RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASE LIST
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESATE
1. SILVERIO SR. vs. SILVERIO JR. | 208828-29 | 2014
2. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS | 133743 | 2007*
3. AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP | 177099 | 2011*
4. SUNTAY III vs. COJUANCO-SUNTAY | 183053 | 2012*
5. LEE vs. RTC QC | 146006 | 2004
6. ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. CA & EDMOND RUIZ | 118671 | 1996*
7. UNION BANK vs. SANTIBANEZ | 149926 | 2005*
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN | 189121 | 2013*
9. PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF BRIONES | 150175 | 2007
10. SABIDONG vs. SOLAS | P-01-1448 | 2013
11. ARANAS vs. MERCADO | 156407 | 2014*
12. BUTIONG vs. PLAZO |187524 | 2015
B. ESCHEATS (RULE 91)
1. ALVARICO vs. SOLA | 138953 | 2002
2. MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO | 172720 |
2015
3. NARCISE vs. VALBUECO | 196888 | 2017
4. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF MENARDO CABRERA | 200369 |
2017
C. GUARDIANS AND GUADIANSHIP (RULE 92-97)
1. GOYENA vs. LEDESMA | 147148 | 2003
2. CANIZA vs. CA | 110427 | 1997
3. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY | 194366 | 2012
4. OROPESA vs. OROPESA | 184528 | 2012
5. ABAD vs. BIASON | 191993 | 2012
D. TRUSTEES (RULE 98)
1. LAND BANK vs. PEREZ | 166884 | 2012
E. ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS (RULE 99-100)
1. CASTRO vs. GREGORIO | | 2014
2. CANG vs. CA 296 SCRA 128
3. VDA DE JACOB vs. CA 312 SCRA 722
4. REPUBLIC vs. CA 255 SCRA 99
5. REYES vs. MAURICIO 636 SCRA
6. IN RE: STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA 454 SCRA
7. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM 588
SCRA 2009
8. NERY vs. SAMPANA 734 SCRA
9. BARTOLOME vs. SSS 740 SCRA
F. HABEAS CORPUZ (RULE 102)
1. ILUSORIO vs. BILDER 332 SCRA 169
2. SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANYAN 396 SCRA 443
3. LACSON vs. PEREZ 357 SCRA 756
4. SANGCA vs. CITY PROSECUTOR 524 SCRA 610
5. MANGILA vs. PNGILINAN 701 SCRA 355
6. TUJAN-MILITANTE 701 SCRA 355
7. DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO vs. THE WARDEN 755 SCRA 296
8. PADILLA vs. CONGRESS OF THE PHIL. 832 SCRA | 2017
9. OSORIO vs. NAVERA 856 SCRA 435 | 2017
G. CHANGE OF NAME VS CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
(RULE 103 vs. RULE 108)
1. ELEOSIDA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF Q.C. | 2002
2. REPUBLIC vs. KHO | 526 SCRA
3. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULAN LIM
CARULASAN WANG | 454 SCRA
4. BRAZA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEGROS OCC. | 607 SCRA |
2009
5. REPUBLIC vs. SILVERIO | 537 SCRA
6. REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN | 565 SCRA
7. REPUBLIC vs. UY | 703 SCRA | 2013
8. MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARINAY | 2013
9. PEOPLE vs. MERLINDA OLAYBAR | 2014
10. ONDE vs. CR OF LAS PINAS | 734 SCRA |2014
11. ALMOJUELA vs. REPUBLIC | 801 SCRA 399
12. GAN vs. REPUBLIC | 803 SCRA 204
13. CHUA vs. REPUBLIC | 845 SCRA 407 | 2017
I. PREROGATIVE WRITS
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
1. TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO | 554 SCRA
2. CARAM vs. SEGUI | 2014
3. VIVARES ET AL vs. STC ET AL || 2014
4. RAZON vs. TAGISTIS | 606 SCRA |
5. ROXAS vs. GMA | 630 SCRA
6. BURGOS vs. ESPERON | 715 SCRA | 2014
7. DOLOT vs. PAJE | 703 SCRA (CONTINUING MANDAMUS)
8. MERALCO vs. LIM | 632 SCRA | 2010
9. LEE vs. ILAGAN | 738 SCRA 59 |
10. ARIGO vs. SWIFT |735 SCRA 102
11. PAJE vs. CASINO | 749 SCRA 39
12. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. REYES | 180771| 2015
13. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM vs. PHIL. IND. CORP. | 758
SCRA 292
14. REPUBLIC vs. CAYANAN | 844 SCRA 183 | 2017
CASES PROPER
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
1. SILVERIO SR. vs. SILVERIO JR. | 208828-29 | 2014
The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any
disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
FACTS: The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a
will. Having survived by 6 legal heirs (respondent included),
an intestate proceeding for settlement of her estate was
filed by her husband, Silverio Sr.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different
petitions and appeal challenging several orders of the
intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme
Court.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and
appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO, SR.
