acre.
The use of this phrase in designating quantity covers only
Asiain v. Jalandoni
G.R. No. L-20435, 23 October 1923
FACTS:
Asiain said to Jalandoni that he was willing to sell a portion of
his hacienda for the sum of P55,000. With a wave of his hand,
Asiain indicated the tract of land in question, affirming that it
contained between 25 and 30 hectares, and that the crop of
sugar cane then planted would produce not less than 2,000
piculs of sugar. But Jalandoni, remaining doubtful as to the
extent of the land and as to the amount of crop on it. Once in
possession of the land, Jalandoni did two things. He had the
sugar cane ground in La Carlota Sugar Central with the result
that it gave and output of P800 piculs and 23 cates of centrifugal
sugar. When opportunity offered, he secured the certificate of
title of Asiain and produced a surveyor to survey the land.
According to his survey, the parcel in question contained an area
of 118 hectares, 54 ares, and 22 centiares.
Of the purchase price of P55,000, Jalandoni had paid P30,000,
leaving a balance unpaid of P25,000. To recover the sum of
P25,000 from Jalandoni or to obtain the certificate of title and the
rent from him, action was begun by Asiain in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros. Defendant interposed that the
contract be annulled, both parties to return whatever they had
received, and that he recover from the plaintiff the sum of P3,600
annually as damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract can be rescinded?
RULING:
The memorandum-agreement between Asiain and Jalandoni
contains the phrase or “more or less.” It is the general view that
this phrase or others of like import, added to a statement of
quantity, can only be considered as covering inconsiderable or
small differences one way or the other, and do not in themselves
determine the character of the sale as one in gross or by the
a reasonable excess or deficiency. Such words may indeed
relieve from exactness but not from gross deficiency.
Coordinating more closely the law and the facts in the instant
case, we reach the following conclusions: This was not a
contract of hazard. It was a sale in gross in which there was a
mutual mistake as to the quantity of land sold and as to the
amount of the standing crop. The mistake of fact as disclosed
not alone by the terms of the contract but by the attendant
circumstances, which it is proper to consider in order to throw
light upon the intention of the parties, is, as it is sometimes
expressed, the efficient cause of the concoction. The mistake
with reference to the subject-matter of the contract is such that,
at the option of the purchaser, it is rescindable. Without such
mistake the agreement would not have been made and since
this is true, the agreement is inoperative and void. It is not
exactly a case of over reaching on the plaintiff’s part, or of
misrepresentation and deception, or of fraud, but is more nearly
akin to a bilateral mistake for which relief should be granted.
Specific performance of the contract can therefore not be
allowed at the instance of the vendor.
Dumasug v. Modelo
G.R. No. L-10462, 16 March 1916
FACTS:
Petitioner Andrea Dumasug alleged that respondent Felix
Modelo persuaded her to sign a document by falsely and
maliciously making her believe that it contained an engagement
on petitioner`s obligation to pay a certain sum of money. Such
obligation pertains to the advances and expenses incurred by
the respondent in protecting and aiding her in the proceeding of
her case wherein the petitioner was the plaintiff. Petitioner does
not know how to write, hence, she only affixed her mark as her
signature believing in good faith that respondent herein was
telling her the truth.
Three months after the execution of such document, the
respondent took possession of a carabao and of two parcels of
land owned by the petitioner on the ground that the latter had
conveyed such properties to him by an Absolute Sale in
consideration to the expenses he incurred in aiding the petitioner
on the proceedings of her case. Petitioner herein seeks for the
recovery of the above properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instrument of purchase and sale of two
parcels of land and a plow carabao is null and void.
RULING:
Yes.In the case at bar, it was inconceivable that respondent
herein incurs such big amount as he allegedly spent in the
proceedings of the lawsuit involving petitioner. The evidence
discloses that the only great expense which Andrea Dumasug
could have incurred was the sum that as fees she had to pay the
attorney Andres Jayme for filing a demurrer in the Court of First
Instance. Said attorney testified that he received from Andrea
Dumasug only P80 or P90, the only large sum which the latter
had to expend.
