011;30
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase
IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the
release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1)
P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October
28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4)
P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on
October 1, 2012;39
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase
V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the
release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and
P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of
funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with
Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P27,443,629.97;47 and
30

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior
Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the
Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of
Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9,
2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB
Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman,
upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10,
2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et
al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that
the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are
present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was
strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and
Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending
the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated
the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and
official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et
al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2)
said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service
under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access
to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence,
their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary
Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the
same.56
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to
the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of
Binay, Jr.'s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or
WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he
could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and
that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In any
event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented
against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the
purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay,
Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in
view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly
deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have
conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the
implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG
National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III
(Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City
Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of
entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant
City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office
on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon
assumed office as Acting Mayor.64
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16,
2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its
part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and
seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine,
Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for certiorari .70
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not
state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive
suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no
longer any act to restrain.72
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials
of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to
obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional
31
respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental
petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among
others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein
for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
preventive suspension order.77
In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation
of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without
necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The
cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25,
2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing
the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for
TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing
her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be
issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's
jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected
to contempt proceedings.84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the
Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case
when said office issued the preventive suspension order against
him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1
have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed
heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the
issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr.
maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public
office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for
any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013
operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have
committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the
Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits
that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence,
cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for
contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily
resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to
punish contempt.89
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the
oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI,
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension
order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v.
Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from
2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term —
namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24,
2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay,
Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases
of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the
condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments
were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were
merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To
this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s
participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6,
2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this
Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of
issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that
a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should
have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay,
Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in
2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral
arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their
respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her
Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his
Memorandum the following day.104
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the
parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment
on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of
the notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each
32
other's memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually
agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum,
consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her
Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman
pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.chan rob leslaw
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral
arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in
seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy;
cralaw lawlib rary
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman;
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious. chan robles law
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that
the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
cralawlawli bra ry
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
cralawlawlib rary
prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court
or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or
prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
33
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions
attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and
of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental
powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an
issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a
careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue
on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as
invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition
before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior
reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified. cha nrob leslaw
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it
is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in
view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed
had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the
opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly
submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's
Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable
objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal,
is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman
Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court
to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this
Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question
of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any
court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may
be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in
the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which
connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending,
the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to
injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional
injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of
impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable
by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction
to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of
the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court
which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase
"application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not
specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that
the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to
34
apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that
when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law
seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to
look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at
the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which
the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x
[a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in
doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great
respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose,
and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful
meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA
6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or
findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14,
after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof,
insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of
the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but
on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of
that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is
that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would
not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in
effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.
xxxx
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example,
if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent
himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short
by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?
Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for
example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the
appropriate action?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change
the administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must
exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and
seeks judicial review.
xxxx
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee
in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review
to a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the
provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the
Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding
Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is
more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the
part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue
is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without
jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr.
President.
35
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of
the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but
should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a
distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ;
because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling
or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the
Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this
change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts,
into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the
evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of
whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of,
jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that
that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It
is very well stated, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority
to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the
Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr.
President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have
made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of
Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting
the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same
is approved.128
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,
unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of
Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase
"petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the
"review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be
taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange
between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of
changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition
for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately,
the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to
"petition for certiorari" was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed
"petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA
6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its
second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one
should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only
reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of
law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this
case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current
formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the
available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the
above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the
Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these
deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27,
RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator
Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or
finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth
paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual
findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third
paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
cra lawlawlib rary
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained. ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
36
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the '
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in
stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule
65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman
Act was passed way back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of
Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken
thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's
textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal
by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from
notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in
due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without
proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis
supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory
construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law." ; cralawlawli bra ry
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the
whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception
below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy,"
being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term
"appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken
mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a
general sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also
separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore
refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional),
except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing
general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its
text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only
remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law,"
whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
xxxx
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise
statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the
court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and
it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be
reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any,
and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified
statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be
distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of
Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition,
shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of
the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
37
 RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any
time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or
the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of
procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on
errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications
of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact
and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or
new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law.
Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body
cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile
systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a
useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and
unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court,
and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act
provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the
Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the
Court on pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited
restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is
within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can
only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not
against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon,
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter
the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings"
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to
a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari,
grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The
provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA
6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v.
Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA
6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision
was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997
Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the
Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's
ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the
application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to
assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing
the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not
only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review
on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final
orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law." We pointedly said: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy
against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and
thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its
advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-
38
stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the
same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the
Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own
motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its
bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds
must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case,
but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and
other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support
its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its
commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the
courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case
before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions
which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit
of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to
enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it
may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point
in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized
right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis
supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was
filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence,
unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65
petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman
should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was -
similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by
the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1
of Rule 65."152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a
Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that
"petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it
stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v.
Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against
final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was
reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the
CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the
Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO
and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order,
incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been
adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis,
she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction
with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances
the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA
6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from
injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that
said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
pressure would."159
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
39
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced
the historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several
Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing
grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the
government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective
performance of their function as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman
became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence
and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973
Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office
of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any
administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979,
the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to
the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file
the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman
was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its
objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the
standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution. These provisions read: cha nRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must,
at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's
mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of
the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary. ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court
has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers
granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and
the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all
acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and
influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.
xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is
a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers,
both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting
task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by
the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not
40
owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In
general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent
that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their
core functions"163;
cralawlawl ibra ry
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the
Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based";164 and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional
Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973
Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for
a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created
by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent
on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit
highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the
foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently
intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these
bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA
358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the
control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are
executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's
act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman
of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have
been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court
categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent
Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the
discretionary power of the President.
xxxx
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly
cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence
similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which
provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from
office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as
it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the
President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity
of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept
of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or
an amendment thereto is made; cralawlawl ibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair
said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means
that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of
the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it
from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
41
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating
the office from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence
notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay
any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the
Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the
Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an
amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record
whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no
injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it
necessary to have a special paragraph for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will
prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being
one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only
to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the
Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be
allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say,
the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the
Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left
by RTC judges all over the country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that
effect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other
than the Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same
is approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory
orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a
corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or
provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over
matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except
this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an
Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is
the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue
anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the
course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly
necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral
Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and
the judicial departments of the government."176 The constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more
commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark
case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In particular,
"there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's
functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is
allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other
lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus,
through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional
Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183were established. Later, through the passage
42
of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court of Tax
Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5186 of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxxx ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v.
Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the
authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject
matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned
constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through
the passage of BP 129, as amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay,
Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under
Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the
concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v.
Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all
a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals.189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as
conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts
established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a
case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the
jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by
this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial
power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court
elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject
matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
43
began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it
simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly
exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not
mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."194
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973
Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the
old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
"[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making
powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to
insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right
after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete
the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a
comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the
present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As
pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the
first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various
rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed
for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action.
They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole
objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard. They are
usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial
controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can
be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence,
not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a
sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being
44
mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the
provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined
under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates
the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO
may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under certain procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides
with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect
under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction
is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules. ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be
a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final
orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over
the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The
court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary
and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain
the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of
its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court
endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers
which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent
in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its
process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
xxxx cralawlawlib rary
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as
well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-
entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case
of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred."215
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the
principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are
thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general
judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent
powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to
achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is sought.
Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its
constitutionally mandated functions."216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of
a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a
revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that
which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering
the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ".
. . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by
the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to
make that power effective in the administration of justice."
(Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional
injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end,
45
stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same
was constitutionally impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the
language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and
for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause
of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent
power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice
in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when
necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the
litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment
effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or
ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular
instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm
of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature
to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this
inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the
power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of
constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general
jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the
administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the
inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right
to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the
appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal
does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted
powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and
the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to
control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules
have come into play and have preempted the field.219 (Emphasis
supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by
nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of
the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively
within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not
create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of
implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs
to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated
during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was
stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then
the rule deals merely with procedure. ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases
of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal
Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative
enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and
cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the
Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its]
institutional independence."226
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article
VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5),
Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under
its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and
delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA,
stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have
been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with
a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
46
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and 5, would you kindly read that provision?
inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the
Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."
violation of the separation of powers principle.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the
14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired
jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered JUSTICE LEONEN:
nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which
Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not
occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction correct?
over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a
court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's Correct, Your Honor.
duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged,
this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive JUSTICE LEONEN:
writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress,
promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same. is that not correct?

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay Correct, Your Honor.
(Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
JUSTICE LEONEN: On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of not correct?
Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Correct, Your Honor.
Rule 58, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
JUSTICE LEONEN: A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I it part of litigation in an ordinary case?
will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our
resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x. It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

xxxx JUSTICE LEONEN:

In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you Correct, Your Honor.
please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph
47
JUSTICE LEONEN: create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?
litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not
correct? ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a
JUSTICE LEONEN: TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional? correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx JUSTICE LEONEN:

And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is
JUSTICE LEONEN. [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under
Rule 16? ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)
remedies, x x x.
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court
JUSTICE LEONEN. instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these
power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is
cannot, because that's part of procedure... the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be
That is true. stricken down for being unconstitutional.230

JUSTICE LEONEN However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the
correct? first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions
of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of
Correct. procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against
courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive
JUSTICE LEONEN: writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman,
So what's different with the writ of injunction? until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing
part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent
jurisdiction... (interrupted) thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned
injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
JUSTICE LEONEN: order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction

48
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely
abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the
validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first
provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive
suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the
Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the
official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by
considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as
they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position
and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for
misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
(Emphasis supplied) ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is
placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the
actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found
guilty.232(Emphases supplied) ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated
in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied
to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an
investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first
requirement: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; cralawlawli bra ry
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.233 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however,
show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in
Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the
assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were
established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint
49
were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then,
following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively
charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it
would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very
least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness
of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during
the pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of
the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case
of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from
2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e.,
the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the
services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation
dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after
the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have
considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the
administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with
the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in
conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting
jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by
Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in
passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued
that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453,245it appears that the CA found that the application of
the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation
of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with
this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation
doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with
condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative
defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the
evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing
the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs
herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely
abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or
implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as
if there had been no offense."246
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on
statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to
the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6,
1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before
the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority
and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in
Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo
Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against
him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and
therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The
Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later
decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on
appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is,
whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on
the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes
and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of
these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule
denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered
that there is really no established weight of authority in the United States
50
(US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual,
theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from
office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during
the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US
have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites
several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on
the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied
across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a
public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he
allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of
the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular
case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example,
a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act
committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or
removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election
to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of
commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a
previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in
some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's
resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office."
On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute
containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby
declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word
"office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged
against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court
of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so
that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior
to the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite
was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that
an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain
offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the
fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the
offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court
of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the
words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire
tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the
statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-
making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed
during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer
was a successor in the same office for which he has been administratively
charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous
States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that
each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct,
but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions
committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected
incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v.
Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand
Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing
nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked.
In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with
malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money
illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him."
In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that
"there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the
misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a
duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county
commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive
prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of
the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends
into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion
in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation
doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had
accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation,
an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been
proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of
this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but
as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether
or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in
numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note
that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting
existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an
intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of
standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out,
jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic
creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we
can decide, we can undecide."271
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the
time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which
51
dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161
S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex
rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher
County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x
x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63
So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281,
63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people.274 (Emphases supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first
applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated
passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court
clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.
It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case
in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and
is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the
populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court
noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided
under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was
applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although
his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the
Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation
prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases
filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend
himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that
the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of
the contract and the incidents related therewith.279
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) -
wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor
Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an
anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only
four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that
notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is
presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character,
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the
Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation
doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant
that as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term,
acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a
succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation
doctrine in favor of the elective official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.;
April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
52
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official,
and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the
elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing
of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was
committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of
which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that
gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as
to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein
the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court
therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman
in view of the condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to
justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for
condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was
never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is
that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still
remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from
rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own
state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core
premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the
right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior
term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely
because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -
dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence,
the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to
determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine
of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the
supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute
should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a
framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take
into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government.286
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore,
it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent
with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in
dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public
accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the
matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no
glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with
public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced
an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII.
Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that
"[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the
people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have
framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants
under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of
the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State
policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding
public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public
trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied)
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the
section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291
53
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline,
suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated
in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991,
and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
dereliction of duty; cra lawlawlib rary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority; cralawlawlib rary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except
in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the
status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states
that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty
of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service
examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official
nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only
pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability
therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
c ralawlaw lib rary Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
cralawlawlib ra ry
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
cralawlawlib ra ry respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense,
nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
cralawlawl ibra ry Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions
now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In
this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to
administrative offenses:
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide
for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation,
cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do
not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
54
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an
elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected
to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in
the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of
removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a)
of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State
jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability
was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in
effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed
during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office
does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency
occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-
election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that
condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution -
which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's
requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the
doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a
party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in
the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior
irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was
deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or
inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued
adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election
This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it
was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed
during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b)
states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished
by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation
that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their
officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election
pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an
individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal
basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is
there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has
an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal
mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means
has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot
be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a
local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption
exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to
human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public
official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that
most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed
from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily
covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when
they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes
that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus,
there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed
in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his
removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the
theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because
condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the
absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive
something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse,
it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and
thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal
regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means,
55
and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De
Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those
called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should
be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The
landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.310
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit
from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly
perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was
able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this
Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons
the condonation doctrine.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or
not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating
the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor
Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI
against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to
resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the
merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had
already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative
charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313As
initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary
issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and
perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of
investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of
the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of
this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly,
its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the
moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend
the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that
56
its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the
continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible
under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates
that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be
accountable to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that
has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative
liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have
been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which
this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as
a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that
paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of
administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse
the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The
Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this
controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the
same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them.
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for
the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon
Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach
of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently,
this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative
of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution,
revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
discussion moot. chanrob leslaw
V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the
Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper
and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable
officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor
would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of
the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already
been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it
clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s
contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as
the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are
hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and
Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a
comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the
exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course
to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply
put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due
course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the
issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of
this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court
adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor; cralawlaw lib rary
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment
is PROSPECTIVE in effect; cralawla wlibra ry
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its
Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable
in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058,
OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-
0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
57
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's
comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

58
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any
provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in
Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody,
one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP
03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance,
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to
Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section
12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He
argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the
law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among
the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution
moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested
that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea
bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph
3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of
Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left
without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order
denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms
part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118,
the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-
making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found
in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea
59
bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the
intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a
drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of
illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case
law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held
in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling
of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an
otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to
serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the
offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be
plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which
bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion
of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is
not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts
must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential
ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of
illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an
Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID
LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON.
FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright
for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress
should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for
declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the
RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the
requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing
to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or
controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
1âw phi 1
underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to
the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and
exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite
the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional
issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
60
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance
are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and
spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and
destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At
the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign
against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more
so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as
mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on
the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has
beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within
its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not
totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and
users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this
petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the
final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for
enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court
may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application
of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the
rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again,
this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so
as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno
traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its
evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to
this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested
this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under
the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
61
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section
13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its
power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered
as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned;
and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any
attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation
of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable
jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court,
and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this
Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of
the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this
Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
62
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme
with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the
Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an
initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court.
Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former
sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved,
thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the
Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
63
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and
NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule
141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this
Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and
one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our
jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect.
Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the
consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser
offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same
provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the
1âw phi 1
effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea
of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116
provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it
is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court
of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2,
Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A
second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was
enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted.
Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other
matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be
considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
64
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the
2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment
of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules
or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's
rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive
is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken
within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural
rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People v.
Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal
was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking
65
through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court
opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed
a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and
with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on
first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the
Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the
orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the
substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process.
The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the
accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly
short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the
time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due
process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for
such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and
trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as
it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or
have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.
The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that
the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him
and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community
suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties
and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He
may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend
himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice
system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system
for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the judgment, does not take away
substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per
se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the
Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause
on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction
that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.
66
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency
of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of
the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.
For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which
there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the
corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct
even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between
charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties
and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case,
the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing
whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is
protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of
the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system
- speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead,
it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered
and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to
a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion"
inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself
and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic
rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty;
the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
67
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea
of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to
prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how
best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that
simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal
charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been
"properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes
an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise
for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even
up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As
regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to
a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on
which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it
behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of
the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance
of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection
of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on
the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or
a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for
being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
68
 A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-36-SCC), July
01, 2015 On March 24, 2011, Abdullah issued the Certificate of Registration of
Divorce12 (CRD) finalizing the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL, Complainant, v. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG
S. ABDULLAH, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY, Respondent. Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD, questioning the validity of
the kapasadan on which the CRD was based. In his motion, Mamiscal
contended that the kapasadan was invalid considering that he did not
DECISION prepare the same. Moreover, there were no witnesses to its execution. He
claimed that he only signed the kapasadan because of Adelaidah's threats.
MENDOZA, J.:
Mamiscal also questioned the validity of the COD, denying that he had
executed and filed the same before the office of Abdullah. Insisting that he
This resolves the complaint of Baguan M. Mamiscal (Mamiscal) against 1
never really intended to divorce his wife, Mamiscal pointed out the fact that
respondent Macalinog S. Abdullah (Abdullah), Clerk of Court, Shari'a Circuit
on December 13, 2010, before the expiration of the 'iddah, he wrote his
Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and
wife13 to inform her that he was revoking the repudiation he made on
conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Originally, the complaint also
September 26, 2010 and the kapasadan they entered into on the same day
charged Judge Aboali J. Cali (Judge Cali), Presiding Judge, Shari'a Circuit
because he did it on the "spur of the moment."14
Court, Marawi City, for his participation in the subject controversy. On
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

January 9, 2013, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges against Judge
For Mamiscal, the CRD should be declared invalid considering that: a) he
Cali for lack of merit.2
was deprived of due process because the AAC, before which he and his
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

children were supposed to express their sentiments regarding the divorce,

The Facts
was yet to be constituted; b) three days before the issuance of the CRD,
Professor Mustafa Lomala M. Dimaro, appeared before Judge Cali to discuss
In his complaint, Mamiscal averred that on September 26, 2010, he and his
the possibility of reconciliation between the parties; and c) their children,
wife, Adelaidah Lomondot (Adelaidah) had a heated argument. In a fit of
Adelah Rima and Nairn Mamiscal, prayed that the trial court advise their
anger, Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq).3 The
mother not to proceed with the divorce.15 In addition to the revocation of the
repudiation was embodied in an agreement4 (kapasadan) signed by
CRD, Mamiscal also prayed that Abdullah order the reconvening of the AAC
Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
and, thereafter, grant the restoration of his marital rights with Adelaidah.
The next day, Adelaidah left their conjugal dwelling in Iligan City and went
On April 20, 2011, Abdullah denied Mamiscal's motion.16 In sustaining the
back to her family's home in Marinaut, Marawi City. A few days later, during
divorce between Mamiscal and Abdullah, Abdullah opined that it was simply
the obligatory period of waiting ('iddah),5 Mamiscal had a change of heart
his ministerial duty to receive the COD and the attached kapasadan filed by
and decided to make peace with his wife. For the purpose, he sent their
Adelaidah. Abdullah also noted that when the AAC was convened during the
common relatives to see Adelaidah and make peace with her on his
February 28, 2010 hearing, only Mamiscal and his representatives appeared.
behalf.6
Considering the fact that Adelaidah manifested her opposition in writing to
ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary

any reconciliation with her husband and the fact that the 90-day period of
Almost five (5) months later, however, on February 23, 2011, Adelaidah
'iddah had already lapsed, Abdullah ruled that any move to reconstitute the
filed7 the Certificate of Divorce (COD),8 dated September 26, 2010, with the
AAC would have been futile because the divorce between Mamiscal and his
office of Abdullah for registration. Although unsigned, the certificate,
wife had already become final and irrevocable.
purportedly executed by Mamiscal, certified that he had pronounced talaq in
the presence of two (2) witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law for
Contending that the issuance of the CRD was tainted with irregularity,
the purpose of effecting divorce from Adelaidah. A notation on the certificate
Mamiscal comes to this Court, through the subject complaint, charging
stated that it was being filed together with the kapasadan.
Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
On the same day, Abdullah, in the exercise of his duty as both Clerk of Court
and Circuit Civil Registrar,9issued the Invitation10 notifying the couple and
The Charge
their representatives to appear before the Shari'a Circuit Court on February
28, 2011, in order to constitute the Agama Arbitration Council (AAC) that
In his complaint, Mamiscal averred that Abdullah should not have
would explore the possibility of reconciling the spouses.11
entertained or acted upon the COD and the kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. He
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