and SILVERIO, JR. The Court of Appeals, then, rendered a
decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator.
Prior to the above proceedings, on October 31, 2006, the
intestate court ordered among others, the sale of certain
properties belonging to the estate.
By virtue of said order, Silverio Jr., sold the certain
properties to respondents Citrine Holdings, Inc., Monica
Ocampo and ZEE2 Resources, Inc. On the other hand,
Silverio Sr., filed for the issuance of TRO to prevent the
aforementioned sale and transfer of titles. Acting upon
Silverio Sr.’s petition, the intestate court granted the TRO
enjoining the sale and transfer of titles of the properties.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE INTESTATE COURT CAN ANNUL THE
SALE CONSIDERING ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION, WHICH
DOES NOT INCLUDE RESOLVING ISSUES ON OWNERSHIP?
HELD: YES. The rule that a sale by an administrator of
property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the
purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare
null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same
having been effected without authority from said court. It
is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a
fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or
terminated.
To uphold petitioner’s contention that the probate court
cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that:
 Any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and
 Any unauthorized disposition of estate property can
be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
However, while it is true that petitioner was eventually
reinstated as Administrator, the SC agree with the CA that
the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as
explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of
the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant
of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of
administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the
CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in
the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject
properties.
Therefore, respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should
not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good
faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval
of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated
October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting
insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
2. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS | 133743 | 2007
It has been held that that for purposes of fixing the venue
under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person refers
to one’s personal, actual, or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
one’s legal residence or domicile PROVIDED one resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
Section 2, Rule 79 provides that an interested person is one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. Pp. 96
FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis, during his lifetime, contracted
three marriages, to wit:
(1) First with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
children, one of which is herein petitioner Edgar San
Luis;
(2) On 1968 he was married to Merry Lee, with whom
he had a son, Tobias; but said marriage was divorced
by virtue of a decree granting said divorce by Family
court of Hawaii; and
(3) On 1984, he married Felicidad San Luis with whom
he had had no children but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Claiming to be the widow of the decedent, herein
respondent Felicidad San Luis sought the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate and filed a petition for letters of
administration before RTC Makati.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
Petitioners also insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval
v. Guray “residence” is synonymous with “domicile” which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time.
ISSUE: WHETHER VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna,
he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
ISSUE: WHETHER A SURVIVING SPOUSE WHOSE
MARRIAGE TO THE DECEDENT IS ASSAILED ON THE
GROUND OF PRIOR MARRIAGE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN
INTERESTED PARTY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
DECEDENT’S ESTATE?
HELD: YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. *See Stated Doctrine*
Page 1

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code.
This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating
the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
3. AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP | 177099 | 2011
GR: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
XPNs: As justified by expediency and convenience:
 First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon
in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.
 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
The jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Pp. 16
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
FACTS: On September 15, 1994, herein petitioner Eduardo
(son from 2nd marriage) filed with RTC Pasay a verified
petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin. It alleged that he died intestate
without debts or obligations.
The grandchildren of Joaquin from the first marriage filed
their opposition alleging that the 2 subject lots belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, and that,
upon Lucia’s death, they became pro indiviso owners of the
subject properties. They prayed that Joseph be appointed
as special or regular administrator.
RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator. It also allocated the greater part of the
estate in favor of the children of the second marriage
considering that the bulk of the estate property were
acquired during the existence of the second marriage.
The RTC dismissed respondents’ motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
decision, hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC, AS AN INTESTATE COURT, HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE ON OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* The general rule does not
apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be
impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate
court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his
verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate,
he alleged that the subject properties were owned by
Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that
Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad,
contracted a first marriage with Lucia.
Oppositors to the petition, grandchildren from first
marriage, however, were able to present proof before the
RTC that TCT were derived from a mother title in the name
of their grandfather married to their grandmother.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the
wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the
properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In
fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement
proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same
should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of
Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse.
4. SUNTAY III vs. COJUANCO-SUNTAY | 183053 | 2012
In determining who should be appointed as administrator,
the principal consideration of the court is the interest in the
estate od the one to be appointed as such administrator. Pp.
92
The Supreme Court have upheld the appointment of co-
administrators for the benefit of the estate:
(1) To have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps
at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) Where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;
(4) To have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; and
(5) When a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office. Pp. 93-94
As owner of one-half of the conjugal properties and at the
same time a compulsory, it would be unfair if the surviving
spouse be deprived of any hand in the administration
deceased-spouse’s estate. Pp. 94
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.
But since the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
appointee must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but also an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was
survived by her widower Dr. Federico Suntay, 3 legitimate
grandchildren including Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, and 2
illegitimate grandchildren including Emilio A.M. Suntay III,
both of whom were later adopted by Dr. Federico.
Isabel filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Cristina. Dr.
Federico opposed the petition and manifested that he will
nominate Emilio III as administrator. The RTC appointed
Emilio III, but the same was revoked by the CA, which
appointed Isabel as administratrix instead. The SC ordered
both Isabel and Emilio III to be joint administrators. Isabel
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
ISSUE: WHETHER EMILIO III SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF CRISTINA
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY?
HELD: YES. The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. The reason is that those who will reap the benefits
and suffer the consequences of management or
mismanagement have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
But given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
Mere interest in the estate does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration; nor does adverse
interests among the heirs necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in the Rules. Here, Emilio III’s
appointment as co-administrator is not a demandable right.
In fact, his appointment should be revoked in view of his
inactions and hostility towards Isabel, which may even
prove prejudicial to the disposition of the estate of the
deceased.
5. LEE vs. RTC QC | 146006 | 2004
Where the appropriation of estate properties is invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof to a third party without court
approval is likewise invalid.
An heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may
be alloted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees
shall have been given their shares.
The sale of the property of the estate by an administrator
without the order of the probate court is void and passes no
title to the purchaser, and any unauthorized disposition of
estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be
meaningless.
Where the issue is the effect of the sale made by the
decedent's heirs without the required approval of the
intestate court, not with the issue of inclusion or exclusion
of properties in the inventory of the estate, the
determination thereon by the intestate court is not merely
provisional.
Page 2

The title of a purchaser of an estate property can be struck
down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the
nullity of the alienation.
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on 1956. At the
time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind his wife
Juliana Salgado Ortañez, three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by
Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico
Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted
an inventory of the estate of their father which included
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the
company’s outstanding capital stock.
The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate
among themselves. Juliana and Jose then sold 1,014 and
1,011 shares respectively to FLAG. The lower court declared
the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed. Hence this
case.
ISSUE: WHETHER SALE IS NULL AND VOID?
HELD: YES. The rule is clear that any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending
final adjudication requires court approval and any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled
by the probate court, there being no need for a separate
action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil
Code which provides that possession of hereditary property
is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the
estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the
estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid
or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares.
This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the
present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of
the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
NOTE: The same case was tried again in 2005, this time for
indirect contempt of the Court and for the disbarment
and/or imposition of disciplinary sanctions on petitioners’
counsel for their refusal to comply with the final and
executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
Petitioners were found guilty.
6. ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. CA & EDMOND RUIZ | 118671 | 1996
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession
and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
of administration.” Pp. 119
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned forthe payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs. Pp.
