[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
CONCEPT, CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES
THAT GIVE RISE TO OWNERSHIP
DE GUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano
and Lorenza Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego
was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir
of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole
fishpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge
and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to
possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein despite the
expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by Teofilo
Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo filed a complaint
for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo
failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the
fishpond.
ISSUE:
Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner? Whether
Abejo was entitled to rent the property?
HELD:
Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-
owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole,
and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is
at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.”
Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring
an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under
Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of
the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff
cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property
because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition
from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely,
if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can
demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to
DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer
use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875
and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17,
1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,
named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin,
her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were
already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon
themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by
Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious
detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the
properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had
been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of
unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed
by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or
suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion
was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-
owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
“Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses
them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure
the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing
them according to their rights.”
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed
for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership ; but the
record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she
prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according
to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over
the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every
one of the co-owners exercises together with his other co-
participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters,
Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the
Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by
her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing
outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885
and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange
that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made
to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in
common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during
several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in
a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-
ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of
their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to
pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have
been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle
Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the
storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and
effects of common ownership between the litigants.
The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband
the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of
her co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter
from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right
pertaining to her as a co-owner of the property.
SALANTADOL vs. RETES
FACTS:
On January 17,1965, EUFEMIA OMOLE sold her one-third (1/3) share of said
Lot No. 513 for P l,000.00 to defendant CATALINA RETES. On January l8,
1965 the Register of Deeds or the Province of Negros Oriental wrote to
plaintiff Flavia Salatandol which letter was received on January 21, 1965
informing her about the document presented for registration affecting the
one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 in favor of Defendant Catalina
Salatandol to surrender the owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title. Plaintiffs
were never notified by the late EUFEMIA OMOLE nor by Defendant Catalina
Retes about the proposed sale.
On January 30, 1965, Plaintiffs wrote to Defendant CATALINA RETES
informing her of their desire to repurchase the said one-third (1/3) share of
Lot No. 513 which the late Eufemia Omole sold to her and failing to get a
favorable action from Defendant Catalina Retes, Plaintiffs on February 5,
1965 deposited the amount of Pl,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and who, on February 13, 1965 wrote
Defendant Catalina Retes informing the latter about the deposit and of
Plaintiffs' desire to exercise their right of pre-emption as co-owners of
Eufemia Omole.
When Defendant Catalina Retes failed to get the deposit with the Clerk of
Court, on February 16, 1965 (plaintiffs) filed the instant action for Legal
Pre-emption. on February 22, 1965 while this case was still pending,
Defendant Catalina Retes resold the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No.
513 back to EUFEMIA OMOLE.
On March 11, 1965 Eufemia Omole donated the said one-third (1/3) share
of Lot No. 513 to Defendant Catalina Retes as evidenced by a Deed of
Donation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SALANTADOL has a right of legal pre-emption, given that
no notice was given by Omole regarding the sale
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RULING:
The Court ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly
prescribes that the thirty (30) days for making the pre-emption or
redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the
vendor. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have not been furnished
any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by Eufemia Omole, the
vendor. Said plaintiffs' right to exercise the legal right of preemption or
redemption, given to a co-owner when any one of the other co-owners
sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person, as
provided for in Article 1623 of the Civil Code, has not yet accrued.
But, even assuming ex gratia argurmenti, that the notice from the Register
of Deeds of Negros Oriental to co-plaintiff Flavia Salatandol of the
document transferring the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole to
defendant, was equivalent to notice from the vendor, still, it appears that,
while the disputed one-third (1/3) portion of Eufemia Omole and the one-
third (1/3) share of the plaintiffs, (there is no mention of the other third
portion) are embraced in one certificate of title, there had been an
actual partition of the land described in the certificate of title and
each co-owner is in possession of his respective share. This is
deduced from the order of the trial court, dated 30 July 1966, where the
court restrained the parties from harvesting the nuts on the "and in
question," referring to the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole.
As expressed in Article 484 of the Civil Code, a co-ownership exists
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Under such concept, a co-owner cannot point to a
particular portion of the property owned in common as his own,
because his portion thereof is intangible rather than identifiable.