The lower court held that the statements of Andrea Dumasug
were well worthy of credence, and, taking into consideration the
merits of the case, reached the conclusion that the sole
document which plaintiff signed which she acknowledged she
was owing to Felix Modelo, and not to the sale of all her
properties. The record shows plaintiff to have stated that she
received an offer to sell her carabao, but that she did not wish to
sell the animal as she only rented it and it is her only means of
livelihood.
It is, then, perfectly evident that the document, by means of
which defendant made himself the owner of the properties in
question is not the instrument of debt which Andrea Dumasug
had signed, and if it is the same one its contents were not duly
and faithfully explained to plaintiff in the act of its execution. In
either case, the consent said to have been given by Andrea
Dumasug in said document is null and void, as it was given by
mistake. This error invalidates the contract, because it goes to
the very substance of the thing which was the subject matter of
said contract, for, had the maker thereof truly understood the
contents of said document, she would neither have accepted nor
authenticated it by her mark.
The consent given by plaintiff being null and void, the document
is consequently also null, void, and of no value or effect. Article
1303 of the Civil Code is therefore, applicable, which prescribes
that: “When the nullity of an obligation has been declared, the
contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which
have been the object of the contract with their fruits, and the
value with its interest.”
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from are deemed to have been refuted,
petition granted.
The ultimate result is to put the parties back in exactly their
respective positions before they became involved in the
negotiations and before the accomplishment of the agreement.
This was the decision of the trial judge and we think that decision
conforms to the facts, the law, and the principles of equity.
Judgment is affirmed, without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff
to establish in this action in the lower court the amount of the
rent of the land pursuant to the terms of the complaint during the
time the land was in the possession of the defendant.
Leonardo v. CA
G.R. No. 125485, 13 September 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the
late Sps. Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo. Private
respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all
surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina
with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.
In 1988, private respondent Corazon Sebastian with her
niece and a certain Bitang, came to Restituta’s house to
persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate
of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the
document, Restituta allegedly insisted that they wait for her
husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which
was written in English. Subsequently, she proceeded to sign the
document even without her husband and without reading the
document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon that
she will get her share as a legitimate daughter. Petitioner then
asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to wait
for her husband so he could read the document. When
petitioner’s husband arrived, however, private respondent
Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of
the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that
they were able to secure a copy and read the contents thereof.
Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the
legitimate children and sole heirs of Jose Sebastian and
Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each
other, thus, the extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and
illegal. Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated
because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial
settlement. She further denied having appeared before a Judge
of MTC of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to acknowledge the
execution of the extrajudicial partition.
ISSUE:
Whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate was given voluntarily.
RULING:
No. Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable.
These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of
which impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity, and
voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the agreement. In
determining whether consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide
latitude in weighing the facts considering the age, physical
infirmity, intelligence, relationship and the conduct of the parties
at the time of making the contract and subsequent thereto,
irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private
writing.
In this case, private respondents failed to offer any evidence to
prove that the extrajudicial settlement of the estate was
explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the
Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade
3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and
spontaneous consent without having the document, which was
in English, explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.
Domingo Realty v. CA
G.R. No. 126236, 26 January 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo Realty filed complaint with the against
Antonio M. Acero, who conducted business under the firm name
A.M. Acero Trading, David Victorio, John Doe, and Peter Doe,
for recovery of possession of three (3) parcels of land.
Defendants Acero and Victorio filed answer to the alleging that
they merely leased the land from his co-defendant David
Victorio, who, in turn, claimed to own the property on which the
hollow blocks factory of Acero stood. In the Answer, Victorio
assailed the validity of the TCTs of Domingo Realty, alleging that
the said TCTs emanated from spurious deeds of sale, and
claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the property for more than 70 years.
