A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo
G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit
on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized
by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and
Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling
in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into
the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted
in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article
41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
Page 1 of 152
 (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, married persons.
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4 period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate
the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of
the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
Page 2 of 152
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left
by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request
he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery
of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only
gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered
by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall
be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record
of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue
a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9
May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot
issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We
held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
Page 3 of 152
 officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Page 4 of 152
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that
the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and
is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family,
avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
Page 5 of 152
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon
in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code
is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas
a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise
that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned,
it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death
of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity
Page 6 of 152
can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the
death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Page 7 of 152
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children
were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and
Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case
at bar.
Page 8 of 152
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to
judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Page 9 of 152
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-
Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose)
and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.
The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
4
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute
the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him
on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed
an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina
were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between
Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces
of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on
guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written
instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November
29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
Page 10 of 152
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
Felisa.15
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the
is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered
Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established
only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage. Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
Page 11 of 152
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
wit: under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

I It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the
Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
II
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. (2) Their consent, freely given;

III (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v.
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential which provides:
and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate
as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents:
(1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his legalizing their status.36
wife.
Page 12 of 152
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a
sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the
law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The
appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute
a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this
Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes
that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.
Page 13 of 152
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity;
hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Page 14 of 152
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since
the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent
to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his
parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife
and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when
the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated
7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case.
There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but
it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March
1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and
not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
Page 15 of 152
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support.
Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that
their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with
the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
entitled to support.
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
Court and special laws.28
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment child, thus stating:
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22 That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by
the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
Page 16 of 152
 sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go
to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of
the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1"
and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to
"H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2")
respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch
70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 17 of 152
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of
a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information
that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification
on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a
certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed
by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and
that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any
other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January
9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After
the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified
Page 18 of 152
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and
that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It
also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9,
1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE,
THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE
WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
Page 19 of 152
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued.
The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44
Page 20 of 152
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. It is worth noting
45
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin,
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy
of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima
Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed
on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a
second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready
to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
Page 21 of 152
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Page 22 of 152
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age
(scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain,
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination
of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita
Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal
that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning,
the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what
he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a
maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta
and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living
with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"),
while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their
love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-
appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño
liable for damages;.
Page 23 of 152
 3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that — For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
country.
act, which provided the following:

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
divorces outside the Philippines.
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
Phil. 579).
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
valid and binding. jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
dismissed for non-prosecution.
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Page 24 of 152
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for
the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for
legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App.,
pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and
for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record
shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked
for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and
arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon
advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony
was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to
the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in
law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she
was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury
even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and
being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected.
Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of
a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where
he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it
has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may
in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so
long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied
in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused
them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
Page 25 of 152
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

Page 26 of 152
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the
Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration
of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order
of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower
Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of
time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in
the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground
of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP
& GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without
further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
Page 27 of 152
 relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Page 28 of 152
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to
be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes,
Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent
city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not
yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases
to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted
on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Page 29 of 152
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of
legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing
of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but
did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the
right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect
on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Page 30 of 152
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void",
the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab
initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is
the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by
a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where
the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse
therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Page 31 of 152
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
Page 32 of 152
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those
whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here
and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
Page 33 of 152
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Page 34 of 152
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
is granted to the father.
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

QUISUMBING, J.:

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of
by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from
divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the
between petitioner and private respondent.
order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set
aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues
relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children. On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital
tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born
the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well
dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order 8 dated
August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to
the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive
Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien
spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50
and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is
partially set aside with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov.
1997:
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
The parental custody for the children

Page 35 of 152
 1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not
allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody
of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated
September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim,
deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying
the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14,
1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside
the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may
deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the
judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or
final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial
or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment
or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has
not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover,
in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after
the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there
are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained
finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently
held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a
German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been
challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
Page 36 of 152
 (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
the thing; proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right SO ORDERED.
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res
judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The
proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree
itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to
the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent
had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued
to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived
separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on
the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of
her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of
this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property
nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the
proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be
accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no
longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of
the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which
is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30,
1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the

Page 37 of 152
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
The Case

Ruling of the Trial Court

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3

Hence, this Petition.18

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

Issues
The Facts

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. "I

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
"2
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
"3
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4
Page 38 of 152
 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and
53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
Page 39 of 152
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment
of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce
may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient
to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated
and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
Page 40 of 152
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon,
Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records; 54 and
(e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 41 of 152
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
DECISION
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
BRION, J.:
THE PETITION
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
(present petition).

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
divorce decree.
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
THE COURT’S RULING
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages.
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

Page 42 of 152
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of
the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in
a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity
are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Page 43 of 152
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by
its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status,
i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status
of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Page 44 of 152
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Page 45 of 152
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure
but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which
is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
Page 46 of 152
 In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
A Yes, Your Honor.
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court has no more questions.
The Court's Ruling
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
The petition is meritorious.
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
of the bench and the bar:
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
COURT
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
A Yes, Your Honor. alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman. assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
Page 47 of 152
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
SO ORDERED.
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
concur.
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

Page 48 of 152
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July
24, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36
of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126
and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime
of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where
the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
Page 49 of 152
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality
of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged
in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by
an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from
an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not
a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had
no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity
of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court
as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Page 50 of 152
 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
essential obligation of marriage.
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
decision. afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
xxx xxx xxx
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to marriage void.
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10 the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or costs.
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a SO ORDERED.
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

Page 51 of 152
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the
unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was
no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces
of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Page 52 of 152
 Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is
no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from
any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
Page 53 of 152
 to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4 though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, —
marital status.
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months. We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order,
it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

SO ORDERED.