177-178
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
Immediately after Hilario died, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. The
letters testamentary was issued to Edmond Ruiz
conditioned upon payment of the bond amounting to
P50,000.
The court then issued an order in favour of Edmond to take
possession of the rental payments of the properties it
leased out to third persons but only such amount as may be
necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for the support of Hilario’s grandchildren.
It also ordered the release of the titles of the properties to
certain heirs and granted possession of all properties of the
estate to the executor of the will.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROBATE COURT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE BEFORE PAYING
THE DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* In settlement of estate
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can
only be made:
 After all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
tax have been paid; or
 Before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of
the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the
taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet
paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or
make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
Therefore, no distribution of the estate should be made yet.
7. UNION BANK vs. SANTIBANEZ | 149926 | 2005
As soon as the probate court acquires jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, no other court can dispose
of such such properties without the probate court’s
approval, for that would be tantamount to divesting the
latter with jurisdiction. Pp. 11.
A probate court acting as such exercises limited jurisdiction.
The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation, and distribution of the estate.
Pp. 15
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing
any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extrajudicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval
is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of
its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Pp. 51
Claims mut be made within the time prescribed in the
notice, otherwise, they are barred forever. The exception to
this rule is when the claim is set up as a counterclaim in an
action brought by the executor or administrator of the
estate. The law imposes a time limit for the filing of the
claims for the following reasons:
(1) To protect the state of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed;
(2) For the speedy settlement of affairs of the deceased;
and
(3) The early delivery of property to distributes,
legatees, and heirs. Pp. 136
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased,
to determine whether they should or should not be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise or any other transaction.
FACTS: First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into two loan agreements. Efraim died,
leaving a holographic will, testate proceedings commenced
before the Regional Trial Court. Edmund, son of Efraim and
as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez
Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities
to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Hence UnionBank sent demand letter to Edmund which was
unheeded. UnionBank filed action for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence
before the RTC Makati.
Florence filed an answer alleging that the loan documents
did not bind her since she was not a party thereto,
considering that the joint agreement xxx was not approved
by the probate court, it was null and void hence she was not
liable to the UBP. RTC dismissed the case. Union Bank
appealed to CA which affirmed RTC. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIM OF UNION BANK SHOULD
HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE PROBATE COURT?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
Page 3

informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EDMUND
AND FLORENCE WAS VOID CONSIDERING THAT IT HAD
NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT?
HELD: YES. The Court held that there could be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The Court added that the filing of a money claim
against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN | 189121 | 2013
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. Pp. 12
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Pp.
93
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers
to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. Pp.
93
FACTS: Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo
Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are common-law
partners.
When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of
Las Piñas City., claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo
having conceived at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration asserting that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed.
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of
Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
ISSUE: WHETHER VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
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No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
ISSUE: WHETHER ELISE HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The Court ruled that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of right, such that any interested party may
attach the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.
Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death
of her father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing
an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as
an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse.
As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action for the
declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia. Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be an interested
part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in
the estate. Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party.
9. PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF BRIONES | 150175 | 2007
It should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and
that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the same,
in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing
on the date and time indicated in the publication.
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union
did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle
her husband’s estate. CFI issued Letters of Administration
appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s
estate.
Subsequently, CFI issue an Order, awarding ownership of
the aforementioned real properties to Donata. Donata died
on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of
the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of
Donata’s intestate estate.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint
with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property.
They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of
Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach
of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the
heirs of Maximino.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. SC reversed the
decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property filed by the heirs of Maximino. Hence this motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD?
HELD: NO. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name.
Donata was able to register the real properties in her name,
not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order,
dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the
entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband.
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate
estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband.
The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its
conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy
the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m)
and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court,
reproduced below –
 (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
 (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must
presume, in the absence of any clear and convincing proof
to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and
to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it
could not give credence to the following statements made
by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, *See Stated Doctrine.*
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties
in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were
not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless
of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
10. SABIDONG vs. SOLAS | P-01-1448 | 2013
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is Lot No. 11 which is
part of the Hodges Estate. Hodges Estate is the subject of a
pending intestate proceedings. Herein complainant is the
son of Trinidad Sabidong, one of the longtime occupants of
Lot 11. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by
the Hodges Estate, docketed at the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch
4.