Mariano Yu representing Domingo Realty, Luis Recato Dy[6],
and Antonio M. Acero, all assisted by counsels, executed a
Compromise Agreement which contains the following:
1. That defendants admit and recognize the ownership of
the plaintiff over the property subject of this case;
2. That defendant Luis Recato Dy admits and recognizes
that his title has been proven not to be genuine and that
the area indicated therein is inside the property of the
plaintiff;
3. That defendant Acero admits that the property he is
presently occupying by way of lease is encroaching on
a portion of the property of the plaintiff and assume[s]
and undertakes to vacate, remove and clear any and
all structures erected inside the property of the plaintiff
by himself and other third parties, duly authorized
and/or who have an existing agreement with defendant
Acero, and shall deliver said portion of the property of
the plaintiff free and clear of any unauthorized
structures, shanties, occupants, squatters or lessees
within a period of sixty (60) days from date of signing
of this compromise agreement. Should defendant
Acero fail in his obligation to vacate, remove and clear
the structures erected inside the property of the plaintiff
within the period of 60 days afore-mentioned, plaintiff
 shall be entitled to a writ of execution for the immediate
demolition or removal of said structure to fully
implement this agreement; and ejectment of all
squatters and occupants and lessees, including the
dependents to fully implement this agreement;
4. That plaintiff admits and recognizes that defendant Luis
Recato Dy bought and occupied the property in good
faith and for value whereas defendant Acero leased the
portion of said property likewise in good faith and for
value hereby waives absolutely and unconditionally all
claims including attorneys fees against both
defendants in all cases pending in any court whether
by virtue of any judgment or under the present
complaint and undertake to withdraw and/or move to
dismiss the same under the spirit of this agreement;
5. That defendants likewise waive all claims for damages
including attorneys fees against the plaintiff;
6. That plaintiff acknowledges the benefit done by
defendant Luis Recato Dy on the property by incurring
expenses in protecting and preserving the property by
way of construction of perimeter fence and maintaining
a caretaker therein and plaintiff has agreed to pay Luis
Recato Dy the amount of P100,000.00 upon approval
of this agreement by this Honorable Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the judgment on compromise agreement
should be set aside due to mistake.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Acero gave his consent to the Compromise
Agreement in good faith that he would only vacate a portion of
his lot in favor of petitioner Domingo Realty.
Prior to the execution of the Compromise Agreement,
respondent Acero was already aware of the technical
description of the titled lots of petitioner Domingo Realty and
more so, of the boundaries and area of the lot he leased from
David Victorio. Before consenting to the agreement, he could
have simply hired a geodetic engineer to conduct a verification
survey and determine the actual encroachment of the area he
was leasing on the titled lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had
he undertaken such a precautionary measure, he would have
known that the entire area he was occupying intruded into the
titled lot of petitioners and possibly, he would not have signed
the agreement.
In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have easily
averted the alleged mistake in the contract; but through palpable
neglect, he failed to undertake the measures expected of a
person of ordinary prudence. Without doubt, this kind of mistake
cannot be resorted to by respondent Acero as a ground to nullify
an otherwise clear, legal, and valid agreement, even though the
document may become adverse and even ruinous to his
business.
Moreover, respondent failed to state in the Compromise
Agreement that he intended to vacate only a portion of the
property he was leasing. Such provision being beneficial to
respondent, he, in the exercise of the proper diligence required,
should have made sure that such matter was specified in the
Compromise Agreement. Respondent Aceros failure to have the
said stipulation incorporated in the Compromise Agreement is
negligence on his part and insufficient to abrogate the said
agreement.
Martinez v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank
G.R. No. L-5496, 19 February 1910
FACTS:
Plaintiff seeks to annul a contract on the ground that her consent
was obtained under duress. Under the contract, she agreed to
convey several properties to Aldecoa & Co. and HSBC as a
settlement of their claims against her and her husband, who fled
the country. It was established at the trial that during the period
of negotiation, representations were made to her by the
defendants and concurred in by her lawyers, that if she assented
to the requirements of the defendants, the civil suit against
herself and her husband would be dismissed and the criminal
charges against the latter withdrawn, but if she refused, her
husband must either spend the rest of his life abroad or be
criminally prosecuted.
ISSUE:
WON there was duress which would invalidate the contract.
RULING:
No. There is no duress that will invalidate the contract.
Article 1335 of the Civil Code in its last paragraph provides that:
“A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if
the claim is just or legal does not vitiate consent”.
In order that this contract can be annulled it must be shown that
the plaintiff never gave her consent to the execution thereof. It
is, however, necessary to distinguish between real duress and
the motive which is present when one gives his consent
reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties
entered into it against his wishes and desires or even against his
better judgment. Contracts are also valid even though they are
entered into by one of the parties without hope of advantage or
profit. A contract whereby reparation is made by one party for
injuries which he has willfully inflicted upon another is one which
from its inherent nature is entered into reluctantly by the party
making the reparation. He is confronted with a situation in which
he finds the necessity of making reparation or of taking the
consequences, civil or criminal, of his unlawful acts. He makes
the contract of reparation with extreme reluctance and only by
the compelling force of the punishment threatened.