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
Page 54 of 152
G.R. No. 167523 June 27, 2008
NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner,
vs.
REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2,
2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The facts are as follows:
Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked
as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by
her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was
prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This,
despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that
she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him.3 The two got married
on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.4
Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems
arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care
of him and attend to household chores.5 Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics
instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity
recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself
as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time
when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home
late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a
child with him, as it would destroy her figure.6 On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never
reconciled with her again.7
On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his
marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior
indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.8
Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing that Nilda
used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of "Navales."9 Reynaldo also presented Josefino Ramos, who
testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer," and
that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk
with.10 Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the
YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and
wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that
there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which
angered Reynaldo.11
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a
Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.12 In said Assessment, Vatanagul
concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an
alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are
incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to
Reynaldo.13
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo
continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.14 She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who
was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and
subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the
YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her
for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo,
with concubinage.15 Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that
she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies,16 as well as a
statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, Nilda B. Navales. 17
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case
declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted
on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.18
The RTC held that:
x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established that the
defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of
[the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing her marital status by
using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of being still single
through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband
despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her
husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch
her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in the full
view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as
aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband
because it will destroy her figure, is a clear indication of the herein defendant's psychological
incapacity.19
Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002.20
The CA dismissed Nilda’s appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital
status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania,
the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological
Page 55 of 152
incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence
presented by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.21
Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
I law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital
obligations as a wife.
II
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or
INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
MARRIAGE.
III
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly
preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family
Code has not been strictly complied with.22
Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she
never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo
against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.23 She
questions the lower courts’ finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by
the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to
show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living
together.24
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. Molina25 were not complied with.
The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in
favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given
weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was
already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave
enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage.26
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction.27 Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a
review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and
passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of
requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo
City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses, one of
whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause of
action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present
her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by
nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to
Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo
and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of
Vatanagul.28
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments.29
Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda
is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.
family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.30 The
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties.31 The Family Code under Article 4832therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to
appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of
the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of
marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.33
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is
agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,34 still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through
the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.35
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case
through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of
the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no
collusion exists between the parties;36 the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated June 2, 2000;37 and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on
Reynaldo38 and his witness Abales.39 There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed
Page 56 of 152
by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the
judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the
Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting.40
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary
to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such
principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of
facts.41 Such is the case at bar.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 42 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.43
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,44 the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.45 In Republic of the Philippines v.
Molina,46 the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological --- not physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.47
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage,
which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances
alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another man instead of
him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men
to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by
themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or
grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations.48 Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations
or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.49 Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.50
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first
year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during
the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.51
In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, the same must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,52 37,53 3854 and 4155of the Family
Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45
Page 57 of 152
that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation.56 These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.57 Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.58
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that
Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings presented by
Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995,59 after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992.
Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda
represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot agree with the
RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in
turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for
its understanding of the human personality,60 and that there is no requirement that the defendant
spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity may be declared,61 still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained,62 and said incapacity
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.63
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the
trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no
other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to
support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge
the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage.69
While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.70 And this
Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it
may be.71
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
799, is DISMISSED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an Associate Justice
emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego,
emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions,
an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful,
impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and vain.64 She further defined "nymphomia" as a
psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship
with various men other than her husband.65

The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that
she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims,
during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also
Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain
Marvin and a certain Susan.66 Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons,
which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations.
Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As
the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and
failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral
element" in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying
with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even
before the marriage.67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment.

The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed
very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.68

Page 58 of 152
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in
our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case,
however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with
the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The
petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided
to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back
to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was
abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years
old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like
a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his
brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward
relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could
live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that
he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if
there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated,
and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification
of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P.
Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient.
This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself
to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he
tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself
from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She
is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
Page 59 of 152
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of Revised Beta Examination
their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as
they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because Draw A Person Test
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent,
but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties
tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all
of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the MMPI
meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent
called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went
home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to
make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent,
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they
are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they REMARKS:
will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner
that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting
new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives. unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that
she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly- Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself. The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
TESTS ADMINISTERED: marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
Page 60 of 152
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum,
the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case
may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points
out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he
avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the
trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. 27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The
root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine
the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-
fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and
the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person
would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one
for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took
time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present
Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Page 61 of 152
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’ insanity of a lesser degree.

‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop
prescribe.’ Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
xxxxxxxxx
discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of
due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-
age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
2. reasons of public policy;
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
3. special cases and special situations.
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations,"
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration." Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties from the beginning.
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."

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Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as
to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders
such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of
proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present
in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change
was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to
accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony
as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment
and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and
on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there
remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and
prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of
them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph
does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori
that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent
[the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which
does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an
object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals
not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of
positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania
is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment,
and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact
the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence
from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which
may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of
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what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render
question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed
essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
the incapacity to posit consent itself.
xxxx
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one
the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its
of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent,
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon
free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly
realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be
more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of
consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent,
realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem
detained and individual description.
more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the
party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire. A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent
may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to
give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods. matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of
the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how
to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can
others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac
taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.
affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but
also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a
person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
evaluating of those same obligations. centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not
have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even
all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties
of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the

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Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to
be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon
that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is
it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due
discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because
he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference
to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution
which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
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 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
provides: schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.51
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of
contemplated under Canon 1095.47
the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to
result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
judgment for that of the trial court."48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." 50 The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
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By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended
to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more
than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship
to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option
for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who
are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the
case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-
term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but
are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress
or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
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less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may
lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead
to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding
and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at
the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to
derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness
and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have found
little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality
may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent
in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized
into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through
a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65 and
antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
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The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further
consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the
same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has
no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control
of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive
and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5,
2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

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G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker"
in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending
to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
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(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that
the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.
He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided
by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
Page 71 of 152
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already
married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law
of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was
cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage
void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family
Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice
of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated
in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed
that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even
though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
Page 72 of 152
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t],"
and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
provides:
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

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Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law
on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,
the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses
in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two
(2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected
to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as
this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about
this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another
woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
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Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to
perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about
her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent
to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial
court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of
her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less
its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at
best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles
45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of
respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
Page 75 of 152
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of
the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial
consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a
judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to
prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also
by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition
by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged,
as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time
when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are
further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
Page 76 of 152
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Page 77 of 152
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010 marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
vs. 10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

DECISION xxxx

BRION, J.: Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.2 The reversed the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged
incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on
THE FACTS these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they
were married.
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after
their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for
Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural
the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of (sic) pattern before you got married?
Jocelyn’s efforts.
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he
has since lived. They now have children. Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got
married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
Q. Even to other people?

xxxx
A. He also quarrel (sic).3

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been
marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome
encounter; When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his

Page 78 of 152
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage
the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe
apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I
examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital
relationship with respondent.
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality
Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative
and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering
last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that
that kind of disorder (sic).
marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality
practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior Court:
fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in
proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and
became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent
up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean? (sic).

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he Court:
entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not
develop (sic). Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic). A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not
he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological
disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the Court:
person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Permanent and incurable.
Court:
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time
of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Yes, ma’am."
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

xxxx
Court:

Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).

Page 79 of 152
 Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not
aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the
influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than
one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid
instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for
the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices.
(sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but
what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder,
he is good for nothing person.4
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states: 5
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage"
versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver,
eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a
heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that
she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy,
chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so
that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set
simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she
needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for
frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative
trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the Philippines – strongly opposed
the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it
argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was
purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be
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unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points
(sic) to one thing – that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent.
On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the
former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all – a wife beater.
The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided,
after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and
that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latter’s
niece (sic) and because they were living with her husband’s family, she was obliged to do the
household chores – an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a
servant in his (sic) husband’s family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their
marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives.
The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the
respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted above] would
only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is
not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268
SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar
(sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that
there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief
prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now
separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag
during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons
with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.8
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals
and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach
which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically
identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children,
relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in
the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological
capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically
incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due
to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the
husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed
to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary
to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-
social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical
or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could
equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or
the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt
that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and
more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the
petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be
extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize
what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling
based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal
basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158;
to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial
Page 81 of 152
 Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the time
of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was
intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled
by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract
marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of
a psychic nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being
clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing
jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what
constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on
generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually
exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the
RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an
abstract concept – psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations
of marriage – without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must
therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined
to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in
Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
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 adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.13
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under
the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d)
of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including
expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of
evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability
of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us were invariably
decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on
Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from
the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some
resiliency in its application.19
Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the
Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court
are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as
so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
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Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but
that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-
Ting20 follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of
poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case.
The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as
follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the
Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling
to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations – must be shown.26Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity to
perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence
on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the
appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence – the
psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias
for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons
intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
Page 84 of 152
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological
doubtful sources of information. incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from
a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by
the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be
found in her testimony.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity,
do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may
concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such
violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there
must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the
present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even
assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were
true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or incurable;
Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his
early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that
Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s
own equivocation on this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized
that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based
entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of Angelito’s family background and upbringing.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings
of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal with us)
does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36
and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was
SO ORDERED.
Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito’s
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites
of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.

