2.) Roa vs. Moreno, April 21, 2010 A.C. No.

8382

Facts: On September 1998, respondent Atty. Juan R. Moreno sold to complainant Alfredo B. Roa a parcel of land
located along Starlite Street in Cupang, Antipolo. Complainant paid respondent P70, 000 in cash as full payment for the lot.
Respondent did not issue a deed of sale. Instead, he issued a temporary receipt and a Certificate of Land Occupancy
purportedly issued by the general overseer of the estate in which the lot was located. Respondent assured complainant that he
could use the lot from then on.
Complainant learned that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the Register of
Deeds. When complainant went to see respondent, the latter admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio.
Respondent also said there was a pending legal controversy over the lot. On 25 February 2001, complainant sent a letter to
respondent demanding the return of the P70, 000 paid for the lot.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent in the MTC of Antipolo City. On 26 September
2003, the trial court rendered a decision convicting respondent of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTC sentenced respondent to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for one month
and one day and ordered him to return the amount of P70, 000 to complainant.
On appeal, the RTC of Antipolo City set aside the lower court’s ruling. For lack of evidence establishing
respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC acquitted respondent in a decision dated 20 December 2005. The
decision further stated that the remedy of complainant was to institute a civil action for the recovery of the amount he paid to
respondent.
On 23 February 2006, complainant filed with the IBP an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent. In his
Answer, respondent explained that what he sold to complainant was merely the right over the use of the lot, not the lot itself.
Respondent maintained he never met the complainant during the negotiations for the sale of said right. Respondent claimed it
was a certain Benjamin Hermida who received the purchase price. Respondent further alleged that it was one Edwin Tan, and
not the complainant, who paid the purchase price.
At the hearing set on 14 October 2008, complainant narrated that respondent personally sold to him the lot in question.
Complainant stated respondent assured him that the papers would be processed as soon as payment was made. Complainant
claimed he duly paid respondent P70, 000, but when he followed up the sales documents, respondent just dismissed him and
denied any transaction between them. For his part, respondent did not appear at the hearing despite receipt of notice.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 17 October 2008, the IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-632passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors suspended
respondent from the practice of law for three months and ordered him to return the amount of P70, 000 to
complainant within 30 days from receipt of notice.

Issues: 1.WON the respondent are guilty of 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional and Responsibility,
2.WON respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered him to return the amount
of P70, 000 to complainant

Held: After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court gives credence to complainant’s version of the facts.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of respondent are not without recourse in law. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Respondent’s refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an
officer of the court. By his conduct, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s acts violated the trust and respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar
and an officer of the court.
However, we cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the money paid by complainant.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other.
That said, we deem that the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is insufficient to atone for
respondent’s misconduct in this case. We consider a penalty of two-year suspension more appropriate considering the
circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Juan R. Moreno GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of 2 years effective
upon finality of this Resolution.

3.) Barcenas vs. Alvero, April 23, 2010 A.C. No. 8159

Facts: On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,
000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant
of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment
receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda
Gasta refused to accept the same.
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave
Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80, 000.00 from the P300, 000.00 and promised to return the
amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, “ Akala nyo ba ay
madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?” Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in
court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs.
Despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be
disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession.
On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Atty.
Alvero claimed that he did not know nor did he know that San Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came
to know Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60, 000.00 “from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio”
who entrusted to respondent. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300, 000.00 from San Antonio,
though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action.
Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that
the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. Finally,
Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed.
During the mandatory conference notified by IBP, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. In Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and return the amount of P300, 000.00 to complainants within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice.

Issue: WON the respondent guilty of gross misconduct.

Held: Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money
from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client. These, Atty. Alvero failed to do.
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of
his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant
case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant’s repeated demands.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be
removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.
 Atty. Alvero’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust
reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It
gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and gross
unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
In Small v. Banares, the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for
failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court
finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.
As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. Those
who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the
privilege to practice law.
WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which
found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTYof gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

5.) METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, INC. vs. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF RIVERSIDE MILLS
CORPORATION PROVIDENT AND RETIREMENT FUND, September 8, 2010 G.R. No. 176959