On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case
ordering the occupants to immediately vacate the portion
of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due,
attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time,
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3,
Iloilo City.
On January 8, 1986, respondent submitted an Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
amount of P35,100. Under the Order dated November 18,
1986 issued by the probate court, respondent’s Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 was approved.
On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another
Order granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ
of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over Lot
11 was eventually issued on June 27, 1989. On November
21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was
executed. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent on
installment for the total purchase price of P50,000. Thus, a
new certificate of title in the name of respondent was
issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-
complaint asserting that as court employee respondent
cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a
buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty,
oppression and grave abuse of authority.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN ESTATE PROCEEDING MAY
BE CONSIDERED A PENDING LITIGATION IN RELATION TO
THE PROPERTY INCLUDED IS SUCH ESTATE WHICH
DISALLOWS A COURT OFFICIAL FROM PURCHASING THE
SAME ON THE GROUND OF ART. 1491 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
Page 4

HELD: YES. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code provides that
he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property
is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it
was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same.
Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672
in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale
With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still
deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, it was held that the sale of Lot 11 in
favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No.
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1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not
MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11. ARANAS vs. MERCADO | 156407 | 2014
Questions of title may be passed on provisionally, but the
final determination of the ownership of the property must
be threshed out in a separate civil action and not in probate
court. Pp. 19
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of
ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Pp. 24
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified
by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity. Pp. 116
FACTS: Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his
real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty. Emigdio died
intestate survived by: 1st family: 2 children (Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma)) and
2nd family: Wife (Teresita V. Mercado) and their 5 children
(Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson). Teresita was the appointed administrator of the
estate.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. The RTC ruled
in favor of Thelma and ordered Teresita to redo the
inventory of properties by including therein the properties.
Teresita et al filed an MR before the RTC alleging that the
real properties had been sold and assigned to Mervir but
RTC denied the MR.
Hence, Teresita et al filed petition for certiorari against the
RTC. CA ruled in favor of Teresita et al (Hindi na si Emigdio
ang owner dahil sa sold and assigned na ang properties kay
Mervir – w/c has separate and distinct personality from its
stockholders, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is NOT
warranted because the wrongdoing cannot be presumed –
it must be clearly and convincingly established). Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER PROBATE COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO
DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES
FOR PURPOSES OF THEIR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION FROM
THE INVENTORY TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE
ADMINISTRATOR?
HELD: YES. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator.
If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title. However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
12. BUTIONG vs. PLAZO |187524 | 2015
Where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there
is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for him and to deprive the real owners
of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
FACTS: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma.
Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, his second wife Benita
Tenorio and other children, as well as several properties
including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square
meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is
covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Respondents Plazo filed an action for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession dated
September 15, 1993, on the ground their co-heirs, Pedro's
second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold
Pedro’s resort and family home to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria,
without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the
same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however,
did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. Subsequently,
respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita.
Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse
claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among
others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the
subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents due to the
irregularities irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public
who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed.
The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side
of the document was not signed. The CA affirmed RTC’s
decision. Before the SC, petitioners contended that the RTC
had no jurisdiction. According to them, the allegations in
the complaint filed by the respondents show that the cause
of action is actually one for settlement of estate of
decedent Pedro.
Considering that settlement of estate is a special
proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
jurisdiction, while judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the respondent’s
complaint.
ISSUE: WON THE RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IS FOR THE
Page 5

SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF PEDRO AND NOT OF
PARTITION?
HELD: NO. The RTC had jurisdiction. Petitioner is mistaken.
It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would
readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.
— A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
Here, the complaint alleged:
(1) That Pedro died intestate;
(2) That respondents, together with their co-heirs, are
all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose;
(3) That the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs
of Pedro;
(4) That there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro;
(5) That Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness;
and
(6) That respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's
estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of
the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement
of estate.