69
contended that under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, a divorce
under talaq could only be filed and registered by the male spouse,
considering that female Muslims could do so only if the divorce was
through tafwid.17ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Moreover, Mamiscal alleged that Abdullah "fabricated and twisted the
facts"18 when he declared that only Mamiscal and his representative
appeared when the AAC was convened. Mamiscal insisted that Adelaidah and
her relatives were also present during the hearing of February 28, 2010, and
that the AAC was never convened because the parties agreed to reset the
proceedings so that they could explore the possibility of reconciling the
differences between them. Notwithstanding the ongoing mediation
proceedings, Abdullah proceeded to act on the COD and finalized the divorce
by issuing the CRD.
Finally, it was averred that Abdullah violated the Shari'a rules of procedure
when he initially refused to receive Mamiscal's motion for reconsideration
when it was first filed. Mamiscal also argued that Abdullah should not have
considered the opposition of Adelaidah when he denied his attempt to seek
reconsideration because he was never furnished a copy of Adelaidah's
opposition.
Abdullah's Comment
In his comment,19 Abdullah countered that although he had the authority to
process the registration of the divorce as court registrar, he could not be
held responsible for the contents of the COD and the kapasadan because his
functions were only ministerial. Nevertheless, Abdullah asserted that the
divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah had already attained finality, not
only because of the lapse of the required 'iddah, but also because
the kapasadan and Adelaidah's opposition both proved that there could be
no reconciliation between the spouses.
Abdullah also discounted any impropriety for processing the unsigned COD,
arguing that since it was accompanied by the kapasadan which bore the
signature of Mamiscal and his declaration that he was divorcing his wife
by talaq - there was nothing wrong with Adelaidah filing it with his office.
Moreover, with the lapse of the 'iddah, Abdullah argued that the COD had
remained to be nothing more than a formality for the purpose of registering
the divorce with the National Statistics Office (NSO) and its issuance using
the NSO security paper.
As to the allegations pertaining to the February 28, 2010 hearing, Abdullah
stated that he only conducted the same because it was required under the
Muslim Personal Code. Abdullah explained that he did not convene the ACC
anymore not only because Adelaidah or her representatives were not
present, but also because the divorcing couple's own children wrote to him
opposing the convening of the council.
As to Mamiscal's contention that he already revoked his repudiation of his
wife, Abdullah pointed out that his office was not informed of any revocation
of the divorce. According to Abdullah, if Mamiscal had indeed revoked his
repudiation, he should have complied with the provisions of Rule II (1)(2) of
NSO Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2001, which required the husband
to file five (5) copies of his sworn statement attesting to the fact of
revocation, together with the written consent of his wife.
In its report,20 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Abdullah
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
offense shall be dealt with severely.
On January 30, 2014, Abdullah filed a motion,21 praying for the early
resolution of the complaint filed against him. Reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the said complaint, Abdullah claimed that he was due for
compulsory retirement on June 5, 2014. chanroble slaw
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must first be pointed out that while it may seem to be a
related issue, the validity of the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah is
not in issue here. Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce
from his wife is a matter that must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit
Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code),22 enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes
relating to divorce.
Thus, Article 155 of the Muslim Code provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Article 155. Jurisdiction. The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over;
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating
to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
70
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
[Emphases Supplied]
Consequently, in resolving the subject complaint, the Court shall confine
itself to the sole issue of whether or not Abdullah should be held
administratively liable for his actions in connection with the registration of
the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah. A priori to the resolution of the
foregoing issue is the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to
impose administrative sanction against Abdullah for his acts.
The Court rules in the negative.
The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital
events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil
Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and
is applicable to all persons residing in the Philippines.23
ChanRoble sVirtua lawlib rary
To ensure the proper registration of all facets of the civil life of Muslim
Filipinos throughout the country, Article 81 of the Muslim Code provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Article 81. District Registrar. The Clerk of Court of the Shari' a District Court
shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim
Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the
territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages,
Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within his
jurisdiction.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In view of the above-quoted provision, it becomes apparent that the Clerk of
Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two
hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and second, as
Circuit Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction. Although the Constitution
vests the Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel,24 this power must be taken with due regard to other
prevailing laws.
Thus, Article 185 of the Muslim Code provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Article 185. Neglect of duty by registrars. Any district registrar or circuit
registrar who fails to perform properly his duties in accordance with this
Code shall be penalized in accordance with Section 18 of Act 3753.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 375325 is the primary law that governs the
registry of civil status of persons. To ensure that civil registrars perform
their duties under the law, Section 18 of C.A. No. 3753 provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the provisions of this Act. —
Any local registrar who fails to properly perform his duties in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued hereunder, shall
be punished for the first offense, by an administrative fine in a sum equal to
his salary for not less than fifteen days nor more than three months, and for
a second or repeated offense, by removal from the service.
[Emphasis Supplied]
The same Act provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. - The director of
the National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall enforce the
provisions of this Act. The Director of the National Library, in his capacity as
Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare and issue, with the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for carrying out the
purposes of this Act, and to prepare and order printed the necessary forms
for its proper compliance. In the exercise of his functions as Civil Registrar-
General, the Director of the National Library shall have the power to give
orders and instructions to the local Civil registrars with reference to the
performance of their duties as such. It shall be the duty of the Director of
the National Library to report any violation of the provisions of this Act
and all irregularities, negligence or incompetency on the part of the
officers designated as local civil registrars to the (Chief of the
Executive Bureau or the Director of the Non-Christian Tribes)
Secretary of the Interior, as the case may be, who shall take the
proper disciplinary action against the offenders.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
Prescinding from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that this Court does
not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against
civil registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk
of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint
reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the
divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar
of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is the
nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender.26 The fact that
the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court
employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not
the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no
court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.27ChanRoblesVirt uala wlibra ry
It bears to stress at this point that this Court can resolve the foregoing
jurisdictional issue even if the matter of jurisdiction was never raised by any
of the parties. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that jurisdiction, or the
power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case must first be
acquired by the court or an adjudicative body over the subject matter and
the parties in order to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits.28 Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject
71
matter and jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred by the Constitution or by law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the
person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's voluntary submission
to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive
processes. Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over
the subject matter which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by
consent of the parties.29 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Having settled the foregoing issue, the following question now confronts the
Court: Who, among the various agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, is empowered with administrative supervisory powers in order
to impose disciplinary sanctions against erring civil registrars?
On this score, a recap of the legislative history surrounding our system of
civil registration is in order.
The system of civil registration was first established in the Philippines by the
revolutionary government on June 18, 1898 or barely six days after the
declaration of the country's independence from Spain on June 12, 1898.
Originally, the system was decentralized in the sense that civil registration
was purely a local government responsibility. It was only on February 27,
1931, when C.A. No. 375330 took effect and centralized the system of civil
registration in the country. Under this law, the director of the National
Library was made responsible as the Civil Registrar-General to exercise
technical supervision and ensure the proper establishment and maintenance
of our civil registry system.
Then, following C.A. No. 591,31 the duties exercised by the director of
National Library with regard to matters concerning the system of civil
registration were transferred to the Bureau of Census and Statistics. This
bureau subsequently became the NSO,32 whose Administrator concurrently
served as the Civil Registrar-General.33 At present, the National Statistician
is empowered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10625, as Civil Registrar-General
to exercise technical supervision of civil registrars.34 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
Due to the need to address the cultural peculiarities practiced by our Muslim
brethren, however, Congress saw the need to designate the Clerk of Court of
the Shari'a Circuit Court to act as the Circuit Registrar of Muslim marriages,
divorces, revocations of divorces, and conversions to Islam within his
jurisdiction. As earlier cited, Article 181 of the Muslim Code provides
that: The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court shall act as Circuit
Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and
Conversions within his jurisdiction.
In order to ensure that Circuit Registrars remain faithful to their duties,
Article 82 of the Muslim Code tasks the Clerks of Court of the
Shari'a District Court to act as District Registrars and exercise technical
supervision over Circuit Registrars by requiring them to keep a proper
recording of all matters pertaining to the personal lives of Muslims. Thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Article 82. Duties of District Registrar. Every District Registrar shall exercise
supervision over Circuit Registrars in every Shari'a District. He shall, in
addition to an entry book, keep and bind copies of certificates of
Marriage, Divorce, Revocation of Divorce, and Conversion sent to
him by the Circuit Registrars in separate general registers. He shall
send copies in accordance with Act. No. 3753, as amended, to the office of
the Civil Registrar-General.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
All these notwithstanding, the power of administrative supervision over
civil registrars remains with the National Government. As Section 2 of CA
No. 3753 provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. - The director of
the National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall enforce the
provisions of this Act. The Director of the National Library, in his capacity as
Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare and issue, with the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for carrying out the
purposes of this Act, and to prepare and order printed the necessary forms
for its proper compliance. In the exercise of his functions as Civil Registrar-
General, the Director of the National Library shall have the power to give
orders and instructions to the local Civil registrars with reference to the
performance of their duties as such. It shall be the duty of the Director of
the National Library to report any violation of the provisions of this Act
and all irregularities, negligence or incompetency on the part of the
officers designated as local civil registrars to the (Chief of the
Executive Bureau or the Director of the Non-Christian
Tribes) Secretary of the Interior, as the case may be, who shall take
the proper disciplinary action against the offenders.
[Emphasis Supplied]
It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that the power of
administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to
the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units.
Under the "faithful execution clause" embodied in Section 455(b)(l)(x)35 and
Section 444(b)(l)(x)36 of the Local Government Code, in relation to Section
47937 under Article IX, Title V38 of the same Code, the municipal and city
mayors of the respective local government units, in addition to their power
to appoint city or municipal civil registrars are also given ample authority to
exercise administrative supervision over civil registrars. Thus, when
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993 of the Office of the Civil
Registrar-General (OCRG) was passed to implement CA No. 3753 it was
declared:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Rule 1. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar-General. - The Civil
Registrar-General shall have the following duties and powers:
a) To enforce the provisions of Act No. 3753;
b) To prepare and issue regulations for carrying out the
purposes of Act No. 3753 and other laws relative to civil
registration, and to prepare and order printed the necessary
72
 forms for its proper compliance;
c) To give orders and instructions to the city/municipal civil
registrars with reference to the performance of their duties as
such; and
d) To report any violation of the provisions of Act No. 3753 and
other laws on civil registration, and all irregularities,
negligence or incompetency of city/municipal civil
registrar to the concerned mayor who shall take the
proper disciplinary action against the offender.
This authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative jurisdiction over
Circuit Registrars was also recognized generally, under Section 47(2) of the
Administrative Code of 1987,39 and specifically, under Rule 11 of
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 199340 of the OCRG, and the more
recent Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 200541 of the same office, which
applies specially to the registration of acts and events concerning the civil
status of Muslim Filipinos.

At this juncture, it should be remembered that the authority of the Mayor to

exercise administrative supervision over C/MCRs is not exclusive. The Civil
Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal.42 Under Section 9 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the CSC is
granted original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases. Thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Section 9. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. - The Secretaries and heads of

agencies, and other instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission over
their respective officers and employees. x x x
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Consequently, it behooves the Court to also forward the subject complaint to

the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and to the CSC for appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah,

Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of
due process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming a court employee
is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. The complaint of
Baguan M. Mamiscal against Macalinog S. Abdullah is hereby REFERRED to
the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for
appropriate action.

SO ORDERED

73
 THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
PART I
RULE 1
THE INTERNAL RULES
Section 1. The Internal Rules. – These Rules shall govern the internal
operations of the Supreme Court and guide its exercise of judicial and
administrative functions. They shall be cited as The Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Interpretation. – The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
shall be interpreted in accordance with the mandates of the Supreme
Court under the Constitution, applicable laws, and the Rules of Court to
ensure a just, fair and efficient administration of justice. Nothing in
these Rules shall be interpreted to procedure or limit the exercise of
the power and authority of the Court as provided in the Constitution,
the applicable laws, and the Rules of Court.
Section 3. Committee on Internal Rules. –
(a) A permanent Committee on Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court shall ensure, through appropriate recommendation to the
Court en banc, that these Rules are kept current and
responsive to the needs of the Court and the public it serves;
(b) The Committee, composed mainly to Members of the Court,
shall include the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Chief
Attorney as permanent members, and may include other court
officials as may needed;
(c) The Committee shall collate relevant materials from laws,
the Rules of Court, and Resolutions of the Court at the end of
every year and submit to the Court en banc an update of the
Rules the following January. It shall likewise recommend to the
Court en banc the amendment, revision, or deletion of any of
these Rules to reflect and achieve the objectives of justice,
fairness and efficiency;
(d) These Rules shall be posted on the Supreme Court
website.
Section 4. Amendment or suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of
sound and efficient administration of justice, and upon a majority vote
of the Court en banc, any provision of these Rules may be amended,
revised, deleted, suspended or dispensed with in particular cases,
upon such terms as the Court en banc may decide to be just, fair and
proper.
RULE 2
THE OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 1. Exercise of judicial and administrative functions. – The
Court exercises its judicial functions and its powers of administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel through the Court en
banc or its Divisions. It administers its activities under the leadership of
the Chief Justice, who may, for this purpose, constitute supervisory or
special committees headed by individual Members of the Court or
working committees of court officials and personnel.
Section 2. Quorum of the Court en banc. – Eight Members shall
constitute a quorum of the Court. In the absence of the Chief Justice,
the most senior Associate Justice present shall chair the sessions of
the Court.
Section 3. Court en banc matters and cases. – The Court en
banc shall act on the following matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty or reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
74
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls;
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit;
(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year,
or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving
the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the
reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of
a judge’s suspension or a lawyer’s suspension from the
practice of law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a
Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial
appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the
Court en banc or by a Division my be modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more
divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial
impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases
that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the Division
who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the
Court en banc;
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient
importance to merit its attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative
supervision of all courts and their personnel.
Section 4. Division cases. – All cases and matters under the
jurisdiction of the Court not otherwise provided for by law, by the Rules
of Court or by these Internal Rules to be cognizable by the Court en
banc shall be cognizable by the Divisions.
Section 5. Composition and quorum of a Division. – Unless the
Court en banc decrees otherwise, a quorum shall consist of a majority
of all Members of the Division, and an absent or a non-participating
regular Member of a Division may be replaced at the request of the
regular Members by a Member designated from another Division in
order to constitute a quorum.
Section 6. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
an unsigned resolution or minute resolution.– Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of an unsigned resolution or a minute
resolution shall be acted upon by the regular Division to which the
ponente belongs at the time of the filling of the motion. The ponente is
the Member to whom the Court, after its deliberation on the merits of a
case, assigns the writing of its decision or resolution in the case.
Section 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions; creation of a Special Division. –
Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed
resolution shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members
of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution.
If the ponente or a Member of the Division who participated in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a
Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself
from acting on the motion for reconsideration, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a new ponente or Member. For this purpose,
the Division that rendered the decision or signed resolution, including
the replacement Member, shall be constituted as a Special Division
and shall thereafter act on the motion for reconsideration and all other
pleadings, motions, and incidents.
75
Section 8. Composition and reorganization of a division. – The difference from the caseload of the incumbent Members
composition of each Division shall be based on seniority as follows: divided among them in equal number;

(a) First Division – Chief Justice, the fourth in seniority as (c) cases submitted for decision within the last twelve months
working chairperson, the seventh in seniority, the tenth in preceding the appointment of the new Member of the Court
seniority, and the thirteenth in seniority. may be unloaded to him or her.

(b) Second Division – the second in seniority as Chairperson, Section 11. Actions on cases referred to the Court en banc. – The
the fifth in seniority, the eighth in seniority; the eleventh in referral of a Division case to the Court en bancshall be subject to the
seniority, and the fourteenth in seniority. following rules:

(c) Third Division – the third in seniority as Chairperson, the (a) the resolution of a Division denying a motion for referral to
sixth in seniority, the ninth in seniority, the twelfth in seniority, the Court en banc shall be final and shall not be appealable to
and the fifteenth in seniority. the Court en banc;

The Chief Justice may, however, consider factors other than seniority (b) the Court en banc may, in the absence of sufficiently
in Division assignments. The appointment of a new Member of the important reasons, decline to take cognizance of a case
Court shall necessitate the reorganization of Divisions at the call of the referred to it and return the case to the Division; and
Chief Justice.
(c) No motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Court en
Section 9. Effect of reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases. – In banc declining cognizance of a referral by a Division shall be
the reorganization of the membership of Divisions, cases already entertained.
assigned to a Member-in-Charged shall be transferred to the Division
to which the Member-in-Charged moves, subject to the rule on the Section 12. Committees. – (a) The Court shall have the following
resolution of motions for reconsideration under Section 7 of this Rule. permanent Committees, whose members shall be designated by the
The Member-in-Charged is the Member given the responsibility of Chief Justice:
overseeing the progress and disposition of a case assigned by raffle.
(i) Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court;
Section 10. Formula for assigning cases to a new Member of the
Court. – The following rules shall be observed in assigning cases to a (ii) Committee on Computerization and Library;
newly appointed Member of the Court:
(iii) Committee on Security;
(a) the average caseload of each Member shall be determined
by dividing the total number of pending cases of all fifteen
(iv) Bids and Awards Committees;
Members by fifteen;
(v) Committee on Administrative Concerns;
(b) the newly appointed Member of the Court shall inherit the
caseload of the Member being replaced, and the inherited
caseload, if less than the average caseload as determined in (vi) Legislative-Executive Relations Committee;
(a), shall be equalized with the average caseload by taking the

