Moreover, in the absence of any specific provision to the
4478790
IMMOVABLE AND MOVABLE PROPERTY (ART. 415-418)
JRPA
Lopez v. Orosa
G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, 103 SCRA 98
DOCTRINE: For while it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could only mean one
thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property
FACTS:
Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo
Sawmill. Orosa, who lived in the same province as Lopez, one
day approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an
investment in the theatre business. Orosa, his family and close
friends apparently were forming a corporation named Plaza
Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest.
Nonetheless, there was an oral agreement between Lopez and
Orosa that Lopez would be supplying the lumber for the
construction of the theatre. The terms were the following: one,
Orosa would be personally liable for any account that the said
construction would incur; two, payment would be by demand
and not by cash on delivery.
Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for the
construction. Lopez was only paid one-third of the total cost.
The land on which the building has been erected was
previously owned by Orosa, which was later on purchased by
the corporation. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez, the
corporation mortgaged its properties. On an earlier relevant
date, the corporation obtained a loan with Luzon Surety
Company as surety and in turn, the corporation executed a
mortgage over the land and building. In the registration of the
land under Act 496, such mortgage wasn’t revealed. Also due
to the demands of Lopez, Orosa issued a deed of assignment
over his shares of stock in the corporation. As there was still
an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza
theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable
solidarily for the unpaid balance; and in case defendants failed
to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction
with the proceeds to be applied to the balance; or that the
shares of stock be sold in public auction. Lopez also had lis
pendens be annotated in the OCT. The trial court decided that
there was joint liability between defendants and that the
material man’s lien was only confined to the building.
ISSUE:
W/N the material men’s lien for the value of the materials used
in the construction of the building attaches to said structure
alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the building is
adhered to?
HELD:
The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher
of materials used for the construction and repair of a building
is also extended to land on which the building was constructed
is without merit. For while it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could only mean one
thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property.
contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.
Appellant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which
provides—“With respect to determinate real property and real
rights of the debtor, the following are preferred: xxx Credits
for reflection, not entered or recorded, and only with respect
to other credits different from those mentioned in four next
preceding paragraphs.” Close examination of the
abovementioned provision reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with
respect to the real estate upon which the refectionary or work
was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be
that the lien so created attaches merely to the immovable
property for the construction or repair of which the obligation
was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the
unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the
building attaches only to said structure and to no other
property of the obligors.
ABB
Associated Insurance and Surety Company v. Iya
103 SCRA 972
DOCTRINE: A building is an immovable property irrespective
of where or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.
FACTS:
Spouses Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino own a house of
strong materials. They filed a bond of P 11,000.00 subscribed
by the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. and as a
counter-guaranty, the spouses Valino executed an alleged
chattel mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor of the
surety company.
The parcel of land on which the house is erected was still
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation but
was able to obtain the same from them after full payment of
the purchase price. The Valinos acquired another loan from
Isabel Iya for P12,000.00, executing a real estate mortgage
over the house and lot. However, they were unable to pay off
their other loan which caused the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. The surety company was awarded the land as the
highest bidder in the auction but later on discovered that the
land was subject to a real estate mortgage. The surety
company then requested that the house and lot be excluded
from the real estate mortgage. Iya, in her answer, said that
she had a real right over the property and that the chattel
mortgage on which the foreclosure was based should be
declared null and void for non-compliance with the form
required by law. The CA ruled that the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage is limited to the land alone and they awarded
the structure to the surety company saying that the house is a
personal property and may be subject to chattel mortgage.
ISSUE:
Which of the mortgages should have preference?
HELD:
It was held in Lopez vs. Orosa that the building is an
immovable itself, separate and distinct from the land. A
building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner.

Only personal properties can be the subject of a chattel
mortgage and since the structure in this case is an immovable,
it cannot subject to a chattel mortgage. Therefore the chattel
mortgage and the sale on which it was based should be
declared null and void. Also, while it is true that said document
was registered in the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal, this
act produced no effect whatsoever for where the interest
conveyed is in the nature of a real property, the registration of
the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act
which would produce no legal effect insofar as the building is
concerned.
FZC
Bicerra v. Teneza
G.R. No. L-16218, 6 SCRA 648
DOCTRINE: A house is classified as immovable property by
reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article
415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land
belonging to a different owner. But once the house is
demolished it ceases to exist, hence its character as an
immovable likewise ceases.
FACTS:
The Bicerras are supposedly the owners of the house (PhP
20,000) built on a lot owned by them in Lagangilang, Abra
which the Tenezas forcibly demolished in January 1957,
claiming to be the owners thereof. The materials of the house
were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant. The
Bicerras filed a complaint claiming actual damages of P200,
moral and consequential damages amounting to P600, and the
costs. The CFI Abra dismissed the complaint claiming that the
action was within the exclusive (original) jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, Abra.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed. Having been
admitted in forma pauperis, no costs were adjudged.
ISSUE:
WON the house is immovable property even if it is on the land
of another
HELD:
House is immovable property even if situated on land
belonging to a different owner; Exception, when demolished.
LNAC
Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-11139
DOCTRINE: Sales on execution affect the public and third
persons. The regulation governing sales on execution are for
public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed
for each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the
character, which the parties have given to it or desire to give it.
When the rules speak of personal property, property which is
ordinarily so considered is meant; and when real property is
spoken of, it means property which is generally known as real
property. The regulations were never intended to suit the
consideration that parties may have privately given to the
property levied upon.
FACTS:
Petitioner Santos Evangelista instituted a Civil Case for a sum
of money. He obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon
a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased
to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice
of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. Judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who,
bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the
writ of execution issued in said case. The definite deed of sale
was issued to him upon expiration of the period of redemption.
When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house,
Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had
leased the property to the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.,
respondent herein, and that the latter is now the true owner of
said property. It appears that a definite deed of sale of the
same house had been issued to respondent, as the highest
bidder at an auction sale held in compliance with a writ of
execution. Hence, Evangelista instituted the present action
against respondent and Rivera, for the purpose of establishing
his (Evangelista) title over said house, securing possession
thereof, apart from recovering damages.
In its answer, respondent alleged that it has a better right to
the house, because the sale made, and the definite deed of
sale executed, in its favor, on September 29, 1950 and May 10,
1952, respectively, precede the sale to Evangelista (October 8,
1951) and the definite deed of sale in his favor (October 22,
1952). Rivera, in effect, joined forces with respondent.
CFI rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and
respondent to deliver the house in question to petitioner herein
and to pay him, jointly and severally from October, 1952, until
said delivery, plus costs.
On appeal taken by respondent, the above decision was
reversed by the CA which absolved Alto Surety from the
complaint on account that although the writ of attachment in
favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds
of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Alto Surety, Evangelista
did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment
having been levied as if the house in question were immovable
property.
Evangelista now seeks a review by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether a house, constructed by the lessee of the land on
which it is built, should be dealt with, for purpose of
attachment, as immovable property, or as personal property.
HELD:
Said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit
or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but
immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges,
"a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is
immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner
of the land or by usufructuary or lessee.
It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may
agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of
said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the
principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is
applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point
where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to
the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.
The rules on execution do not allow, and, we should not
interpret them in such a way as to allow, the special
consideration that parties to a contract may have desired to
impart to real estate, for example, as personal property, when
they are, not ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public
and third persons. The regulation governing sales on execution
are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings
prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its character,
not to the character, which the parties have given to it or
desire to give it. When the rules speak of personal property,
property which is ordinarily so considered is meant; and when
real property is spoken of, it means property which is generally
known as real property. The regulations were never intended
to suit the consideration that parties may have privately given
to the property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would
be difficult were the convenience or agreement of private
parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings.
The mere fact that a house was the subject of the chattel
mortgage and was considered as personal property by the
parties does not make said house personal property for
purposes of the notice to be given for its sale of public auction.
This ruling is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and
well defined regulation for official and public guidance and
would prevent confusion and misunderstanding.
The foregoing considerations apply, with equal force, to the
conditions for the levy of attachment, for it similarly affects the
public and third persons.
TKDC
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co.
G.R. No. L-11658
DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the parties decided to deal
with the building as personal property does not change its
character as real property. Neither the original registry in the
chattel mortgage registry nor the annotation in said registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the
building.
FACTS:
Compañia Agricola Filipina bought several rice-cleaning
machinery from a machinery company, Frank L. Strong
Machinery Company and executed a chattel mortgage to
secure payment of the purchase price. The deed of mortgage
includes the building where the machinery was installed
without any reference to the land on which it stood. Since
Compañia Agricola Filipina failed to pay when due, the
mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff and was bought by
the machinery company.
Few weeks later, Compañia Agricola Filipina executed a deed
of sale of the land where the building stood to the machinery
company. In effect, the machinery company possessed the
building when the sale took place and continued its possession
ever since.
When the chattel mortgage was executed, Compañia Agricola
Filipina executed another mortgage in favor of Yee over the
building to pay its debt to the machinery company. Since
Compañia Agricola Filipina failed to pay when due, Yee secured
a judgment to levy execution upon the building and bought the
building at the sheriff’s sale; Yee secured the sheriff’s
certificate of sale and registered it in the land registry.
When the execution was levied upon the building, the
machinery company filed with the sheriff a sworn statement
setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of
property from the levy. On the other hand, Yee filed an action
to recover possession of the building from the machinery
company. Trial court ruled in favor of the machinery company
on the basis of Article 1473 of the Civil Code; it ruled that the
machinery company registered the title to the building prior to
the registration date of Yee’s certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the nature of property is changed by its
registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. -- NO
HELD:
The registry under Article 1473 of the Civil Code refers to
registry of real property and the annotation or inscription of a
deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry
cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry
of real property.
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates mortgages of
personal property. The sole purpose and object of the chattel
mortgage registry is the registration of personal property
mortgages executed in the manner and form prescribed in the
statute.
In this case, the building where the rice-cleaning machinery
was installed was real property. The mere fact that the parties
dealt with it as separate and apart from the land on which it
stood does not change its character as real property. Neither
the original registry of the building in the chattel mortgage nor
the annotation of sale of the mortgaged property in the
registry had any effect on the building’s nature as immovable
property.
AMD
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo
44 SCRA 630
DOCTRINE: The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the
registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial
character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers
upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the
nature of any document of which registration is sought as a
chattel mortgage.
FACTS:
Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, was the lessee of a parcel
of land situated in Manila and owner of the house built thereon.
She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Standard Oil Co.
to convey both the leasehold interest in said lot and the
building. After the document had been duly acknowledge and
delivered, petitioner presented it to the respondent, Joaquin
Jaramillo, as ROD of Manila, to be recorded in the book of
record of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the
instrument, Jaramillo was of the opinion that it was not a
chattel mortgage as the interest mortgaged did not appear to
be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this ground
only. So, petitioner sought for a peremptory mandamus to
compel the respondent to record the said document in the
register. Jaramillo interposed a demurrer before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the ROD can refuse the registration of a Chattel
Mortgage? NO

HELD:
It is his duty to accept the proper fee and place the instrument
on record. The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the
registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial
character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers
upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the
nature of any document of which registration is sought as a
chattel mortgage.
The original provisions touching this matter are contained in
section 15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508), as
amended by Act No. 2496; but these have been transferred to
section 198 of the Administrative Code. There is nothing in any
of these provisions conferring upon the register of deeds any
authority whatever in respect to the "qualification”, of chattel
mortgage. His duties in respect to such instruments are
ministerial only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel
mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive
notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of
the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in
relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to
the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects
nobody's rights except as a specifies of notice.
Articles 334 and 335 of the Civil Code supply no absolute
criterion for discriminating between real property and personal
property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. Those articles state rules which, considered as a general
doctrine, are law in this jurisdiction; but it must not be
forgotten that under given conditions property may have
character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is
undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property; and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed
as real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle might be considered personal property.
CRF
Sibal v. Valdez
G.R. No. L-27532
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of attachment and execution,
and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.
(batasnatin)
FACTS:
As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of
Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the
plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. That within
one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff
offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid
by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or
taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and
the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to
accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
One of the defenses of the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez is that
the sugar cane in question had the nature of personal property
and was not, therefore, subject to redemption. The trial court
hold that the sugar cane in question was personal property
and, as such, was not subject to redemption.
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real
property under civil code? Under chattel mortgage law?
HELD:
The court ruled that It is contended that sugar cane comes
under the classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said
paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates as real property the
following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they
are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any
immovable property."
We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of
the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the
purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of
the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the
nature of personal property. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in holding that the sugar cane in question
was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption.
MPF
Tsai v. CA
G.R. No. 120098
DOCTRINE: Even if the properties are immovable by nature,
nothing detracts the parties from treating them as chattels to
secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
FACTS:
● EVERTEX secured a loan from PBC,
guaranteed by real estate and chattel mortgage over a
parcel of land where the factory stands, and the chattels
located therein, as included in a schedule attached to the
mortgage contract. another loan was obtained secured by
a chattel mortgage over properties with similar
descriptions listed in the first schedule.
● During the date of execution of the second
mortgage. EVERTEX purchased machineries and
equipment.
● Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed for
insolvency proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation and
thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages.
● PBC was the highest bidder in the public
auctions, making it the owner of the properties. It then
leased the factory premises to Tsai.
● Afterwards, EVERTEX sought the annulment
of the sale and conveyance of the properties to PBC as it
was allegedly a violation of the insolvency law.
● The RTC held that the lease and sale were
irregular as it involved properties not included in the
schedule of the mortgage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the (immovable) properties in question can be
entered into a chattel mortgage. -- YES
HELD:
An immovable may be considered a personal property if there
is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of
an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as
in the case at bar. While it is true that the controverted
properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of
real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage by the parties gives
a contrary indication. Both the trial and appellate courts show
that the intention was to treat the machineries as movables or
personal property.
Assuming that the properties were considered immovables,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to
secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
AMDG
Yap v. Tanada
G.R. No. L-32917
DOCTRINE: The Civil code considers as immovable property
among others, anything “attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object”
FACTS:
Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. (herein Goulds) filed a
complaint against Yap and his wife seeking to recover the
balance of the price and installation of the water pump in the
latter’s residence. The city court declared Yap and his wife in
default and rendered a judgment in favor of Goulds. Yap
appealed to the CFI wherein Judge Tanada was residing. Yap
was again declared in default and judgment was again
rendered in favor of Goulds. Later on, Judge Tanada granted
Gould’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Subsequently,
the water pump was sold in a public auction in favor of Goulds
being the highest bidder. Another writ of execution was issued
as regards the removal of the water pump and delivery of such
to Goulds. Yap is questioning validity of the auction sale and
praying that it be annulled as well as the writ of execution. Yap
is alleging that the water pump is considered as an immovable
property because it is installed in his residence. He also argued
that being an immovable property, a notice must be made
before the auction sale pursuant to the Rules of Court. It is
noted that
Yap filed several motion of reconsideration to which all were
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the water pump is an immovable property --
NO
HELD:
The Civil code considers as immovable property among others,
anything “attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such
a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking
the material or deterioration of the object”
The water pump involved in this case does not satisfy the
above description. It is highly possible to remove the water
pump without it breaking or deteriorating by simply loosening
the bolts or dismantling the fasteners that were used to attach
or install it in his house.
GCG
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870
DOCTRINE: Movable equipment, to be immobilized in
contemplation of Article 415 of the Civil Code, must be the
essential and principal elements of an industry or works which
are carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus, where
the business is one of transportation, which is carried on
without a repair or service shop, and its rolling equipment is
repaired or serviced in a shop belonging to another, the tools
and equipment in its repair shop which appear movable are
merely incidentals and may not be considered immovables,
and, hence, not subject to assessment as real estate for
purposes of the real estate tax.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized
lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by
the Public Service Commission.
The petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and
operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair shop;
blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries
which are placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body
constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be
serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates.
These machineries have never been or were never used as
industrial equipments to produce finished products for sale,
nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the
general public indiscriminately for business or commercial
purposes for which petitioner has never engaged in,
The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on
said machineries and repair equipment. This was then
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) who sustained the
respondent city assessor's ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries and the equipments are
considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty tax. -- NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held a decision for the petition for review
to be set aside and the equipments in question declared not
subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the
real estate tax.
The law that governs the determination of the
question at issue is as follows:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works; (Civil
Code of the Phil.)
Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted
provision also requires that the industry or works be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land. Thus in the case of
Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng, supra, the "machinery, liquid
containers, and instruments or implements" are found in a
building constructed on the land. A sawmill would also be
installed in a building on land more or less permanently, and
the sawing is conducted in the land or building.
But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined
only to repair or service the transportation business, which is
not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land,
as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore,
be deemed real property.
Resuming what we have set forth above, we hold that the
equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the
petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is
not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land,
so said equipment may not be considered real estate within
the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.
Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are
merely incidental, not essential and principal to the business of
the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on
without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they
can be repaired or services in another shop belonging to
another
VCL IV
Fels Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, et al.
G.R. No. 168557
DOCTRINE: Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides
that “docks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus,
power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
FACTS:
On January 18, 1993, National Power Corporation (NPC)
entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3×30
MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in
Calaca, Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy
Conversion Agreement, was for a period of five years. Article
10 states that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of
taxes. (other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis
of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its
employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental
permit fees and other similar fees and charges. Polar Energy
then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite
NPC’s initial opposition.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the
power barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of
Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of
its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes.
It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in
any conference regarding the real property assessment of the
Provincial Assessor. NPC filed a petition with the Local Board
Assessment Appeals (LBAA). The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the
real estate taxes. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities,
while they may be classified as movable or personal property,
are nevertheless considered real property for taxation
purposes because they are installed at a specific location with
a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the
owner of the barges–FELS, a private corporation–is the one
being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC
responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and
assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a
privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be extended
to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the petition was filed
out of time.
Fels appealed to the Central Board Assessment Appeals (CBAA).
The CBAA reversed and ruled that the power barges belong to
NPC; since they are actually, directly and exclusively used by it,
the power barges are covered by the exemptions under
Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional
issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription did not preclude the
NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance
with Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. Upon MR, the CBAA
reversed itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not barges are considered as real property,
thus can be subject to real property tax -- YES
HELD:
The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are
thus subject to real property tax.
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v.
The City of New York, et al., a power company brought an
action to review property tax assessment. On the city’s motion
to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that the
barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants
designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges
which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the
accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to
real property taxation.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
“docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by
their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus,
power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
FXRL
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo
G.R. No. 40411,
DOCTRINE: Generally, machinery becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the plant or property. This rule does
not apply should the machinery be placed by any other person
such as a tenant or usufructuary.
FACTS:
● The petitioner company operates a sawmill
in barrio Tigatu, Davao.
● Said facility contained both movable and
immovable property (machines and other such
implements).
● However, the land on which it is situated
belongs to another person.
● The parties executed a lease contract
providing that upon the expiration or termination of
such lease, the following shall happen:
o The ownership of all structures and
improvements introduced by the petitioner
company shall be transferred to the
respondents without any cost or obligation to
pay.
o The machines and their accessories shall not
 be included in said transfer.
● It was noted by the court that in a previous
case between the two parties, judgment was rendered
against the petitioner company upon which a writ of
execution was brought against its machines (as
personalty) in favor of Castilllo, et al.
● Additionally, the records of the current case
reflected that the petitioner company had treated its
machinery as personal property by executing chattel
mortgages on them in favor of third persons.
● Petitioner company contends that its
machines are immovable under the first and fifth
paragraphs of Article 334 (now Article 415) of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the machines of the petitioner company are movable or
immovable property.
HELD:
The machines are movable.
The court observed that the petitioner company failed to
register its protest at the time its machines were sold.
Generally, this inaction would be inconclusive but it is
indicative of the intention impressed upon the property in
question.
This is so because while machines are generally movable
property, they may nevertheless be “immobilized” by
destination or purpose subject to several conditions.
This conclusion finds its ground under the fifth paragraph of
Article 415. Here, machinery becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the plant or property. This rule does
not apply should the machinery be placed by any other person
such as a tenant or usufructuary.
Applying the rule to the case on hand, the machinery was
placed by the petitioner company who was merely a lessee. As
such, the equipment was never immobilized in the first place.
RSDM
Makati Leasing and Financial Corporation v. Wearever
Textile Mills, Inc.
G.R. No. L-58469
DOCTRINE: If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so
agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby,
there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is
movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
FACTS:
The private respondent Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted
and assigned several receivables with the former under a
Receivable Purchase Agreement in order to obtain financial
accommodations from herein petitioner Makati Leasing and
Finance Corporation. To secure the collection of the
receivables assigned, private respondent executed a Chattel
Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as a
machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
Upon default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it. The Deputy
Sheriff assigned to implement the foreclosure failed to gain
entry into private respondent's premises and was not able to
effect the seizure of the aforedescribed machinery. Petitioner
thereafter filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Acting on petitioner's application for replevin, the lower court
issued a writ of seizure, the enforcement of which was
however subsequently restrained upon private respondent's
filing of a motion for reconsideration. After several incidents,
the lower court finally issued an order lifting the restraining
order for the enforcement of the writ of seizure and an order
to break open the premises of private respondent to enforce
said writ. The lower court reaffirmed its stand upon private
respondent's filing of a further motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings
subsequently filed by herein private respondent, set aside the
Orders of the lower court and ordered the return of the drive
motor seized by the sheriff pursuant to said Orders, after
ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of
replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real
property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the
same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the
only way to remove it from respondent's plant would be to drill
out or destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the
sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive
motor of said machinery. The appellate court rejected
petitioner's argument that private respondent is estopped from
claiming that the machine is real property by constituting a
chattel mortgage thereon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in suit is real property – NO. It is
a personal property
HELD:
Examining the records of the instant case, We find no logical
justification to exclude the rule out, as the appellate court did,
the present case from the application of the abovequoted
pronouncement. If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so
agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby,
there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is
movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioner's assertion on the applicability of the
Tumalad doctrine, the Court of Appeals lays stress on the fact
that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not
belong to the owner of such house. But the law makes no
distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which
the house is built and We should not lay down distinctions not
contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject
machinery as chattel by the private respondent is indicative of
intention and impresses upon the property the character
determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of
New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal
property that which by nature would be real property, as long
as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
MRAM
Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO
10 SCRA 68
DOCTRINE: The steel towers or poles of MERALCO are not
real properties because 1) they are not adhered to the soil, 2)
they are not attached to an immovable property and can be
dismantled without breaking or deteriorating the material and
3) they are not machineries nor instruments or implements
intended for the industry or works on the land
FACTS:
Generated by its hydroelectric plant, MERALCO’s electric power
is transmitted from Laguna to Manila through electric
transmission wires. These electric transmission wires which
carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached
on steel towers. MERALCO has constructed 40 of these steel
towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
Three steel towers were the subject of this dispute. When
inspected, the findings disclose that there was no concrete
foundation but there was adobe stone underneath. Further, it
could not be ascertained whether said adobe stone was
purposely or not.
From this, the City Assessor of Quezon City declared the steel
towers subject to real property tax. MERALCO, however,
protested the assessment saying that the steel towers are
considered poles and according to their franchise, it is exempt
from taxation
ISSUE:
Whether or not the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO are
considered real properties, hence subject to real property tax?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. The Court said that
the steel towers are personal properties. The Court based their
ruling on the enumeration of immovable properties in Art. 415
of the Civil Code.
First, the steel towers do not come within the objects
mentioned in par. 1, because they do not constitute buildings
or constructions adhered to the soil.Moreover, they are not
construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil
because as per description, they are removable and merely
attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
place to place.
Second, they can not be included under paragraph 3 since
they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner; they
can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. In
fact, each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel
bars joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by
screwing the same.
Lastly, they do not fall under paragraph 5, as they are not
machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements. SC said
that even if they were machineries, receptacles, instruments or
implements, they are not intended for industry or works on the
land. MERALCO is not engaged in an industry or works in the
land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.
FMM
Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. L-7057
DOCTRINE: When the machinery and equipment in question
appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the
concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in
such a way that the former could not be separated from the
latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object or that in order to remove said outfit, it became
necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but , also, to cut some
of its wooden supports and when, said machinery and
equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry" carried on said immovable and tended, it becomes
immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article
415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
FACTS:
▪ On 13 March 1953, Machinery &
Engineering Supplies, Inc. (the “Petitioner”) filed a
complaint for replevin in the Court of First Instance (“CFI”)
of Manila for the recovery of the machinery and
equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co., Inc
and Dr. Antonio Villarama (the “Respondents”) at their
factory in Barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
▪ Upon application ex-parte of the
Petitioner and upon approval of its bond sum of
P15,769.00, herein Respondent Judge issued an order
directing the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and take
immediate possession of the properties specified in the
said order.
▪ On 19 March 1953, two deputy
sheriffs of Bulacan, Ramon S. Roco and a crew of
technician and laborers proceeded to Bigti to carry out the
CFI’s order.
▪ Leonardo Contreras, herein
Respondent Company’s Manager met the sheriffs and
handed the latter a letter addressed to Atty. Leopoldo C.
Paled, ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, signed by
the Respondent Company’s counsel, protesting against the
seizure of the properties on the ground that the same are
not personal properties.
▪ Roco and the deputy sheriffs
contended that their duty is ministerial and went ahead to
the factory. At the factory, Rocco’s attention was called to
the fact that the equipment could not possibly be
dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the
wooden frames attached to them but Roco insisted in
dismantling the same on his own responsibility and alleged
that the bond was posted for such eventuality. Thus, the
deputy sheriffs directed that some of the machine’s
supports be cut.
▪ On 20 March 1953, the Respondent
Company filed an urgent motion, with a counter-bond in
the amount of P15,769 for the return of the properties
 seized by the sheriffs. On the same day, the trial court
issued an order, directing the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan
to return the machinery and equipment to the place where
they were installed at the time of seizure.
▪ On 2 March 1953, the deputy
sheriffs returned the said properties by depositing them
along the road near the quarry of the Respondent
Company, without inventory and re-installation in its
former position and replacing the destroyed posts, which
rendered its use impracticable.
▪ On 23 March 1953, Respondents’
counsel asked the provincial sheriff if the machinery and
equipment dumped on the road would be re-installed to
their former position and condition. The next day, the
provincial sheriff filed an urgent motion in court
manifesting the Roco had been asked to furnish the
sheriff’s office with the expenses, laborers, technical men
and equipment to carry into effect the courts order,
among other things but that Roco absolutely refused and
asking the Court that Respondent Company be ordered to
provide the required aid or relieve the sheriff of the duty
of complying to the said order.
▪ On 30 March 1953, the trial court
ordered the provincial sheriff and the Petitioner Company
to reinstate the machinery and equipment removed by
them in their original condition. An urgent motion of the
provincial sheriff dated 15 April 1953 requesting for an
extension was denied and on 4 May 1953, the trial court
ordered the Petitioner Company to furnish the provincial
sheriff with the necessary funds and technical crew and
laborers to reinstate the machinery and equipment.
▪ The case was appealed before the
Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed the same for lack
of merit.
▪ Hence this petition filed before the
Supreme Court (the “SC”). The Petitioner argued that the
respondent judge had completely disregarded his
manifestation that the machinery and equipment seized
were and still are the Petitioner's property until fully paid
for and such never became immovable. The question of
ownership and the applicability of Art. 415 of the new Civil
Code are immaterial in the determination of the only issue
involved in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the machineries and equipments can be considered
as personal properties subject to replevin. -- NO
HELD:
The SC held that the special civil action known as replevin,
governed by Rule 62 of Court, is applicable only to "personal
property". When the sheriff repaired to the premises of
respondent company, the machinery and equipment in
question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to
the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in
such a way that the former could not be separated from the
latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object." Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became
necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but, also, to cut some
of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and
equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry" carried on said immovable and tended." For these
reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the
Philippines, which are substantially identical to paragraphs 3
and 5 of Article 334 of the Civil Code of Spain. As such
immovable property, they were not subject to replevin.
RGGM
Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana
121 SCRA 331
DOCTRINE: Buildings are always immovable under the Civil
Code. Separate treatment by the parties of building from the
land in which it stood does not change the immovable
character of the building.
FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he
mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay, the
mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public
auction to which PNB was the highest bidder.
On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of
the land, it secured a permit for the construction of a
warehouse.
A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This
contract was amended to include the warehouse and the
improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments,
respondent Lacsamana secured title over the property in her
name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale.
Among his allegations was that the bank did not own the
building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.
Petitioner’s complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The
trial court held that the action being filed in actuality by
petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warehouse is an immovable and must be
tried in the province where the property lies.
HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property. Buildings are always immovable
under the Civil Code. A building treated separately from the
land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere
fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood did not
change its character as immovable property.
MCSS
Prudential Bank v. Panis
153 SCRA 390
FACTS:
Plaintiff-spouses Magcale secured two loans over a 2-storey
residential building.
For failure of the plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant
Bank after it became due, the deed of the Real Estate
Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed.
ISSUE: WON a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted
on the building. -- YES
HELD:
Inclusion of building separate and distinct from land, in the
provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an
immovable property. A building by itself may be mortgaged
apart from the land on which it has been built.
NKVS
Tumalad v. Vicencio
41 SCRA 143
DOCTRINE: The view that parties to a deed of chattel
mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property
for the purposes of said contract, "is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the
principle of estoppel.”
FACTS:
On 1 September 1955 defendants executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of plaintiffs over their house located at Quiapo, Manila,
which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The
mortgage was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on
2 September 1955. The mortgage was executed to guarantee
a loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffs. It was also agreed
that default in the payment of any of the amortizations, would
cause the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately
due and Payable and the Chattel Mortgage will be enforceable
in accordance with the provisions of Special Act No. 3135, and
for this purpose, the Sheriff of the City of Manila or any of his
deputies is hereby empowered and authorized to sell all the
Mortgagor's property after the necessary publication in order
to settle the financial debts of P4,800.00, plus 12% yearly
interest, and attorney's fees.
When defendants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and the house was sold at public
auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder,
plaintiffs were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in the
municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that
the house be vacated and its possession surrendered to them,
and for defendants to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27
March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered.
MTC granted petition.
Defendants, in their answers in both the municipal court and
court a quo impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage,
claiming that they are still the owners of the house. During the
pendency of the appeal to the Court of First Instance,
defendants failed to deposit the rent as ordered in the decision
of the municipal court. As a result, the court granted plaintiffs
motion for execution. However, the judgment regarding the
surrender of possession to plaintiffs could not be executed
because the subject house had been already demolished
pursuant to the order of the court in a separate civil case for
ejectment against the present defendants for non-payment of
rentals on the land on which the house was constructed.
ISSUE:
W/N the house may be a subject of a Chattel Mortgage. – YES,
it may be the subject of a chattel mortgage.
HELD:
Defendants predicate their theory of nullity of the chattel
mortgage on the ground that the subject matter of the
mortgage is a house of strong materials, and, being an
immovable, it can only be the subject of a real estate
mortgage and not a chattel mortgage.
The rule about the status of buildings as immovable property is
that it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate
and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may
constitute real properties could only mean one thing — that a
building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.
It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property that which by nature
would be real property. The view that parties to a deed of
chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
property for the purposes of said contract, "is good only
insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based,
partly, upon the principle of estoppel.”
In a case, a mortgaged house built on a rented land was held
to be a personal property, not only because the deed of
mortgage considered it as such, but also because it did not
form part of the land for it is now settled that an object placed
on land by one who had only a temporary right to the same,
such as the lessee or usufructuary, does not become
immobilized by attachment. Hence, if a house belonging to a
person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it
may be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in
the document of mortgage. It should be noted, however that
the principle is predicated on statements by the owner
declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may
conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject
house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants
could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at
least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should
not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise.
Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which
defendants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and
although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the
property, it does so when combined with other factors to
sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty. Finally,
because it is the defendants themselves, as debtors-
mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel
mortgage in this case, the doctrine of estoppel therefore
applies to the defendants, having treated the subject house as
personalty.
AMPS
Serg’s Products and Goquiola v. PCI Leasing and
Finance
338 SCRA 499
DOCTRINE: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real
or immovable property be considered as personal or movable,
a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin
obtained by the other contracting party.
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed a complaint with the RTC
for a sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin.
Upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge
issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver
the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days
and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
Serg’s filed a motion for special protective order. This motion
was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the properties
[were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a
writ of replevin.
In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought
to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the
Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the
agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They
further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating
these machineries as personal because the contracts in which
the alleged agreement were embodied were totally sham and
farcical.
Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held
that the subject machines were personal property, and that
they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also
ruled that the “words of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by
SERG’S became real property by virtue of immobilization.
HELD:
The machineries herein are real properties but are considered
personal by the parties’ agreement.
The Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal,
not immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a
writ of replevin. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that
writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal
property only. Section 3 thereof reads:
“SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such
affidavit and approval of the bond, the court
shall issue an order and the corresponding
writ of replevin describing the personal
property alleged to be wrongfully detained
and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take
such property into his custody.”
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates
immovable or real property as follows:
“ART. 415. The following are immovable
property:
x x x....................................x x
x....................................x x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works;
x x x....................................x x the publication of the notice of its sale in order to make the
x....................................x x x”
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of
the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory
built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence,
although each of them was movable or personal property on
its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry.” In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that
the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the
petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of
the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material fact found therein.
Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court upheld the intention
of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because
it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the
machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the
Lease Agreement – is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by
the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not
affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery
as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any
specific third party would be adversely affected.
KGS
Manarang and Manarang v. Ofilada and Esteban
99 SCRA 108
DOCTRINE: House is personal property for purposes of
chattel mortgage only; Remains real property. The mere fact
that a house was the subject of a chattel mortgage and was
considered as personal property by the parties does not make
said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be
given for its sale at public auction. It is real property within the
purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has
become a permanent fixture on the land, which is real property.
FACTS:
Manarang obtained a loan from Esteban, and executed a
chattel mortgage over a house of mixed materials as a security.
Upon default, Estaban brought an action to foreclose the
property mortgaged. At Manarang’s request, the house
mortgaged was to be sold at public auction to satisfy the debt.
However, before the property could be sold, Manarang offered
to pay the sum. But the sheriff refused the tender unless the
additional amount is also paid representing the publication of
the notice in two newspapers. Manarang contended that the
house in question should be considered as personal property
and the publication of the notice of its sale at public auction in
execution considered unnecessary. The Court of First Instance
held that although real property may sometimes be considered
as personal property, the sheriff was in duty bound to cause
sale valid or to prevent its being declared void or voidable.
ISSUE:
Can the house of Manarang be classified as personal property
since it was considered as such in a chattel mortgage? -- NO
HELD:
The house of mixed materials levied upon on execution,
although subject of a contract of chattel mortgage between
the owner and a third person, is real property within the
purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has
become a permanent fixture on the land, which is real property.
There cannot be any question that a building of mixed
materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage, in which
case it is considered as between the parties as personal
property. The matter depends on the circumstances and the
intention of the parties.
The general principle of law is that a building permanently
fixed to the freehold becomes a part of it, that prima facie a
house is real estate, belonging to the owner of the land on
which it stands, even though it was erected against the will of
the landowner, or without his consent. The general rule is
otherwise, however, where the improvement is made with the
consent of the landowner, and pursuant to an understanding
either expressed or implied that it shall remain personal
property. Nor does the general rule apply to a building, which
is wrongfully removed from the land and placed on the land of
the person removing it.
Among the principal criteria for determining whether property
remains personally or becomes realty are annexation to the
soil, either actual or construction, and the intention of the
parties. Personal property may retain its character as such
where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though
annexed to the realty, or where it is affixed in the soil to be
used for a particular purpose for a short period and then
removed as soon as it has served its purpose.
These considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the rules
on execution do not allow, and we should not interpret them in
such a way as to allow, the special consideration that parties
to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate, for
example, as personal property, when they are not ordinarily so.
Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The
regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials
to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of
property is suited to its character, not to the character which
the parties have given to it or desire to give it. When the rules
speak of personal property, property which is ordinarily so
considered is meant; and when real property is spoken of, it
means property which is generally known as real property. The
regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that
parties, may have privately given to the property levied upon.
Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the
convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or
govern the nature of the proceedings. We, therefore, hold that
the mere fact that a house was the subject of a chattel
mortgage and was considered as personal property by the
parties does not make said house personal property for
purposes of the notice to be given for its sale at public auction.
This ruling is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and
well-defined regulation for official and public guidance and
which would prevent confusion and misunderstanding
JPOT
Navarro v. Pineda
9 SCRA 631
DOCTRINE: Estoppel, in that "the parties have so expressly
agreed" in the mortgage to consider the house as chattel "for
its smallness and mixed materials of sawali and wood".
FACTS:
December 14, 1959, Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana
Gonzales (married to Gregorio Pineda), borrowed from plaintiff
Conrado P. Navarro, the sum of P2,500.00, payable 6 months
after said date or on June 14, 1959. To secure the
indebtedness, Rufino executed a document captioned "DEED
OF REAL ESTATE and CHATTEL MORTGAGES", whereby Juana
Gonzales, by way of Real Estate Mortgage hypothecated a
parcel of land, belonging to her, registered with the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25776,
and Rufino G. Pineda, by way of Chattel Mortgage, mortgaged
his two-story residential house, having a floor area of 912
square meters, erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Vicente
Castro, located at Bo. San Roque, Tarlac, Tarlac; and one
motor truck, registered in his name, under Motor Vehicle
Registration Certificate No. A-171806. Both mortgages were
contained in one instrument, which was registered in both the
Office of the Register of Deeds and the Motor Vehicles Office
of Tarlac.
After failing to settle amount due, respondent was then
granted an extension on June 30,1960 and consequently July
30th of the same year for still being unable to comply. Rufino
Pineda then issued a document entitled "Promise," stating that
defendant would no longer ask for further extension and there
would be no need for any formal demand, and plaintiff could
proceed to take whatever action he might desire to enforce his
rights, under the said mortgage contract.
On August 10, 1960, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure
of the mortgage and for damages, which consisted of
liquidated damages in the sum of P500.00 and 12% per
annum interest on the principal, effective on the date of
maturity, until fully paid. Defendants admit that the loan is
overdue but deny that portion of paragraph 4 of the First
Cause of Action which states that the defendants unreasonably
failed and refuse to pay their obligation to the plaintiff the
truth being the defendants are hard up these days and
pleaded to the plaintiff to grant them more time within which
to pay their obligation and the plaintiff refused;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully
prayed that this Honorable Court render judgment granting the
defendants until January 31, 1961, within which to pay their
obligation to the plaintiff.
November 11, 1960, however, the parties submitted a
Stipulation of Facts, wherein the defendants admitted the
indebtedness, the authenticity and due execution of the Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgages; that the indebtedness has been
due and unpaid since June 14, 1960; that a liability of 12% per
annum as interest was agreed, upon failure to pay the
principal when due and P500.00 as liquidated damages; that
the instrument had been registered in the Registry of Property
and Motor Vehicles Office, both of the province of Tarlac.
ISSUE:
W/N the residential house, subject of the mortgage therein,
can be considered a Chattel and the propriety of the attorney's
fees.
HELD:
The court ruled "a property may have a character different
from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement, treat as personal
property that which by nature would be real property"
(Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 632-633)."There
can not be any question that a building of mixed materials may
be the subject of a chattel mortgage, in which case, it is
considered as between the parties as personal property. ...
The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of
the parties". "Personal property may retain its character as
such where it is so agreed by the parties interested even
though annexed to the realty ...". (42 Am. Jur. 209-210, cited
in Manarang, et al. v. Ofilada, et al., G.R. No. L-8133, May 18,
1956; 52 O.G. No. 8, p. 3954.) Moreover, the court continues
and makes plain that it "is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. It is based partly, upon the principles of
estoppel ..." (Evangelista v. Alto Surety, No. L-11139, Apr. 23,
1958). WHEREBY, previous judgment is hereby AFFIRMED
costs against appelant.
MLAV
Manila Electric Co., v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals
114 SCRA 273
DOCTRINE: Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include
things which should generally be regarded as personal
property.
FACTS:
The case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil
storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company in
Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The
tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound, and are used
for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants.
According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel
plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest
on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the
outermost layer, a sand pad as the intermediate layer and a
two-inch thick bituminous asphalt stratum as the top layer.
The bottom of each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer.
Hence, it is not attached to its foundation.
On the other hand, according to the hearing commissioners of
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) states that
while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation
itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of
the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines are
attached to the tanks.
The CBAA ruled that the tanks together with the foundation,
walls, dikes, steps, pipelines and other appurtenances
constitute taxable improvements.
Meralco filed a motion for reconsideration which the Board
denied. They elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the storage tanks are considered “improvements” on real
property such that it is subject to real property tax. -- YES
HELD:
Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall
within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article
415 of the Civil Code and, therefore, they cannot be
categorized as realty by nature, by incorporation, by
destination nor by analogy. Stress is laid on the fact that the
tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed
on leased land, not on the land owned by Meralco.
The issue raised by Meralco has to be resolved in the light of
the provisions of the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No.
470, and the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No.
464 which took effect on June 1, 1974.
Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is
due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery,
and other improvements" not specifically exempted in section
3 thereof. This provision is reproduced with some modification
in the Real Property Tax Code which provides:
Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. — They shall
be levied, assessed and collected in all provinces,
cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on
real property, such as land, buildings, machinery and
other improvements affixed or attached to real
property not hereinafter specifically exempted.
The Code contains the following definition in its section 3:
k) Improvements — is a valuable addition made to
property or an amelioration in its condition,
amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement
of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to
enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for
new or further purposes.
The SC holds that while the two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered
as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and
rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of
oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include
things which should generally be regarded as personal
property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle might be considered personal property (Standard Oil
Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
DJTV
Caltex Philippines v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals
114 SCRA 296
DOCTRINE: Gasoline station equipment and machineries are
permanent fixtures for purposes of realty taxation.
FACTS:
Machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station
operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It
is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon
demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment in
good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear
excepted.
The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of
gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The
city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. The
assessor appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
The Board said machines and equipment are real property
within the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real
Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took
effect on June 1, 1974, and that the definitions of real property
and personal property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code
are not applicable to this case.
Caltex filed this certiorari petition wherein it prayed for the
setting aside of the Board's decision and for a declaration that
t he said machines and equipment are personal property not
subject to realty tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gasoline station equipment and machineries
are permanent fixtures for purposes of realty taxation. -- YES
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that gasoline station equipment and
machineries are permanent fixtures for purposes of realty
taxation. Thus, they are subject to the real property tax. The
said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station
would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed
permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are
taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of
the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the city assessor's is
imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and
equipment.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals are affirmed. The
petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
JGY
Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Jarque
G.R. No. 41506
DOCTRINE: Vessels are considered personal property under
the civil law. Similarly under the common law, vessels are
personal property although occasionally referred to as a
peculiar kind of personal property. Since the term "personal
property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage
agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
FACTS:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Jarque executed three chattel
mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. Neither
of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good
faith. The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this
mortgage was not registered in the customs house within the
period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings against Jarque. A fourth mortgage was executed
and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the
register of deeds within the thirty-day period before the
institution of insolvency proceedings. CFI declared Jarque to be
an insolvent debtor. As a result, all his properties were
assigned to Corominas. CFI Judge declined to order the
foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained
the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
ISSUES:
1. WON the vessels are considered as personal property
and can be the subject of Chattel Mortgage. Yes
2. WON the Chattel Mortgages are valid. No.
HELD:
Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law.
Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property
although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal
property. Since the term "personal property" includes vessels,
they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of
the Chattel Mortgage Law. Indeed, it has heretofore been
accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in
nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other
personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel
mortgage of a vessel to be noted n the registry of the register
of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents
affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the
Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a
mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages
as to its requisites and validity.
The Chattel Mortgage Law in its section 5, in describing what
shall be deemed sufficient to constitute a good chattel
mortgage, includes the requirement of an affidavit of good
faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against
creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a
chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith
required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is
unenforceable against third persons.
JRPA
Rubiso v. Rivera
37 Phil 72
DOCTRINE: The requisite of registration in the registry, of the
purchase of the vessel, is necessary and indispensable in
order that the purchaser’s rights may be maintained
against a third person.
FACTS:
Rubiso filed a complaint against Rivera for the recovery of a
pilot boat. He alleged that he is the rightful owner of a
pilot boat, which was stranded and recovered by Rivera.
The latter refused to return the said boat as he alleged too
that he was the owner thereof.
It was known that the original owners of the boat had secretly
sold the pilot boat to Rivera on an earlier date than the sale in
a public auction to Rubiso. Nonetheless, material is the fact
that the entry into the customs registry of the sale of the boat
was later than the recording of the sale to Rubiso.
ISSUE:
WON it is Rubiso or Rivera who has a better right to the boat?
-- Rubiso has a better right
HELD:
The requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of
the vessel, is necessary and indispensable in order that the
purchaser’s rights may be maintained against a third
person. Such registration is required both by the Code of
Commerce and Act 1900. It is undeniable, ergo, that Rivera
doesn’t have a better right than Rubiso over the pilot boat.
Ships and vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail,
partake, to a certain extent of the nature and conditions of
real property, on account of their value and importance in
world commerce; and for this, the provisions of the Code of
Commerce are nearly identical with Article 1473 of the Civil
Code
ABB
U.S. v. Carlos
21 Phil. 553
DOCTRINE: The true test of what constitutes the proper
subject of [theft] is not whether the subject is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by
another other than the owner.
FACTS:
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished by
MERALCO for a building containing the residence of the
accused and 3 other residences. Representatives of the
company believing that more light is consumed than what is
shown in the meter installed an additional meter on the pole
outside Carlos’ house to compare the actual consumption and
found out that a jumper was used to manipulate the readings
of the first meter. Further, a jumper was found in a drawer of
a small cabinet in the room of the defendant’s house where
the meter was installed. In the absence of any explanation for
Carlos’ possession of said device, the presumption raised was
that Carlos was the owner of the device whose only use was to
deflect the current from the meter. Thus, he was charged with
the crime of theft amounting to 2,273KW of electric power
worth 909.20 pesos.
Carlos claimed that what he did failed to constitute an offense
because the crime of theft applies only to tangibles, chattels
and objects that can be taken into possession.
Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently
sentenced him to over a year in jail. Carlos contested saying
that electrical energy can’t be stolen because of its nature of
being incorporeal. He filed an appeal on such grounds which
the CFI affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not theft can be committed against an intangible
such as electricity. -- YES
HELD:
Theft of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership
of electrical current was secured by Art 517 and 518 of the
Penal Code which applies to gas.
Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‘gas’ which can be
stolen. However, the true test of what constitutes the proper
subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by
another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of
merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of
science (under Art. 416 of the New Civil Code). Carlos secretly
and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property,
used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use.
Such acts constitute theft.
FZC
Piansay v. David
12 SCRA 227
DOCTRINE: regardless of the validity of a contract
constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, the same cannot
and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the
contract of their privies.
FACTS:
David obtained a loan from Uy Kim secured with a chattel
mortgage on a house in Tondo. David failed to pay, thus was
Kim foreclosed. Kim then bought the house at the resulting
public auction. Thereafter, Kim sold the same to Marcos
Mangubat, who later filed a complaint against David for the
collection of a portrion of the loan. The complaint was later
amended to implead Uy Kim and Piansay praying that the
auction sale and deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in
favor of Piansay be annulled. CFI Manila ordered David to pay
and annulled the chattel mortgage. CA affirmed. David was
ordered to pay and the house was levied upon. To prevent the
sale at the public auction, Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition
for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the
CA; it was denied.
Subsequently, Piansay and Uy Kim instituted an action against
David and Mangubat praying that judgment be rendered
declaring Piansay as the true owner and restrain the levy and
sale to public auction. David demanded from Piansay the
payment of the rentals for the use and occupation of the
house; the latter claims it is his property. Mangubat, on one
hand, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
adjudicata and lackof personality to sue; it was granted. CA
affirmed explaining that Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the
chattel mortgage because it was in reality a mere contract of
an unsecured loan. Piansay assailed Mangubat's right to levy
execution upon the house alleging that the same belongs to
him, he having bought it from Uy Kim who acquired it at the
auction sale.
ISSUE:
WON the chattel mortgage and sale are valid - NO
HELD:
Upon the theory that the chattel mortgage and sale in favor of
Uy Kim had been annulled in the original decision, as affirmed
by the CA, the fact is that said order became final and
executory upon the denial of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus. Hence, Uy Kim and Piansay are now barred from
asserting that the chattel mortgage and sale are valid. At any
rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a
chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to said
contract, the same cannot and does not bind third persons,
who are not parties to the contract of their privies. As a
consequence, the sale of the house in question in the
proceedings for the extrajudicialforeclosure of said chattel
mortgage, is null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is
concerned, anddid not confer upon Uy Kim, as buyer in said
sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that shecould
not have transmitted to her assignee Piansay any such right as
against Mangubat. In short, they donot have a cause of action
against Mangubat and David
LNAC
U.S. v. Tambunting
41 Phil 364
DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the nature of gas used for
illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being
feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property,
susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity
and of being transported from place to place. Likewise water
which is confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by
wires are subjects of larceny.
FACTS:
This appeal was instituted for the purpose of reversing a
judgment of the CFI, finding the accused, Manuel Tambunting,
guilty of stealing a quantity of gas belonging to the Manila Gas
Corporation, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment
with the accessories prescribed by law; to indemnify the said
corporation, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The evidence submitted in behalf of the prosecution shows
that in January of the year 1918, the accused and his wife
became occupants of the upper floor of the house situated at
No. 443, Calle Evangelista, Manila. In this house the Manila
Gas Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the
delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors, consisting
of the necessary piping and a gas meter, which last mentioned
apparatus was installed below. When the occupants at whose
request this installation had been made vacated the premises,
the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the
meter, thus cutting off the supply of gas from said premises.
Upon June 2, 1919, one of the inspectors of the gas company
visited the house in question and found that gas was being
used, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company,
for cooking in the quarters occupied by the defendant and his
wife: to effect which a short piece of iron pipe had been
inserted in the gap where the gas meter had formerly been
placed, and piece of rubber tubing had been used to connect
the gas pipe of rubber tubing had been used to connect the
gas pipe in kitchen with the gas stove, or plate, used for
cooking.
At the time this discovery was made, accused Tambunting was
not at home. However, he presently arrived and admitted to
the agent to the gas company that he had made the
connection with the rubber tubing between the gas pipe and
the stove, though he denied making the connection below. He
also admitted that he knew he was using gas without the
knowledge of the company and that he had been so using it
for probably two or three months.
The clandestine use of gas by the accused in the manner
stated is thus established in our opinion beyond a doubt; and
inasmuch as the animo lucrandi is obvious.
ISSUE:
Whether gas can be the subject to larceny. -- YES
HELD:.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by
article 517 and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of these
articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting,
and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by
the rule laid down in the decisions of the SC of Spain,
construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531
of the Penal Code of that country, articles identical with articles
517 and 518 of the code in force in these Islands. These
expressions were used in a case which involved the subtraction
and appropriation of electrical energy and the court held, in
accordance with the analogy of the case involving the theft of
gas, that electrical energy could also be the subject of theft.
In this connection it will suffice to quote the following from the
topic "Larceny," at page 34, Vol. 17, of Ruling Case Law: There
is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes
which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and
carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought
and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place. Likewise water which is
confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires are
subjects of larceny.
TKDC
Involuntary Insolvency of Strochecker v. Ramirez
44 Phil. 933
DOCTRINE: All personal properties may be mortgaged.
Interest in business is personal property capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties under Article 335 of the Civil Code. Thus, interest in
business may be subject of mortgage.
FACTS:
Three mortgages seek preference in the lower court: one in
favor of Fidelity and Surety Co., another in favor of Ramirez,
and the last one in favor of Ayala. Ayala’s claim was rejected
by trial court from which she didn’t appeal.
As to the time of the mortgages, the one in favor of Fidelity
and Surety Co. is preferred because it was executed and
registered in the registry of property prior to that of Ramirez’s.
However, Ramirez claimed that the mortgage in favor of
Fidelity and Surety Co. is invalid because the property, the half
interest in the drug business, is incapable of being mortgaged.
Trial court ruled that the mortgage in favor of Fidelity and
Surety Co. is entitled to preference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one-half interest in the business is capable of
being mortgaged. -- YES
HELD:
All personal properties may be mortgaged. Interest in business
is personal property capable of appropriation and not included
in the enumeration of real properties under Article 335 of the
Civil Code. Thus, interest in business may be subject of
mortgage.
In this case, the mortgaged property of one-half interest in the
drug business in favor of Fidelity and Surety Co. is a valid
subject of mortgage.
AMD
 Laurel v. Abrogar
G.R. No. 155076
DOCTRINE: Telecommunication services and the business of
providing said services are not personal properties and cannot
be subject to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
Services in business, although properties, are not proper
subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the
same cannot be "taken" or "occupied".
FACTS:
PLDT claims that Luis Marcos P. Laurel, board member and
corporate secretary of Baynet Co., Ltd., stole and used the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) – a method of
routing and completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of
the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that such
business was effectively stolen while using their facilities
leading to great damage and prejudice amounting to
P20,370,651.92.
Laurel however alleged that the allegations do not constitue
the felony of theft under Article 308 of the RPC or any special
law. He claimed that, telephone calls with the use of PLDT
telephone lines, whether domestic or international, belong to
the persons making the call, not to PLDT. He argued that the
caller merely uses the facilities of PLDT, and what the latter
owns are the telecommunication infrastructures or facilities
through which the call is made. He also asserted that PLDT is
compensated for the caller’s use of its facilities by way of
rental; for an outgoing overseas call, PLDT charges the caller
per minute, based on the duration of the call. Thus, no
personal property was stolen from PLDT.
The prosecution asserted that the use of PLDT’s intangible
telephone services/facilities allows electronic voice signals to
pass through the same, and ultimately to the called party’s
number. It averred that such service/facility is akin to
electricity which, although an intangible property, may,
nevertheless, be appropriated and be the subject of theft. The
prosecution further alleged that "international business calls
and revenues constitute personal property envisaged in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code." Moreover, the intangible
telephone services/facilities belong to PLDT and not to the
movant and the other accused, because they have no
telephone services and facilities of their own duly authorized
by the NTC; thus, the taking by the movant and his co-accused
of PLDT services was with intent to gain and without the
latter’s consent.
ISSUE:
W/N telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders
through the telecommunication services provided by PLDT are
considered as personal property, and thus, proper subjects of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. -- NO
HELD:
The court finds that the international telephone calls placed by
Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services
provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services
are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed
strictly. Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or
intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and may
not be held to include offenses other than those which are
clearly described.
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone,
covers both tangible and intangible properties and are subject
of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words
"Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The
statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates
that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper
subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable
properties which have physical or material existence and
susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft.
According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code,
only those movable properties which can be taken and carried
from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft.
Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject
of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it
is found and is occupied or appropriated.
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business
or services provided by business entrepreneurs to the public.
Business does not have an exact definition. Business is
referred as that which occupies the time, attention and labor
of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces
everything that which a person can be employed. Business
may also mean employment, occupation or profession.
Business is also defined as a commercial activity for gain
benefit or advantage. Business, like services in business,
although are properties, are not proper subjects of theft under
the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken"
or "occupied."
PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of
the voices of the telephone callers or of the electronic voice
signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice
and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are
intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or
appropriation by PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter.
PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its
facilities and equipment. Baynet Card Ltd., through its operator,
merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and passes them to its toll
center.