Here, the portion of Eufemia Omole as well as those of the
plaintiffs had been identified and localized, so that co-ownership,
in its real sense, no longer exists.
Hence, the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620
of the Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the plaintiffs over
the portion appertaining to Eufemia Omole.
RIGHT OF ANY CO-OWNER (TO
RECOVER)/LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF CO-
OWNER
ADLAWAN vs. ADLAWAN
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador
Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is
the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to
himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy
the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he
demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment
suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59)
denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their
parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since
birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in
Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for
renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan
and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they
executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the
settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the
suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal
heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and
Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted
the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of
Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the
heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property
via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit
HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that
he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his
wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot.
Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity
thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition.
(Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It
is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of
joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be
instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit
alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the
instant petition should be dismissed.
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr., is the co-owner and
overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu,
designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate.
Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses
Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja own two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the
other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs
of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares
was not determined a quo.
Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena,
Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena
resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the
acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the
other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592,
allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the
original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims that all petitioners
have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own
liberality.
Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by
him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to
expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the
subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the
property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.
On 16 February 1994, respondent filed a Complaint5 for ejectment with
the MTC against the petitioners.
MTC
Found that Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were owned in common by
respondent with other persons. It ruled that respondent did not have a
preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by petitioners,
since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet partitioned nor the disputed
portions assigned to respondent as his determinate share. Thus, the MTC
held that respondent had no right to evict petitioners therefrom.
Consequently, respondent’s Complaint was dismissed.
Notably, the MTC held that respondent and the spouses Bascon were the
owners in common of Lot No. 2587 and their respective shares had not yet
been determined by partition as proven by a testimony given by
respondent.
RTC:
The RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC.
It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co-
owners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by
the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and
possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. The RTC also ruled that
assuming petitioners were authorized to occupy a portion of the co-owned
property, they could resume this occupation when the properties shall
have been partitioned and allocated to the ones who gave them
permission to reside therein.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners
from the property therefrom
RULING:
it is unmistakable that respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from
Lot No. 2587.
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that "[a]ny one of the
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," is a categorical and an
unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the
portions of Lot. No. 2587.
This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an
action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-
owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When
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the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their
rights.
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property
since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy
the same.
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with
respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s
prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
WITH REGARDS TO RESPONDENTS BEING ESTOPPED FROM FILING
AN EJECTMENT CASE:
"[e]stoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their
successors in interest;" thus, only the spouses Bascon or their successors
in interest may invoke such "estoppel." A stranger to a transaction is
neither bound by, nor in a position to take advantage of, an estoppel
arising therefrom.
ARCELONA, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona
are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in
California, U.S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal
heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa.
Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria
Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter collectively
referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a
fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. The six
Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences ownership over the
fishpond.
On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed
between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a
period of three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984.
Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as
caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract
of lease was executed. After the termination of the lease contract, the
lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the
lessors, Olanday, et al.
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio
instituted Civil Case D-7240 for "peaceful possession, maintenance of
security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an
interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al. The case was intended to
maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond.
On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private
respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by
TCT 34341.
Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the
implementing sheriff. The case was docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On
May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners
"to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
Branch 50, Dagupan City."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack
jurisdiction for not including petitioners who, as co-owners of the subject
property, are indispensable parties
RULING: YES.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an
action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not
deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding.
The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific
portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion
belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion
the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled
upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been
properly impleaded as indispensable parties.
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently
held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment
without joining all the other co-owners.
Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and
cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion
belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro-
indiviso. Obviously, the failure to implead petitioners barred the
lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a
judgment therein cannot attain finality.
ALTERATION OF A PROPERTY UNDER CO-
OWNERSHIP
CRUZ vs. CATAPANG
“Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and
prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance
with their rights.”
“The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act
of dominion.”
FACTS:
Leonor, Luz and Norma are co-owners of a parcel of land. Norma allowed
Teofila to build a house on a lot adjacent to their co-owned land. The
house intruded on a portion of their property.