76
 (vii) Committee on Publication of the Court Systems
Journal;
(viii) Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters;
(ix) Committee on Retirement Program;
(x) Committee on Public Information;
(xi) Judicial Reform Support Project Management
Committee;
(xii) Committee on Publication of the Advanced Syllabi;
(xiii) Committee on Foreign Travel;
(xiv) Committee on Justice on Wheels; and
(xv) Committee on Gender Responsiveness in the
Judiciary.
The Court may create other Committees as may be necessary,
with the Chief Justice designating the Committee Chairperson
and Members.
(b) Subcommittees may be created by the Chief Justice upon
the recommendation of the Committee Chairperson.
(c) Ad Hoc committees shall be created as the need arises.
Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In addition to the above, a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be established and
chaired by the Chief Justice, with the following membership:
(a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief Justice;
(b) three (3) members chosen among themselves by the en
banc by secret vote; and
(c) a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the Chief Justice
as a non-voting observer-consultant.
The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme Court Justice
shall serve for a term of one (1) year, with the election in the case of
elected Members to be held at the call of the Chief Justice. The
Committee shall have the task of preliminarily investigating all
complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical
standards, including anonymous complaints, filed against Members of
the Court, and of submitting findings and recommendations to the en
banc. All proceedings shall be completely confidential. The Committee
shall also monitor and report to the Court the progress of the
investigation of similar complaints against Supreme Court officials and
employees, and handle the annual update of the Court’s ethical rules
and standards for submission to the en banc.
Section 14. Per curiam decisions. – Unless otherwise requested by
the Member assigned to write the opinion of the Court, the decision or
resolution shall be rendered per curiam
(a) where the penalty imposed is dismissal from service,
disbarment, or indefinite suspension in administrative cases; or
(b) in any other case by agreement of the majority of the
Members or upon request of a Member.
Section 15. Form of resolution on motion for reconsideration in cases
where the vote of Members of the Court is divided. – The resolution of
motions for reconsideration, in case the opinion of the Court en banc or
Division is divided, may be by minute resolution specifying the
respective votes of the Members.
Section 16. Filling up of Court positions in Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals. – Positions for Members of the Court in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall be
designated by the Chief Justice among the Members of the Court in
the order of seniority: The most senior Member shall serve as
chairperson of the tribunal.
RULE 3
THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION
77
Section 1. The Supreme Court a court of law. – The Court is a court of
law. Its primary task is to resolve and decide cases and issues
presented by litigants according to law. However, it may apply equity
where the court is unable to arrive at a conclusion or judgment strictly
on the basis of law due to a gap, silence, obscurity or vagueness of the
law that the Court can still legitimately remedy, and the special
circumstances of the case.
Section 2. The Court not a trier of facts. – The Court is not a trier of
facts its role is to decide cases based on the findings of fact before it.
Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the exercise of its
discretion, decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence may
be delegated to a member of the Court, to either the Clerk of Court or
one of the Division Clerks of Court, or to one of the appellate courts or
its justices who shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation
on the basis of the evidence presented.
Section 3. Advisory opinions proscribed. – The Court cannot issue
advisory opinions on the state and meaning of laws, or take
cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject only to notable
exceptions involving constitutional issues.
Section 4. Cases when the Court may determine factual issues. – The
Court shall respect factual findings of lower courts, unless any of the
following situations is present:
(a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture;
(b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(c) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the
case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by
the evidence on record; and
(k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review
of the lower courts’ findings of fact.
RULE 4
THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
Section 1. Disciplinary cases against Court personnel. –
Administrative supervision of courts and court personnel shall be
undertaken by the court en banc, provided that, in appropriate cases,
such function may be undertaken by the Divisions.
Section 2. Assisting officers in the exercise of administrative
function. – In the discharge of its administrative functions, the Court
shall be assisted by the Office of the Clerk of Court in administrative
matters and cases involving the Court and the collegial appellate
courts, and by the Office of the Court Administrative matters and cases
involving the lower courts.
Section 3. Administrative functions of the Court. – The administrative
functions of the Court en banc consist of , but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) the discipline of justices, judges and court personnel,
whether by en banc or by Division, subject to matters
assignable to the Divisions, disciplinary matters involving
justices, judges and court personnel;
78
 (b) the temporary assignment of judges to other stations as
public interest may require;
(c) the transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or
judicial region, to another, or the transfer of venue of the trial of
cases to avoid miscarriage of justice;
(d) the amendment, modification or revocation of administrative
orders and circulars issued by the Court;
(e) the policy consideration and determination of matters and
issues; and
(f) matters involving the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) or the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) in the exercise of the
Court’s supervisory authority over them.
RULE 5
PRECEDENCE AND PROTOCOL
Section 1. Concept. – The Chief Justice enjoys precedence over all
the other Members of the Court in all official functions. The Associate
Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their
appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.
Section 2. When rule on precedence is applicable. – The rule on
precedence shall be applied in the following instances:
(a) in the determination of the Chairpersonship of the Division;
(b) in the seating arrangement of the Justices in all official
functions; and
(c) in the choice of office space, facilities, equipment,
transportation, and cottages.
Section 3. When rule on precedence is not applicable. – Precedence
in rank shall not beobserved in social and other non-official functions or
be used to justify discrimination in the assignment of cases, amount of
compensation, allowance or other forms of remuneration.
PART II
RULE 6
FILING, RECEIVING, AND PROCESSING OF INITIATORY
PLEADINGS AND APPEALS
Section 1. Governing rules of procedure in appeals or petitions filed in
the Supreme Court. – All appeals or petitions and pleadings that initiate
an application for relief shall be filed with the Court only in accordance
with the procedure provided by the Rules of Court and other issuances
of the Court.
Section 2. Reception of pleadings and other documents. – All appeals
and petitions in all types of cases, and original records in criminal
cases shall be filed with and received by the Receiving Section of the
Docket Division of the Judicial Records Office during office hours.
Section 3. Assessment and payment. – An initiatory pleading shall be
processed pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
and issuances of the Court. The corresponding legal fees shall then be
assessed and paid.
Section 4. Docket number and entry in logbook. – An initiatory
pleading properly filed shall be assigned a docket or G.R. (General
Register) number, which shall identify the case for record purposes
until its termination under the Rules of Court. Any case for which no
docket fee has been paid shall be assigned an undocketed or UDK
number. All initiatory pleadings shall be entered in the logbook of the
Receiving Section.
Section 5. Case Administration System. – Pleadings, letters,
resolutions, decisions, entry of judgment, and all the relevant
information regarding any particular case identified by a G.R. number
or a UDK number shall be encoded in the Case Administration System
(CAS).
Section 6. Indexing and transmittal to Docket Division. – After the
recording in the logbook and encoding in the CAS by the Receiving
Section, the initiatory pleading shall be indexed on a card that shall
indicates such information as court of origin, the lower court case
number(s), the nature of the case, the names of the counsel(s) for the
79
litigants, and the date and time of transmittal to the Docket Division of
the Judicial Records Office. The indexing of cases shall serve as a
backup record of the receipt of a case by the Court. Thereafter, the
initiatory pleading shall be transmitted to the Docket Division.
Section 7. Classification of cases. – A court attorney in the Docket
Division shall preliminarily classify the petitions and appeals filed as en
banc or as Division cases in accordance with law.
Section 8. Recording of cases in the main docket book. – The case
shall be recorded in the main docket book of the Docket Division,
where all pleadings, motions, communications, resolutions, the
decision, the entry of judgment, and all relevant information on a
particular case shall be recorded by handwriting. The personnel
charged with making entries in the main docket book of the said
pleadings and other said pleadings and other information shall affix his
or her initials after such entries.
Section 9. The rollo for each case. – All original pleadings and other
documents filed under the same docket number shall be encased in a
folder or rollo with a Court en banc-approved, color-coded cartolina
cover indicating the G.R. or UDK number, the title of the case, the date
of filing, the date of submission for decision, and the nature of the
case. The pages of the pleadings and other documents shall be
consecutively numbered and attached to the rollo preferably by
stitching or any method that ensures the integrity of the contents of
the rollo.
Section 10. Processing. – A court attorney at the Docket Division of
the Judicial Records Office shall accomplish the processing slips for all
initiatory pleadings, including motions for extension of time to file
petition. The processing slip shall serve as the checklist of the
requirements of the Rules of Court for filing a case, and shall inform
the Court of compliance or non-compliance by the appellant or
petitioner with such requirements, as gathered from the initiatory
pleading filed. Information provided by the processing slip shall be
reported in the initial agenda item on the case.
Section 11. Transmittal of rollo from the Receiving Section to the
Office of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court. – The
Judicial Records Office shall transmit all rollos to the Office of the Clerk
of Court or Division Clerk of Court within forty-eight hours from receipt
of pleadings, documents or papers attached to them, unless immediate
transmittal is demanded by the nature of the case. Copies of pleadings,
documents, or papers not attached to the rollo shall be distributed by
said Offices to all Members of the Court en banc or of the Division.
RULE 7
RAFFLE OF CASES
Section 1. Raffle of cases. – Every initiatory pleading already identified
by a G.R. or a UDK number shall be raffled among the Members of the
Court. The Member-in-Charge to whom a case is raffled, whether such
case is to be taken up by the Court en banc or by a Division, shall
oversee its progress and disposition unless for valid reason, such as
inhibition, the case has to be re-raffled, unloaded or assigned to
another Member.
Section 2. Raffle Committee. – Two Raffle Committees – one for
the en banc and the other for Division cases, each to be composed of
a Chairperson and two members – shall be designated by the Chief
Justice from among the Members of the Court on the basis of seniority.
Section 3. Raffle Committee Secretariat. – The Clerk of Court shall
serve as the Secretary of the Raffle Committee. He or she shall be
assisted by a court attorney, duly designated by the Chief Justice from
either the Office of the Chief Justice or the Office of the Clerk of Court,
who shall be responsible for (a) recording the raffle proceedings and
(b) submitting the minutes thereon to the Chief Justice. The Clerk of
Court shall make the result of the raffle available to the parties and
their counsels or to their duly authorized representatives, except the
raffle of (a) bar matters; (b) administrative cases; and (c) criminal
cases where the penalty imposed by the lower court is life
imprisonment, and which shall be treated with strict confidentiality.
Section 4. Classification of cases for raffle. – The initiatory pleadings
duly docketed at the Judicial Records Office shall be classified into en
banc and Division cases for purposes of the raffle. The Clerk of Court
shall forthwith make a report on the classified cases to the Chief
Justice.1avv phi1
80
Section 5. Schedule of regular raffle. – Regular raffle of en banc and
Division cases shall be held on Mondays and Wednesdays,
respectively.
Section 6. Special raffle of cases. – Should an initiatory pleading pray
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or an urgent and
extraordinary writ such as the writ of habeas corpus or of amparo, and
the case cannot be included in the regular raffle, the Clerk of Court
shall immediately call the attention of the Chief Justice or, in the latter’s
absence, the most senior Member of the Court present. The Chief
Justice or the Senior Member of the Court may direct the conduct of a
special raffle, in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) Upon receipt of an initiatory pleading containing a motion
for the conduct of a special raffle, the Judicial Records Office
shall immediately (I) process the pleading and (ii) transmit a
copy of it to the Office of the Clerk of Court.
(b) The Judicial Records Office shall inform the Clerk of Court
in writing of the motion for special raffle, and the Clerk of Court
shall forthwith seek authority to conduct the special raffle from
the Chief Justice or substitute Senior Member, as the case may
be.
(c) The special raffle shall be conducted immediately.
(d) The Clerk of Court shall furnish the Member-in-Charge to
whom the case is raffled, the Judicial Records Office, and
the Rollo Room at the Office of the Chief Justice, copies of the
result of the special raffle in an envelope marked "RUSH". The
Member-in-Charge shall also be furnished a copy of the
pleading. If the case is classified as a Division case, the Clerk
of Court shall furnish the same copies to the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Division to which the same Member-in-Charge
belongs and to the Division Chairperson.
(e) Upon receipt of the special raffle result, the Judicial
Records Office shall immediately forward the rollo to the
Division concerned, with the word "RUSH" clearly indicated on
the rollo cover.
(f) Upon receipt of the rollo, the Clerk of Court – or, should the
case be classified as a Division case, the Division Clerk of
Court – shall immediately (i) prepare the Agenda item on the
specially raffled case; and (ii) forward the rollo and a copy of
the Special Agenda to the Rollo Room, which shall transmit
the rollo to the Member-in-Charge and distribute the Special
Agenda to the Chief Justice and the Members of the Court or to
the Chairperson and Members of the Division, as the case may
be.
(g) When the Court in recess and the urgency of the case
requires immediate action, the Clerk of Court or the Division
Clerk of Court shall personally transmit the rollo to the Chief
Justice or the Division Chairperson for his or her action.
Section 7. Conduct of the raffle. – The cases included in a previously
prepared list shall beraffled using a reasonably acceptable random
raffle device under a system that shall ensure the fair and equitable
distribution of case load among all Members of the Court.
Section 8. Transfer of rollos of raffled cases. – The rollos of all raffled
cases shall bedelivered to the Officers of the respective Clerks of
Court, for inclusion in the next agenda of the Court en banc or the
Division.
RULE 8
INHIBITION AND SUBSTITUTE OF MEMBERS OF THE COURT
Section 1. Grounds for inhibition. – A Member of the Court shall inhibit
himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any
of these and similar reasons:
(a) the Member of the Court was the ponente of the decision or
participated in the proceedings in the appellate or trial court;
(b) the Member of the Court was counsel, partner or member of
law firm that is or was the counsel in the case subject to
Section 3(c) of this rule;
81
 (c) the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or
child is pecuniarily interested in the case;
(d) the Member of the Court is related to either party in the
case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of
record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity;
(e) the Member of the Court was executor, administrator,
guardian or trustee in the case; and
(f) the Member of the Court was an official or is the spouse of
an official or former official of a government agency or private
entity that is a party to the case, and the Justice or his or her
spouse has reviewed or acted on any matter relating to the
case.
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound
discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than
any of those mentioned above.
The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.
Section 2. Motion to inhibit a Division or a Member of the Court. – A
motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall state
the grounds therefor.
A motion for inhibition of a Division or a Member of the Court must be
acted upon by the Division or the Member of the Court concerned, as
the case may be, within ten working days from receipt thereof except
when there is an application for a temporary restraining order, in which
case the motion must be acted upon immediately.
No motion for inhibition of a Division or a Member of the Court shall be
granted after a decision on the merits or substance of the case has
been rendered or issued by an Division, except for a valid or just
reason such as an allegation of a graft and corrupt practice or ground
not earlier apparent.
Section 3. Effects of inhibition. – The consequences of an inhibition of
a Member of the Court shall be governed by these rules:
(a) Whenever a Member-in-Charge of a case in a Division
inhibits himself for a just and valid reason, the case shall be
returned to the Raffle Committee for re-raffling among the
Members of the same Division other than the Member-in-
Charge of a case, and the fifth Member of the Division chosen
by raffle among the Members of the Divisions shall act in place
of the inhibiting Member.
(b) Whenever a Member of the Division, other than the
Member-in-Charge of a case, inhibits on any of the grounds
specified in Section 1, except paragraph (b), the case shall be
decided by the four remaining Members of the Division and
another Member of the two other Divisions chosen by raffle to
act on the case.
(c) When a Member of the Division, other than the Member-in-
Charge of a case, was counsel or partner or member of a law
firm that is or was counsel in the case before the Division, such
Member shall inhibit himself or herself, unless the Member was
no longer a partner or member of the law firm when it was
engaged as counsel in the case and the Member votes against
the client of such firm. In any event, the mandatory inhibition
shall case after the lapse of ten years from the resignation or
withdrawal of the Member from the law firm, unless the
Member personally handled the case when he or she was a
partner or member of the law firm.
(d) Whenever two or more Members o the Division, other than
the Member-in-Charge of a case, inhibit themselves from a
case, they shall be replaced by raffle by Members of the other
Divisions.
(e) A Member of the Court who inhibits, on the grounds
specified in Section 1, shall be assigned an additional case at
the next raffle of Division cases.
Section 4. Substitution of Member. – When a Member of the Court is
on leave or a vacancyoccurs in a Division, another Member from the
82
other Divisions shall be designated by the Chief Justice by rotation,
according to a reverse order of seniority, to act as Member of the
Division until the regular Member reports back to work or a newly
appointed Member assumes office, as the case may be.
RULE 9
FOLDER OF PLEADINGS, COMMUNICATIONS, DOCUMENTS AND
OTHER PAPERS IN A CASE
Section 1. The rollo of a case. – The original of all pleadings,
communications, documents, and other papers filed by the parties shall
be encased in a rollo, which shall serve as their official repository for
purposes of the case. The rollo shall be properly and sequentially
paginated by the Docket Division of the Judicial Records Office to
prevent intercalation or detachment of a page.
Section 2. Repository of rollos. – All rollos shall be kept in
the Rollo Room in the Office of the Chief Justice. No rolloshall be taken
out except for delivery to any following: (1) the Judicial Records Office
for attachment of a pleading, communication, document or other
papers filed; (2) the Office of the Clerk of Court or the Office of the
Division Clerk of Court, for the preparation of the Agenda and to the
Minutes of a Court session, as well for the attachment of the decisions
or resolutions to the rollo; (3) the Office of the Member-in-Charge or
the Office of the ponente or writer of the decision or resolution; (4) any
Office or official charged with the study of the case.
All personnel charged with the safekeeping and distribution
of rollos shall be bound by strict confidentiality on the identity of the
Member-in-Charge or the ponente, as well as on the integrity of
the rollos, under pain of administrative sanction and criminal
prosecution for any breach thereof.
Section 3. The expediente. - The Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Division Clerk of Court shall provide copies of all pleadings,
communications, documents, and other papers of a case to the Offices
of the Members of the Court for the constitution of an expediente to
facilitate access and easy reference to a case.
Section 4. Confidentiality of identify of Member-in-Charge or ponente
and of Court actions. – Personnel assigned to the Rollo Room and all
other Court personnel handling documents relating to the raffling of
cases are bound by strict confidentiality on the identify of the Member-
in-Charge or ponente and on the actions taken on the case.
Rollo Room personnel may release a rollo only upon an official written
request from the Chief Judicial Staff Head or the Chief of Office of the
requesting Office. The rollo room personnel may release a rollo only to
an authorized personnel named in the official written request. All
personnel handling the rollos are bound by the same strict
confidentiality rules.
Section 5. Consolidation of cases. – The Court may order the
consolidation of cases involving common questions of law or of act.
The Chief Justice shall assign the consolidated cases to he Member-
in-Charge to whom the case having the lower or lowest docket number
has been raffled, subject to equalization of case load by raffle. The
Judicial Records Office shall see to it that (a) the rollos of the
consolidated cases are joined together to prevent the loss,
misplacement or detachment of any of them; and (b) the cover of
each rollo indicates the G.R. or UDK number of the case with which the
former is consolidated.
The Member-in-Charge who finds after study that the cases do not
involve common questions of law or of fact may request the Court to
have the case or cases returned to the original Member-in-Charge.
Section 6. Reconstitution of lost rollo. – When a rollo is lost and a
diligent search for it proves futile, the personnel-in-charge of
the Rollo Room shall immediately inform the Chief Justice or the
proper Chairperson of the Division of such loss. Without prejudice to
any administrative or criminal liability of the personnel responsible for
the loss, the Chief Justice or the Chairperson of the Division concerned
shall direct the Judicial Records Office to reconstitute the rollo and
request the counsel and the parties to personally appear and submit,
on a specified date, legible copies of the pleadings, communications,
documents, and other papers filed in the case, and to authenticate their
respective submissions.
The same procedure shall be observed when the loss of a rollo occurs
in the office of a Member of the Court. The Judicial Staff Head
concerned shall immediately report the loss.
83
Entries in the main docket book of the Judicial Records Office, as well
as in the Case4 Administration System, shall be used for verification
purposes.
RULE 10
COURT SESSIONS AND HEARINGS
Section 1. Court sessions. – The Court en banc shall hold sessions
every Tuesday. The Divisions may meet on Monday s and
Wednesdays. Special sessions may be held whenever necessary. In
every session, proceedings shall follow the agenda of cases and
matters to be taken up. Actions taken during sessions shall be duly
reflected in the minutes of the proceedings.
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court sessions are
executive in character, with only the Members of the Court present.
Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to
outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by
the Court.
The Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson shall record the action or
actions taken in each case for transmittal to the Clerk of Court or
Division Clerk of Court after each session. The notes of the Chief
Justice and the Division Chairperson, which the Clerk of Court and the
Division Clerks of Court must treat with strict confidentiality, shall be
the bases of the minutes of the sessions.
Section 3. Oral arguments. – The Court may hear any case on oral
arguments upon defined issues. The petitioner shall argue first,
followed by the respondent and the amicus curiae, if any. Rebuttal
arguments may be allowed by the Chief Justice or the Chairperson. If
necessary, the Court may invite amicus curiae.
Section 4. Transcripts of hearings, recording of oral arguments. – Oral
arguments shall be recorded by at least two stenographers, alternately
taking stenographic notes of the proceedings. The stenographers shall
transcribe their notes and submit the consolidated transcripts to the
Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court within twenty-four hours
from the termination of the oral arguments. The Clerk of Court or the
Division Clerk of Court shall review the transcripts of stenographic
notes, using the tape or electronic of the hearing for verification
purposes.
RULE 11
AGENDA AND MINUTES OF COURT SESSIONS
Section 1. Agenda. – The Clerk o9f Court and the Division Clerks of
Court shall ensure that all pleadings, communications, documents, and
other papers duly filed in a case shall be reported in the Agenda for
consideration by the Court en banc or the Division. The Agenda items
for each case shall adequately apprise the Court of relevant matters for
its consideration.
Section 2. Periods for inclusion of pleadings, motions, and other
matters in the agenda. – The Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of
Court shall observe the following periods for the inclusion of pleadings,
motions, and other matters in the agenda counted from receipt:
(a) motions for extension of time to file petitions – immediately
calendared;
(b) appeals in criminal cases under Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, or under Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court – within fifteen days;
(c) petitions under Rules 45, 64 and 65 – within ten days,
unless a party asks for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or an extraordinary writ, immediate inclusion of the case
in the Agenda; and
(d) other pleadings – within ten days.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Chief Justice may direct the
immediate inclusion ofany matter in the agenda.
Section 3. Minutes of proceedings. – The Chief Justice or the
Chairperson of the Divisionshall provide the Clerk of Court or the
Division Clerk of Court his or her notes on the actions taken by the
Court. The copy of the Agenda containing the handwritten notes of the
Chief Justice or Division Chairperson shall serve as the basis for the
84
preparation of the minutes of the session by the Office of the Clerk of
Court or of the Division Clerks of Court.
Section 4. Preparation of minutes of proceedings. – Within forty-eight
hours from the time the copy of the Agenda containing the handwritten
actions of the Court is transmitted to him or her, the Clerk of Court or
the Division Clerk of Court shall submit the draft of the minutes of the
session for the approval by the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairperson. The draft of the minutes of a Court session shall follow
the chronological sequence of the cases in the Agenda. Excerpts of the
minutes pertaining to a particular case quoted in a letter of the Clerk of
Court or the Division Clerk of Court to the parties, and extended
resolutions showing the actions of the Court on the cases on agenda
shall be released to the parties only after the Chief Justice or the
Division Chairperson has approved the minutes in writing.
Section 5. Confidentiality of minutes prior to release. – The Offices of
the Clerk of Court and of the Division Clerks of Court are bound by
strict confidentiality on the action or actions taken by the Court prior to
the release of the resolutions embodying the Court action or actions.
A resolution is considered officially released once the envelope
containing a final copy of it addressed to the parties has been
transmitted to the process server for personal service or to the mailing
section of the Judicial Records Office. Only after its official release may
a resolution be made available to the public.
Section 6. Preparation of minute resolutions and unsigned extended
resolutions. – A minute resolution quoting an excerpt of the minutes of
Court sessions pertinent to a case shall be prepared by the court
attorneys in the Office of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of
Court and personally reviewed, approved, and initialled by the Clerk of
Court or the Division Clerk of Court before submission for final
approval by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson. An unsigned
extended resolution may be prepared by the Office of the Member-in-
Charge or by the Office of the Clerk of Court or Division Clerk of Court,
upon instructions of either the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairperson, who shall approve the resolution. The Chief Justice and
the Division Chairperson shall order the Clerk of Court or the Division
of Clerk of Court to release duly approved minute and unsigned
extended resolutions.
Section 7. Form of notice of a minute resolution. – A notice of a minute
resolution shall be embodied in a letter of the Clerk of Court or the
Division Clerk of Court notifying the parties of the action or actions
taken in their case in the following form:
(SUPREME COURT Seal)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC/_____ DIVISION
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc/_____ Division issued a
Resolution dated ______________, which reads as follows:
"G.R./UDK/A.M./A.C. NO. _________ (TITLE). – (QUOTE
RESOLUTION")
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
CLERK OF COURT/Division Clerk of Court
Section 8. Release of resolutions. – All resolutions shall be released
within forty-eight hours from approval of the Minutes of any session by
the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson. Resolutions with the
following actions shall be released immediately to the parties:
(a) directing the issuance of extraordinary writs;
(b) granting or denying motions for extension of time to file
petitions or subsequent pleadings, or other motions of urgent
nature;
85
 (c) granting applications for a temporary restraining
order/status quo order/writ of preliminary injunction;
(d) preventively suspending judges or court personnel; and
(e) directing any party, the Office of the Court Administrator, or
any other official or agency to submit a comment, a report or a
recommendation within a non-extendible period.
RULE 12
VOTING REQUIREMENTS
Section 1. Voting requirements. – (a) All decisions and actions in
Court en banc cases shall be made up upon the concurrence of the
majority of the Members of the Court who actually took part in the
deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them.
(b) All decisions and actions in Division cases shall be made
upon the concurrence of at least three Members of the Division
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issue or
issues involved and voted on them.1
Section 2. Tie voting in the Court en banc. – (a) In civil cases,
including special proceedings and special civil actions, where the
Court en banc is equally divided in option or the necessary majority
vote cannot be had, the Court shall deliberate on it anew. If after such
deliberation still no decision is reached, the Court shall, in an original
action filed with it, dismiss the case; in appealed cases, it shall affirm
the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) In criminal cases, when the Court en banc is equally divided
in option of the necessary majority cannot be had, the Court
shall deliberate on it anew. If after such deliberation still no
decision is reached, the Court shall reverse the judgement of
conviction of the lower court and acquit the accused.
(c) When, in an administrative case against any of the Justices
of the appealed courts or any of the Judges of the trial Courts,
the impossible penalty is dismissal and the Court en banc is
equally divided in opinion or the majority vote required by the
Constitution for dismissal cannot be had, the Court shall
deliberate on the case anew. If after such deliberation still no
decision is reached, the Court shall dismiss the administrative
case, unless a majority vote decides to impose a lesser
penalty.
(d) Where the Court en banc is equally divided in opinion of the
majority vote required by the Constitution for annulling any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation cannot be had, the Court shall deliberate on the
case anew. If such deliberation still no decision is reached, the
Court shall deny the challenge to the constitutionally of the act.
(e) In all matters incidental to the main action where the
Court en banc is equally divided in opinion, the relief sought
shall be denied.
Section 3. Failure to obtain required votes in Division. – Where the
necessary majority of three votes is not obtained in a case in a
Division, the case shall be elevated to the Court en banc.
Section 4. Leaving a vote. – A Member who goes on leave or is
unable to attend the voting on nay decision, resolution, or matter may
leave his or her vote in writing, addressed to the Chief Justice or the
Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be counted, provided that he
or she took part in the deliberation.
RULE 13
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Section 1. Period for deciding or resolving cases. – The Court shall
decide or resolve all cases within twenty-four months from the date of
submission for resolution. A case shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filling of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum that the Court or its Rules require.
The Member-in-charge, assigned to oversee the progress and
disposition of a case, who is unable to decide or resolve the oldest
cases within that period shall request the Court en banc for an
extension of the period, stating the ground for the request. The Court
86
shall act on the request as it sees fit, according to the circumstances of
the case.
Should a Member object to the request, the Court shall grant a final
extension of thirty days within the Member-in-Charge shall report the
case for deliberation, falling which, the case shall be re-raffled to
another Member who shall submit the report within thirty days from
assignment.
Section 2. List of cases submitted for decision or resolution. – The
Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of Court shall maintain a system
for apprising the Court periodically, at least six months before the last
day of the twenty-four-month period for deciding or resolving a case, of
the approach of such cut off date.
Section 3. Actions and decisions, how reached. – The actions and
decisions of the Court whether en banc or through a Division, shall be
arrived at as follows:
(a) Initial action on the petition or complaint. – After a petition or
complaint has been placed on the agenda for the first time, the
Member-in-Charge shall except in urgent cases, submit to the
other Members at least three days before the initial deliberation
in such case, a summary of facts, the issue or issues involved,
and the arguments that the petitioner presents in support of his
or her case. The Court shall, in consultation with its Members,
decide on what action it will take.
(b) Action on incidents. – The Member-in-Charge shall
recommend to the Court the action to be taken on any incident
during the pendency of the case.
(c) Decision or Resolution. – When a case is submitted for
decision or resolution, the Member-in-Charge shall have the
same placed in the agenda of the Court for deliberation. He or
she shall submit to the other Members of the Court, at least
seven days in advance, a report that shall contain the facts, the
issue or issues involved, the arguments of the contending
parties, and the laws and jurisprudence that can aid the Court
in deciding or resolving the case. In consultation, the Members
of the Court shall agree on the conclusion or conclusions in the
case, unless the said Member requests a continuance and the
Court grants it.
Section 4. Continuance in deliberations. – The deliberation on a case
may be adjourned to another date to enable the Member who
requested it to further study the case; provided, however, that the total
period of continuances shall not exceed three months from the date
was first adjourned. This rule shall likewise apply to actions on months
for reconsideration of the decisions and resolutions of the Court, unless
a Member, whose vote in the original decision of a divided Court
matters, is about to retire. In such a situation, the action on the motion
for reconsideration submitted for resolution shall be made before his or
her retirement.
Section 5. Ponente or Opinion writer. – Immediately upon arriving at a
conclusion regarding the issue or issues in the case, the Court shall
assign2 a Member to write the opinion of the Court. Should the majority
vote of the court on such conclusion be different from or contrary to the
conclusion arrived at by the ponente, the writing of the new opinion
shall be assigned to a ponente chosen by the majority.
Section 6. Manner of adjudication. – The Court shall adjudicate cases
as follows:
(a) By decision, when the Court disposes of the case on its
merits and its rulings have significant doctrinal values; resolve
novel issues; or impact on the social, political, and economic
life of the nation. The decision shall state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall bear the
signatures of the members who took part in the deliberation.
(b) By signed resolution, when the Court comprehensively
resolves the motion for reconsideration filed in the case or
when a dissenting opinion is registered against such resolution.
The signed resolution shall no longer discuss issues resolved
in the decision and need not repeat the facts and the law stated
in it. It shall also bear the signatures of the Members who took
part in the deliberation.
(c) By unsigned resolution when the Court disposes of the case
on the merits, but its ruling is essentially meaningful only to the
87
 parties; has no significant doctrinal value; or is minimal interest
to the law profession, the academe, or the public. The
resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
(d) By minute resolution when the Court (1) dismisses a
petition filed under Rule 64 or 65 of the Rules of Court, citing
as legal basis the failure of the petition to show that the
tribunal, board or officer exercising or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(2) denies petition filed under Rule 45 of the said Rules, citing
as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the
challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below; (3)
Dismisses an administrative complaint, citing as legal basis
failure to show a prima facie case against the respondent; (4)
denies a motion for reconsideration, citing as legal basis the
absence of a compelling or cogent reason to grant the motion,
or the failure to raise any substantial argument to support such
motion; and (5) dismisses a petition on technical grounds or
deficiencies.
Section 7. Dissenting separate or concurring opinion. – A Member
who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the
disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division
Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason for such
dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the case, but based
on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a
concurrence "in the result" should state the reason for the qualified
concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to
express other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring
opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be within
one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members.
Section 8. Attestations and certifications on consultations held. – In
cases decided by a Division, the Division Chairperson shall issue an
attestation regarding the conduct of consultation among its Members
and the assignment of the writing of the decision to a Member after
such consultation. In all decided cases, whether by the Court en
banc or by a Division, the Chief shall issue a certification regarding the
conduct of consultant among the Members of the Court and the
assignment of the writing of the decision to a Member after such
consultation.
Section 9. Submission of decisions and resolutions. – The original of
all decisions and resolutions as well as separate, concurring, or
dissenting opinions shall be submitted to the Chief Justice,
accompanied by electronic copies. The Judicial Staff Head of the
Office of the ponente or the writer of the majority opinion shall certify, in
writing, the authenticity of the electronic copies, which shall be placed
in a separately marked, dated, and signed envelop.
Section 10. Promulgation of decisions and resolutions. – The Clerk of
Court or the Division Clerk of Court shall promulgated every decision or
resolution within forty-eight hours from receipt of the same from the
Office of the Chief Justice, indicating the date and hour of promulgation
and affixing his or her signature underneath such date and hour. In the
absence of the Clerk of Court, the First Division Clerk of Court shall
promulgated the decisions of the Court en banc.
Section 11. Authentication of decisions and resolutions. – All
decisions, resolutions, and other Court issuances shall be released to
the parties concerned only after these shall have been authenticated
by the Clerk of Court of Division Clerk of Court through a bar code at
the bottom of each page, which he or she shall personally affix, or by
other means to protect the authenticity and integrity of such document.
They shall also initial every page of per curiam decisions, minute
resolutions, and unsigned extended resolutions.
RULE 14
HANDLING AND DISSEMINATION OF DECISIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS
Section 1. Promulgation. – A decision or resolution shall deemed
promulgated on the date it is received and acknowledged by the Clerk
of Court or Division Clerk of Court from the Office of the Chief Justice
or the Division Chairperson.
Section 2. Report of promulgation. – Within twenty-four hours from the
promulgation of a decision or resolution, the Clerk of Court or the
88
Division Clerk of Court shall formally inform the Chief Justice or the
Division Chairperson of such promulgation.
Section 3. Electronic dissemination of decision or resolution. – Upon
receipt of the report of promulgation, the Chief Justice shall direct the
Chief Justice’s Staff Head to deliver immediately the magnetic or
electronic copy of the decision or resolution to the Management
Information Systems Office (MISO).
Section 4. Responsibilities of the MISO. – Upon receipt of a copy of a
promulgated decision or resolution, the MISO shall
(a) log the date and time of receipt;
(b) format the decision or resolution in such a way as to make it
readable on the Supreme Court website;
(c) scan any handwritten notes on the signature page, such as
"In the result," and include signature page with the same
handwritten notes for posting;
(d) take note of any typographical error in the magnetic or
electronic file of the decision or resolution, and immediately
bring it to the attention of the writer of the decision or
resolution, or the Chief Justice in case of a per curiam decision
or when the writer has ceased to serve the Court;
(e) immediately furnish the Library with soft copies of all
decisions and resolutions for archival purposes.
Section 5. Service and dissemination of decisions and signed
resolutions. – The Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court shall
see to the service of authenticated copies of the promulgated decision
or signed resolution upon the parties in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court. The Clerk of Court of the Division Clerk of Court
shall also immediately provide hard copies of the same to the Public
Information Office, Office of the Court Administrator, Office of the Chief
Attorney, Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Library.
Section 6. Safekeeping of original hard copy of decision and drafting
of syllabus of each promulgated decision. – As soon as hard copies of
the decision or resolution shall have been served on the parties and
disseminated in accordance with these Rules, the Clerk of Court or the
Division Clerk of Court shall deliver to the Office of the Reporter (a) the
original hard copy of each signed decision or resolution for
safekeeping, and (b) a reproduction of such hard copy for the
preparation of the concise synopsis and syllabus of each decision or
resolution duly approved by the writer of the decision or by the Chief
Justice if the writer has retired or is no longer in the judicial service,
prior to publication in the Philippine Reports. The Office of the Reporter
shall (a) see to the secured safekeeping of original decisions that shall
be collated and bound on a monthly basis, and (b) be responsible for
the updated publication of the Philippine Reports.
Section 7. Publication of decisions and resolutions. – A decision and
signed resolution of the Court shall be published in the Philippine
Reports, with the synopsis and syllabus prepared by the Office of the
Reporter. Other decisions and signed resolutions not so published may
also be published in the Philippine Reports in the form of memoranda
prepared by the Office of the Reporter. The Public Information (PIO)
may choose and submit significant decisions and resolutions for
publication in the Official Gazette.
RULE 15
FINALITY OF DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS
Section 1. Finality of decisions and resolutions. – A decision or
resolution of the Court may be deemed final after the lapse of fifteen
days from receipt by the parties of a copy of the same subject to the
following:
(a) the date of receipt indicated on the registry return card
signed by the party-or, in case he or she is represented by
counsel, by such counselor his or her representative- shall be
the reckoning date for counting the fifteen-day period; and
(b) if the Judgement Division is unable to retrieve the registry
return card within fifteen days from mailing, it shall immediately
inquire from the receiving post office on (i) the date when the
addressee received the mailed decision or resolution; and (ii)
89
 who received the same, with the information provided by
authorized personnel of the said post office serving as the
basis for the computation of the fifteen-day period.
Section 2. Motion for reconsideration. – A motion for reconsideration
filed within the fifteen-day period from receipt of a copy of the decision
or resolution shall stay the execution of such decision or resolution
unless, for good reasons shown, the Court directs otherwise.
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to
this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice"
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s
declaration.1avv ph!1
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a
second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
RULE 16
ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT
Section 1. Entry of judgement. – The entry of judgement covering the
final decisions and resolutions of the Court shall be made in
accordance with the Rules of Court. The date of entry of judgement
shall be the date such decision or resolution becomes executory,
unless the Court directs its immediate execution.
Section 2. How entry of judgement is made. – The entry of judgement
shall be in the form of a certification indicating the date when the final
decision or resolution of the Court has become executory and entered
in the book of judgements. The entry shall restate the dispositive
portion of the judgement of final resolution, and be duly signed by the
Chief of the Judicial Records Office as the Deputy Clerk of Court. The
Judicial Records Office shall furnish the parties with a photocopy of the
entry of judgement, which shall be authenticated by the Chief of the
Judicial Records Office in the same manner that decisions and
resolutions are authenticated.
Section 3. Time frame for entry of judgement. – Unless the Court
requires an immediate entry of judgement, the Judicial records Office
shall enter judgement within fifteen days from the expiration of the
fifteen-day reglementary period for filling a motion for reconsideration.
Section 4. Return of case records to lower court. – The records of
every decided case shall be returned to the court where it originated for
execution of judgement on the same day that entry of judgement is
made.
RULE 17
CORRECTION OF TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN DECISIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS
Section 1. Correction of typographical errors in decisions and
resolutions. – Typographical errors discovered after the promulgation
or even after the publication of a decision or signed resolution may be
corrected as follows:
(a) The Reporter and the MISO shall, with the authority of the
writer of the decision or resolution, make the necessary
correction of typographical errors. In per curiam decisions and
in unsigned resolutions, or when the ponente has retired,
resigned or is no longer in the judicial service, the authority
shall be given by the Chief Justice.
(b) The correction of typographical errors shall be made by
crossing out the incorrect word and inserting by hand the
appropriate correction immediately above the corrected or
cancelled word. The writer of the decision of the Chief Justice,
as the case may be, shall authenticate the correction by
affixing his or her initials and the date or correction immediately
below the correction.
Section 2. Report of corrections made. – The Reporter and the MISO
Chief shall submit to the Court, through the Clerk of Court, a quarterly
report of cases where the decisions and resolutions have been
90
corrected. The Clerk of Court shall thereafter include the report in the
Agenda of the Court en banc for confirmation of the correction.