PROPERTY IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE PERSON WHOM
IT BELONGS (ART. 419-426)
CRF
Villanueva v. Castañeda
154 SCRA 142
DOCTRINE: Article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public
use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and
town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service
supported by said towns or provinces.” Such is outside the
commerce of man and cannot be the object of a valid contract.
(Article 1271)
FACTS:
The subject of the herein petition is a “talipapa” that the
petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct
business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization
granted to them by the municipal government. The
respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls
as illegal constructions on public property.
This dispute goes back to when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24
members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the
above-mentioned place. 2 The action was protested where the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. 3 On January 18, 1964, while this case was
pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as
"the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality.
Four years later, the judge decided that the land occupied by
the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the
commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of
private occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was
made permanent. 6
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners
were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to then
they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific
areas or space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees
to the municipal government. Then, on January 12, 1982, the
Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of
Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its
original and customary use as a public plaza thereby the
respondent was tasked to demolish the stalls in the subject
place which was favored by the trial court.
The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed
area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had
entered into with the municipal government.
ISSUE:
WON the lease agreement whereby the municipality of Cavite
leased to the petitioner valid given the fact the said area is
dedicated for public use? -- NO
HELD:
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners
had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises
and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of
their alleged lease contracts. The lease agreement is null and
void.
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public
use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and
town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service
supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the
municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or
exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it
for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas.
Furthermore, the Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that
everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be
the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of
this commerce.
MPF
Maneclang v. IAC
144 SCRA 553
DOCTRINE: Finding that subject body of water is a creek
belonging to the public domain,not susceptible to private
appropriation, a factual determination binding on the Supreme
Court.
FACTS:
● Maneclang filed a complaint for quieting of
title over a certain fishpond located within the four parcels
of land belonging to them.
● The trial court dismissed the complaint upon
finding that the body of water traversing the titled
properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary
of a river; therefore public in nature and not subject to
private appropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a creek can be registered under the Torrens
System -- NO
HELD:
A creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. It is a property
belonging to the public domain, It is a property belonging to
the public domain. it is not susceptible to appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. As a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual.
Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified
by the construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation
Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond. Hence, a
compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such
property in favor of an individual is null and void. The
compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary
to law and public policy.
AMDG
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
384 SCRA 152
DOCTRINE: Until now, the only way the government can sell
to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. However, there exists a
constitutional ban wherein private corporations are prohibited
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. These
corporations may only lease the lands from a period granted
by the law.
FACTS:
The government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with CDCP to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay under the MCCRRP.
Later on President Marcos signed PD No. 1084 and 1085
creating PEA and transferring to PEA the reclaimed lands in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay. In addition, a
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between PEA and
CDCP wherein the latter acceded and transferred its rights and
interest in favor of the former as regards CDCP’s reclaimed
lands under MCCRRP. During Aquino’s administration, special
patents as well as 3 TCTs (the lands were known as Freedom
Islands) were issued in favor of PEA.
PEA and AMARI, a private corporation, through negotiation but
without conducting any public bidding entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) for the development of
the Freedom Islands. A year later, Senate President Maceda
described such JVA during his privileged speech as the
“grandmother of all scams”. Consequently, a joint investigation
was conducted and the report concluded that the JVA is illegal
because what PEA seeks to do is to transfer ownership of the
reclaimed lands which are public lands hence inalienable to
AMARI. However, the Legal Task formed by Pres. Ramos
upheld the legality of the JVA.
Phillipine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that Pres.
Ramos ordered that renegotiations regarding the JVA be again
made. Such JVA (now called Amended JVA) was later on
approved by Pres. Estrada. Petitioner Chavez prays that the
Amended JVA be declared null and void for it violating the
Constitutional and statutory provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation may acquire the
reclaimed lands? NO
HELD:
In this case, the SC traced back the laws governing reclaimed
lands as regards its alienability. The previous Constitutions
including the 1987 Constitution has adopted the Regalian
Doctrine wherein it states that all public lands and waters are
owned by the State. The court discussed and emphasized also
CA No. 141 which states that the only way the government can
sell to private parties’ government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. In addition, the Constitution
has established that private corporations (such as AMARI)
cannot acquire the reclaimed lands however; these
corporations are allowed to lease them. This rule is absolute.
Applying these provisions to the case, the reclaimed lands are
classified as public property and in order for PEA to sell these
lands; there must be a legislative act granting such right to sell.
In addition, even if there exist an express provision in favor of
PEA, such would still subject of the constitutional ban as
regards private corporation acquiring reclaimed alienable lands.
As mentioned and established already, these reclaimed lands
are considered inalienable public property. PD No. 1085
granting PEA the power to oversee the Freedom Islands did
not in any way convert the lands into alienable or disposable
lands. The issuance of special patents by Pres. Aquino as well
as the TCTs also did not convert it into private lands. It must
be noted that the registration of public lands under Torrens
system cannot convert it into private property.
GCG
Republic v. Court of Appeals
281 SCRA 639
DOCTRINE: When the sea moved towards the estate and the
tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land
and passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly
cannot be a subject of a free patent.
FACTS:
Respondent Josefina Morato filed a Free Patent Application on
a parcel of land. The patent was approved at the Register of
Deeds of Quezon. Both the free patent and the title
specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor
encumbered within five years from the date of the issuance of
the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting
upon reports that respondent Morato had encumbered the land
in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an
investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject
land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet
deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at
low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, a portion of
the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents
Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan. The spouses Quilatan
constructed a house on the land. Another portion of the land
was leased to Perfecto Advincula, where a warehouse was
constructed.
Petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents
Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and
reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a
free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that
the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased
within the five-year prohibitory period.
The lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year
period ban against alienating or encumbering the land,
because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also
found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan
covered only the improvement and not the land itself.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned land is a foreshore land and thus must
be reverted to the public domain. -- YES
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that the subject land was foreshore
land, it nevertheless sustained the award thereof to
Respondent Morato. It defined a foreshore land as “that
parcel of land which is between high and low water and left
dry by the flux and reflux of the tides”; it is that “strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide”.
From the actual findings of the lower court, it was found out
that years before the issuance of the free patent to private
respondent, the questioned land was subjected to several
natural calamities like earthquakes and typhoons that caused
severe erosion of the land. Then private respondent introduced
improvements and developments to the land. At the time then
of the issuance of free patent of land to Morato, it was not
covered by water but due to the gradual sinking of the land
caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. During high
tide, at least half of the land is 6 feet deep under water and
three feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay has extended
up to a portion of the land.
Thus, uncontestedly, the land has become a foreshore land
and is now a part of the public domain pursuant to Article 420
of the New Civil Code – being part of the “shores” defined
therein. Accordingly, it cannot be disposed of by the
government and appropriated by a private individual, i.e. be a
subject of a free patent.
VCL IV
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650
DOCTRINE: The term “ports” includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code,
the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
FACTS:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex in Parañaque City.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the
land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex.
The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600
hectares of land including the runways and buildings (“Airport
Lands and Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air
Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no
portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of
through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by
the President of the Philippines.
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) issued
Opinion No. 061, in which it said that the Local Government
Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter.
Therefore, MIAA was held to be delinquent in paying its taxes.
The City of Parañaque Levied upon the properties of MIAA,
and posted invitations for public biddings of MIAA’s properties.
MIAA filed with CA an action for prohibition / injunction. The
City of Parañaque averred that Section 193 of the Local
Government code expressly withdrew tax exemptions from
government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).
CA dismissed the petition for filing beyond the 60 day
reglementary period
ISSUE:
Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate
taxes. -- NO
HELD:
In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality
of the government. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers. As operator of the international airport,
MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to
MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the
runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and Buildings”) then
under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to
MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode
unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property
of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. Article 419 of the Civil Code
provides, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property
of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or
of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of
public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development
of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is
not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,”
are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports
and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute
a “port” constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil
Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of
public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic
of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and
domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does
not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use. The operation by the government of
a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for
public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road,
either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the
government, or only those among the public who actually use
the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road.
The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable
manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public
roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the
character of the property whether it is of public dominion or
not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public
dominion as one “intended for public use.” Even if the
government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for
public use” if anyone can use the road under the same terms
and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees,
the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the
speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road
do not affect the public character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the
landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of
the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The
collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA
as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s
tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually
use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including
those who never use the particular public facility. A user’s tax
is more equitable — a principle of taxation mandated in the
1987 Constitution.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter
calls the “principal airport of the Philippines for both
international and domestic air traffic,” are properties of public
dominion because they are intended for public use. As
properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA
are beyond the commerce of man.
FXRL
Lanzar v. Director of Lands
78 SCRA 130
DOCTRINE: Properties formed by accretion through the
action of the sea belong to the public domain unless the
government decrees otherwise.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Lanzar
filed an application for the registration of a property in
Molo, Iloilo City.
● The Director of
Lands filed an opposition to such application on the
following grounds:
o the said property is foreshore land
o the City of Iloilo needs the same property
as a road right of way for Molo Blvd.
o the petitioner had not possessed the
property in such manner as to grant him
ownership
● The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the ground of
valid prescription.
● The CA reversed, ruling in favor of the respondent on
the ground that the property was formed by accretion
from the sea making it public domain.
ISSUE:
W/N the title to property formed by action of the sea as an
accretion may be registered to an applicant on the basis of
adverse possession for over 30 years --
HELD: The land is of public domain.
Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides that:
“Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters
of the sea, and are not necessary for the purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be
the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and
as an increment thereof.”
In sum, properties formed by accretion through the action of
the sea belong to the public domain unless the government
decree otherwise. As applied to the case on hand, it is
undisputed that the property was formed by accretion through
the action of the sea and that there was no such declaration
by the government that the said property is no longer part of
public domain. As such, the petitioner could not have acquired
the property by mere adverse possession for the requisite
number of years.
RSDM
Ignacio v. Director of Lands
108 Phil. 335
DOCTRINE: Citing Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article
366, Old Civil Code), which provides that: To the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the
accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.
FACTS:
Ignacio filed an application alleging that among others that he
owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. The Director
of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed
oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The
Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of
the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor
his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto,
not having acquired it either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by possessory information title under
the Royal Decree and that he had not possessed the same
openly, continuously and adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged
he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by
the Bureau of Fisheries and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel
owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also
been established that the parcel in question was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that
the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of
the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding
that the parcel formed part of the public domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed land is part of public domain --
Yes. It is part of public domain
HELD:
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law
of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action
of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil
Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the
accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case
of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it
was there held that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a
portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
service, the government shall declare it to be the property of
the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an
increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the
sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service.
If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the
lot in question forms part of the public domain.
MRAM
Villarico v. Court of Appeals
309 SCRA 193
DOCTRINE: Private persons cannot own forest lands.
Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a
registrable title.
FACTS:
Spouses Villarico filed an application for confirmation of title
over a parcel of land in Meycauayan, Bulacan. The applicants
alleged that 1)they are the absolute owners of the property
having bought the same from Segundo Villarico and Mercedes
Cardenas, 2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for
more than 30 years, 3) they are not aware of any mortgage or
encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or
interest therein, and 4) the land involved is not within the
forest zone or government reservation.
Marcos Camargo opposed the application for the registration of
the land claiming that he is the real owner thereof. The
Government interposed its opposition, through the Director of
Forestry, averring that the land in question is part of the public
domain, within the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan
hence, it is not available for private appropriation.
The trial court dismissed the case saying that “a certificate of
title is void when it covers property of the public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title thus
issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, should be cancelled.”
ISSUE:
W/N the property in question can be registered by the
applicant or by the oppositor or by their respective
predecessors-in-interest?
HELD:
The Supreme Court Held in the negative. Since there is no
showing that a declassification has been made by the Director
of Forestry declaring the land in question as disposable or
alienable, the land remains to be part of the public domain as
a forest land. Considering this, possession of the land in
question by the applicants and/or their predecessors-in-
interest even for more than 30 years does not convert the land
into private property capable of private appropriation.
The SC stated that forest lands cannot be owned by private
persons. Its possession, no matter how long it is, does not
ripen into a registrable title. Furthermore, it must be noted
that the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
FMM
Villanueva v. Castaneda
154 SCRA 142
DOCTRINE: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man
and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.
FACTS:
On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution No. 28 authorizing some members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association (herein
“Petitioners”) to construct permanent stags and sell on a strip
of land measuring 12 by 77 meters along Mercado Street, San
Fernando, Pampanga. However, the action was protested on
10 November 1961 through a civil case. The issuance by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga of a writ of preliminary
injunction prevented the Petitioners from constructing the
stalls until final resolution of the controversy.
On 18 January 1964, while the civil case was pending, the
municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No.
29 declaring the subject area as “the parking place and as the
public plaza of the municipality”, thereby impliedly revoking
Resolution No. 218, series of 1961.
Four years later, on 2 November 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar
decided the case and held that the land occupied by the
Petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce
of man and thus could not be subject of private occupancy.
The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.
However, the decision was not enforced for the Petitioners
were not evicted from the subject area. The latter claimed
that they and 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned
specific areas for which they paid daily fees to the municipal
government. This problem appears to have worsened for
some more years under a presumable uneasy truce among the
protagonists, none of whom made any move, for some reason
that does not appear on record.
On 12 January 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate
implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject
property “to its original and customary use as a public plaza”.
Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the
municipal attorney, Vicente a. Macalino (herein “Respondent”),
as officer in charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando,
issued on 14 June 1982, a resolution requiring the municipal
treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in
the subject area beginning 1 July 1982.
The Petitioners reacted by filing a petition for prohibition with
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on 26 June 1982.
However, herein Respondent judge denied the petition as well
as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Thus this petition for certiorari to challenge the decision. The
basic contention of the Petitioners is that the disputed area is
under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had entered
into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the
original occupants were concerned, and later with them and
the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in
their favor in 1971 for which they are paying daily fees. Upon
request by the Petitioners, the Supreme Court (SC) issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo
between the parties pending the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the lease of the subject area is valid. -- NO
HELD:
The SC held that a public plaza is beyond the commerce of
man and cannot be subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.
The SC cited the following cases:
1. In Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, the SC
declared as null and void the lease of a public
plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private
person;
2. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, the SC held that the
City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public
sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond
the commerce of men; and
3. In Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, the
SC declared: “There is absolutely no question that
the town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, specially of
residences, and that such structures constitute a
nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to
be devoted to public use and to be made available
to the public in general They are outside the
common of man and cannot be disposed of or
even leased by the municipality to private parties.”
And ruled that applying this well-settled doctrine, the
petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the
disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on
the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision and
order of the lower court. It also lifted the temporary
restraining order requested by the petitioners.
RGGM
Dacanay Jr. v. Asistio Jr.
208 SCRA 404
DOCTRINE: A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of men. The right of the public to use
the city streets may not be bargained away through a contract.
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city
government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the
RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the
streets of Caloocan.
January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an
ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea
markets subject to several conditions.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea
markets and the stall owners filed a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in
questions are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce
of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city
administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the
action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the
streets as is.
Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in
their street.
ISSUE:
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders
by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan
Manila Commission? -- NO
HELD:
A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may
not be the subject of lease or other contract. Any executive
order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public
street because it is going to be contrary to the general law.
MCSS
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles
66 SCRA 431
FACTS:
A portion of land, sought to be registered, was declared,
through law, an abandoned road. The lot was awarded to the
petitioner for being the highest bidder.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss
the application on the ground that the property sought to be
registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man.
ISSUE:
WON the portion of land is susceptible to registration by a
private individual. -- YES

HELD:
Revised Charter of Cebu, under section 31, provides that, the
City Council shall have the power to close any city road, street
or alley, etc, withdrawn from public servitude, may be used or
conveyed for any purpose.
It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to
close a city road or street. Such power is discretionary and will
not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. It follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
NKVS
Laurel v. Garcia
187 SCRA 797
DOCTRINE: An abandonment of the intention to use the
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property
under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment and it cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve the property
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
FACTS:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding
with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of
land at Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is 1 of the 4 properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956. The properties and the capital goods and services
procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their
suffering during World War II.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by
former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
Japanese firm. No change of ownership or title shall occur. The
Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease
period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted
favorably.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No.
296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas"
clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of
the government has been pushing its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor
price of $225 million.
ISSUE:
W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated
by the Philippine Government. -- NO
HELD:
NO, the subject property cannot be alienated by the
government, even if the property has not been in use for a
long time.
Vice President Laurel asserts that the lands were acquired as
part of the reparations for diplomatic and consular use by the
Philippine government. Laurel states that the Roppongi
property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of
private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code.
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes
under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of
the above provision. He states that being one of public
dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even
by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were
acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular
quarters, buildings and other improvements. The petitioner
states that they continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an
opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in
more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30
Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property
at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains
property of public dominion so long as the government has not
used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides
in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks shores roadsteads,
and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and
are intended for some public
service or for the development of
the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph
2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such.
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property
for public service and to make it patrimonial property under
Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-
use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate
and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair
and improve the property Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in
1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original
purpose.
Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation
by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property
was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid
change in the public character of the Roppongi property. It
does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi
property is no longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents. There is no law
authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court sees no
compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner Ojeda.
AMPS
Palanca v. Commonwealth
G.R. No. 46373
DOCTRINE: A private person may not acquire ownership of a
property of public dominion (such as navigable waters)
through prescription or even by virtue of a Torrens title.
FACTS:
On the 17th of July 1919 Carlos Palanca obtained a decision
from the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the registration
of 4 parcels of land, each adjacent to the others and separated
only among them by some waterways called “esteros”. Before
the decision is read, the government through the fiscal general
presented a petition for reopening of the case to check on the
existence of “esteros” and rivers that are navigable in the
terrain, with the intention of setting/including the said
circumstance in the map and so that it be excluded from the
registration.
The Court denied this petition because they consider it
unnecessary. Despite its presence in the terrain, the
registration of these will not affect the rights of propriety of
the Insular Government or the public use of the said
waterways, which will always remain safe with article 39 of the
Law Register of Propriety.
Much later, the Government of the Islands of the Philippines
presented the current action against Carlos Palanca claiming
that he is illegally occupying portions of the Viray River and
Sapang Sedaria “estero’, which are navigable and was asked
that he be obliged to open it, and leave it in its primitive state.
The court discontinues this action; but elevated it to the Court
of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals declared that the said River Viray and
Sapang Sedaria “estero’ are of the possession and use of the
public and that the right acquired by Carlos Palanca over the
land in which the waterways are located does not affect the
right of the State over them, as goods destined for public use.
Carlos Palanca in his turn elevated an appeal through
“certiorari” to this decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
What is the status of the river and estero?
HELD:
The river and the “estero” being navigable, useful for
commerce, the navigation and fishing, have the character of
public possession and its legal condition in this sense has not
been affected by the possession of Carlos Palance, whenever
has been the time of this possession, because it does not
admit any prescription against the State over goods of public
use.
The Court of Appeals declared in view of the proofs presented
in the case that the River Viray and the Sapang Sedaria “Estero”
are found within the land of Carlos Palanca that was the object
of the decision of the Court of First Instance, and that said
river and “estero” are navigable and of common use, serves as
a communication between two courses of water which flows
into the Manila Bay, and that the water current in them are of
the possession and use of the public, useful for commerce,
navigation and fishing and that they have these conditions
when the land that surrounds them still pertains to the State.
These being the fact, the request or the recourse opened
before this tribunal should be denied, thus confirming the
decision pronounced by the Court of Appeals.
We cannot find basis for the request of the appellant that the
decision pronounced by the Court of First Instance and the
Torrens title issued, in its consequence, in favor of Carlos
Palanca establish the non-existence of the river and “estero” in
question as navigable. In that decision, it is well said that the
terrain is crossed by some waterways called “esteros”. There
is no declaration whatsoever that these “esteros” are not
navigable. On the other hand, when the government asked for
opportunity to prove that some of these “esteros” are
navigable, the court denied them this opportunity due to the
reason that, if they really are navigable, the right of the
Government over them, by reason of such condition of the
River Viray and the Sapang Sedaria “estero” as navigable, have
not been the object of the judicial decision.
As for the rest, the river and the “estero” being navigable,
useful for commerce, the navigation and fishing, have the
character of public possession and its legal condition in this
sense has not been affected by the possession of Carlos
Palance, whenever has been the time of this possession,
because it does not admit any prescription against the State
over goods of public use.
For these considerations, the appeal is denied and the decision
of the court of appeals is confirmed.
KGS
Rabuco v. Villegas
 G.R. No. L-24661
DOCTRINES:
1. RA 3120 converting communal lands into
alienable lands is constitutional.
2. Legislative body has wide discretion to
reclassify State property.
FACTS:
The legislatures enacted RA3120 converting certain parcels of
land in the City of Manila which are reserved as communal
property into disposable or alienable lands of the state and
providing for their subdivision and sale. It includes a lot located
in San Andres, Malate, which was occupied by petitioners
(illegal settlers). The City Mayor of Manila wanted to demolish
and eject said occupants. Subsequently, a large fire gutted the
Malate area, which includes said property. City officials then
took over the lot and kept petitioners reconstructing or
repairing their burned dwellings. The petitioners insisted that
RA 3120 should be implemented to them as the tenants and
bona fide occupants thereof.
ISSUE:
Can a communal property be converted into disposable or
alienable land through legislation? -- YES
HELD:
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act
3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the
subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in
the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the
resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona
fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition
does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or
the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates
simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control
and power to deal with State property.
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be
stricken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of
Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in
subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without
payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis,
since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in
its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public
property over which Congress had absolute control as
distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its
private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be
deprived without due process and without just compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties
were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their
conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State"
for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is
established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power
which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The case of Salas vs. Jarencio wherein the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress in
identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted
another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral
survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as
communal property into disposable land of the State for resale
in small lots by the Land Tenure, Administration to the bona
fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that
"regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is
held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It
holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the
legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its
creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its
public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use" 9 and stressed
that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not
acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private
or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered
title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be
held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part
of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign
upon its creation."
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question
(Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the case
at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of
the Constitution and the government program of land for the
landless and that they were not "intended to expropriate the
property involved but merely to confirm its character as
communal land of the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government: ... The subdivision of
the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the
occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as
an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article
III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its
right and power to deal with state property."
JPOT
Macasiano v. Diokno
G.R. No. 97764
DOCTRINE: "Verily, the powers of a local government unit
are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by
the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover,
the exercise of such powers should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the
members of the community."
FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed
Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure
of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila
and the establishment of a flea market thereon. July 20, 1990,
the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86,
s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality
subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for
vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the
residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea
market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea
market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be
used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be
 used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary
and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are
developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
June 20, 1990, Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract
with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending
areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an
agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and
manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were
put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. On
September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered
the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to
respondent Palanyag. October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig.
General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag
giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market;
otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, on
October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed
with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and
mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction,
to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. October 24, 1990,
the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990
pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary
injunction. On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an
order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the
Municipality of Paranaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen.
Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent
Palanyag.
ISSUE:
W/N an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council
of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. -- NO
HELD:
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing
the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for
stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government
contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and
roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not
infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets
for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of
travel for vehicles and pedestrians. The Solicitor General
furthers the matter with his observation, "Verily, the powers of
a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as
our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should
be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-
being of the members of the community. Every local
government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures
that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience,
maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity
of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,
the local government should refrain from acting towards that
which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare."
Moreover, the municipality did not even comply with the
guidelines set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority. Even
if we were to argue for purposes of debate, the city of
Paranaque's claim would still be bereft and lacking in reason.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of
the respondent Regional Trial Court dated December 17, 1990
which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
petitioner as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic
Command from enforcing the demolition of market stalls along
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
MLAV
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga
G.R. No. L-24440
DOCTRINE: Under the law of Municipal Corporations,
properties which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City.
It further provided that buildings and properties which the
province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to
another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots
and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of
title in the name of Zamboanga Province. Pursuant to CA 39,
the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties and
buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in
Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00.
When RA 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur,
assets and obligations of the previous Zamboanga province
were divided as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte
therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the
total value of the lots and buildings in question, or
P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
The Executive Secretary issued a ruling holding that
Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner of the
properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the
price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked
the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots
and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City when the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the
regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga.
The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of
the P704,220.05 due it.
On June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50
of CA 39 by providing that buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are transferred, free of charge,
in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered the CIR to
stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte
and to return to Zamboanga City the sum taken from it out of
the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Zamboanga City, the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. They prayed that 1) RA 3039 be declared
unconstitutional, 2) plaintiff's rights and obligations under said
law be declared, 3) they be reimbursed the sum paid to
defendant City, and 4) the latter be ordered to continue paying
the balance of its internal revenue allotments.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WON RA 3039 is valid – PARTLY VALID
HELD:
Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting
the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50
properties in question which are devoted to public service are
deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm,
to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held
and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.
Following this classification, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it
affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its
grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held
by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental
capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of
Congress.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-
mentioned, the records do not disclose whether they were
constructed at the expense of the former Province of
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings
must have been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was
enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power
to authorize construction of buildings at their own expense, it
can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the
National Government, using national funds. Even assuming
that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute
mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and
so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public.
But RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del
Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining
lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Moreover, the
fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. However, the
fact that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also
registered is of no significance since registration cannot
convert public property to private.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to
collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share
in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature.
DJTV
Director of Lands v. MERALCO
153 SCRA 686
DOCTRINE: Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land ceases to be public land and
becomes private property.
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed an amended
application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Applicant acquired the land applied for
registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad who in turn
acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as
evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale. Applicant's
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The property
was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the
applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.
The respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the
registration of the property in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner Director of Lands interposed this
petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may
apply for registration of title to land. Petitioner contends that a
corporation is not among those that may apply for
confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, the Public Land Act.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a corporation may apply for
registration of titles to public land.
2. Whether or not open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land ceases to be public land and becomes private
property.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands
has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No. L-73002
(December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509. The Director of
Lands v. Hon. Bengzon and Dynamarine Corporation, etc.,
No. 54045 (July 28, 1987)], and resolved in the
affirmative. There can be no different answer in the case
at bar.
Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private
at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad, then the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
holding alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
The fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted
by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance,
"productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings."
Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads
could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny private
 respondent the right to register its property which was
validly acquired.

2. Yes.
In the Acme decision, Supreme Court upheld the doctrine
that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision

of the respondent Judge is AFFIRMED.

OWNERSHIP (ART. 427-439)
JGY
Chiao Liong Tan v. Court of Appeals
228 SCRA 75
DOCTRINE: Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for
the possession of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to
authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties,
arising from or growing out of the main controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of an Isuzu
Elf van. He claims that he has been in possession, enjoyment
and utilization of the said motor vehicle until it was taken from
him by his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private
respondent herein. Petitioner relies principally on the fact that
the Isuzu Elf van is registered in his name. He claims in his
testimony before the trial court that the said vehicle was
purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of
over P100K; that he sent his brother to pay for the van and
the receipt for payment was placed in his name because it was
his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he
allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was
working for his company.
Private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family
business. When the family business needed a vehicle, he asked
petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of
P5K to be deposited as down payment and he himself paid the
whole price out of a loan of P140K. Since he was still on good
terms with the petitioner then, he allowed the registration of
the vehicle in petitioner's name.
TC: Ruled in favor of private respondent. CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON questions of ownership may be resolved in a replevin
proceeding. -- YES
HELD:
It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve
in whom is the right of possession. Primarily, the action of
replevin is possessory in character and determined nothing
more than the right of possession. However, when the title to
the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea
and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the
conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the
property in controversy, the question of ownership may be
resolved in the same proceeding.
Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for the possession
of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a
settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or
growing out of the main controversy. Thus, in an action for
replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to
possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief
for the return of the replevied property or secure a judgment
for the value of the property in case the adjudged return
thereof could not be had. Appropriately, the trial court
rendered an alternative judgment.
CRF
Calub v. Court of Appeals
331 SCRA 55
DOCTRINE: Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without
its consent, cannot prosper. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2)
motor vehicles by whose drivers failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at
the DENR-PENR. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers
refused to accept the receipts. Abuganda, one of the drivers
was charged with for violation of Revised Forestry Code.
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly
taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR.
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR loaded with
forest products. A corresponding criminal case was again filed
against Abuganda because of this incident. In both criminal
cases however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon,
the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed
a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2)
impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against
herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan which was
granted by the RTC.
The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from
conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin;
and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to
take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the
custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest
products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from
deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject
to the direct order of the Supreme Court. On May 27, 1994,
the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It
ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the
authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said
conveyance in custodia legis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle in custodia
legis can be a subject to an action for replevin? - NO
HELD:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and
the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be
subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody
of the law, and not otherwise.
JRPA
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals
250 SCRA 108
DOCTRINE: A boundary dispute is neither a case of forcible
entry nor of unlawful detainer, but an issue of ownership.
FACTS:
Cruz was the owner of a parcel of land. Adjacent to this lot is
one wherein Sarmiento had a house built on. On trying to
cause the relocation of her lot, Cruz found out that Sarmiento
was encroaching on her property. When Cruz talked to
Sarmiento about constructing a new fence, which will cover
her true property, the latter vehemently refused to do so and
threatened Cruz with legal action. For fear of being sued in
court, she sought judicial relief. The trial court decided in
favor of Cruz. Sarmiento tried to assail this decision by saying
that the issue was on ownership of the portion of land and
thus, the action should have been an accion
reivindicatoria and not forcible entry.
ISSUE:
WON Cruz filed the proper judicial relief. -- NO
HELD:
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint
filed by Cruz reveals that the action is neither of forcible entry
nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary
dispute, which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on
the issue of ownership over the portion of a lot.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.
Cruz cannot belatedly claim that petitioner’s possession of the
controverted portion was by mere tolerance. The
complaint didn’t characterize Sarmiento’s alleged entry on
the land—whether legal or illegal. The complaint
admitted also of the fact that the fence had already preexisted
on the lot when she acquired the same.
This was definitely not a situation obtained in and gave
rise to an ejectment suit for two reasons. First, forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
lawful possessor, the violation of which
right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court
provided for in the Rules. Second, if a forcible entry action in
the court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years,
then the result may well be no action of forcible entry
can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in
physical possession, the plaintiff may just throw in a demand,
file a suit in court and summarily throw him out of the land.
ABB
Bongato v. Malvar
387 SCRA 327
DOCTRINE: The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party deprived of the parcel of land may file either accion
publiciana; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to
recover ownership as well as possession.
FACTS:
Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint in the
MTCC for forcible entry against Teresita Bongato, alleging that
Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to the
spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials.
MTCC decided in favor of Malvar and ordered Bongato to
vacate the land. RTC affirmed the decision. CA also held that
MTCC had jurisdiction. On appeal, Bongato raised the issue of
MTCC jurisdiction because the complaint was filed beyond the
one-year prescriptive period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTCC had jurisdiction since the Complaint
was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged
entry? -- NO
HELD:
MTCC had no jurisdiction. Forcible entry is a quieting process,
and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement
the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year
period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-
year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about
it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party deprived of
the parcel of land may file either accion publiciana; or an
accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership
as well as possession.
One the basis of the facts, it is clear that the cause of action
for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed
when they filed the complaint on July 10, 1992 (the house was
built as early as 1987), thus the MTCC had no more jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case for forcible entry.
FZC
De La Cruz v. CA
286 SCRA 230
DOCTRINE: A positive act of the gov’t is needed to reclassify
land and until such reclassification, property remains part of
the forest reserve incapable of alienation and cannot be
acquired by prescription.
FACTS:
In 1973, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an
application under the Land Registration Act by the Ramos bros.
Eugenio de la Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After trial, the
application was dismissed on the ground that the land was not
yet reclassified and remains part of the forest reserve. The
Ramos bros. pursued the reclassification of the land and were
subsequently awarded ownership of it. Cristina Villanueva, the
private respondent, subsequently purchased the same lot from
the brothers. Upon learning of the said sale, petitioner filed a
complaint for reconveyance claiming ownership of the said
land having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly,
notoriously and adversely against the whole world and in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years. His complaint
was dismissed. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court thus the case at bar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the
residential lot to which he possessed and devoted time, effort
and resources -- NO
HELD:
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was
declared by the Gov’t as part of the forest zone. Forest lands
or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land
and to convert it to alienable or disposable land. And until such
declassification, there is no disposable land to speak of.
LNAC
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez
358 SCRA 489
DOCTRINE: Reconveyance is a remedy of those whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed
of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for
value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property
should not have passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
FACTS:
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the
Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and
registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya et al.
On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix
Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they
declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the
registered owners of the aforesaid lot. Consequently, they
were issued TCT No. 12467 on July 8, 1982.
Considering that the said lot was among the objects of
expropriation proceedings, the RTC rendered a partial Decision
on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the RTC approved the
Compromise Agreement entered into between the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered
owners of Lot No. 4673; namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca
Booc and Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved
Compromise Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just
compensation for the expropriation of the subject property.
Petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the
corresponding TCT No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City on October 13, 1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages against
petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroño et al. The Complaint alleged
that herein private respondents had been excluded from the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the
nullification of several documents, including TCT No. 12788
dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of herein
petitioner.
On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint on the ground of prescription. This Motion was
denied by respondent judge on January 12, 1998. A Motion
for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on March 31,
1998.
On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA
through a Petition for Certiorari.
CA dismissed the Petition.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES:
1. Whether private respondents’ claim against
expropriated property had prescribed. -- YES
2. Whether reconveyance lies against the expropriated
property in this case. -- NO
HELD:
1. The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, are reproduced for easy
reference, as follows: Section 4. Liability of distributees
and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2)
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in
accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate,
such heir or such other person may compel the settlement
of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years,
it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against
the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or
other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose,
after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner
each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof,
and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against
the bond provided in the preceding section or against the
real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such
bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a
liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full
period of two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have
been made.
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons
unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a
settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year
period after the settlement and distribution of the estate.
This prescription period does not apply, however, to those
who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement.
Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to
be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or
logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being
merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons
who had no knowledge thereof. Be that as it may, it
cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the
manner provided by law, a transaction may be known
actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to
have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial
settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in
the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time
of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or
until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or
to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is
when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have
fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or
in those of their transferees who cannot be considered
innocent purchasers for value. In this regard, title to the
property in the present case was no longer in the name of
the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an
 innocent purchaser for value—the government. Even
assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the
other heirs, private respondents may proceed only against
the defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no
participation in or knowledge of the alleged fraud.
2. An action for reconveyance resulting from
fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the
fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon
the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
Registration of real property is considered a constructive
notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall
be counted therefrom. Clearly then, private respondents’
action for reconveyance based on fraud has already
prescribed.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a
constructive trust would have already prescribed just the
same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. The
imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff
or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the
property. Undisputedly, private respondents are not in
possession of the disputed property.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a
remedy of those whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another. Such
recourse, however, cannot be availed of once the property
has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an
action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should
not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value.
We find that the property has already been conveyed to
the government in appropriate expropriation proceedings,
the regularity or validity of which has not been questioned.
Petitioner should, therefore, enjoy the security afforded to
innocent third persons under our registration laws.
Equally important, its title to the property must be
rightfully preserved.
TKDC
Idolor v. Court of Appeals
351 SCRA 399
DOCTRINE: Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; and (2) the act, against which the injunction is to
be directed, is a violation of such right. Hence, the existence of
a violated right is a prerequisite to the granting of an
injunction.
FACTS:
Idolor executed a deed of real estate mortgage with right of
extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem over a
property in favor of De Guzman to secure a loan. Upon Idolor’s
failure to pay, De Guzman filed a complaint against Idolor
before the Office of the Barangay Captain that resulted in an
agreement wherein Idolor is given another ninety days to
settle her loan; otherwise, she will execute a deed of sale with
the agreement to repurchase without interest within a year.
Idolor again failed to pay back her loan so De Guzman filed an
extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage resulting
in a public auction where the property was sold to Gumersindo.
Idolor filed a complaint with the RTC resulting to the court’s
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership
of the property in favor of the De Guzmans.
Idolor claims that her proprietary right over the property was
not yet lost since her right to redeem the land for a year had
neither lapsed nor run as the sheriff’s certificate of sale was
null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned writ of preliminary injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion. -- YES
HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be
issued, the following requisites must be present: (1) a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the
act, against which the injunction is to be directed, is a violation
of such right. Hence, the existence of a violated right is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction.
In this case, Idolor has no more proprietary right to speak of
over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a
writ of injunction. She had one year from the registration of
the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to
exercise her right; she failed to show sufficient interest or title
in the property as her right of redemption had already expired
two days before the filing of the complaint. Thus, the de
Guzmans are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of
the foreclosed property.
AMD
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents v. Court of
Appeals
254 SCRA 220
DOCTRINE:
1. Injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the
status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be heard. Before an injunction can be
issued, it is essential that the following requisites be
present:
a. There must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and
b. The act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right.
2. An Original Certificate of Title serves as a concrete
and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property. The certificate of title vests not only
ownership over the lot but also the right of
possession as a necessary consequence of the right of
ownership.
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a 12.82-hectare land located at
Cagayan de Oro City. Said parcel of land was formerly
classified as a timberland until1956, when the Bureau of
Forestry released the said land as alienable and disposable
public land.
On January 1964, Petitioner Cagayan de Oro City Landless
Residents Association, Inc (COCLAI) was authorized by the
Bureau of Lands (BOL) to survey the land for purposes of
subdivision into residential lots. On March 1964, after
conducting an ocular survey, the BOL required COCLAI to file a
Miscellaneous Sales Application over the land. The said sales
application was held in abeyance by the BOL pending the final
outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and the City of CDO against Benedicta Salcedo for
the annulment of an Original Certicate of Title covering the
subject land. In this case, COCLAI was a party-intervenor.
Meanwhile, the NHA initiated an expropriation proceeding to
acquire an area which included the subject land. Petitioner
intervened and claimed that instead of being paid through
money, it preferred acquisition of residential lots in any
housing area of NHA. Upon learning of the pending suit (v.
Salcedo case) over the same land, the NHA sought the
suspension of the expropriation proceedings. In 1982, the SC
finally resolved the pending suit by annulling the title and
declaring the subject lot to be public land. In response to
the BOL’s order to take an inventory of the land, the Regional
Land Director of Region 10 informed the Director of Lands that
the members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said
lot by virtue of the Survey Authority.
In 1983, Presidential Proclamation No. 2292 was issued,
reserving the entire subject land for the Slum Improvement
and Resettlement (SIR) Project of the NHA. This led to the
rejection of the subdivision survey submitted by COCLAI.
Eventually, the NHA caused the demolition of the settlement
structures constructed by COCLAI members. This prompted
petitioner to file a case for forcible entry, which the MTCC
decided in petitioner’s favor. On appeal, the RTC affirmed
the MTCC decision.
However, during the pendency of the case filed by COCLAI,
Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by the President over the
entire subject land, and by virtue of which the ROD of CDO
issued an Original certificate of Title in the name of NHA.
Thus, a day after COCLAI moved for the execution of
judgment, the NHA filed a complaint for "Quieting of Title with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against
COCLAI. The RTC ruled in favour of COCLAI, denying NHA’s
Motion to Dismiss and prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. NHA’s MR was also denied. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC decision. The CA ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to respect the possession of the
NHA over the land in dispute. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the NHA is entitled to the injunction
prayed for. -- YES
2. W/N the NHA has a better right to the
possession of the lot involved. -- YES
HELD:
1. As an extraordinary remedy,
injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the
status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be heard. As such, injunction is
accepted as a strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy to be used cautiously, as it
affects the respective rights of the parties, and only
upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme
necessity.
NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction because while
the case for forcible entry was pending on appeal, NHA
was granted an OCT over the subject land by virtue of the
Special Patent issued by the President. In view of this
intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for
quieting of title before the RTC. Thus, it was only proper
for the CA to direct the RTC, where the quieting case was
pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in
the forcible entry case as there was a material change in
the status of the parties with regard to the said land.
2. The Original Certificate of Title
issued to respondent NHA serves as a concrete and
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property.
Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under
the Torrens systems and the one year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without
said decree being controverted by any adverse party, the
title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned.
Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted
by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that
the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the
register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or
fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the
presumption of having been issued by the register of
deeds in the regular performance of its official duty. The
certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot
but also the right of possession as a necessary
consequence of the right of ownership.
MPF
Lucero v. Loot
25 SCRA 687
DOCTRINE: When a final decree has been issued in a land
registration case, the issuance of a writ of possession is only a
matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor
of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as
to the issuance of writ of possession.
FACTS:
● Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of
possession of property (based on a final decree in a land
registration proceeding).
○ Although the other party (all surnamed Loot)
filed a motion to quash the writ, this was granted
by CFI Iloilo’s Judge Fernan on September 21,
1959.
● The Loots opposed the decision on the
ground that there were defects in the reconstitution of the
records and that the motion was not under oath.
○ The court dismissed these as trivial arguments.
○ Two motions for reconsideration were also
denied.
○ The writ of possession prayed for was issued in
favour of Lucero.
● The Loots were very adamant to their
opposition.
○ They then went straight to the Supreme Court for
 an appeal for certiorari.
○ The Loots desperately tried to assert
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was
in accordance with law. -- YES
HELD:
The order granting the writ of possession was based on a
decision promulgated on a land registration case in 1938,
which became a final decree on October 29, 1941.
 After the
final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a
ministerial duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the
registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately
empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree.
This automatic process is to avoid further delay and
inconvenience to a successful land registration litigant if he
were compelled to commence another action to secure
possession.
Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the
issuance of a writ of possession. The writ may be issued not
only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case, but also against anyone adversely occupying
the land or any portion of the land. Even fraud shall not be a
bar to the issuance of the writ of possession, which necessarily
implied the delivery of possession of the land.
As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do
nothing. These must be raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise,
the parties contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the
opportunity to question the correctness of the findings.
AMDG
Vencilao v. Vano
182 SCRA 492
DOCTRINE: Writ of Possession may be issued not only
against the party defeated in the land registration case but
also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the
land, or any portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings up to issuance of final decree
FACTS:
(NOTE: Three consolidated cases)
First case: Juan Reyes applied for the registrations over parcels
of land, however, it was argued that Juan Reyes was not the
lawful owner of a portion of the parcels that was registered.
Second case: Bernardina Vda. de Lupso was the administratix
over the lot subject in controversy. When she died, several
TCTs were issued to Pedro Lupso and several persons. As a
result, several writs of possession were also issued in their
favor. When the writs were being served by the sheriff, the
petitioners refused to vacate and even executed guerilla-like
tactics as their sign of refusal. A petition for contempt was filed
by one of the registered owners against the petitioners to
which the court granted. The petitioners were contending that
the writs of possession should not be issued in the first place
since there were no complaints of forcible entry, unlawful
detainer or recovery of ownership and possession that were
filed against them. The petitioners also claim that they were
not defeated oppositors in the first case.
Third case: As a result of the writ of possessions being issued
against the petitioners, the judge also issued writs of
demolition. The petitioners opposed the validity of these writs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the writs of possession were
valid? -- YES
2. Whether or not the writ of demolition was valid?
-- YES
HELD:
The issuance of the TCTs carried with it the delivery of
possession which is an inherent element of the right of
ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore,
sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the
generally accepted principle upon which the administration of
justice rests. A writ of possession may be issued not only
against the person who has been defeated in a registration
case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
Applying this to the case, from the records, though the
petitioners were not the defeated oppositors over the land
registration case, they were unlawfully occupying the lots
although writs of possession were already being served to
them. Having said this, the writs of possession were properly
issued against them.
The writs of demotion were also issued properly. These writs
were described by previous cases as a complement to the writs
of possession. Without it, the writ of possessions would be
ineffective. The writs are issued to prevent the lawful owner
from being deprived of his lots.
GCG
German Management and Services v. CA
177 SCRA 495
DOCTRINE: Actual possessors can commence a forcible entry
case because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely
a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession
FACTS:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose,
residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of
a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal. The land was originally registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines.
Spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their
property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner
obtained development permit from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part
of the property was occupied by private respondents and
twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to
vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject
property which included the portions occupied and cultivated
by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal.
They alleged that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen
years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the
first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the
Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to
improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it
shall secure the needed right of way from the owners of the
lot to be affected; that, petitioner deprived private respondents
of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their
farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means
of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038
and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass,
remove and eject private respondents from their respective
farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.
Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint
for forcible entry. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the
Municipal Trial Court.
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. The court gave due course to their petition
and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court.
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were
in actual possession of the property at the time they were
forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right
to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by
the Appellate Court. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
forcible entry case against petitioner? -- YES, they are entitled
to file a forcible entry case.
HELD:
Since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner,
private respondents have a right to commence an action for
forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not
in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved,
only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
respondents were in possession of the property and not the
petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have
a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify
their act of ―forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless
of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help,
which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are
not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent
in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are
threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force).
Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who
has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means
to recover the property from another person who possesses
the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly
stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor
who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to
deliver the thing.
VCL IV
Caisip v. People
36 SCRA 17
Doctrine: Art. 429 cannot be used as a defense of the
petitioner to justify their action. The order to vacate was until
June 26 (or 20 days from the execution of the decision.) On
June 17, the spouses REMAINED in possession of the said lot.
At the very least the owner of the hacienda is just a co-
possessor of the land, thus the spouses still had rights over it.
FACTS:
Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated
a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico
situated in Sitio Bote-bote, Barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the
deceased father of the Cabalag. Hacienda Palico is owned by
Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The
overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the
accused herein.
Before the present case happened, Marcelino Guevarra filed an
action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition
as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of
Hacienda Palico. In a decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, it declared that Guevarra is not a tenant on the said
parcel of land. Then after, Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry
case against Guevarra. The court decided in favour of Roxas y
Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return of the writ
showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the
owner thru Caisip and that spouses Guevarra and Cabalag
were given 20 days from June 6, 1959 to vacate the premises.
It also appears in the record that due to the tenacious attitude
of Cabalag, Caisip sought the help of policemen Federico
Villadelrey and Ignacio Rojales.
On June 17, 1959, Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the
portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached
her and bade her to leave but Cabalag refused to do so
claiming that she and her husband has a right over the
property. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he
threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants,
Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who
were some distance away, and brought them with him.
Gloria Cabalag Version: Rojales told her, who was then in a
squatting position, to stop weeding. As she insisted on her
right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and,
twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was
holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and,
together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her, which resulted for
her dress to torn.
Caisip et. al Version: Upon being asked by the policemen to
stop weeding and leave the premises, Cabalag, not only
refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip.
According to the defense, she was arrested because of the
crime of slander then committed by her. Rojales and
Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were heading
towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear
her clothes.
Due to the aforementioned incidents, A case filed against
Caisip et al. for Grave Coercion, (Petitioners Caisip et al. also
filed grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria Cabalag
after 8 days) One of their defences was ART. 429 (including
the doctrine of self help.)
TC Ruled in favor of Gloria Cabalag and that Caisip et al. are
guilty of Grave Coercion. CA Upheld the TC Ruling.
*Caisip et al. argued in the SC that the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that their acts are justified under Article 429 of
the Civil Code; “The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has
the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.”
ISSUE:
Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present
case. -- NO
HELD:
No, Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from
June 6, 1959 within which to vacate the premises. Cabalag did
not, on June 17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or
usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof,
even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-
possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or
threatened . . . physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled
Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in
possession.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A,
Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the policemen,
despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants
claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is
manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in
the presence of the hacienda owner’s representative, appellant
Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented
to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; 2) Gloria and
her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together
with the owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip;
(3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial
to its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and,
even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a
criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had
been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them
did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had
tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind
whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as
“necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor,”
and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been
held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of
violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the
complainant from “doing something not prohibited by law,”
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her “to do
something against” her will (stopping the weeding and leaving
said lot), “whether it be right or wrong,” thereby taking the law
into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, Grave Coercion.
FXRL
Heirs of Vencilao, Sr. v. CA
288 SCRA 574
DOCTRINE: Tax declarations and receipts do not by
themselves conclusively prove title to the land. They only
constitute prima facie evidence of ownership or possession.
Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when
the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. However, the
vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is
anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property. Otherwise, his mere
refusal to believe that such defect exists, he will not be
deemed a purchaser in good faith should such title indeed be
defective.
FACTS:
Both petitioner and respondent claim ownership over a parcel
of land located at Bohol.
Petitioner claims ownership by virtue of inheritance from their
father who exercised uninterrupted possession over the land,
declared the property for taxation purpose and religiously paid
the real estate tax.
The respondent claims ownership as registered owner of said
lot as a portion of the lot owned by Pedro Luspo who
mortgaged his land to PNB and subsequently was foreclosed.
The respondents won as the highest bidder and they became
the owner of that portion of land.
The RTC ruled in favor to the petitioners holding that they had
validly acquired the land by prescription. Although a Torrens
Title is indefeasible and not subject for prescription it is not so
when the respondents purchased the land from PNB with prior
knowledge that the land was in possession of the petitioner’s
father.
The CA reversed the court ruling and declared the petitioners
as the true owners of the property.
ISSUE:
W/N land registered under the Torrens system can be acquired
by prescription -- NO
HELD:
No. The previously registered land may not be acquired by
prescription.
The Property Registration Decree states that no land under the
Torrens System may be acquired through prescription. Such
title is indefeasible.
The tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners
as evidence of ownership prevail over respondents’ certificate
of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. Tax
declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively
prove title to the land. They only constitute prima facie
evidence of ownership or possession.
Petitioners are wrong to contend that the prior knowledge of
the respondents on the possession of the petitioner’s father
defies the Torrens title’s imprescriptibility because there is no
flaw on the title when they purchased it from PNB that was the
registered owner of the land.
The general rule is that where the certificate of title is in the
name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for
value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the
title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of
the certificate.
However, the vendee is required to make the necessary
inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property.
Otherwise, his mere refusal to believe that such defect exists,
or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor’s title, will not make him an
innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he
acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably
be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
In the instant case, there is nothing from the records showing
that the title of PNB, the vendor, was flawed.
Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their claim of
acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also
failed to allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there
was a defect in the title of PNB. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption leans towards the validity of the
vendor’s title.
RSDM
Oclarit v. CA
233 SCRA 239
DOCTRINE: Although it is true that what defines a piece of
land is not the area mentioned in its description but the
boundaries therein laid down, in controversial cases as in this
case where there appears to be an overlapping of boundaries,
the actual sizeof the property gains importance.
FACTS:
The late Juan Oclarit, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest,
allegedly purchased from Martin Macalos a parcel of
unregistered land located in Antipolo, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol,
with no permanent landmarks . This particular land did not
have specified boundaries, as it was only indicated that the
borders were a brook, lands of Gales, and another of
Baja.Then he bought five more parcels of land located in
Antipolo and Ulbujan, also in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, from
Dalmacio Gales.
The heirs of Oclarit filed an action for the quieting of title and
damages against respondent Balasabas. The complaint alleged
that private respondent entered the properties subject of the
action. Failing to work on the area planted to palay, private
respondent climbed the coconut trees, replaced the "J.O."
markings on the trees with "F.G.", representing Felipa Gales,
his mother, and caused to be recorded in the cadastral survey
of the land the name of Felipa Gales as claimant against Juan
Oclarit. The heirs of Oclarit considered the acts of private
respondent as having cast a cloud of doubt over their title to
the property and therefore deprived them of the enjoyment of
the fruits of the coconut trees. Petitioners further alleged that
the late Juan Oclarit, from the time of the acquisition of said
properties, had exercised dominion and ownership thereon
openly, peacefully, adversely and uninterruptedly. It was also
claimed even after the death of Oclarit they still enjoyed the
property.
Respondent Balasabas claims to have actually and lawfully
possessed the disputed parcels of land "since time
immemorial". The first parcel of land was owned by his mother,
Felipa Gales, by virtue of inheritance, and declared in her
name under Tax Declaration; while the second parcel of land
was acquired by him from his own mother as evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale and which he declared in his name under
Tax Declaration. In addition, respondent likewise alleged
possession of the parcels of land openly, peacefully, adversely
and continuously without disturbance from any party until he
was molested by the heirs of Oclarit.
Trial court appointed an Assessor (commissioner) for the
purpose of determining whether the lands described in the
complaint overlapped with any of those lands claimed by
respondents’.
Trial court dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Oclarit are lawfully entitled to the
subject properties. -- NO
HELD:
Had the petitioners been in possession of solid evidence that
the parcels of land they are claiming are "alien" or "foreign" to
those declared by private respondent as his, they should have
questioned the commissioner’s report which was based on the
relocation survey and ocular inspection which were conducted
in their presence. Moreover, petitioners’ claim that their
property is different from those of private respondent’s is
indeed antithetical to their filing of the complaint for quieting
of title — there would not have been any basis for claiming
that private respondent cast a cloud of doubt to their title over
their two parcels of land.
The deed of sale wherein Martin Macalos conveyed to Oclarit a
parcel of land did not even indicate with particularity the area
of the land covered thereby. This explains why they
indiscriminately pointed at boundaries which are even beyond
what could have been bought by Oclarit. Although it is true
that what defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in
its description but the boundaries therein laid down, in
controversial cases as in this case where there appears to be
an overlapping of boundaries, the actual size of the property
gains importance. Thus, the lower court correctly stressed that
it would have done petitioners some good had they correctly
specified even in their tax declarations the areas of the land
they were claiming. It is well settled that anyone who claims
that he has a better right to the property, must prove both
ownership and identity of the said property. An area delimited
by boundaries properly identifies a parcel of land.
With regard to tax declarations as bases for claim of ownership,
petitioners capitalize on what was obviously an obiter that no
one in his right mind would be continuously paying taxes for
property that is not in his actual possession. On the contrary,
any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations
must also prove he is in actual possession of the property.
Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared for
taxation purposes did not constitute proof of possession, nor is
it proof of ownership in the absence of the claimant’s actual
possession of said property.
MRAM
Cutanda v. Heirs of Roberto Cutanda
335 SCRA 418
DOCTRINE: Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten
years of actual adverse possession was required, regardless of
how such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
before possession ripened into full and complete title over the
land.
FACTS:
Private respondents brought an action for recovery of
possession, accounting and damages against petitioners in the
RTC of Tagbilaran City. They alleged that in the 1900’s, their
grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels of land in
Bohol. Tax declarations were used by them as evidence. Upon
Roberto’s death, these lands were inherited by his children,
namely: Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia. Except
for Doque who stayed in Bohol and administered the lands, all
of Roberto’s children established residence in Leyte. In 1987,
they returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands.
Their plan, however, was frustrated as petitioners, who were
occupying the lands, refused to leave. Private respondent thus
prayed that each be declared owner of 1/5 of the subject real
properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them
said properties.
The petitioners, on the other hand averred that the lands were
owned by their uncle Anastacio who died without children. As
such, petitioners, who were nieces and nephews of Anastacio
occupied and cultivated the land. The petitioners were claiming
rightful ownership of the land for having openly, contiguously,
adversely, and continuously possessing the land for about 55
years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents’ right over the land has
prescribed?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Civil Code provides that
title to land by prescription is acquired if the land has been in
open, continuous, adverse possession and occupancy of the
land over 10 years. Under the Code of Civil Procedure,
therefore, ten years of actual adverse possession was required,
regardless of how such occupancy may have commenced or
continued, before possession ripened into full and complete
title over the land. Applying this to the present case, by 1943,
ten years after his possession of the subject parcel of land had
begun, Anastacio Cutanda became owner of the land in
question through acquisitive prescription.
Hence, the rightful owner of the land is the petitioners.
FMM
Sps. Luis Cruz v. Sps. Alejando Fernando, Sr.
G.R. No. 145470
DOCTRINE: Occupation of a property merely through the
tolerance of the owners could neither ripen into ownership nor
operate to bar any action by the subsequent owners to recover
absolute possession thereof.
FACTS:
Spouses Luis V. Cruz and Aida Cruz (the “Spouses Cruz”) are
occupants of the front portion of a 710-square meter property
located in Sto. Cristo, Baliuag, Bulacan.
On 21 October 1994, Spouses Alejandro Fernando, Sr. and Rita
Fernando (the “Spouses Fernando”) filed before the Regional
Trial Court (the “RTC”) a complaint for accion publiciana
against the Spouses Cruz, demanding the latter to vacate the
premises and to pay the amount of P500.00 a month as
reasonable rental for the use thereof. The Spouses Fernando
alleged that they are owners of the property having bought the
same from Spouses Clodualdo and Teresita Glorioso (the
“Gloriosos”) pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 9 March 1987.
They also alleged that the Gloriosos offered to sell to the
Spouses Cruz the rear portion of the property but the
transaction did not materialize due to the latter’s failure to
exercise their option and for this reason, the Spouses
Fernando were able to buy the whole property.
For their part, the Spouses Cruz argued that the Kasunduan
dated 6 August 1983 they made with the Gloriosos is a
perfected contract of sale and that the agreement has already
been “partially consummated” as they already relocated their
house from the rear portion of the lot to the front portion that
was sold to them.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision on 3 April
1998 in favor of the Spouses Fernando and ordered the
Spouses Cruz to vacate the property and pay the rent
beginning from 2 October 1994 when the case was filed before
the RTC.
The Spouses Cruz appealed the RTC decision but the Court of
Appeals affirmed it on 3 October 2000.
Thus, the Spouses Cruz herein petition before the Supreme
Court. The Spouses Cruz argued that the Kasunduan is a
perfected contract of sale and thus they have ownership over
the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Cruz have a right of ownership over the
property. -- NO
HELD:
The SC held that the terms and conditions of the Kasunduan
show that it is a contract to sell and that a contract of sale is
yet to be consummated and thus ownership of the property
remained in the Gloriosos.
The SC also held that the Spouses Cruz have no superior right
of ownership or possession to speak of. Their occupation of
the property was merely through the tolerance of the owners.
Evidence on record shows that the Spouses Cruz and their
predecessors were able to live and build their house on the
property through the permission and kindness of the previous
owner, Pedro Hipolito, who was their relative, and
subsequently, Teresita Glorioso, who is also their relative.
They have no title or, at the very least, a contract of lease over
the property. Based as it was on mere tolerance, the Spouses
Cruz possession could neither ripen into ownership nor operate
to bar any action by the Spouses Fernando to recover absolute
possession thereof.