Leonor was surprised to see a part of Teofila's house intruding unto a
portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands to
demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching
their property.
Leonor then filed a forcible entry against Teofila.
Leonor's contention:
She contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma
Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic
principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
partition.
Teofila's Contention:
She counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because
her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the
consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma
Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession
de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-
owners to enjoy the property.
ISSUE:
WON the consent given by one of co-owner of a parcel of land to a person
to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person?
HELD: NO.
A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to
the prejudice of the coownership. A co-owner cannot give valid consent to
another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent
other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily
follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations
include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The
construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code.
There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by
Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz
did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned
property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification
"through strategy or stealth".
Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the
other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover,
respondent's act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister
Norma, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in
fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into
the co-owned property. As such, respondent's acts constitute forcible
entry.
CRUZ vs. LEIS (132 SCRA 97)
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give
her title to the whole property subject of the co-ownership
FACTS:
Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired
from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of
land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a
“widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest)
secured by a mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due
date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: a Deed of Absolute Sale
and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to
repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership
of the land in favor of Cruz.
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The
heirs then filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was
conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC
found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA
merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to
have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply
with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore
subject to the rules on co-ownership?
HELD:
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death,
the conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of
Leis’ half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership
of the land then began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to
repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT
being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer
back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of
registering the title in the Torrens System.
SEGURA vs. SEGURA
No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon those who did not
participate in it.
FACTS:
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died
intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never
decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises
when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession of the disputed inheritance.
On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and
Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating
the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The
partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.
Before such registration, the following developments transpired:
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not
exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the
rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope
Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not
retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de
Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido.
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the
plaintiff's counsel.
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They
alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land
were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their
shares as co-owners of the said property.
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred
by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have
pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of
Court and the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning
the alleged extrajudicial partition
RULING:
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the
Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been
impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the
challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No.
3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was
commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness
under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.
Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.
RAUL ARAMBULO vs. GENARO NOLASCO
A co-owner may dispose a portion of his share without the need of consent
from other co-owners.
FACTS:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a
233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was
succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.
On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all
co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective
shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-
owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell,
because they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding
the sale of the property.
RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their
consent to sale.
Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.
CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel
Nolasco to give their consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this
withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.
RULING:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner
without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However,
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co–owner of the property.
To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of
every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that
the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.
EXTENT OF CO-OWNER’S RIGHT
PAULMITAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other
co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the
buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by
Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7)
children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the
respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to
himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of
Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a
deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment
of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of
Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property.
Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint
against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense
was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11
years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive
ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With
respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are
entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway
prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the
petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits
and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The
CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were
co-owners of their mother’s lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the
property
HELD:
(1) YES
When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states
that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still
alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died,
his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the
same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493
states that “each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer
(Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO
When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The
right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her
share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse
her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the
thing and to taxes.
SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A co-owner’s share of the property shall not be included if she did not
consent to the sale
FACTS:
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her
parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita
Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the
name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-
owners in her favor.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document
and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria
to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
MeTC.
MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to
the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of
petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having
been established as a forgery.
RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their
pleadings.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ
of execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the
sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s
house without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to
serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment
with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her
counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not the portion of the petitioner should be included in the sale,
notwithstanding the fact that she did not affix her signature in the alleged
deed of sale
RULING:
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in
the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes
and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a
party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other
co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition
needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and
determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done
without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as
buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON
PROPERTY
AURORA DEL BANCO, ET AL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, ET AL
FACTS:
Pansacola Brothers (Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel) entered into an
agreement which provided the following terms:
- They will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands
comprising the Island of Cagbalite which has an area of 1,600
hectares.
- The land shall be considered as their COMMON PROPERTY
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
- The co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera
Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Fr.