RULE 18
EFFECTIVITY

Section 1. Effectivity. – These Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.

91
 G.R. No. 203655, September 07, 2015
SM LAND, INC., Petitioner, v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY AND ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ESQ., IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND CEO OF BCDA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Once again, respondent-movants Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) and Arnel Paciano D. Casanova, Esq. (Casanova) urge this Court to
reconsider its August 13, 2014 Decision1 in the case at bar. In their Motion
for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en
banc to Take Cognizance of this Case and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument
Before the Court en banc),2 respondent-movants remain adamant in
claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and
irremediable injury to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries,
the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).3
The motion fails to persuade.
The instant recourse partakes the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleadingunder Section 2, Rule 56,4 in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. The rule categorically
states: "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rationale behind the
rule is explained in Manila Electric Company v. Barlis, thusly:
The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is
not contingent upon the averment of "new" grounds to assail the judgment,
i.e.. grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected.
Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be staved off
indefinitely, depending on the party's ingeniousness or cleverness in
conceiving and formulating "additional flaws" or "newly discovered errors'"
therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights of the movant
for reconsideration. "Piece-meal1" impugnation of a judgment by successive
motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary
axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or
proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those
not so included are deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent
motions.
For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with
established rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice
and policy, courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and
in fulfillment of their role in the administration of justice, they should brook
no delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or maneuverings of
parties or their lawyers...5
Indeed, all cases are to eventually reach a binding conclusion and must not
remain indefinitely afloat in limbo. Otherwise, the exercise of judicial power
would be for naught if court decisions can effectively be thwarted at every
turn by dilatory tactics that prevent the said rulings from attaining finality.
Hence, the Court has taken a conservative stance when entertaining second
motions for reconsideration, allowing only those grounded on extraordinarily
persuasive reasons and, even then, only upon express leave first
obtained.6 As proscribed under Sec. 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court:
SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to
this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.
There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or
damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be considered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate
a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.7
(emphasis added) ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Succinctly put, the concurrence of the following elements are required for a
second motion for reconsideration to be entertained: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same
would be in the higher interest of justice; cra lawlawlib rary
2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered attains finality; cralawlawl ibra ry
3. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court
through one of its Divisions, at least three (3) members of the said
Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and
4. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc's
actual membership must be mustered for the second motion for
reconsideration to be granted.
Unfortunately for respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not
obtain in the case at bench. To begin with, there are no extraordinarily
persuasive reasons "in the higher interest of justice" on which the instant
92
second motion for reconsideration is anchored on. The enumerated grounds
for the second motion for reconsideration say as much:
GROUNDS8
I Competitive Challenge Procedure for Public-Private Joint Ventures of the
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SMLI AND BCDA WAS NEVER PERFECTED TO
COMPEL BCDA TO COMPLETE THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE AS THERE WAS
NO MEETING OF THE MINDS.
II
THE GOVERNMENT RESERVATION TO CANCEL THE COMPETITIVE
CHALLENGE IS A POLICY DECISION AND REMAINS ELECTIVE IN THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS AND BINDING TO ALL PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES
INCLUDING SMLI.
III
THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE IS A POLICY
AND ECONOMIC DECISION. MANDAMUS WILL THEREFORE NOT LIE.
IV
ESTOPPEL CANNOT OPERATE TO PREJUDICE THE GOVERNMENT.
V officials or agents.17 As jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to
THE PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT LOSSES IS NOT IMAGINED BUT REAL.
Based on the records, the second motion for reconsideration is a mere
rehash, if not a reiteration, of respondent-movants' previous arguments and
submissions, which have amply been addressed by the Court in its August
13, 2014 Decision, and effectively affirmed at length in its March 18, 2015
Resolution.9
To recapitulate, there exists between SMLI and BCDA a perfected
agreement, embodied in the Certification of Successful Negotiations, upon
which certain rights and obligations spring forth, including the
commencement of activities for the solicitation for comparative
proposals.10 As evinced in the Certification of Successful Negotiation:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, BCDA and
SMLI have, after successful negotiations pursuant to Stage II of Annex
C x x x. reached an agreement on the purpose, terms and conditions on the
JV development of the subject property, which shall become the terms for
the Competitive Challenge pursuant to Annex C of the Guidelines, x x x.11
xxxx
BCDA and SMLI have agreed to subject SMLI's Original Proposal to
Competitive Challenge pursuant to Annex C - Detailed Guidelines for
NEDA .TV guidelines, which competitive challenge process shall be
immediately implemented following the Terms of Reference (TOR) Volumes
1 and 2.12 (emphasis added)
Under the agreement and the National Economic Development Authority
Joint Venture Guidelines (NEDA JV Guidelines), the BCDA is duty-bound to
proceed with and complete the competitive challenge after the detailed
negotiations proved successful. Thus, the Court found that BCDA gravely
abused its discretion for having acted arbitrarily and contrary to its
contractual commitment to SMLI, to the damage and prejudice of the latter,
when it cancelled the competitive challenge prior to its completion.13
Respondent-movants' reliance on the Terms of Reference (TOR) provision on
Qualifications and Waivers14to cancel the Swiss Challenge is misplaced for
the provision, as couched, focuses only on the eligibility requirements for
Private Sector Entities (PSEs) who wish to challenge SMLI's proposal, and
not to the Swiss Challenge in its entirety.15 To rule otherwise - that the TOR
allows the BCDA to cancel the competitive challenge at any time - would
contravene the NEDA JV Guidelines, which has the force and effect of law.16
Respondent-movants cannot also find solace in the dictum that the State is
never be barred by estoppel by the perceived mistakes or errors of its
exceptions, viz:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in a rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.18
Here, despite BCDA's repeated assurances that it would respect SMLFs rights
as an original proponent, and after putting the latter to considerable trouble
and expense, BCDA went back on its word and instead ultimately cancelled
its agreement with SMLI.19 BCDA's capriciousness became all the more
evident in its conflicting statements as regards whether or not SMLI's
proposal would be advantageous to the government.20 The alleged
dubiousness of the proceeding that led to the perfection of the agreement
93
cannot also be invoked as a ground to cancel the contract for to rule that
irregularities marred the actions of BCDA's former board and officers, as
respondent-movant would have us to believe, would be tantamount to
prematurely exposing them, who are non-parties to this case, to potential
administrative liability without due process of law.21
Respondent-movants would then asseverate that to proceed with the
competitive challenge starting at the floor price of P38,500.00 per square
meter is patently unjust and grossly disadvantageous to the government
since the property in issue is allegedly appraised at P78,000.00 per square
meter.22However, this alleged adverse economic impact on the government,
in finding for SMLI, remains speculative. To clarify, Our ruling did not award
the project in petitioner's favor but merely ordered that SMLI's proposal be
subjected to a competitive challenge. And lest it be misunderstood, the
perceived low floor price for the project, based on SMLI's proposal, remains
just that - a floor price. Without first subjecting SMLI's proposal to a
competitive challenge, no bid can yet be obtained from private sector
entities and, corollarily, no determination can be made at present as to
whether or not the final bid price for the project is indeed below the
property's fair market value.23
Overall, the foregoing goes to show that the BCDA failed to establish a
justifiable reason for its refusal to proceed with the competitive
challenge.24 We are left to believe that the cancellation of the competitive
challenge, in violation not only of the agreement between the parties but
also of the NEDA JV Guidelines, was only due to BCDA's whims and caprices,
and is correctible by the extraordinary writ of certiorari .
With the foregoing disquisitions, respondent-movants' second motion for
reconsideration, as its first, is totally bereft of merit. There exists no
argument "in the higher interest of justice" that would convincingly compel
this Court to even admit the prohibited pleading. It also then goes without
saying that this Division does not find cogent reason to elevate the matter to
the Court en banc.
Furthermore, it is well to note that the Court's ruling in this case has already
attained finality and an Entry of Judgment25 has correspondingly been
issued. The Court, therefore, no longer has jurisdiction to modify the
Decision granting SMLI's petition for its finality and executoriness
consequently rendered it immutable and unalterable.26 As elucidated
in Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez:
This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly
administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the
law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no
end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any
act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed,
the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its
operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but
extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.27
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are
(1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void
judgments.28 Respondent-movants, therefore, question the validity of the
Court's Third Division's rulings and postulate that a deliberation of the case
by the Court en banc is warranted under Sec. 4(2), Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 4. x x x x
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, (emphasis added)
In support of their contention, respondent-movants cite the 1953 case
of Ykalina v. Oricio, which held that a presidential order may either be in a
written memorandum or merely verbal.29 They then argue that the issuance
of Supplemental Notice No. 5, effectively cancelling the Swiss Challenge of
petitioner's duly accepted suo moto proposal, was pursuant to a verbal
presidential order or instruction. And pursuant to the constitutional
provision, the challenge against this presidential directive, so respondent-
movants insist, is within the jurisdiction of Court en banc, not with its
divisions.30
We disagree.
Respondent-movants' interpretation of the antiquated 1953 doctrine
in Ykalina is highly distorted. In the said case, the Court, finding for
respondent Ananias Oricio (Oricio), sustained his appointment in spite of
having been merely verbally made. As held:
While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a Commission,
as a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment that a
commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral
announcement of his determination by the appointing
power.31 (emphasis added, citation omitted)
94

Based on the Court's reasoning, the presidential order that "may either be in
a written memorandum or merely verbal " adverted to in Ykalina should
therefore be understood as limited specifically to those pertaining to
appointments. Current jurisprudence, however, no longer recognizes the
validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires the transmission and
receipt of the necessary appointment papers for their completion.32
To further distinguish Ykalina with the extant case, it was observed in the
former that Oricio's verbal appointment was established in evidence by a
communication duly signed by the then Acting Executive Secretary "by order
of the President."33 Applied in modern day scenarios, the limited application
of the Ykalina doctrine should only govern those that were similarly verbally
given by the president but were, nevertheless, attested to by the Executive
Secretary. This is in hew with Section 27 (10) of Book III, Title III, Chapter
9-B of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),34 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, which empowers the Executive Secretary to
attest executive orders and other presidential issuances "by authority of the
President." These "executive orders and presidential issuances," in turn,
relate to the enumeration under Book III, Title I, Chapter 2 of EO 292.35
Here, it is well to recall that the President did not issue any said executive
order or presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for
the competitive challenge to be cancelled. There was no document offered
that was signed by either the Chief Executive or the Executive Secretary, for
the President, to that effect. The situation, therefore, does not involve a
presidential order or instruction within the contemplation of Sec. 4(2),
Article VIII of the Constitution, and, consequently, does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the glaring differences in context,
the doctrine in Ykalina cannot find application herein, and cannot operate to
divest the Court's division of its jurisdiction over the instant case.
Anent the joint motion for intervention36 filed by the DND and AFP, both
agencies claimed therein that they are the statutory beneficiaries of the
proceeds from the conversion, development, and disposal of the camps
transferred to BCDA, which include the subject property. These expected
proceeds that would redound to their benefit are to be applied in funding the
AFP Modernization Program as per Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,37 as
amended by RA 10349.38 As such, so the applicants claim, they have legal
and financial interests and stakes in the outcome of the subject matter, and
should, therefore, be allowed to intervene.
The argument does not hold merit.
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the
Court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
statute authorizing intervention."39 Under the Rules of Court,40 what qualifies
a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the case - be it
in the subject matter of litigation itself, in the success of the parties, or in
the resultant distribution of property in custodia legis. The Court has further
expounded on this concept of legal interest and set the parameters for
granting intervention as follows:41
xxx As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled
that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is
more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not
be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural,
consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a
legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of
the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding, (emphasis added) ChanRob les Virtualawl i brary
In the case at bar, the DND and AFP moved for intervention on the ground
that they are the beneficiaries of the proceeds from the project to be
undertaken by the BCDA. Obviously, this "right to the proceeds" is far from
actual as it veritably rests on the success of the bidding process, such that
there will be no proceeds that will accrue to their benefit to speak of if the
project does not push through. All the applicants have then, at best, is an
inchoate right to the proceeds of the development of the property in
litigation. Said inchoate right, contradistinguished with vested rights that
have become fixed and established, are still expectant and contingent and,
thus, open to doubt or controversy.42 Consequently, the said right does not
constitute sufficient legal interest that would qualify the DND and AFP, in
this case, to intervene. And in any event, regardless of the presence or
absence of sufficient legal interest, the Comment in Intervention43 filed does
not contain any new issue that has not yet been resolved by the Court in its
Decision and Resolution. Hence, there is no cogent reason to grant the
motion for intervention and to admit DND and AFP's comment.
As a final note, the Rule of Law allows the citizenry to reasonably assume
that future conduct will be in observance of government regulations, and to
conceivably expect that any deviation therefrom will not be
countenanced.44 The Judiciary, therefore, undertakes to strengthen the Rule
of Law by embedding a sense of predictability in the jurisprudence it builds.
To allow the government to trample on the very rules it itself issued and to
renege on its contractual and legal obligations by invoking the all too
familiar mantra of public interest, at any time it pleases, will only result in
uncertainty in the application of laws, a trait inimical to the Rule of Law. The
Court, therefore, steps in to send a strong signal that the government will be
honorable in its dealings and that it can be trusted in the partnerships it
forges with the private sector. In holding respondent-movants accountable
for the representations they made during the long drawn-out negotiation
process and during the times the competitive challenge repeatedly
95
encountered roadblocks in the form of constant delays and postponements,
the Court endeavors to concretize into a norm the government's strict
adherence to its statutory enactments, and its fulfilment in good faith of the
commitments it made and of the covenants it entered into. By granting
SMLI's petition, We ruled that this is the conduct the public should
reasonably expect of the government. This is what strengthening the Rule of
Law exacts.