RIGHTS OF ACCESSION (ART. 440-475)
Accession Industrial
RGGM
Depra v. Dumlao
136 SCRA 475
DOCTRINE: The owner of land on which improvement was
built by another in good faith is entitled to removal of
improvement only after land owner has opted to sell the land
and the builder refused to pay for the same. where the land’s
value is considerably more than the improvement, the
landowner cannot compel the builder to buy the land. In such
event, a “forced lease” is created and the court shall fix the
terms thereof in case the parties disagree thereon.
FACTS:
Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered,
situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Agustin
Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot. When
Dumlao constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof
had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of
Depra’s property, After the encroachment was discovered in a
relocation survey of Depra’s lot made on November 2, 1972,
his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking
Dumlao to move back from his encroachment, filed an action
for Unlawful Detainer. Said complaint was later amended to
include Depra as a party plaintiff. After trial, the Municipal
Court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and
applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. Depra did not accept
payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with
the Municipal Court. In this case, the Municipal Court, acted
without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot
operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Quieting of
Title. The court conceded in the MCs decision that Dumlao is a
builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the factual situations of Dumlao and Depra
conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law,
for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in
good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith'
under Article 448?
HELD:
Owner of the land on which improvement was built by another
in good faith is entitled to removal of improvement only after
landowner has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to
pay for the same. Res judicata doesn’t apply wherein the first
case was for ejectment and the other was for quieting of title.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of
the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building
or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
MCSS
Sarmiento v. Agana
129 SCRA 122
FACTS:
While one Ernesto was still courting his wife, the latter's
mother had told him the couple could build a residential house
on a certain lot. They constructed a residential house.
Subsequently, the land was sold to petitioner Sarmiento, who
asked Ernesto and his wife to vacate. Sarmiento filed an
Ejectment suit against them.
In the evidentiary hearing, Sarmiento submitted the deed of
sale of the land which showed the price to be PHP15,000. On
the otherhand, Ernesto testified that the residential house then
cost PHP30,000-40,000, which was not questioned.
The MTC found that Ernesto was a builder in good faith and
the house had a value of PHP20,000. When the case was
elevated, the CFI of Pasay ordered Sarmiento to exercise his
option, to reimburse Ernesto for the sum of the house or allow
them to purchase the land, within sixty days. Upon expiration
of the period, Ernesto was allowed to deposit the sum of
PHP25,000 with the Court as the purchase price for the land.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are builders in good faith. -- YES
HELD:
Ernesto and his wife were builders in good faith in view of the
peculiar circumstance under which they had constructed the
residential house. As far as they knew, the land was owned by
Ernesto's mother-in-law, and could reasonably be expected to
later on give them the land.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land
owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the
land until he is paid the value of his building. The owner of the
land, has the option either to pay for the building or to sell his
land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as Sarmiento
did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected.
NKVS
Nuguid v. CA
452 SCRA 243
FACTS:
Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at Quezon
City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment
building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at
public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses
Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the
RTC of Quezon City. In its Decision, the RTC upheld the
spouses’ title but declared that the four-door two-storey
apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by
this Court, in its Decision dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No.
105360 entitled Pecson v. Court of Appeals.
Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building.
In its Order of November 15, 1993, the trial court, relying upon
Article 546 of the Civil Code, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid
were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost of P53,000,
following which, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to
immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and
improvements. In the same order the RTC also directed
Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the
Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units
or P21,000 per month from June 23, 1993, and allowed the
offset of the amount of P53,000 due from the Nuguids against
the amount of rents collected by Pecson from June 23, 1993 to
September 23, 1993 from the tenants of the apartment.
After conducting a hearing, the lower court issued an Order
dated, directing the spouses to pay the sum of P1,344,000 as
reimbursement of the unrealized income of Pecson for the
period beginning November 22, 1993 up to December 1997.
The sum was based on the computation of P28,000/month
rentals of the four-door apartment
Pecson filed a petition for review before this Court. The Court
handed down the decision remanding to the trial court for it to
determine the current market value of the apartment building
on the lot. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by
Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid to Pedro Pecson otherwise
the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the
apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.
On the basis of this Court’s decision, Pecson filed a Motion to
Restore Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting,
praying respectively for restoration of his possession over the
subject 256-square meter commercial lot and for the spouses
Nuguid to be directed to render an accounting under oath, of
the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from
November 22, 1993 until possession of the same was restored
to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners should reimburse the
respondent for the improvements of the building -- YES
HELD:
It is not disputed that the construction of the four-door two-
storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was undertaken at
the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot on June 23,
1993, by virtue of entry of judgment of the Court’s decision,
dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360, the apartment
building was already in existence and occupied by tenants. In
its decision dated May 26, 1995 in G.R. No. 115814, the Court
declared the rights and obligations of the litigants in
accordance with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These
provisions of the Code are directly applicable to the instant
case.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor
in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the
necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right
of retention until full reimbursement is made.
While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership
of the land and the improvements thereon in view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership,it
guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith
builder’s improvements are concerned. The right of retention
is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for
the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to
guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the
actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for
possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and
useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed.
Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay
rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, as in this
case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or
compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the
fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith.
Otherwise, the security provided by law would be impaired.
This is so because the right to the expenses and the right to
the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation
juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the
other.
The text of the decision in G.R. No. 115814 expressly
exempted Pecson from liability to pay rentals, for we found
that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial
court’s determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering
him to account for the rentals of the apartment building from
June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993, the period from entry of
judgment until Pecson’s dispossession. As pointed out by
Pecson, the dispositive portion of our decision in G.R. No.
115814 need not specifically include the income derived from
the improvement in order to entitle him, as a builder in good
faith, to such income. The right of retention, which entitles
the builder in good faith to the possession as well as the
income derived therefrom, is already provided for under Article
546 of the Civil Code.
AMPS
Sulo ng Nayon v. Nayong Filipino
G.R. No. 170923
DOCTRINE: Article 448 does not apply to a lessee-BPS. The
basis of the application of Article 448 is the BPS’s (good faith)
belief of a claim of title.
FACTS:
Respondent Nayong Pilipino Foundation, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land in
Pasay City, known as the Nayong Pilipino Complex. Petitioner
Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. (PVHI), formerly called Sulo sa
Nayon, Inc., is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws.
Contract of lease: respondent leased a portion of the Nayong
Pilipino Complex, consisting of 36,289 square meters, to
petitioner Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. for the construction and
operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine
Village Hotel. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years, or
until May 1996. The contract was renewed for another 25
years or until 2021.
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment
of their monthly rental. Respondent repeatedly demanded
petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. Hence,
respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the
MeTC of Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Should the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code, apply to the improvements made by the
lessee? -- NO. Article 1678 applies.
HELD:
The late Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, a leading expert in Civil
Law, explains: This article [Article 448] is manifestly intended
to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows on
land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and
not to lands where the only interest of the builder, planter or
sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to
the land. In fact, as lessees, they recognize that the
respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is
that because of the improvements, which are of substantial
value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with
the permission of respondent, they should be considered
builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession
of the property until reimbursement by respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable
improvements on the leased premises does not give the
petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which
rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a
situation would allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor
out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is
neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call
for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the
property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee
one-half of the value of the improvements at
that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby.
He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the
lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is
caused to the principal thing, and the lessor
does not choose to retain them by paying
their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.
Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-
half of the value of the improvements which the lessee made
in good faith, which are suitable for the use for which the lease
is intended, and which have not altered the form and
substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may
remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse.
Petitioners argue that to apply Article 1678 to their case would
result to sheer injustice, as it would amount to giving away the
hotel and its other structures at virtually bargain prices. They
allege that the value of the hotel and its appurtenant facilities
amounts to more than two billion pesos, while the monetary
claim of respondent against them only amounts to a little more
than twenty six-million pesos. Thus, they contend that it is the
lease contract that governs the relationship of the parties, and
consequently, the parties may be considered to have impliedly
waived the application of Article 1678.
We cannot sustain this line of argument by petitioners. Basic is
the doctrine that laws are deemed incorporated in each and
every contract. Existing laws always form part of any contract.
Further, the lease contract in the case at bar shows no special
kind of agreement between the parties as to how to proceed in
cases of default or breach of the contract.
KGS
Pecson v. CA
244 SCRA 407
DOCTRINES:
1. Article 448 of the Civil Code does not apply
to a case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the
land by sale or donation.
2. The provision of Art. 448 on indemnity may
be applied by analogy to a case where one loses the
ownership of the land on which he earlier built an
apartment.
FACTS:
Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a
4-door, 2-storey apartment. For his failure to pay realty tax on
said property, the lot was sold at public auction by the City
Treasurer of Quezon City to Nepomuceno, who in turn the
property to Sps. Nuguid. Pecson questioned the validity of the
auction sale. RTC then, dismissed the complaint and ruled that
the apartment building was included in the sale. It reached the
SC, but the same was denied. Thereafter, Sps. Nuguid filed a
Motion for delivery of possession, which was granted by the
trial court. Pecson contested. The Court of Appeals affirmed in
part the order of the trial court citing Article 448 of the Civil
Code. CA ordered that Pecson should be indemnified with the
construction cost of the apartment.
ISSUE:
Is Article 448 applicable in a case wherein the owner of the
land is also the builder who then later loses ownership of the
land by sale? -- NO
HELD:
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose
ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has
built some works, or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in
bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the
Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder,
sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not
apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land
by sale or donation.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of
works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not
apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the
provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a
state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the
two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis
of the indemnity.
JPOT
Spouses Benitez v. CA
266 SCRA 242
DOCTRINE: "His right is older, and because, by the principle
of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing."
FACTS:
Spouses Macapagal bought a 303 sq. m. lot and found that
Spouses Benitez had encroached on their land. Both parties
were amenable to a compromise and had sold the land in
excess for a P1000 per sq.m. The former spouses again
acquired a lot adjacent to the Benitezes and after a survey had
discovered that their lot was encroached on yet again by the
latter. They went to court and filed legal action in the MeTC
(San Juan), RTC (Pasig) as well as with the CA. It was held by
each respectively below:
On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58, Civil Case No.
61004 for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan
decided in favor of the former, with the following disposition:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants ordering them and all persons claiming
rights under them to vacate and surrender possession
of the subject premises to the plaintiffs as well as to
pay the following:
1. The amount of P930.00 a month
starting July 17, 1989 until they finally
vacate the subject premises;
2. The amount of P5,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees; and
3. Cost of suit."
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 167,
affirmed said decision. The RTC said:
"The controversy in this case is not an encroachment or
overlapping of two (2) adjacent properties owned by the
parties. It is a case where a part of the house of the
defendants is constructed on a portion of the property of the
plaintiffs. So that as new owner of the real property, who has
a right to the full enjoyment and possession of the entire
parcel covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961,
plaintiffs have the right to demand that defendants remove the
portion of the house standing on plaintiff's realty. . . ."
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, it being more consistent with the facts and the
law applicable, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the defendant-appellants. SO ORDERED."
On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in
petitioners' plea. In a Resolution dated March 24, 1992, the
Sixth Division of said Court found the petition to be a mere
rehash of the issues and arguments presented before the
lower courts. It ruled in part that:
"3) Petitioners were fully aware that part of their
house encroached on their neighbor's property, while
respondents became aware of it only after purchasing
said property. Petitioners cannot claim good faith as
against the respondents.
"4) Since petitioners are not builders in good faith,
they cannot demand that respondents sell the
disputed portion; what the law provides is that the
builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle said
structure at their own expense. In the interim period
that petitioners' structure remains, they should pay
reasonable rent until they remove the structure."
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
"For reasons indicated, We find the appeal without merit and
deny it due course, with costs against the petitioners. SO
ORDERED."
Spouses Benitez contest and have firm belief to the contrary,
for which they assailed tweaked claims to be reviewed by the
SC.
ISSUE:
W/N possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of
another's house be recovered in an action for ejectment? --
YES
HELD:
The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by
the facts, are: after conducting a relocation survey, private
respondents discovered that a portion of their land was
encroached by petitioners' house; notices to vacate were sent
to petitioners, the last one being dated October 26, 1989; and
private respondents filed the ejectment suit against petitioners
on January 18, 1990 or within one (1) year from the last
demand. Prior possession is not always a condition sinequa
non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Actual or physical
occupation is not always necessary. Hence, ejectment is the
proper remedy for the case at bar.
In addition, the court also ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction
over the matter and were appaled by the audacity of
petitioners persistently arguing otherwise after receiving a
decision which was sound from the beginning. Furthermore,
the "rental" issue is technically damages for which the land
owner is entitled to for the non-enjoyment and deprivation of
his property. Moreover, the option to sell rests solely with the
land owner and only his. Article 448 is accorded the landowner
because "his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing."
In sum, the SC affirms the decision of all lower courts and said
decision is unanimous.
MLAV
Technogas Phil. V. CA
268 SCRA 5
DOCTRINE: Possession acquired in good faith continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance
of any defect or flaw in his title. The good faith ceases from
the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner.
FACTS:
Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp is the registered
owner of Lot 4531-A of Lot 4531 with all buildings, walls, and
improvements therein, which they bought from Pariz Industries
Inc. The lot that it adjoined, Lot 4531-B, is owned and
registered under the name of Eduardo Uy. It was later found
out that a portion of the walled lot encroached on the land
owned by Uy. Technogas offered to by the encroachment but
Uy refused.
They entered into a private agreement to demolish the wall on
the encroached land. Consequently, Uy filed a complaint for
encroachment before the office of the Municipal Engineer and
the Provincial Fiscal. However, the complaint of did not prosper.
This prompted Uy to dig a canal along the wall, causing it to
collapse. Due to the damage, petitioner filed a complaint
against Uy for malicious mischief.
The RTC ruled in favor of Technogas and ordered Uy to sell
the encroached land and pay for damages to the wall.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
Technogas to pay rent for the encroachment.
ISSUE:
WON Technogas is a builder in good faith -- YES
HELD:
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no
proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow,
needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done
in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the
latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It
is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the
same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is
proved.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he
is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in
his title. Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s
successor, petitioner in this case. The good faith ceases from
the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner.
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner
for recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions
of Art. 448 of the Civil Code. The benefit to the builder under
this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the
land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between
the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the
indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the
land.
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private
respondent, their rights and obligations are to be governed by
Art. 448. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating
the encroaching portion of petitioner’s building after payment
of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot
occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his
own liking.
Petitioner, however, must also pay the rent for the property
occupied by its building only up to the date private respondent
serves notice of its option upon petitioner and the trial court;
that is, if such option is for private respondent to appropriate
the encroaching structure. In such event, petitioner would
have a right of retention which negates the obligation to pay
rent. The rent should however continue if the option chosen is
compulsory sale, but only up to the actual transfer of
ownership.
DJTV
Manotok Reality v. Tecson
164 SCRA 587
DOCTRINES:
● Issuance of writ of execution is proper even if private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or
peculiar circumstances supervened; Option to retain
the premises and pay for improvements or to sell the
premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the
owner of the property.
● Where the improvements have been gutted by fire,
the basis for private respondent’s right to retain the
premises has already been extinguished without
petitioner’s fault.
FACTS:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession
and damages against the private respondent, the then Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring the
defendant Nilo Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good
faith; ordering the plaintiff to recognize the right of said
defendant to remain in Lot No. 345, Block 1, of the Clara
Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been
reimbursed by the plaintiff the sum of P7,500.00, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by
respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a motion for the approval of
petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment,
praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the
exercise of petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements
introduced by the private respondent on the property; b)
thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession
of the property in question to the petitioner.
The respondent judge denied the motion by issuing the
disputed order that under the peculiar circumstances which
supervened after the institution of this case, like, for instance,
the introduction of certain major repairs of and other
substantial improvements on the controverted property, the
instant motion of the plaintiff is not well-taken and therefore
not legally proper and tenable.

After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner
filed the present petition for mandamus alleging that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion to exercise option and for execution of
judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code, the exercise of option belongs to the owner of
the property, who is the petitioner herein, and that upon
finality of judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a
matter of right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act
on the part of the respondent judge.
The private respondent filed his comment on the petition
alleging that the same has already become moot and academic
because fire gutted not only the house of the private
respondent but the majority of the houses in Tambunting
Estate.
Petitioner argues that since the judgment of the trial court has
already become final, it is entitled to the execution of the same
and that moreover, since the house of the private respondent
was gutted by fire, the execution of the decision would now
involve the delivery of possession of the disputed area by the
private respondent to the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the private
respondent is a builder in good faith. -- NO
2. Whether or not the
issuance of writ of execution is proper even if private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or
peculiar circumstances supervened. -- YES
3. Whether or not the basis
for private respondent’s right to retain the premises has
already been extinguished without petitioner’s fault
when the improvements have been gutted by fire. --
YES
HELD:
1. The private respondent's good faith ceased
after the filing of the complaint by the petitioner. A
possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long
as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such
interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons
(Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code). Thus, the repairs and
improvements introduced by the said respondents after
the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have
been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of
the petitioner's option.
2. When the decision of the trial court became
final and executory, it became incumbent upon the
respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the
execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for
the respondent judge to deny the petitioner's motion to
avail of its option to approriate the improvements made
on its property.
Neither can the respondent judge deny the issuance of a
writ of execution because the private respondent was
adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of
"peculiar circumstances which supervened after the
institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction
of certain major repairs of and other substantial
improvements..." because the option given by law either
to retain the premises and pay for the improvements
thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in good
faith belongs to the owner of the property.
3. Since the improvements have been gutted
by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's
right to retain the premises has already been extinguished
without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other
recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the
premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED and the respondent judge is hereby ordered to
immediately issue a writ of execution ordering the private
respondent to vacate the disputed premises and deliver
possession of the same to the petitioner.
JGY
Ballatan v. CA
304 SCRA 34
DOCTRINE: In the event that the owner elects to sell to the
builder, planter or sower the land on which the improvement
stands, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value
at the time of payment.
FACTS:
The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots. Lot 24 is
registered in the name of petitioners Ballatan. Lots 25 & 26 are
registered in the name of respondent Go Sr. His son, Winston
Go constructed a house on Lot 25. Adjacent to Lot 26 is Lot 27,
4 registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.
Petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot 24. During
the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of respondent’s house encroached her property.
Ballatan informed Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment
on her property. Surveys were made and it was found out that
the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by a few meters and
that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two 2 meters.
Petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go
to remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot 24.
Respondents Go refused. Hence, Ballatan filed for recovery of
possession of real property. TC decided in favor of petitioners.
It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion, demolish
their improvements. CA modified: ordered Go to pay Ballatan,
and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay Go and the value to be
fixed at the time of the taking.
ISSUE:
WON the value should be fixed at the time of the taking. -- NO
HELD:
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their
rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property specifically
Art. 448. Petitioners, as owners of Lot 24, may choose to
purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their
land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying
the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house
useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that
portion of Lot 24 on which their improvement stands. If the
Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must
vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to
petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents
Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the
portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the
land is much more than the Go's improvement, then
respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not
agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to
fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the
subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the
prevailing market value at the time of payment.
JRPA
Geminiano v. CA
259 SCRA 344
DOCTRINE: Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article
546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord
out of his property.
FACTS:
Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314sq was originally
owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de
Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the
petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold to
the private respondents with an alleged promise to sell to the
latter that portion of the lot occupied by the house.
Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a 7-year
contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot,
including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the
private respondents. The private respondents then introduced
additional improvements and registered the house in their
names. After the expiration of the lease contract however, the
petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit,
which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee. Lee sold the
lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it to the spouses Agustin
and Ester Dionisio. Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of
Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. As
such, the lot was registered in the latter's name. The
petitioners sent, via registered mail, a letters addressed to
private respondent Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate
the premises and pay the rentals in arrears. Upon failure of the
private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed
with the MTCC of Dagupan City a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Art 448 applies to this case?
-- NO
2. Whether or not the private respondents are
builder in good faith or mere lessees? -- LESSEES
HELD:
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith,
hence, Article 448 of the Civil Code should apply. They rely on
the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of the
execution of the contract of lease, as well as the alleged
assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which the
house stood would be sold to them.
It has been said that while the right to let property is an
incident of title and possession, a person may be lessor and
occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is
not the owner of the premises let. After all, ownership of the
property is not being transferred, only the temporary use and
enjoyment thereof.
In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was
originally owned by the petitioners' mother. The land was
allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortage. Lee, however, never
sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession
of the property in question. The petitioners' mother therefore
remained in possession of the lot.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into
possession of 126 square-meter portion of the said lot by
virtue of contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother
as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees, is therefore
well-established, and carries with it a recognition of the
lessor's title. The private respondents, as lessees who had
undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are
then estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a
better title not only in themselves, but also in some third
person while they remain in possession of the leased premises
and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This
estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time
the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title.
Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of
the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor
builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the
same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord
out of his property.
Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot
occupied by the private respondents' house, the same was not
substantiated by convincing evidence. Neither the deed of sale
over the house nor the contract of lease contained an option in
favor of the respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And
even if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not
make the private respondents possessors or builders in good
faith so as to covered by the provision of Article 448 of the
Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy or
ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged
promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven.
ABB
Spouses del Campo v. Obesia
160 SCRA
DOCTRINE: When the co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of the defendants
occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
plaintiffs which the defendant obviously built in good faith, the
provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
FACTS:
An action for partition of a parcel of land was filed by the
spouses Del Campo in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and
defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the
proportion of and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court
appointed a commissioner in accordance with the agreement
of the parties. The commissioner conducted a survey, prepared
a sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on May
29, 1976, recommending that the property be divided into two
lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for the
spouses Del Campo and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15
square meters for Obesia. Upon surveying, it was shown that
the house of Obesia occupied the portion with an area of 5
square meters of Lot 1161-A of the spouses Del Campo. The
parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the
trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the
parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of the
land in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a
builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in
common.
HELD:
When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it
appears that the house of Obesia occupies a portion of 5
square meters of the land pertaining to spouses Del Campo
which Obesia obviously built in good faith, the provisions of
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
In applying Article 448 of the New Civil Code, the plaintiffs
have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as
provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the
plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the
land occupied by their house. But if the price asked for is
considerably much more than the value of the portion of the
house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be
obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the
reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions
that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court
shall fix the terms thereof. The defendants may opt to
demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their
own expense, if they so decide.
FZC
Rosales, et al. v. Castellfort, et al.
G.R. No. 157044
DOCTRINE: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in
good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and
it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower
the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It
is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle
of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-
Rosales (petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan situated
in Los Baños, Laguna.
Petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on
their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent
Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). It turned out that respondents
Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of
the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-
Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas
(Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer
Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the
Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with
Villegas offering a larger lot near petitioners’ lot in the same
subdivision as a replacement thereof. In the alternative,
Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners’ lot
with legal interest. Both proposals were, however, rejected by
petitioners whose counsel directed Castelltort to stop the
construction of and demolish his house and any other structure
he may have built thereon, and desist from entering the lot.
Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and preliminary injunction against spouses-
respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna
ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD:
Under Article 448, the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which
case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the
parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease,
the court must fix the terms thereof.The choice belongs to the
owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e.,that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel
instead the owner of the building to remove it from the
land.The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated
thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good
faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership,
the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the
land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of
the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay
for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse
to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older,
and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.

LNAC
Ignao v. IAC, G.R. No. 72876
193 SCRA 17
DOCTRINE: When the co-ownership is terminated by a
partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-
owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another
co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the
provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the
respective rights of the parties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents
Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 534 square meters situated in Barrio
Tabon, Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action for
partition filed by petitioner, the then CFI directed the partition
of the aforesaid land, allotting 133.5 square meters or 2/8
thereof to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the
remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to
petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was ever
effected.
Petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of
real property against private respondents Juan and Isidro
before the CFI. In his complaint petitioner alleged that the
area occupied by the two (2) houses built by private
respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously
allotted to them by the trial court.
It was found that the houses of Juan and Isidro actually
encroached upon a portion of the land belonging to Florencio.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered a
licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to determine
the exact area occupied by the houses of private respondents.
The survey subsequently disclosed that the house of Juan
occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro occupied 59
square meters of Florencio's land or a total of 101 square
meters.
Trial court ruled that although private respondents occupied a
portion of Florencio's property, they should be considered
builders in good faith.
Petitioner appealed to IAC which subsequently affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Thus, herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder
in good faith on a property held in common. -- YES
HELD:
It should be noted that prior to partition, all the co-owners
hold the property in common dominion but at the same time
each is an owner of a share which is abstract and
undetermined until partition is effected. As co-owners, the
parties may have unequal shares in the common property,
quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co-
owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners.
Every co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract,
because until division is effected such portion is not concretely
determined.
Article 448 provides: The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a
builder in good faith on a property held in common has been
resolved in the case of Spouses del Campo vs. Abesia, wherein
the Court ruled that:
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code
cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the
land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow
upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he
is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of
co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated
by the partition and it appears that the home of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land
pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil
Code should apply.
Both the trial court and the Appellate Court erred when they
peremptorily adopted the "workable solution" in the case of
Grana vs. CA, and ordered the owner of the land, petitioner
Florencio, to sell to private respondents, Juan and Isidro, the
part of the land they intruded upon, thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to choose. Such ruling contravened the
explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "(t)he owner
of the land xxx shall have the right to appropriate xxx or to
oblige the one who built xxx to pay the price of the land xxx."
The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the
courts
TKDC
MWSS v. C.A.
143 SCRA 623
DOCTRINE: The right of a possessor in bad faith to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or
mere pleasure, provided the thing does not suffer any injury
and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by
paying their value at the time of his possession.
FACTS:
Dagupan City filed a complaint against MWSS for recovery of
ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
MWSS interposed R.A. 1383 as its defense; it vested to MWSS
the ownership, possession, and control of all waterworks
system throughout the Philippines. MWSS also filed a
counterclaim for reimbursement of expenses it incurred for
necessary and useful improvements.
Trial court ruled that MWSS is a possessor in bad faith so it is
not entitled to claim reimbursement. MWSS appealed to the
Court of Appeals arguing that Dagupan City should be liable for
payment of the balance of the loan secured by MWSS for the
improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System; however
the Court of Appeals affirmed trial court’s judgment.
MWSS appealed to the Supreme Court for the removal of
useful improvements. Dagupan City argues that MWSS is a
possessor in bad faith so it has absolutely no right to the
useful improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a possessor in bad faith has the right to
remove useful improvements. -- NO
HELD:
Under Article 499 of the Civil Code, “he who builds, plants, or
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted, or sown without right to indemnity.” Additionally,
under Article 546 of the Civil Code, only a possessor in good
faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of
retention until reimbursed. Finally, under Article 547 of the
Civil Code, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the
principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession
does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful
expenses.
The right of a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements
applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure,
provided the thing does not suffer any injury and the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying their value
at the time of his possession.
In this case, MWSS is a builder in bad faith so it loses
whatever useful improvements it made without right to
indemnity.
AMD
Alviola v. CA
289 SCRA 537
DOCTRINE: For Article 448 to apply, the construction must be
of permanent character, attached to the soil with an idea of
perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is
transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must
remove the construction. The proper remedy of the landowner
is an action to eject the builder from the land.
FACTS:
In 1950, Victoria Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan 2
parcels of land situated in Valencia, Negros Occidental. Victoria
and her son, Agustin Tinagan took possession of said parcels
of land. In 1960, the Alviola spouses occupied portions thereof
whereat they built a copra dryer and put up a store engaged in
the buying and selling of copra. Both Victoria and Augustin
died in 1975. The latter was survived by private respondents,
his wife Florencia and their children.
Editha Aviola, assisted by her husband, filed a complaint for
partition and damages before the CFI, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural child of Augustin TInagan and
demanding the delivery of her share in the estate. The case
was dismissed on the ground that recognition of natural
children should be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
In 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against the Alviolas. The RTC ruled in favor of
private respondents and ordered the Alviolas to peacefully
vacate and to surrender the possession of the premises. The
latter may remove their store and dryer without injury and
prejudice to the plaintiffs. Petitioners appealed to the CA, said
court upheld the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the copra dryer and the store are susceptible of accession
(as accession industrial). -- NO
HELD:
The SC ruled that private respondents adduced overwhelming
evidence to prove their ownership and possession of the 2
parcels of land on portions of which petitioners built the copra
dryer and a store. In addition, the Alviolas’ stay thereon, since
1961, was merely by tolerance on the part of the private
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest. The evidence
shows that the petitioners were permitted by Victoria Tinagan
to build a copra dryer on the land when they got married.
As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith
on the part of the petitioners when they constructed the copra
dryer and store on the disputed portions since they were fully
aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan.
And, there was likewise bad faith on the part of the private
respondents, having knowledge of the arrangement between
petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative to the construction of
the copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity,
Article 448 of the New Civil Code should be applied. However,
the copra dryer and the store, as determined by the trial court
and respondent court, are transferable in nature. Thus, it
would not fall within the coverage of Article 448. As the noted
civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly explains:
"To fall within the provision of this Article, the construction
must be of permanent character, attached to the soil with an
idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is
transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must
remove the construction. The proper remedy of the landowner
is an action to eject the builder from the land." The private
respondents’ action for recovery of possession was the suitable
solution to eject petitioners from the premises.
MPF
Arangote v. Maglunob
GR 178906
DOCTRINE: The rights under Article 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to
possessors in good faith.
Possession in Good Faith; Every possessor in good faith
becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he
becomes aware that what he believed to be true is not so.
FACTS:
● All the respondents in the case are
siblings of Esperanza.
● 1985. Esperanza executed a Last
Will and Testament bequeathing the subject property she
inherited from her father based on the Partition
 Agreement to Arangote.
● 1986. Esperanza executed an
affidavit waiving and quitclaiming all her rights, interest,
and participation in the subject property in favor of
Arangote.
○ Tax Declaration of the subject property was
cancelled from Esperanza and was issued in the
name of Arangote
● 1989. Arangote constructed a
house on the subject property.
● 1993. OCT was issued in the name
of Arangote on the subject property.
○ However, respondents (Maglunobs) entered the
subject property and built a concrete wall behind
and front of Arangote’s house effectively blocking
the entrance.
● Arangote file a complaint against
respondent for quieting title, declaration of ownership and
possession at MTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Arangote were builders in good faith.
-- NO
Whether or not Arangote were entitled rights under
Article 448 and 526. -- NO
HELD:
Possessors in good faith are those who are not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition and flaw which
invalidates it. Good faith of the possessor consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Every possessor in good faith becomes possessor in bad faith
from the moment he becomes aware that what believed to be
true is not so. In the case, the subject property waived and
quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioners in affidavit was
only covered by a tax declaration in the name of Esperanza.
Arangote did not look into the origin if the subject property
and to probe if Esperanza has the right to relinquish the
subject property. Thus, when Arangote built their house, they
cannot be considered to have acted in good faith because they
only relied on tax declaration.
Settles is the rule that a tax declaration does not prove
ownership and the Supreme Court also added that payment of
taxes is not a proof of ownership. Hence, Arangote is not a
builder and possessor in good faith.
Accession Natural
AMDG
Reynante v. C.A.
207 SCRA 794
DOCTRINE: Granting that the lots were created by alluvial
formation and while it is true that accretions which the bank of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion
to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional are by another person through prescription
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jose Reynante was a tenant over the two lots of
Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years. A fishpond is
situated between the two lots. During his tenancy, Reynante
constructed a nipa hut, and planted and harvested nipa plams,
to which he appropriated it as his own. When Don Cosme
Carlos died, his heirs, private respondents, executed a written
agreement with Reynante wherein the latter would turn over
the fishpond to the former. After executing the agreement,
Reynante surrendered the fishponds as well as the lots. The
fishpond was leased to one Carlos de la Cruz. However,
Reynante did not vacate the lots and continued to live there
and harvest the nipa palms he planted. The private
respondents formally demanded that Reynante vacate the lots
to which the latter refused to do. A forcible entry with
preliminary injunction was filed against Reynante however the
trial court dismissed the complaint basing from the fact that
Reynante was the prior possessor of the lots. The trial court’s
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. Who between the petitioner and private
respondents has prior physical possession the two lots? --
PETITIONER REYNANTE
2. Whether or not the disputed lots belong to
private respondents as a result of accretion? -- NO
HELD:
It has been held that party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. As
long as the party is able to prove prior possession he is entitled
to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected. It is clear
from the records that Reynante has been in possession of the
lots for more than 50 years. Consequently, the court cannot
legally grant the possession over the two lots to the private
respondents.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the two lots were created by
alluvial formation hence under Article 457 of the New Civil
code the ownership of such is granted to the private
respondents. However, although the lands to which the
additional areas (which are the two lots subject in this case)
are attached to are registered; the failure to register the
additional lands subjected it to acquisition through prescription.
Applying this to the case, the private respondents never
registered the two lots and since Reynante has been in
possession of such for more than 50 years already, its
possession over it must be respected unless the private
respondents are able to show that they have the better title
over it.
GCG
Vda. de Nazareno v. C.A.
257 SCRA 589
DOCTRINE: Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these
requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers
(or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which
if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters.
FACTS:
A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro
City is said to have been formed as a result of sawdust
dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya
leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.
Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the MTC. A decision was rendered against
Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC.
The case was remanded to the Municipal trial court for
execution of judgment after the same became final and
executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental which was
dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced
with the private respondents being ejected from portions of
the subject lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated with a view to
perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by
him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the
applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents
before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land
Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District
Land Officer, recommended the Survey Plan MSI-10-06-
000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio
Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be
directed to file appropriate public application. Based on the
report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered
a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of
Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the
private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources
and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.
The petitioners Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia
Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC for the annulment of
the decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the
parcel of land.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the
administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing
the complaint. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accretion belongs to the riparian owners -- NO
HELD:
No. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that “to the owners of
land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.” In the case of Meneses v. CA, it was held that
accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of
the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the
sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters.
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the
present case as the first and second requirements of the rules
were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of
a riparian owner. By their own admission, the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling
materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, it was held that the word “current”
indicate the participation of the body of water in the ebb and
flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of
the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous
Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. The mere filing of said
Application constituted an admission that the land being
applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey
Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D which was conducted as a
consequence of Antonio Nazareno’s Miscellaneous Sales
Application wherein said land was described as an orchard.
Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the
findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers
a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of
Cagayan River.
The Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion
area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the
ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It has
often enough held that findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality. Again, when said factual findings are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the
deposit should due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code
all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently,
alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in
Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not
formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the
river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the
direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a
man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the present case, the subject land was the direct result of
the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations. As the accretion site was
the result of the late Antonio Nazareno’s labor consisting in the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the
same would still be part of the public domain.
VCL IV
Bagaipo v. C.A.
347 SCRA 443
DOCTRINE: In the absence of evidence that the change in
the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and
was caused by alluvium and erosion.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot
which located southeast of Davao river. While respondent
Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land
located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession
by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162
square meters which is supposedly included in the area
belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the
recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which
Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her
property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in
course of the said river, her property became divided into
three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.In January
1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and
presented before the trial court a survey plan prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno which concluded that the
land presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s
property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano who
planted some 350fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old
abandoned river bed.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo
is actually an accretion to their titled property. He asserted
that the Davao River did not change its course and that the
reduction in Bagaipo’s domain was caused by gradual erosion
due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is
also because of the river’s natural action that silt slowly
deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He
further averred that this accretion continues up to the present
and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the
alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it
continued to increase in size.
The Trial Court, upon inspection, found that the decrease in
land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in
the river’s course. CA affirmed the TC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a change in the river’s course which
resulted to avulsion? -- NO
HELD:
The trial court and the appellate court both found that the
decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and not a
change in the river’s course. This conclusion was reached after
the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the
banks located on petitioner’s land are sharp, craggy and very
much higher than the land on the other side of the river.
Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is lower and
gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the
alluvial soil carried by the river current.
These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court,
unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are
unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself
is based on a misapprehension of facts.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding
expansion of respondent’s property were the combined effect
of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code
is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old
abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The
riverbed’s former location cannot even be pinpointed with
particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place
gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the
effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of
respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in
the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and
was caused by alluvium and erosion.
FXRL
Agustin v. IAC
187 SCRA 218
DOCTRINE: Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river .
FACTS:
● Petitioner Agustin is the owner of a parcel of
land on the eastern side of the Cagayan river.
● Private respondents Binuyag, et al. own
parcels of land on the western side of the Cagayan river.
● From 1919 to 1968, the river transferred
land (by alluvium) from the property of Agustin to that of
the respondents.
● In 1968, a flood made the river changed its
course and now cut through the land of the respondents.
● This change in course forced the
respondents to cross the river whenever they have to
cultivate their land
● Seeing this, the petitioner sought the
assistance of the local government in displacing the
respondents while they were planting crops on the land
now separated by the river
● RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and
ordered the petitioners to vacate the land.
● IAC affirmed the ruling.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondents’ ownership of the land was affected by
the sudden change in the course of the river. -- NO
HELD:
No. The land separated by the course of the river remains to
be that of the respondents.
Art. 457 of the civil code provides that:
“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters. (366)”
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river .
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case as the
river had indeed, over a period of time (49 years), deposited
the land gradually and imperceptibly from the current if its
water and that it is adjacent to the riverbank.
Further, the private respondents' ownership of the accretion to
their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of
the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the eastern bank of the river. Articles 459 and
463 of the Civil Code apply to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land
and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to
which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership
of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the
owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the
Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused
a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be
"separated from the estate by the current." The private
respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that
was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
RSDM
Viajar v. CA
168 SCRA 405
DOCTRINE: Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect
of the current become the property of the owners of the banks
(Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such
accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are
not affected by the Registration Act.
FACTS:
The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were
the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan
situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot
contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was
registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo.
Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered
owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot No.
7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.
Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar. A Torrens title was later
issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.
Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found
out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y.
Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido
refused.
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for
recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y.
Ladrido. Summoned to plead, defendant Ladrido filed his
answer with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their reply to the
answer.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed.
There was a mention in the case that the issue from which the
decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA so the
affirmation made by the CA should be void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the change in the course of the
Suague River was sudden
2. Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the
Torrens Title.
HELD:
No it was gradual. The trial court found that the change in the
course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was
affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find
any valid reason to disturb this finding of fact.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit
the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered
land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered
land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered
land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot
acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by
accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title.
The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area
of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of
an adjoining stream is well settled.
MRAM
Binalay v. Manalo
195 SCRA 374
DOCTRINE: For accretion to take place as a mode of
acquiring ownership over the land, the land formed should be
directly adjacent to the land owned.
FACTS:
Guillermo Manalo bought parcels of land in Isabela; 8.65
hectares from was acquired from Faustino Taccad and 1.80
hectares was bought from Gregorio Taguba. The parcels of
land were described as having the Cagayan River on their west.
During a cadastral survey conducted, the two parcels of land
was consolidated into one lot and was designated as Lot No.
307. But since the survey was conducted on a rainy day, a
portion of the land bought from Taccad was covered with
water and was not included in Lot No. 37.
The Sketch Plan shows that the Cagayan River running from
south to north, forks at a certain point to form 2 branches
(eastern and western branches) and then unites at the other
end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. It appears
that eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of
Manalo and is inundated with water during rainy season. The
bed of the eastern branch is the unsurveyed portion of the
land belonging to Manalo, and is, for most part of the year
(about 8 months), dry and susceptible to cultivation.
Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated
from it during the rainy season. Being a portion of the land
bought from Taccad, Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs
to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the
property to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay et al)
however claims ownership over the land as they have
possessed it, occupied it and have cultivated it.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative saying that 1.) it is part of
public dominion and 2.) it fails to meet all the requisites
needed for accretion to take place.
First, it must be noted that Art. 70 of the Law of Waters
defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the
ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The
periodic swelling of the water was taken into consideration and
it was concluded that the submerged portion of the land
during rainy days forms part of the natural bed of the river. In
connection with this conclusion, Art. 420 of the Civil Code
provides that rivers form part of public dominion.
Second, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art.
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of 3 requisites:
1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and 3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). In this case, the claimed accretion lies on the bank
of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot
307 across the river.
Lastly, SC held that it is difficult to suppose that a land with an
area of 22.72 hectares resulted from slow accretion to another
lot of almost equal size. If Manalo’s contention is accepted,
then his land would have doubled in a span of 10 years.
All these considered, the Court held that the land in question is
part of public dominion and neither Manalo nor the petitioners
were held owners of the land.
FMM
Republic v. CA
132 SCRA 514
DOCTRINE: Article 457 of the New Civil Code states that, “To
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.”
Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before
an accretion is said to have taken place: (1) That the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers.
FACTS:
Tancinco (the “Tancincos”) are registered owners of a parcel of
land situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering
on the Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers.
On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed the application for the
registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property
(Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan Psu-131892).
However, on 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.
Vicente, representing the Bureau of Lands (the “Republic”)
filed a written opposition to the said application for registration.
On 6 March 1975, in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court, the Tancincos filed a
partial withdrawal of the application for registration of Lot 3.
On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the
application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and
2.
On 26 June 1976, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
rendered a decision granting the application on the finding
that the lots (1 and 2) are accretions to the Tancincos’
fishpond property.
On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals (the “CA”)
However, the CA, on 19 August 1982, rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
Hence, the Republic filed this petition with the Supreme Court
(the “SC”). The Republic contended that there is no accretion
to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because
the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further down the
riverbed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any
accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the
result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the
waters of the river.
ISSUE:
Whether there was accretion to the fishpond property of the
Tancincos. -- NO
HELD:
The SC agreed with the Republic’s contention that there is no
accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code.
The SC held that Article 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides that “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters”, requires the
concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is said to
have taken place, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The SC emphasized that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. It held that this excludes from Article 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
It further held that alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature. On the contrary, in the instant case, there is no
evidence to prove that the addition to the fishpond property
was made gradually through the effects of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits
came into being not because of the sole effect of the current
of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards
the river and encroaching upon it by reclamation.
Thus, the SC granted the Republic’s petition, reversed and set
aside the decisions of the lower courts and ordered the
Tancincos to move back the dikes of their fishpond to their
original location and return the disputed property to the river
to which it belongs.
RGGM
Republic v. CA
131 SCRA 532
DOCTRINE: Laguna de bay is a lake and that part around it
which becomes covered with water four to five months a year,
not due to tidal actions, but due to rains cannot be considered
as part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bar nor as a
foreshore land; Property being so, the land is registerable
under the LRA.
FACTS:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from
the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by
Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was
acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in
this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio
to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors,
however, violated their agreement and instead constructed
residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit
against the private oppositors and later on sought to register
the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and
they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration.
The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration.
Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from
the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private
oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said
decision to the Supreme Court.
The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land
is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is
part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot
be the subject of registration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public
land; and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has
registerable title to the land.
HELD:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land,
hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land
registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of
lands but only the registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.
Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has
been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty
(30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus,
he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
MCSS
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
268 SCRA 74
FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen
(17) hectares.
This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his
motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied,
eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that
this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as
well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the
Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating
that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a
portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta
quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be
foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it
cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the
court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the
subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was
denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of
the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed
14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners'
own tract of land.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the
principle of accretion.
HELD:
The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is
only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers
as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is
an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such,
the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila
Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain,
the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so
long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain
and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause
of establishment of special industries or for coast guard
services.
Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land
as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the
estates adjacent thereto.
NKVS
Grande v. CA
5 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of
3.5032 hectares, located at the province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia. Said property
is identified as Lot No. 1. When it was surveyed for purposes
of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary
was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took
place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much
so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance
of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial
deposit of 19,964 square meters, more or less, had been
added to the registered area.
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action
in the CFI of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said
portion formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that
they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September,
1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding
to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees
and costs. In their answer, respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the
year 1933 to the present.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the land formed through accretion becomes
automatically registered land of the riparian owner. --
NO
2. W/N defendants acquired the property through
prescription. -- YES
HELD:
1st Issue: NO, land formed through accretion does not become
automatically registered.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the
New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the
lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens
title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the
land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed
sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934)
up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or
subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it
was subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
2nd Issue: YES, the defendants acquired the property through
prescription.
This is a question which requires determination of facts:
physical possession and dates or duration of such possession.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that
respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot
since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under
a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This
finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court
of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by
the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed
by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided
in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the
possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles
of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial
lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with
law.
AMPS
Ronquillo v. CA
195 SCRA 433
DOCTRINE: The rules of accretion do not apply where the
drying-up of river is not due to a “natural” change in the
course of the waters. Herein, the change was man-made
(pollution). The dried-up portion belongs to the State as land
of public domain.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a
certain Lot No. 34. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of
the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945.
Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when title was
issued over the lot to his name, Rosendo del Rosario had been
in possession of this including the adjoining dried-up portion of
the old Estero Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio
Arzaga.
In the early part of 1945 defendant (Ronquillo) occupied the
eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion
of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot.
After a relocation survey of the land in question sometime in
1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was occupying a portion
of their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land
when the latter refused to pay the reasonable rent for its
occupancy. However, despite said demand defendant refused
to vacate.
Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del
Rosarios), lodged a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the
rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub.
The trial court upheld the complaint. On appeal, respondent
court, in affirming the decision of the trial court, declared that
since Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930
due to the natural change in the course of the waters, under
Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned river bed
belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners.
Hence, the petition before the SC.
Before the SC, the Director of Lands in his Comment stated:
We do not see our way clear to subscribe to
the ruling of the Honorable Court of Appeals
on this point for Article 370 of the Old Civil
Code, insofar as ownership of abandoned
river beds by the owners of riparian lands
are concerned, speaks only of a situation
where such river beds were abandoned
because of a natural change in the course of
the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the
abandonment was for some cause other
than the natural change in the course of the
waters, Article 370 is not applicable and the
abandoned bed does not lose its character
as a property of public dominion not
susceptible to private ownership in
accordance with Article 502 (No. 1) of the
New Civil Code. In the present case, the
drying up of the bed, as contended by the
petitioner, is clearly caused by human
activity and undeniably not because of the
natural change of the course of the waters.
ISSUE:
Whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being claimed
by herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the
course of the waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the
applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
HELD:
Caused by man. Article 370, thus, does not apply.
A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in
the case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of
Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to
the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the
surrounding neighborhood.
Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony,
made a categorical statement which in effect admitted that
Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage
dumped therein, by the inhabitants of the locality.
In addition, the relocation plan which also formed the basis of
respondent court's ruling, merely reflects the change in the
course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to
what actually brought about such change. There is nothing in
the testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said
relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the
course of the estero was due to the ebb and flow of the waters.
On the contrary, the aforequoted testimony of the witness
belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent
on the matter. The inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up
portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural
change in the course of the waters, but through the active
intervention of man.
The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case
from the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are
abandoned because of a natural change in
the course of the waters, belong to the
owners of the riparian lands throughout the
respective length of each. If the abandoned
bed divided tenements belonging to different
owners the new dividing line shall be
equidistant from one and the other.
Hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly
as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain
which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.
KGS
Baes v. CA
224 SCRA 562
DOCTRINE: If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation
for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when the
change in the course of the river is effected through artificial
means.
FACTS:
The government dug a canal on a private parcel of land to
streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek. This lot was later
acquired by Baes and registered it under his name. Said lot
was subdivided into 3 parts: A, B, and C. However, Lot B was
totally occupied by the canal. To resolve this, the government
gave Baes a lot exactly the same area in exchange for Lot B. It
was near but not contiguous to Lot C. The soil displaced by the
canal was used to fill up the old bed of the creek. Thereafter,
the lots were resurveyed and subdivided wherein Lot A was
designated as Lot 1-A and B.
After years, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot
1-B on which Baes erected an apartment building, was a filled-
up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes claimed that
they own said lot as they became the owners of the old bed by
virtue of Article 461. The government rejects this claim and
avers that sps. Baes had already been fully compensated for it
when they agreed to exchange their Lot B to another lot
belonging to the government.
ISSUE:
Is Baes entitled for compensation for his lot which was totally
occupied by the man-made canal by virtue of Article 461? --
YES
HELD:
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there
is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in
the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The
loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the
result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when
it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It
was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their
loss. We find, however, that the petitioners have already been
so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange
for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of
Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange
because the two lots were of the same area and value and the
agreement was freely entered into by the parties. The
petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation because,
as correctly observed by the Solicitor General,. . . to allow
petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the
creek would be a clear case of double compensation and
unjust enrichment at the expense of the state. The exchange
of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result
of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government
could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent
domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land was
needed for a public purpose.
JPOT
Jagualing v. CA
194 SCRA 607
DOCTRINE: Article 465 of the Civil Code -an island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than
the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure
to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the
length of their property along the margin of the river.
FACTS:
Janita Eduave inherited a parcel of land in Mindoro which was
eroded and became surmountably underwater because of
typhoon Ineng. She has actual possesion of land and tends to
its needs. She pays taxes, even though, declared land fails in
comparison to its present size. Eduave also made a loan with
Luzon Surety in consideration of said land for P6000.
Eventually, because of the sudden increase in size of said lot
from 4,937 sq.m. to16,452 sq.m. and the formation of an
island, Janita permitted petitioners to occupy land in support of
her endeavors warding away informal settlers as well as
planting corn and bananas in duration of their stay.
Afterwhich, petitioners assail that they would be the rightful
owners of the said land by admission stating that they
acquired it through prescription.
ISSUE:
Between the one who has actual possession of an island that
forms in a non-navigable and non-floatable river and the
owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, who
has the better right thereto?
HELD:
Although there is much controversy regarding the matter, the
meat of it is stated on the issue aforementioned. In this
regard the Court of Appeals did not err in applying Article 465
of the Civil Code. 12 Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than
the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure
to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the
length of their property along the margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established by
petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be
recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion
belong to the riparian owner. 13This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the
margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are
in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation
of the same. 14 In fact, no specific act of possession over the
accretion is required. 15 If, however, the riparian owner fails to
assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land
titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by respondent court
and DENY the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
MLAV
Payatas-Estate Improvement Co. v. Tuason
G.R. No. L-30067
DOCTRINE: Accretions, as contemplated in Article 366 of the
Civil Code, are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It
follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
FACTS:
Maria de la Concepcion Martinez Canas was originally the
owner of Payatas estate, principal part was bounded by the
east side Mariquina river. An estate belonging to the Tuasons
adjoined the river on the other side.
After the initiation of the Torrens system of land registration,
Maria de la Concepcion Canas had the property surveyed and
obtained the certificate of title. Later on, the land, consisting of
3 parcels, A, B and C, was sold to the Payatas Estate
Improvement Company.
In 1920, another survey was made for subdivision purposes,
and on October 15, 1924, the subdivision plans were
submitted to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for approval.
On October 25, 1924, the Payatas Estate Improvement
Company filed another motion in which it asked that transfer
certificate of title no. 8691 be cancelled as to parcels A and C
but not in regard to parcel B, the latter not being included in
the subdivision. The CFI approved, and certificate of titles
were issued accordingly.
On March 18, 1925, the Payatas Estate Improvement Co., filed
another motion alleging that the area of the subdivided land
parcels A and C together with parcel B did not include all the
land to which the company was entitled. The motion was
accompanied by a plan of two strips of land situated along the
eastern side of the Mariquina River, and the company asked
that a certificate of title be issued in its favor, to which the
Tuasons opposed.
The CFI Denied the motion of Payatas Estate.
ISSUE:
WON Payatas Estate has right of ownership over the disputed
area -- NO
HELD:
Article 366 of the Civil Code states: "any accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current belong to the owners of the estates bordering
thereon." Accretions of that character are natural incidents to
land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the
registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Mariquina river separates the Payatas estate from the
Mariquina estate and constitutes the boundary between the
two estates. The river has changed its course to the prejudice
of the Payatas estate on the western side of the stream and to
the benefit of Mariquina estate by increasing the latter's area,
and the 22 hectares now in controversy which formerly were
on the Payatas side of the river are now on the Mariquina
estate side.
Assuming this to be true, was the change in the course of the
direction of the river was caused by erosion and accretion or
has it occurred through avulsion? The presumption is that the
change is gradual and caused by the erosion of the Payatas
bank of the river and consequent accretion to the Mariquina
estate. (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason (5 Phil., 688)) It follows
that the land in question is now a part of the estate and no
longer pertains to the Payatas estate.
Accession with Respect to Movable Property
DJTV
Santos v. Bernabe
54 Phil 19
DOCTRINE: Article 381 of the Civil Code states: “If, by the
will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature
are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter
case the things cannot be separated without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the
part belonging to him, according to the value of the things
mixed or commingled.”
FACTS:
Plaintiff Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of
palay and appellant Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of the same grain in defendant Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse. It does not appear that the sacks of palay
deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse bore any marks or
signs nor were they separated one from the other.
Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover the cavans
and kilos palay he deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of
attachment was granted, and the attachable property of Jose C.
Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found
by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public
auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to said defendant
Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
Plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the
palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the
sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the
present complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff acquired right over the mixture of
cavans and kilos of palay. -- YES
HELD:
The sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of
palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof
and there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans
and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those
belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in
article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is
applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical
or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs
accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be
separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in
the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined,
we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay
which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos,
who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value
thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified,
and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at at the
rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
JGY
Siari Valley Estate v. Lucasan
97 Phil. 987
DOCTRINE: One who has stolen a part of the stolen money
must have taken the larger sum lost by the offended party. If
the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share.
FACTS:
Siara Valley Estate filed an action to recover 200 head of cattle
that were driven to the adjoining ranch of Lucasan, which the
latter denied having appropriated or retained any cattle
belonging to the former. Lucasan alleging that there’s no
actual evidence on the number of missing bulls and that
plaintiff’s cattle comingle with his. Trial Court: Ruled in favor of
Siara Valley.
ISSUE:
WON Lucasan can recover his share of the cattle. -- NO
HELD:
Defendant’s cowboys and even his sons Rafael and Vicente-
rounded up and drove plaintiff's cattle into his pasture; he
knew he had plaintiff's cattle, but refused toreturn them
despite demands by plaintiff; he even threatened plaintiff's
men when the latter tried to retrieve its animals; he harassed
them with false prosecutions for their attempts to get back the
company's animals; he wouldn't allow plaintiff' s cowboys to
get into his pasture to identify its flock; he rebranded several
Siari Valley cattle with his own brand; he sold cattle without
registering the sales; after some cattle impounded were
entrusted to his custody as trustee, he disposed of not less
than 5 head of cattle among those he received as such
trustee; lastly, he disposed of much more cattle than he had a
right to.
It is clear that we have here a case of accession by
specification: Leonora and Company, as purchaser acting in
good faith, spending P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of the
tank which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner Aguirre.
There is no showing that without the works made by Leonora
& Company, the tank in its original condition when Aguirre
paid P900.00 therefor, would command the price of P14,500
which Nassco was willing to pay. Although ordinarily, therefore,
Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be entitled to any
accession thereto, the rule is different where the works or
improvements or the accession was made on the property by
one who acted in good faith.2 And, it is not contended that the
making of the improvements and incurring of expenses
amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora & Company was done in
bad faith. Furthermore, to uphold petitioner's contention that
he is entitled to the sum of P14,500.00 the price of the tank in
its present condition, would be to allow him to enrich himself
at the expense of another. The lower courts, therefore, acted
correctly in ordering the reimbursement to Leonora &
Company of the expenses it made on the tank.