Facts: On November 1, 1973, RMC established a Provident and Retirement for its regular employees. Under the Plan, RMC and
its employees shall each contribute 2% of the employee’s current basic monthly salary, with RMC’s contribution to increase by
1% every five (5) years up to a maximum of 5%. The contributions shall form part of the provident fund which shall be held,
invested and distributed by the Commercial Bank and Trust Company. Paragraph 13 of the Plan likewise provided that the Plan
"may be amended or terminated by the Company at any time on account of business conditions, but no such action shall
operate to permit any part of the assets of the Fund to be used for, or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit
of the members of the Plan and their … beneficiaries. In no event shall any part of the assets of the Fund revert to [RMC]
before all liabilities of the Plan have been satisfied."
On October 15, 1979, the Board of Trustees of RMCPRF entered into an Investment Management Agreement with
Philbank (now, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company). Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner shall act as an agent of
the Board and shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the Fund in Trust Account No. 1797 in its behalf. The Agreement shall be
in force for one (1) year and shall be deemed automatically renewed unless sooner terminated either by petitioner bank or by
the Board.
In 1984, RMC ceased business operations. Nonetheless, petitioner continued to render investment services to
respondent Board. In a letter7 dated September 27, 1995, petitioner informed respondent Board that Philbank’s Board of
Directors had decided to apply the remaining trust assets held by it in the name of RMCPRF against part of the outstanding
obligations of RMC.
Subsequently, respondent RMC Unpaid Employees Association, Inc., representing the terminated employees of RMC,
learned of Trust Account No. 1797. Through counsel, they demanded payment of their share in a letter8 dated February 4,
1997. When such demand went unheeded, the Association, along with the individual members of RMCPRF, filed a complaint for
accounting against the Board and its officers, namely, Ernesto Tanchi, Jr., Carlitos Y. Lim, Amelita G. Simon, Evelina S. Ocampo
and Cesar Saligumba, as well as petitioner bank.
On June 2, 1998, during the trial, the Board passed a Resolution9 in court declaring that the Fund belongs exclusively to
the employees of RMC. It authorized petitioner to release the proceeds of Trust Account No. 1797 through the Board, as the
court may direct. Consequently, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the Board as co-plaintiffs.
On June 27, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. The trial court declared invalid the reversion
and application of the proceeds of the Fund to the outstanding obligation of RMC to petitioner bank. Hence this appeal.

Issues: 1.)WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REVERSION AND APPLICATION BY PHILBANK OF THE
FUND IN PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBLIGATIONS OF RIVERSIDE MILLS CORPORATION WERE INVALID.
2.) WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING THAT "BY HAVING
ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE BOARD, (PHILBANK) IS NOW ESTOPPED TO QUESTION THE LATTER’S AUTHORITY
AS WELL AS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS THEREOF."13
3.) WON THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ON THE BASIS THAT "[PHILBANK] WAS REMISS IN ITS DUTY TO TREAT RMCPRF’S ACCOUNT WITH
THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF CARE CONSIDERING THE FIDUCIARY NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP, PERFORCE, THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE COMPELLED TO LITIGATE TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHT."14