Nevertheless, We underscore Our finding that "the government is not

without protection for it is not precluded from availing of safeguards
and remedies it is entitled to after soliciting comparative proposals,
as provided under the TOR and the NEDA JV Guidelines".45 Indeed,
there are sufficient safeguards installed in the guidelines to ensure that the
government will not be in the losing end of the agreement; enough, in fact,
to avoid the dreaded "unwarranted, irreparable injury" that it will allegedly
sustain. If only respondent-movants devoted sufficient time in perusing and
reviewing the NEDA JV guidelines, they would have identified the remedies
BCDA, and ultimately the Philippine government, is entitled to that would
have dispelled any apprehension towards conducting the competitive
challenge, and any fear of the government ending up with a low price for the
lot.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Leave to file
Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the Attached Second Motion
for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance
of this Case and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en
banc), filed by the respondent-movants Bases Conversion Development
Authority and Arnel Paciano D. Casanova, is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Likewise, the Motion for Leave to File Comment-in-Intervention and to
Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, jointly filed by the Department of
National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is
hereby DENIED.

No further pleadings, motions, letters, or other communications shall be

entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED. chanrobl

96
G.R. No. 161390 April 16, 2008
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PROVINCE OF CEBU, GOV.
EDUARDO R. GULLAS, THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE
PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, THE PROVINCIAL ENGINEER
PATROCINIO BACAY (sued both in their official and personal
capacities), respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 23,
2003 and its Resolution2 dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
43287. The assailed decision reversed the decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Cebu City in Civil Case R-19022 insofar
as the RTC held the Province of Cebu liable for damages to petitioner
Raul H. Sesbreño. The assailed resolution denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros4 hired the
petitioner to prosecute Civil Cases Nos. R-109335 and R-
11214,6 evidenced by an Agreement,7 the terms of which read as
follows:
AGREEMENT
WE, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreño, thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries,
damages, etc. that we may recover in the mandamus and other
cases that we are filing or have filed against the Province of
Cebu, the Provincial Governor, etc., whether or not the said
cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by final
judgment. We shall take care of all expenses in connection with
the said cases.8
During the pendency of the aforesaid cases or on April 17, 1979,
petitioner registered his charging/retaining lien based on the
Agreement.9
The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First
Instance (now RTC) of Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their
original positions with back salaries, together with all privileges and
salary adjustments or increases.10 Aggrieved, the Commissioner of
Public Highways and the District Engineer filed certiorari cases before
this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal
assistance and represented the camineros.
When respondent Eduardo R. Gullas (Gov. Gullas) assumed the
position of governor of Cebu, he proposed the compromise settlement
of all mandamus cases then pending against the province which
included Civil Cases Nos. R-10933 and R-11214 handled by the
petitioner.
On April 21, 1979, the camineros, represented by the petitioner, and
the province of Cebu, through then Gov. Gullas, forged a Compromise
Agreement,11 with the following terms and conditions:
1. The respondent Province of Cebu represented in this act by
Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, duly authorized by proper resolution
of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, hereby agrees to immediately
appropriate and pay full backwages and salaries as awarded
by the trial court in its decision to all the private respondents-
employees from and after July 1, 1968, the date of their
termination, up to the date of the approval of the herein
Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Supreme Court,
except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement
whose back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the
effective date of their retirement.
xxxx
9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned
represented by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño is subject to said
lawyer’s charging and retaining liens as registered in the trial
court and in the Honorable Court of Appeals.
97
 xxxx
11. That upon request of the employees concerned, most of
whom are in dire actual financial straits, the Province of Cebu
is agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to each
employee payable through their counsel, Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreño, deductible from the total amount that each will
receive from the Province of Cebu, effective upon confirmation
by the Honorable Solicitor General, the Supreme Court and the
Philippine National Bank where the JJ (now infrastructure
funds) are now in deposit under trust.12
Apparently, the camineros waived their right to reinstatement
embodied in the CFI decision and the province agreed that it
immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. This Court
adopted said compromise agreement in our decision13 dated December
18, 1979.14
In view of the finality of the above decision, the camineros, through
their new counsel (who substituted for the petitioner), moved for its
execution. The court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of
execution directing the payment of only 45% of the amount due them
based on the computation of the provincial engineering office as
audited by the authority concerned.15 The court did not release the
remaining 55%, thus holding in abeyance the payment of the lawyer’s
fees pending the determination of the final amount of such
fees.16 However, instead of complying with the court order directing
partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the
full amount of their adjudicated claims.17
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of
Contract) and Attorney’s Fees against the Province of Cebu, the
provincial governor, treasurer, auditor, and engineer in their official and
personal capacities, as well as against his former clients
(the camineros).18
Petitioner anchored his claim on the provision of the Civil Code,
specifically Article 1919 thereof. He alleged that by directly paying
the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced
the camineros to violate their written contract for attorney’s fees.20 He
likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement
approved by the Court by computing the camineros’ money claims
based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate which,
consequently, yielded a lower amount.21 Petitioner went on to say that
although he was not a party to the above contracts, by virtue of the
registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and thus, had
legal standing to institute the case below.22
On August 23, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case against
the camineros after he had entered into an agreement with them and
settled their differences.23 The case, however, proceeded against the
respondents.
On October 18, 1992, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner and against the respondent province of Cebu, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, for all the foregoing, judgment is rendered, ordering
the defendant Province of Cebu to pay the plaintiff the following
sums:
(a) P669,336.51 in actual damages; with interest of 12% per
annum from date of demand until fully paid;
(b) P20,000.00 in moral damages;
(c) P5,000.00 in litigation expenses; and
(d) To pay the costs.24
While maintaining the validity of the compromise agreement, the trial
court found that the petitioner’s money claims should have been
computed based on the national and not the provincial rate of wages
paid the camineros. Accordingly, the court declared that the petitioner
was prejudiced to the extent of the difference between these two rates.
The court further upheld the petitioner’s status as a quasi-party
considering that he had a registered charging lien. However, it did not
give credence to the petitioner’s claim that the respondent public
officials induced the camineros to violate their contract, and thus,
absolved them from liability.
98
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the
complaint.25 The appellate court concluded that petitioner failed to
sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced
the camineros to violate the agreement for attorney’s fees and the
compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to
respondents’ act of directly paying the camineros the amounts due
them.26
Hence, the instant petition. In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION DUE TO LONG
DELAY IN DECIDING CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287.
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE APPEAL IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287 FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND DUE TO THE FATALLY-
DEFECTIVE APPELLANT’S BRIEF.
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION BY DECLARING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT FIX THE
ATTORNEY’S FEES OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS CLEAR THAT WHAT
WAS ADJUDGED WAS THE DECLARATION THAT THERE
WAS BREACH OF THE COMPROMISE CONTRACT AND
DAMAGES ARE TO BE AWARDED THE PETITIONER.
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING RESPONDENTS GULLAS, RESENTES,
SANCHEZ AND BACAY AS PERSONALLY LIABLE AND
THAT THEIR PERSONAL LIABILITY IS SOLIDARY WITH
THAT OF RESPONDENT PROVINCE OF CEBU.
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY TO PETITIONER ACTUAL OR
COMPENSATORY, MORAL, EXEMPLARY, NOMINAL,
TEMPERATE DAMAGES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND
LOSS OF EARNINGS AND INTERESTS.27
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner insists that the CA should have affirmed the trial court’s
decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and should have
denied the appeal because of the formal defects in the appellant’s
brief.28 Petitioner cites the cases of Malacora v. Court of
Appeals29 and Flora v. Pajarillaga30 where this Court held that an
appealed case which had been pending beyond the time fixed by the
Constitution should be "deemed affirmed."
We cannot apply the cited cases to the one at bench because they
were decided on the basis of Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973
Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 11. x x x
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate
appellate courts, when the applicable maximum period shall
have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision
or resolution because the necessary vote cannot be had, the
judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be deemed
affirmed x x x.
That provision is not found in the present Constitution. The court, under
the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated to decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted to it for determination within specified
periods.31 Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is
made within the prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmance of
the appealed decision. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be
faulted in not affirming the RTC’s decision. While we do not tolerate
delay in the disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases
solely because they had been pending in court for a long period,
especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present
case.
Likewise, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the appealed case
be dismissed on account of the formal defects in respondent’s
appellant’s brief filed before the CA. The requirements laid down by the
Rules of Court on the contents of the brief are intended to aid the
appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the
case.32However, despite its deficiencies, respondent’s appellant’s brief
99
is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of
the essential facts and nature of the case, as well as the issues raised
and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.33 Thus, we
sustain the CA’s decision to rule on the merits of the appeal instead of
dismissing it on mere technicality.
Now, on the main issue of whether or not respondents are liable for
damages for breach of contract.
Petitioner clarifies that he instituted the instant case for breach of the
compromise agreement and not for violation of the agreement for
attorney’s fees as mistakenly concluded by the appellate court. He also
cites Calalang v. De Borja34 in support of his right to collect the
amounts due him against the judgment debtor (the
respondents).35Lastly, petitioner argues that the respondent public
officials acted beyond the scope of their authority when they directly
paid the camineros their money claims and failed to withhold the
petitioner’s fees. There is, according to the petitioner, a showing of bad
faith on the part of the province and the public officials concerned.
After a careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we find no compelling
reason to disturb the appellate court’s conclusion. We would like to
stress at this point that the compromise agreement had been validly
entered into by the respondents and the camineros and the same
became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court. Its validity,
therefore, had been laid to rest as early as 1979 when the Court
promulgated its decision in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
Burgos.36 In fact, the judgment had already been fully satisfied by the
respondents. It was precisely this full satisfaction of judgment that gave
rise to the instant controversy, based primarily on the petitioner’s claim
that he was prejudiced because of the following: 1) the wrong
computation in the camineros’ money claims by using the provincial
and not the national wage rate; and 2) the mode of satisfying the
judgment through direct payment which impaired his registered
charging lien.
Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees was evidenced by an agreement
for attorney’s fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the
latter agreed to pay the former "thirty (30%) percent of whatever back
salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and
other cases that they were filing or have filed." Clearly, no fixed amount
was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate
agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use
of the word "whatever" shows that the basis for the computation would
be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros.
Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment
would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the
compromise agreement approved by the court. And since the
compromise agreement had assumed finality, this Court can no longer
delve into its substance, especially at this time when the judgment had
already been fully satisfied. We cannot allow the petitioner to question
anew the compromise agreement on the pretext that he suffered
damage. As long as he was given the agreed percentage of the
amount received by the camineros, then, the agreement is deemed
complied with, and petitioner cannot claim to have suffered damage.
Petitioner likewise claims that he was prejudiced by respondents’ act in
directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, as it rendered
inutile the charging lien duly registered for his protection.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his
lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the
court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the
funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come
into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but also a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services
have been retained by the client.37 Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the
same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
100
 delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to
the lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or
recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the
plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in
his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in
obtaining such judgment.38
In this case, the existence of petitioner’s charging lien is undisputed
since it was properly registered in the records. The parties even
acknowledged its existence in their compromise agreement. However,
a problem arose when the respondents directly paid in full
the camineros’ money claims and did not withhold that portion which
corresponds to petitioner’s fees.
When the judgment debt was fully satisfied, petitioner could have
enforced his lien either against his clients (the camineros herein) or
against the judgment debtor (the respondents herein). The clients,
upon receiving satisfaction of their claims without paying their lawyer,
should have held the proceeds in trust for him to the extent of the
amount of his recorded lien, because after the charging lien had
attached, the attorney is, to the extent of said lien, regarded as an
equitable assignee of the judgment or funds produced by his
efforts.39 The judgment debtors may likewise be held responsible for
their failure to withhold from the camineros the amount of attorney’s
fees due the petitioner.
In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against
both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of
the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn
on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He
maintained the case against respondents because, according to him,
the computation of the camineros’ money claims should have been
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner
insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference.
While the respondents may have impaired the petitioner’s charging lien
by satisfying the judgment without regard for the lawyer’s right to
attorney’s fees, we cannot apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v.
Judge de Borja,40because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the judgment debtor
may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of
attorney’s fees in accordance with the duly registered charging
lien.41 However, there is a disparity between the two cases, because, in
this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against
the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal services. The
withdrawal was premised on a settlement, which indicates that his
former clients already paid their obligations. This is bolstered by the
certification of the clerk of court that his former clients had deposited
their passbooks to ensure payment of the agreed fees. Having been
paid by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim against
the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on.
Neither can the petitioner rely on Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v.
Henares, etc.42 where this court declared that satisfaction of the
judgment, in general, does not by itself bar or extinguish the attorney’s
liens, as the court may even vacate such satisfaction and enforce
judgment for the amount of the lien.43 However, the satisfaction of the
judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown
either by the attorney’s conduct or by his passive omission.44 In the
instant case, petitioner’s act in withdrawing the case against
the camineros and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a
waiver of his right to the lien. No rule will allow a lawyer to collect from
his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor except,
perhaps, on a claim for a bigger amount which, as earlier discussed, is
baseless.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns
it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a
calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of
freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public
interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.45
Considering that petitioner’s claim of higher attorney’s fees is baseless
and considering further that he had settled his case as against his
former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of
101
contract against the respondents, even on the basis of Articles
119146 or 1311.47 Although we sustain his status to institute the instant
case, we cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no
breach of contract. Even if there was such a breach, he had waived his
right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or
absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him. Thus, no
liability can be imputed to the province of Cebu or to the respondent
public officials, either in their personal or official capacities.

Lastly, we cannot ascribe bad faith to the respondents who directly

paid the camineros the amounts due them. The records do not show
that when they did so, they induced the camineros to violate their
contract with the petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their
obligation in order to cause prejudice to the petitioner. The attendant
circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their
liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It
would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to have acceded
to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the
agreed attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 23, 2003 and its
Resolution dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