Manuel who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of
the Cagbalite Island
- Whatever benefits may be derived from the island shall be
shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion:
a. Benedicto – ¼ share
b. Jose – ¼ share
c. Domingo and Baldomera – 2/4 share (which shall be placed
under the care of their father, Fr. Manuel)
The co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the
island. 2 years later, they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of
the agreement entered into. The new agreement provided for a new
sharing and distribution of the lands and whatever benefits may be
derived therefrom:
- The first ¼ portion shall belong to Benedicto
- The second ¼ shall belong to Jose
- The third ¼ shall belong to the children of their deceased
brother, Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Mariano, Maria and
Hipolita
- The fourth and last ¼ shall belong to their nephews and nieces –
Domingo, Baldomera, Marcelina, Francisca, Candelaria,
Gervasia, who being all minors, are still under the care of their
brother, Fr. Manuel. The latter is the real father of said minors
In 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of
Cagbalite Island intered into an agreement to partition the island,
supplemented by another agreement dated 1908.
100 years later, in 1968, private respondents (Alejandra Pansacola, et al)
brought a special action for partition, including as parties the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the 2 nd
contract of co-ownership. In their answer, the petitioners herein (Del
Banco, et al) interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata,
exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in
common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers,
Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel
RULING:
YES.
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or
physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original
owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into
in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be
derived from the island.
The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be
considered as their common property.
In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only
on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also
on the distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated.
With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of
the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the
instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island
which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected
such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined.
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented
agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April
18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of
the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as
yet been done.
Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither
could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the
Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the
heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as
agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11,
1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no
more than another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among
the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative plan
by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph
of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to
be prepared by the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April
18, 1908.
A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a
judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate
portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion
of other co-owners. It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both
under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co-
owner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment
that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in
their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They
must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take
actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan
and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals,
113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the
procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
CORNELIA PAMPLONA vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, ET AL
FACTS:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and 1496 of the
Calamba Friar Land Estate, covered by certificates of title issued in the
name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega”.
They had 6 children – Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all
surnamed Moreto.
More than 6 years after the death of his wife, Monica, Flaviano Moreto,
without the consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, the Deed of Absolute
Sale covering Lot No. 1495 for P900.00, covered by a TCT in the name of
“Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega” although the lot was
acquired during their marriage.
As a result of the sale, a new TCT was issued in the name of “Geminiano
Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte”.
After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Spouses Pamplona constructed
their house on the Eastern part of Lot No. 1496, as Flaviano pointed to it
as the land which he sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, Rafael (Son of
Spouses Pamplona), also built his house within lot 1496 about 1 meter
from its boundary with the adjoining lot.
Flaviano Moreto and vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time
that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of
their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the
subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion
sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
Flaviano died and 5 years after, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to
vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the
ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano as it belonged to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and wife
Monica, and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
Spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises occupied by them;
hence, a case was instituted by the heirs of Monica seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards to the ½ of the
property.
The defendants claimed that the sale made in their favor is valid as the lot
sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers
believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the
parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano
Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because
while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real
intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square
meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale
transaction.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same
RULING:
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY
The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law.
The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending
Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition
between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor
was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving
husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica
Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by
the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership
and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the
exclusive property of the widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part
and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and there is no dispute
that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as
well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery
coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over
nine (9) years.
And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of
Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on
August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no
finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the land
purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to
rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the
property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity
which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without
presenting the same.
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal
partnership was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the
estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving
husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the
area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-
vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon
Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent
coral for piggery.
And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal
and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
belonging to him at the time of the sale. therefore may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless
personal rights are in question.
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner
as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the
boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred
not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any
right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor
Flaiano Moreto.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private
respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-
interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not
extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1,
New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano
Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are
the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of
781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their
predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private
respondents must comply with said obligation.
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE
REGALADO, SR.
FACTS:
The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was divided
in aliquot shares among the 8 co-owners as follows:
1. Salome – 4/16
2. Consorcia – 4/16
3. Alfredo -2/16
4. Maria – 2/16
5. Jose – 1/16
6. Quirico – 1/16
7. Rosalia – 1/16
8. Julita – 1/16
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad
Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad immediately took possession of the land and
built a house thereon.
A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the subject
portion of Lot 162 as security for a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. This
was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage.
Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo)
sold portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the
mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn executed
a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs. On the same
date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to
herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo).
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. 18047.
The Reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the original co-
owners in Lot 162. However, the title was transferred later to Jose
Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each
covered by a respective title in his name.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of
the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned
an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was
erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential
dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way
back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid
the corresponding taxes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid,
notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided co-owned
property
RULING:
SALE IS VALID.
There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and
Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the
sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-
ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the
parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad
would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which
the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the
consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her
undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with
the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention
was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid
objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the
full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully
dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s
undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale
between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are
the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other
words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and
acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940
when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April
14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property
less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the
principle that "no one can give what he does not have," Salome, Consorcia
and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a
co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We
have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only
transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the
extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer
her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second
disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner
of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding
the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
FELIPE SEGURA, ET AL vs. NICOLAS SEGURA, ET AL
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died
intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never
decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises
when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession of the disputed inheritance.
On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and
Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating
the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The
partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.
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Before such registration, the following developments transpired:
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not
exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the
rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope
Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not
retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de
Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido.
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the
plaintiff's counsel.
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They
alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land
were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their
shares as co-owners of the said property.
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred
by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have
pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of
Court and the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning
the alleged extrajudicial partition
RULING:
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the
Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been
impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the
challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No.
3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was
commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness
under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.
Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
FACTS:
Respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married. During
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated in San
Pablo City from Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo as vendee to the
exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
(Homeowners Bank) to be secured by Spouses Dalio’s house and lot in San
Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount
of P300,000.00. As security, Gesmundo executed a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of the bank. The transactions
entered into by Gesmundo took place without the knowledge and consent
of respondent (Miguela).
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
(Homeowners Bank) instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of petitioner (HB) as the highest bidder.
After the lapse of 1 year without the property being redeemed, petitioner,
through its Vice-President, consolidated the ownership by executing an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino died. In one of her visits to the property,
Miguela learned that HB had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to
clean its premises and that her car, a Ford Sedan, was razed because
Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Miguela instituted a case for nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate
of sale, affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance
with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner HB,
claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
subject property.
In its Answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is an exclusive property of Marcelino; hence,
the sale made in favor of HB was valid
RULING:
IT IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY; THE SALE IS VOID.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying
Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August
8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real
estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
Effects of Redemption of Co-Owned
Property By One Co-owner
Abille vs CA
Facts:
- the land in question is Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
originally belonged to Felisa Alzul as her own private property
- she married twice (she had an only child Rustico Adille herein
defendant and her children to the 2nd marriage were the plaintiffs)
- Felisa sold the property with a right to repurchase for a period of 3
years (she died on 1942 without being able to redeem)
- during the period of redemption Abille repurchased by himself alone
and executed a deed of extrajudicial partition representing himself to
be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa
- after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-siblings filed the
case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed
- trial court rendered decision in favor of Abille sustaining the position
that the defendant was and became the absolute owner
- CA reversed the decision of the trial court
Issue: WON a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held
in common
Held:
- no, the right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone, though the records show that petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, it did not make him the owner of
all of it. It did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (refer
to Art 488)
- the other co-owners are liable to reimburse him for their shares in
redemption expenses since he cannot claim exclusive right to the
property owned in common
- there was fraud committed in registration of the property
- prescription cannot be applied in the case for prescription as a mode
of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation of the co-ownership
- in the instant case petitioner failed to comply with the requisites of
repudiation
- petition is denied
TAN vs CA
“Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of
redemption period terminates co-ownership. A co-owner who
redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation
becomes the sole owner thereof.”
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
FACTS:
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a
parcel of land and its improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six
children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie
Tan.
The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several
obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their
obligations.
China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption
period expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a
settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to repurchase even
after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973.
The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China
Bank consolidated its ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D.
Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement
using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the
name of all the heirs.
D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages.
RTC ruled that the property was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the
foreclosure and consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption
period has expired?
HELD:
Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased
parents, there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among the
heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property.
Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of
all.
The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the
disputed property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the
brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired
more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank
consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name.
When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire without
redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation
of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was
extinguished.
Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she
is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking Corporation is
ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of
the petitioner alone.