Held: Petitioner contends that RMC’s closure in 1984 rendered the RMCPRF Board of Trustees functus officio and devoid of
authority to act on behalf of RMCPRF. It thus belittles the RMCPRF Board Resolution dated June 2, 1998, authorizing the release
of the Fund to several of its supposed beneficiaries.
A trust is a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed
upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another." A trust is either express or implied.
Express trusts are those which the direct and positive acts of the parties create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
evincing an intention to create a trust.15
Here, the RMC Provident and Retirement Plan created an express trust to provide retirement benefits to the regular
employees of RMC. RMC retained legal title to the Fund but held the same in trust for the employees-beneficiaries. Thus, the
allocation under the Plan is directly credited to each member’s account.
Employees’ trusts or benefit plans are intended to provide economic assistance to employees upon the occurrence of
certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or disability. They give security against certain hazards
to which members of the Plan may be exposed. They are independent and additional sources of protection for the working
group and established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose. 18 Here, while the Plan provides for a reversion of the
Fund to RMC, this cannot be done until all the liabilities of the Plan have been paid. And when RMC ceased operations in 1984,
the Fund became liable for the payment not only of the benefits of qualified retirees at the time of RMC’s closure but also of
those who were separated from work as a consequence of the closure.
A member who is separated from the service of the Company before satisfying the conditions for retirement due to
resignation or any reason other than dismissal for cause shall be paid the balance of his account as of the last day of the month
prior to separation. A member who is separated for cause shall not be entitled to withdraw the total amount representing his
contribution and that of the Company including the earned interest thereon, and the employer’s contribution shall be retained in
the fund.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
To be sure, the cessation of business by RMC is an authorized cause for the termination of its employees. Hence, not
only those qualified for retirement should receive their total benefits under the Fund, but those laid off should also be entitled to
collect the balance of their account as of the last day of the month prior to RMC’s closure. In addition, the Plan provides that the
separating member shall be paid a maximum of 40% of the amount representing the Company’s contribution and its income
standing to his credit. Until these liabilities shall have been settled, there can be no reversion of the Fund to RMC.
Clearly, petitioner had no power to effect reversion of the Fund to RMC.
Under Section 12227 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation shall nevertheless continue as a body corporate for three
(3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was
established. Within those three (3) years, the corporation may appoint a trustee or receiver who shall carry out the said
purposes beyond the three (3)-year winding-up period. Thus, a trustee of a dissolved corporation may commence a suit which
can proceed to final judgment even beyond the three (3)-year period of liquidation.28
In the same manner, during and beyond the three (3)-year winding-up period of RMC, the Board of Trustees of
RMCPRF may do no more than settle and close the affairs of the Fund. The Board retains its authority to act on behalf of its
members, albeit, in a limited capacity. It may commence suits on behalf of its members but not continue managing the Fund for
purposes of maximizing profits. Here, the Board’s act of issuing the Resolution authorizing petitioner to release the Fund to its
beneficiaries is still part of the liquidation process that is, satisfaction of the liabilities of the Plan, and does not amount to doing
business. Hence, it was properly within the Board’s power to promulgate.
Here, petitioner applied the Fund in satisfaction of the obligation of RMC without authority and without bothering to
inquire regarding unpaid claims from the Board of Trustees of RMCPRF. It wrote the members of the Board only after it had
decided to revert the Fund to RMC. Upon being met with objections, petitioner insisted on the reversion of the Fund to RMC,
despite the clause in the Plan that prohibits such reversion before all liabilities shall have been satisfied, thereby leaving
respondents with no choice but to seek judicial relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 7, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76642 are AFFIRMED.

6.) Benedicto vs. Villaflores, October 6, 2010 G.R. No. 185020

Facts: Maria Villaflores was the owner of Lot 2-A, with an area of 277 square meters, in Poblacion, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-84.761 (M). In 1980, Maria sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her
nephew, respondent Antonio Villaflores then took possession of the portion sold to him and constructed a house
thereon. Twelve (12) years later, or on August 15, 1992, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
covering the entire Lot 2-A. However, Antonio did not register the sale or pay the real property taxes for the subject land.
On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena, evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan.[4] Filomena registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan on September 6, 1994. Consequently, TCT
No. T-84.761 (M) in the name of Maria was cancelled and TCT No. T-208265 (M) was issued in the name of Filomena. Since
then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land.
On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim,
Damages and Attorney’s Fees[5] against Antonio. She alleged that she acquired Lot 2-A in 1994 from her grandaunt Maria by
virtue of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. At the time of the sale, she was not aware that Antonio had any claim or interest
over the subject property. Antonio assured her that there was no impediment to her acquisition of the land, and promised to
vacate the property five (5) years after the sale. In August 1999, Antonio requested an extension of one (1) year, and offered
to pay a monthly rental of P2,000.00, which she granted. However, in 2000, Antonio refused to vacate the property and,
instead, claimed absolute ownership of Lot 2-A.
Antonio traversed the complaint, asserting absolute ownership over Lot 2-A. He alleged that he purchased the subject
property from Maria in 1980; and that he took possession of the same and constructed his house thereon. He came to know of
the sale in favor of Filomena only in 2000 when the latter demanded that he vacate the property. He averred that Filomena
was aware of the sale; hence, the subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated.[6]
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision[7] sustaining Filomena’s ownership. According to the RTC, Filomena was the
one who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than Antonio. It rejected Antonio’s allegation of bad
faith on the part of Filomena because no sufficient evidence was adduced to prove it. Likewise, the RTC found Antonio’s
evidence of ownership questionable. Nevertheless, it declared Antonio a builder in good faith.
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the RTC denied the motions for lack of merit.
Filomena and Antonio then filed their separate appeals with the CA. Filomena assailed the RTC pronouncement that
Antonio was a builder in good faith, and the denial of her claim for damages. Antonio, on the other hand, faulted the RTC for
sustaining Filomena’s ownership of the subject lot.
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision[9] affirming with modification the RTC
decision. The CA affirmed the RTC for upholding Filomena’s ownership of Lot 2-A and for declaring Antonio a builder in good
faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, and the amount due Antonio.