One who has stolen a part of the stolen money must have
taken the larger sum lost by the offended party. If the
commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share.

JRPA
Aguirre v. Pheng
18 SCRA 18

DOCTRINE: Although ordinarily, the owner would be entitled

to any accession thereto, the rule is different where the works
or improvements or the accession was made on the property
by one who acted in good faith.

FACTS:
On June 28, 1954, Vicente Aldaba and Teresa V. Aldaba sold to
Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank with a capacity of
5,000 gallons, for the sum of P900.00, for which the latter
delivered to the sellers duly endorsed, Security Bank & Trust
Company check No. 281912, in the amount of P900.00.
Aguirre, however, failed to, take physical possession of the
tank, having been prevented from doing so by the municipal
authorities of Los Baños, Laguna (where the tank was located),
in view of the claim of ownership being made by the Bureau of
Public Highways. It appears, however, that Vicente and Teresa
Aldaba again sold the same tank on December 2, 1954 to
Zosimo Gabriel, for P900.000. Gabriel, in turn, sold it to the
Leonora & Company on December 5, 1954, for P2,500.00.
After some alterations and improvements made on the tank,
Leonora & Company was able to sell the tank to National
Shipyards & Steel Corporation (Nassco), for P14,500.00.

ISSUE:
1. WON Aguirre can take ownership of the property --
YES
2. WON Aguirre should reimburse Leonora for the
improvements -- YES

HELD:

QUIETING OF TITLE AND CO-OWNERSHIP (ART. 476-
501)
Quieting of Title
ABB
Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. IAC
G.R. No. L-67451
DOCTRINE: One is considered an innocent purchaser for
value only if, relying on the title, he bought the property from
the registered owner without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time such purchase or before he
receives notice of the claim or interest of some other persons
in the property.
FACTS:
Two adjacent lands situated in Las Pinas were covered by
three (3) distinct sets of Torrents titles. Morris Carpo, filed a
complaint with the CFI (Vera Court) for declaration of nullity of
Decree no. N-66934 and TCT 20408 against Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. Macondray Farms and the Commission of Land
Registration.
Prior to all these, Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador
Mayuga (Realty’s predecessor-in-interest) originally filed on
June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding to confirm his title
over parcels of land (Lots 1, 2, 3; lots 2 and 3 currently the
subject of the litigation). The LRC case was jointly tried with
the cases filed by Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar
involving the same pieces of land.
The Baltazars herein impleaded in this case are the heirs of
Florentino Baltazar of the original application filed by Estanislao
Mayuga. Carpo bought the disputed property from them. The
CFI confirmed title of Estanislao Mayuga to Lots 1, 2, and 3
and held that the succesors of Florentino Baltazar cannot feign
ignorance to the land registration proceedings initiated by the
elder Baltazar, Guico and Mayuga.
The title in the name of Dominador Mayuga from whom Realty
Sales Enterprise, Inc. derived its title was issued in 1958, 12
years before the issuance of the title in the name of Baltazar in
1970.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carpo was an innocent purchaser of value and
in good faith. -- NO
HELD:
One is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if,
relying on the title, he bought the property from the registered
owner without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time such purchase or before he receives notice
of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
In the case at bar, at the time of the sale, there was as yet no
Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon so that he
may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Therefore,
Carpo’s claim should be discredited by the court because
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. is the one with the valid title to
these properties.
Also, the general rule is that in case of two (2) certificates of
title purporting to include the same land, the one earlier in
date prevails. Since the title in the name of Dominado Mayuga
(Predecessor-in-interest of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc) was
issued in 1958, 12 years earlier from the issuance of title in the
name of Baltazar in 1970, it is held that Mayuga hold the
better right to the property in question.
FZC
Lucasan v. PDIC
G.R. No. 176926
DOCTRINE: To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two
(2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
For levied properties sold on public auctions, the right to
redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and
its exercise after the period is not really one of redemption but
a repurchase. The judgment debtor therefore, no longer has
legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action. Thus, he may not avail of the remedy of quieting
of title.
FACTS:
Petitioner Inocencio Y. Lucasan (Lucasan) and his wife
Julianita Sorbito (now deceased) were the owners of Lot
situated in Bacolod City. Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC)
extended a loan to Lucasan, with Carlos Benares as his co-
maker. Lucasan and Benares failed to pay the loan when it
became due and demandable. Consequently, PBC filed a
collection case with the RTC of Bacolod City. The RTC rendered
a decision ordering Lucasan and Benares to jointly and
severally pay PBC until the full payment of the obligation.
Lucasan failed to pay the monetary award; thus, to satisfy the
judgment, the RTC issued a writ of execution directing the
sheriff to effect a levy on the properties owned by Lucasan and
sell the same at public auction. In compliance with the writ,
the City Sheriff of Bacolod issued a Notice of Embargo.
Annotated therefore on Lucasan’s TCTs as prior encumbrances
on the same titles were the mortgages in favor of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Republic Planter’s Bank (RPB)
executed to secure Lucasan’s loans with the banks.
The lots were later sold at a public auction where PBC was
awarded the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed
in its favor and was registered. Neither PNB nor RPB, the
mortgagees, assailed the auction sale. Lucasan, as well as the
mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the properties
within the redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a
petition for consolidation of ownership.
Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), PBC’s receiver and
liquidator seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale and
offering to pay PBC’s claim against Lucasan. Not long
thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB.
Consequently, the mortgagee banks executed their respective
releases of mortgage, resulting in the cancellation of the prior
encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.

Later, PDIC denied Lucasan’s request for the cancellation of
the certificate of sale stating that the subject lots have already
become part of the acquired assets of Pacific Banking
Corporation by virtue of a Certificate of Sale executed by the
City Sheriff of Bacolod. That reacquisition of the subject
properties have to be through PDIC’s public bidding disposal
policy.
Lucasan then filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief
with the RTC of Bacolod City. He sought confirmation of his
rights provided in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 75 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and pleaded for the lifting and/or
cancellation of the notice of embargo and the certificate of sale,
offering to pay as consideration for the cancellation.
PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action. It averred that an action to quiet title under Section 1
of Rule 63 may only be brought when there is a cloud on, or to
prevent a cloud from being cast upon, the title to real property.
It asseverated that a cloud on the title is an outstanding
instrument record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless
impair or affect injuriously the title to property. PDIC claimed
that the notice of embargo was issued pursuant to a writ of
execution while the certificate of sale was executed as a result
of a public bidding. Thus, their annotations on the titles were
valid, operative or effective. PDIC asserted that Lucasan’s
petition is nothing but a disguised attempt to compel PDIC to
resell the properties at a reduced price. Accordingly, it prayed
for the dismissal of the petition.
Lucasan opposed the motion. He countered that the subject
properties were still in his possession, and neither PBC nor
PDIC instituted an action for consolidation of ownership. Since
the certificate of title was still in his name, he contended that
he could pursue all legal and equitable remedies, including
those provided for in Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
to reacquire the properties. He also claimed that PDIC’s policy
of disposing the subject properties through public bidding was
unjust, capricious and arbitrary, considering that the judgment
debt was lower in amount.
The RTC granted PDIC’s motion to dismiss, finding the claim of
any cloud over the titles of [Lucasan] to be bereft of basis in
fact and in law.
Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared
that Lucasan already lost his right to redeem the properties
when he failed to exercise it within the prescribed period. The
effect of such failure was to vest in PBC absolute ownership
over the subject properties. Lucasan sought a reconsideration
of the CA Decision, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
WON Lucasan has sufficient cause of action for quieting of title.
-- NO
HELD:
The requisites of quieting of title are wanting in this case.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal
or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute,
and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or
efficacy.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by
virtue of a writ of execution. They were later sold on a public
auction, awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale in favor of PBC was issued. Under the Rules of Court, the
judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem the
property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the
registration of the certificate of sale. With the expiration of the
twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption having
been made, the judgment debtor or the redemptioner lost
whatever right he had over the land in question.
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties
within the redemption period, on account of his then limited
financial situation.It was only fifteen (15) years later that he
manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus,
he had lost whatever right he had over the subject lots.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB
cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights he had
over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished
his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens
which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the
registration of the notice of embargo and certificate of sale.
Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC’s failure to file a petition
for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the
redemption period.
Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable
title to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he
cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.
LNAC
Coronel v. IAC
G.R. No. 70191
DOCTRINE: Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. Private respondents have always been in peaceful
possession of the 1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising
ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in
1975 when the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his
torrens title covering the entire Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate.
It was only at this point that private respondents knew about
the supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the
Naic Estate.
FACTS:
The complaint was filed against the private respondents Elias
Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates,
Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before
the then CFI.

Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he purchased
the subject parcel of land, the defendants (private respondents
herein) were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants
at will" and that despite demands to vacate the premises, the
defendants failed and refused to move out from the land.
In their Answer with Counterclaim and With Third-Party
Complaint, the defendants denied that Coronel was the owner
of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots occupied
by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers Brigido
Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their
deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of
Bernabela Lontoc, the original owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the
Naic Estate; that the Merlan brothers together with their two
brothers and a sister never sold their undivided 1/3 share of
the lot to anybody; that it was actually their other co-heirs who
sold their undivided portions and that the plaintiff's claim of
ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is
fraudulent, void, and without effect; that the Merlans have
always been in open and peaceful possession of their
undivided share of the lot throughout the years from the first
sale by their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-A in 1950; and that the
other defendants were legitimate tenants. They prayed that
the plaintiff respect their rights over 1/3 (4,063 square meters)
of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate.
In their Third-Party Complaint, the defendants charged that
the third-party defendants, owners of the remaining portion of
Lot No. 1950-A, defrauded them when they sold the entire
parcel.
Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel
Anuat and Rosario Cailao, the defendants' co-owners of Lot No.
1950-A, denied that they had something to do with the
fraudulent acts or illegal machinations which deprived the
defendants of their share in the subject parcel of land, and
that what they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said
parcel. They also filed a cross-claim against their co-defendant
Mariano Manalo whom they charged might have connived with
others, including the plaintiff to deprive the defendants and
their co-heirs of their share in the subject parcel of land.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on appeal,
the lower court's decision was affirmed with modification by
the then IAC.
Thus, herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the claim of private respondents to the land in
question is barred by the statute of limitation or by estoppel by
laches. -- NO
HELD:
No. In dispute is the 2/8 share of Bernabela Lontoc which is
equivalent to 12,189 square meters.
When Lontoc died in 1945, she was survived by three sets of
heirs: 1) Bernardino Merlan, a grandson by her son Enrique
Merlan who died in 1918; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan,
defendants in the case below and private respondents herein,
Graciano Merlan, Agapito Merlan and Corazon Merlan, children
of her son Gabriel who died in 1937; and 3) Daniel Anuat and
Paz Anuat children of her daughter Francisca Merlan.
In 1950, Bernardino Merlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat sold
their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio
Manalo and Marcela Nobelo.
In 1960, TCT No. (T-3116) RT-5010 was cancelled by TCT No.
T-1444 but carried the same afore-specified registered co-
owners with an annotation carried from the former TCT.
In 1968, Lot No. 1950 of the Naic Estate was subdivided
according to a Sketch Plan. The sketch plan was approved by
the Commission on Land Registration. Bernabela Lontoc's 2/8
portion of Lot No. 1950 became Lot No. 1950-A with an area
of 12,189 square meters.
Sometime in 1970, Ignacio Manalo sold his interest in Lot
1950-A to Mariano Manalo.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-1444 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
41175 was issued for Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate in the
name of Mariano Manalo married to Jorga Lagos. The
certificate of title issued in the name of spouses Mariano
Manalo and Jorga Lagos covered the whole Lot No. 1950-A
without any mention of the 1/3 share of the private
respondents in the parcel of land which was not sold to them.
Relying on the TCT of the spouses Mariano Manalo and Jorga
Lagos and the Sketch Plan, petitioner Coronel then bought Lot
No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate from the former for the
consideration of P27,000.00. The deed of sale was registered
on December 19, 1974 causing the cancellation of TCT No. T-
41175 and the issuance of TCT No. T-75543 in the name of
petitioner Coronel.
It is evident that the private respondents never sold their 1/3
share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their
co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the
same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to
third-party defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-
interest of petitioner Coronel. There was a mistake when TCT
No. 41175 was issued to Mariano Manalo covering the whole
area of Lot No. 1950-A. Unfortunately, Mariano Manalo who
was included as third-party defendant as well as the subject of
a cross- claim filed by the other third-party defendants, and
who could have shed light on this controversy was at the time
residing abroad and was not served with the third-party
complaint.
There is no bar based on laches to assert their right over 1/3
of the disputed property. Laches has been defined as the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Private respondents have
always been in peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of the
subject lot, exercising ownership thereto for more than 25
years disrupted only in 1975 when the petitioner tried to
remove them by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire
Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was only at this point that
private respondents knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3
portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they immediately
resisted.
Neither the private respondents nor their co-owners of the
subject parcel of land sold the former's share of the lot.
Furthermore, even Ignacio Manalo to whom the third-party
defendants sold their share resold only the 2/3 shares to
Mariano Manalo, the successor-in-interest of the petitioner.
Whether or not there was fraud or just a mistake or oversight
of an employee of the Register of Deeds of Cavite is not clear
from the records. The point is that the 1/3 undivided portion of
the private respondents over Lot No. 1950-A was mistakenly
included in the TCT of Mariano Manalo.
TKDC
Sapto v. Fabiana
103 Phil 683
DOCTRINE: The statute of limitations is not a defense to an
action to remove a cloud from title when complainant is in
possession of the property. However, the statute of limitations
is a defense when the property is in another’s possession; the
complainant must invoke his remedy within the statutory
period.
FACTS:
Upon his death, Moro was left a parcel of land registered under
his name to his children, Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon.
After Ramon’s death, Samuel and Constancio executed a deed
of sale of a portion of the property in favor of Fabiana; the sale
was approved by the Provincial Governor but was unregistered.
Since 1931 when possession of conveyed land was transferred,
Fabiana has possessed the property.
After Constancio’s death, Samuel married Dora and had two
children. After Samuel’s death, his widow and children filed an
action with the Court of First Instance to recover the parcel of
land sold to Fabiana. Trial court held that, although the sale
was unregistered, it was valid and binding upon the parties
and also the vendors’ heirs; trial court ordered the Samuel’s
heirs to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in
Fabiana’s favor.
Samuel’s heirs appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that
Fabiana’s action had long prescribed; twenty years had lapsed
since the original sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fabiana’s action had already prescribed since
twenty years had passed since the original sale. -- NO
HELD:
The statute of limitations is not a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title when complainant is in possession of
the property. However, the statute of limitations is a defense
when the property is in another’s possession; the complainant
must invoke his remedy within the statutory period. In this
case, prescription does not run again Fabiana because she
already possesses the property. Thus, her action may prosper.
AMD
Titong v. CA
287 SCRA 102
DOCTRINE: The ground or reason for filing a complaint for
quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding" which constitutes or casts
a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or
interest in real property.
FACTS:
Mario Titong filed an action for quieting of title against
Victorico and Angeles Laurio. Petitioner alleged that he was the
owner of an unregistered parcel of land. He claimed that
private respondents (Laurios), with heir hired laborers, forcibly
entered a portion of the land containing an area of
approximately 2 hectares; and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. The Laurios denied this allegation, and
averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-
hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa, an adjoining owner of
Titong’s land. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents,
declaring Laurio as the true and absolute owner of the
property. Petitioner appealed to the CA, the RTC decision was
affirmed and the MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the action for quieting of title should have prospered. --
NO
HELD:
The SC held that the instant petition must be denied for the
reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed
the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of
title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in
the Civil Code:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.”
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
the owner's title to or interest in real property. The ground or
reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore
be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding."
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the
purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the
same action.
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed,
it would have had no other course of action under the law but
to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an "instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the
plaintiff's title over the property involved. Petitioner merely
alleged that the respondents, together with their hired laborers
and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern
portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same. He
then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees.
Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as
clouds cast on his title to the property were private
respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be
considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but
definitely not one for quieting of title. In addition, when the
issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint,
it would have become apparent to the court that the case was
a boundary dispute.
MPF
Pingol v. CA
226 SCRA 118
DOCTRINE: A vendee (buyer) in an oral contract to convey
land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the
land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had
refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the
vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being
sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to
quiet title.
FACTS:
● 1969 - Pingol, the owner of a lot in Caloocan
City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF
OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND
(274.5 sqm) in favor of Donasco (private respondent),
payable in 6 years. And Donasco agreed to pay in monthly
basis (for 72 months).
○ Both agreed that in case of default in the
payment due the same should earn a legal
interest.
○ Donasco took possession immediately and
constructed a house thereon.
● 1984 - Donasco died and was only able to
pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance
of P10,161.
○ The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of
such lot and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol.
○ However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and
demanded a larger amount.
■ Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an
action for specific performance (with
Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction,
because Pingol were encroaching upon
Donasco’s lot).
■ Pingol averred that the sale and transfer
of title was conditional upon the full
payment of Donasco (contract to sell,
not contract of sale).
■ With Donasco’s breach of the contract in
1976 and death in 1984, the sale was
deemed cancelled, and the continuous
occupancy of the heirs was only being
tolerated by Pingol.
RTC: ordering heirs of Donasco to pay monthly rental to Pingol
CA: ordering Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161 plus legal
interest from heirs of Donasco as payment to the land in
question
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to
Donasco. -- NO
2. Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title.
HELD:
1. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract
of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly
show that the parties intended an absolute deed of sale;
the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco
upon its actual (upon Donasco’s possession and
construction of the house) and constructive delivery
(upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot
divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover
the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded
under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may
pay even after the expiration of the period stipulated as
long as no demand for rescission has been made upon
him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did
so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.
2. Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an
action for specific performance, it was actually an action
to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since
despite the fact that the title had been transferred to
them by the execution of the deed of sale and the
delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly
refused to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted
that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and
improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit
to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer
title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have
an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet
title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos
because an action to quiet title to property in ONE’s
POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
SC: appealed decision affirmed
AMDG
Gallar v. Hussain
20 SCRA 186
DOCTRINE: An action to quiet title, brought by a person who
is in possession of the property, is imprescriptible. However, if
the plaintiff is not in possession, the action would prescribe
within the proper period.
FACTS:
Teodoro Husain is the owner of the land to which he sold to
Serapio Chichirita for P30 with the right to repurchase of such
land within six years. Teodoro did not avail his right to
repurchase however, his sister, Graciana Husain, bought the
said land shortly after the sale between Teodoro and Chichirita.
It is alleged that that the sale was described to be a resale of
the land. Afterwhich, Graciana sold it to appellee, Elias Gallar
in exchange for one cow. Owner’s duplicate of the TCT was
given to Gallar and since then has been the possessor of the
subject land.
Gallar was unsuccessful when he went to the Cadastral Court
to ask that the TCT be issued under his name. It is noted
however that the Cadastral Court granted his request as
regards amending the certificate and changing the registered
owner of the land to Husain. Gallar then filed the suit in the
CFI (now RTC) to compel the heirs of Teodoro Husain
(Heremenegilda and Bonifacio) to execute the deed of
conveyance in his favor to which the latter refused to execute.
The heirs were denied and alleged that when Graciana bought
the land from Serapio, she was exercising the right to
repurchase granted to Teodoro. Also, they invoked that
prescription has set in which bars the appellee’s action.
ISSUES:
1. WON the land was acquired by Graciana Husain on behalf
of his brother Teodoro? -- NO
2. WON this action this is action is for specific performance?
-- NO
3. WON appellee’s action is imprescriptible? -- YES
HELD:
The right to repurchase may only be availed by the person to
whom such right was given to or to the person to whom such
right was transferred to. There was no evidence whatsoever to
prove that Graciana acquired the land on behalf of his brother.
Graciana bought the land subject only to his brother’s right of
remdeption. Therefore, being the owner, she has every right to
sell the land which she did to Elias.
When Teodoro failed to exercise his right of redemption, its
ownership became consolidated in the appellee. Though the
sale was in a private document, such was still considered valid.
The delivery of the land and title to Gallar indicates that a sale
was consummated.
This action is not for a specific performance but a mere
quieting of title. The object of the action was to remove the
cloud cast on Gallar’s ownership because of the heir’s refusal
to recognize the sale. Lastly being the Gallar is in possession
when this action was constituted, the action is imprescriptible.
The heir’s argument as regards prescription would have been
granted by the court in their favor if the land was not
possessed by Gallar.
GCG
Vda de Aviles v. CA
264 SCRA 473
DOCTRINE: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling
Boundary Dispute. Quieting of title is a common law remedy
for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property.
FACTS:
Petitioners aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel
of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, more
particularly described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and
residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E
by Malawa River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square
meters and declared under Tax Declaration No. 31446. This
property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and
brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased
parents.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described
property since 1957. In fact, the latter mortgaged the same
with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in
Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank
representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the
boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio
Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin pointed to the inspector
the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the
property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage
was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction but this
was redeemed by plaintiffs’ mother and the land was
subsequently transferred and declared in her name.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the
northern portion of the property with an area of approximately
1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting
and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over
said portion.
Defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition
executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. The
respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured
before the execution of the agreement but he was not present
when the measurement was made. Defendant agreed to have
a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he
wanted a bigger share because he has several children to
support. The portion in litigation however is part of the share
given to him in the agreement of partition.
At present, he is only occupying a smaller than his actual share.
Tax Declarations Nos. 23575, 481 and 379 covering his
property from 1958 show that the area of his property is
14,470 square meters. The riceland portion of his land is
13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square
meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a
total of 14,470 square meters. That the topography of his land
is not the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise
not the same.
The trial court disposed of the case thus ordering the parties to
employ the services of a Land Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands,
Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine
the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the defendant
on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four
hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual
area given to the defendant be determined. It ordered the
complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioners appealed
to the respondent appellate Court. In its now-assailed Decision,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial
court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is
not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and
that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit
instead. It affirmed the decision of the trial court in dismissing
the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it
opined that the complaint for quieting of title instituted by the
petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is
not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case for
ejectment.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Quieting of Title Not Proper
Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute. Quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following
language:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon a title to real property of any interest therein."
In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must
show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt,
question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real
property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the
import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court
erred in holding that there was “no xxx evidence of any
muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, xxx”, and that
there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, (i) the
Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his
brothers (including the petitioners’ father and predecessor-in-
interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited
property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale
evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de
Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However,
these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt
upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises
from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the boundary
between their respective properties.
As correctly held by the respondent Court, both plaintiffs and
defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition
and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was alloted (sic) to
them and that the only controversy is whether these lands
were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the
defendant “which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable” and which
constitutes a cloud thereon.
Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the
bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving
of earthen dikes are not the “clouds” or “doubts” which can be
removed in an action for quieting of title.
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought
for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. The precedent
on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is
herewith reproduced in full.
VCL IV
Oblea v. CA
244 SCRA 101
DOCTRINE: The pendency of an action for quieting of title
before the RTC does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to
proceed with the ejectment case over the same property. The
subsequent acquisition of ownership by petitioners is not a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment
in said unlawful detainer case.
FACTS:
The lot in issue was originally registered in the names of
Manuel Melencio, Pura Melencio, Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle
Wico. But was subsequently re-registered in the name of
Ramon Melencio (son of deceased Manuel Melencio), Pura
Melencio and the Wicos via a deed of sale.
On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent
Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who claimed to have
acquired the property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged
administratrix of the estate of Manuel and Pura Melencio.
Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea leased a building
located on the subject lot from a certain Marius Esteban, an
alleged son of private respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea
eventually bought from Marius the lot on which the building
stood. As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Juan Esteban filed an
ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea.
MTC decided for Juan Esteban and ordered Oblea to vacate
and pay arrears. RTC affirmed MTC’s decision.
On 3 June 1993, the registered owners (Ramon Melencio, Pura
Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico) sold the
disputed lot to petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together
with the registered owners filed before the RTC an action for
quieting of title against Juan Esteban. They contended that the
deeds of sale executed by Mauricio Ramos in favor of Juan
Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio Ramos
were a nullity.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was appealed thrice in the CA,
but all were denied.
In the appeal to the SC, Oblea asserts that the subsequent
sale to him by the registered owners is a supervening event
that gave him a better right of possession and ownership.
Hence the judgment of eviction can no longer be enforced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent action to quiet title in the RTC
divests the MTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case -- NO
HELD:
The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is physical or
material possession, i.e., possession de facto and not
possession de jure. The pendency of an action for quieting of
title before the RTC does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction
to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property.
The subsequent acquisition of ownership by petitioners is not a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment
in said unlawful detainer case, the fact remaining that when
judgment was rendered by the MTC in the ejectment case,
petitioner Oblea was a mere possessor of the subject lot.
Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate action
for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the
execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the
contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the eviction case did
not deal with the issue of ownership which was precisely the
subject matter of the action for quieting of title before the RTC.
With the finality of the decision in the ejectment case,
execution in favor of the prevailing party has become a matter
of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot be avoided.
FXRL
Gapacan v. Omipet
387 SCRA 383
DOCTRINE: An action to Quiet Title is a valid remedy to
ascertain property rights.
FACTS:
● Gapacan is a native Igorot possessor of a parcel of
land in Bauko, Mr. Province. The property is divided into
three and declared by him for taxation purposes.
● He has two children. Maria and Antonio.
● Antonio left to work in mining while Maria remained
and eventually took over management and cultivation of
the property.
● Antonio returned to their home and thereafter
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property which
now makes him the legal owner of the property in
question as it transfers ownership from his sister to him.
● Since then, the family of Antonio (Gapacan) had been
occupying and cultivating the property.
● The family of Maria (Omipet)
ISSUE:
W/N property rights may be determined by an action to Quiet
Title. -- YES
HELD:
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title
may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to a real
property or any interest therein.
The property owner whose property rights were being
disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper
determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants,
places things in their proper place by:
1. Requiring the party with no right over the
property to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful
enjoyment of the property by rightful owner and
2. Mutually benefitting both parties with the
view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property.
The appellate court in resolving the present controversy is well
within its authority to adjudicate on the respective rights of the
parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the property;
hence to declare the same as common property.
The court also noted that Omipet did not present sufficient
evidence to overcome Gapacan’s better right to possession.
The Supreme Court ruled that CA was correct in its
determination that the land in dispute is common property and
must be partitioned.
RSDM
Robles v. CA
328 SCRA 97
DOCTRINE: An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
FACTS:
Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga,
Lagundi, Morong, Riza. He also declared the same in his name
for taxation purposes as early as 1916 and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon. When Leon Robles died, his son
Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the
land, declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid
the taxes thereon.
Upon the death of Silvino Robles, his widow Maria de la Cruz
and his children inherited the property. They took adverse
possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task
of cultivating the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles
who planted trees and other crops. The plaintiffs entrusted the
payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother,
Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the
parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and
transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles
who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter,
Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank,
using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax
declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural
Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant
Hilario Robles and his wife.
In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural
Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles
testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her
husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because Hilario
Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings
were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest
bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
"The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and
so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
defendant Rural Bank. Rural Bank sold the same to the
Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
Plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the
property, but was unsuccessful. Defendant spouses Santos
took possession of the property in question and was able to
secure Free Patent in their names.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that
will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting
of title. -- YES
HELD:
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been
occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax
declarations issued in their names. Also undisputed is the fact
that the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the
land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly
ousted therefrom in 1988.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the
property in question is vital to the resolution of the present
Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his
title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him
to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation
and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and
Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was
not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly
evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the
heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the
best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented,
however.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners
that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank
of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly,
the said transaction did not divest them of title to the property
at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of
title.
Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario
effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership.
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the
subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from
the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably
shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a
mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his
undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his
share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land
taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion
that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to
repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and
possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as
owners.
MRAM
Metropolitan Bank v. Alejo
364 SCRA 812
DOCTRINE: In a suit to nullify an existing TCT in which a real
estate mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an
indispensable party. In such suit, a decision canceling the TCT
and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for
annulment of judgment, because the non-joinder of the
mortgagee deprived the court of jurisdiction to pass upon the
controversy.
FACTS:
Spouses Acampado obtained a loan from petitioner and as
security for their payment of the credit accommodations, they
executed a real estate mortgage in Valenzuela City. The land
was also located in Valenzuela and the TCT covering it is
registered in the Registry of deeds in the same city.
On June 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT
was filed by Respondent Sy Tan Se against Spouses Acampado.
Despite being the registered mortgagee of the real property
covered by the title sought to be annulled, petitioner was not
made a party to the case nor was it notified of its existence.
The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan.
Thereafter,extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the
mortgaged property were initiated and then the sheriff of
Valenzuela conducted an auction sale of the property, during
which petitioner submitted the highest and winning bid. A
Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor and the sale was
entered in the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela.
When the redemption period lapsed exactly a year after,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
to enable the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela to issue a new
TCT in its name however petitioner was informed that an RTC
decision declared the TCT as null and void for having
proceeded from an illegitimate source.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the RTC that declared the
TCT as null and void should be annulled?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative.
The Rules of Court provide that no final determination can be
had of an action wherein the indispensable party is not joined
in the complaint either as the defendant or the complainant.
It is undisputed that the property covered by the TCT was
mortgaged to petitioner, and that the mortgage was annotated
on it before the institution of Civil Cas. It is also undisputed
that all subsequent proceedings pertaining to the foreclosure
of the mortgage were entered in the Registry of Deeds. The
nullification and cancellation of TCT carried with it the
nullification and cancellation of the mortgage annotation.
Although a mortgage affects the land itself and not merely the
TCT covering it, the cancellation of the TCT and the mortgage
annotation exposed petitioner to real prejudice. Evidently, the
nullification of the TCT adversely affected its property rights,
considering that a real mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself.
Because petitioner falls under the definition of an
indispensable party, it should have been impleaded as
defendant in the civil case questioning the title.
FMM
Sps. Benito v. Saquitan Ruiz
394 SCRA 250
DOCTRINE: A petition for the quieting of title, although
essentially an action for reconveyance, should not be
dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the
plaintiff is in possession of the property.
FACTS:
On 1 April 1999, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz (“Saquitan-Ruiz”) filed
against Spouses Horacio and Felisa Benito (“Spouses Benito”)
a civil suit for “specific performance with declaration of nullity
of titles and damages”. The Complaint alleged that the couple
had sold in her favor a property located in Pasig City and
despite repeated demands, they failed to deliver or cause the
issuance of a new certificate of title in her name.
However, it turned out that instead of issuing or delivering to
Saquitan-Ruiz her certificate of title over the said property,
Spouses Benito re-subdivided the property into five lots.
On 28 June 1999, the Regional Trial Court (the “RTC”)
dismissed Saquitan-Ruiz’s Complaint on the grounds of
prescription and/or laches. It held that from the moment the
contract was perfected, the parties could reciprocally demand
performance of their obligations. There was a breach of
obligation when, despite repeated demands, Spouses Benito
failed to deliver to respondent the corresponding certificate of
title to the lot. She, however, failed to file any action to
compel performance until 16 April 1999, or 20 years from the
time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on 17 April
1979. Moreover, the assailed Certificates of Title had been
issued 25 March 1996, or more than one year before the
Complaint was filed. An action to invalidate title certificates on
the ground of fraud prescribes upon the expiration of one year
from the entry of the decree of registration.
Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals (the “CA”), the latter
reversed the RTC’s decision. It held that the Saquitan-Ruiz’s
second cause of action was for reconveyance, not for the
invalidation of certificates of title. As long as the property was
still in the name of the person who had caused the wrongful
registration, and as long as it had not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance was
still available. Such cause of action prescribes in ten (10)
years, counted from the date of the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title. Since the Complaint alleged that the
questioned titles had been issued on 25 March 1996, the cause
of action for reconveyance has not prescribed.
Thus this petition filed by Spouses Benito. They contended
that the action for reconveyance has been rendered moot and
academic, because the disputed lot was already sold to Basilia
dela Cruz at a public auction. They maintain that although the
action for reconveyance may not have expired, the exercise of
the right is no longer feasible, because the property was
already transferred in good faith and for value to a third party.
ISSUE:
Whether the cause of action for reconveyance has already
prescribed -- NO
HELD:
The SC noted that the Spouses Benito is in possession of the
disputed property. Thus the SC held that if a person claiming
to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in
actual possession, the right to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe.
A petition for the quieting of title, although essentially an
action for reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the
ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in
possession of the property.
Ruinous Buildings
CRF
Nakpil and Sons v. CA
144 SCRA 596
DOCTRINE: To be exempt from liability due to an act of God,
the engineer/architect/contractor must not have been
negligent in the construction of the building. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association decided to construct an
office building on its 840 square meters lot located at the
comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila.
The construction was undertaken by the United Construction,
Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan J.
Carlos, the president and general manager of said corporation.
The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by
the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The
building was completed in June, 1966. In the early morning of
August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and
its environs and the building in question sustained major
damage. The tenants vacated the building in view of its
precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the
building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the cost
of P13,661.28. On November 29, 1968, the plaintiff
commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising
from the partial collapse of the building against United
Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan
J. Carlos as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the collapse of
the building was accused by defects in the construction, the
failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and
violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract.
Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the
architects who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging
in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the
defects in the said plans and specifications.
Finally, on April 30, 1979 the building was authorized to be
demolished at the expense of the plaintiff, but not another
earthquake of high intensity on April 7, 1970 followed by other
strong earthquakes on April 9, and 12, 1970, caused further
damage to the property. The actual demolition was undertaken
by the buyer of the damaged building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-
which caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability,
parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence
(NAKPILS and UNITED) -- NO
HELD:
There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED
are liable for the damage resulting from the partial and
eventual collapse of the PBA building as a result of the
earthquakes. The applicable law governing the rights and
liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans
and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within
fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice
fags within the same period on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished
by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall
be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person
concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is
not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause
of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
damage may have been occasioned.
Co-ownership
RGGM
Robles v. C.A.
328 SCRA 97
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. in
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: 1.) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; 2.) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and 3.) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
FACTS:
Leon Robles owned a land in Morong Rizal. When Leon died,
his son Silvino Robles inherited the land. Both of them declared
the property under their name for taxation purposes. Upon the
death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela Cruz and his children
inherited the property. They took adverse possession of it and
paid the taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land was
assigned to one of Silvino’s son, Lucio Roles while the payment
of the taxes was entrusted to their half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the
parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and
transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles
who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter,
Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank,
using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax
declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank
and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario
Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan
from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as
security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure
proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as
the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and
so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant
Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was able
to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have the appropriate title
essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant
issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is
valid
2. Whether real estate mortgage between Hilario and
RBC is valid
3. Whether issuance of free patent is valid
HELD:
1. Petitioners have valid title by virtue
of their continued and open occupation and possession as
owners of the subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners’ title emanate from
the apparent validity of the free patent issued and the tax
declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents
ultimately leading to the transfer of the property to
spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is
deemed invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the
title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have
prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the
real estate. He must have first repudiated the ownership
clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider the
irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No
instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show
any transaction between petitioners and Ballane or even
Hilario.
2. Mortgage was only valid insofar as
Hilario’s undivided interest is concerned there being co-
ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross
negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank
by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership
of the land considering such was unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having
been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue of the
adverse possession in the concept of owners since.
3. 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of
patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands.
MCSS
Acevedo v. Abesamis
217 SCRA 186
FACTS:
Herodotus and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real
properties in Quezon City and Caloocan City. Herodotus
became the administrator pending partition. For the meantime,
the property is owned in common by the heirs.
The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel et al
(respondents) then filed a Motion for Approval of Sale for them
to sell their shares of the estate. The court approved the
motion. Respondents were able to find a buyer in the person
of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the properties for P12
Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.
Herodotus assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the
price is quite low. The court ordered Miguel et al to find a
higher bidder within a specified time frame which was later
extended to 7 months but still no other buyer could provide
better terms.
Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their
share to the price already agreed upon with Ping and that the
Herodotus can negotiate his price with Ping. But Herodotus still
filed a Supplemental Opposition against the approval of the
conditional sale.
The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered
Herodotus to sell his share at the same rate that the other
heirs sold their share to Ping.
ISSUE:
WON the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate prior to
adjudication. -- YES
HELD:
An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is
a co-owner of the property (estate) before adjudication.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a
decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in
its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the
probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in
issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property,
even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil
Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary
property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case
the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.
NKVS
Paulmitan v. C.A.
215 SCRA 866
DOCTRINE: Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common.
FACTS:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left
the two parcels of land located in the Province of Negros
Occidental. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is
also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children,
namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, apparently
shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan,
who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is
Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is
Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona
Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children,
name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito,
all surnamed Paulmitan.
Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757
based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of
Agatona Sagario. As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed
on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
For non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold
at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the
property. On learning of these transactions, respondents
children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on with the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against
petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to
Lot No. 757 contending that the Complaint was filed more than
eleven years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title
to Donato Paulmitan over the land as consequence of the
registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As
regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in
her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive
ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale
executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato
Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Donato and Pascual (through his heirs)
are co-owners of the land.
2. W/N Juliana has acquired ownership of the
property due to the same being forfeited and
subsequently redeemed.
HELD:
1st Issue: YES, they are co-owners.
When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her
two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. From the
time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the
subsequent passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the
estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code
provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the
deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-
owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was
ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children,
the respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the
disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over
an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children,
who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with
their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to
his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with
respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.
The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half
(1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from
their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with
the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in
the property 14 and consequently made the buyer a co-owner
of the land until it is partitioned.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner
is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
2nd Issue: NO, she is only entitle to the spiritual share of
Donato.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate
the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of
the co-ownership.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with
respect to his share alone. While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering
the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all
of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of
co-ownership. There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel
the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the
taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No
such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the
entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless,
she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the
redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until
reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for
the amount due her.
AMPS
Del Campo v. C.A.
351 SCRA 1
DOCTRINE:
1. The co-owner’s undivided interest could properly be
the object of the contract of sale.
2. Also, undisturbed possession by a co-owner has the
effect of a partial partition of the co-owner property
which entitles the possessor to the definite portion
which he occupies.
FACTS:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and
Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of
Lot 162 (27,179 sq.m.). It was divided in aliquot shares
among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16
Sale by co-owner of her portion: Salome sold part of her 4/16
share to Soledad Daynolo. The land was specified in the deed
of sale. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took
possession of the land and built a house thereon. Mortgage: A
few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo,
mortgaged this portion to Jose Regalado. Soledad eventually
died. The husband was able to redeem the mortgage (portion
of) land. The heirs subsequently sold this to herein petitioners,
the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Another sale by the co-owners of the entire lot: Later on, three
of the eight co-owners (Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo) sold
24,993 sq. m. of said lot to Jose Regalado. Meanwhile, Jose
Regalado was able to obtain a title in his name of the whole lot
previously co-owned. The whole was subdivided and covered
in further titles in his name.
Hence, complaint by previous buyers: Thus, petitioners Manuel
and Salvacion del Campo broug ht this complaint for
"repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of
the now deceased Jose Regalado. They claim that they owned
an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6
which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name
of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the
disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased
the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also
declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the
corresponding taxes.
ISSUES:
1. Could Salome have validly sold her pro-indiviso share
in Lot 162 by metes and bounds to Soledad, from
whom petitioners derived their title?
2. May the ownership of the previous buyers be upheld
against that of the second buyer who has now a
registered title?
HELD:
1. YES. Sale valid up to portion of entitlement.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year
1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the
entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado. Regalado merely
became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the
shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951.
2. Previous buyers who only had uninterrupted
possession prevails over the second buyer despite the
latter’s registered title. His purchase constitutes fraud
which defeats a purportedly indefeasible title.
The area subject matter of this petition had already been
effectively segregated from the ‘mother lot’ even before
title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted
that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought
and took possession of the property in 1951 until
Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. X x x.
In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, we
had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the
property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not
disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored,
the possessor is in a better condition or right than said
transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such
undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition
of the co-owner property which entitles the possessor to
the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably,
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having
enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49
years up to the present.

Although Regalado’s certificate of title became

indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of
the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in its
issuance created an implied trust in favor of petitioners
and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the
parcel wrongfully obtained by the former. Regalado was
aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion as
well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.