b. Jocelyn’s Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist’s
testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she
provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s

habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received
from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that
Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder,
during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the
alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the
time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that

Page 85 of 152
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and
Resolution3 dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which
affirmed the Decision4 dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte,
Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia
(Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug,
Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2)
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza),
who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
(complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the
Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on
the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they
were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely
three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely
worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and
train with the army,12 Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his
consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez
(Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad
contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and
has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned
them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest
efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s psychological
incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons.18Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric
examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo also
underwent the same examination.20
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both
parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct." 22 As for Natividad,
Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her
two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he
sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties
already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on
the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for
the obligations of marriage."23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed
by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere
grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and
Natividad void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr.
Zalsos, holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in
psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties’ marriage
but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that Natividad’s
condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality. Accordingly, it
concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividad’s personality
traits constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that
the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily
equate to psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad]
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations."30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution31 dated February
3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
Page 86 of 152
The petition is meritorious. conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is
essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad
was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632 of the Family Code,
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the
should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be
courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.45 After
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among
uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with
others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity,
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been
marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).37 The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic
of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated
basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.40 February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family
Code is DISMISSED.
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein respondent’s emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to SO ORDERED.
discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her
Associate Justice
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the Court
upheld the appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband
"showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has
preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been
identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature."44

The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1âwphi1 Based on the evidence presented, there
exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which
does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad,
Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it
existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's
behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in
Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare

Page 87 of 152
G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954 the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a
competent court.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant. This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse,
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.
Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1âwphïl.nêt
PARAS, C.J.:
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of officio so ordered.
Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married
in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was
married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19,
1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This
last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and,
therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5,
1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot
be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The
Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga
Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment
of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling.
Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of
his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual
contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act
3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:1âwphïl.nêt

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by

Page 88 of 152
 [G.R. No. L-10016. February 28, 1957.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROCESO S. ARAGON, Defendant-
Appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for Appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. MARRIAGE LAW NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES; JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY, NOT
NECESSARY. — A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity as distinguished from mere annuable marriage. (People v. Mendoza, L-5877, September 28,
1954.)
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The
facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
"On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with
a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A). While his
marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita church in
Iloilo City.
"The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomera, a clerk in the said office
(Exhibit "A", and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage,
the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling
salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he
maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit
"2"). After Maria Gorrea’s death, and seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, the accused brought
Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.
"It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it
appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to
Ilioilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the
accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Magsalang on October 3, 1953, in
Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F").
"The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang in Sibonga, Cebu, on
October 3, 1953. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria
Faicol, the Court, however, believes the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was
fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria
Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused
made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B" ; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27,
1954)." library
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in he absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang without the dissolution of his
marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of
such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for his ruling are 5 iada, 5th edition,
651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs, Bickford, 74 N.H. 466, A.
579.
Appellant in this court relies on the case of People v. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10]
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of Act 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity, as distinguished from mere
annuable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive
years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void
by a subsequent court."
We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case
above-quoted. But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict
construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify
our stand in the above-cited case of People v. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent
enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity
of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of
strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this
marriage cannot prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Page 89 of 152
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
under the law.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PARAS, J.:
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of
Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of
the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior
marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted
on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her
favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable
(Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is

Page 90 of 152
G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986
SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administratrix of the estate of
MANING YAP, JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA. DE YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP, JASMIN YAP, and
SAMUEL YAP, respondents.
Francisco Villanueva for petitioners.
Ramon Tuangco for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the earlier decision of
the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Special Proceeding No. 1334 (R-61), declaring the
petitioners as the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap entitled to inherit his estate and dismissing the
opposition filed by the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision on appeal reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and, after a complete
and correct inventory is returned by the administratrix, the entire estate of the
deceased Maning Yap shall be divided into two equal parts, one-half (1/2)
corresponding to the petitioner Talina Bianong and her children Shirley Yap and
Jaime Yap and the other half corresponding to the oppositors Nancy J. Yap and her
children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy
Yap on December 11, 1948.
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in
accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the Islam religion professed by both of
them. Immediately, after the marriage, the couple lived in the house of the parents of Maning Yap at
the poblacion of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Out of the marriage, four children were born; two of them
died in infancy during the Japanese occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley Yap and
Jaime Yap.
While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on December 11, 1948
in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a married man.
They had four children, namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap.
On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur, in the crash of an airplane of the
Philippine Air Lines. At the time of his death he, therefore, had two families living separately about 80
kilometers apart.
On March 3, 1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed Special Proceeding No. 1334 (Intestate Estate of
Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, seeking the issuance of letters of
administration for the estate of Maning Yap. Among other things, the petition alleged that Maning Yap
left personal and real properties all located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur, with an approximate value of
P100,000.00.
The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her minor children on the ground that she is the
legitimate widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, all
minors, are their legitimate children.
Talina Bianong was initially appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap.
However, after a formal hearing and on recommendation of Talina, the lower court appointed Shirley
Yap as regular administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap.
Various claims filed by the creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap were duly approved by
the court and paid by the administratrix. Since there still existed a residue of the intestate estate
consisting of real and personal properties and collectible debts after payments to creditors, the court
set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the
conjugal partnership of the late Maning Yap and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs
entitled to inherit his intestate estate.
After trial, the lower court rendered decision declaring Talina Bianong and her children as the legal
heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, the legal heirs of the late
Maning Yap and entitled to inherit or succeed to his intestate with Talina Bianong,
as his surviving spouse, and Shirleyt Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving legitimate
children;
(b) Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of the whole intestate estate of
the late Maning Yap, as her share, pursuant to Art. 996 of the New Civil Code; to
Shirley Yap, the other one-third (1/3) as her share and to Jaime Yap the remaining
one-third (1/3), also as his share, pursuant to Art. 980 in conjunction with Art. 996
of the new Civil Code.
The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby dismissed without costs.
Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision.
As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap should be equally divided
into two equal parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to
Nancy Yap and her children.
The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee Tim (45 Phil. 739). The facts in the cited
case are similar to the case at bar in that Yap Siong in his lifetime contracted two marriages; first to
Dee Tim on September 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three children and second to Maria Lao
on June 24, 1903 with whom he had one child. Moreover, Maria Lao entered into the marriage
believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man. Yap Siong died on September 1922 leaving
Page 91 of 152
properties which were claimed by the two families. In resolving the issue on how the properties of Yap We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the
Siong should be divided, this Court applied the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit: effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws
and by the Rules of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492; Canales v. Arrogante,
91 Phil. 9; and Morales, et al. v. Yañez, 98 Phil. 677), while the rights to the inheritance of a person
xxx xxx xxx
who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the New Civil Code (Del
Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68).
... [W]here two wome innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy
matrimony to the same man, their children and each family will be entitled to one-
There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the second
half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of
marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the
the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages were celebrated
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants.
to wit:
The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positive
proved. (Articles 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v.
Hennen, 65 U.S., 553). SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;
A woman who is deceied by a man who respresents himself as single and who
marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the
Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another
marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
the offspring of such second marriage. ...
alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in 1964 when the New Civil Code had already super marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a
ed the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the competent court.
distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance with, the new codal provisions and
not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable,
Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning Yap be distributed?