Issues: 1.) WON Antonio is possessor in good faith.

Held: The question of whether a possessor is in good or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, a party may raise
only questions of law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
It is not disputed that the construction of Antonio’s house was undertaken long before the sale in favor of Filomena;
that when Filomena bought the property from Maria, Antonio’s house which he used as residence had already been erected on
the property. Thus, we sustain the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith. Under Article 448, a landowner is given the
option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to
the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
The RTC found good faith on the part of Antonio. Yet, it did not order the reimbursement of the necessary and useful
expenses he incurred.
The pronouncement of this Court in Pecson v. CA,[15] which was reiterated in Tuatis v. Escol,[16] is instructive, viz.:

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In
this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717
(1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in
good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor
the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the
current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling
would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore
be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial
court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

Thus, the CA correctly ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
 Filomena then argues that the CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled on Antonio’s right to reimbursement and
retention. She asserts that this issue was not raised in the proceedings a quo.
Indeed, the issue of Antonio’s right to reimbursement and retention was not specifically raised during the pre-trial
because Antonio insisted on his claim of ownership. However,Filomena is now estopped from questioning the CA for ruling on
this issue because she was the one who raised it in her appeal before the CA.
Finally Filomena faults the RTC and the CA for denying her claim for attorney’s fees. She asserts that there is
overwhelming proof on record to support her claim, and insists on entitlement to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
amounting to P440,700.00
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not
awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary
sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be
paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case
within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable.
Certainly, Filomena was compelled to file this suit to vindicate her rights. However, by itself, it will not justify an award
of attorney's fees.
Thus, we sustain the denial by the RTC and the CA of Filomena’s claim for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
In fine, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in the challenged Decision. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80103 is AFFIRMED.

7.) SPOUSES CHUNG VS. ULANDAY CONSTRUCTION, INC., October 11, 2010 G.R. No. 156038

Facts: In February 1985, the petitioners contracted with respondent Ulanday Construction, Inc. to construct, within a 150-day
period, the concrete structural shell of the former’s two-storey residential house in Urdaneta Village, Makati City at the contract
price of P3,291,142.00.
The Contract provided that: (a) the respondent shall supply all the necessary materials, labor, and equipment
indispensable for the completion of the project, except for work to be done by other contractors; [8] (b) the petitioners shall pay
a P987,342.60[9] downpayment, with the balance to be paid in progress payments based on actual work completed; [10] (c) the
Construction Manager or Architect shall check the respondent’s request for progress payment and endorse it to the petitioners
for payment within 3 days from receipt;[11] (d) the petitioners shall pay the respondents within 7 days from receipt of the
Construction Manager’s or Architect’s certificate; (e) the respondent cannot change or alter the plans, specifications, and works
without the petitioners’ prior written approval;[12] (f) a penalty equal to 0.01% of the contract amount shall be imposed for each
day of delay in completion, but the respondent shall be granted proportionate time extension for delays caused by the
petitioners;[13] (g) the respondent shall correct, at its expense, defects appearing during the 12-month warranty period after the
petitioners’ issuance of final acceptance of work.[14]
Subsequently, the parties agreed to exclude from the contract the roofing and flushing work,
for P321,338.00,[15] reducing the contract price to P2,969,804.00. On March 17, 1995, the petitioners paid the P987,342.60
downpayment,[16] with the balance of P1,982,461.40 to be paid based on the progress billings. While the building permit was
issued on April 10, 1995,[17] actual construction started on March 7, 1995.
As the actual construction went on, the respondent submitted 12 progress billings. While the petitioners settled the
first 7 progress billings, amounting to P1,270,641.59,[20]payment was made beyond the seven (7)-day period provided in the
contract. The petitioner subsequently granted the respondent a P100,000.00 cash advance, leaving the unpaid progress billings
at P445,922.13.[22]
During the construction, the respondent also effected 19 change orders without the petitioners’ prior written approval,
amounting to P912,885.91.[23] The petitioners, however, paid P42,298.61 for Change Order No.
1 and partially paid P130,000.00 for Change Order Nos. 16 and 17.[25] Petitioner Debbie Chung acknowledged in writing that
[24]