KGS
Villanueva v. Florendo
139 SCRA 329
DOCTRINE: Where a surviving spouse sold his undivided
portion of the conjugal property to the wife of one of his sons,
the vendor’s other children are entitled to exercise the right of
redemption as co-owners of the right portion sold.
FACTS:
Macario and Basilia are husband and wife. They have five
children. After Basilia died intestate, the subject parcel of land
(165sqm) was left undivided. Thereafter, Macario sold his
share to said property (one-half) to his daughter-in-law,
Erlinda. Having been informed of the sale, the petitioners (co-
heirs) signified their intention to redeem the lot in question but
Erlinda refused to allow such redemption contending that she
is the wife of one of the legal heirs and therefore redemption
will not lie against her because she is not the "third party" or
"stranger" contemplated in the law.
ISSUE:
Is Erlinda considered as a co-heir and hence, the legitimate
heirs are disallowed redemption contemplated in Article 1620
of the Civil Code? – NO
HELD:
NO. Erlinda is a third person. The co-owners have the right to
redeem.
Art. 1620 of the New Civil Code provides: A co-owner of a
thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares
of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or
more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption,
they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common.
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court
disallowed redemption because it considered the vendee,
Erlinda Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion
Villanueva, and the conveyance was held valid since it was in
favor of the conjugal partnership of the spouses in the absence
of any statement that it is paraphernal in character.
Within the meaning of Art. 1620, the term "third person" or
"stranger" refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession,
and by heirs are meant only those who are called either by will
or the law to succeed the deceased and who actually succeeds.
In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner. The
vendee is related by affinity to the deceased by reason of her
marriage to one of the heirs and being married to Concepcion
does not entitle the vendee to inherit or succeed in her own
right. She is not an heir of Basilia Garcia nor included in the
"family relations" of spouses Macario and Basilia as envisioned
in Art. 217 of the Civil Code. Art. 217. Family relations shall
include those:
(1) Between Husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
The co-owners should therefore be allowed to exercise their
right to redeem the property sold to Erlinda Vallangca. To deny
petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Art. 1620 of
the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-
ownership and to contravene the public policy in this regard.
Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way
out of what, in the words of Manresa, "might be a disagreeable
or inconvenient association into which they have been thrust."
Respondent seller Macario, as co-owner and before partition,
has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest
or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with
boundaries as what was done in the case at bar. It is an
inherent and peculiar feature of co-ownership that although
the co-owners may have unequal shares in the common
property quantitatively speaking, each co-owner has the same
right in a qualitative sense as any one of the other co-owners.
In other words, every co-owner is the owner of the whole and
over the whole, he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at
the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract
because until division is effected, such portion is not correctly
determined.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
An undivided portion of a lot sold to a daughter-in-law is a sale
to the conjugal partnership of gains; hence, her sisters and
brothers-in-law cannot exercise the co-owner’s right of
redemption. I am of the opinion that no right of redemption
exists in favor of Erlinda's sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law
because the sale was made to the (conjugal partnership of
Erlinda and Concepcion), a co-owner. The sale made
Concepcion and Erlinda the co-owners of 6/10 or 3/5 of the
165-square- meter lot. Erlinda is not a third person with
respect to the co-ownership.
JPOT
Adille v. C.A.
157 SCRA 455
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation
of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law.
FACTS:
Felisa Alzul owns a parcel of land in Legazpi City, Albay. In her
lifetime, she married twice. First,with Bernabe Adille which was
Rustico Adille's father and second, with Prospero Asejo from
whom she had other children. In 1939, she entered in a pacto
de retro sale with a period of three years for repurchase.
Unfortunately, she died in 1942 and was unable to settle her
affairs accordingly. Rustico, acted on his own and acquired the
land along with a OCT, which he was able to procure stating
that he was the only child of Felisa and Bernabe. He has then
been in charge of the land in question and has kept his actions
from his siblings. Although there is one, namely, Emeteria who
happens to live in the same land he resides in. He was then
deemed absolute owner of the land and through his actuations
seek to keep the land for himself not taking into account his
other brothers nor his sister. It is because of this that plaintiffs
have come here and contend that trial court erred in:
 I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the
property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in
possession of the portion of the property to vacate
the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.
ISSUE:
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property
held in common? -- NO
HELD:
Given that Rustico acquired the property individually, tends to
it and is in possession together with the corresponding OCT, it
does not discount the fact that the perfection of such was
done through fraudulent means. His function of reacquisition
only makes him a trustee in place of his other siblings. In
addition, a torrens title does not make for a mode of
extinguishment with regard to co-ownership. The court also
refuses to recognize his claim of ownership by way of
prescription given that he registered said land in 1955 and has
been in his possession until 1974.
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-
ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the
co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law.
Rustico's claim falls short because he did not repudiate. In fact,
he had been keeping substantive information for himself
leaving all other co-owners oblivious with concern to his acts.
So, the court finds it fit that although the span of time is
indeed what prescription necessitates, it is still not conclusive
nor meritorious to its effect.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
MLAV
Delima v. C.A.
201 SCRA 641
DOCTRINE: The issuance of the new title constituted an open
and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership.
FACTS:
Lino Delima acquired a lot from the Friar Lands Estate in Cebu.
He later died leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a
sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima
and Vicente Delima. After his death, a title was issued in the
name of his legal heirs, as represented by Galileo Delima.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
Petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita
Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action
for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of the land title with damages against their uncles
Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
The decision was appealed, and the CA reversed the lower
court’s decision. It held that all other heirs (Eulalio, Juanita and
Vicente Delima) had already relinquished and waived their
rights to the property in favor of Galileo, considering that he
alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price and the
realty taxes.
ISSUE:
WON Galileo Delima already acquired the property by
prescription -- YES
HELD:
When a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed
of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and
the issuance of a new one in his name, in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their
shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the
purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their
rights thereunder.
Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the
date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of
adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is
counted.
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal
heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was
cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima
and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the
issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009 to
the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title
constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse
possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was
sufficient to vest title in him by prescription.
As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his
exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the
other heirs and started as against them the period of
prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for
reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968,
such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever
claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before
can no longer be invoked by them at this time.
DJTV
Mariategui v. C.A.
205 SCRA 337
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation
of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law.
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife
he begot four (4) children. With his second wife, he begot a
daughter. And with his third wife, he begot three children.
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties
which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo's
descendants by his first and second marriages executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto
themselves lots in the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, an
Original Certiicate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of the
said heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the
subdivision of the said lot into for which separate transfer
certificates of title were issued to the respective parties.
Lupo's children by his third marriage filed with the lower court
an amended complaint claiming that the lots were owned by
their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the
adjudication of the lots to their co-heirs, they (children of the
third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the
lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased
father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of cause of action and prescription. The motion to dismiss
was denied by the trial court. The plaintiffs elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the CA upheld the trial court’s
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right
to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui. -- NO
HELD:
Prescription does not run against private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not
expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other
words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the
co-owner.
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners.
Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible
and cannot be barred by laches. On the other hand, an action
for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved.
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-
ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition
excluding the private respondents and registered the
properties in their own names. However, no valid repudiation
was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private
respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject
lot was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription
had not yet set in when private respondents filed the present
action for partition.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names did not
operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the
other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
JRPA
Estreller v. Ysmael
G.R. No. 170264
DOCTRINE: Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2016,
reinforced by P.D. No. 1517, which prohibits the eviction of
qualified tenants/occupants, extends only to landless urban
families who are rightful occupants of the land and its
structures, and does not include those whose presence on the
land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract,
those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.
Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property.
However, they failed to prove any lease relationship or, at the
very least, show with whom they entered the lease contract.
Respondents, on the other hand, were able to prove their right
to enjoy possession of the property. Thus, petitioners, whose
occupation of the subject property by mere tolerance has been
terminated by respondents, clearly do not qualify as "tenants"
covered by these social legislations.
FACTS:
Petition for Review under Rule 45.Ysmael and Santos-Alvarez
(respondents) filed with the RTC of Quezon City, a case for
Recovery of Possession against Estreller et al.(petitioners),
claiming ownership of the property subject of dispute, by
virtue of a TCT issued by the Register of Deeds.
Ysmael’s allegations:
On various dates in 1973, Estreller et al. entered the property
through stealth and strategy and had since occupied the same;
and despite demands refused to vacate the premises.
Estreller et al.’s counterclaims:
Ysmael had no personality to file the suit since he only owned
a small portion of the property, while Santos-Alvarez did not
appear to be a registered owner thereof.
That their occupation of the property was lawful, having leased
the same from the Magdalena Estate, and later on from
Alvarez. That the property has already been proclaimed by the
Quezon City Government as an Area for Priority Development
under P. D. Nos. 1517 and 2016, which prohibits the eviction
of lawful tenants and demolition of their homes.RTC decision:
in favour of Ysmael and Santos-Alvarez.CA decision: affirmed
in toto the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are rightful occupants of the property. -- NO

HELD:
Finally, petitioners' claim that they are entitled to the
protection against eviction and demolition afforded by P.D. Nos.
2016, 1517, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, is not plausible.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 grants preferential rights to landless
tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform
areas, while Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 prohibits the eviction
of qualified tenants/occupants.
In Dimaculangan v. Casalla, the Court was emphatic in ruling
that the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517and P.D. No. 2016
extends only to landless urban families who meet these
qualifications: a) they are tenants as defined under Section
3(f) of P.D. No. 1517; b) they built a home on the land they
are leasing or occupying; c) the land they are leasing or
occupying is within an Area for Priority Development and
Urban Land Reform Zone; and d) they have resided on the
land continuously for the last 10 years or more.
Section 3(f) of P.D. No. No. 1517 defines the term
"tenant" covered by the said decree as the "rightful occupant
of land and its structures, but does not include those whose
presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the
benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit,
or those whose possession is under litigation."
It has already been ruled that occupants of the land whose
presence therein is devoid of any legal authority, or those
whose contracts of lease were already terminated or had
already expired, or whose possession is under litigation, are
not considered "tenants" under the Section 3(f).
Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property.
However, they failed to prove any lease relationship or, at the
very least, show with whom they entered the lease contract.
Respondents, on the other hand, were able to prove their right
to enjoy possession of the property. Thus, petitioners, whose
occupation of the subject property by mere tolerance has been
terminated by respondents, clearly do not qualify as "tenants"
covered by these social legislations.
ABB
Pada-Kilario v. C.A.
322 SCRA 481
DOCTRINE: It is not required that partition among heirs be in
writing and registered in order to be valid. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to third persons
who might have interest on the said property. Thus, it follows
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved.
FACTS:
Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against the spouses
Ricardo and Verona Kilario. The Kilarios occupy a portion of the
intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, grandfather of Silverio and
have been living there since 1960 by sheer tolerance. Upon the
death of Jacinto Pada, his heirs entered into extrajudicial
partition of his estate in 1951. As a result thereof, Lot 5581
was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became co-owners
of the said lot.
Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-
owner. Eventually, Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership
to Engr. Paderes. Maria, Marciano’s heir, on the other hand,
sold her share to her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The
latter demanded spouses Kilario to vacate the lot for their use
but the spouses Kilario refused. On June 1995, a complaint for
ejectment was filed against the spouses Kilario. On July 1995 a
deed of donation in their favor was executed by heirs of
Amador Pada.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition was valid -- YES
HELD:
The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among
his heirs made in 1951 is VALID, even if executed in an
unregistered private document. It is not required that partition
among heirs be in writing and registered in order to be valid.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
third persons who might have interest on the said property.
Thus, it follows that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined
when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules
from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied
in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs
that participated therein. The extrajudicial partition which the
heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in
1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and
agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is
presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual
interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until
it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been
made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada.
Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by
their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are
the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to
petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal
effect. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the
subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. In any case, it is too late for the heirs of Amador Pada
to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition
as prescription and laches have equally set in. Having said this,
the petitioners are then estopped from impugning the
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada
after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been
occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying
any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of
the Pada family. Such admissions are binding to them insofar
as the character of their possession of the subject property is
concerned.
FZC
Maestrado v. C.A.
327 SCRA 678
DOCTRINE: A possessor or real estate property is presumed
to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a
better right. partition is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom
it may belong. If may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs
themselves through a public instrument filed before the
register of deeds. However, as between the parties, a public
instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of a
contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors are affected.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve Lot No. 5872 and the rights
of the contending parties thereto. The lot has an area of
57.601 sq.m. and is registered in the name of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses died
intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were urvived by
six heirs. To settle the estate of said spouse, Angel Chaves,
one of the heirs, initiated intestate proceedings and was
appointed dministrator of said estates in the process. An
inventory of the estates was made and thereafter, the heirs
agreed on a project partition. The court approved the partition
but a copy of said decision was missing. Nonetheless, the
estate was divided among the heirs. Subsequently, in 1956,
the partition case effected and the respective shares of the
heirs were delivered to them.
Significantly, Lot No.5872 was not included in a number of
documents. Parties offered different explanations as to the
omission of said lot in the documents. Petitioners maintain the
existence of an oral partition agreement entered into by all
heirs after the death of their parents. To set things right,
petitioners then prepared a quitclaim to confirm the alleged
oral agreement. Respondents dispute voluntariness of their
consent
to the quitclaims.
Six years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents
discovered that indeed subject lot was still a common property
in the name of the deceased spouses. Eventually, an action for
Quieting of Title was filed by petitioners on December 22, 1983.
The trial court considered Lot No. 5872 as still a common
property and therefore must be divided into six parts, there
being six heirs. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
which sustained the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for quieting of title had already
prescribed.
HELD:
Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners’
ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of the oral
partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses’ heirs
sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by
the notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August
16, 1977 and September 8, 1977. There was indeed an oral
agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. A
possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title
thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right.
In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of
Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto by
virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims of the heirs. Partition is the
separation,division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-
judicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument
filed before the register of deeds. However, as between the
parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an
inherent element of a contract of partition. Since registration
serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition
by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. Moreover,
even the requirement of a written memorandum under the
statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the
heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such
transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change
of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that
part which belongs to each heir.
LNAC
Pilapil v. Briones
GR 150175
DOCTRINE: Since an implied trust is an obligation created by
law, then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an
action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s
properties. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance
of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property,
not only because registration under the Torrens system is a
constructive notice of title, but also because by registering the
disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had
already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones,
consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz- Aguila;
Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the other nephews and
nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters
who had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand,
are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones, composed of his
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not
produce any children. When Maximino died, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate. The CFI
issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the
administratrix of Maximino’s estate. She submitted an
Inventory of Maximino’s properties, which included, among
other things, parcels of land.
The CFI subsequently issued an Order, awarding ownership of
the real properties to Donata. Donata had the said CFI Order
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds,
and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said
properties, now in her name.
Donata died. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata.
Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC
as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino,
which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an
Order, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino’s
properties. But then, Gregorio filed a Motion to Set Aside the
Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his
and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of
Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her
name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino.
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the heirs of Maximino.
Thus, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Donata succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. --
YES
HELD:
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to
have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of
Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata
was able to register the real properties in her name, not
through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order issued by
the CFI. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly
issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive
heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of
the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed
properties based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144
of the New Civil Code. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1)
Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by
law; (3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by, then
respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for
reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s properties. The
general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property
based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration
and/or issuance of the title to the property, not only because
registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice
of title, but also because by registering the disputed properties
exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally
repudiated any other claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, Donata
was able to register and secure certificates of title over the
disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The
respondents filed their Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed real properties only on
3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the
said properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’
action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties
had clearly prescribed.
Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust,
is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a
question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced,
applies independently of prescription, which is a question of
time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable. Laches is
defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to
assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of
public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale
claims for the peace of society.
It is uncontested that from the time of Maximino’s death on 1
May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She
managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on
some of them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After
Donata’s death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties,
and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees
thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in
exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs
of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had
rights thereto.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires
them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to
deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he
is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
TKDC
Oliveros v. Lopez
168 SCRA 431
DOCTRINE: Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-
ownership of an estate should not exceed twenty years, while
the agreement to keep a thing undivided should not exceed
ten years. When parties stipulated a definite period to keep a
thing undivided which exceeds the maximum allowed by law,
said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such
maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed
twenty years so property should be divided after twenty years.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned.
FACTS:
Upon his death, Lopez left the lot he owned to his widow and
six children; the heirs did not initiate any move to legally
partition the property. After many years, the widow and the
eldest son, Candido, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
undivided eastern portion of their interests in favor of spouses
Oliveras & Minor; another deed of absolute sale of the
undivided eastern part in favor of spouses Oliveras & Gaspar.
The two Oliveras spouses had since possessed the properties.
After many years, the counsel of the two Oliveras spouses
wrote to the remaining heirs of Lopez reminding them of the
Oliveras spouses’ demand to partition the property so they
could acquire their titles without court action. The heirs didn’t
answer so the Oliveras spouses filed a complaint for partition
and damages.
According to the Oliveras spouses, possession of the disputed
properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and
consent of the heirs; however, according to the heirs, no sale
transpired as the vendors, the widow and Candido, could not
sold specific portions of the property making Oliveras spouses’
possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties
illegal. Trial court ruled that the deeds of absolute sale are
valid and ordered the segregation of the lot.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the two deeds of absolute sale were
null and void since the lot had not yet been
partitioned. -- NO
2. Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed.
-- NO
HELD:
1. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-
ownership of an estate should not exceed twenty years,
while the agreement to keep a thing undivided should not
exceed ten years. When parties stipulated a definite
period to keep a thing undivided which exceeds the
maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void
only as to the period beyond such maximum. Thus, co-
ownership of an estate cannot exceed twenty years so
property should be divided after twenty years. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
In this case, the heirs maintained the co-ownership
beyond 20 years so when the widow and Candido sold
definite portions of the lot, they validly exercised dominion
over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership
had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the
Oliveras spouses who are legally considered as subrogated
to the rights over the partitions of lot in their possession
merely served as formality on the widow and Candido’s
act of terminating co-ownership.
2. Prescription may have barred the filing of complaint
under Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code; however, Article
494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. In this case,
although the complaint was filed after thirteen years from
the execution of the deeds of sale, the Oliveras spouses’
action for partition was timely and properly filed.
AMD
Sering v. Plazo
166 SCRA 84
DOCTRINE:
1. Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable
may bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner may bring
an ejectment action without joining the other co-owners,
the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all.
2. The term, "action in ejectment," includes a
suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio).
FACTS:
Alfredo Sering filed a forcible entry suit against respondent
Spouses Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan with the Municipal
Court of del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. The case was
adjudged against the Plazos, who then appealed to the CFI.
Therein, the Plazos learned that the property subject of the
suit was not owned solely by Sering but was owned in
common by him and others. The Plazos moved for the
impleading of the other co-owners as plaintiff, claiming that
they were indispensable parties. The CFI agreed and ordered
Sering to amend his complaint so as to include his co-owners
as co-plaintiffs. Sering demurred, claiming that under the law
anyone of the co-owners could bring suit for ejectment without
joining the others. The Plazos contended that the invoked
provision had no application to forcible entry actions, but only
to suits of unlawful detainer. Because Sering failed to comply
with the order for amendment of the complaint, the CFI
dismissed his complaint, it also denied his MR. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Sering, as co-owner, can file an action for ejectment in
behalf of and without joining the other co-owners. -- YES
HELD:
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-
owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment. A
co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action without joining
the other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for the
benefit of all. And the term, "action in ejectment," includes a
suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio).
As early as 1969, in the case Vencilao v. Camarento, the SC
pertinently ruled as follows:
“Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and
detainer should be brought in the name of all co-owners, We
hold that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the
co-owners may bring the action... In forcible entry and
detainer action(s) the matter to be determined is simply the
question of prior physical possession. It having been alleged in
the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the
properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual
possession, could file the complaint.”
CRF
Adlawan v. Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916
DOCTRINE: A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to
bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners
as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if
the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
(batasnatin)
FACTS:
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute
over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, registered in the name of
the late Dominador Adlawan and located in Cebu. Petitioner
averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the
sole heir of Dominador. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC
held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly
transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his
acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the
questioned lot. The petitioner further claims that he allowed
the respondents to occupy the property out of respect and
generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father
who stayed on the questioned property since birth, provided
they would vacate the same should his need for the property
arise. When the petitioner verbally requested respondents to
vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an
action for quieting of title with the RTC.
The respondents argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to
succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his
wife, Graciana. This means that the petitioner is not the sole
owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived
not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who
died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.
By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-
owners of Lot 7226.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case
for ejectment against his co-owners of lot 7226. -- NO
HELD:
No. The ejectment suit will not prosper as the petitioner filed it
for his benefit alone and not for the benefits of the rest of co
owners.
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his
co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the
suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated
property, the action should be dismissed.
MPF
Cruz v. Leis
327 SCRA 570
DOCTRINE: Redemption by co-owner does not terminate the
co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the
co-ownership.
FACTS:
● Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923.
Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which
was titled in her name, with the description that she was a
“widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing
a will.
● Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP
15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the
land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro
executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: a Deed of Absolute
Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro
still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she
consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.
● 
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs
to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint
with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property
having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC
found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the
CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz
failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated
in his name after failure of Isidro to comply with the
requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and
therefore subject to the rules on co-ownership?
HELD:
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon
Leis’ death, the conjugal property regime ceased, and gave
Isidro an equal portion of Leis’ half of the property to be
divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then
began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right
to repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz.
Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the
ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for compliance
with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the
Torrens System.
AMDG
Mariano v. CA
222 SCRA 736
DOCTRINE: Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner
does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will
inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not
put an end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption
is not a mode of termination of a co-ownership
FACTS:
Decendent Francisco Gosienfiao, mortgage a residential lot to
Rural Bank. Failing to pay the loan, the lot was foreclosed and
was awarded to be bank for being the highest bidder.
Francisco died intestate and was survived by his heirs, the
third-party defendants and plaintiff-appellants. Within the lot’s
one year redemption period, one of the third-party defendants,
Amparo, bought the land from the bank using her personal
funds. It is noted that the rest of the third-party defendants
executed a “Deed of Assignment of the Right of Repurchase”
to Amparo.
Amparo sold the lot to then defendant spouses Leonardo and
Avelina Mariano (now petitioners in this case) who built a
house on the said lot. When one of the plaintiff-appellants,
Grace, discovered such sale, she requested for a confrontation
between her and the defendants in the presence of the
Barangay Captain. Grace asked that the defendants to present
her claim of the said property which never happened. It is also
noted that the spouses sold the questioned lot to their children,
Lazaro and Dionicia.
The plaintiff-appellants filed a complaint for “recovery of
possession and legal redemption with damages” against the
spouses. The plaintiffs alleged that they are co-owners of the
lot hence they have the right to it since they did not sell their
shares. Also they alleged that they have the right of
redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold
to the spuses. In their answer, the spouses raised that such lot
was purchased by Amparo alone hence she became the sole
owner of the land. As to the right of redemption, though such
right indeed exists, the spouses alleged that it was already
barred by Statute of Limitations or of by laches.
The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses and held that the
plaintiffs had no right of ownership or possession over the lot.
The lower court further explained that when the lot was
bought by the bank, their rights were reduced to a mere right
of redemption. Having failed to redeem the land and Amparo
solely repurchasing the land, the plaintiff’s lost all their rights
over the lot. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court’s decision and ruled the plaintiffs were the co-owners of
the lot. It explained that although Amparo used her own
money when she bought the land, it did not make her the sole
owner. Such redemption inured to the benefit of all the co-
owners.
ISSUES:
1. WON a notice was given to the petitioners? -- NO
2. WON the petitioners lost their right to redeem
although no notice was received by them? -- NO
HELD:
The right of legal redemption is granted within one month
after the written notice was delivered to the party granted of
such right. It has been previously held by this Court that such
written notice is an indispensible requirement and the right of
legal redemption will only run after such notice was presented.
Also, a copy of a deed of sale was considered as a notice.
Looking at the pieces of evidence, no written notice of the sale
was ever presented to the petitioners even during the
confrontation. The private respondents (then plaintiff-
apellants) exercised their right of redemption at the first
opportunity by tendering the repurchase price to the spouses
which refused to accept it.
A written notice must be given to remove all uncertainty as to
the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet and doubt that
the alienation is not definitive. Establishing that no notice was
ever presented, the 30-day period has not yet started.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the
redemption of Amparo alone did not terminate the co-
ownership rather such action inured to the benefit of all co-
owners. Redemption is not a recognized mode of extinguishing
co-ownership.
GCG
Tan v. CA
172 SCRA 660
DOCTRINE: Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after
expiration of redemption period terminates co-ownership. A
co-owner who redeems a property with her own funds after
such consolidation becomes the sole owner thereof.
FACTS:
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered
owner of a parcel of land and its improvements in Binondo
Manila. During his lifetime, he obtained a loan secured by a
real estate mortgage over the land. The land was mortgaged
to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations.
Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their
obligations. They had six children George Laurel, Teodora,
Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie Tan.
China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the
redemption period expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan
Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It provided that the heirs
were given right to repurchase even after the redemption
period but before August 3, 1973.
The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period
so China Bank consolidated its ownership and was issued a
new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan exercised the right to
repurchase pursuant to the settlement using her personal
funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name of
all the heirs.
D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her
and damages. RTC ruled that the property was co-owned by
the heirs. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved
by the foreclosure and consolidation of title by the bank after
the redemption period has expired? -- YES
RULING:
Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the
deceased parents, there can be no question that a co-
ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by
law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption by one
during this period would have inured to the benefit of all.
The records show, however, that when the petitioner
purchased the disputed property on August 30, 1974, any co-
ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer existed.
The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier,
on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its
ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name.
When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to
expire without redeeming their parents' former property and
permitted the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new title, the co-ownership was extinguished.
Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the
property, she is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China
Banking Corporation is ordered to execute the deed of sale
over the disputed property in favor of the petitioner alone.
VCL IV
Heirs of Maninding v. CA
276 SCRA 601
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a
co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. It must be clearly shown that
he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period would begin to run.
FACTS:
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly
discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his
children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the
partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the
produce but were unsuccessful.
With regard to the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having
executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented by
petitioners. He claimed that he acquired ownership over both
the sugarland and the riceland by donation propter nuptias
from his parents Ramon Bauzon and Sotera Zulueta on 21 April
1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra Loresco. Since
the death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in open,
continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the
subject properties.
RTC ruled that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of
Ramon Bauzon and his wife Sotera Zulueta which, upon their
death, devolved by right of succession to their children
Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and
Roque Bauzon in equal pro-indiviso shares. The court a quo
however awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and
Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after finding that
Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed
an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed
of donation for failure to prove its due execution and
authenticity and ruled that the same was negated by the
Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation of Juan Maningding
and Maria Maningding in favor of Roque Bauzon and nullified
the deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor of Luis Bauzon as
regards the riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect to the
sugarland. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have
validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel
rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
CA ruled that the properties validly pertained to Roque Bauzon
by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. Consequently, the
transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect.
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the same deed of
donation was declared null and void by the appellate court for
failure to comply with Art. 633 of the old Civil Code, the law
then applicable, which required for the validity of the deed of
donation to be in a public instrument. Nevertheless, the same
court maintained that the properties belonged to Roque
Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bauzon acquired the ownership of the land by
acquisitive prescription -- YES
HELD:
Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of
acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through
the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years.
In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need
of title or of good faith.
The disputed lots are unregistered lands. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession,
as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong
evidence of ownership.
Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for
failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute
a legal basis for adverse possession. Sixty (60) years have
already elapsed.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-
owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the
co-ownership. It must be clearly shown that he has repudiated
the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period would begin to run.
The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which
the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any
shadow of doubt.
Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take
place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and
uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects
when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the
ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As disclosed by the
records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property
from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were
never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for
which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce
and the conveyance to them of their shares.
CRF
Aguilar v. CA
227 SCRA 472
DOCTRINE: Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of
the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to
such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective interests.
(batasnatin)
FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers and
purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful
neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's
share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen
was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23
February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their
interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen
assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for
his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their
father. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of
their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were
staying in Cebu. After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974,
petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter
vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds
thereof divided among them but the latter refused to do so
thereby causing the petitioner to file a complaint. In his
complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be
divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-
third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly
rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their
father died. The respondent alleged that he had no objection
to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained;
that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should
be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled
to the use and enjoyment of the property.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against
defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-
owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of
their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has
been deprived of his participation in the property by
defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of
rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of
defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the
right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Since
plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant
for the former's share, the trial court held that this property
should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties.The trial court likewise ordered
defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00
as rentals 2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus
interest from the time the action was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff as a co-owner demand a partition
of the said property? -- YES
respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the contract of sale executed by a parent co-owner is
enforceable with respect to the share of her children. -- NO
HELD:
It is clear that petitioner Benjamin did not sign the document
and that the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the subject
property were not sold by them.
The deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner
Benjamin had sold his own share of the subject property. It
cannot be disputed that Benjamin did not sign the document
and therefore, it is unenforceable against him.
Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in
representation of her three children.

HELD: Article 493 of the Civil Code states:

The Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the
parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
equally according to their respective interests. with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be termination of the co-ownership.”
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this in favor of Santos and Bernardo is limited to the portion which
rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is may be allotted to her upon the termination of her co-
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it ownership over the subject property with her children.
be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is
invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of
the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners.

JGY
Coronel v. Constantino
397 SCRA 128

DOCTRINE: The sale of the subject property made by a co-

owner is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her
upon the termination of co-ownership over the subject
property with her children.

FACTS:
The subject property consists of two parcels of land is
originally owned by Aguinaldo. One-half was inherited by
petitioners Emilia together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino
and Ceferino. The other half was inherited by respondents
Constantino and Buensuceso.

Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of ownership,

quieting of title against the Petitioners. Respondents allege
that a certain Santos and Bernardo purchased the property
belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale
signed by Emilia. Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to
Constantino and Buensuceso.TC ruled in favor of the

POSSESSION (ART. 523-561)
FXRL
Yu v. Pacleb
G.R. No. 130316
DOCTRINE: Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed
in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
FACTS:
● Respondents sold a parcel of land divided into three
partitions to Rebecca del Rosario
● Del Rosario sold the land to Ruperto Javier.
● The title to the property remained in the name of the
respondents. None of the sales earlier mentioned were
annotated on the title.
● Javier offered to sell a parcel of land to the spouses
Yu (petitioners).
● Petitioners accepted the offer and formally took over
the property after execution of a contract to sell.
● At the time of such turnover, a portion of the property
was occupied by the son of the respondent and the wife
thereof as tenants.
● The son allegedly surrendered possession of his
portion of the property to the petitioners. He was made
trustee by the petitioners.
● Petitioners also caused the annotation on the title of
the property
● Petitioners allege that they exercised open, public,
and peaceful possession of the property for three years.
During this span of time, the respondent was in the US.
● Respondent allegedly entered the property using
Force, Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, and Stealth (FISTS)
and ousted the trustee of the property, replacing him with
another one of his sons.
● Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry.
● MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.
● CA reverses the decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners had prior physical possession of the
subject property. -- NO
HELD:
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right. In the grammatical sense, to
possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a
thing, with or without right. "Possession always includes the
idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary that the person in
possession should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can
be held by another in his name." Without occupancy, there is
no possession.
Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be
occupancy, apprehension or taking. Second, there must be
intent to possess (animus possidendi).
In the current case, the petitioners’ contentions fail on three
grounds. First, they never truly occupied the land as a lower
court ruling categorically mentioned that they were never in
possession of the property and that the tax declarations for the
two years prior the return of the respondent were made in the
name of the latter. Further, the land was in the possession of
the son of the respondent. Second, the petitioners
acknowledged the fact that the son of the respondent and the
wife thereof were tenants of the respondent. As a mere tenant,
the son had no right at all to surrender the property in
question.
Most importantly, the title of the land in question remained in
the name of respondent. "As the registered owner, petitioner
had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of
the attributes of ownership." The Civil Code states that
possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if
all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
RSDM
De Jesus v. CA
217 SCRA 307
DOCTRINE: Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive
period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten
years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in
bad faith
FACTS:
The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated
in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan, bounded on the North by a
Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial Road; on the East, by
Catalino Tayag (Tayao); on the West, by Macario de Leon,
containing an area of 2565 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoriano Felipe
Private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring
herself the only heir of the deceased Victoriano Felipe and
adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in question.
More than twelve years later, petitioners herein filed in the
Court of First Instance, an action for recovery of ownership
and possession and quieting of title to the abovementioned
piece of land covered by Tax Declaration, alleging among
others: "that their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during his
lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de Jesus died
before the outbreak of World War II, leaving three (3) sons,
namely: Mariano, Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus;
that Mariano de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight
(8) surviving children, namely: Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita,
Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and Ernesto, all surnamed
de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died
on April 3, 1948, survived by two (2) children — Priscilo and
Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs in this case;
while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II
without any issue.
CFI found for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals set aside the
judgment of the trial court in a decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to the ownership
and possession of the residential lot. -- YES
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner has the rigth to the ownership and
possesion of the residential lot.
Private respondent's pretensions to acquisitive prescription
may not succeed even under Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure. Under Section 41 thereof, good faith and just title
are not required for purposes of acquisitive prescription;
adverse possession in either character ripens into ownership
after the lapse of ten years. The just title required for
acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y
valido" — such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer
ownership without the necessity of letting the prescriptive
period elapse, but only "titulo
colorado" — or such title where, although there was a mode of
transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the
grantor is not the owner, and incidentally, it may perhaps be
mentioned that prescription running even after the effectivity
of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be
governed by Section 41 of the Old Civil Code.
Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required
for acquisition of immovable property is ten years if the
possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith.
Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of
the disputed property for thirty years must be conclusively
established.
Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of
adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil Code
had taken effect, private respondent's possession of the
contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of thirty
years considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing
of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and
quieting of title by petitioners on April 27, 1973 was well below
the acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent,
which is thirty years under Article 1141 of the present Civil
Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is
deemed to have commenced when petitioners were made
aware of a claim adverse to them, that is, when the affidavit of
adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds
which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when
private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her
name.
MRAM
SMPSM v. BCDA
G.R. No. 142255
DOCTRINE: Prescription does not apply if the subject land is
covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at bar. Moreover,
prescription does not run against the State.
FACTS:
As a background, in 1992, RA 7227 created the BCDA to
"accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative
productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations
and their extensions," and "to raise funds by the sale of
portions of Metro Manila military camps." Pursuant to this Act,
Pres. Ramos issued EO No. 40, series of 1992, specifying,
among others, the portions of Metro Manila military camps to
be utilized to generate capital for the BCDA. Among these
Metro Manila military camps is Fort Bonifacio, located in the
City of Makati and the Municipality of Taguig. Under EO No. 40,
214 hectares in Fort Bonifacio were earmarked for
development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects
and to use such funds to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extensions.
The members of SMPMI, allegedly comprising over 20,000
families, are residents of Fort Bonifacio occupying a portion of
it specifically Lot 4, Lot 3, and Lot 1 with an aggregate area of
97.58 hectares allegedly covered by SWO-00-001265 in the
name of BCDA. Petitioner maintains that its members have
been occupying peacefully and continuously these lots in Fort
Bonifacio. It alleges that Fort Bonifacio is covered by the TCT
in the name of the United States of America, hence the
Philippine Government.It further alleges that BCDA, pursuant
to RA 7227, the Municipality of Taguig, through its Mayor, sent
30-day notices of eviction to its members. It asserts the
illegality of the imminent eviction, for which the present action
was filed, as the land which petitioner’s members are
occupying is still owned by the USA and not by the Philippine
Government.
It further asserts that Section 8 of RA 7227, which stipulates
the area of Fort Bonifacio specifically covering 2,276 hectares,
did not provide any technical description on what is indeed
covered. Besides, it strongly argues that because of the lack of
"tie line" locating the exact position claimed by BCDA, the
latter cannot illegally stake its claim on the whole of Fort
Bonifacio to the prejudice not only of its members but also of
all persons or entities occupying said area. Petitioner also
contends that what complicates the controversy is the approval
of the BCDA plan by the Bureau of Land without due
certification from the Land Registration Authority.
ISSUE:
Who between petitioner SMPMI and BCDA has the right of
possession over the particular parcels of land which are subject
of this petition.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of BCDA for the ff. reasons:
1. The Philippine Government, and
now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio.
2. BCDA has convincingly shown that
the in the name of the USA covering Fort Bonifacio was
cancelled by TCT No. 61524 issued in 1958 in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. In 1995, the TCT was
transferred in the name of BCDA. Thus, BCDA has valid
titles over Fort Bonifacio which have become indefeasible
and beyond question. On the other hand, SMPMI has not
presented any title or deed to demonstrate ownership or
any interest in the subject lots.
3. Third, it is clear from the records
that BCDA has been granted a clear mandate by RA 7227,
specifically by its Sections 7 and 8, and re-enforced by EO
No. 40, series of 1992, to take over and administer Fort
Bonifacio for its development and disposition to raise
funds for BCDA projects, among others, the conversion of
Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions
to alternative productive uses.
4. It is basic that ownership or
dominion includes the right of possession. In traditional
Roman law, jus possidendi or the right to possess is
fundamentally not only an attribute of ownership but also
a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDA’s
 ownership of the subject lots originates the rights of
possession, use, and disposition
5. Prescription does not apply if the
subject land is covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case
at bar.
6. Neither prescription nor laches runs
against the State. Thus, even granting arguendo that the
subject lands had been erroneously issued titles in favor of
third parties, which is definitely not the case; neither
prescription nor estoppel by laches applies against the
State. In a catena of cases, we have consistently
reiterated this hornbook doctrine. In Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, it was held that:
In so far as the timeliness of the action of the
Government is concerned, it is basic that
prescription does not run against the State. x x x
The case law has also been:
‘When the government is the real party
in interest, and is proceeding mainly to
assert its own rights and recover its own
property, there can be no defense on
the ground of laches or limitation.’ x x x
‘Public land fraudulently included in
patents or certificates of title may be
recovered or reverted to the State in
accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie
against the State in such cases for the
Statute of Limitations does not run
against the State. The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the State is not
barred by prescription.’
FMM
Heirs of Soriano v. CA
363 SCRA 87
DOCTRINE: Possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is complete does not own it and cannot evict themly
subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the
thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from
possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined
as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally,
to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing
with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder.
FACTS:
On 30 June 1967, the heirs of Adrian Soriano, who died
intestate in 1947, leased the property to spouses David de
Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years
beginning 1 July 1967.
The contract of lease provided that Roman Soriano (“Soriano”),
one of the children of the late Adriano, will be the caretaker of
the property during the period of the lease.
During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano
Soriano entered into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate.
The property subject of this case was adjudicated to seven (7)
of his rune (9) children pro-indiviso.
On 11 January 1968, the property was divided into two (2) lots,
Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. The former lot was assigned
to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while the latter
lot was assigned to Francisco, Librada, Elcocadio and Soriano.
The new owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the portions assigned
to them to spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos. Likewise, the
new owners of Lot 8459, except Soriano, sold their shares to
the Spouses Abalos.
On 14 March 1968, On March 14, 1968, the Spouses de Vera
ousted Soriano as caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza and
Vidal Versoza as his substitutes. Thereafter, Soriano filed a
case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the Spouses
de Vera.
On 30 September 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision
authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals (“CA”). However, before
it was executed, the parties entered into a post-decisional
agreement wherein the spouses de Vera allowed Soriano to
sub-lease the property until the termination of the original
lease on 30 June 1982. This agreement was approved by the
court in an order dated 22 December 1972.
On 16 August 1976, the Spouses Abalos filed with the then
Court of First Instance (“CFI”) of Pangasinan at Lingayen an
application for registration of title. The application claimed
ownership of the entire lot No. 60052 and 3/4 pro-indiviso of
Lot No. 8459. The Director of Lands (“Republic”) and Soriano
filed separate oppositions to the application. The latter’s
opposition alleged that the two (2) lots subject of the
application have not yet been subdivided and remained as one
parcel; that he is the co-owner pro-indiviso of the combined
area of the two (2) lots and not just to one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 8459 as alleged in the application; and that the applicant’s
source of ownership is voidable. The Republic subsequently
conceded that the land applied for was private and disposable.
The RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, granted the
application for Registration.
On 13 April 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and
the sub-lease in favor of Soriano, the Spouses Abalos filed a
case for unlawful detainer against Soriano. This case, however,
was dismissed on motion of the complainants, Spouses Abalos.
For their part, Elcocadio, Librada, Soriano, Francisco, Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia, filed a complaint to annul
the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Spouses Abalos
or should the deeds be not annulled, to allow Soriano,
Elcocadio and Librada to redeem those shares sold by Candido,
Lourdes, Francisca and the heirs of Dionisia and to uphold
Soriano’s possession of the fishpond portion of the property as
a tenant-caretaker. After the dismissal of the case for unlawful
detainer, the Abalos spouses a motion for execution of the
post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Soriano and
the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the
property.
In the mean time, Soriano died on 11 December 1985. Thus,
the complaint in the civil case for annulment of document
and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was amended to
substitute Soriano’s heirs.
Several decisions by the Supreme Court (“SC”) were rendered
but the issue on possession remains challenged.