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
MARIANO vs De Vega
Facts:
- sps Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino owned as conjugal
property, during their lifetime 29 parcels of unregistered land without
improvements and all situated in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan
- both died intestate
- Mariano instituted an action with the CFI for partition and delivery of
possession of their corresponding shares in the conjugal estate of
decedents-spouses
- petitioners filed the case because private respondents had taken
possession of the whole conjugal property and appropriated to
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners the products coming from
the 29 parcels of land
- the trial court denied the petition
Issue: WON the trial court erred in deciding the case
Held:
- no
- SC found the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription under
Sec 40 of PA No 190 to be inaccurate
- since under Art. 494 no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
against his co-owners so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership
- there’s no repudiation of co-ownership. In view of their lack of a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the petitioners
(the other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire the shares
of the petitioners by prescription.
- assailed order is set aside
PAULMITAN VS CA
Facts:
- Agatona Paulmitan died in 1952 left 2 parcels of land located in the
Province of Negros Occidental
- in 1963 the estate of Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to
the 2 lots remained in the name of Agatona.
- in August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot
No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of
Agatona. TCT No. 35979 was issued in Donato’s name
- As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of
Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter
- in 1952 Lot No. 1091 was forfeited for non-payment of taxes and was
sold at a public auction with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer
- in 1974, Fanesa redeemed the property
- the respondents filed before the CFI upon learning of the transactions
- CFI dismissed the complaint upon finding merit in petitioners’
affirmative defense (Lot No. 757)
- as regard to Lot 1091, CFI decided in favor of respondents ruled that
as descendants of Agatona they are entitled to 1/2 of 1091 pro diviso
- Fanesa did not vest exclusive ownership over the entire land but only
gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the
property
- CA affirmed trial court’s decision
Issue: WON respondents are entitled to 1/2 of Lot 1091, pro diviso
Held:
- Yes
- the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter,
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over
the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2)
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the
land in question with the respondents, her first cousins.
- the redemption of the land did not terminate the co-ownership
nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership
(same issue raised in Adille vs CA)
- Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire
lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did
acquire the right to be reimbursed for half of the redemption
price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners (Article 1613 of CC)
- petition is denied
AGUILAR vs CA
Facts:
- Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers
- on October 28, 1969, the 2 brothers purchased a house and lot in
Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining
years in a peaceful neighborhood
- they initially agreed that Virgilio’s share was 2/3 while Senen was 1/3
but by virtue of a written memorandum in 1970 they agreed that their
interests in the house and lot should be equal
- after the death of their father petitioner demand respondent to vacate
the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof shall be
divided among them
- because of the refusal of Senen, Virgilio filed an action to compel the
sale of the house and lot so they could divide the proceeds
- On July 26, 1979 trial court found both to be co-owners of the house
and lot in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. But
ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the
property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot,
free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of
defendant to delay partition.
- trial court ordered defendant to vacate the property for they could not
agree to the amount
- CA set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the
assailed judgment rendered by default.
Issue: WON CA erred in not holding that the motion of defendant through
counsel to cancel the pre-trail was dilatory in character
WON CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial
Held:
- first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-
trial is mandatory and a party who fails to appear may be considered
as in default. In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has authority
to declare respondent in default.
- the trial court is correct in denying the motion to postpone pre-trial for
lack of merit for pre-trial should be much more than mere perfunctory
treatment. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its
objective i.e speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases
- SC uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to
the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-
owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court
ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July
1979.L
- Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner may demand
at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned
- being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the
property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners.