Nevertheless, such contract is binding and enforceable. Petition
is dismissed.
Loyola v. CA
G.R. No. 115734, 23 February 2000
FACTS:
Gaudencia Zarraga allegedly sold to private respondents her
share in Lot 115-A-1. The sale was evidenced by a notarized
document denominated as “Bilihang Tuluyan ng Kalahati (1/2)
ng Isang Lagay na Lupa.”
Private respondents, are the children of Mariano Zarraga, the
brother of Gaudencia, alleged that they were the lawful owners
of Lot 115-A-1, the one-half share inherited by their father and
the other half purchased from their deceased aunt, Gaudencia.
Petitioners, all surnamed Loyola, are first cousins of private
respondents, assailed the validity of the deed of absolute sale
citing that it is a simulated contract since the notary public who
prepared the questioned Bilihan did not personally know
Gaudencia, thus, the deed of sale is questionable.
ISSUE:
Whether fraud or undue influence was exercised to obtain
Gaudencia’s consent to the sale.
RULING:
Article 1337 of the Civil Code states: There is undue influence
when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the
will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of
choice. The following circumstances shall be considered:
confidential, family, spiritual, and other relations between the
parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly
influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant
or in financial distress.
For undue influence to be established to justify the cancellation
of an instrument, three elements must be present:
1. a person who can be influenced;
2. the fact that improper influence was exerted;
3. submission to the overwhelming effect of such unlawful
conduct.
To prove a confidential relationship from which undue influence
may arise, the relationship must reflect a dominant,
overmastering influence which controls over the dependent
person. In the present case, petitioners failed to show that
Romana used her aunt’s reliance upon her to take advantage or
dominate her and dictate that she sell her land. Undue influence
is not to be inferred from age, sickness, or debility of body, if
sufficient intelligence remains.
The Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.
[A confidential or fiduciary relationship may include any relation
between persons, which allows one to dominate the other, with
the opportunity to use that superiority to the other’s
disadvantage. Included are those of attorney and client,
physician and patient, nurse and invalid, parent and child,
guardian and ward, member of a church or sect and spiritual
adviser, a person and his confidential adviser, or whenever a
confidential relationship exists as a fact.]
Woodhouse v Halili
July 31, 1953, 93 Phil. 526
FACTS:
On November 29, 1947, plaintiff Woodhouse entered into a
written agreement with defendant Halili for a partnership for the
bottling and distribution of Mission soft drinks, plaintiff to act as
industrial partner or manager, and the defendant as a capitalist.
The plaintiff was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for
and in behalf of the proposed partnership and that the plaintiff
was to receive 30 per cent of the net profits of the business.
Prior to the agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission Dry
Corporation that he had interested a prominent financier who
was willing to invest in the bottling and distribution of the said
beverages, and requested, in order that he may close the deal
with him, that the right to bottle and distribute be granted him for
a limited time under the condition that it will finally be transferred
to the corporation. Pursuant to this request, plaintiff was given
thirty days option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights.
Plaintiff prayed for the execution of the contract of partnership;
accounting of profits and share thereof of 30 percent with
damages. The Defendant on the other hand claims that the
defendant’s consent to the agreement, was secured by false
representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to
become owner of an exclusive bottling franchise. Further, he
contended that plaintiff did not secure the franchise but was
given to defendant himself. He also filed a counterclaim for
damages.
ISSUE:
WON false representation, if it existed, annuls the agreement to
form the partnership
RULING:
No. Article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code distinguishes two
kinds of (civil) fraud, the causal fraud, which may be ground for
the annulment of a contract, and the incidental deceit, which only
renders the party who employs it liable for damages only. The
Supreme Court has held that in order that fraud may vitiate
consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the
incidental (dolo incidente) inducement to the making of the
contract.
If ever the plaintiff was guilty of a false representation, this was
not the causal consideration that led plaintiff to enter into the
partnership agreement. The main cause that induced defendant
to enter into the partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the
ability of plaintiff to get the exclusive franchise to bottle and
distribute for the defendant or for the partnership.