ISSUE:
Whether an owner is also entitled to possession. -- NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that possession and ownership are
distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of
others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among
which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to
exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession
may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of
an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be
declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The
possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee
or a tenant. The SC also held that the exercise of their rights
of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by
law.
RGGM
State Investment House v. CA
254 SCRA 368
DOCTRINE: A mortgagee who has foreclosed property is not
considered in good faith when such mortgagee has or is
expected to have knowledge of any defect in the title; a prior
buyer in good faith, although merely under a contract to sell, is
preferred over a mortgagee since if the original owner
delivered title, he would not anymore be able to mortgage the
thing.
FACTS:
A contract to sell was executed between spouses Canuto and
Oreta, and Solid Homes. The sale involved a parcel of land
(511 sq. m.). Upon signing of the contract, Oreta made
payment with the agreement that the balance shall be paid in
installments. Meanwhile. Solid Homes executed several
mortgages in favor of State Investment over its subdivided
parcels of land, including the subject of land of the mentioned
contract to sell. Such mortgage was foreclosed upon failure of
Solid to comply with its obligations. Thereafter, Solid through a
MOA, negotiated for the deferment of consolidation of
ownership over the foreclosed properties. It further committed
itself to redeem the properties.
Spouses Canuto after a few years filed a complaint before the
HLURB against Solid and State for failure on the part of Solid
to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale as well as to
deliver title to property subject of the contract to sell despite
full payment. Solid alleged that its obligations under the
contract have become so difficult for performance. Solid , in
effect, asked to be partially released from its obligations by
delivering another parcel of land in substitution to the subject
of the sale. State, on the other hand averred that unless Solid
pays the redemption price, it has a right to hold on to the
foreclosed properties. However, HLURB ordered State to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of complainants and
deliver the title to the land. Solid was then ordered to pay
State the portion of the loan which corresponds to the value of
the lot. this judgment was sustained by the Board of
Commissioners, Office of the President, and Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. W/N spouses Oreta's unregistered rights are superior
over State's registered mortgage over the property
2. W/N State has the right to rely on the face of the
Torrens title
HELD:
1. State's registered mortgage right over the property is
inferior to that of respondents' unregistered right. The
unrecorded sale is preferred for the reason that if the
original owner (Solid) had parted with the ownership of
the thing sold, he would no longer have the free
disposal of it and would not be able to mortgage it.
Registration of the mortgage is not important since it is
understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third
persons.
2. As a general rule, where there is nothing in the title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership thereof, the
purchaser is not required to explore further. An
exception to this is when the mortgagee or purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or lack of title on the part of
the vendor or that he was aware of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire further. In
this case, petitioner knows full well that Solid is
engaged in selling subdivision lots. Therefore, as
founded on jurisprudence, it should have taken
necessary precautions to ascertain any flaw. Moreover,
the uniform practice of financing institutions is to
investigate, examine, and assess real property offered
as security. State is therefore not a mortgagee in good
faith.
MCSS
DBP v. CA
316 SCRA 650
FACTS:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of
159 lots, in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision of the
PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4,
which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the
spouses Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to
them by PHHC. Upon learning of PHHC’s previous transaction
with DBP, the spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the
PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of
DBP. The CFI held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null
and void, for being in violation of Section 13 of the DBP
Charter.
ISSUE:
WON spouses possess the legal personality to question the
legality of the sale? -- YES
HELD:
The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment
in full of the purchase price for the same lots which had been
sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction in question.The
general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts
can only be maintained by those who are bound either
principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person
who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced
in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and
can show the detriment which could positively result to him
from the contract in which he had no intervention.
NKVS
San Miguel Corporation v. CA
185 SCRA 727
DOCTRINE: Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of
land. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation purchased from Silverio Perez a parcel
of land located in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Claiming ownership in
fee simple of the land, SMC filed before the then CFI, now RTC
of Batangas an application for its registration under the Land
Registration Act.
The Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration
contending that SMC's claim of ownership, that the parcel of
land in question is part of the public domain, and that SMC,
being a private corporation, is disqualified under Section 11,
Article XIV of the Constitution from holding alienable lands of
the public domain. The Solicitor General thereafter authorized
the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas to appear in said case, subject
to his supervision and control.
Petitioner's claim that its predecessor-in-interest had open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of Lot 684 for more than
thirty years is anchored on certain documentary and
testimonial evidence. Its documentary evidence consist of tax
declaration No. 923 wherein it appears that in 1974, Silverio
Perez declared as his own for taxation purposes, a certain
riceland with an area of 1.5657 hectares located in Sta.
Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, and a certification of the
Office of the Treasurer of Sto. Tomas to the effect that in 1977,
Silverio Perez paid realty taxes for the land subject of tax
declaration no. 923.
ISSUE: W/N Tax declarations are evidence of ownership. --
NO
HELD:
NO, it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership or right of
possession of a piece of land.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Tax declarations only
become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by
prescription, a mode of acquisition of ownership relied upon by
petitioner in this case, when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.
Such proof of actual possession was sought to be provided by
the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez that he had been in
possession of the property since 1933 until he sold it to SMC in
1975; that the property was given to him by his parents when
he got married; that no document evidenced that transfer;
that it had been in the possession of his parents since 1925;
that he had declared the property in his name for taxation
purposes; that he had paid taxes therefor, and that he was in
peaceful, continuous and exclusive possession of the property
until its sale to SMC.
Petitioner did not present other witnesses to corroborate Perez'
testimony. Its other witness, Antonio M. de las Alas, Jr., a
lawyer of the petitioner, simply testified that he handled the
negotiations for the purchase of the property; that SMC was
authorized to own and acquire property as shown by its
articles of incorporation and by-laws; that since its acquisition
in 1975, the property had been used as a hatchery farm of
SMC; that SMC's possession in the concept of an owner had
been continuous, adverse and against the whole world, and
that the land was declared for taxation purposes still in the
name of Silverio Perez .
We hold that there is paucity of evidence of actual, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property on the part of vendor
Silverio Perez so as to attach to it the character of an express
grant from the govemment. Indeed, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, Silverio Perez's testimony, being
uncorroborated, is simply self-serving and hence, undeserving
of any weight.
AMPS
Equatorial Realty Development v. Mayfair Theatre
370 SCRA 56
DOCTRINE: Under Article 1380 to 1381(3) of the Civil Code, a
contract otherwise valid may be rescinded by reason of injury
to third persons, like creditors. Nonetheless, acquisition by a
third person of the property subject of the contract is an
obstacle to the action for its rescission where it is shown that
such third person is in lawful possession of the subject of the
contract and that he is in good faith.
FACTS:
Carmelo Inc. (Lessor) and Mayfair entered into two contracts
of lease over certain portions of a two-storey building. Both
contracts contained the following stipulation:
That if the LESSOR should desire to sell the
leased premises, the LESSEE shall be given
30-days exclusive option to purchase the
same.
In the event, however, that the leased
premises is sold to someone other than the
LESSEE, the LESSOR is bound and obligated,
as it hereby binds and obligates itself, to
stipulate in the Deed of Sale hereof that the
purchaser shall recognize this lease and be
bound by all the terms and conditions
thereof.
Later on, Carmelo informed Mayfair that a certain Jose Araneta
was offering to buy the whole property for US Dollars
1,200,000. Carmelo asked Mayfair if it was willing to buy the
property for Six to Seven Million Pesos.
Mayfair sent letter to Carmelo purporting to express interest in
acquiring not only the leased premises but "the entire building
and other improvements if the price is reasonable. However,
Carmelo proceeded with the sale of the whole property which
included the leased premises to Equatorial. Hence, Mayfair
instituted the action a quo for specific performance and
annulment of the sale of the leased premises to Equatorial.
ISSUE:
Is the contract of sale between Carmelo (lessor) and Equatorial
still rescissible in spite of the possession of Equatorial?
HELD:
Still rescissible as the exception does not apply to Equatorial –
not third party to the rescissible contract and possession was
in bad faith.
What Carmelo and Mayfair agreed to, by executing the two
lease contracts, was that Mayfair will have the right of first
refusal in the event Carmelo sells the leased premises. It is
undisputed that Carmelo did recognize this right of Mayfair, for
it informed the latter of its intention to sell the said property in
1974. There was an exchange of letters evidencing the offer
and counter-offers made by both parties. Carmelo, however,
did not pursue the exercise to its logical end. While it initially
recognized Mayfair's right of first refusal, Carmelo violated
such right when without affording its negotiations with Mayfair
the full process to ripen to at least an interface of a definite
offer and a possible corresponding acceptance within the "30-
day exclusive option" time granted Mayfair, Carmelo
abandoned negotiations, kept a low profile for some time, and
then sold, without prior notice to Mayfair, the entire Claro M
Recto property to Equatorial.
Since Equatorial is a buyer in bad faith, this finding renders the
sale to it of the property in question rescissible. We agree with
respondent Appellate Court that the records bear out the fact
that Equatorial was aware of the lease contracts because its
lawyers had, prior to the sale, studied the said contracts. As
such, Equatorial cannot tenably claim to be a purchaser in
good faith, and, therefore, rescission lies.
Contract of Sale was not voidable but rescissible. Under Article
1380 to 1381(3) of the Civil Code, a contract otherwise valid
may nonetheless be subsequently rescinded by reason of
injury to third persons, like creditors.
According to Tolentino, rescission is a remedy granted by law
to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure
reparation for damages caused to them by a contract, even if
this should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to
their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said
contract. It is a relief allowed for the protection of one of the
contracting parties and even third persons from all injury and
damage the contract may cause, or to protect some
incompatible and preferent right created by the contract.
Rescission implies a contract which, even if initially valid,
produces a lesion or pecuniary damage to someone that
justifies its invalidation for reasons of equity.
It is true that the acquisition by a third person of the property
subject of the contract is an obstacle to the action for its
rescission where it is shown that such third person is in lawful
possession of the subject of the contract and that he did not
act in bad faith. However, this rule is not applicable in the case
before us because the petitioner is not considered a third party
in relation to the Contract of Sale nor may its possession of the
subject property be regarded as acquired lawfully and in good
faith
KGS
Maglucot v. Maglucot
329 SCRA 78
DOCTRINES:
1. Partition; The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e. not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property.
2. Partition; The second phase commences when it
appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon
the partition” directed by the court. In that event,
partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners.
3. Under the present rule, the proceeding of the
commissioners without being confirmed by the court
are not binding upon the parties.
4. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take
under partition, and who took possession of the
portion allotted to them, are estopped to question
title to portion allotted to another party.
5. In cases involving oral partition under which the
parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, equity will confirm such partition
and in a proper case decree title in accordance with
the possession in severalty.
FACTS:
Lot 1639 was registered under the names of six persons.
Thereafter, one of the co-owners and his predecessor-in-
interest (Tomas) filed a petition to subdivide the lot, which was
granted. As such, said lot was physically subdivided into A-F.
Lot D (subject lot) was given to Roberto Maglucot. Portion of it
was rented to Guillermo Maglucot; and subsequently, to
Leopoldo and Severo Maglucot (respondents). The
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots.
After years, they stopped paying rentals as they are claiming
ownership over the subject lot. Then, Tomas and other
petitioners filed a case in the RTC for recovery of the
possession for Lot D. They claimed that no partition took place,
as it was not annotated in the title. The RTC ruled that there
was partition; and ordered respondents to demolish the houses
in Lot D and vacate the premises thereof. The CA reversed the
decision and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations
relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of
partition.
ISSUE:
Was the oral and physical partition of Lot 1639 valid
considering it was not annotated in the title? -- YES
HELD:
An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an
order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in
fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a
decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the
parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the
case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting
suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed)
and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either the action
is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed – the
order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it
appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be
done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may
well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was
issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, which
held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling.
In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been
confirmed by the trial court are not binding. In this case, both
the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are,
thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object
to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that
they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question
the decree, especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan.
They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty
(40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for
partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. In that case, the order was
clearly interlocutory since it required the parties " to submit the
corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval."
Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed
them merely to approve the sketch plan already existing and
tentatively followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners
without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the
parties. However, this rule does not apply in case where the
parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed
sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to
give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the
parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order
for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No.
1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this
case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has
been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that
confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but
only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this
question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly
non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was
a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By
virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied
specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the
petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the
co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis,
refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate
certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings,
the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No.
1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession
remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years
later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took
notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the
parties therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware
that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions
in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this
factual backdrop, said court ordered the partition and
appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative
sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to
presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same
sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the
commissioners for approval. There is no showing that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records
show that the parties continued their possession of the specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision
plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not
a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and
holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be
subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a
party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when
he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land
especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed
ownership rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under
partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to
them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to
another party. A person cannot claim both under and against
the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands
awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the
decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or
none. Parties who had received the property assigned to them
are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any
part of it.[38] Here, respondents, by themselves and/or
through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the
lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation
continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be
heard to question the possession and ownership of the other
co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in
accordance with the sketch plan.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong
to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in
severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been
held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land,
improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and
acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that
there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by
proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and
were not recorded. And where a tract of land held in common
has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long
been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in
common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of
a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has
been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose
name it bears.
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946.
Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts
subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral
partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took
possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for
partition was instituted because some of the co-owners
refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title.
In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral
court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in
the possession of the parties. The only significant fact
subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is
that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would
be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as
the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of
actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of
the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately,
we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral
partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition
and the continuation of such possession for a very long period
indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition.
The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In
Espina vs. Abaya, we declared that an oral partition is valid. In
Hernandez vs. Andal, reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, this Court has
ruled, thus: on general principle, independent and in spite of
the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to
partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will proper
cases where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions
set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and
the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or
stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under
which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition
agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a
proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol
partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the
parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts
of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement
and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
concluding the right of the parties as between each other to
hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership
with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of
the partition. A number of cases have specifically applied the
doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the
operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where
there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and
a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to
enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
JPOT
Gabrito v. CA
167 SCRA 771
DOCTRINE: Pending final adjudication of ownership by the
Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the
meantime the right of possession over the land.
FACTS:
The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a
complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against defendants
Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors
and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon
Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of
this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding monthly
rentals due thereon. The Tans found it fit for them to make
said lot a residential house for them instead. They furnished
requests to Gabrito and others stating their reasons and three
months later they (Gabrito, et al.) were still being stubborn in
keeping with the operations of their commercial spaces. On
November 22, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court ruled and the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the
defendants to vacate the parcel of land described in
par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the
buildings and any other improvements respectively
owned by them; and to pay plaintiffs the following as
reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:
Maximo Gabrito-aT P250.00 per month from April
1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libut-at P150.00 per month from May 1984
until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Vera-at P150.00 per month from April 1984,
until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uy-at Pl
70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates
the premises. for all defendants to pay, in equal
shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as
well as costs SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).
Gabrito, et al., found the findings contrary and elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court as well as the Court of
Appeals, leading up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the
land in dispute?
2. Who has a better right to possess the land which
definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court and which of the summary procedures
may properly be applied?
HELD:
In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right
thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case,
prior physical possession is not required. Possession can also
be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the
fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution
of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical
occupation is not always necessary. Although, there is still a
dispute between the Bureau of Lands and the courts, unlawful
detainer is still applicable and is indeed the correct action.
Promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that
"pending final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau of
Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime
the right of possession over the land." Corollary thereto, the
power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn
over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled
thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the
Bureau of Lands. In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of
June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to decide
the case on the question of physical possession, although not
on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).
Under the circumstances, a careful study of the
records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the
Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and finally of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order is lifted. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MLAV
Vda. De Borromeo v. Pogoy
126 SCRA 217
DOCTRINE: Prescription for actions involving forcible entry
and unlawful detainer is one year.
The Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto
are "individuals" or a single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution. It applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole,
testate or intestate, estate, etc.
FACTS:
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of
a building in Cebu City. Said building has been leased and
occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly
rental of P500.00.
Private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the
estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a
letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals, and
thereafter to vacate the premises. When petitioner failed to
comply, Atty. Reyes instituted an ejectment case against
petitioner.
Petitioner moves for the dismissal of the casce for want of
jurisdiction as conciliation proceedings with the Lupon
Barangay should have first been instituted since they both live
in the same city. Respondent justified such omission through
PD 1508, which allows the direct filing of an action in court
where there was danger of prescribing under the Statute of
Limitations.
RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner elevated the case to the
Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was prescription -- NO
2. WON there was a need to go to the Lupon Barangay -
- YES
HELD
Article 1147 of the Civil Code states that the period for filing
actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this
period is counted from demand to vacate the premises.
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28,
1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on
September 16, 1982. There is at least eleven (11) full months
of the prescriptive period.
Under the procedure outlined in PD 1508, the time needed for
the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and
the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Thus, it cannot
be truthfully asserted that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only
where the parties thereto are "individuals" or a single human
being as contrasted with a social group or institution. It applies
only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of
the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation,
partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
Atty. Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in
behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. The real party
in interest is the intestate estate under administration and thus,
it does not fall within the “individual” description.
DJTV
Wilmon Auto Supply v. CA
208 SCRA 108
DOCTRINE: An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an
action filed in the RTC based on tenant’s claim that his right of
preemption (or prior purchase) was violated.
FACTS:
Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation, et al. (Wilmon) were lessees
of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered
land owned in common by Lucy Solinap, et al. The leases were
embodied in uniformly worded deeds executed by the
individual petitioners wherein one of the clauses provided for a
reservation of rights—the lessor has the right to sell, mortgage,
hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires
the purchaser or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of
the lease contract; provided further that lessee shall be duly
informed about lessor’s plan to sell the property.
After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements,
the premises were sold to Star Group Resources and
Development Inc. (Star Group). Thereafter, Star Group
instituted an action in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) for
unlawful detainer against Wilmon. Wilmon refused to concede,
and indeed impugned, Star Group's right to eject them.
Wilmon then filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and argued that in so selling the properties and seeking their
ejectment therefrom, the lessors — and their buyer — had
violated their leasehold rights because (i) they (the lessees)
were not accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was
not required to honor the leases, and (c) the lessees were
denied the option to renew their leases upon the expiration
thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC
against a lessee — grounded on the expiration of the latter's
lease — should be abated or suspended by an action filed in
the RTC by the defendant lessee — on the claim that he is
entitled to a right of preemption (or prior purchase) of the
premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially
enforced. -- NO
HELD:
An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in
the RTC based on tenant’s claim that his right of preemption
(or prior purchase) was violated.
Actions in the RTC did not involve physical or de facto
possession and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the
RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could
quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action
and there resolved. This is specially true in the cases at bar,
where the petitioners-lessees' claims — that the lessors (and
the buyer of the leased premises) had violated their leasehold
rights because (a) they (the lessees) were not accorded the
right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect
their leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to
renew their leases upon the expiration thereof — constituted
their causes of action in the suits commenced by them in the
Regional Court.
JGY
Semira v. CA
230 SCRA 577
DOCTRINE: The issue of ownership can be decided
provisionally for the sole purpose of resolving priority of
possession and does not bar an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.
FACTS:
Gutierrez owned a parcel of land which she sold to private
respondent Buenaventura by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa". Aside from the estimated area of 822.5 square
meters appearing in the deed of sale, the following boundaries
of the lot are also stated. Thereafter, private respondent
entered the premises observing thereby the boundaries of the
property and not the area given. Subsequently, he acquired
two other parcels of land from the spouses Hornillas.
Respondent sold the first lot to his nephew, Cipriano by means
of another "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" where the lot was
described with the same area and boundaries mentioned in the
first "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" with the exception of the
boundary on the east. Cipriano sold the lot to petitioner Semira.
However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
4 was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the
previous document. As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is
actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was
confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey.
A complaint for forcible entry was filed against petitioner by
respondent. The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was
822.5 square meters only and that the excess portion forcibly
occupied by petitioner formed part of a lot which he acquired
from the Hornillas. MTC dismissed the case since the issue of
prior physical possession could not be resolved without first
deciding on the ownership, dismissal was proper since forcible
entry cases involve the sole issue of prior physical possession.
ISSUE:
WON the issue of ownership can be decided for the sole
purpose of resolving priority of possesion. -- YES
HELD:
In the case at bench the issue of possession cannot be decided
independently of the question of ownership. Where land is sold
for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or
number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract
determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area
thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the
land included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the
real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the
deed.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case is merely an
action for forcible entry and that the issue of ownership was
decided for the sole purpose of resolving priority of possession.
Hence, any pronouncement made affecting ownership of the
disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence,
does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land.
JRPA
Javier v. Veridiano
237 SCRA 565
DOCTRINE: A final judgment on forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for determination of
ownership. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of
possession is conclusive only as to possession, not ownership.
It is not a bar against an action for determination of ownership
FACTS:
Petitioner bought a land on a subdivision by filing a
Miscellaneous Sales Application. Pending the approval of the
sale, Ben Babol entered a portion adjacent to the land being
bought by Petitioner. Petitioner claims that the occupied land
by Babol is part of his land so he filed a forcible entry case.
However, the trial court found Petitioner wrong and so
sustained the possession of Babol. Later on, Babol would sell
this portion to private Respondent. In the meantime, the
application was approved and a TCT was delivered to
Petitioner. This motivated the Petitioner to demand the land
again, this time from Respondent, and this time on the basis of
ownership. He filed a complaint for quieting of title and
recovery of possession. Respondent countered that the first
case on forcible entry constituted res judicata against the
second complaint.
ISSUE:
W/N the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against
the second case on quieting of title -- NO
HELD:
For res judicata to arise, four requisites must concur: Final
judgment, Court with competent jurisdiction, judgment based
on merits, identity of parties and cause of action.
The Court said that in the two cases, there were identity of
parties because Respondent, having acquired the contested
land by sale and tradition, is a successor in interest.
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no
other issue than possession and declares only who has the
right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has right or title of ownership.
ABB
Lim Kich Tong v. CA
195 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Any person deprived of possession of any land or
building may file an action for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only available to
landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within one
year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.
FACTS:
Respondent Reginaldo Lim and his family resided in room of a
building owned by Petitioner Lim Kieh Tong until the former
transferred to their new residence. However, the respondent
retained possession of the room to keep his important
belongings. At one point, when respondent wanted to go to his
room, he found that his key was no longer compatible with the
door’s lock, that is, the lock was changed. He asked from
petitioner the new key but having failed, he filed a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction plus damages with the MTC.
Petitioner countered that since the action is one for specific
performance, the action should have been filed with the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is one for specific performance or
forcible entry and detainer.
HELD:
The suit is actually one for forcible entry and detainer.
Respondent remained in possession of the property but
petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving
him of the right of egress and ingress through the door of the
building and the room. Any person deprived of possession of
any land or building may file an action for forcible entry and
detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only available to
landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within one
year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.
FZC
Penas v. CA
233 SCRA 744
DOCTRINE: The notice giving the lessee the alternative either
to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not
the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary
demand is first made.
FACTS:
Private respondent was the lessee of a property owned by
petitioners based on a written lease contract (on a monthly
basis). On January 18, 1990, petitioners (lessors) sent a letter
terminating the lease contract with respondent and demanding
that he vacate the premises. In the same letter, respondent
was given an option to sign a new lease contract but with an
increased rate (from P610 to P2,000). Respondent refused to
vacate and refused to sign a new contract. He tried to pay the
rentals at the old rate but petitioners refused to accept the
same. Respondent deposited the amount with PNB in trust for
petitioners but the petitioners never withdrew the said money.
In August 1992 or after 2 years, petitioners again sent a letter
to respondent demanding him to vacate the premises and pay
back rentals for 2 years at the increased monthly rate. For
failure to comply with the demands, petitioners filed this
unlawful detainer case against respondent in September 1992.
The MTC, RTC and the CA all ruled in favor of respondent-
lessee and dismissed the case on the ground that more than
one year has elapsed from the time petitioner sent his letter
terminating the contract and demanding a new lease contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unlawful detainer case was proper. -- YES
HELD:
Yes, the unlawful detainer case was proper. The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to
vacate the leased premises and pay back rentals at the
increased rate.
The settled rule is that when a lessee is given an option to
vacate the premises or sign a new lease contract with
increased rental, his choice to continuously stay means a new
contract is made and he should pay the increased rental. In
this case, respondent deposited an amount based on the old
rental. Thus he defaulted in the payment. The demand to
vacate sent in August 1992 was proper since there was a
breach of the contract on the part of the lessee. The case was
filed in September 1992, and so it was properly filed within one
year from the last letter of demand.
LNAC
Francel Realty Corporation v. CA
G.R. No. 117051
DOCTRINE: The action here is not a simple action to collect
on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization
payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a
subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to
regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent Francisco T. Sycip.
Petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to
private respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the Francel
Townhomes, at 22 Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for
P451,000.00. The Contract to Sell provides that in case of
default in the payment of two or more installments, the whole
obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will
then be entitled to rescind the contract and take possession of
the property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the
necessity of any court action and the downpayment will be
treated as earnest money or as rental for the use of the
premises. Petitioner alleged that private respondent failed to
pay the monthly amortization since October 30, 1990 despite
demands to update his payments and to vacate the premises,
the latest of which was the demand made in the letter dated
September 26, 1992, and that because of private respondent’s
unjust refusal to vacate, petitioner was constrained to engage
the services of counsel. Petitioner prayed that private
respondent be ordered to vacate the premises and pay a
monthly rental beginning October 30, 1990 until he shall have
vacated the premises, and other expenses of litigation.
Private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint but his
motion was denied by the MTC. He filed his answer in which
he alleged that he had stopped paying the monthly
amortizations because the townhouse unit sold to him by
petitioner was of defective construction. He alleged that he
had in fact filed a complaint for “unsound real estate business
practice” in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
against petitioner. Private respondent prayed that petitioner
be ordered to pay damages.
The MTC ruled that the answer was filed out of time on the
ground that it was filed more than ten days after the service of
summons. However, it dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The MTC held that the case was cognizable by the
HLURB. But it also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
On appeal the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the CA, however it was
dismissed.
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether MTC correctly held itself to be without jurisdiction
over petitioner’s complaint. -- YES
HELD:
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer
arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply
with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the
premises after the expiration of the lease. Since the
determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB,
the question of the right of petitioner must be determined by
the agency.
Petitioner’s cause of action against private respondent should
instead be filed as a counterclaim in HLURB Case in
accordance with Rule 6, §6 of the Rules of Court which is of
suppletory application to the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure
per §3 of the same. In the case of Estate Developers and
Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte, the
developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price
of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was
dismissed by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the
order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:
The action here is not a simple action to collect on a
promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization
payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a
subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to
regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices.
Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending
resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no
order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on
account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its
warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of
collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is
necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it
affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a
subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as
amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to
dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular
court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.
We hold that the MTC correctly held itself to be without
jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. But it was error for the
MTC to grant private respondent’s counterclaim for damages
for expenses incurred and inconveniences allegedly suffered by
him as a result of the filing of the ejectment case.
Pursuant to Rule 6, §8 a party may file a counterclaim only if
the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Otherwise the
counterclaim cannot be filed.
Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the
award of damages to private respondent must be disallowed
for the following reasons: (1) The MTC decision itself stated
that the answer with its counterclaim was filed out of time or
more than 10 days from private respondent’s receipt of
summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent did not
make any counterclaim. (2) A reading of the MTC decision
showed no justification for the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
TKDC
Azarcon v. Eusebio
105 Phil. 569
DOCTRINE: A person who is in possession of a parcel of land
and is being ordered to leave said land while products are
pending harvest has the right to a part of the net harvest.
FACTS:
This involves a dispute over the possession of a parcel of
public land; Eusebio filed a lease application for a parcel of
said laid but Azarcon occupied a portion of that land under a
homestead application. The conflict between the lessee and
the homesteaders was investigated by the Director of Lands
and again by the Secretary of Agriculture and natural
Resources.
Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance alleging that he acquired that
parcel of land through a lease with the Bureau of Lands and
while he is in possession of said land, Azarcon occupied a
portion of it. Azarcon answered that he is in actual possession
of a portion of the land under a homestead application and
that the lease application of Eusebio was subsequent to his
homestead application; he occupied the land since 1941 with
interruption during the war and again in 1950 up to the time of
the filing of the action.
The trial court ruled in favor of Eusebio; while the case was
appealed, a writ of execution was issued for the restitution of
the land to Eusebio. Despite receipt of the notice of the writ of
execution, Aznar entered the land to gather palay which was
then pending harvest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aznar acted in bad faith when he entered the
land to gather palay despite receipt of the notice of the writ of
execution. -- NO
HELD:
While the court ordered Aznar to move out from the premises,
it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop existing on the
land. Under Article 545 of the Civil Code, a person who is in
possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land
while products thereon are pending harvest has the right to a
part of the net harvest.
In this case, the order of execution did not expressly prohibit
Aznar from gathering the pending fruits, which were the result
of their possession and cultivation of the land, so it cannot be
said that Aznar violated the courts' order. Their act in
harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but
was not expressly prohibited by the court's order, and was
even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the
execution.
AMD
Calagan v. CFI of Davao
95 SCRA 498
DOCTRINES:
1. Purpose of the law on homesteads: to conserve
ownership in the hands of the homesteader and his
family
2. Under Article 547, the homesteader desiring to
repurchase should be given the option to require the
vendee a retro to remove the useful improvements on
the land subject of the sale a retro, such option is not
granted the vendor a retro under Article 1616.
FACTS:
In 1954, Mangulon Calagan and his wife, Takura, were granted
a Homesstead Patent and issued an Original Certificate of Title
over a lot located in Digos, Davao del Sur. In 1955, Takura
died and was survived by her husband and their children.
In 1961, Calagan sold a portion of their homestead to private
respondent, Petra Sandoval. Sandoval borrowed Calagan’s title
to the land so she could have the sale annotated. In 1963,
Calagan offered to repurchase the land but Sandoval refused
such offer. Sandoval was only willing to comply if she was
reimbursed the value of the house that she had constructed on
the land.
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against Sandoval.
The CFI ruled in favor of petitioners. Sandoval was ordered to
reconvey the land, given that petitioners pay her the value of
the house she has constructed in good faith. Petitioners
appealed, maintaining that the Court erred in ordering them to
reimburse the value of the house.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be ordered to reimburse the value of
the house built in good faith on the land they seek to
repurchase. -- NO
HELD:
It being obvious that petitioners are not exercising the option
to refund the amount of the expenses incurred in building the
house, private respondent, as the vendee a retro, may remove
her house since this can be done without damage to the
principal thing, as stipulated in Article 547 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners should not, as opined by the trial Court, be made to
refund the value of that house to private respondent, else, the
salutary policy behind the Public Land Law would be thwarted
and rendered meaningless.
There is no provision in the Public Land Act (CA No. 141)
which provides for the terms and conditions under which
repurchase may be effected by a homesteader except that it
should be made within 5 years from the date of conveyance.
That Act is silent as to the nature of expenses that should be
reimbursed by a repurchasing homesteader or his heir.
However, under Art. 1616 of the New Civil Code, the vendor a
retro cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of
the contract and other legitimate payments, and the necessary
and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
The provision of Article 1616 of the Civil Code on redemption,
is, in general, the applicable law to a homesteader desirous to
redeem his property. However, considering the purpose of the
law on homesteads, which is to conserve ownership in the
hands of the homesteader and his family, Article 1616 of the
Civil Code should be construed in conjunction with Articles 546
and 547 of the Civil Code prescribing the rules on refund of
necessary and useful expenses, inasmuch as a vendee a retro
is, as a rule, considered in good faith.
Applying Article 547, the homesteader desiring to repurchase
should be given the option to require the vendee a retro to
remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the
sale a retro, which option is not granted the vendor a retro
under Article 1616. Under the latter Article, the vendor a retro
must pay for the useful improvements introduced by the
vendee a retro, otherwise, the latter may retain possession of
the property until reimbursement is made. To allow a vendee a
retro of a homestead, however, the right of retention until
payment of useful expenses is made by the redemptioner
would be to render nugatory the right of repurchase granted
by law to a homesteader because all a vendee a retro can do
to prevent repurchase is to build something on the homestead
beyond the capacity to pay of the homesteader who seeks to
repurchase
CRF
Cruz v. Pahati
98 Phil. 788
DOCTRINE: The common law principle that the one who has
made the happening of fraud possible through misplaced
confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied
since there is an express provision covering the case. Article
559, a statutory provision, prevails over a common law
principle. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
Pahati admitted having bought the automobile from Bulahan
but when it was impounded, he returned the automobile to
Bulahan who in turned surrendered the check for cancellation.
Bulahan on his part claims that he acquired the automobile
from Jesusito Belizo for value and without having any
knowledge of any defect in the title of the latter.
The lower court found that the automobile in question was
originally owned by the Northern Motors, Inc. which later sold
it to Chinaman Lu Dag. This Chinaman sold it afterwards to
Jesusito Belizo and the latter in turn sold it to plaintiff. Belizo
was then a dealer in second hand cars. One year thereafter,
Belizo offered the plaintiff to sell the automobile for him
claiming to have a buyer for it. Plaintiff agreed. At that time,
plaintiff's certificate of registration was missing and, upon the
suggestion of Belizo, plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to the
Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance
of a new registration certificate alleging as reason the loss of
the one previously issued to him and stating that he was
intending to sell his car. This letter was delivered to Belizo on
March 3, 1952. He also turned over Belizo the automobile on
the latter's pretext that he was going to show it to a
prospective buyer. Subsequent facts show that the letter was
falsified by Belizo to enable him to sell the car to Bulahan for a
valuable consideration.
ISSUE:
Who has, therefore, a better right of the two over the car?
HELD:
The plaintiff has a better right to the car in question than
defendant Bulahan for it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had
been illegally deprived thereof because of the ingenious
scheme utilized by Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as if he
were the owner thereof. Plaintiff therefore can still recover the
possession of the car even if defendant Bulahan had acted in
good faith in purchasing it from Belizo.
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Article 1505 of the same Code provides that "where goods are
sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does
not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner,
the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller's authority to sell.
MPF
Aznar v. Yapdiangco
13 SCRA 486
DOCTRINE: Ownership is not transferred by contract merely
but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or
rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery
or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
FACTS:
● Teodoro Santos advertised the sale of his
FORD FAIRLANE 500 in a newspaper. L. De Dios went to
the house of Teodoro and talked to his son Ireneo Santos
and said that his uncle Vicente Marella is interested in
buying the said car.
● The next day, Ireneo went to the house of
Marella and they agreed to the price of P14,700 on the
understanding that it will be paid after the car has been
registered in the latter’s name.
○ 
Adeed of sale was executed and the registration
was changed to the name of Marella. Ireneo
went to Marella to get the payment and deliver
the car who informed him that he is P2,000 short
of the money and that they need to go to his
sister to get it. Ireneo, together with De Dios and
an unidentified man went to a house.
● Once inside, De Dios asked Ireneo to wait..
After waiting in vain, he went down and discovered that
the car was gone.
● Marella was able to sell the car to plaintiff-
appellant Jose Aznar and while attending to registration;
Philippine Constabulary seized the car due to the report of
the incident.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right on the property involved (car)??
HELD:
Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella did not have any
title to the property under litigation because the same was
never delivered to him. He may have the contract but he never
acquired valid title. Although the keys to the car may have
been given to the unidentified companion, it may be done only
because that companion took them to the place where the
sister of Marella was supposed to live. The car was evidently
stolen and that the buyer did not acquire any valid title thereto.
Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't ever
delivered to him. While there was a deed of sale in his favor,
he was only able to obtain possession of the car since he stole
it from Santos. The applicable law is Article 559. The rule is to
the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only
from its finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who
may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
robber. The said article establishes 2 exceptions to the general
rule of irrevindicabilty—to wit, the owner has lost the thing or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the
possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner who
may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the
possessor acquired it in a public sale. Furthermore, the
common law principle that where one of two innocent persons
must suffer a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes
the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has
enable the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in this
case, which is covered by an express provision of law.
AMDG
De Garcia v. CA
37 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: Article 559 of the Civil Code: The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable loss of which has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid thereof.
As stated in Cruz v Pahati, the rightful owner may not be
prevented from recovering his property by reason of good faith
alone. The only exception that is acknowledged by the law is
when the property was acquired in good faith at a public sale.
Still, in such case, recovery may only take place after
reimbursement.
FACTS:
Guevara purchased a diamond ring from R. Rebullida, Inc. The
ring was eventually stolen from her. More than a year after it
was stolen, while she was conversing with De Garcia, she
noticed the latter wearing a ring which she recognized to be
her stolen ring. Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it
and the latter answered that she purchased it from Mrs.
Miranda who bought it from Ms. Hinahon who bought it from a
certain Aling Petring. After Guevara explained to De Garcia that
the ring is hers, she borrowed it and proceeded to Mr.
Rebudilla. After examining the jewelry, Mr. Rebudilla confirmed
that it was indeed the ring the Guevara bought from him.
Guevara returned the ring and later on wrote and requested
De Garcia to deliver the ring to her. Despite the written
request as well as the writ of seizure delivered by the sheriff
and served against her, De Garcia did not deliver the ring.
The lower court ruled in favor of De Garcia. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and
ordered that the ring be returned to Guevara or pay Guevara
equivalent price of the jewelry. One of the reasons cited by the
CA was the dubious source narrated by De Garcia as regards
how she acquired the ring.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
ring must belongs to Guevara and must be returned to her –
NO
HELD:
Reviewing the facts and reasoning of the CA, the SC did not
see any error on the part of the CA in ruling in favor of
Guevara. Applying Article 559 of the Civil Code, it is evident
that Guevara was unlawfully deprived of her diamond ring. It is
only proper that the ring be returned by De Garcia who has
possession of it. Furthermore, as stated in Cruz v. Pahati, the
rightful owner may not be prevented from recovering his
property by reason of good faith alone. The only exception
that is acknowledged by the law is when the property was
acquired in good faith at a public sale. Still, in such case,
recovery may only take place after reimbursement. Applying
this to the case, De Garcia herself admitted that she did not
acquire the ring from a public sale but rather from Mrs.
Miranda.
In addition, Anzar v. Yapdiangco, reiterated that the reason
behind the recovery of the rightful owner from a person who
acquired the property in good faith was because no consent
was given by the former from the dispossession of his property.
The Court also discussed the existing common law principle
which is: where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a
fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon
the part who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the
fraud to be committed. However, such common law cannot be
applied if there exists an express provision of the law such as
Article 559 of the Civil Code.
It follows from the above discussion that De Garcia’s
contention as regards possession in good faith is equivalent
from a just title cannot be accepted by this Court. Looking
further at the true meaning of Article 559, the title mentioned
refers to a presumptive title only and not just title.
Consequently, when the true owner has been unlawfully
deprived of his property it is only just that it be returned to
him.
GCG
Dizon v. Suntay
47 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has/acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefore. The only exception the law allows is
when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a
public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a three-carat diamond ring valued at
P5,500 and entered into a transaction with Clarita R. Sison.
The plaintiff’s ring was delivered to Clarita R. Sison for sale on
commission.
Upon receiving the ring, Clarita R. Sison executed and
delivered to the plaintiff the receipt. After the lapse of a
considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to
the plaintiff the latter’s ring, the plaintiff made demands on
Clarita R. Sison for the return of her ring but the latter could
not comply with the demands. Three days after the ring
above-mentioned was received by Clarita R. Sison, the ring
was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of the husand of Clarita R.
Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, with the
defendant’s pawnshop for P2,600. This was done without the
knowledge of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff insistently demanded from Clarita R. Sison the
return of her ring, the latter finally delivered to the former the
pawnshop ticket, which is the receipt of the pledge with the
defendant’s pawnshop of the plaintiff’s ring. When the plaintiff
found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged, she took steps to file a
case of Estafa against the latter with the fiscal’s office.
Subsequently thereafter, the plaintiff, wrote a letter to the
defendant asking for the delivery to the plaintiff of her ring
pledged with defendant’s pawnshop.
Since the defendant refused to return the ring, the plaintiff
filed the present action with the CFI for the recovery of said
ring. The plaintiff asked for the provisional remedy writ of
replevin by the delivery of the ring to her, upon her filing the
requisite bond, pending the final determination of the action.
The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by
plaintiff and the latter was able to take possession of the ring
during the pendency of the action upon her filing the requisite
bond. The lower court rendered judgment declaring that
Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring in question.

Petitioner Dizon, as defendant, sought to have the judgment
reversed by the CA, which ruled in favor of Suntay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Suntay had the right to the possession of the
ring. -- YES
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Suntay had the right to the
possession of the ring.
The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code.
It reads thus: The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has/acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefore. The only exception the law allows is
when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a
public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price.
VCL IV
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos
184 SCRA 614
DOCTRINE: Possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a
receipt.
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose
Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which was agreed to be
payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered to
him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a
personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who
asked for verification, and was then showed the invoice for the
books.
EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by
Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries
with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a
dean and was informed that there was no such person in its
employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more
account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against
which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA then went to
the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7,
1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la
Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from
EDCA to Santos.
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of
the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue, which forced their
way into the store of the private respondents and threatened
Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property.
They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a
van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to
the petitioner.
Protesting this high-handed action, the Santos sued for
recovery of the books after demand for their return was
rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued
and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the
books to the private respondents.
MTC ruled that the ownership of the books of Santos. RTC and
CA sustained the MTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the
property -- NO
HELD:
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the
identity of the seller. When she was showed the invoice, she
reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully
deprived of the property by mere failure of consideration.
There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even
substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of
payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to
unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz,
ownership of the books already transferred to him.
FXRL
Ledesma v. CA
213 SCRA 195
DOCTRINE: Article 559 cannot be applied when the property
was lawfully divested from the original owner.
FACTS:
● September 1977, a person representing himself to be
Jojo Consuji purchased two vehicles from Citywide Motors,
Inc.
● “Jojo” used a manager’s check to pay for the vehicles
● The said vehicles were delivered via a contract of sale.
● The check was dishonored.
● It was discovered that “Jojo Consuji” was in fact an
Armando Suarez, a known and infamous conman.
● One of the vehicles was recovered, abandoned in
Quezon City. The other vehicle was found to be sold to
the petitioner.
● Ledesma claims that he had acquired the vehicle in
good faith and is thus entitled to the same.
● The company filed for replevin and reacquired the
vehicle from Ledesma after payment of a bond.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Ledesma and awarded him
with possession of the vehicle plus damages.
● The CA ruled in favor of the company.
● The company relies on the strength of Article 559 of
the Civil Code which provides that if the owner has lost a
thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a
right to recover it not only from the finder, thief or robber,
but also from third persons who may have acquired it in
good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said
article establishes two (2) exceptions to the general rule
of irrevendicability (sic), to wit: when the owner (1) has
lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner who may recover it without paying any
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a
public sale.’
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondent (the company) was unlawfully
deprived of the vehicle in the first place so as to make Article
559 apply. -- NO
HELD:
The company was not unlawfully deprived of the vehicle in
question. Therefore, the petitioner is a buyer in good faith and
Article 559 may not apply.
There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between
private respondent and the original vendee. The former
voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration
of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee — even if the
said vendee used a fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily
delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to the
vendee Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the vendee.
The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to a
failure of consideration which does not render the contract of
sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for
specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to
prosecute the impostor for estafa under the Revised Penal
Code.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the parties to a
contract of sale may stipulate that ownership in the thing sold
shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase
price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the
rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing
sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
RSDM
Chua Kai v. Kapunan
104 Phil. 110
DOCTRINE:
1. That the acquirer and possessor in good faith, of a
chattel or movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession, as if he
were the true owner thereof, until a competent court
rules otherwise;
2. That being considered, in the meantime, as the true
owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be
compelled to I surrender possession nor to be
required to institute an action for the recovery of the
chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in
his favo
FACTS:
Roberto Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware, owned
by Ong Shu, 700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets and 249
pieces of round iron bar for P6,137.70, and in payment thereof
he issued a check drawn against the Security Bank and Trust
Company for P7,000.00, without informing Ong Shu that he
had no sufficient funds in said bank to answer for the same.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan
and 535 sheets in Calapan, Mindoro. Of those sold in
Pangasinan, 100 were sold to petitioner Chua Hai. When the
case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Roberto Soto, for estafa, the offended party filed a petition
asking that the 700 galvanized iron sheets, which were
deposited with the Manila Police Department, be returned to
him, as owner of the Youngstown Hardware. Petitioner herein
opposed the motion with respect to the 100 sheets that he had
bought from Soto. Notwithstanding the opposition, the court
ordered the return of the galvanized iron sheets to Ong Shu.
Petitioner then presented a motion to reconsider the order,
alleging that by the return thereof to the offended party, the
court had not only violated the contract of deposit, because it
was in that concept that petitioner had delivered the 100
sheets to the Manila Police Department, and that said return to
Ong Shu amounted to a deprivation of his property without
due process of law. It is also claimed that Article 105 of the
Revised Penal Code, under whose authority the return was
ordered, can be invoked only after the termination of the
criminal case and not while said criminal case is still pending
trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Chua has better right of the
possession
HELD:
To deprive the possessor in good faith, even temporarily and
provisionally, of the chattels possessed, violates the rule of Art.
559 of the Civil Code. The latter declares that possession of
chattels in good faith is equivalent to title; i.e., that for all
intents and purposes, the possessor is the owner, until ordered
by the proper court to restore the thing to the one who was
illegally deprived thereof. Until such decree is rendered (and it
can not be rendered in a criminal proceeding in which the
possessor is not a party), the possessor, as presumptive owner,
is entitled to hold and enjoy the thing; and "every possessor
has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession established by the means established by the laws
and the Rules of Court."(Art. 539,
New Civil Code).
The decision of the court below, instead of conforming to Arts.
559 and 539 of the Civil Code, directs possessor to surrender
the chattel to the claimant Ong Shu before the latter has
proved that he was illegally deprived thereof, without taking
into account that the mere filing of a criminal action for estafa
is no proof that estafa was in fact committed. Instead of
regarding the possessor as the owner of the chattel until illegal
deprivation is shown, the court below regards the possessor of
the chattel not as an owner, but as a usurper, and compels
him to surrender possession even before the illegal deprivation
is proved. We see no warrant for such a reversal of legal rules.

USUFRUCT (ART. 562-612)
MRAM
NHA v. CA
G.R. No. 148830
DOCTRINE: A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.
FACTS:
By virtue of Proclamation No. 481 issued by then Pres. Marcos,
a portion of land in Quezon City owned by NHA was reserved
for the site of National Government Center (NGC).
Subsequently, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670,
which removed a seven-hectare portion from the coverage of
the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. (MSBF) usufructuary rights over this
segregated portion.
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670.
However, over the years, MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the
seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights; it
occupied approximately 16 hectares by 1987. By then the land
occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon
Avenue to the south and a creek to the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it
occupied to Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC) and other
stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which
occupies 4,590 sq. m. of the 16-hectare area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued
Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127). This revoked the
reserved status of “the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining
out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of
the NGC.” MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize
the area and to sell it to the public.
Acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave
BGC 10 days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left
behind after the expiration of the 10-day period will be
demolished by NHA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is
within the 7-hectare area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted
to MSBF by way of usufruct?
HELD:
The Court held that MSBF abused their usufruct rights. Clearly,
in the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title
constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically
states that the 7-hectare area shall be determined “by future
survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to
private rights if there be any.” MSBF, then, has the latitude to
determine the location of its 7-hectare usufruct portion within
the 16-hectare area.
Although MSBF has the discretion to determine its 7-hectare
usufruct, MSBF abused its right when it exceeded the 7-
hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. The
Court said that “a usufruct is not simply about rights and
privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s
interests. One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil
Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify
the owner of any act of a third person, of which he
may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the
rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he
not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused
through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the
title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.”
The Court further said that “at this point, the determination of
the seven-hectare portion cannot be made to rely on a choice
between the NHA’s and MSBF’s survey. There is a need for a
new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to
remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare
area and thus avoid future controversies. This new survey
should consider existing structures of MSBF. It should as
much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the
seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.”
It must be noted however that based on Art. 605, MSBF has
only 22 years to exercise its usufruct since the Civil Code
provides that the right can be exercised only within 50 year
FMM
Gaboya v. Cui
38 SCRA 85
DOCTRINE: The reserved usufructuary right of a seller on a
property doesn’t include rentals from the buildings
subsequently constructed on the sale, but it entitles the
usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of the land
being occupied by the building.
FACTS:
Don Mariano Cui was a widower who owned three lots (Nos.
2312, 2313 and 2319) situated in Cebu City with a total area of
2,658 square meters. He sold the three commercial lots to
three of his children (Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C.
de Ramas and Antonia Ma. Cui) pro indiviso.
Rosario C. de Encarnacion was unable to pay her
corresponding share of the purchase price due to lack of funds.
Thus, the sale to her was cancelled and the one-third of the
property corresponding to her was returned to Don Mariano
Cui. Because of the sale of the lots was pro indiviso and due
to the cancellation of one of the three lots, Don Mariano and is
children, Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of the
whole property.
In the Deed of Sale, Don Mariano retained for himself the
usufruct of the property, stating that he “shall enjoy the fruits
and rents of the property as long as his natural life shall last.”
Subsequently, a building was erected on a portion of the
property and was occupied by a Chinese businessman which
paid a rent of P600 a month.
Sometime after the sale to his two daughters, the latter
applied to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) for a
loan of P130,000 with which to construct a building
presumably on a portion of the property sold to the two
daughters. To facilitate the granting of the loan, Don Mariano
executed an authority to mortgage his share of the property in
favor of his two daughters.
The loan was eventually granted and secured by a mortgage
on the property. However, Don Mariano, despite being one of
the mortgagors, did not join in the construction of the building.
The building was eventually constructed and the two
daughters received rents therefrom and paid their loan.
On 19 March 1949, Rosario C. Encarnacion, one of the
daughters of Don Mariano filed a petition to declared their
father incompetent and to have a guardian appointed for his
property. The petition was granted and Victorino Reynes was
appointed guardian of his property.
On 15 June 1949, guardian Reynes filed a motion in the
guardianship proceeding seeking authority to collect the
rentals from the property. The motion, however, was denied
by the judge.
Subsequently, another complaint was filed by Don Mariano’s
guardian which alleged that the usufructuary right reserved in
favor of Don Mariano extends to and includes the rentals of
the building constructed by his two daughters on the land sold
to them by their father; that the defendants retained those
rentals for themselves; that the usufructuary rights of the
vendor were of the essence of the sale, and their violation
entitled him to rescind (or resolve) the sale. It prayed either
for rescission with accounting, or for delivery of the rentals of
the building with interests, attorneys' fees and costs.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu denied the resolution of
the foregoing complaint hence this petition by the Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of Mariano Cui, Jesus M. Gaboya.
ISSUE:
Whether the usufruct reserved by Don Mariano in the deed of
sale, over the property that were at the time vacant and
unoccupied, gave the usufructuary the right to receive the
rentals of the commercial building constructed by the two
daughters with funds borrowed from the Rehabilitation and
Finance Corporation, the loan being secured by a mortgage
over the lots sold. -- NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court (the “SC”) held that the usufructuary
rights of the late Don Mariano reserved in the deed of sale was
over the land alone and did not entitle him to the rents of the
building later constructed thereon by his two daughters.
The SC also held that said usufructuary was entitled only to
the reasonable rental value of the
land occupied by the building aforementioned.
RGGM
Vda. De Albar v. Carangdang
106 Phil. 855
DOCTRINE: Under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by
the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance. Any war
damage payment received by the naked owner should also be
subject to usufruct for life if such payment has not been used
in the construction of a new building. A usufructuary who is
the only recipient of all the benefits of the property subject of
the usufruct, and who has bound himself to pay the real estate
taxes on the property in a formal agreement approved by the
court, should pay such taxes.
FACTS:
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City
of Manila with a building and improvements, and by a will left
by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised
the naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey
Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for life.
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the
building in many portions of Manila, the building on the Ongpin
lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements
that were not destroyed by the fire.
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a
period of five years, at the same time agreeing to construct on
the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as
the usufructuary sign the agreement of the lease. As the
usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to cede
the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by
virtue of her right to usufruct while on the other hand the
naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was
extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right of the
usufructuary being limited to the legal interest on the value of
the lot and the materials, in order that the agreement of lease
may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary
compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00,
or 20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary
the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was
likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the
building to be constructed would accrue to the land upon it
completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked
owners but subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The
parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective
claims after the termination of the contract of lease to
determine which of said claims was legally correct.
By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin
property, the United States War Damage Commission
approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused
to the property, paid to and received by the naked owners. In
the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due
on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.
ISSUE:
W/N the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the
usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should
undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should
pay the real estate taxes?
HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building.
From the above, it is clear that when the deceased constituted
the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and
Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance
both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed
the building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court
well said, "The land, being an indispensable part of the rented
premises cannot be considered as having no rental value
whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the term
"fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but
land as well. (Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines
Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the
usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land
as well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the
destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the
encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the
building. Of course, this is addressed to the wisdom and
discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes
is deemed as the administrator of the property. This has been
clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536,
which was litigated between the same parties and wherein the
scope of the same provision of the will has been the subject of
interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however,
merit in the contention that the real estate taxes paid by
respondent in her capacity as usufructuary for several years
previous to the present litigation should be paid by her, as she
did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound
herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by
the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which
involved the same parties and the same properties subject to
usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which
was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein
respondent, bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes,
special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the
necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the
usufruct and in accordance with said agreement, respondent
paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954
MCSS
Baluran v. Navarro
79 SCRA 309
FACTS:
Spouses Paraiso executed an agreement entitle “BARTER”
whereby they agreed to “barter and exchange” with spouses
Baluran their residential lot with the latter's unirrigated riceland.
The documents allowed the parties to enjoy the material
possession of their respective properties, reap the fruits of the
unirrigated riceland for spouses Paraiso and build a house in
the residential lot for spouses Baluran. Also, it was conditioned
upon the event that if any of the children of Natividad Obencio,
daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall choose to reside in this
municipality and build a house in the residential lot, spouses
Balura shall be obliged to return the lot with damages. Lastly,
neither party shall encumber, alienate or dispose of in any
manner their respective properties as bartered without the
consent of the other.
Antonio Obendencio, son of Natividad, filed a complaint to
recover the residential lot. Avelino Baluran alleged that the
barter agreement transferred to him the ownership of the
residential lot in exchange for the unirrigated riceland.
ISSUE:
WON there was a transfer of ownership between the parties. --
NO
HELD:
It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract
courts are not bound by the name or title given to it by the
contracting parties. The stipulations in said document are clear
enough to indicate that there was no intention at all on the
part of the signatories to convey the ownership of their
respective properties; all that was intended, and it was so
provided in the agreement, was to transfer the material
possession thereof. In the third condition, the parties retained
their right to alienate their respective properties which right is
an element of ownership.
All that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in
essence is the right to enjoy the Property of another. Under
the document, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the
unirrigate riceland while Baluran could build a house on the
residential lot. The mutual agreement was subject to a
resolutory condition, that the children of Natividad, shall
choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on the
lot, which would terminate the right of possession and use.
Usufruct may be constituted for any period of time and under
such conditions as they may deem convenient and beneficial
subject to the provision of the Civil Code. The manner of
terminating or extinguishing the right of ususfruct is primarily
determined by the stipulations of the parties which in this case
is the happening of the event agreed upon.
The right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and each is
entitled to a return of his property.
NKVS
Moralidad v. Pernes
G.R. No. 152809
FACTS:
While petitioner is in the U.S.A., where she stayed for a long
time as teacher, that sometime in 1986, she received news
from Arlene, petitioner’s niece, that Mandug was infested by
NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of
crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. She
immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with
instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and
her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she
bought the parcel of land in Davao.
Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of
letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but
later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her
kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City.
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the
Philippines to stay with the respondents’ on the house they
build on the subject property. In the course of time, their
relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family
were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change
certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation
within their compound. Violent confrontations meanwhile
transpired, with the petitioner narrating that, at one occasion
in July 1998, she sustained cuts and wounds when Arlene
pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back, while her
husband Diosdado held her, twisting her arms in the process.
Petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful
detainer suit against the respondent spouses. Petitioner
alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on which
the respondents built their house; that through her counsel,
she sent the respondent spouses a letter demanding them to
vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor.
In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the
property in question, building their house thereon and
maintaining the same as their residence with petitioner’s full
knowledge and express consent. To prove their point, they
invited attention to her written declaration of July 21, 1986,
supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the
spouses to build their house on her property and stay thereat
for as long as they like.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the agreement for the use of the land
constituted the defendants as usufructs.
2. W/N the usufruct is terminated.
3. W/N the defendants, as usufructs, have the right of
reimbursement.
HELD:
1st Issue: YES, because of the written letter by the petitioner
to the defendants, it created the usufruct between the parties.
What was constituted between the parties herein is one of
usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the
owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto
remained and the respondents being two (2) among other
unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as
petitioner’s kin.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the
following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to
enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to
enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the
jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21,
1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents
and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of
her property. There can also be no quibbling about the
respondents being given the right "to build their own house"
on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like."
2nd Issue: YES, the usufruct was terminated.
The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides
only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold
and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are
other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be
considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code
enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was
constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the
same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person
constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986
constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of,
the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of
my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail
the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof". What may be inimical to the
purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the
preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly
clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the
aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of
cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with
one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and
harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an
indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is
clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where
petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot
conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the
freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of
the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the
bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which,
by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable
that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the
subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished
by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in
the title creating the usufruct.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between
the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and
humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced
age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider
the usufruct as having been terminated.
3rd Issue: NO, they have no right to reimbursement.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and
respondents respecting the property in question is one of
owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for
reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the
property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be
governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on
usufruct.
By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do
not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements
they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles
579 and 580 of the Civil Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in
usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere
pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter
its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage
to the property.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he
may have made on the property against any damage to the
same.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be
ordered to vacate the premises without any right of
reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity
were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author
pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. The
respondents may, however, remove or destroy the
improvements they may have introduced thereon without
damaging the petitioner’s property.

EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES (ART. 613-693)
AMPS
Relova v. Lavarez
9 Phil. 149
DOCTRINE: Servitude may be created by usage for a
considerable period of time.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land, which is
cultivated with the aid of water brought from the River
Bangcabangca, through an aqueduct which passes over the
land of the defendants. On the land of the defendants there
was a dam (presa) with a small gate or aperture in its face
which was used to control the flow of the water in the
aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in
a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.
One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let
all the water escape by the drainage ditch, so that none flowed
on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was
destroyed the plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared
to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting
from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his
crop, which was a complete failure.
The trial court granted an injunction upon the fact that the
aqueduct and dam in question had been in use by the plaintiff,
as of right, for more than thirty years, and that he had an
easement in the land of the defendants for the maintenance of
the said aqueduct and dam, to restrain the defendants from
interfering with the plaintiff's right to the use of the water in
the aqueduct, in the manner heretofore established by custom.
ISSUE:
The existence of servitude for the maintenance of the dam
upon the land of the defendants in favor of the land of the
plaintiff.
HELD:
The aqueduct and the dam (presa) have been in existence for
more than thirty years, during which period the owner of the
land in question has always exercised the right to the
reasonable use of the water in the aqueduct for irrigation
purposes. (Arts. 527 and 528, Civil Code.)
Counsel for the appellants contend that under the definition of
a servitude which appears in article 530 of the Civil Code the
existence of the servitude cannot be established unless it
appears that from such servitude a benefit (beneficio) was, or
might be, derived by the plaintiff landowner; and that since it
appears from the testimony of the witnesses that the aperture
in the dam was used for the purpose of controlling the flow of
water in the aqueduct and for preventing damage by overflow
to the lowlands over which the aqueduct runs, and since it
appears that the lands of the plaintiff are higher than the lands
of the defendants, therefore the aqueduct could never have
been intended for the supply of water to the lands of the
plaintiff and neither the dam nor the aqueduct could be of any
benefit to these lands.
This contention cannot be maintained in the face of the
positive testimony as to the existence of the aqueduct and its
use for many years to supply water to the lands in question. It
may be that the defendants had a right to open the aperture in
the face of the dam to prevent a destructive overflow of water
on their lands, but this would not give them the right to stop
the flow of water altogether; nor does it tend to establish the
contention of the defendants that the plaintiff landowner is not
entitled to the benefit of the reasonable use of the water
flowing in the aqueduct, since it does not appear that such use
necessarily involved destructive overflows from the aqueduct,
provided the flow of water therein was properly regulated by
the opening of the aperture in the dam.
AFFIRMED.
KGS
Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
195 SCRA 748
DOCTRINES:
1. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of
which they form part, and even if they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from
the tenement or mortgaged separately.
2. The vendee of real property in which a servitude or
easement exists, did not acquire the right to close that
servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the
public from using it.
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in
Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel
owned by Bio Hong Trading (respondent). The latter’s title
came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties
thereto reserved as an easement of way approx. 914sqm
converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring
estates. As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the
respondent’s title. The petitioners and its neighbors made use
of the private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep. Thereafter, respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use. Respondent filed a case to remove
said gates and to allow full access to the easement, which was
granted. In the Court of Appeals, it was held that since
respondent has acquired title to the property, “merger”
brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by
merger?
HELD:
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the
Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintains an independent
existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which
they form part. Although they are possessed of a separate
juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however,
be alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement,
is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the
petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it
operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the
servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi). As the
petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself
stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring
914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private alley
for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." and precisely,
the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private
owner a discount on account of the easement.
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did
acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed
alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the
right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as
a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the
Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated
in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here,
however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude,
that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the
general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of
the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for
the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a
dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at
large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior
servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of
that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner
conveys the property in favor of the public –– if that is possible
–– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
JPOT
CID v. Javier
108 Phil. 850
DOCTRINE: "With regard to easements in the negative, from
dominant to a servient, it must be accompanied by a 'formal
act.' The law is explicit in stating that it should be in an
instrument acknowledged by a notary public."
FACTS:
The review for certiorari arises with the conflict of Javier
effectively blocking the easement of light and view, although
both structures are in accordance with their corresponding lots.
The conflict can be assisted by the interpretation of a formal
act which has different applications in the Spanish Civil Code
as well as our Civil Code. In the former, it was discussed that
any act would suffice. As long as there is a positive act of
prohibition whether orally or implied. However, the distinction
was made apparent in the latter's discussion. The court does
not aver and makes plain and distinguishes between a formal
act. In this case, the effectivity of said act would be in the
negative. This act (i.e. prohibition) would be coming from the
dominant directed towards the servient. Moreover, such an act
could only be validly appreciated once it is in a legal document
that is notarized. Only with such acknowledgement can an
easement be binding and bar anyone who committs to
undermine and deprive the right of a land owner to his
pleasures, in this instance privacy, sunlight and a view.
ISSUE:
W/N respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building
standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot,
had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light
and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such
view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of
which lots being covered by Torrens titles.
HELD:
NO. The requirement for an easement to be applicable would
be that it be annotated and affixed together with the registry
of the Torrens title specifying the prohibition in question. Also,
Article 538 provides that the requirement to be fulfilled for
prescription to run is that a formal act such as prohibition
coming from a dominant estate to a servient one be in an
instrument duly acknowledged by a notary public. Otherwise,
there is no prescription or easement to speak of.
MLAV
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative
easement. When easement is negative, there should be a
formal act of opposition for prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes’ wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows
open on the adjacent property (No. 63), a neighboring house
on the same street. This setting has been in existent since
1843. The tenant of the adjacent property raised the roof of
house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of
house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large
part of air and light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use
of the windows for 59 years, he acquired from prescription an
easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude
upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to
restrain the making of any improvement in the latter house
which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement.
Further, he contends that the easement of light is positive; and
that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on
which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other
words, from the time that said windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without
opposition on this part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may
have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient
estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the
existence of the easement.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed
the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of
a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which
cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538
of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate has,
in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate
to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the
easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal
act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63 to
make improvements which might obstruct the light of house
No. 65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired,
nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light,
no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period
which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could
not have commenced to run, the act with which it must
necessarily commence not having been performed.
DJTV
Abellana v. CA
208 SCRA 316
DOCTRINES:
● The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it
is not a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man.
● A right of way is not acquirable by prescription.
FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the
northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to
establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road
which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath
which they and their ancestors had been using since time
immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired, through
prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The
construction of a wall by the respondents around the
subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the
subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access
to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls
enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to the
subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened to
them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing
footpath in the place before it was developed into a subdivision.
They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are
not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct
route from the petitioners' land to the public highway.
After trial, the trial court ordered to demolish the subject
fences or enclosures at the dead ends of Road Lots 1 and 3 of
the Nonoc Homes Subdivision at their expense and to leave
them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the general public.
However, on appeal by the defendants and intervenors (now
private respondents), the appellate court reversed the
appealed judgment. It found that requisites essential for the
grant of an easement of right of way are not obtaining in this
case hence no alternative presents itself except reversal of the
judgment.
The appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. Hence, this petition
for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred:
1. 1.in not holding that the easement
claimed by them is a legal easement established by law
(Art. 619. Civil Code) and acquired by them by virtue of a
title under Art. 620, Civil Code and P.D. No. 957 through
the National Housing Authority which has exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate subdivision and condominium
projects;
2. 2.in not holding that the footpaths
and passageways which were converted into subdivision
road lots have acquired the status of public streets in view
of Section 4 of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1969
of Talisay, Cebu which provides that subdivision roads
shall be used not only for the exclusive use of the
homeowners but also for the general public, and Section 5
of Ordinance No. 5, Series of 1974, which provides that
"those subdivision road lots whose use by the public are
(sic) deemed necessary by the proper authorities shall be
made available for public use"; and
3. 3.in not determining whether or not
the closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 of the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision by the private respondents was
legal.
HELD: NO
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is
continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription
under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a
footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the
acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts
his feet over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is
not acquirable by prescription.
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which
provides:
Sec. 29.Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or
developer of a subdivision without access to any
existing public road or street must secure a right of
way to a public road or street and such right of way
must be developed and maintained according to the
requirement of the government authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a
subdivision (which petitioners are not) without access to a
public highway.
The petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were
converted to subdivision roads have acquired the status of
public streets, is not well taken. In the first place, whether or
not footpaths previously existed in the area which is now
known as the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, is a factual issue
which this Court may not determine for it is not a trier of facts.
The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads
open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper
authorities" simply allow persons other than the residents of
the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein when
they are inside the subdivision but those ordinances do not
give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can
enter the subdivision from the back. As the private
respondents pointed out in their Comment:
The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid
exercise of proprietary rights. It is for the protection of
residents in the subdivision from night prowlers and thieves.
And the public is not denied use of the subdivision roads, only
that the users must get inside the subdivision through the
open ends of the road lots that link the same to the public
road. It is common to most, if not all subdivisions in Cebu,
Metro Manila and other places, that points of ingress to and
egress from the subdivision are the points where the
subdivision roads intersect with public roads. It is of judicial
notice that most, if not all, subdivisions are enclosed and
fenced with only one or few points that are used as ingress to
and egress from the subdivisions.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, the
same is DENIED with costs against the petitioners.
JGY
Ronquillo v. Roco
103 Phil. 84
DOCTRINE: An easement of right of way being discontinuous,
cannot be acquired through prescription but only by virtue of a
title.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ronquillo have been in the continuous and
uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed
the land of the Respondents Roco and their predecessors in
interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of
Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than
20 years.
Respondents Roco and his men started constructing a chapel
in the middle of the said right of way construction actually
obstructed the continuous exercise of the rights of the
plaintiffs over said right of way. Respondents also forcibly
planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed the
road passage way.
ISSUE:
WON an easement of right of way can be acquired thru
prescription -- NO
HELD:
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of
right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless,
discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be
acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Easements may be Continuous or discontinuous, apparent or
non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less
long intervals and which depend upon acts of man. Continuous
and apparent easements are acquired either by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and
discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired
only by virtue of a title. Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are
of the opinion that the easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one.
JRPA
Amor v. Florentino
74 Phil. 404
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse).
By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the
warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to
Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to
build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off
the light and air that come in through the window of the
adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for
prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting
Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would
block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement.
Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code
took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor
from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied
HELD:
1. Yes. Easement are established by
law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624,
there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the
estate is subsequently owned by two different persons
and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the
transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an
easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it
involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition
by title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death
of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old
Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the
effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is
already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amor’s
supposition, the law on easement was already integrated
into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the
warehouse above the level of the window.
ABB
Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
108 Phil. 888
Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates
were formerly owned by one person who introduced
improvements on both such that the wall of the house
constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the
warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of
the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of
the house, doors, windows which serve as passages for light
and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the
easement of light and view will not be established, the
apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.
FACTS:
The late Francisco Sanz was the previous owner of a land
which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to
Guillermo Tengtio, who sold to Vicente Uy Veza. Another lot
with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A
third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The
problem arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for
a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a
higher one. Tan Yanon opposed the application for it would
block his window and impair his right of light and view. Both
the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon
recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos.
Tan Yanon then filed against Gargantos an action to restrain
him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff
from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window
of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of
not less than three meters from the boundary line between the
lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of
Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding
building permit to defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an
easement of light and view against the property of petitioner
Gargantos. -- YES
HELD:
Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were
formerly owned by one person who introduced improvements
on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the
first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second
estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate, there
existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors,
windows which serve as passages for light and view, there
being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of
light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of
easement between the two estates is established as a title.
FZC
Valderama v. North Negros Sugar Central
48 Phil. 492
DOCTRINE: It is against the nature of the easement to
pretend that it was established in favor of the servient estates,
because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner
by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros,
entered into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio wherein the
latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of
300 tons for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to
be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish
the central with all the cane they might produce in their
estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract. Later
on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc. 2 years after, the current petitioners,
Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al,
made other milling contracts identical to the first one with the
North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners, however,
could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as
required by its capacity, so the North Negros made other
milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz,
Occidental Negros. This gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their
complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of
them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for
the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of
the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had
the right to transport to its central upon the railroad passing
through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane
harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda
owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in
Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North Negros had no
right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus
the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the easement of way established was restricted to
transporting only sugar cane from the hacienda owners’ lands.
-- NO
HELD:
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners
contained a clause that granted the North Negros an easement
of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their
properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege
ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar
cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their
intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement was
established for the benefit of all producers and of the
corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous
easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary to
the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes
produced by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule
that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not
by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use
for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from
obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more
burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is
that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a
greater area or deposit excavations outside the granted 7
meters. This does not happen in this case when the North
Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient
estates, since it continues to occupy the same area and the
encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of
times it passes through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of
the milling contracts, so even if the owners no longer desire to
furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has
the right to the easement for the remaining period so the
contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by
the owners has no basis.
LNAC
Javellana v. IAC
172 SCRA 280