We agree.
The records show that the real and personal properties under administration in the intestate estate
proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina Bianong and the deceased Maning Yap during
Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 their marriage. Hence, these properties, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary are
states: considered conjugal properties of Talina Bianong and Maning Yap (Article 142, New Civil Code).
Considering that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains during the lifetime of
Maning Yap, such liquidation must be carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning Yap, the
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
deceased spouse as expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court (Lapuz v.
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).
previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or
without a will die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides:
Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they
may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and
By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work
manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.
or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
(Rule 12a)
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.
The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule, to wit:
and Article 185 thereof states:
The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs, devisees and legatees
is the death of the decedent. This is the basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee
The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally
or legatee has any vested right until the moment of such death (Civil Code, Padilla,
between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis
Volume VII, 1975, p. 712).
of division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements.
Page 92 of 152
Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money
claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap approved by the lower court have
been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as
their shares. The one-half share of Maning Yap would then comprise his intestate estate to be
distributed among his heirs. (See also Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216)

Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs are Talina Bianong, her
children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning
Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife had not lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in Maning Yap's estate
upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife
cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil Code;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by Maning Yap have the status of
natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles
89 and 887, New Civil Code).

Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles 142 and 185 New Civil
Code), the other half being the share of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows:

a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap-one-half (1/2) of the
resulting net estate to be divided equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of
the New Civil Code;

b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken
from the free portion or disposable half of the estate pursuant to Article 999 in
relation. to Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and

c. To the natural children by legal fiction --Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap
and Samuel Yap-the remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate to be shared
equally between them pursuant to the first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in
relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The widow, Talina Bianong shall receive one half (1/2) of the
whole intestate estate as her share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains. The
other half, which is the net estate of the late Maning Yap, is distributed and adjudicated as stated
above.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Page 93 of 152
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz
on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to
the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983
up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of
Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed
her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-
fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and
such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man
with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals,
145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the
second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit
terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has
no property in his possession is an issue that may be determined
only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary
with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status
of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is
denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the
declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss
Page 94 of 152
is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with
the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation
of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same
issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
Page 95 of 152
 The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,
however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some
judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed.
Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what
they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as
well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is
that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party
should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a
collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will
be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken
up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve
the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters
into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity
of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes
Page 96 of 152
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits
that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive.
For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to
be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of
"only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in
proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
Page 97 of 152
 or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted
in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide
the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February
7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Page 98 of 152
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her
in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet,
he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his
first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life.
A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
Page 99 of 152
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Page 100 of 152

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the
motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage,
inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a
legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of
the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted
that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license
is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware
of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:10
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage,
they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we
are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state
that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of
law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 []
Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the
same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of
an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho
v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may
not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent
case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is
not a prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the
subsistence of a marriage.
Page 101 of 152
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an
excuse.16The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to
know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the
second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he
wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only
after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil
action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal
prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.19 The reason
is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Page 102 of 152

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration.
The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado
of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of
three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the
evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either
that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on
April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued
in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October
10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a
child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case
before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information
dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted
a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he
was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his
previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action
having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made
at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted
such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to
his first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’
But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a
second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
Page 103 of 152
 "A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict
petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates
the guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt."6
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is
undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages
which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak
of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if
the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information
had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a
subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage has been characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an
accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that
case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first
wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting
him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while
the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the
Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not
commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v.
Aragon,12which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de
Consuegra v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to
the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest
nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initioas it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second
wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in
the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz
Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground
that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another
woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise
no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Page 104 of 152
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there
was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary
for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the
Court declared: "The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect
several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and
Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was
necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a
person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person
can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86,
143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that
where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that
he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled:
"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted
that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it
observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner,
changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a
person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
subsequent marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The
Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
Page 105 of 152
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees.23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot
obtain affirmative relief from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the
pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not
the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous
marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire
belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced
that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the
truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there
are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making." 25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an
indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a
defense against the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations on
its application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant petition is
a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent
Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts,
are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family code requires a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted;
without such declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of the subsequent marriage
would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code.
Parenthetically, I would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said
that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my
view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance, is between persons of the
same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the "marriage." Indeed, it is
likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages
declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in
criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
"Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article
349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set
aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:
"xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in
America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation."
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in
bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity
and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal
case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family Code,
and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
Page 106 of 152
 SECOND DIVISION The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner
null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,
vs.
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
DECISION void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of
whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself – for this would
QUISUMBING, J.: be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent
court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say
the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – Code on marriage.
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring
the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null
and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their xxx
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. 1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, initio;
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4,
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court 1991; and
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
SO ORDERED.2
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he
was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April Court of Appeals erred:
4, 1979.
I.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this
PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his
civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church II
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence
during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979,
before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears
indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1 III

Page 107 of 152

 IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF
THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before
a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that People v.
Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a
marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But
the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209
as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read
into the provisions of law previously obtaining.5
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs
significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of
his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The
second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the
second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is
no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for
the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the second
wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of
the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death
of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in
the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena
Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in
February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court,
expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
Page 108 of 152
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of
judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article
40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that
a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre
should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court
held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147,
148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced
into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that
despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony
wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in
the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner
claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued
on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused
to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such
failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight.
She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social
institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied
with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid
license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the
civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the
first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the
defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely
interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the
absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and
perfidy."
On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.1âwphi1 Although the
appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in
marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to
support her claim.26
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present
case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.27There are other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,
1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Page 109 of 152
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by
the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on
June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with
whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had
no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
“death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that
she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5and
2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which
reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO
(sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it
may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago
S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY
THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
Page 110 of 152
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
marriage void. 11
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the contributions ...”
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy.
heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void
ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
Page 111 of 152
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner
to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to
pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that: Puno J., on official leave.