Sps. Tongson v. Emergency Pawnshop
G.R. No. 167874, 15 January 2010
FACTS:
Napala offered to purchase the land of Spouses Tongson for
P3,000,000. The petitioners find the offer acceptable executed
with Napala a Memorandum of Agreement. Upon signing of the
Deed of Absolute Sale Napala paid P200,000 in cash to
petitioners and issued a postdated PNB check for the payment
of the remaining amount. However, the check bounces because
of insufficient fund, despite the petitioners repeated demand that
it be paid in full or return the land, Napala failed to do both now
the petitioners filed an action against Napala.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale can be annulled based on
the fraud employed by Napala.
RULING:
A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following
essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is,
consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent.
In the case, there is no dispute as regards the presence of the
two requisites for a valid sales contract, namely, (1) a
determinate subject matter and (2) a price certain in money. The
problem now lie with the existence of the remaining element,
which is consent of the contracting parties, specifically, the
consent of the Spouses Tongson to sell the property to Napala.
The Supreme Court found no causal fraud in this case to justify
the annulment of the contract of sale between the parties. It is
clear from the records that the Spouses Tongson agreed to sell
their property to Napala who offered to pay ₱3,000,000 as
purchase price therefor. Contrary to the Spouses Tongson’s
belief that the fraud employed by Napala was “already
operational at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale,”
the misrepresentation by Napala that the postdated PNB check
would bounce on its maturity hardly equates to dolo causante.
Napala’s assurance that the check he issued was fully funded
was not the principal inducement for the Spouses Tongson to
sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Even before Napala issued the
check, the parties had already consented and agreed to the sale
transaction. The Spouses Tongson were never tricked into
selling their property to Napala. On the contrary, they willingly
accepted Napala’s offer to purchase the property at ₱3,000,000.
In short, there was a meeting of the minds as to the object of the
sale as well as the consideration therefor.
Instances where there is an existence of causal fraud include:
(1) when the seller, who had no intention to part with her
property, was “tricked into believing”; (2) when the signature of
the authorized corporate officer was forged; or (3) when the
seller was seriously ill, and died a week after signing the deed
of sale raising doubts on whether the seller could have read, or
fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of
the consequences of his act. Suffice it to state that nothing
analogous to these badges of causal fraud exists in this case.
However, while no causal fraud attended the execution of the
sales contract, the fraud surfaced when Napala issued the
worthless check to the Spouses Tongson, which is definitely not
during the negotiation and perfection stages of the sale. Rather,
the fraud existed in the consummation stage of the sale when
the parties are in the process of performing their respective
obligations under the perfected contract of sale.
ECE Realty v. Mandap
G.R. No. 196182, 1 September 2014
FACTS:
The petitioner is a corporation engaged in building condominium
units. The petitioner started its construction at Pasay City.
However, in their advertisement it provides that it is situated in
Makati City. The respondent in belief that the condo unit was in
Makati City agreed to buy a unit by paying reservation fee,
downpayment and monthly installments. In their Contract to Sell
it indicated therein that the condo unit was in Pasay City.
More than two years after the execution of the contract,
respondent demanding the return of her payment on the ground
that the unit was built in Pasay not in Makati.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was guilty of fraud and if so, whether such
fraud is sufficient ground to nullify its contract with respondent.
RULING:
First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in
obtaining the consent of the party. This is referred to as causal
fraud. The deceit must be serious. The fraud is serious when it
is sufficient to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent person
into error; that which cannot deceive a prudent person cannot
be a ground for nullity. The circumstances of each case should
be considered, taking into account the personal conditions of the
victim. Second, the fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and not merely by preponderance thereof.
In the present case, the Supreme Court finds that petitioner is
guilty of false representation of a fact. This is evidenced by its
printed advertisements indicating that its subject condominium
project is located in Makati City when, in fact, it is in Pasay City.
However, insofar as the present case is concerned, the Court
agrees with the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, and the Office of the President, that
the misrepresentation made by petitioner in its advertisements
does not constitute causal fraud which would have been a valid
basis in annulling the Contract to Sell between petitioner and
respondent.
“Being a notarized document, it had in its favor the presumption
of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be upheld. Mandap failed to
overcome this presumption.