DOCTRINE: They closed the entrance of the canal and
demolished portions of the main dike thus impairing the use of
the servitude by the dominant estate. And by so doing,
plaintiffs violated not only the law on easement but also
Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins any person, natural
or juridical, to demolish structures or improvements which tend
to obstruct the flow of water through rivers, creeks, esteros
and drainage channels. For this canal did not serve merely to
supply salt water to the school fishpond but also serves as
drainage charged or channel of rainwater from adjacent lands
to the Iloilo River.
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present
owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo River up to the adjacent
lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a
main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and through a canal that traverses the school
property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike
entrance and later on demolished the portions of the main dike
connecting the main canal to the canal running through the
school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of
the school and its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of
rain or flood water that empties into the river. This prompted
the school and barangay officials to complain to higher
authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete was
about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was
prevented from doing so by District Supervisor Javellana.
Florete instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for
allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to his
property.
RTC ruled in favor of Javellana.
Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision.
Thus, Javellana instituted herein recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether an easement has been constituted on the subject
property. -- YES
HELD:
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on
the property of Florete as the servient estate in favor of the L.
Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as dominant
estates since it has been in continuous use for no less than 15
years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent
lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the
use of the canal without violating Art. 629 of the CC which
provides that “The owner of the servient estate cannot impair,
in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of
the manner established for the use of the easement, the same
should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient
estate, or should prevent him from making any important
works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at
his expense, provided he offers another place or manner
equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused
thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who
may have a right to the use of the easement.”
Defendants' closure of the dike's entrance connecting the main
canal with the canal running through the school premises,
therefore, caused the flooding of the premises of the L. Borres
Elementary School and its vicinity. This is so because during
rainy season, said canal also serves as outlet of rain or flood
waters that empties to the Iloilo River. Witnesses Ignacio
Gencianeo, Francisco Regacho, Severo Maranon and Barangay
Captain Antonio Sison were unanimous in declaring so.
TKDC
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: The easement is perpetual in character and was
annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras
and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual
agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.
FACTS:
Heras filed an action with the Court of First Instance to recover
a portion of land enclosed and walled by Benedicto and to
demand the reopening of an easement of way between his and
Benedicto’s real property. Hendrick sold portions of her
property to several personalities including Recto and Heras.
When portion of the property was sold to Herras, he closed
and walled the part of land serving as easement of way.
Trial court found that the easement of way was found entirely
within Benedicto’s property contrary to the stipulation in the
deed of sale between Hedrick and Recto that it should be
between their properties with each contributing an equal
portion of his property. Thus, trial court directed the parties to
equally contribute to the maintenance of the passageway
between Herras and Benedicto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benedicto may enclose his property.
HELD:
In this case, the easement is perpetual in character and was
annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras
and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual
agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.
TKDC
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by
operation of law. Alienation of the dominant and servient
estates to different persons is not a ground for the
extinguishment of easements, absent a statement
extinguishing it.
FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2
parcels of land situated in Cebu City. An apartment building
was constructed on Lot A, while on Lot B stands a 4-door
apartment, a 2-storey house, a bodega, and a septic tank for
the common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A small
portion of the apartment building on Lot A also stands on Lot B.
Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo. On the
same day, Cardenas also mortgaged Lot B to Tañedo as a
security for the payment of a loan. Cardenas agreed that he
would sell Lot B only to Tañedo in case he should decide to sell
it. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the respondent spouses
Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Upon learning of the sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the
property from Romeo Sim, but the latter refused. Instead, Sim
blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo
Tañedo built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also
asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building
enroaching on Lot B.
As a result, Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and
damages against Spouses Sim and Antonio Cardenas, invoking
the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code. Respondent judge,
Juanito A. Bernad, dismissed the complaint for legal
redemption, as well as petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a ground for the
extinguishment of the easement of drainage. -- NO
HELD:
The finding of the trial court that Tañedo's right to continue to
use the septic tank on Lot B ceased upon the subdivision of
the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do
not have the same interest, also appears to be contrary to law.
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. From its provisions, the
alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different
persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued
by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner
of both, shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue
actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the
title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This
provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing
owned in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing
the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale
of Lot A to Tañedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain
pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold
said lot. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita
Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
CRF
Alcantara v. Rita
372 SCRA 364
DOCTRINE: Construction of a house on the lot of another to
facilitate the utilization of usufruct may constitute as personal
easement pursuant to Article 614. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the
exercise of the right of right of first refusal under Presidential
Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction,
attorney’s fees and nullity of amicable settlement. The
plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land
located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land
has been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that
Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert
that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in
accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517
since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not been
proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable
law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to
pay the rentals for the use of the land; and that the amicable
settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was translated to
the latter and fully explained in his own dialect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right of first refusal
under Presidential Decree No. 1517. -- NO
HELD:
None of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first
refusal under P. D. No. 1517. The area involved has not been
proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ).To be able to
qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by
the said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the
land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home
on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for
the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall within
the said category cannot be considered “legitimate tenants”
and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to
purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to
sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner only usufruct to the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form
and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides. Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct
his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering
of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement
under Article 614 of the Civil Code.
A contract has been defined as “a meeting of the minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some service.”
Clearly, from the moment respondent Reta demanded that the
petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease agreements,
which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly,
ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease. Indeed,
none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first
refusal under P. D. No. 1517. Another factor which militates
against petitioners’ claim is the fact that there is no intention
on the part of respondent Reta to sell the property. Hence,
even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the
situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is,
the sale or intended sale of the land, has not happened. P. D.
No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to
sell it to a third party.
MPF
Costabella Corp. v. CA
193 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and
as such cannot be acquired by prescription. Convenience of the
dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsary
right of way.
While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the
dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on
arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be
established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and (2) where the distance to a public
highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
● Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started
constructing their beach hotel. Before such construction,
the private respondent, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road, passed
through a passageway, which traversed the petitioner’s
property.
○ As a result of the construction, this passageway,
including the alternative route, was obstructed.
○ Private respondent filed for injunction plus
damages.
● In the same complaint the private
respondents also alleged that the petitioner had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter’s
property without the necessary permit, obstructing the
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping
debris of flotsam on the beach.
● The private respondent also claim that they
have acquired the right of way through prescription.
○ They prayed for the re-opening of the “ancient
road right of way” (what they called the
supposed easement in this case) and the
destruction of the dike.
● Petitioner answered by saying that their
predecessor in interest’s act of allowing them to pass was
gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of
the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private
respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be
acquired through prescription? -- NO
2. Whether or not the private respondents had acquired
an easement of right of way in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioner’s property? -- NO
HELD:
1. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it
cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.
2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way
when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
(4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The private
respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate
outlet from their respective properties to a public
highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there
is another outlet for the private respondents to the
main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private
respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the
convenience of the dominant estate was never a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There
must be a real necessity and not mere convenience
for the dominant estate to acquire such easement.
Also, the private respondents made no mention of
their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC
also clarified that “least prejudicial” prevails over
“shortest distance” (so shortest distance isn’t
necessarily the best choice).
AMDG
Villanueva v. Velasco
346 SCRA 99
DOCTRINE: A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest and becomes a
continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs as provided for
Article 617 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Villanueva is currently registered owner of land that he bought
from Pacific Bank Corporation. The bank is the mortgagee of
the land and bought it from Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a
public auction. It is noted that before Villanueva purchased the
property, a two-meter wide easement of right of way was
granted by the spouses Gabriel in favor of the Espinolas, the
predecessor-in-interest of private respondents Sebastian and
Lorilla. In addition, Gabriel constructed a small house that
encroached one-meter of the easement right.
A Civil Case was filed by Sebastian and Lorilla against the
spouses Gabriel praying for the easement right to be enforced.
The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in their favor and
ordered the demolition of the house. Consequently, an Alias
Writ of Demolition was issued. It is noted that at this time,
Villanueva is now the owner of the property. Villanueva filed a
Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias of Demolition
which was later on denied. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed his petition for certiorari.
Villanueva is arguing that the civil case decision cannot be
enforced against him since (1) the easement right of way was
not annotated in his title and (2) he was not a party in the civil
case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a right of way can be enforced
against Villanueva although it was not annotated in
his title – YES
2. Whether or not the civil case decision can be enforced
against Villanueva even though he was not a party to
the civil case – YES
HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly identified that the contract of
easement present in this case is both voluntary and legal
easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes
a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided
for in Article 617 of the Civil Code.
The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
 highway
2. Proper indemnity has been paid
3. The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate
4. The right of way claimed is at a point at least
prejudicial to the servient estate
5. To the extent consisted with the foregoing rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
Having established that the easement right present in this case
is legal in nature, it follows that the servient estate
(Villanueva) is legally bound to adhere to his obligation of
providing the dominant estate (Sebastian and Lorilla) its right
of way. Applying this to the case, the one-meter wide
easement is insufficient for the needs of the private
respondents which is why Villanueva is obligated to demolish
the house to be able to conform to what is stated in the
contract of easement.
As regards Villanueva’s second argument, a decision in a case
is conclusive and binding upon the parties as well as to its
successor in interest by title. It is clear from the facts that the
civil case was decided almost four years before Villanueva
purchased the property. Being the successor in interest, the
civil case decision binds Villanueva.
GCG
Cristobal v. CA
291 SCRA 122
DOCTRINE: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right
of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right
of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
FACTS:
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas
Avenue Extension, Quezon City. They have already been
residing there since 1961.
Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the
owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue.
It included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2.
The said lots were originally part of a private road known as
Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. When
Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979,
Cesar Ledesma Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon
City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots.
The petition was granted. Road Lot 2 was converted into
residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Subsequently,
Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in
whose favor Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly
issued.
In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and
daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on
Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found out that the lot
was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo. A
portion was being used as a passageway by petitioners to and
from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained
about the intrusion into their property to the barangay office.
At the barangay conciliation proceeding, petitioners offered to
pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the
Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing
Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners protested the
enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides
by residential houses belonging to different owners and had no
adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through
the property of the Paciones.
As their protest went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action
for easement of right of way with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a
TRO directing the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from
fencing the disputed property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one
essential requisite of a legal easement of a right of way was
not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
filed the present petition together with the issue of legality or
illegality of the conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2)
residential lots by the Cesar Ledesma, Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a compulsory easement of right of
way.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant
estate is surrounded by othe immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been
paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies
on the owner of the dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As
found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet
already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of
petitioners' property and which is connected to a private road
about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in
turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide
and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by
the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants
estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they
have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that
the easement they seek to impose on private respondents'
property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters
and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot may
unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and
enjoyment of their property, considering that its already small
area will be reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may
even render the property useless for the purpose for which
private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when
considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the
servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction
on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as
a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way be
granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
VCL IV
Quimen v. CA
257 SCRA 163
DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any
of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two
(2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property
situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did, with the
shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the
municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia
and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as
Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal
parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter
Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private
respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-
B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who
was then acting as his administratrix.
According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property
for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public
road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought
using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of
Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay
for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from
passing through her property.
Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot
No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her
parents who provided her a pathway between their house from
the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong
materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring
four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the
pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one
has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the
store to reach the road.
Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying
for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was
that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from
the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by
one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five
(5) meters to avoid the store.
TC dismissed Yolanda’s complaint, but the CA reversed the
decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda
would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient
estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's
parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a
detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree
standing thereon. -- YES
HELD:
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement
of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a
matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when
there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be
free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass
through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and
another right of way which although longer will only require an
avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
FXRL
Floro v. Llenado
244 SCRA 713
DOCTRINE: One may not claim a legal easement merely out
of convenience.
FACTS:
● Floro is the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision in
Bulacan
● The subdivision has access roads from MacArthur
Highway through road lot 4
● Llenado is the owner of the Llenado Homes
Subdivision, formerly known as Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision prior to his purchase of the project.
● This subdivision is bounded on the south and
separated from Floro Park Subdivision by Planas Creek. To
its west lies a parcel of land owned by Marcial Ipapo
● Llenado Homes does not have any existing access to
MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road
traversing the property of Ipapo had been provided for in
the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes which was
approved by the HLURB.
● Llenado sought and was granted the (oral and
provisional, as they were still drafting a formal contract)
permission of Floro to use lots 4 and 5 of Floro Park
Subdivision as a passage to and from MacArthur Highway.
● Several months later, Floro barricaded road lot 5 to
prevent Llenado from further using the property on
account of the damage done to the property due to the
passage of heavy equipment.
● Llenado filed an easement claim with the RTC but was
denied.
● The CA ruled in favor of Llenado and ordered Floro to
remove the barricade.
ISSUE:
W/N Llenado can demand a compulsory easement of right of
way over the existing roads of an adjacent subdivision instead
of developing his subdivision's proposed access road as
provided in his duly approved subdivision plan. -- NO
HELD:
A compulsory easement of right of way may be granted only
upon the acquisitions of the conditions required by Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code. To wit, these conditions are:
1. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. That proper indemnity has been paid
3. That the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate
4. That the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
In this case, the elements are incomplete. The original
subdivision development plan presented by Llenado indicates
an existing and prior agreement which creates a right of way
through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed
to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much
work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to
create an easement via the Floro property.
Jurisprudence has dictated that one may not claim a legal
easement merely out of convenience. It was convenience
motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road
development and pursue an access road through the Floro
estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the
unnecessary detriment of his neighbor.
RSDM
Fransisco v. IAC
177 SCRA 527
DOCTRINE: The law makes it amply clear that an owner
cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his
property from a public highway and then claim an easement of
way through an adjacent estate.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta
Estate. Lot 860 was owned by Cornelia and Frisca Dila, and
had a frontage along Parada Road measuring 51.90 meters.
Adjoining Lot 860 was Lot 226, owned by Eusebio Francisco,
as aforestated; it also had a frontage along Parada Road of
62.10 meters.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and
Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an undivided one-third
portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and
another undivided one-third (1/3) portion to the children of a
deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also
an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and
would be retained by Cornelia Dila.
Some months later, in March, 1972, after having set up a
piggery on his newly acquired property, Ramos had his lawyer
write to Eusebio Francisco — owner, as above mentioned, of
the adjoining lot, Lot 266- to ask for a right of way through the
latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed to
bring about a satisfactory arrangement. Francisco's proposal
for an exchange of land at the rate of one (1) square meter
from him to three (3) square meters from Ramos, as was
supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to
Ramos.
Later that year, 1972, Ramos succeeded, through the
intercession of Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, in obtaining a
three-meter wide passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania
Dila . Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a ten-foot
high concrete wall on his lot, this was in August, 1973, and
thereby closed the very right of way granted to him across Lot
860-B. It seems that what he wished was to have a right of
passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to
be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep
quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get
what he wanted.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing
the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a
stone wall, also in August, 1973. Shortly thereafter, Francisco
was served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil
Case of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, instituted by
Ramos, as well as a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directing him to remove his stone fence and keep his lot open
for Ramos' use.
The Court handed down its verdict, adversely to Francisco.
Francisco appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its own decision,
the latter affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Private Respondent was entitled to an
easement of right of way through the land belonging to the
Petitioner
HELD:
It is the fact already adverted to and which has never been
disputed that respondent Ramos, having already been granted
access to the public road (Parada Road) through the other
adjoining Lot 860-B owned by Epifania Dila — and this, at the
time he was negotiating with petitioner for the similar
easement over the latter's Lot 266 that he now claims —
inexplicably gave up that right of access by walling off his
property from the passageway thus established. The evidence,
also uncontradicted, is that said passageway was 2.76 meters
wide, or wide enough to accommodate a truck. The surveyor
who at the instance of petitioner made a survey of the
premises on September 13, 1973, shortly after Ramos had filed
his complaint, verified the existence of said passageway from
the presence of tire marks found on the scene and indicated
on the sketch plan he prepared the path that it took from said
respondent's Lot 860-A through Lot 860-B to Parada Road.
That there was such a passageway was also confirmed by
another witness, Parada Barrio Captain Fausto Francisco, one
of those who had earlier tried to bring petitioner and
respondent to an agreement about the proposed right of way
through the property of the former. This witness declared, as
already stated, that after the negotiations had been stalled by
the failure of the parties to agree on the terms of a proposed
land exchange that would have given Ramos access to Parada
Road, said respondent had been able to obtain right of
passage to the same public road over a 3-meter wide portion
of Lot 860-B owned by Epifania Dila through the intercession
of Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela.
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the
private respondent had been granted an adequate access to
the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent estate
of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a
satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for another
passageway through the latter's property. If at the time he
filed suit against the petitioner, such access (through the
property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be used, it was
because he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone wall
on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no
reason to which the record can attest except to demonstrate
the isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But the
law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent
has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the
claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the
isolation of his property had not been met indeed the
respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition
and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not
do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B
was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the
contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by
even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere
inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way
does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative
location. .
MRAM
Sta. Maria v. CA
285 SCRA 163
DOCTRINE: The requirements for an estate to be entitled to
a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code are
the ff.:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest .
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the
registered owners of a piece of land (Lot 124), containing an
area of 1,043 sq. m in Obando Bulacan. They acquired said lot
under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the vendors Pedro
M. Sanchez, et al.
Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast;
by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz on the southeast; by Lot
6-A and a portion of Lot 6-B owned respectively by Sps Sta. Mr
and Florcerfida Sta. Maria (petitioners); on the southwest,; and
by Lot 122 owned by the Jacinto family on the northwest.
The respondents filed a complaint against the defendants for
the establishment of an easement of right of way, alleging that
1) Lot 124 is surrounded by properties belonging to other
persons, 2) since they have no adequate outlet to the
provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through
either of the alternative petitioners’ properties which are
directly abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs’ only
convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the
provincial road, 3) respondents’ predecessors-in-interest have
been passing through the properties of petitioners in going to
and from their lot, 4) petitioners’ mother even promised
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an
easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of
an access from their property to the road, and 5) despite
respondents’ request for a right of way and referral of the
dispute to the barangay officials, the petitioners refused to
grant them an easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to
the respondents who have two other existing passageways
other than that of petitioners’ and an alternative vacant lot
fronting the provincial road also adjacent to plaintiff’s property,
which can be used in going to and from respondents’ property?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The following are the
requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory
servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par.
1);
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
 consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650).
Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the
respondents’ property is surrounded by other immovables
owned by different individuals and that the property is without
adequate outlet to a public highway.
The second requisite is also present since, as established
through testimony, respondents are willing to pay the
corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the
right of way.
As for the third requisite, the isolation of their lot is not due to
plaintiffs’ acts. The property they purchased was already
surrounded by other immovables leaving them no adequate
ingress or egress to a public highway.
Lastly, as to the fourth requisite of “least prejudice” and
“shortest distance,” the Court agreed with the lower court that
this twin elements have been complied with in establishing the
easement of right of way on defendants-appellants’ properties.
Among the 3 possible servient estates, it is clear that
petitioners’ property would afford the shortest distance from
defendants’ property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the
least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, “it appears
that there would be no significant structures to be injured in
the defendants’ property and the right-of-way to be
constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative
routes pointed to by the defendants”
FMM
National Irrigation Authority v. CA
340 SCRA 661
DOCTRINE: When a land, originally public, is awarded to a
private individual, a legal easement may be constituted and
thus no just compensation is required.
FACTS:
On 28 June 1963, a free patent over three hectares of land
situated in Barrio Baybayog, municipality of Alcala, province of
Cagayan, was issued in the name of respondent’s predecessor-
in-interest, Vicente Manglapus and registered under a title in
his name, subject to provisions including conditions on public
easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law.
Subsequently, Dick Manglapus (“Manglapus”) acquired the lot
from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.
On 18 July 1974, the land was registered in Respondent’s
name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26658 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan.
Sometime in 1982, the National Irrigation Authority (“NIA”)
entered into a contract with Villamar Development
Construction. Under the contract, NIA was to construct canals
in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a
portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon.]
On 14 March 1991, Manglapus filed with the Regional Trial
Court (the “RTC”), Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for
damages against NIA. Manglapus alleged that NIA's diggings
and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that
no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. Despite
service of notice of the pretrial conference, NIA did not appear
at the pre-trial conference.
On 3 December 1991, the trial court declared NIA in default
and received Manglapus' evidence ex parte and on 23
December 1991, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Manglapus.
On 27 January 1992, NIA filed a motion to lift the order of
default dated 3 December 1991, and to set aside the decision
of 23 December 1991.
On 3 June 1992, the RTC issued a resolution denying the
motion for lack of merit. Thus on 17 July 1992, NIA filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals (the “CA”).
On 27 July 1992, the RTC gave due course to the appeal and
ordered the transmission of the original records to the CA.
Manglapus subsequently filed a motion for execution of
judgment with the RTC which the NIA through the Solicitor
General opposed. On 17 August 1992, the trial court declared
that since the notice of appeal of NIA was given due course,
the motion for execution was "moot and academic."
On 8 March 1994, the CA dismissed the appeal hence this
petition. The NIA contended that the certificate of title
covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation
granting the government a right of way over the land covered
therein.
ISSUE:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for
the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a
right of way. -- NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Article 619 of the Civil Code
provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the
latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and
declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor
of the government. The land was originally public land, and
awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling
would be otherwise if the land were originally private property,
in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking
of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of
way.
RGGM
Abellana v. CA
208 SCRA 316
DOCTRINE: The use of a footpath or road may be apparent
but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man; A right of way is
not acquirable by prescription.
FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of
Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to establish an easement
of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim
they’ve acquired through prescription since their ancestors
have been using these since time immemorial.
They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be
taken down to allow easy access to the public highway.
RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that road
lots in subdivisions are private property and may only be used
as a public highway once acquired by the government through
donation, purchase or expropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be
acquired by prescription?
HELD:
No. Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous
and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The
easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous
because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of
man.
MCSS
Encarnacion v. CA
195 SCRA 74
FACTS:
The servient estate of respondent heirs are what stands
between the dominant estate and the national road. When the
servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence,
persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient
estate at no particular point.
When a fence was constructed, a roadpath measuring 25
meters long and a meter wide was constituted to provide
access to the highway, with one-half meter taken from the
servient estate and another one-half from another lot.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work
flourished and he bought an owner-jeep which he could use
for transporting his plants. However, the jeep could not pass
through the roadpath. He offered the servient estate owners
that they sell him one and one-half meters of their property to
be added to the existing pathway. His request was turned
down.
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to
the existence of another exit, a dried river bed, to the highway,
only eighty meters away from the dominant estate.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing
easement of right-of-way. -- YES
HELD:
Just because the second egress is nearer to the highway by a
difference of only 65 meters, are not amount the conditions
specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code. While there is a dried
river bed closer to the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be
demanded:(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public
highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or
dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep
to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four to
five meters up. During the rainy season, the river bed is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at
certain times of the year. The river bed which make passage
difficult, if nor impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
There is a real and compelling need for such servitude in his
favor.
Article 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of
way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time
to time.” It is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage, and these may
vary from time to time. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney
in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of
theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient
estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people
concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
NKVS
Vda. De Baltazar v. CA
245 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE: The owner of an estate may claim a compulsory
right of way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land
consisting of 117 square meters denominated as Lot no. 1027
located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said
land is Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor
Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta. Ana River. On either
side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and
Jose Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road,
runs along the frontage of Lots 1025, 1026 and 1028.
Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who
are owners of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent
and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access
to the provincial road.
Petitioners opposed arguing that there exists two other rights
of way adjacent to private respondent's property. Aside from
the passageway which the plaintiff seeks to be established as a
permanent easement, the property of the plaintiff is accessible
to and from the provincial road via two (2) other passageways.
RTC dismissed the case.
The CA, however, found that the two passageways mentioned
were mere temporary pathways, that the existence of the two
passageways was not simultaneous and was granted by
respondent's neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi only upon
respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the
claimed passageway is supported by the evidence on record.

In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the
underlying issue begging resolution is whether or not
respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of
right of way over the Baltazars' property.
ISSUE:
W/N Panganiban is entitled to the easement prayed for. -- YES
HELD:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil
Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of
way only after he has established the existence of four (4)
requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established
by the court a quo in its Order dated May 22, 1990.
Respondent Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by
immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth.
As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate
Appellate Court states:
There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a
reading of the law which would impute to it a strict
requirement to pay "proper indemnity" in advance of a suit the
purpose of which, in addition to creating an easement, is
precisely to fix the amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor.
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was
likewise able to establish that the isolation of his property was
not due to his own act for he merely bought Lot 1027. The
respondents have been using as a right of way, has been
"existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by
the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the
lifetime of petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father,
Onisimo Baltazar." It was also established that the right of
way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they
closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-
B when petitioners constructed their present residence."
As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that
the passage claimed by respondent as his right of way,
compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance
from respondent's lot to Braulio Street.
Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the
passageway for, as borne out by the records, the same is
separate and distinct from the gate used by them to enter
their lot and residence. Such being the case, we conclude that
respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right
of way over petitioners' Lot 1026-B.
AMPS
David-Chan v. CA
268 SCRA 677
DOCTRINE: There are rigorous standards to be complied with
by owners of the dominant estate before they may be granted
with easement of right of way. These standards must be
strictly complied with because easement is a burden on the
property of another. Equity is not applied as statutory laws on
the matter are existent.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop
private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her
of access to the highway.
Petitioner alleged that her property was delineated on its
northern and western sides by various business establishments.
Adjoining her property along its southern boundary was the
land of the Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern
boundary, and lying between her property and the MacArthur
Highway, was another lot with an area of approximately 161
square meters owned by private respondent. In short,
petitioner's lot was almost completely surrounded by other
immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access to
the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four
inches wide through the aforementioned property of private
respondent.
Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory
easement of right of way through the said property of private
respondent. The prospective subservient estate was a portion
of a bigger lot, which was formerly owned by the Singian
Brothers Corporation and was sold to private respondent
without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, who was
thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-
emption or right of redemption. The petition likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell
to petitioner the subject lot.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The
parents and relatives of petitioner were never tenants or
lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they
were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by
the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga.
As their affirmative and special defenses, Defendant Singian
Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no
cause of action because, being apparent and discontinuous,
the right of way cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner
was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she was
not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption.
Finally, petitioner had another access to the National Highway
which, however, she closed during the pendency of the case at
the trial court when she extended the construction of her fence.
ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through
private respondent's property?
2. Should traditional Filipino values as pakikisama be
considered?
HELD:
1. Not legally entitled to a right of way for failure to satisfy the
requirements.
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits
that "the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of
way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four
requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate out-let to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not
due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The Supreme Court upheld the factual findings of the lower
courts thus:
1) Petitioner is not "without adequate outlet to a public
highway". It was plaintiff who built a concrete fence
on the southern boundary of her property to separate
it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse,
during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-
inch clearance which she could use as a means to
reach the National Highway without passing through
the property of defendant.
2) The appellate court likewise found that petitioner
failed to satisfy the third requirement because she
caused her own isolation by closing her access
through the Pineda property.
3) Petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of
the proper indemnity.
2. Equity should only be applied in the absence of statutory
law or judicial rules of procedure.
Petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the
property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable
arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of
the dominant estate before they may be granted with
easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly
complied with because easement is a burden on the property
of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the
Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial
intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their
isolation is caused by their own acts. In the latter case, they
decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of
such choice.
KGS
Almendras v. CA
G.R. No. 110067
DOCTRINE: When the easement may be established on any
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen.
FACTS:
Almendras owns a land that is bounded on the north and on
the east by lots owned by Eng and Yap, on the south by the lot
owned by Bongo, and on the west by the properties of the
Opones. On the western boundary of Almendras land abuts an
existing private road, which passes through the several lots
and leads to another private road (a permanent easement)
located on the property of Tudtud, which in turn connects to
the provincial road.
Thereafter, Eng and Yap began building a concrete wall on his
property on the northern and eastern sides of petitioner’s lot.
For this reason, Almendras wrote to them offering to buy a
portion of their lot, so that he could have access to the
provincial road. But her request was denied on the ground
that there was an existing private road on the western side of
Almendras’ property providing adequate outlet to the provincial
road. Eng and Yap claimed that granting petitioner’s request
would greatly reduce the value of his property, as the
proposed right of way cuts across the middle of the property.
Shortly thereafter, Bongo also fenced his property, thus closing
off the southern boundary of petitioner’s lot. As such,
Almendras brought this action for the establishment of a right
of way through Eng and Yap’s land, which was granted by the
trial court. Then, Opone subsequently closed off the western
side of petitioner’s property by erecting a fence on his lot, with
the result that petitioner’s property became inaccessible.
ISSUE:
Is Almendras entitled to a right of way through Eng and Yap’s
property? -- YES
HELD:
To begin with, the owner of a landlocked property has the
right to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates. The easement must be established at the point which
is least prejudicial to the servient estate and, whenever
possible, the shortest to the highway. If these two conditions
exist on different properties, the land where establishment of
the easement will cause the least prejudice should be chosen.
Thus, it has been held that “where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, . . . if
these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the easement
should be constituted through the land of private respondents
on the eastern side because it would be the shortest way to
the provincial road, being only 17.45 meters long, compared to
149.22 meters if the easement was constituted on the Opone
and Tudtud roads on the western and southern sides of
petitioner’s land.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the Court of
Appeals, in pointing to the longer way, considered the fact that
this was already existing and does not preclude its use by
other parties than the individual owners of Lot 1-A to Lot 1-G
and the owners of the land on which the connecting Tudtud
road is found.
The way may be longer and not the most direct way to the
provincial road, but if the establishment of the easement in
favor of petitioner on this roads will cause the least prejudice,
then the easement should be constituted there. This seems to
be reasoning of the Court of Appeals. However, this can only
be determined if the several lot owners ( i.e., the Opones and
their buyers and those of Bienvenido Tudtud) are before the
court, for the determination of the point least prejudicial to the
owners of servient estates (if there are two or more possible
sites for an easement) requires a comparative evaluation of
the physical conditions of the estates. It is not possible to
determine whether the estates which would be least
prejudiced by the easement would be those of the owners of
the Opone and Tudtud properties because they have not been
heard. Although evidence concerning the condition of their
estates has been presented by private respondents, it is
impossible to determine with certainty which estate would be
least prejudiced by the establishment of an easement for
petitioner until these parties have been heard. Any decision
holding them liable to bear the easement would not be binding
on them since they are not parties to this action.
The case was REMANDED to the RTC.
JPOT
Dionisio v. Ortiz
204 SCRA 745
DOCTRINE: Easement-Right of way is not applicable when
the cause of its effectivity is the proprietary's own actuations.
FACTS:
Owners of lots are contiguous and adjacent each other leading
to Howmart road and EDSA. Both parties consent to have a
shared road by way of agreement involving Quezon City
Industrial Estates (QCIE). This, in order to traverse Howmart
road which is private and make known cooperation with fellow
QCIE members having a shared interest. However, legal action
ensued from the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
until January of 1990. The said internal agreement with QCIE
only subsisted until December. Furthermore, said gate came
into fruition because of respondents' willingness to subdivide
their lot. Eventually, this would lead to unnecessary noise
pollution and disturbances brought upon by the transportation
business of the respondent. The gate in question leads into
Dionisios' lot so they found it best to assemble a barricade.
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondents have an easement of right of way
over Howmart Road -- NO
HELD:
The court finds it untenable to appreciate the logic of an
expired contract of agreement. Moreover, it finds it harder to
take into account the claim of right of way when the land
owner necessitated to avail said easement because of their
own proprietary action. It is inadequate to make use of such a
right when it is through one's own fault why there is a need for
another gate for them to be able to access Howmart road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals and the Order of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3949 are SET ASIDE. The
writ of preliminary injunction is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
MLAV
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative
easement. When easement is negative, there should be a
formal act of opposition for prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes’ wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows
open on the adjacent property (No. 63), a neighboring house
on the same street. This setting has been in existent since
1843. The tenant of the adjacent property raised the roof of
house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of
house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large
part of air and light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use
of the windows for 59 years, he acquired from prescription an
easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude
upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to
restrain the making of any improvement in the latter house
which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement.
Further, he contends that the easement of light is positive; and
that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on
which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other
words, from the time that said windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without
opposition on this part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may
have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient
estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the
existence of the easement.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed
the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of
a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which
cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538
of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate has,
in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate
to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the
easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal
act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63 to
make improvements which might obstruct the light of house
No. 65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired,
nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light,
no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period
which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could
not have commenced to run, the act with which it must
necessarily commence not having been performed.
DJTV
Purugganan v. Paredes
69 SCRA 69
DOCTRINE: In drainage or easement of receiving water
falling from roofs, the distances prescribed in the Decree of
Registration should not correspond to the width and length of
the roof of the house but to the distance of the rainwater
falling inside the land of the servient estate.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of
a residential lot subdivided as Lot 1 and Lot 2 (servient estate),
adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of defendant-
appellant Felisa Paredes (dominant estate). The lots of the
plaintiff-appellee are subject to an easement of drainage in
favor of the defendants-appellants in the Decree of
Registration of the Court of First Instance of Abra.
Defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot
adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in such a manner
that the southern side of their house is exactly on the brick
wall, the southern side of which is the demarcation line
between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants,
demolishing said brick wall and built thereon the southern wall
of their house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the
defendants-appellants is 2-½ meters longer than the length of
roofing allowed in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer
roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the property of
the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters wider than that
allowed in the same Decree of Registration, and the rain water
from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of
the plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff filed a case prohibiting defendant from proceeding
with the construction of the roof. Trial court, in a summary
proceeding decided in favor of the plaintiff. CA affirmed trial
court’s decision. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the length
of the roofing? -- NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that defendants-appellants have
made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the
Decree of Registration to the roofing of their house. They
failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase "servidumbre
de vertiente de los tejados" constitutes on the land of plaintiff.
Translated, it means the easement of receiving water falling
from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the land of
the plaintiff-appellee. Consequently, the distances prescribed
in the Decree of Registration should not correspond to the
width and length of the roof of the defendants-appellants'
house but to the distance of the rain water falling inside the
land of the plaintiff-appellee because the encumbrance is not
the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the property of
the plaintiff-appellee.
The summary judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs
against defendants-appellants.
JGY
Valisno v. Adriano
161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage
ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel
of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance
FACTS:
Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action
for damages. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the
absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendant’s
sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the
sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters
long, traversing the appellee's land.
Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno
was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case
and was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the
irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He
also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against
respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to
use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land.
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for
without it the property would be unproductive.
ISSUE:
WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. --
YES
HELD:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land,
pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of
necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third
person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its
permanency as property right, which survives the
determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been
established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act
of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of
water from the Pampanga River.
JRPA
Trias v. Araneta
15 SCRA 241
DOCTRINE: Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable
easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts of sales;
the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the
ground that it impacts dominical rights.
FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a
subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of Araneta Coliseum
fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez
with the condition that said lot should never be used to erect a
factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in
the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed
with the annotation that stated “5. That no factories be
permitted in this section.”
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights
and therefore illegal and existed as mere surplusage since
existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of
factories in the vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly
hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the
issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating
that the imposition resulted from a valid sales transaction
between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court
held no authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired
the right to contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition was valid.
HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement
validly imposed under art 594 which provides that “every
owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems
suitable xxx and not in contravention to the law, public policy
and public order”
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the
peace and quiet of neighboring residents. The intention is
noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with
public policy, the easement may not be eroded.
easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an easement of right of way -- YES
HELD:
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was
acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Ateneo.
Being a voluntary easement, the four requisites for a
compulsory easement need not be satisfied. Also, like any
other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the
servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In
the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties
recognized the existence of such easement and there was no
agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and
egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary
agreement is thus demandable.

The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning

regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the erection of
factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original
intent to bar factories remains binding.

ABB
La Vista v. CA
278 SCRA 498

DOCTRINE: Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary

easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or
renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.

FACTS:
Mangyan road is a 15-meter wide road abutting Katipunan
Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila
University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road
was originally owned by the Tuasons who sold a portion of
their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such
sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The
said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the
Tuasons, to Ateneo through a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the
western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land
which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo
and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a
mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other
to use their half portion of the Mangyan road (La Vista to use
Ateneo’s 7.5 meters of the Mangyan road and also the other
way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid
Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the
highest bidder.

Ateneo transferred not only the property, but also the right to
negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not
want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using
6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of
the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola
Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista
in turn filed a third party complaint against Ateneo. Some of
the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had
adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also
that Ateneo has not yet finalized the negotiation of the

NUISANCE (ART.694 TO 707)
FZC
Sitchon v. Aquino
98 Phil. 720
DOCTRINE: Houses constructed, with governmental authority,
on public streets, and waterways obstruct at all times the free
use by the public of said streets and waterways, and,
accordingly, constitute nuisance per se, aside from public
nuisances. As such, the summary removal thereof, without
judicial process or proceedings may be authorized by the
statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due process clause.
FACTS:
This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the
petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer of Manila) as
respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the
demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas
along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these
constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the
subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or
damages for the use of the land with the agreement that such
payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to
vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that
petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he
threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by
virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public
nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City
Engineer.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a public nuisance?
2. Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the
abatement of the nuisance?
HELD:
There is a public nuisance. This case falls on article 694(4),
classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any
public highway or street. It is public because it affects a
community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact
constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets.
As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by
statute or ordinance.
Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the
abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of
the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was
placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision
not only because it is later law but also because of the
principle that special provisions prevail over general ones.
Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be
taken by respondent.
LNAC
Velasco v. Manila Electric
40 SCRA 342
DOCTRINE: A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance
but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or
comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable
extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of
specially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise
seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary
occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in
which that word is used, but in the absence of statute noise
becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of
the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener.
FACTS:
Appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots. These lots are
within an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by the
City Council of Quezon City. Subsequently, the appellant sold
two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which
was farthest from the street-corner, whereon he built his
house.
Appellee company started the construction of the sub-station
in question and finished it the following November, without
prior building permit or authority from the Public Service
Commission. The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a
current suitable for distribution to the company's consumers,
numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300
commercial establishments and about 30 industries. The
substation has a rated capacity of "2 transformers at 5000 Kva
each or a total of 10,000 Kva without fan cooling; or 6250 Kva
each or a total of 12,500 Kva with fan cooling". It was
constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the
appellant's house. The company built a stone and cement wall
at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the
appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it
to an interlink wire fence. It is undisputed that a sound
unceasingly emanates from the substation.
Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable
nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
reading as follows:
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business
condition of property or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
XXX
Subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the
concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his
health and lowered the value of his property. Wherefore, he
sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and
asked that he be declared entitled to recover damages.
Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance. -- YES
HELD:
The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual
or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of
others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not
complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the
inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the
neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for
the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance.
While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have
been made in the Philippines, our law of nuisances is of
American origin, and a review of authorities clearly indicates
the rule to be that the causing or maintenance of disturbing
noise or sound may constitute an actionable nuisance.
By jurisprudence, there can be no doubt but commercial and
industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become
nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they
render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. It is
no defense that skill and care have been exercised and the
most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent
such result. Of course, the creation of trifling annoyance and
inconvenience does not constitute an actionable nuisance, and
the locality and surroundings are of importance. The fact that
the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to
expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise
must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable.
Usually it was shown to be of that character. The determining
factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its
intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as
to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property
less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well
be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and
reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard
as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. It is true some
witnesses in this case say they have been annoyed by the
humming of these transformers, but that fact is not conclusive
as to the nonexistence of the cause of complaint, the test
being the effect which is had upon an ordinary person who is
neither sensitive nor immune to the annoyance concerning
which the complaint is made. In the absence of evidence that
the complainant and his family are supersensitive to distracting
noises, it is to be assumed that they are persons of ordinary
and normal sensibilities.
As can be anticipated, character and loudness of sound being
of subjective appreciation in ordinary witnesses, not much help
can be obtained from the testimonial evidence. That of plaintiff
Velasco is too plainly biased and emotional to be of much
value. The estimate of other witnesses on the point of inquiry
are vague and imprecise, and fail to give a definite idea of the
intensity of the sound complained of.
TKDC
Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council
24 Phil. 471
DOCTRINE: City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or
motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby
residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant
emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and
comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on
passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of
the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will
be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for
injunction.
Iloilo Ice constructed an ice and cold storage plant in Iloilo City,
after being granted authority by theMunicipal Council.After the
plant was completed, residents who lived near the plant
complained to the Council that smokecoming from the plant
was injurious to their health and comfort.The Council formed a
committee to investigate the complaints. The committee found
that the complaintswere well founded, so the Council passed a
resolution ordering Iloilo Ice to construct smokestacks;
failureto comply with the same would force the municipal
president to execute an order closing or suspendingthe
operations of Iloilo Ice.Iloilo Ice commenced an action to
enjoin the Council from carrying into effect the resolution, and
apreliminary injunction was issued. They maintained that they
were not obliged to comply with thedirective to elevate the
smokestacks one hundred ft and that the Council threatened to
require compliancewith the resolution without the intervention
of the court.Council answered, denying the allegations in the
complaint, asking that they be absolved from thecomplaint and
that Iloilo Ice be declared to have no right to the remedy
asked for. Iloilo Ice demurred to Council’s answer. Demurrer
was sustained so the Council appealed before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal
council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance
in this case? -- NO
HELD:
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per
accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any
and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the
special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The
former may be abated even by private individuals however the
latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is
a judicial function.
The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all
legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone,
and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by
force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control
such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or
motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the
plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and
comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the
property of the plaintiff.
AMD
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan
91 Phil. 488
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance – One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.
The attractive nuisance doctrine, generally, is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location.

FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of

an ice-plant in San Pablo, Laguna. Installed therein were two
9-feet-deep tanks full of water, with edges barely a foot high
from the surface of the ground. While the compound was
fenced, the tanks themselves were without any kind of fence
or top cover. The plant had a wide gate entrance, usually left
open for motor vehicles, customers, and anyone else to pass
and enter the premises. There was no guard assigned on the
gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario
Balandan, an 8-year old boy, while playing with and in
company of other boys of his age, entered the plant through
the gate to take a bath in one of said tanks. While bathing,
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
later, already a cadaver, having died of "asphyxia secondary to
drowning."

Both the CFI of Laguna and the CA ruled in favor of Spouses

Balandan. They both took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected
to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to
persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of
attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this
jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric. The principle reason
for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question,
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing
or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children.

ISSUE:
W/N a water tank is an instrumentality or appliance considered
as an attractive nuisance. -- NO

HELD:
The great majority of American decisions say no. There are
numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has
not been held to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of
water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains,
cesspools or sewer pools.

The reason why a reservoir of water is not considered an

attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:
“Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract
children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of
drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so
that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if
the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his
own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without
adding any new danger… (he) is not liable because of having
created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley
Const. Co.

Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive

nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken
reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other
issue submitted by petitioner — that the parents of the boy
were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery,
because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their
son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no
further discussion.