the balance for Change Order Nos. 16 and 17 would be paid upon completion of the contract. [26]The outstanding balance on the
change orders totaled P740,587.30.
On July 4, 1995, the respondent notified the petitioners that the delay in the payment of progress billings delays the
accomplishment of the contract work.[27] The respondent made similar follow-up letters between July 1995 to February
1996.[28] On March 28, 1996, the respondent demanded full payment for progress billings and change orders. [29] On April 8,
1996, the respondent demanded payment of P1,310,670.56 as outstanding balance on progress billings and change orders.[30]
 In a letter dated April 16, 1996, the petitioners denied liability, asserting that the respondent violated the contract
provisions by, among others, failing to finish the contract within the 150-day stipulated period, failing to comply with the
provisions on change orders, and overstating its billings.
On May 8, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145, Makati City, for
collection of the unpaid balance of the contract and the unpaid change orders, plus damages and attorney’s fees.[32]
In their answer with counterclaim,[33] the petitioners complained of the respondent’s delayed and defective work. They
demanded payment of liquidated damages for delay in the completion, the construction errors, loss or non-usage of specified
construction materials, unconstructed and non-completed works, plus damages and attorney’s fees.
The RTC noted that the petitioners were nonetheless liable for P130,000.00 under Change Order Nos. 16 and 17,
because petitioner Debbie Chung ratified and acknowledged that such amount was still due upon completion. It also noted that
the respondent should not be faulted or penalized for the delay in the completion of the contract within the 150-day period due
to the petitioners’ delay in the payment of the progress billings. It found, however, that the petitioners are liable for the
construction defect on the roof leak traceable to the shallow concrete gutter.
Thus, the RTC ordered the respondent to repair, at its expense, the defective concrete gutter of the petitioners’ house
and to restore other affected structures according to the architectural plans and specifications. It likewise ordered the
petitioners to pay the respondent P629,819.84 as unpaid balance on the progress billings and P130,000.00 as unpaid balance
on the ratified change orders.
Both parties elevated the case to the CA by way of ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent averred that the RTC failed to consider evidence of the petitioners’ bad faith in violating the contract, while the
petitioners argued that the RTC should have quantified the cost of the repairs and simply ordered the respondent to reimburse
the petitioners’ expenses.
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, but increased the payment on the unpaid balance of the change orders
to P740,587.11. It likewise ordered the petitioners to pay 6% interest on the unpaid amounts from the day of formal demand
and until the finality of the decision, and 12% interest after finality of the decision, plus P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. On November 15, 2002, the CA issued a resolution denying the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, but partially granting the respondent’s motion for reconsideration by awarding it
attorney’s fees equal to 10% of the total award. Hence, the petitioners came to us through the present petition.

Issues: The core issue is whether the CA erred in: (a) affirming the RTC decision for payment of progress billings; (b) in
increasing the amount due for change orders; and, (c) in awarding exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to the respondent.