Laureta Trinidad v. IAC
G.R. No. L-65922, 3 December 1991
FACTS:
The house looked beautiful in summer but not when the waters
came. Then it was flooded five feet deep and leas than
prepossessing, let alone livable. Disenchanted, the buyer sued
the seller for the annulment of the sale and damages, alleging
fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was misrepresentation on the part of
Francisco to justify the rescission of the sale and the award
damages to the petitioner.
RULING:
Fraud is never lightly inferred, it is presumed that “a person is
innocent of crime or wrong” and that “private transactions have
been fair and regular.” While disputable, these presumptions
can be overcome only by clear and preponderant evidence. Our
finding is that the fraud alleged by the petitioner has not been
satisfactorily established to call for the annulment of the
contract. This finding is based on the following considerations.
First, it was the petitioner who admittedly approached the private
respondent, who never advertised the property nor offered it for
sale to her.
Second, the petitioner had full opportunity to inspect the
premises, including the drainage canals indicated in the vicinity
map that was furnished her, before she entered into the contract
of conditional sale.
Third, it is assumed that she made her appraisal of the property
not with the untrained eye of the ordinary prospective buyer but
with the experience and even expertise of the licensed real
estate broker that she was.
Fourth, seeing that the lot was depressed and there was a
drainage lot abutting it, she cannot say she was not forewarned
of the possibility that the place might be flooded.
Fifth, there is no evidence except her own testimony that two
previous owners of the property had vacated it because of the
floods and that Francisco assured her that the house would not
be flooded again. The supposed previous owners were not
presented as witnesses and neither were the neighbors.
Francisco himself denied having made the alleged assurance.
Sixth, the petitioner paid the 1970 and 1971 amortizations even
if, according to her Complaint, “since 1969 said lot had been
under floods of about one (1) foot deep,” and despite the floods
of September and November 1970.
Seventh, it is also curious that notwithstanding the said floods,
the petitioner still “made annexes and decorations on the
house,” all of a permanent nature, for which she now claims
reimbursement from the private respondent.
Songco v. Sellner
G.R. No. L-11513, 4 December 1917
FACTS:
George C. Sellner, was the owner of a farm which was
contiguous to a farm owned by the plaintiff Lamberto Songco.
Sellner desired to mill his cane at a sugar central. However, one
obstacle was that the owners of the central were not sure they
could mill his cane and would not promise to take it. Sellner,
however, learning that the central was going to mill Songco’s
cane, conceived the idea of buying the cane of the latter,
expecting to run his own cane in that same time the other should
be milled. Accordingly he bought Songco’s cane as it stood in
the fields for the agreed sum of P12,000 and executed therefor
three promissory notes of P4,000 each. Two of these notes were
paid; and the present action was instituted to recover upon the
third. A false representation was alleged to have been made by
Songco with respect to the quantity of uncut cane standing in the
fields at the time Sellner purchased the farm. Songco estimated
that the cane would produce 3,000 piculs of sugar and Sellner
bought the crop believing it to be correct but it turned out it only
produce a gross of 2,017 piculs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was false representation made by Songco
in order to secure the sale of sugar cane to Sellner.
RULING:
Sellner is bound in the sale and he must pay the price stipulated.
The representation in question can only be considered matter of
opinion as the cane was still standing in the field, and the
quantity of the sugar it would produce could not be known with
certainty until it should be harvested and milled. Undoubtedly
Songco had better experience and better information on which
to form an opinion on this question than Sellner. Nevertheless
the latter could judge with his own eyes as to the character of
the cane, and it is shown that he measured the fields and
ascertained that they contained 96 1/2 hectares.
A misinterpretation upon a mere matter of opinion is not an
actionable deceit, nor is it a sufficient ground for avoiding a
contract as fraudulent. We are aware that statements may be
found in the books to the effect that there is a difference between
giving an honest opinion and making a false representation as
to what one’s real opinion is. We do not think, however, that this
is a case where any such distinction should be drawn.
The law allows considerable latitude to seller’s statements, or
dealer’s talk; and experience teaches that it is exceedingly risky
to accept it at its face value. The refusal of the seller to warrant
his estimate should have admonished the purchaser that that
estimate was put forth as a mere opinion; and we will not now
hold the seller to a liability equal to that which would have been
created by a warranty, if one had been given.