102
A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC November 28, 2001
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter, the IBP)
recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the resolution of
incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Antecedents
On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D.
Lim, transmitted to the Court a Resolution1addressing the problem of
delays in cases pending before the Sandiganbayan (hereafter, the
Resolution).2 We quote the Resolution in full:3
"WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution
guarantees that, "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies,"
"WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers mandates that "[a] lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice;"
"WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to undertake measures to assist in the speedy
disposition of cases pending before the various courts and
tribunals;
"WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has received
numerous complaints from its members about serious delays in
the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions and other
pending incidents before the different divisions of the
Sandiganbayan;
"WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94
requires all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to
submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual report indicating the
title of the case, its date of filing, the date of pre-trial in civil
cases and arraignment in criminal cases, the date of initial trial,
the date of last hearing and the date that the case is submitted
for decision, and to post, in a conspicuous place within its
premises, a monthly list of cases submitted for decision;
"WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94
has not been made applicable to the Sandiganbayan;
"WHEREAS, considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial
court, the requirements imposed upon trial courts by Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 should also be
imposed upon the Sandiganbayan;
"NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines hereby
resolves as follows:
"1. To recommend to the Supreme Court that Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-94 be made applicable to the
Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the Sandiganbayan
has original jurisdiction; and
"2. To recommend to the Supreme Court an inquiry into the
causes of delay in the resolution of incidents and motions and
in the decision of cases before the Sandiganbayan for the
purpose of enacting measures intended at avoiding such
delays.
"Done in Los Baños, Laguna, this 29th day of July, 2000."
103
On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena to comment on the letter of the IBP
and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases pending decision, or
with motion for reconsideration pending resolution, indicating the dates
they were deemed submitted for decision or resolution.4
On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a report5(hereafter, the compliance)
admitting a number of cases submitted for decision and motion for
reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. We quote:
"Cases Submitted W/ Motions For
"For Decision Reconsideration
"1st Division 341 None
"2nd Division 5 None
"3rd Division 12 None
"4th Division 5 None
"5th Division 52 1 case14 alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, involving
"Total 415"6
Thus, the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415)
cases for decision remaining undecided long beyond the reglementary
period to decide, with one case submitted as early as May 24,
1990,7 and motion for reconsideration which has remained unresolved
over thirty days from submission.8
On October 20, 2000, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena submitted a "schedule of cases submitted for decision,
the schedule indicating the number of detained prisoners, of which
there are (were) none."9
On October 26, 2000, the IBP submitted its reply to the compliance
stating: First, that it was not in a position to comment on the accuracy
of the compliance; nonetheless, it showed that there was much to be
desired with regard to the expeditious disposition of cases, particularly
in the Sandiganbayan's First Division, where cases submitted for
decision since 1990 remained unresolved. Second, the compliance did
not include pending motions, and it is a fact that motions not resolved
over a long period of time would suspend and delay the disposition of a
case. Third, since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is required to
submit the same reports required of Regional Trial Courts. Fourth, the
Constitution10states that, "all lower collegiate courts" must decide or
resolve cases or matters before it within twelve (12) months "from date
of submission"; however, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is
required to resolve and decide cases within a reduced period of three
(3) months like regional trial courts, or at the most, six (6) months from
date of submission.11
On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) "to conduct a
judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the cases subject of
this administrative matter, and to submit a report thereon not later than
31 December 2000."12
On December 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan13 has a backlog of cases; that one
156 cases but the same has been set for promulgation of decision on
December 8, 2000, which would reduce the backlog by at least fifty
percent (50%).15
On January 26, 2001, the Court Administrator submitted a
memorandum to the Court16 stating that the causes of delay in the
disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:17
(1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of several years;
(2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss,
Motion to Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc. that remain
unresolved for years;
(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court;
(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings
despite the lapse of considerable length of time; and
104
 (5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if
the ponente is still in service.
We consider ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) as an administrative complaint against Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for "serious delays in the decision of
cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents
before the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan," amounting to
incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in
office.
We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in
view of the admission of Justice Francis E. Garchitorena in his
compliance of October 20, 2000, that there are indeed hundreds of
cases pending decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90)
days from their submission. In one case, he not only admitted the delay
in deciding the case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for
more than ten (10) years that constrained this Court to grant
mandamus to dismiss the case against an accused to give substance
and meaning to his constitutional right to speedy trial.18
The Issues
The issues presented are the following: (1) What is the reglementary
period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases
falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are there cases submitted for decision
remaining undecided by the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions
beyond the afore-stated reglementary period? (3) Is Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the Sandiganbayan?19
The Court's Ruling
We resolve the issues presented in seriatim.
1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views. The first
view is that from the time a case is submitted for decision or resolution,
the Sandiganbayan has twelve (12) months to decide or resolve
it.20 The second view is that as a court with trial function, the
Sandiganbayan has three (3) months to decide the case from the date
of submission for decision.21
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
"(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself."22
The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The
provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the
present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.23
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of
Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice,24 with functions of a trial court.25
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one.26 The
Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules
of procedure.27 However, on March 30, 1995, Congress repealed the
Sandiganbayan's power to promulgate its own rules of procedure28 and
instead prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan.29
"Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over
particular or specialized categories of actions. They are the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Shari'a Courts."30
Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution "Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court."
In his report, the Court Administrator would distinguish between cases
which the Sandiganbayan has cognizance of in its original
105
jurisdiction,31 and cases which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.32 The Court Administrator posits that since in the first
class of cases, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then for
that classification of cases, the three (3) month reglementary period
applies. For the second class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the
twelve-month reglementary period for collegiate courts.33 We do not
agree.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 160634 is clear on this
issue.35 It provides:
"Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases – As far as
practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once
commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the
judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the
date the case was submitted for decision."
On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own
rules,36 thus:37
"Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases – The judgment or
final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be
rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was
submitted for decision (italics ours)."
Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that the
three (3) month period, not the twelve (12) month period, to decide
cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan
presently sitting in five (5) divisions,38 functions as a trial court. The
term "trial" is used in its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of
evidence by the parties in the cases before it.39 The Sandiganbayan, in
original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the discretion
to weigh the evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as
credible and reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated.40
Compliance with its Own Rules
In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) v.
Court of Appeals,41 the Court faulted the DARAB for violating its own
rules of procedure. We reasoned that the DARAB does not have
unfettered discretion to suspend its own rules. We stated that the
DARAB "should have set the example of observance of orderly
procedure." Otherwise, it would render its own Revised Rules of
Procedure uncertain and whose permanence would be dependent
upon the instability of its own whims and caprices.
Similarly, in Cabagnot v. Comelec,42 this Court held that the
Commission on Elections ought to be the first one to observe its own
Rules. Its departure from its own rules constitutes "arrogance of power"
tantamount to abuse. Such inconsistency denigrates public trust in its
objectivity and dependability. The Court reminded the Comelec to be
more judicious in its actions and decisions and avoid imprudent volte-
face moves that undermine the public's faith and confidence in it.
The ratio decidendi in the afore-cited cases applies mutatis mutandis to
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ought to be the first to
observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, or except a case
from its operation.
2. Undecided Cases Beyond the Reglementary Period.-- We find that
the Sandiganbayan has several cases undecided beyond the
reglementary period set by the statutes and its own rules, some as
long as more than ten (10) years ago.
According to the compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan, three
hundred and forty one (341) cases were submitted for decision but
were undecided as of September 15, 2000. A number of the cases
were submitted for decision as far back as more than ten (10) years
ago. As of September 15, 2000, the following cases43 had not been
decided:44
First Division
Date Submitted
Case Title Case No.
for Decision
(1) People v. Pañares 12127 May 24, 1990
(2) People v. Gabriel Duero 11999 December 11,
1990
(3) People v. Rhiza 133533 December 14,
Monterozo 1990
106
(4) People v. Zenon R. 13353 January 7, 1991 Parale, et al.
Perez
(22) People v. Robert P. 14375 June 21, 1993
(5) People v. Bernardo B. 12305- February 7, 1991 Wa-acon
Dayao, Jr. 12306
(23) People v. Linda J. 13668 July 13, 1993
(6) People v. Melquiades 13521 May 7, 1991 Necessito
Ribo
(24) People v. Simon Flores 16946 August 4, 1993
(7) People v. Carlos Benitez 12102 June 19, 1991
(25) People v. Alejandro F. 14986 August 31, 1993
(8) People v. Salvador P. 11156- August 9, 1991 Buccat
Nopre, et. al. 11160
(26) People v. Irma Collera 15301 March 9, 1994
(9) People v. Delfina A. 12289 August 28, 1991 Monge
Letegio
(27) People v. Melencio F. 9977 May 10, 1994
(10) People v. Rodolfo A. 13618 August 28, 1991 Ilajas
Lasquite
(28) People v. 13747- August 19, 1994
(11) People v. Potenciana 13679- September 3, Buenaventura Q. Sindac, et 13748
Evangelista 13680 1991 al.
(12) People v. Ramon N. 16516 December 2, (29) People v. Jesus A. 17514 August 24, 1994
Guico, Jr. et. al 1991 Bravo
(13) People v. Ruperto N. 16239 January 10, 1992 (30) People v. Raul S. Tello 15006 November 15,
Solares 1994
(14) People v. Socorro Alto 13708 March 9, 1992 (31) People v. Celso N. 14975 January 10, 1995
Jacinto
(15) People v. Tomas 130151 March 11, 1992
Baguio (32) People v. Mayor 17670 January 24, 1995
Antonio Abad Santos, et al.
(16) People v. Felipa D. de 13672 April 13, 1992
Veyra (33) People v. Lamberto R. 20588 February 14,
Te 1995
(17) People v. Felicidad 12139 July 23, 1992
Tabang (34) People v. Ale 21020 July 18, 1995
Francisco
(18) People v. Jose S. 14227 September 9,
Buguiña 1992 (35) People v. Dir. Felix R. 13563 July 25, 1995
Gonzales, et al.
(19) People v. Eleno T. 13689- January 6, 1993
Regidor, et al. 13695 (36) People v. Mayor 14324 January 3, 1996
Adelina Gabatan, et al.
(20) People v. Serafin 14411 February 2, 1993
Unilongo (37) People v. Victoria 17202 January 4, 1996
Posadas-Adona
(21) People v. Manuel 15168 June 21, 1993
107
(38) People v. Roberto 16854 January 22, 1996 Miguel, et al.
Estanislao Chang, et al.
(55) People v. Rogelio A. 17601 April 7, 1998
(39) People v. Godofredo 16927- March 13, 1996 Aniversario
Yambao, et al. 16928
(56) People v. Corazon 9812-9967 May 8, 1998
(40) People v. Honesto G. 13171 April 26, 1996 Gammad Leaño
Encina
(57) People v. Teresita S. 17901 June 8, 1998
(41) People v. Pablito 13971 May 10, 1996 Lazaro
Rodriguez
(58) People v. Brig. Gen. 20688 October 19, 1998
(42) People v. Leandro A. 17759 June 28, 1996 Raymundo Jarque, et al.
Suller
(59) People v. Pros. Filotea 23509 October 19, 1998
(43) People v. Trinidad M. 16695 August 26, 1996 Estorninos
Valdez
(60) People v. Orlando 19534- October 20, 1998
(44) People v. Vivencio B. 19651 January 27, 1997 Mina 19545
Patagoc
(61) People v. Vice Gov. 23042 October 20, 1998
(45) People v. Engr. 14195 March 31, 1997 Milagros A. Balgos
Antonio B. Laguador
(62) People v. Ceferino 18857 November 17,
(46) People v. Paterno C. 16583- March 31, 1997 Paredes, Jr., et al. 1998
Belciña, Jr. 16585
(63) People v. Brig. Gen. 18696 January 15, 1999
(47) People v. SPO3 21608 March 31, 1997 Rayundo Jarque, et al.
Serafin V. Reyes
(64) People v. Mayor 23336 January 15, 1999
(48) People v. Mayor 22195- March 31, 1997 Agustin R. Escaño, Jr.
Samuel F. Bueser, et al. 22196
(65) People v. Mayor Edgar 23374 January 15, 1999
(49) People v. Romeo C. 14223 May 6, 1997 V. Teves, et al.
Monteclaro
(66) People v. C/Supt. 22832 January 29, 1999
(50) People v. Rodolfo E. 20948- October 17, 1997 Alfonso T. Clemente, et al.
Aguinaldo 20949
(67) People v. Dominica 19059- February 18,
(51) People v. Aniceto M. 23324 October 27, 1997 Santos 19063 1999
Sobrepeña
(68) People v. Edith G. Tico 23273 April 20, 1999
(52) People v. Marietta T. 17001 November 26,
(69) People v. Sec. Hilarion 23511 August 6, 1999
Caugma, et al. 1997
J. Ramiro, et al.
(53) People v. Mayor 19708 February 23,
(70) People v. Timoteo A. 24042- August 6, 1999
Meliton Geronimo, et al. 1998
Garcia, et al. 24098
(54) People v. Fernando 17600 April 7, 1998
(71) People v. Mayor Jeceju 24402 August 6, 1999
108
L. Manaay (2) People v. Benjamin 22858 August 11, 2000
T. Damian
(72) People v. Dir. 24355 August 18, 1999
Rosalinda Majarais, et al. (3)People v. Lino L. 22398 July 18, 2000
Labis, et al.
(73) People v. Victor S. 24281 August 13, 1999
Limlingan (4)People v. Alfredo 24407- August 11, 2000
Sarmiento, et al. 24408
(74) People v. Nestor S. 24631 August 31, 1999
Castillo, et al. Third Division**
(75) People v. Apolinar 22145 September 6, Case Date Submitted for
Case Title
Candelaria 1999 No. Decision
(76) People v. Bernardo 19773- October 11, 1999 (1) People v. Sergia A/R # November 16, 1999
Billote Resoso 19779 Zoleta 016
(77) People v. Atty. Alfredo 24433- October 11, 1999 (2) People v. Manuel A/R # December 9, 1999
Fordan Rellora, et al. 24434 Solon Y Tenchaves 029
(78) People v. Faustino 98 December 22, (3) People v. Eliseo L. 13861- April 6, 2000
Balacuit 1999 Ruiz 13863
(79) People v. Mayor 23418- January 6, 2000 (4) People v. Manuel 13889 September 30, 1999
Bernardino Alcaria, Jr., et 23423 R. Galvez, et al.
al.
(5) People v. Tolentino 16756 August 28, 1999
(80) People v. Joel R. 24319- January 6, 2000 Mendoza, et al.
Lachica, et al. 24329
(6) People v. Rodrigo 19563 April 6, 2000
(81) People v. Jose 24531- April 27, 2000 Villas
Micabalo, et al. 24534
(7) People v. Ernesto 19574 April 6, 2000
(82) People v. Mayor 23069 May 29, 2000 Vargas
Eduardo Alarilla
(8) People v. Ernesto, 20053 April 6, 2000
(83) People v. Pros. Nilo M. 23323 May 29, 2000 Vargas, et al.
Sarsaba, et al.
(9) People v. Marcelo 23522 July 6, 2000
(84) People v. Philip G. 24150 May 29, 2000 T. Abrenica, et al.
Zamora
(10) People v. 25657 May 5, 2000
Second Division* Florencio Garay, et al.
Case Date Submitted for Fourth Division***
Case Title
No. Decision
Case Date Submitted for
Case Title
(1) People v. Marcelino 18435 August 11, 2000 No. Decision
Cordova, et al.
(1) People v. Jaime 17664 August 31, 1999
109
Alos, et al. et al.
(2) People v. Antonio 23366 November 26, 1999 (12) People v. Ma. 18036 January 18, 1995
R. De Vera Lourdes L. Falcon
(3) People v. Aurora 24841- May 9, 2000 (13) People v. Luis D. 18684 July 24, 1998
Mantele 42 Montero, et al.
(4) People v. Olegario 25198 July 12, 2000 (14) People v. Roel 18699 December 22, 1995
Clarin, Jr., et al. D. Morales
Fifth Division**** (15) People v. 18759 October 18, 1995
Diosdado T. Gulle
Case Date Submitted for
Case Title
No. Decision (16) People v. 18785 August 31, 1995
Benjamin Sapitula, et
(1) People v. Nestor 13344 January 16, 1998
al.
A. Pablo
(17) People v. Danilo 18932 November 4, 1997
(2) People v. Hernand 14397 January 13, 1999
R. Santos, et al.
D. Dabalus, et al.
(18) People v. Pat. 19039 May 24, 1995
(3) People v. Eduardo 16672 March 23, 2000
Danilo Marañon
Pilapil
(19) People v. Romeo 19378- May 27, 1996
(4) People v. P/Sgt. 17030 April 16, 1998
Cabando, et al. 19379
Nazario Marifosque
(20) People v. SPO2 19593 July 6, 1998
(5) People v. Ignacio 17055 September 12, 1995
Rodolfo Burbos
B. Bueno
(21) People v. 19614 August 31, 1998
(6) People v. Corazon 17072 March 31, 1997
Guillermo M. Viray, et
G. Garlit
al.
(7) People v. Mayor 17538 November 14, 1995
(22) People v. Mayor 20427 November 5, 1999
Rufo Pabelonia, et al.
Bonifacio Balahay
(8) People v. Enrique 17617 March 13, 1996
(23) People v. 20487 December 17, 1998
B. Lenon, et al.
Enrique Sy, et al.
(9) People v. 17618- May 1, 1995
(24) People v. PO2 20648- March 31, 1998
Constancio Bonite, et 17619
Manuel L. Bien 20649
al.
(25) People v. Felipe 23066 September 28, 1999
(10) People v. Jesus 17884 January 9, 1996
L. Laodenio
Villanueva
(26) People v. Mayor 23427 January 16, 1998
(11) People v. 18008 March 9, 1998
Walfrido A. Siasico
Ricardo T. Liwanag,

110
The Sandiganbayan is a special court created "in an effort to maintain 5. 11160 8/9/91 103. 23420 10/15/99
honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy, weed out misfits and
undesirables in the government and eventually stamp out graft and 6. 11999 12/10/90 104. 23421 10/15/99
corruption."45 We have held consistently that a delay of three (3) years 7. 12102 7/1/91 105. 23422 10/15/99
in deciding a single case is inexcusably long.46 We can not accept the
excuses of Presiding Justice Sandiganbayan Francis E. Garchitorena 8. 12127 2/12/90 106. 23423 10/15/99
that the court was reorganized in 1997; that the new justices had to 9. 12139 6/10/92 107. 23509 9/5/98
undergo an orientation and that the Sandiganbayan relocated to its
present premises which required the packing and crating of records; 10. 12289 8/28/91 108. 23511 4/23/99
and that some boxes were still unopened.47 11. 12305 2/7/91 109. 23540 10/15/99

We likewise find unacceptable Presiding Justice Garchitorena's excuse 12. 12306 2/7/91 110. 24042 4/28/99
that one case alone48 comprises more that fifty percent (50%) of the 13. 13015 3/2/92 111. 24043 4/28/99
First Division's backlog and that the same has been set for
promulgation on December 8, 2000.49 As we said, a delay in a single 14. 13171 11/16/95 112. 24044 4/28/99
case cannot be tolerated, "para muestra, basta un boton." (for an 15. 13353 10/6/90 113. 24045 4/28/99
example, one button suffices). It is admitted that there are several
16. 13521 12/12/99 114. 24046 4/28/99
other cases submitted for decision as far back as ten (10) years ago
that have remained undecided by the First Division, of which Justice 17. 13563 7/4/95 115. 24047 4/28/99
Garchitorena is presiding justice and chairman. Indeed, there is even
18. 13618 7/14/91 116. 24048 4/28/99
one case, which is a simple motion to withdraw the information filed by
the prosecutor. This has remained unresolved for more than seven (7) 19. 13668 6/13/93 117. 24049 4/28/99
years (since 1994).50 The compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan
20. 13672 3/5/92 118. 24050 4/28/99
presiding justice incriminates him. The memorandum submitted by the
Court Administrator likewise testifies to the unacceptable situation in 21. 13679 8/6/91 119. 24051 4/28/99
the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, there is a disparity in the reports
22. 13680 8/6/91 120. 24052 4/28/99
submitted by the Sandiganbayan presiding justice and the OCA.
According to the Court Administrator, the cases submitted for decision 23. 13689 11/14/92 121. 24053 4/28/99
that were still pending promulgation51 before the five divisions of the
24. 13690 11/14/92 122. 24054 4/28/99
Sandiganbayan are:52
25. 13691 11/14/92 123. 24055 4/28/99
First Division 26. 13692 11/14/92 124. 24056 4/28/99
Case Date Case Date 27. 13693 11/14/92 125. 24057 4/28/99
Number Submitted Number Submitted
28. 13694 11/14/92 126. 24058 4/28/99
1. 11156 8/9/91 99. 23336 9/4/97
29. 13695 11/14/92 127. 24059 4/28/99
2. 11157 8/9/91 100. 23374 12/17/98
30. 13708 3/9/92 128. 24060 4/28/99
3. 11158 8/9/91 101. 23418 10/15/99
31. 13747 8/19/94 129. 24061 4/28/99
4. 11159 8/9/91 102. 23419 10/15/99
32. 13748 8/19/94 130. 24062 4/28/99

111
33. 13971 3/12/95 131. 24063 4/28/99 61. 17600 8/30/97 159. 24091 4/28/99
34. 14223 3/7/97 132. 24064 4/28/99 62. 17601 8/30/97 160. 24092 4/28/99
35. 14227 9/5/92 133. 24065 4/28/99 63. 17670 11/25/94 161. 24093 4/28/99
36. 14230 11/30/90 134. 24066 4/28/99 64. 17759 6/25/96 162. 24094 4/28/99
37. 14287 7/3/94 135. 24067 4/28/99 65. 17901 5/28/98 163. 24095 4/28/99
38. 14324 11/5/95 136. 24068 4/28/99 66. 18283 2/21/95 164. 24096 4/28/99
39. 14375 5/22/95 137. 24069 4/28/99 67. 18696 8/9/98 165. 24097 4/28/99
40. 14411 1/24/93 138. 24070 4/28/99 68. 18857 10/21/98 166. 24098 4/28/99
41. 14975 9/29/94 139. 24071 4/28/99 69. 19059 2/11/99 167. 24150 1/31/00
42. 14986 12/11/92 140. 24072 4/28/99 70. 19060 2/11/99 168. 24236 2/14/00
43. 15006 11/19/94 141. 24073 4/28/99 71. 19061 2/11/99 169. 24237 2/14/00
44. 15168 3/25/93 142. 24074 4/28/99 72. 19062 2/11/99 170. 24281 5/9/99
45. 15301 3/16/94 143. 24075 4/28/99 73. 19063 2/11/99 171. 24319 11/4/99
46. 16239 12/26/91 144. 24076 4/28/99 74. 19534 9/2/98 172. 24320 11/4/99
47. 16516 11/19/91 145. 24077 4/28/99 75. 19535 9/2/98 173. 24321 11/4/99
48. 16583 8/13/96 146. 24078 4/28/99 76. 19651 11/15/96 174. 24322 11/4/99
49. 16584 8/13/96 147. 24079 4/28/99 77. 19708 8/25/98 175. 24323 11/4/99
50. 16585 8/13/96 148. 24080 4/28/99 78. 19773 5/21/99 176. 24324 11/4/99
51. 16695 8/15/96 149. 24081 4/28/99 79. 19774 5/21/99 177. 24325 11/4/99
52. 16854 1/15/96 150. 24082 4/28/99 80. 19775 5/21/99 178. 24326 11/4/99
53. 16927 12/17/95 151. 24083 4/28/99 81. 19976 5/21/99 179. 24327 11/4/99
54. 16928 12/17/95 152. 24084 4/28/99 82. 19977 5/21/99 180. 24328 11/4/99
55. 16946 8/4/93 153. 24085 4/28/99 83. 19978 5/21/99 181. 24329 11/4/99
56. 17001 9/4/97 154. 24086 4/28/99 84. 19979 5/21/99 182. 24339 10/20/00
57. 17278 5/2/94 155. 24087 4/28/99 85. 20588 2/14/95 183. 24355 2/18/99
58. 17447 9/6/94 156. 24088 4/28/99 86. 20688 7/9/98 184. 24395 7/13/99
59. 17448 9/6/94 157. 24089 4/28/99 87. 20948 10/9/97 185. 24402 6/17/99
60. 17514 8/19/94 158. 24090 4/28/99 88. 20949 10/9/97 186. 24433 9/6/99

112
89. 21020 7/4/95 187. 24434 9/6/99 12. 184404 12/4/98
90. 22145 7/7/99 188. 24531 12/16/99 13. 184405 12/4/98
91. 22195 6/14/96 189. 24532 12/16/99 14. 184406 12/4/98
92. 22196 6/14/96 190. 24533 12/16/99 15. 184407 12/4/98
93. 22832 10/21/98 191. 24534 12/16/99 16. 184408 12/4/98
94. 23042 8/27/98 192. 24631 8/9/99 17. 184409 12/4/98
95. 23146 11/13/00 193. 24768 7/8/00 18. 184410 12/4/98
96. 23273 4/19/99 194. 6672 7/11/90 19. 184411 12/4/98
97. 23323 3/23/00 195. 9977 5/10/94 20. 184412 12/4/98
98. 23324 8/3/97 21. 184413 12/4/98
Civil Case 22. 184414 12/4/98
1. 0112 1/11/92 23. 184415 12/4/98
2. 0116 10/16/91 24. 184416 12/4/98
3. 0156 3/14/97 25. 184417 12/4/98
Second Division 26. 13827 8/30/00
Case No. Date Submitted 27. 13828 8/30/00
Criminal Case 28. 13829 8/30/00
1. 19542 4/16/99 29. 13830 8/30/00
2. 19004 9/10/96 30. 13831 8/30/00
3. 22934 10/14/00 31. 13832 8/30/00
4. 20483 8/28/96 32. 18965 11/30/00
5. 20484 8/28/96 33. 19848 3/28/96
6. 23529 10/23/00 34. 20765 8/30/96
7. 23530 10/23/00 35. 20816 3/11/98
8. 23338 12/2/99 36. 19692 8/27/00
9. 18786 11/28/00 37. 19693 8/27/00
10. 19686 07/2/97 38. 19694 8/27/00
11. 184403 12/4/98 39. 19695 8/27/00

113
40. 19696 8/27/00 1. SCA/005 12/18/00
41. 19697 8/27/00 2. A/R 016 8/5/99
42. 19698 8/27/00 3. A/R 029 10/2/00
43. 19699 8/27/00 4. 487 4/8/98
44. 19700 8/27/00 5. 488 4/8/98
45. 19701 8/27/00 6.489 4/8/98
46. 19702 8/27/00 7.490 4/8/98
47. 19703 8/27/00 8.491 4/8/98
48. 19704 8/27/00 9.11794 6/10/00
49. 19705 8/27/00 10.13861 4/6/00
50. 19706 8/27/00 11. 13862 4/6/00
51. 19707 8/27/00 12. 13863 4/6/00
52. 23262 10/11/00 13. 13889 3/25/99
53. AR#035 12/9/00 14. 16756 8/25/99
54. 24994 8/17/00 15. 17532 12/11/00
55. 21097 12/13/00 16. 18867 10/5/00
56. 20660 12/20/00 17. 18868 10/5/00
57. 23111 11/27/00 18. 18869 10/5/00
58. 24407 7/27/00 19. 18870 10/5/00
59. 24408 7/27/00 20. 18871 10/5/00
60. 18435 3/21/00 21. 18872 10/5/00
61. 22858 8/4/00 22. 19182 4/6/00
62. 22976 5/4/99 23. 19563 4/6/00
24. 19574 4/6/00
Civil Case
25. 19622 4/6/00
1. 0171 7/10/00
26. 19623 4/6/00
Third Division
27. 19624 4/6/00
Case Number Date Submitted
28. 20053 4/6/00

114
29. 20054 4/6/00 9. 16809 03/26/00
30. 20271 12/18/00 10. 17015 06/06/94
31. 22143 12/18/00 11. 17016 06/06/94
32. 23014 9/23/00 12. 17140 06/13/96
33. 23522 7/6/00 13. 17141 06/13/96
34. 23699 3/22/00 14. 17209 12/27/96
35. 23700 3/22/00 15. 17805 02/15/00
36. 23701 3/22/00 16. 17806 02/15/00
37. 23802 9/10/00 17. 17809 02/15/00
38. 23803 9/10/00 18. 17856 04/02/00
39. 24153 12/18/00 19. 18005 05/07/96
40. 24697 9/10/00 20. 18006 05/07/96
41. 24698 9/10/00 21. 18257 09/22/97
42. 24741 12/7/00 22. 18894 11/17/00
43. 24779 10/28/00 23. 18895 11/17/00
44. 24780 10/28/00 24. 18896 11/17/00
45. 24781 10/28/00 25. 18900 10/28/00
46. 25657 5/5/00 26. 18935 06/16/00
Fourth Division 27. 18936 06/16/00
Case No. Date Submitted 28. 18937 06/16/00
1. 11960 09/21/98 29. 19567 05/21/96
2. 17664 01/29/98 30. 20338 05/19/97
3. 13036 02/22/99 31. 20469 07/07/00
4. 13037 02/22/99 32. 20470 07/07/00
5. 13593 05/21/96 33. 20471 07/07/00
6. 13594 05/21/96 34. 20472 07/07/00
7. 13757 03/21/97 35. 20473 07/07/00
8. 14380 02/14/95 36. 20474 07/07/00