“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon
his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in
dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its
nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case,
the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be
void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free
to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other
than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do
is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which
his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights
of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
Page 112 of 152
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore.
The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion
was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When
arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum
to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that
want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage,
the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and
the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from
this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
Page 113 of 152
 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code,
a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial
was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN
HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree
of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and
publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his
lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy,
just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to
commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis
v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing
Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of
the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
Page 114 of 152
 SO ORDERED.21 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin SO ORDERED.
with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But
in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for
said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case,
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage
was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one

can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,
but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months
later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute
an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his
defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Page 115 of 152

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he
sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his
work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register
in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record
of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE
NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
judgment.
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
was indeed her husband.
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second
or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
subsisting first marriage.
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence
CONTRARY TO LAW. of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Page 116 of 152

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented
was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the
National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes
on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office
on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would
plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that
there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the
civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s
own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents,
therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the
first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is
that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage
to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate
disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Page 117 of 152
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
SO ORDERED.
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27 Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these
effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall DISSENTING OPINION
be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal CARPIO, J.:
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each I dissent from the decision of the majority, as expressed in the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting Santiago. The majority opinion reverses a well-settled doctrine, established in a long line of decisions,
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and applying Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The reversal finds no support in the plain and ordinary
commitment. meaning of Article 349. The reversal also violates the constitutional guarantees of the accused and
the separation of powers.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case,
The majority opinion makes the following ruling:
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of celebration of the marriage insofar
time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in. The issue may be stated thus: if the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the
existence of the first marriage, such as psychological incapacity, is there a crime of bigamy?
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is
In the present case, the prosecution filed the information for bigamy against the accused Veronico
prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
Tenebro before the judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage. However, before his
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium
conviction for bigamy by the trial court, another court judicially declared his second marriage void ab
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to
initio because of psychological incapacity.
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
The majority opinion is premised on two basic assertions. First, the mere act of entering into a second
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
marriage contract while the first marriage subsists consummates the crime of bigamy, even if the
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the mere existence of the first marriage.
prision mayor, as maximum.
Second, a marriage declared by law void ab initio, and judicially confirmed void from the beginning, is
deemed valid for the purpose of a criminal prosecution for bigamy. I shall examine the correctness of
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed these assertions.
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of
the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
Page 118 of 152
The majority opinion holds that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial and the mere act of
entering into a second marriage, even if void ab initio on grounds other than the existence
of the first marriage, consummates the crime of bigamy. Thus, the majority opinion states:
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner's valid marriage
to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner's psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is
null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent
marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned, x x x. (Bold underscoring supplied; italics in the
original)
The majority opinion concedes that the second marriage in the present case is void ab initio, even
without need of judicial declaration. The majority expressly admits that the second marriage does not
legally exist, and thus in legal contemplation never took place at all. Nevertheless, the majority holds
that the second marriage is a marriage that exists in law sufficient to convict the accused of the crime
of bigamy.
The majority opinion holds that a judicial declaration of nullity of Tenebro's second marriage is
immaterial in a prosecution for the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration that the second
marriage is void from the beginning is absolutely of no moment.
Prior to appellant Tenebro's conviction by the trial court of the crime of bigamy, his second marriage
was in fact judicially declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Tenebro could
count in his favor not only an express provision of law declaring his second marriage void ab initio, he
also had a judicial confirmation of such nullity even prior to his conviction of bigamy by the trial court.
The majority opinion, however, simply brushes aside the law and the judicial confirmation. The
majority opinion holds that the fact that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity, and judicially declared as void from the very beginning, is immaterial in a
bigamy charge.
For more than 75 years now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void on
grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy. The Court first
enunciated this doctrine in the 1935 case of People v. Mora Dumpo,[1]where the Court held:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices of the
Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo contracted
another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo
was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years and one day of prision
mayor and a minimum of two years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with
costs. From this judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it
has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor
evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according
to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent thereto.
xxx
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have been contracted by the
accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be
considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mendoza,[2] decided in 1954, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the
ground that the first marriage was void having been contracted during the subsistence of a
still earlier marriage. The Court held:
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were
married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the
appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de
Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita
Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and
conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void
and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on
August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the
death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that
appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in
the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of
People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
xxx
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act
3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless.
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and
void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
Page 119 of 152
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense
that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse,
Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio so ordered.
In People v. Lara,3 decided in 1955, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the ground that
his second marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Declared the Court in Lara:
It is not disputed that the [accused] and Anacoreta Dalanida were married on July 1, 1947 x
x x. Neither is it denied that on August 18, 1951, while the marriage just referred to was
subsisting, appellant entered into a second marriage, this time with Josefa A. Rosales x x x.
In connection with the contract [for the second marriage], undisputed documentary evidence
show that x x x it was only on August 19, 1951, that the marriage license x x x was issued x
x x.
We are x x x of the opinion that the evidence in this case virtually beyond reasonable doubt
that the marriage license x x x was issued x x x on the date appearing thereon x x x namely,
August 19, 1951.
xxx
Article 53 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, x x x which "no marriage shall be solemnized," one of
them being a marriage license duly issued at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x.
Related to this point, Article 80(3) of the new Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.
Under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code there can be possible conviction for bigamy without
proof that the accused had voluntarily contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first
marriage with another person. Such was the interpretation given by the Court in People v. Mora
Dumpo that: "It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage."
xxx
As to its validity, the marriage should be examined as of the time it was entered into. On
that precise date all the essential requisites must be present x x x. In the case before us, the
evidence discloses that the marriage preceded the issuance of the marriage license by one
day. The subsequent issuance of the license cannot in law, to our mind, render valid what in
the eyes of the law itself was void from the beginning x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In the 1960 case of Merced v. Diez,[4] the Court held that a prior case for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent constitutes a prejudicial question
warranting the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.[5] The Court declared:
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage
is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
xxx
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and
subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo,
62 Phil. 246, x x x.
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties
must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and
void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity
cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since
the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the
criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second
marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second
marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must
be determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a
situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question
of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and
must precede the criminal action for bigamy. (Emphasis supplied)
In Zapanta v. Montesa,[6] decided in 1962, the Court likewise suspended the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy because of a subsequent civil action filed by the accused to annul his second
marriage on the ground of vitiated consent. The Court ruled:
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question
we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same
must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case
at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent
thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was
involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the
annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.
In De la Cruz v. Ejercito,[7] decided in 1975, the Court, speaking through Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
dismissed a bigamy case against the accused in view of a final judgment the accused obtained
annulling her second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent. The Court, ruling that the annulment
of the second marriage rendered the criminal case "moot and untenable," explained:
The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on which
the prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled.
The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in denying the motion to
dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a
defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright dismissal of
Page 120 of 152
the criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should be
sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People vs. Mora
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil.
1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by
Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence
and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case
in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)
These decisions of the Court declaring there is no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is void on
grounds other than the existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear language and intent of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This Article provides as follows:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. The offender is legally married;
2. The marriage is not legally dissolved;
3. The offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the existence of the first
marriage.
The first three elements reiterate the language of the law. The last element, the validity of the second
marriage except for the existence of the first marriage, necessarily follows from the language of the
law that the offender contracts a "second or subsequent marriage."
If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, then
legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages that
are "void from the beginning." The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a marriage contracted
by one psychologically incapacitated "shall likewise be void." Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares
"inexistent and void from the beginning" contracts "expressly x x x declared void by law." Thus, a
marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally
inexistent and void from the beginning. Such void marriage cannot constitute a second marriage to
sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
If the second marriage is void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the nullity of the
second marriage proceeds from its illegality or bigamous nature. However, if the second marriage is
void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, the nullity does not proceed from its
illegality or bigamous nature. The first situation results in the crime of bigamy while the second does
not. This is clear from Article 1411 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and
the act constitutes a criminal act, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against
each other, and both shall be prosecuted. x x x.
The rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; x x x.
Thus, if the second marriage Is void because of psychological incapacity, the nullity does not proceed
from an illegal or criminal cause, and no prosecution could ensue. However, if the second marriage is
void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the nullity proceeds from an illegal or
criminal cause, and thus prosecution should follow.
The plain and ordinary meaning of Article 349 could only be that the second marriage must be valid
were it not for the existence of the first marriage. This has been the consistent interpretation of the
Court for more than seven decades since the enactment of the Revised Penal Code. Text writers in
criminal law have never entertained or advanced any other interpretation. There is no cogent reason
to depart from the well-established jurisprudence on Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, there is doubt on the interpretation of Article 349,
substantive due process of law requires a strict interpretation of Article 349 against the State and a
liberal interpretation in favor of the accused. The majority opinion reverses this principle and
interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code strictly against the accused and liberally in favor of
the State.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code does not state that it is immaterial whether the second
marriage is valid or void ab initio. This Article does not also state that the mere act of celebration of
the second marriage, while the first marriage subsists, constitutes the crime of bigamy. Article 349
speaks of a "second or subsequent marriage" which, as commonly understood and applied
consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not for the existence of the first
marriage.
To hold that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial, as the majority opinion so holds, would
interpret Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the accused. This
violates the well-settled principle of statutory construction that the Court declared in People v.
Garcia:[8]
Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended
by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language cannot
be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose
for which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included,
beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come
clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it
must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt
will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought. (Statutory Construction, Crawford,
pp. 460-462.)
The principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused
and strictly against the State is deeply rooted in the need to protect constitutional guarantees.[9] This
principle serves notice to the public that only those acts clearly and plainly prohibited in penal laws
are subject to criminal sanctions. To expand penal laws beyond their clear and plain meaning is no
longer fair notice to the public. Thus, the principle insures observance of due process of law. The
principle also prevents discriminatory application of penal laws. State prosecutors have no power to
broaden arbitrarily the application of penal laws beyond the plain and common understanding of the
people who are subject to their penalties. Hence, the principle insures equal protection of the law.
The principle is also rooted in the need to maintain the separation of powers by insuring that the
legislature, and not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes their penalties.[10] As aptly stated by
Page 121 of 152
the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, in United States v.
Wiltberger.[11]
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction
itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department. It
is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has specifically applied the rule on strict interpretation of a criminal statute to the crime of
bigamy. In People v. Aragon,[12]decided in 1957, the Court ruled:
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845, 50 Off.
Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
new interpretation even as Article 349 has remained unchanged since its enactment into law on 1
January 1932. The majority opinion effectively amends the language of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code in violation of the separation of powers.
A final word. Even before appellant Tenebro's conviction of the crime of bigamy, he had already
secured a judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. This judicial declaration merely confirmed what the law already explicitly provides - that a
marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated to marry is void from the very beginning
and thus legally inexistent. Inexplicably, the majority opinion still holds that the second marriage
exists to warrant Tenebro's conviction of the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion and vote to grant the petition.