DONATION (ART. 725-772)
CRF
Republic v. Guzman
326 SCRA 90
DOCTRINE: There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires
that the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son
of the spouses Simerican citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving
to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of
several parcels of land located in Bulacan.
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property
belonging to the estate of Simeon. The taxes due thereon
were paid and the parcels of land were accordingly registered
in their names in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman. On 18 October 1989 David
executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged
thaeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen
Meyers Guzman, an Amt he became the owner of the parcels
of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on
9 August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or
otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita
G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor’s taxes to
facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in the name of
David.
The ownership of David was assailed and on the basis thereof,
the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of
David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be
forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman
responded with a prayer that the petition be dismissed.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands
in the Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner can
acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore
contends that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David
does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that
David being an American citizen could not validly acquire one-
half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way
of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality
donations inter vivos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quitclaim executed by Helen tantamount to
a donation in favor of her son David? -- NO
HELD:
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property
are present in the instant case. The language of the deed of
quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of
her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David,
and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind
is further supported by her deposition which indicated that she
was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not
possible since Philippine law does not allow such an
arrangement. There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires
that the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 came Manresa
said: "If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept x x
x x it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the
donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be
noted in both instruments. Then and only then is the donation
perfected. "
Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied
with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land
by way of donation inter vivos. There is no valid repudiation of
inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2)
of them all the property in Simeon’s estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in
her and her son’s name in undivided equal share and for
eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of
owner.
MPF
Heirs of Velasquez v. CA
325 SCRA 552
DOCTRINE: An action for partition will not lie if the claimant
has no rightful interest over the subject property. A donation
as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee
and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is
accepted. the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property donated.
FACTS:
● Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio
Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947,
respectively and were childless.
 ○ Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters
Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and
Tranquilina deGuzman (grandmother of the
defendants). During the existence of their
marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire
real properties.
● The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de
Guzman, before her death, had a talk with
 the plaintiffs’
mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago
Meneses and
 Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario
Velasquez in attendance; that in the 
 conference Leoncia
told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and
Cesario
 Velasquez that the documents of donation and
partition which she and her husband
 earlier executed were
not signed by them as it was not their intention to give
away all 
 the properties to Cesario Velasquez because
Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her
 sisters had several
children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his
mother
 allegedly promised to divide the properties equally
and to give the plaintiffs one-half
 (1/2) thereof; that they
are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question
being
 the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister
of Leoncia de Guzman.
● Plaintiffs also claim that after the death of
Leoncia, defendants forcibly took 
 possession of all the
properties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for
partition,
 defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity
of any documents covering the
 properties in question
since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the
Aquino
 spouses, to order the partition of the properties
between plaintiffs and defendants in
 equal shares and to
order the defendants to render an accounting of the
produce of the
 land in question from the time defendants
forcibly took possession until partition shall 
 have been
effected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition should be sustained. --
NO
HELD:
No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
order to divide the
 property unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The
 court
must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an
action for partition.
 Needless to state, an action for partition
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the
party filing the action to state in his complaint the “nature and
the extent of his title” to the real estate. Until and unless the
issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the properties.
In this case, the properties sought to be partitioned by private
respondents have 
 already been delivered to petitioners and
therefore no longer part of the hereditary
 estate which could
be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists
between private respondents and petitioners, the court found
no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the
petitioners in support of their petition.
AMDG
Aluad v. Aluad
G.R. No. 176943
DOCTRINE: The donation being mortis causa, the formalities
of a will must be observed. Absent that, the donation is void.
The following are the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before the death of the transferor, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
FACTS:
Matilde and Crispin Aluad raised Maria and Zenaido Aluad
(respondent). Crispin was the owner of Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676,
677, 680 and 682 and when he died Matilde adjudicated the
said lands. Even before TCTs were issued to Matilde, she
executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos over
the six lots in favor of Maria. The deed of donation will become
effective upon the death of Matilde and until then Matilde may
use, encumber or dispose any of the six lands. The deed of
donation also mentioner that if Maria dies first, the deed of
donation will be automatically be rescinded.
After the TCTs were issued, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to
Zenaido and later on executed a last will and testament
wherein Lot Nos., 675, 677, 682 and 680 were given to Maria
while Lot No. 674 to Zenaido. It is noted that both Matilde and
Maria are now deceased.
The heirs of Maria (petitioners) filed an action to recover Lot
No. 674 and 676 from Zenaido. In his answer, one of the
contentions of Zeniado was that the deed of donation does not
exist and that if it did, it was already revoked by Matilde. The
trial court ruled on favor of the heirs however, the decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals in so far as Lot No. 676
is concerned. The Court of Appeals ruled that Deed of
Donation that was executed was not Inter Vivos but one of
Mortis Causa. Being a Donation Mortis Causa, its formalities
under Article 805 were not complied since the donation was
only witnessed by two persons and it had no attestation clause.
Lot No. 674 cannot be awarded to Zenaido because the last
will and testament was not probated. It is noted that Lot No.
674 was not awarded to the heirs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Donation is one of Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa? -- MORTIS CAUSA
2. Whether or not Matilde (DONOR) could still sell to
Zenaido Lot. 676 even after a deed of donation has
been constructed? -- YES
HELD:
The SC agrees to the appellate court that the donation present
in this case is a donation mortis causa. The deed of donation
expressly stated that the donation will only take effect after
the death of the Donor; it is clear that Matilde never intended
to transfer the ownership of the lots to Maria during the
lifetime of the former. To further support this, the deed also
made an express mention that Matilde reserved the right to
dispose the properties. Also, even after the deed of donation
was constituted, Matilde still paid for the taxes, applied for free
patents and the lots remained under her name.
Having established that it is a donation mortis causa, it is
important that the formalities under Article 805 must be
followed. In this case, it was established that the donation was
only witnessed by two persons and they only signed the
attestation clause which is a separate requirement from
signing the left pages of the will. The court emphasizes the
distinction between these two signature requirements:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign
each page of the will from the requisite that the will
be “attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other.
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page
signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware
that the page they are signing forms part of the will.
On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to
the statements contained in the attestation clause
itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even
if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand
margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the
page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
Since the formalities were not observed, the donation mortis
causa is void and transmitted no right to Maria. Even if they
were observed, the deed was not probated hence, it still
cannot be transmitted to her. Therefore, Matilde validly sold
and transmitted Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to Zenaido with the
condition that the will must be probated.
GCG
Danguilan v. IAC
168 SCRA 22
DOCTRINE: In order to determine whether or not said
donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the
law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded
in a public instrument.
Donation of real property should be in a public instrument.
FACTS:
The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the
then Court of First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm
lot and a residential lot. She claimed that she had purchased
from Domingo Melad the land now being unlawfully withheld
by the defendant. In his answer, the petitioner denied the
allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots
of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse
possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad. The
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refilled.
Danguilan presented three other witnesses to corroborate his
statements and to prove that he had been living in the land
since his marriage to Isidra and had remained in possession
thereof after Domingo Melad's death. Two of said witnesses
declared that neither the plaintiff nor her mother lived in the
land with Domingo Melad.
The trial court ruled based mainly on the issue of possession.
Weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the judge
held that the defendant was more believable and that the
plaintiff's evidence was "unpersuasive and unconvincing." It
was held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she moved
out of the property and left it in the possession of the
defendant was contradictory to her claim of ownership. She
was also inconsistent when she testified first that the
defendant was her tenant and later in rebuttal that he was her
administrator. The decision concluded that where there was
doubt as to the ownership of the property, the presumption
was in favor of the one actually occupying the same, which in
this case was the defendant.
The appellate court merely affirmed the factual findings of the
trial court except for an irrelevant modification, and it was only
toward the end that it went to and resolved what it considered
the lone decisive issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation. -- NO
HELD:
The donation being of real property, it is void for not
complying with the requirements given by law. Donation of
real property should be in a public instrument. In this case, it
wasn’t.
The Supreme Court ruled, considering the language of the two
instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the
properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent
contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was
moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the
conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were
given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take
care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his
burial.
The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down
in Manalo v. De Mesa where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question
was made for a valuable consideration, since the
donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing
the expenses that might be occasioned by the death
and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition
and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa
carried out in his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia
Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or
not said donation is valid and effective it should be
sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it
embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid
and effective, although not recorded in a public
 instrument.
The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent
was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly
paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage
worker in a factory. This was itself a suspicious circumstance,
one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the
mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands.
The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad although
she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname,
before that instrument was signed and in fact even after she
got married. The averment was also made that the contract
was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death. It
was also alleged that even after the supposed execution of the
said contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the
owner of the properties and that she had never occupied the
same.
VCL IV
Aldaba v. CA
27 SCRA 263
DOCTRINE: A letter showing an intention to donate is not
sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form
required by law in donations.
FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this
case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father
and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took
care of her until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her
surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar
Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the
death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave
the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an
ejectment case.
The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the
property to them as evidence by the note written by Belen to
them which reads;
June 18, 1953
Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo.
Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.
Belen A. Bautista.
They also argue that the property was for compensation of
their services which amounted to P53,000. The respondents
contend that the letter no way proves a donation.
TC ruled that Estanislao Bautitsta is the absolute owner of the
property in question. CA affirmed TC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in
favor of the petitioners -- NO
HELD:
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient
conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of
a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at
most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial
document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during
those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the
petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all, the
petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was
not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could
have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which
they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.
The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement
between the parties and that respondents Jane did not even
expect to be compensated.
FXRL
Jutic v. CA
153 SCRA 269
DOCTRINE: An affidavit is an inadequate means of
transferring title by donation.
FACTS:
● The petitioners are the heirs
Melquiades Seville, sibling of Arsenio Seville.
● Prior to his death, Arsenio executed
an affidavit stating that he was the owner of two parcels
of land and that upon his death, he desires to donate
these parcels of land in favor of his sibling, Melquiades.
● With no spouse nor children, it was
the siblings of Arsenio who served to be the heirs of his
estate including the two lots allegedly donated in the
affidavit.
● It is contended by the heirs of
Melquiades that Arsenio designated the former to be the
sole inheritor of the two parcels of land in question on the
basis of the affidavit executed in favor of their father.
● The private respondents are his
other siblings seeking to assert their rights over the said
properties.
ISSUE:
W/N there was a valid donation from Arsenio to Melquiades
Seville.
HELD:
No. The affidavit is inadequate to render the donation valid.
A close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter
vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention
and a desire. It is not a concrete and formal act of giving or
donating.
Further, the petitioners did not even assert any actions of
ownership over the property in question. This is illustrated by
the fact that the property was mortgaged by Arsenio with the
knowledge of the Melquiades shows that ownership has not
yet transferred. Additionally, when Arsenio died, payments to
the loan for which the property was mortgaged stopped and
were not continued by the petitioners. Consequently, the
property was even foreclosed but was later on redeemed by
Zoilo, one of the brothers of Arsenio who is also among the
respondents.
Petitioners have a rightful claim over the property based on
the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio and not due to the
alleged affidavit executed in favor of their father, Melquiades.
It is also notable that the signed affidavit is a forgery because
Arsenio Sevile was illiterate during his lifetime. The man was
unable to write his name and only affixed his thumbmark in
the aforementioned real estate mortgage.

RSDM
Howard v. Padilla
96 Phil. 983
DOCTRINE: Donations must be in accordance with the law..
FACTS:
The property that was donasted is a conjugal in nature. The
CA ruled that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa. It
is valid and irrevocable. It is valid, however, only up to the
extent of the share of the donor in the property.
ISSUE:
Is the donation inter vivos or mortis causa?
HELD:
The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon the
death of the donor. Therefore, the donation not having
conformed with the formalities of the law, the same is void.
MRAM
Puig v. Penaflorida
16 SCRA 136
DOCTRINE: The reservation by the donor of the right to
dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed does
not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime
but that the donor merely reserves power to destroy the
donation at any time.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1953, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the
City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in
the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived
by nephews and nieces, children of her predeceased brother,
Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston
Magbanua.
It also appears that besides her will, the deceased had
executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled
Donacion Mortis Causa, was executed in favor of her niece,
Estela Magbanua, married to Mariano Peñaflorida, purporting
to convey to the donee the properties covered by TCT Nos.
2338 and 18951 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo. Two, the
deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled
"Escritura de Donacion Mortis Causa" in favor of the same
donee, Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida, conveying to her three
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 925, 927 and 11042 of
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo .
There was a condition in the instrument saying that “if at the
date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or
conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other
persons or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to
Caridad Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of
P600.00, and such payment was to be made on the date the
donee took possession of Lot No. 58.”
ISSUES:
Are the two donations inter vivos or mortis causa? (It being
admitted that in the latter event the donations are void for not
being executed with testamentary formalities.)
HELD:
The Court held that the first donation is a valid donation inter
vivos while the second one is a donation mortis causa.
An essential characteristic of dispositions mortis causa is that
the conveyance or alienation should be (expressly or by
necessary implication) revocable ad nutum, i.e., at the
discretion of the grantor or so-called "donor," simply because
the latter has changed his mind. In consequence, the
specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
rather than a disposition mortis causa
The Court further said that the designation of the donation as
mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not
controlling criteria ; such statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect
to the real intent of the transferor.
In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation
inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.
Tested by the foregoing principles, the donation of November
24, 1948, while somewhat ambiguous, should be held inter
vivos in character. Admittedly, it is designated as "mortis
causa," and specifies that it will take effect upon the death of
the donor; but, as previously stated, these expressions are not
controlling, and, in the instance, before us, are contradicted by
other provisions indicating a contrary intent. Thus,
● The conveyance of the properties described in the
deed appears made in consideration of the
undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear
"all expenses for medical treatment, hospital
expenses and/or burial of the Donor," without limiting
the time when such expenses are to be incurred. In
fact, the use of the words "y/o entierro" (and/or
burial) strongly suggests that the illness and
hospitalization expenditures to be borne by the donee
may or may not be connected with the donor's last
illness.
● Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction
is the requirement that if the donee should
predecease the donor, Governor Peñaflorida shall
assume the obligations of the donee, "especialmente"
(but not exclusively) "los gastos de ultima
enfermedad y entierro de la donante" (par. 4), and
this undertaking was assumed even if the properties
donated would not go to Peñaflorida but to the
donee's children and descendants (par. 3). It was
evidently because of this liability, unconnected with
the conveyance, that Peñaflorida had to sign the
document together with the donee. It is easy to see
that unless the conveyance were to be effective
before the death of donor,, the obligations assumed
by the donee and Governor Peñaflorida (her husband)
would be without consideration (causa). Such
conditions (consent, subject matter, causa or
consideration and observance of the formalities or
solemnities required by law) are all present in the
deed of November 24, 1948.
● Again, while there is a clause that the donor reserved
her right "to mortgage or even sell the donated
property, when and if she should need funds to meet
her own needs," this last sentence of the stipulation
 appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom to
revoke a true conveyance mortis causa, a faculty that
is essentially absolute and discretionary, whether its
purpose should be to supply her needs or to make a
profit, or have no other reason than a change of
volition on the part of the grantor-testator. If the late
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon wished or intended to
retain the right to change the destination of her
property at her sole will and discretion, there was no
reason for her to specify the causes for which she
could sell or encumber the property covered by her
bounty.
● It is no objection to our view that the donation of
November 24, 1948 should provide that it is not to be
recorded until after the donor's death (par. 5), since
the absence of registration would affect only
subsequent purchasers, without denying the validity
and obligatory effects of the conveyance as between
the parties thereto.
As for the second deed of donation, the text thereof is clear
that no proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged
"donee" prior to the "donor's" death, and that the same was a
true conveyance mortis causa, which by law is invalid because
it was not executed with the testamentary formalities required
by the statutes in force at the time. Here, unlike in the
previous donation the designation is donation mortis causa is
confirmed by the fact that no signs contradict or limit the
unqualified and unrestricted right of the donor to alienate the
conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at
any time that she should wish to do so; it is so expressed in
the deed, and it indirectly recognizes the donor's power to
nullify the conveyance to the alleged "donee" whatever the
"donor" wished to do so, for any reason or for no particular
reason at all. As we have seen, this faculty is characteristic of
conveyances post mortem or mortis causa: for the right of the
transfer or to alienate the "donated" property to someone else
necessarily imports that the conveyance to the "donee" will not
become final and definite in favor of the latter until the death
of the "donor" should exclude every possibility that the
property maybe alienated to some other person.
FMM
Puig v. Penaflorida
294 SCRA 183
DOCTRINE: The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by
both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its
execution.
FACTS:
On 11 December 1979, a deed entitled “Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos” was executed by the late Aurora Virto Vda. De
Montinola (“Montinola”) in favor of her grandchildren, Catalino,
Judy Cristina and Jesus Antonio, all surnamed Valderrama (the
“Valderramas”) over a property located in Panay, Capiz
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16105.
The deed contained signature of the Valderramas in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation.
Montinola’s secretary, thereafter, presented the deed for
recording in the Property Registry and the Register of Deeds
cancelled TCT No. T-16105, the title under Montinola’s name,
and replaced it with TCT No. T-16622 in the name of the
Valderramas. However, Montinola retained TCT No. T-16622
as well as the property until she transferred the same ten
years later, on 10 July 1990, to Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn
Sicad (the “Sicads”).
On 12 March 1987, Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of
the donation and caused it to be annotated as an adverse
claim to TCT No. T-16622.
On 24 August 1990, she then filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City for the cancellation of TCT No.
T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-16105. Her
petition was founded on the theory that the donation she
executed was one of mortis causa which had to comply with
the formalities of a will and since it had not, the donation was
void and cannot be the basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-
16105 and the issuance of TCT No. T-16622.
In an opposition dated 29 August 1990, the Valderramas
argued that the donation was one inter vivos which, having
complied with the requirements set out in the Civil Code, was
perfectly valid and efficacious.
On 27 March 1991, the RTC rendered judgment holding that
the donation was one inte rvivos and dismissed Montinola’s
petition for lack of merit.
Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (“CA”).
She however died on 10 March 1993 while the case was
pending.
Thereafter, on 31 March 1993, a “Manifestation and Motion”
was filed by the Sicads in which they alleged that pursuant to a
“Deed of Definite Sale” dated 25 May 1992, they had become
owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16622.
On 30 June 1995, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court (“SC”). The Sicads
contended that lower courts erred in their judgment in ruling
the donation as one inter vivos because the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the deed of donation, and the
subsequent actions of Montinola incontrovertibly signify the
latter’s intent to transfer the property only after her death
(mortis causa) and that Montinola did not intend to give effect
to the donation.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos
HELD:
The donation is mortis causa.
The SC held that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained
by both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its
execution.
The SC found the following circumstances signifies that
Montinola never intended the donation to take effect within
her lifetime: (a) she expressed her wish that the donation
take effect 10 years after her death; (b) she intercalated a new
provision which states that “however, the donees shall not sell
or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years
after the death of the donor.”; (c) she continued, as explicitly
authorized in the deed itself, to possess he property, enjoy its
fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the
property taxes as they fell due. All these she did until she
transferred the property to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990.
The SC set aside the decisions of the lower courts.
RGGM
David v. Sison
76 Phil. 118
DOCTRINE: When the donor maintains the essential rights of
ownership over the property during his lifetime, the donation is
mortis causa.
FACTS:
The Administrator of deceased Ms. David was ordered by the
court to pay the lawyer of deceased the amount of P18,000 for
legal services rendered. The lawyer, on the other hand,
wanted about P81,000. which was equivalent to 5% of the
inventoried estate. Administrator thought that too high and
said he’d be happy to pay P3,000.
Both parties based their claims on the central issue of the
donation by Ms. David. If the donation was mortis causa, then
the donation should be inventoried with the estate and
therefore the lawyer can get his lofty demand. Should the
donation have been intervivos, then the donation wouldn’t be
inventoried and therefore the administrator can pay the lower
sum contended.
The lower court analyzed a few paragraphs of the deed (in
tagalog) and concluded that the deed partook of the nature
mortis causa.
"Na ang naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato, alang-
alang sa malaki niyang pagtiñgin, pagliñgap at pagmamahal sa
mga nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de
la Fuente, sa pamamagitan nang kasulatang ito, malayang
ibinigay at ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la
Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, at sa kanilang mga
tagapagmana, "albacea" at "Administradores", sa habang
panahon, ang kanyang mga titulo, interes at participacion sa
mag sumusunod na ari-arian na pawang malines sa lahat nang
mga pananagutan: (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209, 210.)
Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan nang
nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y Puato hanggang
siya ay hindi binabawian nang buhay nang maykapal; at ang
mga pinagbibigyan na si Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la
Fuente ay hindi maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit
o sa ano pa man paraan, kung walang kaalaman at pahintulot
nang naturang Margarita David y Puato.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is Mortis Causa -- YES
HELD:
The deed of donation makes it clear that all rents, proceeds,
fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive
benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her
lifetime and that, without the knowledge consent of the donor,
the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way,
whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way
possible, thus making the donees just as paper owners of the
properties.
The court then concluded that the donation in question is a
donation mortis causa, because the combined effect of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of
donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof could not
have taken effect before the death of Margarita David.
According to the terms of the deed, the most essential
elements of ownership — the right to dispose of the donated
properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits,
possession — remained with Margarita David during her
lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita
David's death. While the donation in question is a donation
mortis causa, the court declined to rule that the donated
properties should be included in the inventory of the estate
and should follow the same proceedings as if they were not
donated at all.
The court then awarded the lawyer P10,000 instead of the
P81,000 he craved.
MCSS
Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan
383 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her borhter, Nicolas,
a “Deed of Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot”,
covering two parcels of land. The document stated that, “in
consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR”,
Conchita transfers, conveys, by way of donation the properties.
However, the same was bound by the condition that, “in the
even that the DONEE should die before DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded”.
Respondent heirs filed an action to declare the document void
for failing to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments, considering donations mortis causa.
ISSUE:
WON the donations made are inter vivos or mortis causa. --
NO
HELD:
In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be take into account: (1) It
conveys no title or ownership before death or the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive; (2) Before death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, even if the same may be
done by indirect means of a reserved power; and (3) That the
transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death,
then it is at the time that the donation takes effect, and it is a
donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will
and testament.
The said deed must be executed in accordance with the
requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles
805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
NKVS
Bonsato v. CA
95 Phil. 481
FACTS:
Respondents complaint charged that on December, 1949,
Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced
and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in
favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe
Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of
land situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos,
Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly
accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise
charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack
of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and
Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in
their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past
services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that
the same were executed freely without the use of force and
violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the
dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on
November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation were
executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind,
without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of
donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity
or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the
properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been
acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife
Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an
undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described
therein.
ISSUE:
W/N the late Domingo Bonsato made donations inter vivos or
dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein. --
DONATION INTER VIVOS.
HELD:
If the donation is a dispositions post mortem in favor of the
defendants, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58
Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs.
Sabiniano, G. R. L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of
donation, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor
only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share
of the fruits or produce a reservation that would be
unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property
remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the
contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable",
a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances
mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to
the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his
right of revocation.
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the
phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid
donation shall become effective". However, said expression
must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph,
and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after
the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make
the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free
from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered
that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the
land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or
encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death,
when full title would become vested in the donees.
AMPS
Alejandro v. Geraldez
78 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a
last will and testament (Art. 728). It should not be called
donation mortis causa. It is in reality a legacy. If not
embodied in a valid will, the donation is void.
FACTS:
Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of First
Instance for the partition of Lot 2502 donated to them by their
parents. The Alejandros (compulsory heirs – husband and
children of sister Olimpia Diaz) intervened in the said case,
claiming one-third of Lot No. 2502 and that the donation of
this lot to Andrea and Angel was a void mortis causa
disposition.
The trial court held that the said deed of donation was a
donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties
donated did not pass to the donees during the donors' lifetime
but was transmitted to the donees only "upon the death of the
donors". However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502
into two equal parts between Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz on
the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as an
extra-judicial partition among the parents and their children.
Consequently, the Alejandro intervenors were not given any
share in Lot No. 2502.
On appeal before the SC, the Alejandro intervenors contend
that the said donation is mortis causa; that they are entitled to
a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that the trial court erred
in characterizing the deed as a valid partition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-
third of Lot No. 2502 square meters thereof, as intestate heirs
of the Diaz spouses.
HELD:
Not entitled. Questioned donation valid.
To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the
deed of donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
The Code prescribes different formalities for the two kinds of
donations. An inter vivos donation of real property must be
evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by
the donee in the same deed of donation or in a separate
instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be notified of
the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be
noted in both instruments. (Art. 749, Civil Code. As to inter
vivos donation of personal property, see art. 748).
On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be
embodied in a last will and testament (Art. 728, supra). It
should not be called donation mortis causa. It is in reality a
legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If not
embodied in a valid will, the donation is void (Narag vs. Cecilio,
109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs. Sucilla 102 Phil. 902; Tuazon vs.
Posadas, 54 Phil. 289; Serrano vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998,
1002).
From articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of
effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a donation
inter vivos from a donation mortis causa . And the effectivity is
determined by the time when the full or naked ownership
(dominum plenum or dominium directum) of the donated
properties is transmitted to the donees. (See Lopez vs. Olbes,
15 Phil. 540; Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales
Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105). The execution of a public instrument
is a mode of delivery or tradition (Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals,
97 Phil. 46).
The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took
effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already
effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the
execution of the deed, as shown by the granting, habendum
and warranty clause of the deed.
In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection
and esteem of the donors for the donees and the valuable
services rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by
means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly transfer and
unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and
described in the early part of the deed, free from any kind of
liens and debts. Thus, the habendum and warranty clause is
the donors' declaration that they donate Lot No. 2502, the
property in litigation, in equal shares to their children Angel
Diaz and Andrea Diaz.
The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation
is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they
accept the donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means
of the deed, they acknowledge and give importance to the
generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely
thank them.
In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of
donation, it is stipulated that the donees would shoulder the
expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that
the donees cannot sell to a third person the donated properties
during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray
the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid.
The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the
deed gives to the donees, implies that ownership had passed
to them by means of' the donation and that, therefore, the
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That
is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation
clause provides that "also, while we, the spouses Gabino Diaz
and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and
ownership of the lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall
continue but, upon our death, the right and ownership of the
donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them
shall be fully effective." Evidently, the draftsman of the deed
did not realize the discordant and ambivalent provisions
thereof. The habendum clause indicates the transfer of the
ownership over the donated properties to the donees upon the
execution of the deed. But the reddendum clause seems to
imply that the ownership was retained by the donors and
would be transferred to the donees only after their death.
We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory
clauses. All the provisions of the deed, like those of a statute
and testament, should be construed together in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties. Our conclusion is that
the reddendum or reservation clause refers to the beneficial
ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that
what the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that
clause, was the management of the donated lots and the fruits
thereof. But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as
shown in the habendum clause, was already effective during
their lifetime and was not made in contemplation of their death
because the deed transferred to the donees the naked
ownership of the donated properties.
That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the
deed of donation, out of the eight lots owned by the donors,
only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and
2521 were superflously reserved for the spouses or donors in
addition to one- third of Lot No. 2377. If the deed of donation
in question was intended to be a mortis causa disposition, then
all the eight lots would have been donated or devised to the
three children and daughter-in-law of the donors.
The trial court's amended decision is reversed insofar as it
pronounces that the deed of donation is void. That donation is
declared valid as a donation inter vivos. The disputed lot
should be partitioned in accordance with that deed between
Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.
KGS
Reyes v. Masqueda
187 SCRA 661
DOCTRINES:
1. The title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation “inter
vivos” or “mortis causa”.
2. Characteristics of a donation inter vivos and mortis causa
distinguished in Bonsato et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.
3. Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends
upon the nature of the disposition made.
FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue. As such,
his sister, Ursula, and the children of his late sisters became Dr.
Pascual’s heirs. The heirs filed Special Proceedings for the
administration of the estate. Thereafter, Ursula filed a motion
to exclude some properties from the inventory alleging that Dr.
Pascual during his lifetime or in 1966 executed a “Donation
Mortis Causa” in her favor, which was granted by the court.
Among the properties included in said donation was a lot in
Tondo, Manila. Records show that in 1969 said property was
donated inter vivos to Ofelia Parungao, who is then a minor.
The latter’s mother accepted it. Accordingly, said donation was
duly registered. Subsequently, Ursula sold said property to the
Reyes (involving 4 persons). The CFI ruled that the donation to
Ursula is actually a donation inter vivos and that properties
covered be excluded from the inventory of the estate of Dr.
Pascual. The donation to Ofelia was declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Is the donation made by Dr. Pascual to Ursula a donation inter
vivos although the title given to the deed is “donation mortis
causa”? -- YES
HELD:
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of
donation is not the determinative factor which makes the
donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of
Laureta v. Manta, et al., this Court ruled that the dispositions
in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa"
do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of
donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court
explained in Concepcion v. Concepcion — ...But, it is a rule
consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the
document of donation and the statements contained therein,
and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the
intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called
donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we
find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather
than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which
may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but
services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation
instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in
payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or
compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated by
affection.
We should not give too much importance or significance to or
be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation
and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter
vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al., this Court
through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by
its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al., the court held that the
donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor Severa
Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as — ... a
reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a
token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he
stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa to
said youth all the properties described as follows: xxx xxx xxx I
also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the
donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before
the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said
donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be held
annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold, and also to defray
the expenses of my burial and funerals.’
It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta
above cited are similar in that in both cases the donation was
being made as a reward for services rendered and being
rendered, and as a token of affection for the donee; the
phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take possession
of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the
donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident to
the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death,
including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly
accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the
donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al.
this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter
vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise: Did the late Domingo
Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post
mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then
the documents should reveal any or all of the following
characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while
alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That
the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court
of Appeals, to wit: Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did
the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property
donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as
reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it
is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to
take effect after death.'
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is
no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is
really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr.
Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and
affection as well as a recognition of the personal services
rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership
over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The provision as
regards the reservation of properties for the donor's
subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of
donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked
ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the
execution of the deed of donation.
JPOT
Gestopa v. CA
342 SCRA 105
DOCTRINE: Acceptance makes a donation inter vivos. There
cannot be acceptance mortis causa in the lifetime of a donor
because this would be in a form of a will.
FACTS:
The Danlags own six properties of unregistered land in Cebu.
They donated four parcels of land mortis causa with
reservations to Mercedes Pilapil who is an illegitimate child of
the husband. After four years, the donors then again donated
to Pilapil only this time it was inter vivos including the
remaining two parcels. Afterwhich, the spouses sold two
parcels to the Gestopas. It was first held in favor of the
Gestopas and eventually reversed by the CA. It should be
noted also that the husband of Mercedes was forced to
purchase two parcels even though it was contrary to their
interest. The Pilapils assumed responsibility over these lands
and have tax declarations which were appreciated but put
aside for reasons of them being easily obtained from the
municipal offices, which after all, does not prove ownership.
Some of the terms included in the Danlags issuance of
donation was for them to enjoy the fruits of said parcels during
their lifetime. Unfortunately, there were incidents when they
were denied from getting coconuts.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
RULING:
Said donation was absolutely made inter vivos. Spouses knew
of the difference between the two modes and made use of
them in remarkably distinguishing actions. To stress the court
continues:
"Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego
(father) donated the properties out of love and affection for
the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second,
the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties.
As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need
for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient
properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing
in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the
six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In
the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we
said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime."
The only recourse best available for the spouses were
to revoke said donation on grounds of officiousness or
ingratitude, both of which were not invoked.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
MLAV
Quijada v. CA
299 SCRA 645
DOCTRINE: Donation is perfected once the acceptance by the
donee is made known to the donor. Accordingly, ownership is
immediately transferred and that ownership will only revert to
the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.
FACTS: Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad
Corvera Vda. de Quijada. Trinidad was one of the heirs of a
two-hectare parcel of land. Trinidad Quijada together with her
sisters and brother executed a conditional deed of donation of
the two-hectare parcel of land in favor of the Municipality of
Talacogon, the condition being that the parcel of land shall be
used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the
proposed provincial high school in Talacogon.
Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel of land despite
the donation. She sold one (1) hectare of the subject parcel of
land to respondent Regalado Mondejar. Subsequently, she
verbally sold the remaining to respondent Mondejar without
the benefit of a written deed of sale and evidenced solely by
receipts of payment.
In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad, who at that time was already
dead, filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Mondejar. It was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Because the proposed provincial high school having failed to
materialize, the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution
reverting the land donated back to the donors. In the
meantime, respondent Mondejar sold portions of the land to
respondents Fernando Bautista, Rodolfo Goloran, Efren Guden
and Ernesto Goloran.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that their deceased
mother never sold the property. At the time of the alleged sale,
the land belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon by virtue of
the conditional deed of donation. Therefore, it renders the sale
null and void.
Respondents, in their answer, claimed that the land was sold
to Mondejar. And that petitioners’ action is already barred by
prescription.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that
Trinidad Quijada had no legal title or right to sell the land to
respondent Mondejar since the ownership at the time of sale
belongs to the municipality.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the lower court’s
judgment ruling that the sale made by Trinidad Quijada to
respondent Mondejar was valid as the former retained an
inchoate interest on the lots by virtue of the automatic
reversion clause in the deed of donation.
ISSUE:
WON the sale to Mondejar is void -- NO
HELD
The donation was subject to the condition that the donated
property shall be "used solely and exclusively as a part of the
campus of the proposed Provincial High School in Talacogon."
It further provides that should the proposed high school be
discontinued or in the future be closed, the donated property
shall automatically revert to the donor. Such condition was
validly imposed in the donation. The donation is perfected
once the acceptance by the donee is made known to the donor.
Accordingly, ownership is immediately transferred to the latter
and that ownership will only revert to the donor if the
resolutory condition is not fulfilled.
At the time of the sales made, the alleged seller (Trinidad)
could not have sold the lots since ownership was already
transferred. So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is
capable of fulfillment, the donation remains effective and the
donee continues to be the owner. Such period, however,
became irrelevant when the donee-Municipality manifested
through a resolution that it cannot comply with the condition
of building a school and the same was made known to the
donor. Only then that ownership of the donated property
reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion
clause of the deed of donation.
The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated
property during the time that ownership of the land has not
reverted to her. Such inchoate interest may be the subject of
contracts including a contract of sale. In this case, however,
what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer
owns.
As to laches, petitioners' action is not yet barred by it. When
petitioners initiated the suit, it cannot be said that they had
slept on their rights for a long time.
Be that at it may, there exists a valid sale. Sale, being a
consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent, which is
manifested the moment there is a meeting of the minds as to
the offer and acceptance thereof on three (3) elements:
subject matter, price and terms of payment of the price.
Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at the time of the
perfection of the contract of sale is not an element for its
perfection. What the law requires is that the seller has the
right to transfer ownership at the time the thing sold is
delivered.
The consummation, however, occurs upon the constructive or
actual delivery of the subject matter to the buyer when the
seller or her successors-in-interest subsequently acquires
ownership thereof. Such circumstance happened in this case
when petitioners became the owners of the subject property
upon the reversion of the ownership of the land to them.
Consequently, ownership is transferred to respondent
Mondejar and those who claim their right from him.
DJTV
Lagazo v. CA
287 SCRA 18
DOCTRINES:
● A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure
liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges
or future services equal to or more in value than the
thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code,
donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities
required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
● Acceptance of the donation by the donee is
indispensable, its absence makes the donation null
and void.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from private
respondent Cabanlit a parcel of land which the former claims
to have acquired from his grandmother by donation. Private
respondent, on the other hand, put up the defense that when
the alleged donation was executed, he had already acquired
the property by a Deed of Assignment from a transferee of
plaintiff-appellee's grandmother.
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee
and against defendant-appellant, rationalizing that the
evidence presented by the former is more credible than that of
the latter.
Respondent Court of Appeals reversed trial court’s decision and
anchored its ruling upon the absence of any showing that
petitioner accepted his grandmother's donation of the subject
land. Citing jurisprudence that the donee's failure to accept a
donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument renders the donation null and void,
Respondent Court denied petitioner's claim of ownership over
the disputed land. The appellate court also struck down
petitioner's contention that the formalities for a donation of
real property should not apply to his case since it was an
onerous one — he paid for the amortizations due on the land
before and after the execution of the deed of donation —
reasoning that the deed showed no burden, charge or
condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made
by petitioner were his voluntary acts.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions
imposed upon a donation need not be stated on the deed of
donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically
impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him,
the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid
for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of
the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance
thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art.
1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the
formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment
of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of
possession against private respondent clearly indicate his
acceptance of the donation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the acceptance of a donation made in
a separate instrument but not formally communicated
to the donor may be considered complete, valid and
subsisting. -- NO
2. Whether or not the deed of donation which did not
expressly impose any burden (the expressed
consideration being purely one of liberality and
generosity) but the recipient actually paid charges
imposed on the property like land taxes and
installment arrearages may be deemed onerous and
thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts. -- NO
HELD.
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality
(no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which
is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the
Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was simple, not
onerous. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the
purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him,
such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a
condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden
or charge petitioner as the donee. Supreme Court agrees with
the respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner
were merely his voluntary acts.

As a pure or simple donation, the donation is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee
(Art. 734 of the Civil Code). Acceptance of the donation by the
donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void. Furthermore, if the acceptance is made
in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED.
JGY
Cagaoan v. Cagaoan
43 Phil. 554
DOCTRINE: Applying the rules on double sale, if the one who
first registered the property is in bad faith, the one who first
took possession of the property shall have the better claim.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eugenio and the defendant Felix are brothers, the sons
of Gregorio Cagaoan. Gregorio executed a deed of gift of four
parcels of land in Pangasinan, in favor of Felix. He executed a
similar deed in favor of Eugenio for a parcel of land which,
apparently, is the same as that described as parcel No. 4 in the
deed of gift executed in favor of Felix. Both of the deeds of gift
are free from formal defects and were duly accepted by the
donees.
Eugenio went into possession of the parcel donated to him but
he failed to get the donation recorded with the register of
deeds. The deed given to Felix was duly recorded but he has
never had possession of parcel No. 4. Gregorio died.
Plaintiff Eugenio filed an action to be declared as the owner of
the parcel donated to him. On the other hand, Felix asks that
he be awarded the possession of the land. The trial court
rendered judgment for the defendant
ISSUE:
WON the rules on double sale should be applied -- YES
HELD:
The case seems to use to be analogous to one where the same
real property has been sold by the same vendor to two
difference vendees. In such cases, under article 1473 of the
Civil Code, the property goes to the vendee who first records
his title in the registry of property. If the sale is not recorded
by either vendee, the property goes to the one who first takes
possession of its in good, faith, and in the absence of both
record and possession, to the one who present oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
It clearly appears that Felix Cagaoan had full notice of the
plaintiff's claim to the land before he had his deed of gift
recorded with the register of deeds. The plaintiff Eugenio
Cagaoan having first taken possession in good faith must
therefore be considered to have the better right to the land in
question.
JRPA
JLT Agro v. Balasag
453 SCRA 211
DOCTRINE:
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object
of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be
entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is partition inter vivos referred to in
Article 1080.
FACTS:
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena and had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her
death, he married Milagros Teves and they had four children
namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro
Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a
Compromise Agreement.
When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where
the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which
embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On
the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI declared a
tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property
owned in common by Don Julian and his two children of the
first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during
the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were
given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the
“movie property,” the commercial areas, and the house where
Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed
a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities
in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Later, Don Julian,
Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July
1973. This instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63,
among other properties, in favor of petitioner. The appellate
court ruled that the supplemental deed, conveying ownership
to JLT agro is not valid because the Compromise Agreement
reserved the properties to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership
and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to
them and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the
same. The appellate court in holding that the Supplemental
Deed is not valid, added that it contained a prohibited
preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
ISSUE:
1. Was there preterition in the case?
2.
3. Whether or not the future legitime can be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don
Julian
HELD:
1. None. Manresa defines preterition as the
omission of the heir in the will. In the case at bar, Don
Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was
a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by
the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is
premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to
the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving
a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could
inherit from Don Julian upon his death.

2. As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the
rule that all things, even future ones, which are not
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be
entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is partition inter vivos referred
to in Article 1080. The partition inter vivos of the
properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to
Article 1347. However, considering that it would become
legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the
right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare
hope of succession to the property of their father. Being
the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its
nature was inchoate. Evidently, at the time of the
execution of the supplemental deed in favor of petitioner,
Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs
from the second marriage at the time of his death.
ABB
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA
198 SCRA 300
DOCTRINE: There is no need for prescription to be applied
where a stipulation for automatic reversion is expressly
provided for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there
is no need for a judicial declaration for the rescission of a
contract because the law of the contract governs.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina
Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor of the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land wherein
a resolutory condition was imposed that donee shall not
dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred
(100) years from the execution of the deed of donation,
otherwise would render ipso facto null and void and such deed
and property would revert back to donors.
However, prior to the exhaustion of the period of one hundred
(100) years, the Bishop of Imus executed a deed of absolute
sale to spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao for P114,000.00.
Rieta then filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of
donation, reconveyance of the property with damages, and for
the rescission of the contract.
Ignao, in his answer said that the action for the rescission of
the contract and reconveyance of the property has already
prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action in the case at bar has
already prescribed. -- NO
HELD:
As a general rule, article 764 of the New Civil Code provides
that "(t)his action shall prescribe after 4 years from the non-
compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs
of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
But in the case at bar, there is no need for prescription to be
applied where a stipulation for automatic reversion is expressly
provided for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there
is no need for a judicial declaration for the rescission of a
contract because the law of the contract governs. Judicial
action is proper only when there is absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.
However, the resolutory condition is held to be an undue
restriction on the rights of ownership and is contrary to public
policy. A donation is an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an
unreasonable period of time.
FZC
Genato v. Lorenzo
23 SCRA 618
DOCTRINE: The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by
done must be simultaneous and the acceptance by a person
other than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document
FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares of
stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation, which has P100 par
value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato (Director and
secretary-treasurer of the said company). The petitioners
herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming that they own 530
shares of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation because of
the donation made by Simona to them.
Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are trying to
recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the said stocks so
they can include it in the intestate estate which should later be
distributed among all the surviving children of the decedent.
Four or five days after having Florentino Genato elected and
designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer of the Corporation,
265 shares were issued in favour of Florentino Genato and
another 265 were issued in favour of Francisco G. Genato.
These were not presented as evidence in the course of the
trial; they were merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the
course of his testimony as a witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation? -- NO
HELD:
There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance.
Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the
delivery, and there is no showing that Francisco Genato had
authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them.
The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must
be simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than
the true done must be authorized by a proper power of
attorney set forth in a public document. None has been
claimed to exist in this case.
LNAC
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
140 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a
minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his
properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or
reduction of the donation within four years from the date of
adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time
of the adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the
requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which
annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m
residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-
door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private
respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan
Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly transferred to
the names of private respondents.
Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which
she extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees
resisted, alleging that: (a) the property in question was co-
owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz,
grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the
property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another
property, an agricultural land of more than two hectares
situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation
did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation
of donation in the CFI.
Trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the
complaint.
Thus, prompted herein petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the
subject donation. -- YES
HELD:
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who
had previously donated some or all of his properties to another,
the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the
donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the
adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763).
Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who
must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law,
on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation
can be adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment
does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime
of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of
the total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment
of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that
the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although
then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made
worse by the factual finding of the CA that the grandfather of
the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the
donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the
donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion
of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.
TKDC
De Luna v. Abrigo
181 SCRA 150
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian
University Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed
of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and
conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property
would automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation
failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna “revived” the said
donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with
the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a
Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten School to be named after St.
Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least
70% completed three years from the date of the Deed unless
the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and
annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of Segregation, the
foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the
donation) filed a complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of
the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The
Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor
granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete
construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription
(for being filed after 4 years). The heirs did not file an MR and
went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764
NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the donation) or in 10
years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement of a written contract)
HELD:
10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with
an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations
but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of
actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that
the general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply
under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof
which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the
rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four
(4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation. However, said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on
contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on
donation applies in the case at bar.
AMD
Central Phil. University v. CA
246 SCRA 511
DOCTRINE:
Onerous Donation: one executed for a valuable consideration
which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g.,
when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of
the donation.
When a person donates land to another on the condition that
the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition
imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive
condition but a resolutory one.
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., then a member of the Board
of Trustees of CPU, executed a deed of donation in favor of
CPU over a parcel of land, with the following annotations—
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU
exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical
college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to
any third party nor in any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS",
and the said college shall be under obligation to erect
a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from
the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be
known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be
used for improvements of said campus and erection of
a building thereon.
50 years later, private respondents, the heirs of Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that the
latter had not complied with the conditions of the donation.
They also argued that CPU negotiated with the National
Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property
with another land. In its answer CPU alleged that the right of
private respondents to file the action had prescribed and it
denied any violation of the conditions in the deed of donation.
In 1991, the RTC ruled against CPU and ordered it to reconvey
the property in favor of the heirs of the donor. Petitioner
appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision. It ruled
that the annotations at the petitioner's certificate of title were
resolutory conditions, breach of which should terminate the
rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable. The
CA also ruled that while the first condition mandated the use of
the donated property for the establishment of a medical school,
the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must
be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of
the condition, petitioner could not be considered as having
failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation was onerous and the conditions therein
resolutory, although such conditions were given no fixed
period. -- YES
HELD:
Based on the conditions in the deed of donation, the donation
was onerous. When Don Ramon Lopez donated the parcel of
land but imposed an obligation upon CPU to establish a
medical college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous
consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, in conditional obligations,
the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss
of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of
the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a
person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was
not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a
resolutory one. It is not correct to say that the school had to
be constructed before the donation became effective, that is,
before the donee could become the owner of the land,
otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the
donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of
the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with
the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee
may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action
of private respondents is unavailing. When the obligation does
not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided
in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the
courts may fix the duration because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has
fixed the period for compliance and such period has arrived.
This general rule, however, cannot be applied considering the
different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More
than a reasonable period of 50 years has allowed petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it
be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid.
But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more
need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such
procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and
would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the
execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of
the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its
obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an
unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and
equitable now to declare the subject donation already
ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of
the donor by means of reconveyance.
DISSENTING OPINION (Davide):
I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation
in question is onerous considering the conditions imposed by
the donor on the donee which created reciprocal obligations
upon both parties. Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority
 opinion's description of the donation in question. In one part, it
says that the donation in question is onerous. Yet, later on it
states that the donation is basically a gratuitous one.
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is
unnecessary. There is no conditional obligation to speak of in
this case. It seems that the "conditions" imposed by the donor
and as the word is used in the law of donations is confused
with "conditions" as used in the law of obligations. In his
annotation of Article 764 of the Civil Code on Donations, Arturo
M. Tolentino states clearly the context within which the term
"conditions" is used in the law of donations, to wit:
“The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to uncertain
events on which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical
relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations
or charges imposed by the donor on the donee. It is used, not
in its technical or strict legal sense, but in its broadest sense.”
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of
"conditions" of a donation, what are referred to are actually
the obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor
upon the donee and which would characterize the donation as
onerous. In the present case, the donation is, quite obviously,
onerous, but it is more properly called a "modal donation." A
modal donation is one in which the donor imposes a prestation
upon the donee. The establishment of the medical college as
the condition of the donation in the present case is one such
prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez
determines neither the existence nor the extinguishment of the
obligations of the donor and the donee with respect to the
donation. In fact, the conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez
upon the donee are the very obligations of the donation — to
build the medical college and use the property for the
purposes specified in the deed of donation. It is very clear that
those obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment,
performance, existence or extinguishment of which is not
dependent on any future or uncertain event or past and
unknown event, as the Civil Code would define a conditional
obligation.
It is incorrect to say that the "conditions" of the donation in
the present case are resolutory conditions because, applying
Article 1181 of the Civil Code, that would mean that upon
fulfillment of the conditions, the rights already acquired will be
extinguished. Obviously, that could not have been the
intention of the parties. What the majority opinion probably
had in mind was that the conditions are resolutory because if
they are not complied with, the rights of the donee as such will
be extinguished and the donation will be revoked. To my mind,
though, it is more accurate to state that the conditions here
are not resolutory conditions but, for the reasons stated above,
are the obligations imposed by the donor.
Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that the provisions of
Article 1197 cannot be applied here. The conditions/obligations
imposed by the donor herein are subject to a period. I draw
this conclusion based on our previous ruling in Barretto vs. City
of Manila, in which we said that when the contract of donation
has no fixed period in which the condition should be fulfilled,
the provisions of what is now Article 1197 are applicable and it
is the duty of the court to fix a suitable time for its fulfillment.
Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the
conditions/obligations of the present donation, it can be
inferred that a period was contemplated by the donor. Don
Ramon Lopez could not have intended his property to remain
idle for a long period of time when in fact, he specifically
burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a medical
college therein and thus put his property to good use. There is
a need to fix the duration of the time within which the
conditions imposed are to be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the
performance of the conditions/obligations in the donation in
resolving the petitioner's claim that prescription has already
barred the present action. I disagree once more with the ruling
of the majority that the action of the petitioners is not barred
by the statute of limitations. The mere fact that there is no
time fixed as to when the conditions of the donation are to be
fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations
will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation
becomes imprescriptible.
Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous
donation and is governed by the law on contracts (Article 733).
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
upheld, except its ruling that the conditions of the donation are
resolutory.
CRF
Parks v. Province of Tarlac
49 Phil. 142
DOCTRINE: A condition which cannot be complied with
except after giving effect to the donation is not a condition
precedent. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
On October 18, 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated
a parcel of land perpetually to the municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, under certain conditions(erection of a public
school within six months) specified in the public document in
which they made this donation which was accepted through its
municipal president and was transferred in the name of the
done. Later on, the donor sold this parcel to the herein plaintiff
George L. Parks. On August 24, 1923, the municipality of
Tarlac transferred the parcel to the Province of Tarlac.
The plaintiff, George L. Parks, alleging that the conditions of
the donation had not been complied with prayed that he be
declared the absolute owner entitled to the possession of this
parcel, that the transfer of the same by the municipality of
Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac be annulled, and the transfer
certificate issued to the Province of Tarlac cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was coupled with a condition
precedent? W/N the action to revoke has prescribed? -- NO
HELD:
Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been
imposed in the donation and the same not having been
complied with, the donation never became effective. We find
no merit in this contention. The appellant refers to the
condition imposed that one of the parcels donated was to be
used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central
school and the other for a public park, the work to commence
in both cases within the period of six months from the date of
the ratification by the parties of the document evidencing the
donation. It is true that this condition has not been complied
with. The allegation, however, that it is a condition precedent
is erroneous. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that
the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition
is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. In the
present case the condition that a public school be erected and
a public park made of the donated land, work on the same to
commence within six months from the date of the ratification
of the donation by the parties, could not be complied with
except after giving effect to the donation. The donee could not
do any work on the donated land if the donation had not really
been effected, because it would be an invasion of another's
title, for the land would have continued to belong to the donor
so long as the condition imposed was not complied with.
MPF
Austria-Magat v. CA
375 SCRA 556
DOCTRINE: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer
ownership over the properties upon the execution of deed.
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not
dispose or take away the property donated, he in effect is
making a donation inter vivos.
FACTS:
● Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5)
children, namely, Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria,
herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat,
Leonardo(deceased), and one of herein respondents,
Florentino Lumubos. In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of
residential land together with the improvement thereon
covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4036 (T-3268). On December 17, 1975, Basilisa
executed a document designated as Kasulatan sa
Kaloobpala (Donation). The said document which was
notarized by Atty. Carlos Viniegra, reads as follows:
○ Na ako, si BASELISA COMERCIANTE, may sapat
na gulang, Filipina, balo, at naninirahan sa blg.
809 L. Javier Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Lungsod
ng Kabite, Filipinas, sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang itoy. xxx Na alang-alang sa mabuting
paglilingkod at pagtingin na iniukol sa akin ng
apat kong mga tunay na anak na sila: Kusang
loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap
at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng apat na anak
ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic), ang
aking isang lupang residential o tirahan sampu
ng aking bahay nahan ng nakatirik doon na nasa
Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng
Kabite, at nakikilala bilang Lote no. 7, xxx Na ang
Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula
sa araw na akoy pumanaw sa mundo, at sa ilalim
ng kondision na: Magbubuhat o babawasin sa
halaga ng nasabing lupa at bahay ang anumang
magugul o gastos sa aking libing at nicho at ang
anumang matitira ay hahatiin ng APAT na parte,
parepareho isang parte sa bawat anak kong
nasasabi sa itaas nito upang maliwanang (sic) at
walang makkalamang sinoman sa kanila; At
kaming apat na anak na naakalagda o nakadiit sa
kasulatang ito ay TINATANGGAP NAMIN ang
kaloob-palang ito ng aming magulang na si
Basilisa Comerciante, at tuloy pinasasalamatan
namin siya ng taos sa (sic) puso dahil sa
kagandahan look (sic) niyang ito sa amin. Xxx
(sgd.)
● Basilisa and her said children likewise
executed another notarized document denominated as
Kasulatan which is attached to the deed of donation. On
February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein
petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that
sale, TCT No. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was
cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued
in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat on February
8, 1979.
● On September 21, 1983, herein respondents
(representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria),
Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo
(representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and
Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite an action against the petitioner for annulment of
TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for
reconveyance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was inter vivos. -- YES
HELD:
The decisive proof that the deed is a donation inter vivos is in
the provision that: Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at
hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang
mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan
sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon xxx. This is a clear
expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance. The
irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation
inter vivos. By the words hindi mababawi, the donor expressly
renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in
question. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential
to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the house and lot was
already with the donees even during the donors lifetime. xxx
In the attached document to the deed of donation, the donor
and her children stipulated that: Gayon din ang nasabing titulo
ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang may
buhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante.xxx The stipulation is
a reiteration of the irrevocability of the dispossession on the
part of the donor. On the other hand, the prohibition to
encumber, alienate or sell the property during the lifetime of
the donor is a recognition of the ownership over the house and
lot in issue of the donees for only in the concept of an owner
can one encumber or dispose a property. The express
irrevocability of the same (hindi na mababawi) is the distinctive
standard that identifies that document as a donation inter
vivos. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the
donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable
character of the subject donation.
Thus, the court arrived at no other conclusion in that the
petitioners cited provisions are only necessary assurances that
during the donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right
of possession over the property; but, his naked title of
ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon
the donors death, the donees would get all the rights of
ownership over the same including the right to use and
possess the same.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of
donation regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject
property is couched in general terms such that even the donor
is deemed included in the said prohibition (Gayon din ang
nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa
habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante). Both
the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and
encumbering the property during the lifetime of the donor. If
the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said
property until her death, she could have expressly stated
therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The
prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during
her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property
has been transferred to the donees. It also supports the
irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor
has already divested herself of the right to dispose of the
donated property. On the other hand, the prohibition on the
donees only meant that they may not mortgage or dispose the
donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses the
property during her lifetime. However, it is clear that the
donees were already the owners of the subject property due to
the irrevocable character of the donation.
JPOT
Eduarte v. CA
253 SCRA 391
DOCTRINE: All crimes which offend the donor are considered
manifests of ingratitude and are cause for revocation of
donation.
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine donates half a parcel of his land to his niece,
Helen Doria. For this benevolent act, he is blessed tenfold by
greed and disloyalty. He willingly and knowingly gave only half
of said land. However, there materialized a donation from him
supposedly as well giving the other half to make whole said
parcel. Moreover, these lands "donated" were made for profit
and ironically enough, spirituality. This is when the Eduartes
Romulo and Sally fall prey also. Furthermore, a certain Calauan
Christian Reform Church (CCRC) enters the fray. The niece,
Helen, had the audacity to falsify said donation and donate yet
again to attain false pretense of forgiveness. This, by way of
giving the land to a church except of course the residence. The
Eduartes, unknowingly trust Doria and purchase the lot
altogether. Pedro then moves to reprimand his niece by setting
forth machinations to effectively revoke his donation.
ISSUE:
W/N the act of Helen Doria of falsification of documents is
tantamount to ingratitude towards Pedro Calapine which would
lead to the effective revocation of donation? -- YES
HELD:
This act is of pure treason. Any action that the donor takes
offense to is equal to ingratitude. It is saddening that an
individual can have such a shameful display of thanks relating
to family. The mere act of falsifying documents to reserve the
right to half the land to which you have already been granted
half of is appaling to say the least.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
JPOT
Noceda v. CA
313 SCRA 504
DOCTRINE: Usurpation with regard to donee towards donor
is a definite act of ingratitude and neecessitates only to be
proved to effect revocation.
FACTS:
Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria Arbizo extra-
judicially partitioned a land in Zambales. Aurora coincidentally
donated on the same day of the partition to Rodolfo who
happens to be her nephew. After several surveys conducted by
a certain Geodetic Engineer Eugene Quejada of the Bureau of
Lands and specific boundary adjustments, Aurora opted to
fence her property accordingly. This, for reasons of making
known and presuppose which of the vast land is indeed in her
rightful possession. Even though there was an apparent
exercise of giving and safety measures so as to avoid conflict,
it appears to have been averred by Rodolfo. It was made true
by his actions of passing through said fences and intentionally
staying at nipa huts designated inside Aurora's land. What
comes into contention is the manner Rodolfo makes his action.
ISSUE:
W/N usurpation of Rodolfo is enough to suffice revocation of
donation? --
RULING:
In this case, Rodolfo is directly showing his disregard of
Aurora's wishes intentionally going beyond the boundaries
Directo so painstakingly made plain. Usurpation is the
undermining of one's authority. Noceda not only negates her
will but makes it obvious in the sense of flaunting it even with
the presence of Maria Arbizo.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had
carefully considered the questions of fact raised below and the
respondent Court‘s conclusions are based on the evidence on
record. No cogent reason exists for disturbing such findings.
We also note that petitioner in this petition merely rehashed
the same issues and arguments raised in the respondent Court
in whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly,
petitioner failed to present any substantial argument to justify
a reversal of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.