Assertions concerning the property which is the subject of a
contract of sale, or in regard to its qualities and characteristics,
are the usual and ordinary means used by sellers to obtain a
high price and are always understood as affording to buyers no
ground for omitting to make inquiries. A man who relies upon
such an affirmation made by a person whose interest might so
readily prompt him to exaggerate the value of his property does
so at his peril, and must take the consequences of his own
imprudence.
Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu
G.R. No. L-11872, 1 December 1917
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father
of Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his sister
Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who
pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the
contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased
mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille
Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract asserting P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof,
that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of promised in writing to pay him P10,000 + 2% per annum in legal
contract. currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have not paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949.
ISSUE:
The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family
solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed. The
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid, when the minors
family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they
presented themselves of legal age, at the time of the perfection
were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2%
of the contract.
interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the
Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
RULING:
They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if they signed the promissory note.
it were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be
of legal age.
Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following
reasoning:
Whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the
particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
promissory note that they were not yet of legal age. If they were
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be
really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their
permitted to falsify it. Furthermore, the sale of real estate made
incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative
by a minor who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact he is not,
to their age, parted with his money, then he should have
is VALID, and he will not be permitted to excuse himself from the
contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by him or to have it
case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much-
annulled. The judgment that holds such sale to be valid and
needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory
absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him
note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to
does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minor’s property,
Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant
nor the judicial rules established in consonance therewith.
case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact, they were not, they
will not, later on, be permitted to excuse themselves from the
In the given case, annulment of the sale cannot be invoked on fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it
the ground of minority, since at the time of the perfection of the annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.)
contract; Domingo and Josefa presented themselves to be of
legal age.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the minors are liable for the promissory note?
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

G.R. No. L-12471, 13 April 1959

FACTS:
RULING:
No, in order to hold them liable, the fraud must be actual and not continuous possession of the properties in question. While the
constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making trial court favored the petitioner, the CA reversed the decision of
a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be the trial court by stating that the first deed of sale is absolutely
made the basis of an action of deceit. simulated and fictitious.

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who ISSUE:
contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age must be
actual, not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose
WON the first Deed of Sale is simulated and therefore invalid.
his age is not sufficient.

RULING:
However, the boys though not bound by the provisions of the
contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have
profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written Yes. It can be adduced by the facts that the first deed of sale
contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall stipulating a transfer of property from Federico to Rafael is
make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the absolutely simulated and fictitious. Rafael and Federico were
money received. relatives, whose blood relation was the foundation of their
professional and business relationship. Rafael admits that he
came into possession thereof in the course of rendering legal
services to his uncle. Their close relationship, as considered by
Suntay v. CA the CA, is a badge of simulation. Rafael further attempted to
claim that the transfer was consideration for his attorney’s fees.
The most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
G.R. No. 114950, 19 December 1995 absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the late
Rafael to assert his rights of ownership over the land and rice
FACTS: mill in question. After the sale, he should have entered the land
and occupied the premises thereof. He did not even attempt to.
Federico Suntay, herein private respondent, was the registered If he stood as owner, he would have collected rentals from
owner of a parcel of land and a rice mill. He applied as a miller- Federico for the use and occupation of the land and its
contractor of NARIC. His application was denied because he improvements. All that the late Rafael had was a title in his
was tied up with several unpaid loans. For purposes of name.
circumvention, he thought of letting his nephew-layer, herein
petitioner, to make the application for him. Rafael prepared the
deed of sale, wherein Federico sold the parcel of land and the
rice mill to Rafael. Three months later, the second deed of sale
was made, wherein Rafael sold back the properties in question
to Federico for a consideration of P20,000. A Certificate of Title
in the name of Federico was canceled and a new was one was
issued in the name of Rafael. In spite of this, Federico was
remained in possession of the property and continued to
exercise rights of absolute ownership over the property. Rafael,
meanwhile, did not make any attempt to take possession thereof
at any time. Federico requested Rafael to deliver his copy of the
TCT so that Federico could have the counter-deed of sale in his
favor registered in his name. Rafael declined and furthered
contended that the second deed of sale was a counterfeit.
Federico filed a complaint about reconveyance assailing the
validity of the first deed of sale, interjecting that he has been in