Held: In contractual relations, the law allows the parties leeway and considers their agreement as the law between
them.[39] Contract stipulations that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy shall be
binding[40] and should be complied with in good faith.[41] No party is permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon
his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.[42] In the present case, we find that both
parties failed to comply strictly with their contractual stipulations on the progress billings and change orders that caused the
delays in the completion of the project.
There is no dispute that the petitioners failed to pay progress billings nos. 8 to 12. However, we find no basis to hold
the petitioners liable for P629,819.84, the balance of the total contract price, without deducting the discount of P18,000.00
granted by the respondent. The petitioners likewise cannot be held liable for the balance of the total contract price because that
amount is clearly unsupported by the evidence; only P545,922.13[43] is actually supported by progress billings nos. 8 to 12.
Deducting the respondent’s P100,000.00 cash advance,[44] the unpaid progress billings amount to only P445,922.13.
The CA erred in ruling that Article 1724 of the Civil Code does not apply because the provision pertains to disputes
arising from the higher cost of labor and materials and there was no demand for increase in the costs of labor and materials.
Significantly, the respondent did not secure the required written approval of the petitioners before making the changes
in the plans, specifications and works. Thus, for undertaking change orders without the stipulated written approval of the
petitioners, the respondent cannot claim the additional costs it incurred, save for the change orders the petitioners accepted and
paid for as discussed below.
The petitioners’ payment of Change Order Nos. 1, 16, and 17 and their non-objection to the other change orders
effected by the respondent cannot give rise to estoppel in pais that would render the petitioners liable for the payment of all
change orders.Estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel, arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions or by his
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and the other rightfully relies and acts on such beliefs so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts.[48] The real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supplying deficiency in the law, but it
should not supplant positive law.[49]
Consistent with this ruling, the petitioners are still liable for the P130,000.00 balance on Change Order Nos. 16 and 17
that, to date, remain unpaid.[51] Accordingly, the petitioners’ outstanding liabilities amount to P445,922.13 for the unpaid
progress billings and P130,000.00 for the ratified change orders, or a total of P575,922.13.
 We cannot allow the award for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary
damages that the act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent
manner.[52] On the other hand, attorney’s fees may be awarded only when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses
to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, as when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. [53]We do not see the presence of these circumstances in
the present case. As previously discussed, the petitioners’ refusal to pay the change orders was based on a valid ground – lack
of their prior written approval. There, too, is the matter of defective construction discussed below.
We cannot sustain the lower courts’ order to repair the defective concrete gutter. The considerable lapse of time
between the filing of the complaint in May 1996 and the final resolution of the present case renders the order to repair at this
time highly impractical, if not manifestly absurd. Besides, under the contract, the respondent’s repair of construction defects, at
its expense, pertains to the 12-month warranty period after the petitioners’ issuance of the final acceptance of work.[54] This
provision does not apply since the petitioners have not even issued a certificate of completion and final acceptance of work.
Under the circumstances, fairness and reason dictate that we simply order the set-off of the petitioners’ contractual
liabilities totaling P575,922.13 against the repair cost for the defective gutter, pegged at P717,524.00,[55] leaving the amount
of P141,601.87 still due from the respondent. Support in law for this ruling for partial legal compensation proceeds from Articles
1278,[56] 1279,[57] 1281,[58] and 1283[59] of the Civil Code. In short, both parties are creditors and debtors of each other, although
in different amounts that are already due and demandable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV Nos. 61583 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioners P141,601.87 representing the
balance of the repair costs for the defective gutter in the petitioners’ house, with interest at 6% per annum to be computed
from the date of the filing of the complaint until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until full payment.

H.R
American Bible Society v City of Manila 101 PHIL 386 (1957)02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in
grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of
the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members
from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of
textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate
Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of
Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment
of the religious profession and worship of appellant).'

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:(7) No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.It may be true that in the case at bar
the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the
same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it
imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.It
seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business,
trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so
defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum
of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom F: On the basis of two
warrants issued by the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as
papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners
brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized. HELD: Petitioners'' thesis is impressed with
merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must
contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad
statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another factor
that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. In Stanford v.
State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant void

Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by
petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the
warrant but his motion was denied. HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy
the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of
petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is objectionable.
Published: February 18, 2008
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES
Facts:
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press
Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation
allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice
(DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing
votes in the 2004 national elections.
Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the “hello Garci” tapes a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered
by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

IGLESIA NI KRISTO vs. CA

GR 119673
Facts:
Petitioner Iglesiani Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television
program entitled "AngIglesiani Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review
for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law."
Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint?
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence,
any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will
be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that ". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial
function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior
restraint may
only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. "The same submission is made by Mr. Justice
Mendoza.
MTRCB vs ABS-CBN
GR 155282 Jan 17 2005
Facts:
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV)
program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as
prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and
some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the
students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the
episode.
The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of
the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants
alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.

ISSUE: Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint?

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs
programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioner’s power of review under Section 3 (b) of
P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Iglesiani Cristo vs. Court of Appeals ;25second, television programs are
more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third,
petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and
fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents’ constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

B. Subsequent Punishment

People v. Perez – seditious remarks – Criticisms against the branches of government within the range of liberty and speech
unless the intention and the effect be seditious
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period
of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of
free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao
was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the
other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was
the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters
of politicalexpediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through
self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the
police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners
meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No.
4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association.
He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections,
whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar
Association, theCivil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their
opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first,
means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be
prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides
the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy
the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada
clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to
be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right
to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of
any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials,
against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for
or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

Gonzales v. COMELEC – prolonged political campaigns – freedom of expression not absolute; The speech and free press may
be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment.
There is to be then no previous restraint to the communication of views or subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)

CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT
MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to
the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so
warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use
of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that
said partner is deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be
dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation
of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR
SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN
THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact
in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money
shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
 CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY
AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the
facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the
original documents for comparison with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the
witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.