"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive
years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void
by a subsequent court."

We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case
above-quoted. But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of
strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore,
seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal
Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are
bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to. (Emphasis supplied)

The majority opinion interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to mean that a second
marriage, even if void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, gives rise to
the crime of bigamy. This dissent interprets Article 349 to mean that for the crime of bigamy to exist,
the second marriage must be a valid marriage except for the existence of the first marriage.
Otherwise, the language of the law would mean nothing when it expressly declares certain marriages
void ab initio or void from the very beginning.

These opposing interpretations of a criminal statute call for the application of another will-established
rule that as between two reasonable interpretations, the more lenient one should be applied to penal
statutes. A leading English decision puts it in this wise:

If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must
adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions, we must give the more lenient
one. That is the settled rule for construction of penal sections.[13]

In summary, the majority opinion reverses the well-settled doctrine that there is no bigamy if the
second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage. The Court has
consistently applied this doctrine in several cases since 1935. The majority opinion reverses this
doctrine by disregarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the clear language of a criminal statute
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The majority opinion then proceeds to interpret the criminal
statute strictly against the accused and liberally in favor of the State. The majority opinion makes this
Page 122 of 152
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8,
2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously
united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-
2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on
October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in
Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x
x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2
August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of
a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos
Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by
the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the
time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of
her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
Page 123 of 152
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal
of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO
MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE
IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN
EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER
BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that
right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also
asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a
ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x
x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime
of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration
of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A
plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage."11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
Page 124 of 152
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
SO ORDERED.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
Associate Justice
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of
her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised
Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum
penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next
lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty
of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision
correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the
prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after
all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological
incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
Page 125 of 152
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012 be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by
the court.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs. In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent. with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling
in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated
September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent
Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24,
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second
1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio)
marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be
the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable,
Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition
Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and,
and executory on October 13, 2003.6
that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her
right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent,
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an
Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by
Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
SO ORDERED.

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO
VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper
judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two
valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in
1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January
24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that
jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent
took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of
jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a
second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it
declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose
second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the
RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In
a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
Page 126 of 152
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation
that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense
for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her
first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in
the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for
xxxx
bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores
was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the
shortly thereafter.
RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People
of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition 3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr.
filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words,
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner: there was only one marriage.

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the
trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the
Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the
OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we
rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the
Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:

Page 127 of 152

eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first
and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals
to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.31
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction
40 of the Family Code, to wit:
for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first
not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
subsisting. cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license
as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was
bigamy.38
properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL
previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration
is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage. SO ORDERED.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so Associate Justice
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity
of a completely void marriage.

We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Page 128 of 152
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980
after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first
met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had
no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued
to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished
to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of
life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from
leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do
so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for
England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed
a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where
the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed
a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already
dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the
petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41,
Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Page 129 of 152
 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news
that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.9 The
Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that
he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had
not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the
only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt
on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the
mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and
where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit
relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of
destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool
or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
Page 130 of 152
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his supplied)
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23
the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
letters, under unspecified circumstances.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
the following basic state policy:
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
not that she was dead. institution. . . .

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in
he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the Article 149:
delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica recognized or given effect. 24
was dead a well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20
the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care,
still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes
that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
Page 131 of 152
G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B.
ALEGRO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan,
Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order1 dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m.
and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled
hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by
registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.2
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to comply
with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.4
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.5He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and
he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single
person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents.6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home
later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.7 Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’
house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar.8 However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Lea’s
parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of
Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette’s brother-in-
law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.9 When Alan went back to the house of his
parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left
without notice.10 Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him
locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.11
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave
after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed.12 However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a
house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told
him that she had not seen her.13 He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks
with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in
the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but
failed.14
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.15 The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.16 Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.17
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February 14,
1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did
not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever
since.18 Lea’s father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not
know where Lea was.19
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby
declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.20
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.21 The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.22
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that respondent Alan B.
Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.23 It averred that
the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent
even admitted that Lea’s father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but
left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to the
local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and
locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the
above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature
of its proceedings.
Page 132 of 152
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage
is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the
petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the
Honorable Court of Appeals.24
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The
respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom
he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the
respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995,
his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming
home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go
home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and
never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode
because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-
law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the
credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts
considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea,
but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
the RTC.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.25
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."26 SO ORDERED.

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the Associate Justice
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,27 competence evidence on the ultimate question
of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.28

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that
the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,29 the Court warned against collusion
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
means. It is also the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."