115
37. 20475 07/07/00 65. 24842 03/22/00
38. 20476 07/07/00 66. 24851 10/29/00
39. 20664 06/29/96 67. 25198 05/31/00
40. 20685 02/18/00 68. 25389 09/26/00
41. 20828 09/13/00 69. 25543 12/27/00
42. 21093 08/07/99 70. 25658 07/28/00
43. 21131 08/04/96 Fifth Division
44. 21778 09/29/97 Case Number Date Submitted
45. 21779 09/29/97 Criminal Cases
46. 21780 09/29/97 1. 14397 1/4/99
47. 22891 03/02/00 2. 16672 2/13/00
48. 22892 03/02/00 3. 17030 2/19/98
49. 23007 05/24/99 4. 17826 12/9/00
50. 23058 04/27/00 5. 17827 12/9/00
51. 23059 04/27/00 6. 18478 8/21/00
52. 23060 04/27/00 7. 18684 5/29/98
53. 23061 04/27/00 8. 18880 12/6/00
54. 23062 04/27/00 9. 19510 12/4/00
55. 23366 03/28/99 10. 19511 12/4/00
56. 23415 05/25/00 11. 19512 12/4/00
57. 23534 12/15/00 12. 19593 6/5/98
58. 23708 09/27/00 13. 19614 7/31/98
59. 24447 09/18/00 14. 19668 7/26/98
60. 24448 09/18/00 15. 20194 1/8/01
61. 24464 07/26/00 16. 20427 11/3/99
62. 24465 07/26/00 17. 20648 1/4/98
63. 24742 10/10/00 18. 20649 1/4/98
64. 24841 03/22/00 19. 20694 3/11/98
116
 20. 21882 8/12/00 194. 11999 12/10/90 Garchitorena Under study,
submitted
21. 22184 12/16/00
before the
22. 22873 12/4/99 reorganization
23. 22926 11/13/00 195. 12102 7/1/91 Garchitorena Under study,
submitted
24. 23066 8/16/99
before the
25. 23319 9/30/00 reorganization
26. 23450 9/16/00 196. 12127 2/12/90 Not reported; unaccounted for
by Sandiganbayan report
27. 23515 1/29/00
197. 12139 6/10/92 Castaneda* Under study
28. 24155 11/30/00
submitted
29. 24379 8/27/00 before the
reorganization
30. 24759 5/5/00
198. 12289 8/28/91 Castaneda Under study
31. 24858 12/28/00
submitted
before the
We find that Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena failed to devise reorganization
an efficient recording and filing system to enable him to monitor the
flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition. This 199. 12305- 2/7/91 Castaneda Under study
is his duty on which he failed.53 06 submitted
before the
reorganization
Memorandum of the Court Administrator
200. 13015 3/2/92 Garchitorena Under study
On November 14, 2001, the Court required the Office of the Court submitted
Administrator54 to update its report.55 before the
reorganization
On November 16, 2001, OCA Consultant Pedro A. Ramirez (Justice, 201. 13171 11/16/95 Castaneda Under study
Court of Appeals, Retired) submitted a "compliance report" with the submitted
Court's order. The compliance report shows that to this day, several before the
cases that were reported pending by the Sandiganbayan on reorganization
September 26, 2000, and likewise reported undecided by the OCA on
January 26, 2001, have not been decided/resolved. We quote the 202. 13353 10/6/90 Garchitorena Under study
compliance report:56 submitted
before the
reorganization
First Division
203. 13521 12/12/99 Garchitorena Under study
Case Date Ponente Reason for Not submitted
Number Submitted Assigned Deciding Case before the
117
 reorganization 213. 14223 3/7/97 Death of accused is
unconfirmed and dismissal of
204. 13563 7/4/95 Garchitorena Under study
the case was held in
submitted
abeyance. (Ong, J.)*
before the
reorganization 214. 14227 9/5/92 Castaneda Under study
submitted
205. 13618 7/14/91 Castaneda Under study
before the
submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 215. 14230 11/30/90 Castaneda Under study
submitted
206. 13668 6/13/93 Castaneda Under study
before the
submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 216. 14287 7/3/94 Castaneda Under study
submitted
207. 13672 3/5/92 Castaneda Under study
before the
submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 217. 14324 11/5/95 Castaneda Under study
submitted
208. 13679- 8/6/91 Castaneda Under study
before the
80 submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 218. 14375 5/22/95 Castaneda Under study
submitted
209. 13689- 11/14/92 Castaneda Under study
before the
95 submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 219. 14411 1/24/93 Castaneda Under study
submitted
210. 13708 3/9/92 Castaneda Under study
before the
submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 220. 14975 9/29/94 Castaneda Under study
submitted
211. 13747- 8/19/94 Castaneda Under study
before the
48 submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 221. 14986 12/11/92 Castaneda Under study
submitted
212. 13971 3/12/95 Castaneda Under study
before the
submitted
reorganization
before the
reorganization 222. 15006 11/19/94 Castaneda Under study
118
 submitted before the
before the reorganization
reorganization
232. 17001 9/4/97 Not yet
223. 15168 3/25/93 Castaneda Under study assigned
submitted
233. 17278 5/2/94 Death of accused is
before the
unconfirmed and dismissal of
reorganization
the case was held in
224. 15301 3/16/94 Castaneda Under study abeyance. (Ong, J.)
submitted
234. 17600 8/30/97 Not yet
before the
assigned
reorganization
235. 17601 8/30/97 Not yet
225. 16239 12/26/91 Castaneda Under study
assigned
submitted
before the 236. 17759 6/25/96 Ong Decided and
reorganization set for
promulgation
226. 16516 11/19/91 Castaneda Under study
submitted 237. 17901 5/28/98 Not yet
before the assigned
reorganization
238. 18696 8/9/98 Not yet
227. 16583- 8/13/96 Castaneda Under study assigned
85 submitted
239. 18857 10/21/98 Not yet
before the
assigned
reorganization
240. 19059- 2/11/99 Not yet
228. 16695 8/15/96 Castaneda Under study
63 assigned
submitted
before the 241. 19534- 9/2/98 Not yet
reorganization 35 assigned
229. 16854 1/15/96 Castaneda Under study 242. 19708 8/25/98 Not yet
submitted assigned
before the
243. 19773- 5/21/99 Not yet
reorganization
79 assigned
230. 16927- 12/17/95 Castaneda Under study
244. 20688 7/9/98 Not yet
28 submitted
assigned
before the
reorganization 245. 20948 10/9/97 Not reported; unaccounted for
by Sandiganbayan report
231. 16946 8/4/93 Castaneda Under study
submitted 246. 20949 10/9/97 Not reported; unaccounted for
119
 by Sandiganbayan report assigned
247. 21020 7/4/95 Ong Set for 262. 24042- 4/28/99 Ong Set for
Promulgation 98 Promulgation
on November on November
27, 2001 27, 2001
248. 22145 7/7/99 Not yet 263. 24150 1/31/00 Not yet
assigned assigned
249. 22195- 6/14/96 Castaneda Under study, 264. 24236- 2/14/00 Not yet
96 submitted 37 assigned
before the
265. 24281 5/9/99 Not yet
reorganization
assigned
250. 22832 10/21/98 Not yet
266. 24319- 11/4/99 Not yet
assigned
29 assigned
251. 23042 8/27/98 Not yet
267.24319- 11/4/99 Not reported; unaccounted for
assigned
29 by Sandiganbayan report
252. 23146 11/13/00 Not yet
268. 24355 2/18/99 Not yet
assigned
assigned
253. 23273 4/19/99 Not yet
269.24395 7/13/99 Not reported; unaccounted for
assigned
by Sandiganbayan report
254. 23323 3/23/00 Not yet
270. 24402 6/17/99 Not yet
assigned
assigned
255. 23324 8/3/97 Not yet
271. 24433- 9/6/99 Not yet
assigned
34 assigned
256. 23336 9/4/97 Not yet
272. 24531- 12/16/99 Not yet
assigned
34 assigned
257. 23374 12/17/98 Not yet
273. 24631 8/9/99 Not yet
assigned
assigned
258. 23418- 10/15/99 Not yet
274. 24768 7/8/00 Not yet
23 assigned
assigned
259. 23509 9/5/98 Not yet
275. 6672 7/11/90 Garchitorena Under Study,
assigned
before the
260. 23511 4/23/99 Not yet reorganization
assigned
276. 9977 5/10/94 Garchitorena Under Study,
261. 23540 10/15/99 Not yet before the
120
 reorganization 49. 487- 4/8/98 With pending demurrer
491 to evidence, submitted,
277. 0112 1/11/92 Not reported; unaccounted for
01/26/01 re Submitted,
by Sandiganbayan report
03/20/01
278. 0116 10/16/91 Not reported; unaccounted for
50. 11794 6/10/00 De Castro --
by Sandiganbayan report
51. 17532 12/11/00 Ilarde --
279. 0156 3/14/97 Not reported; unaccounted for
by Sandiganbayan report 52. 18867- 10/5/00 Pending trial per order
72 dated 08/17/00
Summary/Tally
53. 19182 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th
Cases Assigned to Garchitorena, PJ. 9
Division, 10/13/97
Cases Assigned to Castaneda, J. 42
54. 19563 4/6/00 No --
Cases Assigned to Ong, J. 5 Assignment
Cases not yet assigned 73 55. 19574 4/6/00 No --
Assignment
Cases not accounted for or reported 9
56. 19622- 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th
Total 138
24 Division, 10/13/97
Second Division
57. 20053- 4/6/00 Not with the 3rd Division
Case Date Ponente Reason for Not 54
Number Submitted Assigned Deciding Case
58. 20271 12/18/00 Illarde --
63. 19542 4/16/99 For retaking of testimony
59. 22143 12/18/00 De Castro --
due to incomplete TSN
60. 23014 9/23/00 De Castro --
64. 13827- 8/30/00 Victorino For promulgation
32 61. 23699- 3/22/00 Ilarde --
701
65. 18965 11/30/00 For retaking of testimony
due to incomplete TSN 62. 23802- 9/10/00 No --
03 Assignment
Third Division
63. 24153 12/18/00 No --
Case Date Ponente Reason for
Assignment
Number Submitted Assigned Not
Deciding 64. 24697- 9/10/00 Ilarde --
Case 98
47. 12/18/00 Ilarde -- 65. 24741 12/7/00 De Castro --
SCA/005
66. 24779- 10/28/00 No --
48. A/R 10/2/00 Illarde 81 Assignment
029
121
67. 25657 5/5/00 With Defense pending Case Date Ponente Reason for Not
motion for the re- Number Submitted Assigned Deciding Case
examination of the
32. 14397 1/4/99 Badoy, Inherited
Information and the
Jr. case/lack of
parties' affidavits, etc.
personnel
Order dated 08/31/01
33. 16672 2/13/00 Badoy, Inherited
Summary/Tally
Jr. case/lack of
Cases Assigned to Illarde, J. 9 personnel
Cases Assigned to De Castro, J. 4 34. 17030 2/19/98 Badoy, Inherited
Jr. case/lack of
Cases not yet assigned 8
personnel
Others 18
35. 18478 8/21/00 Estrada Inherited
Total 39 case/lack of
personnel
Fourth Division**
36. 18684 5/29/98 Badoy, Inherited
Case Date Ponente Reason for
Jr. case/lack of
Number Submitted Assigned Not
personnel
Deciding
Case 37. 18880 12/6/00 Badoy, Inherited
Jr. case/lack of
71. 09/21/98 Draft of decision
personnel
11960 penned by J. Nario in
view of the dissenting 38. 19510- 12/4/00 Estrada Inherited
opinion of one Justice 12 case/lack of
was referred to a personnel
Division of five (5)
39. 19593 6/5/98 Badoy, Inherited
composed of Nario,
Jr. case/lack of
Palattao, Ferrer,
personnel
Badoy, Jr. and De
Castro, JJ. 40. 19614 7/31/98 Badoy, Inherited
Jr. case/lack of
72. 03/26/00 Palattao --
personnel
16809
41. 20194 1/8/01 Chico- Complicated
73. 04/27/00 Nario --
Nazario Issues
23058-62
42. 20427 11/3/99 Badoy, Inherited
74. 09/26/00 Nario --
Jr. case/lack of
25389
personnel
Fifth Division
43. 20648- 1/4/98 Badoy, Inherited

122
 49 Jr. case/lack of "3. Date arraignment in criminal cases of Pre-trial in civil cases
personnel and

44. 20694 3/11/98 Estrada Inherited "4. Date of initial trial

case/lack of
personnel
"5. Date of last hearing
45. 22926 11/13/00 No report, Unaccounted for
by the Sandiganbayan "6. Date submitted for Decision
report
46. 23066 8/16/99 Badoy, Not yet due "b. The tabulation shall end with a certification by the trial judge
Jr. that he/she has personally undertaken an inventory of the
pending cases in his/her court; that he/she has examined each
47. 24155 11/30/00 Estrada case record and initialled the last page thereof. The judge shall
48. 24379 8/27/00 Estrada Draft decision indicate in his/her certification the date when inventory was
released 7/31/01 conducted.
Summary/Tally
"c. The Tabulation and Certification shall be in the following
Cases Assigned to Badoy, J. *** 11 form.
Cases Assigned to Estrada, J. 7
Docket Inventory for the Period
Cases Assigned to Chico-Nazario, J. 1
No report/Unaccounted For 1 January __ to June ___, ___/July
Total 20
To December ___, ___

3. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme Court (Indicate Period)

Circular No. 10-94 applies to the Sandiganbayan.
Court and Station ________
Administrative Circular 10-9457 directs all trial judges to make a
physical inventory of the cases in their dockets. The docket inventory
Presiding Judge ________
procedure is as follows:58

"a. Every trial judge shall submit not later than the last week of Date
Title Pretrial/ Date of
February and the last week of August of each year a tabulation Date Initial submitte
of Arraign Last
of all pending cases which shall indicate on a horizontal column Filed Hearing d for
Case ment Hearing
the following data: Decision

"1. Title of the case

"2. Date of Filing "CERTIFICATION:

123
 "I hereby certify that on (Date/Dates___), I personally the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and avert
conducted a physical inventory of pending cases in the docket the precipitate loss of their rights.
of this court, that I personally examined the records of each
case and initialled the last page thereof, and I certify that the Practice of Unloading Cases
results of the inventory are correctly reflected in the above
tabulation. According to the memorandum submitted by the OCA, there is a
practice in the first and third divisions of the Sandiganbayan of
_________. _________________ unloading cases to other divisions despite the fact that these cases
____ have been submitted for decision before them. We cite relevant
Presiding portions of the memorandum:67
Judge"
Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fourth Division
Given the rationale behind the Administrative Circular, we hold that it is
applicable to the Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its
original and appellate jurisdiction. Division Date
where Submitted
Case No. Title of the Case
case for
Mora Decidendi originated Decision

We reiterate the admonition we issued in our resolution of October 10, 1) 17015 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94
2000:59 2) 17016 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94

"This Court has consistently impressed upon judges (which 3) 14380 PP vs. Francisco 3rd 02/14/95
includes justices) to decide cases promptly and expeditiously Ramoran
on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Decision 4) 18005 PP vs. Panfilo 3rd 05/07/96
making is the primordial and most important duty of the Bongcac
member of the bench.60 Hence, judges are enjoined to decide
cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross 5) 18006 PP vs. Panfilo 3rd 05/07/96
inefficiency61 that warrants disciplinary sanction, including Bongcac
fine,62suspension63 and even dismissal.64 The rule particularly 6) 13593 PP vs. Dominador 3rd 05/30/96
applies to justices of the Sandiganbayan. Delays in the Meninguito
disposition of cases erode the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into 7) 13594 PP vs. Dominador 3rd 05/30/96
disrepute.65 Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated Meninguito
especially in the anti-graft court, the showcase of the nation's 8) 19567 PP vs. Dominador 3rd 05/30/96
determination to succeed in its war against graft (italics ours)." Meninguito
9) 17140 PP vs. Jose Café, et. 3rd 06/13/96
In Yuchengco v. Republic,66 we urged the Sandiganbayan to promptly al.
administer justice. We stated that the Sandiganbayan has the inherent
power to amend and control its processes and orders to make them 10) 17141 PP vs. Jose Café, et. 3rd 06/13/96
conformable to law and justice. The Sandiganbayan as the nation's al.
anti-graft court must be the first to avert opportunities for graft, uphold
124
 11) 20064 PP vs. Ben dela 3rd 07/01/96 17. 17617 3/28/96
Pena
18. 17618 4/6/95
12) 21131 PP vs. Rufino 3rd 08/05/96
19. 17619 4/6/95
Mamanguin
20. 17640 6/12/95
13) 17209 PP vs. Isidro 3rd 12/27/96
Catapang 21. 17661 12/15/94
14) 13757 PP vs. Catalino 3rd 03/21/97 22. 17666 8/25/97
Daganzo
23. 17884 11/12/95
15) 18257 PP vs. Zenaida 1st 09/22/97
24. 17902 4/16/95
Sazon
25. 18008 9/15/97
Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fifth Division 26. 18423 1/15/96
27. 18687 9/30/94
Case Number Date Submitted
28. 18759 10/12/95
1. 10264 12/22/90
29. 18785 7/13/95
2. 13344 5/14/97
30. 18932 4/20/97
3. 16223 4/25/94
31. 18988 10/25/95
4. 16574 5/30/95
32. 18999 12/21/95
5. 16760 5/25/95
33. 19039 5/6/95
6. 16810 1/23/96
34. 19378 4/17/96
7. 17018 7/20/94
35. 19379 4/17/96
8. 17055 7/5/95
36. 19679 10/5/95
9. 17139 4/24/94
37. 19712 2/18/95
10. 17162 2/23/95
38. 19907 6/22/95
11. 17193 3/8/94
39. 20487 12/14/96
12. 17426 2/12/94
40. 20624 7/15/95
13. 17480 3/22/94
41. 23427 7/25/97
14. 17538 11/20/95
15. 17567 2/24/93 We suggest a review of the practice of unloading cases that greatly
16. 17598 8/3/94 contributes to the backlog of undecided cases. When a case has been

125
heard and tried before a division of the Sandiganbayan, it is ideal that February 21, February 23,
the same division and no other must decide it as far as practicable. 18283 Ong
1995 2001

We further note that several cases which were earlier reported as August 19,
17514 April 24, 2001 Ong
undecided by the Sandiganbayan and the OCA have been decided 1994
since the reports of September 26, 2000 and January 26, 2001. Second Division
Nonetheless, the delay in deciding these cases is patent and merits
reprobation. According to the compliance report submitted by the OCA Submitted
Case Date of
on November 16, 2001, there are several cases decided way beyond for Ponente
Number Promulgation
the reglementary period prescribed by law, even assuming without Decision
granting, a reglementary period of twelve months from the time a case 18403- December February 2,
is submitted for decision.68 Victorino
18417 4, 1998 2001
August 11, March 26,
In a case brought before this Court, Presiding Justice Garchitorena 18435 Victorino
2000 2001
admitted fault and that the fault is exclusively his own, in failing to
decide the case, though submitted for decision as early as June 20, November March 28,
18786 Legaspi
1990.69 This case was not even included among pending cases in the 28, 2000 2001
Sandiganbayan report of September 26, 2000. September March 16,
19004 Victorino
10, 1996 2001
The following cases were decided, though beyond the prescribed
period: 19692- August 27, February 26,
Sandoval
19707 2000 2001
First Division March 28, January 29,
19848 Victorino
1996 2001
Case Submitted for Date of
Ponente 20483- July 26,
Number Decision Promulgation April 6, 2001 Victorino
20484 1995
March 31, November
14195 Ong December August 2,
1997 10, 2000 20660 Legaspi
20, 2000 2001
March 31, November
21608 Ong August 30, February 23,
1997 15, 2000 20765 Victorino
1996 2001
February 14, January 12,
20588 Ong March 11, January 25,
1998 2001 20816 Victorino
1998 2001
November January 26,
19651 Ong December June 15,
15, 1996 2001 21097 Victorino
13, 2000 2001
November January 26,
17670 Ong August 11, January 31,
25, 1994 2001 22858 Victorino
2000 2001
September February 22,
17447-48 Ong 22934 October February 15, Sandoval
6, 1994 2001