MATTER OF ADMINISTRATOR: The general rule is that
when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a
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decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action for partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.
The reason is that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate
for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession
to which they are immediately entitled.
NOTE: Notwithstanding the decision, the RTC still retains
jurisdiction because the given case is incapable of pecuniary
estimation which is a situation well-within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
B. ESCHEATS
1. ALVARICO vs. SOLA | 138953 | 2002
Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or
any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain.
FACTS: Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of
respondent Amelita Sola while Fermina Lopez is petitioner's
aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother. Bureau of Lands
approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application
of Fermina over the subject land in Waterfront, Cebut City.
Fermina executed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of
Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume
all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon
Fermina under the MSA. Amelita then paid to the Bureau of
Lands the amount of P283 thousand.
The BL issued an order approving the transfer of rights and
granting the amendment of the application from Fermina
to Amelita. OCT was issued. Castorio filed an action for
reconveyance against Amelita, claiming that Fermina
donated the land to him. Amelita filed an answer
maintaining that the donation to him is void because
Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it
was allegedly donated to him, the property having
transferred earlier to her.
She added that the donation was void because of lack of
approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. RTC ruled in
favor of Castorio, CA reversed RTC. Hence Castorio filed
Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE: WHETHER AMELITA HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO THE
LAND?
HELD: YES. Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad
faith when she registered the land in her name and, based
on Article 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, he has a
better right over the property because he was first in
material possession in good faith. However, this allegation
of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title
is devoid of evidentiary support.
For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case
of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail
and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No.
3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires
more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original
Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons
must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its
registration.
ISSUE: WHETHER CASTORIO CORRECTLY RESORTED TO AN
ACTION FOR REVERSION?
HELD: NO, Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola
acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the
State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of
the Public Land Act. Thus: Sec. 101.—All actions for
reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
*See Stated Doctrine* Since Amelita Sola's title originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then,
petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of
Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot "recover" the
property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he
is the rightful owner thereof.
2. MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO | 172720 |
2015
The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general
rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to
file an action for reversion.
FACTS: Eusebio Borromeo wasgranted a Free Patent over a
piece of agriculturalland. Eusebio soldthe land to Eliseo
Maltos during the five-yearprohibitory.Eusebio died and his
heirs claimed that priorto his death, heallegedly told his
wife,Norberta and his children to nullify the salemade
toEliseo and have the TransferCertificate of Title No. T-
5477cancelled because the sale was within the five-
yearprohibitoryperiod.
Norberta and her children filed a Complaint for Nullity of
TitleandReconveyance of Title against Eliseo and
theRegister of Deeds. Eliseofiled his Answer,arguing that
the sale was made in good faithand that inpurchasing the
property, he reliedon Eusebio's title. Further, the
partieswere inpari delicto. Since the sale was made
duringthe five-year prohibitoryperiod, the landwould revert
to the public domain and theproper party toinstitute
reversion proceedingswas the Office of the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF AN AGRICULTURAL
LAND BY A FREE PATENT DURING THEFIVE-YEAR
PROHIBITED PERIOD WILL RESULT TO ITS AUTOMATIC
REVERSION AS PART OFTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
HELD: NO. The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered
by a free patent during thefive-year prohibitory period
under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of
land is proper. *See Stated Doctrine*
The contention that pari delict shall apply is untenable. The
doctrine of in pari delicto nonorituractio isinapplicable
when public policy will be violated (the sale of an
agriculturalland covered by a free patent during the five-
year prohibited period isagainst public policy because the
main purpose in the grant of a free patentof homestead is
to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
thatportion of public land which the State has given to him
so he may have aplace to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a usefulmember of the society)
3. NARCISE vs. VALBUECO | 196888 | 2017
An action for reversion can only be brought by the osg
because if successful, the land will revert to the state while
an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of
title may be brought by persons who have interest in the
subject property
FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the CA’s order reversing the earlier decision of the RTC
which dismissed the case. Respondent Valbueco Inc.
alleged that it peacefully possessed the subject land since
1970 and that its presence along with that of its
predecessors-in-interest was never disturbed until 2000.