Page 133 of 152

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari before us assails the decision dated August 27, 2008 of the
1 2
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December 15,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case
No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband, presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and
wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January
1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach
"sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of
animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about
his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent
filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP
Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead.
She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as
well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly
made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest
efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was
already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any news about
the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA
dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and,
accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner
contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code.
It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under
Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review
on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the
requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s attention
to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted
and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory.
Page 134 of 152
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against
the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how
erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to
appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to
wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which
to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
[Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore,
on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the
entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence
tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may,
nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the
ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis
supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Page 135 of 152
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or
the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is
presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration
of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil
Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement
of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead.
It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the
following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present
spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead
before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his
friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during
his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported
his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
Page 136 of 152
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief"
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present
spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s
whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media.
Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court
ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who
had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The
Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his
wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends;
and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be inferred from
the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein
were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the
present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present
spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure
that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the
above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
Page 137 of 152
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature ARTURO D. BRION
of its proceedings. Associate Justice

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s
foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of
marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.

Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the
application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is
intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's
declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the
competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of
remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply
with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to
cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in
cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Page 138 of 152

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April
25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer
to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and
willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise,
the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
Page 139 of 152
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely
for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of
a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding
that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for
a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not
be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the
RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to
be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
Page 140 of 152
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them
to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Page 141 of 152
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners,
vs.
DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of
absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. On
July 2, 2004, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044,1 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari, seeking to reverse the decision of
the CA. They present as the main issue whether the sale of conjugal property made by respondent
wife by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent
husband in her favor was validly made to the vendees, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the
full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been
forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the country.
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CA’s finding that the vendees were not
buyers in good faith, because they did not exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wife’s
authority to sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was
not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
Antecedents
Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their improvements (property) located at No. 49
Miguel Cuaderno Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque City and registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 633762 and TCT No. 633773 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria
Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been estranged from
one another.
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to the
petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements. But
Atanacio’s persistence prevailed upon them, so that on February 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with
Ma. Elena at the site of the property. During their meeting, Ma. Elena showed to them the following
documents, namely: (a) the owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT
No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of the special power of attorney (SPA) dated
January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.4 Before the meeting
ended, they paid ₱20,000.00 as earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a handwritten Receipt
of Earnest Money, whereby the parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of
₱130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to ₱650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the
final payment of ₱700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the property on March 31, 1991. 5
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Assessor’s
Office of Parañaque City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the company of Atanacio and her
husband (also a licensed broker).6 There, they discovered that the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been
encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the encumbrance had already been cancelled
due to the full payment of the obligation.7They noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected
through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena.8 They found on TCT No. 63377 the
annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baños Rural Bank, also effected through an
SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma.
Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of ₱500,000.00.9
The petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the mortgage and the court order annotated on TCT
No. 63377 at the Los Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Noel Zarate, the bank’s legal
counsel, who related that the bank had asked for the court order because the lot involved was
conjugal property.10
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered ₱130,000.00 as additional down payment on
February 4, 1991; and ₱650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then
released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.11
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of ₱700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was
then in Hongkong.12 She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be
turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time,
the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the
custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio
authorizing him to sell both lots.13
At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila
Peninsula.14 For that meeting, they were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca.15 They recalled that
Atty. Parulan "smugly demanded ₱800,000.00" in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No.
63376, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be ₱1.5 million. As a
counter-offer, however, they tendered ₱250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined,16 giving them only
until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but
they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.17
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-
1005 entitledDionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma.
Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof.
Page 142 of 152
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages
against the respondents.
Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.18
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Dionisio A. Parulan, Jr. and against defendants Ma. Elena Parulan and the Sps. Rex and Concepcion
Aggabao, without prejudice to any action that may be filed by the Sps. Aggabao against co-defendant
Ma. Elena Parulan for the amounts they paid her for the purchase of the subject lots, as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1991 covering the sale of the lot located at
No. 49 M. Cuaderno St., Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered
by TCT Nos. 63376 and 63377 is declared null and void.
2. Defendant Mrs. Elena Parulan is directed to pay litigation expenses amounting to
₱50,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena was a forgery, based on its finding that
Dionisio had been out of the country at the time of the execution of the SPA;20 that NBI Sr. Document
Examiner Rhoda B. Flores had certified that the signature appearing on the SPA purporting to be that
of Dionisio and the set of standard sample signatures of Dionisio had not been written by one and the
same person;21 and that Record Officer III Eliseo O. Terenco and Clerk of Court Jesus P. Maningas of
the Manila RTC had issued a certification to the effect that Atty. Alfred Datingaling, the Notary Public
who had notarized the SPA, had not been included in the list of Notaries Public in Manila for the year
1990-1991.22
The RTC rejected the petitioners’ defense of being buyers in good faith because of their failure to
exercise ordinary prudence, including demanding from Ma. Elena a court order authorizing her to sell
the properties similar to the order that the Los Baños Rural Bank had required before accepting the
mortgage of the property.23 It observed that they had appeared to be in a hurry to consummate the
transaction despite Atanacio’s advice that they first consult a lawyer before buying the property; that
with ordinary prudence, they should first have obtained the owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs
before paying the full amount of the consideration; and that the sale was void pursuant to Article 124
of the Family Code.24
Ruling of the CA
As stated, the CA affirmed the RTC, opining that Article 124 of the Family Code applied because
Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the conjugal property by Ma. Elena; and that the RTC
correctly found the SPA to be a forgery.
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.25
Issues
The petitioners now make two arguments: (1) they were buyers in good faith; and (2) the CA erred in
affirming the RTC’s finding that the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity
under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The petitioners impute error to the CA for not applying the "ordinary prudent man’s standard" in
determining their status as buyers in good faith. They contend that the more appropriate law to apply
was Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code; and that even if the SPA held by
Ma. Elena was a forgery, the ruling in Veloso v. Court of Appeals26 warranted a judgment in their
favor.
Restated, the issues for consideration and resolution are as follows:
1) Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
2) Might the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of their purchase of the
property?
3) Might the ruling in Veloso v. Court of Appeals be applied in favor of the petitioners despite
the finding of forgery of the SPA?
Ruling
The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA.
1.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed
the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply
because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue that
notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal
property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that
Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
We do not subscribe to the petitioners’ submissions.
To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband
and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Page 143 of 152
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.28
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 25629 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez,30 the Court rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested
property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256
provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested
or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners
did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their
situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of
the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the
authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an
agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of
the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property. 31
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25,
1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the
transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.32
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the
petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph
of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse’s
consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
2.
Due diligence required in verifying not only vendor’s title,
but also agent’s authority to sell the property
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of
such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner
and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.33 The status of a buyer in good faith is never
presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.34
Here, the petitioners disagree with the CA for not applying the "ordinary prudent man’s standard" in
determining their status as buyers in good faith. They insist that they exercised due diligence by
verifying the status of the TCTs, as well as by inquiring about the details surrounding the mortgage
extended by the Los Baños Rural Bank. They lament the holding of the CA that they should have been
put on their guard when they learned that the Los Baños Rural Bank had first required a court order
before granting the loan to the respondents secured by their mortgage of the property.
The petitioners miss the whole point.
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both spouses before the conjugal
property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v.
Silva,35 the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with
a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that
the consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove
good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the
seller but also into the seller’s capacity to sell.36Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe
two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering
the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell
conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the face of the
certificate of title to the property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the certificate
indicates on its face.37 In this respect, the petitioners sufficiently proved that they had checked on the
authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay
City as the custodian of the land records; and that they had also gone to the Los Baños Rural Bank to
inquire about the mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377. Thereby, the petitioners observed the
requisite diligence in examining the validity of the TCTs concerned.
Page 144 of 152
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or not they had Veloso v. Court of Appeals cannot help petitioners
diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or not the TCT
had been valid and authentic, as to which there was no doubt. Thus, we cannot side with them.
The petitioners contend that the forgery of the SPA notwithstanding, the CA could still have decided in
their favor conformably with Veloso v. Court of Appeals,41 a case where the petitioner husband
Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the claimed that his signature and that of the notary public who had notarized the SPA the petitioner
sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the supposedly executed to authorize his wife to sell the property had been forged. In denying relief, the
circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Court upheld the right of the vendee as an innocent purchaser for value.
Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply accepted the SPA for what it represented on
its face, they would have uncovered soon enough that the respondents had been estranged from each
Veloso is inapplicable, however, because the contested property therein was exclusively owned by the
other and were under de facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests that would
petitioner and did not belong to the conjugal regime. Veloso being upon conjugal property, Article 124
negate the existence of an agency between them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further
of the Family Code did not apply.
inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The omission to inquire indicated their not being buyers in good
faith, for, as fittingly observed in Domingo v. Reed:381avvphi1
In contrast, the property involved herein pertained to the conjugal regime, and, consequently, the
lack of the written consent of the husband rendered the sale void pursuant to Article 124 of the
What was required of them by the appellate court, which we affirm, was merely to investigate – as
Family Code. Moreover, evenassuming that the property involved in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was
any prudent vendee should – the authority of Lolita to sell the property and to bind the partnership.
made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the sale was still
They had knowledge of facts that should have led them to inquire and to investigate, in order to
properly covered by Article 173 of the Civil Code, which provides that a sale effected without the
acquaint themselves with possible defects in her title. The law requires them to act with the diligence
consent of one of the spouses is only voidable, not void. However, the sale herein was made already
of a prudent person; in this case, their only prudent course of action was to investigate whether
during the effectivity of the Family Code, rendering the application of Article 124 of the Family Code
respondent had indeed given his consent to the sale and authorized his wife to sell the property. 39
clear and indubitable.