126
 14, 2000 2001 August 31,
17664 June 1, 2000 Pallatao
1999
May 4, March 1,
22976 Sandoval
1999 2001 March 27,
17016 June 6, 1994 Ferrer
2001
November March 14,
23111 Sandoval
27, 2000 2001 17140- February 6,
June 13, 1996 Nario
41 2001
October
23262 May 16, 2001 Victorino
11, 2000 December 27,
17209 April 30, 2001 Ferrer
1996
December December
23338 Sandoval
2, 1999 14, 2000 17805-
February 15, October 10,
09; Palattao
23529- October March 28, 2000 2001
Victorino 17814
23530 23, 2000 2001
June 25,
24407- August 11, January 24, 17856 April 2, 2000 Palattao
Legaspi 2001
24408 2000 2001
18005-
August 17, May 7, 1996 May 18, 2001 Ferrer
24994 May 30, 2001 Sandoval 06
2000
September 22,
December August 28, 18257 July 26, 2001 Ferrer
AR#035 Legaspi 1997
9, 2000 2001
18894- November 17, March 20,
Third Division Palattao
96 2000 2001
Case Submitted for Date of
Ponente October 28, March 23,
Number Decision Promulgation 18900 Ferrer
2000 2001
November 16, January 26,
A/R 016 Ilarde 18935- January 18,
1999 2001 June 16, 2000 Palattao
37 2001
13861- December Del
April 6, 2000 January 15,
13863 22, 2000 Rosario 19567 May 21, 1996 Ferrer
2001
September 30,
13889 May 10, 2001 Ilarde February 9,
1999 20338 May 19, 1997 Ferrer
2001
August 28, December Del
16756 June 25,
1999 11, 2000 Rosario 20469 July 7, 2000 Palattao
2001
January 12, Del
23522 July 6, 2000 13036- February 22, February 28,
2001 Rosario Ferrer
37 1999 2001
Fourth Division
13593- January 15,
May 21, 1996 Ferrer
Case Submitted for Date of 94 2001
Ponente
Number Decision Promulgation
127
20470- June 25, October 10, March 22,
July 7, 2000 Palattao 24742 Ferrer
76 2001 2000 2001
February 20, 24841- March 7,
20664 June 29, 1996 Ferrer May 9, 2000 Ferrer
2001 42 2001
February 18, March 2, February 6,
20685 Palattao 25198 July 12, 2000 Nario
2000 2001 2001
September 13, October 8, December 27, February 26,
20828 Palattao 25543 Palattao
2000 2001 2000 2001
January 15, 25658 July 28, 2000 July 20, 2001 Palattao
21093 August 7, 1999 Palattao
2001
24447- September 18, December 7,
Palattao
February 13, 48 2000 2001
21131 August 4, 1996 Ferrer
2001
Fifth Division
21778- September 29, June 21,
Ferrer Case Submitted for Date of
80 1997 2001 Ponente
Number Decision Promulgation
22891- December
March 2, 2000 Ferrer 17826- December 9, March 28, Chico-
92 13, 2000
17827 2000 2001 Nazario
March 14,
23007 May 24, 1999 Ferrer February 9, Badoy,
2000 19668 July 26, 1998
2001 Jr.
March 21,
13757 July 2, 2001 Ferrer August 12, Chico-
1997 21882 July 25, 2001
2000 Nazario
February 14,
14380 April 23, 2001 Ferrer December 16, Chico-
1995 22184 May 21, 2001
2000 Nazario
March 27,
17015 June 6, 1994 Ferrer December 4, Chico-
2001 22873 May 31, 2001
1999 Nazario
November 26, October 29,
23366 Ferrer September 30, Chico-
1999 2001 23319 April 23, 2001
2000 Nazario
23415 May 25, 2000 May 28, 2001 Palattao
September 16, March 16, Chico-
23450
December 15, February 28, 2000 2001 Nazario
23534 Palattao
2000 2001
January 29, Cortez-
23515 May 28, 2001
September 27, September 2000 Estrada
23708 Nario
2000 10, 2001
Cortez-
24759 May 5, 2000 July 10, 2001
24464- June 26, Estrada
July 26, 2000 Nario
65 2001
24858 December 28, May 31, 2001 Chico-
128
 2000 Nazario
Relief of Presiding Justice
At this juncture, the Court cites the case of Canson v.
Garchitorena.70 In that case, we admonished respondent Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena. General Jewel F. Canson, Police
Chief Superintendent, National Capital Region Command Director,
complained of deliberate delayed action of the Presiding Justice on the
transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, depriving complainant of his right to a just and
speedy trial. Due to a finding of lack of bad faith on the part of
respondent justice, we issued only a warning. However, the dispositive
portion of the decision cautioned respondent justice that "a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely."71
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena sits as the Chairman, First
Division, with a backlog of cases pending decision. At least seventy-
three cases have been unassigned for the writing of the extended
opinion, though submitted for decision. It may be the thinking of the
Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan that an unassigned case is not
counted in its backlog of undecided cases. This is not correct. It is the
duty of the Presiding Justice and the Chairmen of divisions to assign
the ponente as soon as the case is declared submitted for decision, if
not earlier. If he fails to make the assignment, he shall be deemed to
be the ponente.
The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.72 In
Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court
provided that "A case is considered submitted for decision upon the
admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial.
The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall commence to
run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in
case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript
of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or
suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case
the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the
completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same."73 The
designation of a ponente to a case is not a difficult administrative task.
Administrative sanctions must be imposed. "Mora reprobatur in
lege."74 Again, we reiterate the principle that decision-making is the
most important of all judicial functions and responsibilities.75 In this
area, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, as
the ponente assigned to the cases submitted for decision/resolution
long ago, some as far back as more than ten (10) years ago, has been
remiss constituting gross neglect of duty and inefficiency.76 As we said
in Canson,77 unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a case
amounts to a denial of justice, bringing the Sandiganbayan
into disrepute, eroding the public faith and confidence in the judiciary.78
Consequently, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena should be
relieved of all trial and administrative work as Presiding Justice and as
Chairman, First Division so that he can devote himself full time to
decision-making until his backlog is cleared. He shall finish this
assignment not later than six (6) months from the promulgation of this
resolution.
We have, in cases where trial court judges failed to decide even
a single case within the ninety (90) day period, imposed a fine ranging
from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to the equivalent of their one
month's salary.79According to the report of the Sandiganbayan, as of
September 26, 2000, there were three hundred forty one (341) cases
submitted for decision before its first division headed by the Presiding
Justice. In the memorandum of the OCA, there were one hundred
ninety eight (198) cases reported submitted for decision before the
First Division.80Even in the updated report, there are one hundred thirty
eight (138) cases still undecided in the First Division.
In fact, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that he has
a backlog.81 He claimed that one (1) case alone comprises fifty percent
(50%) of the backlog. We find this claim exaggerated. We cannot
accept that a backlog of three hundred forty one (341) cases in the
First Division could be eliminated by the resolution of a single
consolidated case of one hundred fifty six (156) counts. A consolidated
case is considered only as one case. The cases referred to were
129
consolidated as Criminal Case Nos. 9812-9967, People v. Corazon
Gammad-Leaño, decided on December 8, 2000. What about the one
hundred eighty five (185) cases that unfortunately remained undecided
to this date? Worse, the motion for reconsideration of the decision in
said cases, submitted as of January 11, 2001, has not been resolved
to this date.82 The First Division has only thirty (30) days from
submission to resolve the same. It is now ten (10) months from
submission. The expediente and the motion were transmitted to
the ponente, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, on that date,
but to this day the case remains unresolved.83Unfortunately, even other
divisions of the Sandiganbayan may be following his example.84
In the first report of the Court Administrator, he indicated a total of one
hundred ninety five (195) criminal cases and three (3) civil cases, or a
total of one hundred ninety eight (198) cases submitted for decision as
of December 21, 2000.85 Almost a year later, as of November 16, 2001,
there are still one hundred thirty eight (138) cases undecided submitted
long ago. For almost one year, not one case was decided/resolved by
the Presiding Justice himself.86
Directive
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:
(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a
fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for inefficiency
and gross neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of his powers, functions and duties as
the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, and from presiding over
the trial of cases as a justice and Chairman, First Division, so
that he may DEVOTE himself exclusively to DECISION
WRITING, until the backlog of cases assigned to him as well as
cases not assigned to any ponente, of which he shall be
deemed the ponente in the First Division, are finally decided.
There shall be no unloading of cases to other divisions, or to
the First Division inter se.
In the interim, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as
the most senior associate justice, shall TAKE OVER and
exercise the powers, functions, and duties of the office of the
Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, until further orders from this
Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and
the associate justices of the Sandiganbayan to decide/resolve
the undecided cases submitted for decision as of this date,
within three (3) months from their submission, and to resolve
motions for new trial or reconsiderations and petitions for
review within thirty (30) days from their submission. With
respect to the backlog of cases, as hereinabove enumerated,
the Sandiganbayan shall decide/resolve all pending cases
including incidents therein within six (6) months from notice of
this resolution.
(4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme
Court Administrative Circular 10-94, effective immediately.
(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later
than December 31, 2001 internal rules to govern the allotment
of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among
them and other matters leading to the internal operation of the
court, and thereafter to submit the said internal rules to the
Supreme Court for its approval.87
This directive is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
De Leon, Jr., J., see dissenting and concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
130
DE LEON, Jr., J.: concurring and dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the resolution of Mr. Justice Bernardo P.
Pardo insofar as it declares and rules that the judgment of any division
of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months, and
not within twelve (12) months, from the date the case was submitted
for decision.
The resolution cites Section 6 of P.D. No. 1606 which requires that the
judgment of the Sandiganbayan "shall be rendered within three (3)
months from the date the case was submitted for decision". The said
provision was apparently adopted by the Sandiganbayan in Section 3
of Rule XVIII of its Revised Rules of Procedure which was issued
pursuant to P.D. No. 1606. The resolution also cites Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-94, dated June 25, 1994 which is
addressed "To: All Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Courts, Branch
Clerks of Courts" but not to Sandiganbayan Justices or the Clerk of
Court and Division Clerks of Courts of the Sandiganbayan.
SECTION 15 (1) and (2) Article VII of the 1997 Constitution, however,
provides that:
SECTION 15(1). All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the Court
itself.
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court in Administrative Circular No. 10-94 has not
reduced the 12-month period mentioned in the above quoted
constitutional provision insofar as the Sandiganbayan, a collegiate
court, is concerned. It is basic that in case of conflict between a
constitutional provision on one hand and a statute or an internal rule of
procedure of a court on the other, the former, being a part of the
fundamental law of the land, must prevail. Also, pursuant to Section 4
of Republic Act No. 8245 (approved on February 5, 1997) the
Sandiganbayan has also exclusive appellate jurisdiction "over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided."
In this connection, be it noted that section 1 of R.A. No. 8249 further
amending P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition; Qualifications;
Tenure; Removal and Compensation — A special court, of
the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the
inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the
Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding
justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed
by the President.
Incidentally, per the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan, each
division is composed of three (3) justices whose unanimous vote is
required to render a decision, resolution or order. In the event there is
a dissent, a special division is formed whereby two (2) justices who
shall be chosen by raffle and added to the division concerned, in which
event, the majority rule shall prevail. For that reason and considering
also that appeals from the decisions of the Sandiganbayan are to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan as a
collegiate trial court, is significantly different from the one-man regional
trial court.
Subject to the foregoing observations and partial dissent, I concur with
the rest of the resolution.
131
A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC February 16, 2011
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT - BRANCH 56, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative matter stemmed from the Report dated July 6, 2009
on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted by the
Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in March
2007 in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, Cebu, in
anticipation of the compulsory retirement of Judge Augustine A. Vestil
(Judge Vestil), then presiding judge of the same court.
The report disclosed that during the audit, the trial court has: (1) a total
caseload of 1,431 cases consisting of 555 civil cases and 876 criminal
cases; (2) 15 cases submitted for decision, but were already beyond
the reglementary period;1 (3) two cases with pending incidents awaiting
resolution, which were beyond the reglementary period;2 and (4) 247
cases, which had remained dormant for a considerable length of time.
It was further reported that Branch 56 did not observe an organized
record management. No system was being followed to facilitate the
monitoring of the status of cases. The court records were found to be
in disarray as: (1) court records of terminated and archived cases were
mixed with active cases; (2) copies of orders, pleadings and other
documents were not chronologically attached to the case folders; (3)
copies of the minutes of the hearings/proceedings were left unattached
to the case folders and were merely kept in a separate file; and (4)
loose copies of orders, pleadings and other documents were found
merely inserted in the case folders.
Thus, on April 23, 2007, then Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño issued a Memorandum, directing Judge Vestil to: (1) submit
an explanation of his failure to: [a] decide 15 cases submitted for
decision within the reglementary period, [b] resolve the incidents for
resolution in two cases within the reglementary period, and [c] take
further action on the 247 cases despite the lapse of a considerable
length of time; (2) decide the 15 cases submitted for decision and
resolve the incidents in two cases; and (3) take appropriate action on
the 247 dormant cases within 45 days from notice.
Likewise, in the same Memorandum, Atty. Emeline Bullever-Cabahug
(Atty. Cabahug), Clerk of Court of the same court, was directed to
devise and adopt a records management system that will ensure the
immediate and orderly filing of court records, and effectively facilitate
the monitoring of the status of cases and supervise her staff members
to ensure prompt delivery of their respective assignments.
On June 20, 2007, in compliance with the Court's directives, Judge
Vestil, without explaining the reason for the delay, reported the
subsequent actions taken in the cases referred to in the Memorandum
dated April 23, 2007, to wit:
As to directive no. 2:
1. Civil Case No. MAN-2910 - submitted for decision in May
2007 as the defendant's Formal Offer of Exhibits was filed on
February 12, 2007 and the exhibits were admitted on March
19, 2007;
2. Civil Case No. MAN-3084 – still pending trial and hearing
was reset to June 28, 2007;
3. Civil Case No. MAN-4009 - decided on February 20, 2007,
or 17 days before the lapse of the reglementary period. But due
to the absence of the typist-in-charge, the typing of the decision
was left unfinished;
4. LRC No. 638 – decided on March 8, 2007;
5. LRC (Fe Cortes Dabon, petitioner) – decided on December
7, 2006;
6. Criminal Case No. DU-3316 – decided on September 4,
2006 and was promulgated on June 6, 2007;
7. Criminal Case No. DU-5308 - decided on September 21,
2004. Promulgated set on December 5, 2006. Reset to May 28,
132
 2007. Reset to April 26, 2007 and reset to May 21, 2007. Pre-
trial of other accused was still set on May 21, 2007;
8. Criminal Case No. DU-7047 – decided on April 13, 2007;
promulgated on March 26, 2007;
9. Criminal Case No. DU-7518 – decided on April 7, 2006;
promulgated on April 3, 2007;
10. Criminal Case No. DU-7649 – decided on February 9,
2007; promulgated on May 28, 2007;
11. Criminal Case No. DU-9207 – decided on August 1, 2006
and promulgated on April 18, 2007;
12. Criminal Case No. DU-9650 – submitted for decision on
March 1, 2007;
13. Criminal Case No. DU-11862 – decided per judgment
dated October 16, 2006; set for promulgation on March 1.
2007;
14. Criminal Case No. DU-12508 – originally set to be
promulgated on December 6, 2006 but due to lack of judges, it
was eventually promulgated only on May 11, 2007;
15. Criminal Case No. DU-13453 – promulgated on April 2007;
16. Civil Case No. MAN-3762 (Motion to Dismiss) - counsels
were required to submit their respective memoranda with
regard to the motion to dismiss only up to June 11, 2007, thus,
not yet submitted for decision;
17. Criminal Case No. DU-10480 (Demurrer to Evidence)- per
order dated May 25, 2007, demurrer to evidence was denied.
Reception of Accused evidence was set to August 28, 2007.
With regard to the alleged dormant cases, Judge Vestil acted, although
belatedly, on the two hundred forty-seven (247) cases before he retired
on August 8, 2007. Some of the cases were ordered dismissed or
archived; others were set for pre-marking of exhibits, deposition-taking,
arraignment, pre-trial or hearing; and, some were ordered submitted for
decision. Judge Vestil, however, offered no explanation why there was
delay in the court's action in these cases.
For her part, Atty. Cabahug reported that:
(1) they have already conducted an inventory of court records
in the storage room to properly give space for cases which are
archived, disposed or decided cases;
(2) they made a list in separate logbooks - of the cases: (a)
forwarded to the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals; (b)
those placed in the bodega; (c) transmitted to the Office of the
Clerk of Court; (d) newly filed and transferred from other courts;
and (e) already disposed of, decided or archived;
(3) they already gave instructions to the court clerks to note in
the Semi Annual Inventory Report the last action of the court in
all the cases assigned to them;
(4) issued a memorandum to her staff members to seek
permission and enter in the logbook the time whenever they go
out of the office during office hours;
(5) and suggested to have a staff meeting every Monday of the
month to monitor the concerns of their staff.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2008, the Court granted the request of
Judge Vestil for the release of his retirement benefits, "provided the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) shall be
retained/withheld therefrom to answer for whatever adverse decision
the Court may impose on him in relation to the instant case.
The audit team maintained, however, that except for Civil Case No.
MAN-3084 and Criminal Cases Nos. DU-9650 and DU-11862 which
were inadvertently included as submitted for decision but were in fact
already decided or still pending trial, all other cases reported in the
audit report suffered undue delay in its disposition. While, Judge Vestil
claimed that certain cases were decided within the reglementary
133
period, he, however, also admitted that while he was able to prepare
the decisions, the same remained unpromulgated within the
reglementary period. With regard to the 247 dormant cases, while he
immediately acted upon its resolution, he however, offered no
explanation for the delay in the resolution thereof.
On August 8, 2007, Judge Vestil compulsorily retired from service.
Later, on July 6, 2009, the OCA, in its Report, found Judge Vestil guilty
of undue delay in deciding cases and recommended that a fine of
twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) be deducted from the one
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) previously withheld from his
retirement benefits. However, in so far as Atty. Cabahug is concerned,
the instant matter was recommended to be considered as closed and
terminated.
On August 19, 2009, the Court resolved to consider the instant
complaint CLOSED and TERMINATED in so far as Atty. Cabahug is
concerned.
On October 12, 2009, Judge Vestil manifested that since his retirement
in 2007, he had already undergone several medical examinations and
presently his continuous medication costs at least ₱500.00 daily.
Judge Vestil, thus, prays for the resolution of the instant complaint
against him and the subsequent release of the ₱100,000.00 which was
previously withheld from his retirement benefits upon his retirement.
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
A review of the records would show the undisputed delay in the
disposition of numerous cases assigned to Branch 56 which was then
presided by Judge Vestil. There were at least 80 civil cases, some
were filed as early as 1997, which are still pending as of March 2007.
Furthermore, at least 100 criminal cases are still pending beyond the
90-day reglementary period.
In his defense, Judge Vestil sought refuge from the fact that Branch 56
was saddled with a heavy caseload. We are, however, unconvinced.
The Court knew the heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of
every trial judge. But such cannot excuse him from doing his mandated
duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened
with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the
reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they
cannot comply with their judicial duty. This, Judge Vestil failed to do.
Corollarily, a heavy caseload may excuse a judge’s failure to decide
cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an
extension of time within which to decide the case on time.3 Hence, all
that respondent judge needs to do is request for an extension of time
over which the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the OCA, it is not enough that he
pens his decision; it is imperative to promulgate the same within the
mandated period. The lack of staff that will prepare and type the
decision is equally inexcusable to justify the delay in the promulgation
of the cases.
We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt resolution of
disputes. Justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious violation of Section 16,4 Article III of the Constitution.
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by
the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform
their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the
judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the
performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing
less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the
discharge of official duties.5
Furthermore, the proper and efficient court management is the
responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.6 What we emphasized before
bears repeating: "It is the duty of a judge to take note of the cases
submitted for his decision or resolution and to see to it that the same
are decided within the 90-day period fixed by law, and failure to resolve
a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency." "A
judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or
resolution and is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he
may act on them promptly." "The public trust character of his office
imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility and
efficiency."7 Accordingly, it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
134
recording and filing system in his court, so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.

Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period

constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05,8 Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which then makes Judge Vestil liable administratively.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge
punishable under Section 11 (B) of the same Rule. 1avv phi 1

Here, considering that Judge Vestil had been previously

administratively sanctioned for dereliction of duty,9 the imposition of
fine amounting to ₱40,000.00 is, thus, proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judge Augustine A. Vestil

is adjudged administratively liable for failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period and is hereby FINED in the amount
of ₱40,000.00, to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00 previously
retained from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office
is DIRECTED to immediately release the balance of Judge Vestil’s
retirement benefits after such fine has been deducted therefrom.

SO ORDERED.

135
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to
determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit
in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject
decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress
will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration
and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and
114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2,
2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The
decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their
respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further
orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012
Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their
respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the
Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the
Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive
and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of
American origins, both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935
Constitution12vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary
in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. It was during these times that the country became
witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the
members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive
and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and
justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power
became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the
condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the
Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities,15 the
136
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees
to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in
the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one
(1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to
the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially
altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
1âwphi 1
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the
JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It
has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court
reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following
grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the
JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that
the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there
was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3]
that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention
of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4]
that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is
not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification
of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered
by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds,
carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them
jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by
which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited
and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of
the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one
suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the
framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus,
in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the
Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which
must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What
the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance
and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain
oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the
July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to
describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the
Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the
JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
137
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions
were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20 Another is
Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section
18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress
was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were
made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two
Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article
VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form
of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just
lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is
very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to
support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole
body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be
discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions
which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses
consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in
the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as
inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence
of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House
must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay
between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature
and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other
chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the
two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of
the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four
(4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice
(representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the
Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven
(7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to
the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-
considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need
any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-
repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council,
with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the
three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council
should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC
in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted
provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
138
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio
JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above:
the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of
two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers.
Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase
the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting
deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST
Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is
composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members
pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of
the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute
that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and
specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus,
two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of
JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has
contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that
the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have
in the Council a representation for the major elements of the
community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the
regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to
treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting
members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the
choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress
in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution.
Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in
the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and
the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies
in furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While
the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need
be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three
governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations
that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees
to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any
more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and
principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House
of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In
the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent
the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but
it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of
Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between
139
two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned
practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the
essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot
be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into
two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to
presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect,
has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members
of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the
JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the
first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration.
Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an
act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from
the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if
it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under
the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated
in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in
this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution
which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot
correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither
can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express
provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence.
To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making
amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission.
According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under
its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the
omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot
supply what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by
judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court
tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains
steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or
140
convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or
an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To
broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included
in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the
Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to
accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the
Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is

hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the

dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which
reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

141
 G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this
Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and
Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court,
respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On
September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection
2
and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list
of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a
letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion
in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants
who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a
letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly
noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in
the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five
years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year,
he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to
this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the
qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's
five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the
requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be
fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for
the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has
already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the
JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8separately submitted their
Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they
essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the
assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process
clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of
mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no
clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause
is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less than five years is
valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation
of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
chanR oblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five
years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to
first determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These
are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo,
etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,10 this Court
explained that:chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
142
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in
any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's
constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue
of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides
that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws
and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed
and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but
they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC
is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus,
when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its
supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in
assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper
because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of
candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion
in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.13The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to
the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part
of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us,
was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of
the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession
of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in
the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the
candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus: chanroblesv i rtual lawlib rary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement
or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a
recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the
former to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its
discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list.
Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of
candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced
to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and
selection process would not only be unnecessary, but also improper.
However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the
list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the
selection of nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's
inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege
the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that
is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second level court. There is no
law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-
level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will,
a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the
143
validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties'
rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he
failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included
in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion
in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is
not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have
been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even
if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory
relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over
the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside
procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.
cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list
officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as
justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men
and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution
has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that
the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out
its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a
degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the
applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant
meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year
requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to
screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a
vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the
applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction;
what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.21 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that
the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of
the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement
and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these
standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the
possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended
144
appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The
JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to
screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence
which may be measured by experience, among other factors. The difference
in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least five years
and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely
under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with
the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the
more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court,
which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct
adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium
on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary
be of "proven competence." In determining competence, the JBC
considers, among other qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-
level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-
level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of
conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a
sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level
court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an efficient
case management system, adjust to the work environment, and gain
extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's
nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and
reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct,
and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions
must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude,
cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of
promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to assess
their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the
bench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor
that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by
the President. Persons with this qualification are neither automatically
selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are
chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was
arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist
between lower court judges with five year experience and those with less
than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe
on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification
intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the
said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying
judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be
filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch
of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the
Supreme Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-
level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that
are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and
effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of
publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it
were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their
staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof
that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
145

The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules
of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and
listed the guidelines in determining competence, independence, integrity and
probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants
for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule,
have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge, thus: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should
consider the following in evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in
the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a
judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he has in his favor
outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive scholastic or
educational record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent
reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least
very satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years preceding the filing
of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate
judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been
duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general
circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal
rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published.
Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining
competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should have
amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-
009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to
the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should
be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year
requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision
requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not
prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive,
the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of
the prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in
the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC
unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy
violates the constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for
equal opportunity of employment. The OSG explained: chan roblesv irt uall awlibra ry
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment
opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for appointment to
the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As
with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no
ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the constitutional and
legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous
screening and selection process. They must submit themselves to the
selection criteria, processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has the
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose names
will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair
opportunity is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the basis of
their individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a
clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The
petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of RTC
judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to
be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is
subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine
who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list of
applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the
petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to
meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance
of an injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for,
screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to
the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perform
such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues
various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation
of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the
rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is
freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting
qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience
was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however,
should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so
that they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless
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there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from
interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative
and independence inherent in the latter. cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,

however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the
publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of
experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial
and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

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