- when petitioner file an action to compel the sale of the property and
the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased
- the respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and
his family vacate
- petition is granted
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
PRESCRIPTION AND REPUDIATION OF CO-
OWNERSHIP
DELIMA VS CA
Facts:
- Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands
Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government leaving as
his only heirs his 3 brothers and a sister
- TCT 2744 was issued in the name of “The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima,
deceased, represented by Galileo Delima”
- On 1953 Galileo executed an affidavit of extrajudicial declaration of
heirs, TCT 2744 was cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued in 1954 in the
name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. He
paid taxes from 1954 to 1965
- in 1968 petitioners who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita filed
with the CFI an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property
and annulment of TCT 3009 against Galileo and Vicente (joined as
party defendant for his refusal to joint in their action)
- trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners
- respondents appealed to the CA, the appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision and upheld the claim of Galileo that all the brothers
and sister had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
property in his favor, considering that he alone paid the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes
Issue: WON petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to
perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion
of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property
Held:
- the petitioners are already barred by prescription having only filed the
action in 1968 (more than 10 years have already lapse)
- the moment when Galileo executed an extrajudicial declaration of
heirs, in effect denying or repudiating the ownership, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by
Galileo seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and
of their rights thereunder.
- since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes after 10 years, it is from the date of the
issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
- petition is denied
PANGAN VS. CA
FACTS:
The subject property is a 635 sq. meter lot owned by Leon Hilario.
Petitioners are Hilario’s grand children thru Silveria (daughter) and
respondent, Teodora Garcia, thru Catalina (daughter of Hilario).
Petitioners filed an application of title on the ground of their continuous
possession of the property. There were no oppositors, so the application
was approved.
Subsequently, respondent claims to have a right over the property as an
heir of Leon (since her mother is a daughter of Leon).
When the case reached the CA, the CA reversed decision of trial court
saying that petitioners have not acquired the land thru acquisitive
prescription.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have acquired land thru acquisitive prescription
HELD:
Petitioners claim that they have acquired acquisitive prescription by
possessing and paying the taxes of the land. SC said that tax declarations
are not conclusive proofs of ownership. SC said that tac declarations
cannot be sole proof because the tax declaration in their name could have
been done out of convenience for the co-owners.
According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was
admitted by the private respondent herself Testifying for herself at the
hearing on her opposition in the registration proceedings, she declared:
ATTY. CANLAS:
Q: After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of Tomas Pangan
of your alleged share in the property in question?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did they tell you?
A: They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my
share.
Q: How many years ago did you ask from them?
A: Immediately after the death of their father.
Q: That was some 20 years ago?
A: I do not know how many years ago.
Q: And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did not file any
action to recover your share on the land in question?
A: No sir, it was only this time .
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a
clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners
and that they have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is
making to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal
notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run
against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if
they do not seasonably defend it.
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following
circumstances:
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the
cestui que trust; and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
SC said that the case at bar did not meet all 3 requirements.
MARITEGUI VS. CA
FACTS:
This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo
Mariategui, who died without a will.
During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife
died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed
away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo
in death.
The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left
certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later,
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain
lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by
his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court, contending that
since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were deprived of their
respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said
that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.
The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second
marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the
issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.
CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the
estate. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights
over the said lot
HELD:
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 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the
private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased.
Existence of the Marriage
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his
son who testified that “when his father was still living, he was able to
mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a
Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although
no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided
all the requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is
founded on the following rationale:
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law.
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of
their being married must be admitted as a fact.
Filiation
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private
respondents. Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in
Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the
two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but
they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same
manner as their brother Jacinto.
Prescription of Action for Partition
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that
private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action
for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does
not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action
for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other
words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.
Petition dismissed.
HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA
Facts:
Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in
common and pro-indiviso. Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the
owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation.
According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over
the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to himself and Maningding
renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favour of
Roque. Roque transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland
to his daughter, Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale.
Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque
Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs
sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the
produce but were unsuccessful.
Bauzon’s contentions:
* the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was
executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by
Segunda Maningding.
* denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to
the sugarland.
* had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession
of the subject properties.
Issue:
WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
YES.
Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or
losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary
prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30)
years, without need of title or of good faith.
The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only
by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now
transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with
proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and
receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in
the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The
possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and
cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and
public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to
the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was
never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His
possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-
founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed
and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in
his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the
parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Co-
owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may
prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that
he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of
his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without
specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to
the other co-owners of the occupant's claim of title in himself in
repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession,
as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any
shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession
of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights
of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12
Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the
acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription
arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As
disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the
property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never
given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they
demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of
their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost
11
 [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP

thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right.

Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

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