In 2005, respondent filed an action for annulment of free
patent and certificate against petitioners Narcise, et al., the
DENR and the Register of Deeds of Bataan. A reading of the
complaint reveals that respondent claims acquisitive
prescription as its basis for the annulment of patents and
titles.
From 1977 until 1999, petitioners Aurelia Narcise et.al.
were named as the beneficiaries of free patents, OCTs, and
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TCTs covering the same lot. Instead of filing an Answer,
petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action,
defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and
prescription.
The trial court dismissed the case holding that only the OSG
has the standing to file the case but the CA reversed the trial
court. Petitioner interposed whether the respondent is the
real party-in-interest.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAVE THE PROPER
LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A CASE FOR THE ANNULMENT
OF THE FREE PATENTS AND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE?
HELD: YES, the respondent has the proper legal standing to
file a case for the annulment of the free patents and the
certificate of title.
An action for reversion, a remedy provided under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original
certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate
of title, including the transfer of certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured
through fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and
nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is
filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the
Administrative Code.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents
and certificates of title also seeks for the cancellation and
nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is
granted, it does not operate to revert the property back to
the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity
arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the
director of the Land Management Bureau had no
jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio.
Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as
to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is
sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for
annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent
allegations deal with plaintiff's ownership of the contested
land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant's
fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Here, the action is one of annulment of patents and titles.
The allegations in the complaint show that respondent
asserts its ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription. Thus, being an action for
annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is
the real party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
4. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF CABRERA | 218418 | 2017
The Supreme Court held that public land fraudulently or
erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates
of title may be recovered by the State through reversion
proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 (2006), instructs that in
the absence of any prior classification by the State,
unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category
of forest lands not open to disposition.
The classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and is
exercised by the latter through the President, or such other
persons vested with authority to exercise the same on his
behalf.
The applicant is bound to establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be
registered had been declared alienable or disposable
through a positive act of the State.
Reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State
seeks to revert land to the mass of the public domain. It is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, or
when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act
which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the
public domain.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision rendered by
the CA affirming the Decision of the RTC ruling that the
Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas properties
have been reclassified as forest land.
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free
Patent concerning an 8,072 square-meter parcel of land. In
said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in
possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his
predecessor-in interest Marcelo Cabrera. The Bureau of
Lands issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of Meynardo,
covering the lots.
A portion of Lot 1 was transferred to Consolacion, who sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers. Jose and Leticia
De Castro, claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A,
filed before the DENR a petition urging the department to
conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1- A's land
classification status. In the DENR Final Report, Free Patent
No. 516197 covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas
Properties) was declared null and void for having been
issued over land forming part of the public domain.
The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report;
and (ii) NAMRIA certifications, all stating that the Roxas
Properties had been reclassified as forest land as early as
November 24, 1949.
ISSUE: WHETHER A POSITIVE ACT OF GOVERNMENT
NECESSARY TO EVINCE THE RECLASSIFICATION OF LAND
FROM ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE TO FOREST?
HELD: YES, a positive act of government is necessary for the
reclassification of land. Pursuant to Sections 6 and 7 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, the classification and reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and
is exercised by the latter through the President, or such
other persons vested with authority to exercise the same
on his behalf.
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive
in nature, such acts, effected without executive authority,
are void, and essentially ultra vires. The Republic presented
the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint for
reversion:
o DENR Final Report;
o NAMRIA certifications; and
o LC Map 209.
However, these documents, whether taken individually or
collectively, do not evince a positive act of reclassification
by the Executive Department. Engineer Mendez admitted
that there was no presidential order or act reverting the
classification of the subject property from alienable and
disposable to forest land.
The foregoing testimony confirms that the alleged
reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as
it was done by Engineer Mendez on his sole account,
without any prior directive from the President, or a duly
authorized officer from the Executive Department. In fact,
the annotation appearing on LC Map 209 upon which the
Republic relies does not even state upon whose authority
the alleged reclassification had been made, placing the
annotation's validity, veracity and worth in serious doubt.
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