Indeed, an unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma. Elena’s SPA without first taking
The fault of the petitioner in Veloso was that he did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his
precautions to verify its authenticity was not a prudent buyer’s move.40 They should have done
signature and that of the notary public on the SPA had been forged. The Court pointed out that his
everything within their means and power to ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and
mere allegation that the signatures had been forged could not be sustained without clear and
authentic. If they did not investigate on the relations of the respondents vis-à-vis each other, they
convincing proof to substantiate the allegation. Herein, however, both the RTC and the CA found from
could have done other things towards the same end, like attempting to locate the notary public who
the testimonies and evidence presented by Dionisio that his signature had been definitely forged, as
had notarized the SPA, or checked with the RTC in Manila to confirm the authority of Notary Public
borne out by the entries in his passport showing that he was out of the country at the time of the
Atty. Datingaling. It turned out that Atty. Datingaling was not authorized to act as a Notary Public for
execution of the questioned SPA; and that the alleged notary public, Atty. Datingaling, had no
Manila during the period 1990-1991, which was a fact that they could easily discover with a modicum
authority to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the period of 1990-1991.
of zeal.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated July 2,
Secondly, the final payment of ₱700,000.00 even without the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT No.
2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044 entitled "Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. vs.
63376 being handed to them by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the
Ma. Elena Parulan and Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao" and "Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao vs.
petitioners. It is true that she promised to produce and deliver the owner’s copy within a week
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan."
because her relative having custody of it had gone to Hongkong, but their passivity in such an
essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity in immediately and diligently validating the
TCTs to the extent of inquiring at the Los Baños Rural Bank about the annotated mortgage. Yet, they Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
could have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance. That they did not do so reflected their
lack of due care in dealing with Ma. Elena. SO ORDERED.

Lastly, another reason rendered the petitioners’ good faith incredible. They did not take immediate LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
action against Ma. Elena upon discovering that the owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the Associate Justice
possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elena’s representation. Human experience would have
impelled them to exert every effort to proceed against Ma. Elena, including demanding the return of
the substantial amounts paid to her. But they seemed not to mind her inability to produce the TCT,
and, instead, they contented themselves with meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for the possible
turnover of the TCT to them.

3.

Page 145 of 152

G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children
are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without
regard to the message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our
obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and
partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order2 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution
defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in
accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to
Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond
shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent
spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos,
Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under
Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court granted in
its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution
be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to
be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the
service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
Page 146 of 152
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful
fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said
sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule
[sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.10
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, 22 the
trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31,
2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the Issues
amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the following payments:
I
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125
(SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.11
II
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
Earned." PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?

To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated August 31, 2006, III
which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts."14 The Order
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER
portion of the Order states:
THE CIVIL CODE?

WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
IV
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-
respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE
IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
SEPARATION?23

IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Our Ruling

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 on
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 dated November 8, 2006, holding
aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10,
that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still
2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to
consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss
"net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
the matters that we can clarify.

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED,
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20

Page 147 of 152

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution." 27 In
other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt
of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither
filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had
lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on
February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally,
when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days
had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From the
foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October
10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been
partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s
decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no
court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of
the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment
at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation." 29 But what
precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court, which does
not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties,
will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an
RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together.32 The Rule on Legal Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." 34 In
the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the
respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned
judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not
void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36 In fact, we have ruled that for "[as] long as the public
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was
erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period.
Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial
court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the
very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005
judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman
who is not his wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse;44
Page 148 of 152
 (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and
pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage,
whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were
living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated
and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these
properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article
121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to
the income generated by these properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate
properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore
be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the
children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the
following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code
applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce
that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386)
and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner
and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. 55 Article 119
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation,
"the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife also own in common all the property of
the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier adverted
to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in
common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application
to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses
is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to
Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is
owned in common by the husband and wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties
covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties,
even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family
Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits
retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,61we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
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A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect
in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future
enjoyment of property.62(Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose
the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.65 In
fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October
10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the
trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.67 Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one
founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in
the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate
property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the
guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance
to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil
Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal
assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and
does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente
liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005
that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a
motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from
questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate
properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute
community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations
between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed,
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code.
Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family
Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits
"shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of
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the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." 72 Thus, without
any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime
under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime
under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the
conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and
if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided
between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value
of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of
all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to
the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct
the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if
we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the
properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such
debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the
absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be
returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net
profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-
share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case
(which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered
into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit."
As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both
the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No.
(2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the
same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(2) of Article 121.
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 (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration
of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition
in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the
spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's
conjugal properties and their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the trial court
found that the couple has no separate properties when they married.79 Rather, the
trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the
marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;81 and if the
community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a
restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its
debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife
shall be returned to each of them.84 In the instant case, since it was already established
by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,85 there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will
be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any
property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court.
However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan
City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court,
the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with
the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
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