Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
INTERBEHAVIORAL
PHILOSOPHY
J. R. Kantor
vit
CONTENTS
VIII
CONTENTS
ix
C O N T E N T S
x
CON T E NT S
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
xi
CONTE NT S
xu
PREFACE
XIII
-
M ay 1980 J.R .K .
XV
INTRODUCTION
Perennial Problems
of Philosophy
CHAPTER 1
PHILOSOPHY
IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?
Basic to all the varieties o f philosophyzing and the resulting philosophi
cal products is the construction of systems of assumptions, beliefs, and
other intellectual attitudes. Such systems vary with natural and social
conditions prevailing in the purview of thinkers. Historically philosophies
swing between the creation of literary vehicles to escape from conditions
that plague the constructors and their compatriots, to expressions of
satisfaction by their inventors with themselves and the world in general.
Thus some philosophical products are characterized by the deepest gloom
of pessimism while others m irror the peaks of exultation. With this sugges
tion concerning the identification of philosophy we may explore other
aspects of philosophyzing for light on the merits or ranking of the many
historical or current systems.
3
P E R E N N I A L P R O B L E M S OF P H I L O S O P H Y
IN F O R M A L A N D T E C H N IC A L P H IL O SO PH Y Z IN G
UTISTIC A N D O B SE R V A T IO N A L A SP E C T S O F PH IL O SO PH Y
4
I D E N T I T Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
/-,-vlV
should be the m ost cultivated aspect of hum an living keeps people
enmeshed in the m ost retrogressive intellectual condition despite the high
level of technological, political, economic, and social scales o f living.
T radition and ritual rem ain the m ost effective cultural controls over the
otherwise most advanced people.
AUTHENTIC OR SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY
Genuine philosophical attitudes are essentially those based upon the
responses of persons to confrontable objects and events including the
thinker himself. By contrast they stand over against autistic o r essentially
verbal form ulations. Scientific philosophyzing separates sharply
constructions that consist o f such inventions as forces, essences, and
powers with their products o f universals, absolutes, transcendental *•
creations, and so on, from the objects and events with which persons can
' interaet-and'Observe. Interbehavioral Philosophy stands directly opposed
‘ to the puerile verbiages o f the orthodox systems reported in the
• conventional histories of philosophy.
Authentic philosophy advocates the complete abolition of the nebulous
w raith of historical spiritism as cherished by m any conventional
philosophers whose votaries attem pt to evade or disclaim its mystical and
\ religious source. Although current advanced philosophers claim to be
(yotariesfrf science they still argue for a “mind” in addition to a “body” and
J o r a “will” whether free or determined.
A n acquaintance with the conventional History of Philosophy
convinces that the abiding essence of traditional philosophy is supernatural
and transcendental. The entire philosophical scene since the Greco-Rom an
period is haunted by ghosts o f various shapes and sizes. In the days of the
Church Fathers and the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, philosophy was
frankly centered in the dom ain of theology and consisted of arguments
concerning a grand creator and his angel ministers as explanations of
everything known o r thought of. In those days, thinkers invented a world
5
***'
s> vA J"* * t ‘
' P E R E N N I A - ------- --------------- - - ---------
6
f t *
I D E N T I T Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
only refers to supreme beings but to chemical com pounds also, and
isfi provides many semantic problems in the literature of philosophy.
V The concepts and the term s “meaning” and the “ideal” have become
& effective tools by means of which thinkers of many persuasions have helped
£
to conserve spiritistic institutions. They have used these tools to pry into
<N
many mysteries which they have themselves created. N ot realizing that they
vp'"'
V: are simply reifying words, they ask fo r thejneaninE of “existence”: they ask
“who am I?” and “what am I?” and as certain scientists make plain, they
believe that the mystery of self is the m ost pressing of all scientific pursuits.2
Are these authentic questions or mythological answers? The egregious
error here is to be dom inated by historical spiritism so that things and
\ events are not invariably the starting points for all valid speculation but
only surface appearances of a “Reality” that underlies them and gives them
their significance. One is tempted to ask whether such scientists have no
faith in the world of anatom ists, biochemists, geologists, physiologists, or
anthropologists. O f course, it is true that many scientists of the types just
mentioned also perform sacrifices at the altar of spiritism.
r
— Similarly, the translation of the term “spirit” into the “ideal” has served
to elevate the nonexistent and the most objectionable things and practices
to the ultimate good. Bits of spirit have become ideal building blocks out of
which grand systems have been erected, prominent examples from
different ages are Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea, and
Carnap’s Logical Structure o f the World}
\ W hat is_of the greatest .importance here is the wav spiritistic philosophy^
has always influenced scientists to transform things and events into what V ’
* V./.
v
they are not and could not be.4 Striking examples are the transform ation
by neurologists of the brain into a nest of “functions” and a storehouse of
, “ideas” and “ijiemories!Land-the rubbing out by physicists from the world
7 of alkcolors, tastes, odors, and soundsT^Scientists, too, join laymen in
transform ing all values and v irtu e sin to transcendental, that is, verbal
abstractions. The ultimately baleful effect of inventing spiritism culminates
in creationism. This kind of intellectual behavior amounts to a retreat from
things and events actually encountered and results in the loss of
2Schrodinger, E., Nature and the Greeks, Cambridge, Cambridge Unix’. Press. 1954, and
Schrodinger, E„ Science and Humanism, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951.
Schopenhauer, A., Die Welt als Wide unci vorstcllung, 2 vols. Halle, O. Hendel, 1819; and Carnap,
R., The Logical Structure o f the World; pseudoproblems in Philosophy (R. A. George, trs.), Berkeley,
Univ. of California Press, 1967.
4 Kanlor, J. R., "Scientific Psychology and Specious Philosophy,” Psychological Record. 1969, 19,
15-27.
7
, 1/O f. I A L PROBLEMS OF P H I L O S O P H Y
U
reciation of man’s nature and his relation to those things and events,
is in no sense difficult then to account for the origin and perseverance
anscendental ways of thinking..At the bottom of the process lies man’s
tcity for manipulating language.' Persons embody in language their
ude toward w h af tfiey"dislike, fear, or favor and thus provide
jctures” or intellectual institutions. Such institutions achieve their life
vigor by virtue of other persons performing similar reactions to the
inal stimulating objects and conditions. And as is easily seen, such
tutions potentially exert good or evil consequences depending upon
icular circumstances. How different all this is from authentic
osophy.
PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE: VALID AND INVALID
i recent decades the scientific dom ains have been rather amply supplied
i philosophical analyses and interpretations. Thus have grown up a
inct specialization of study called philosophy of science. (What we
uld expect of such a discipline is the a nalysis a nd criticism of scientific
k and its results by way of com paring and coordinating the interest and
ievement of individuals and groups who investigate the confrontable
Id of things and events, including the dom ain of the stars and planets, .
varieties of vegetations and animals and their actions, as well as the
al and political events of hum an societvj)But what we find instead is the
osition of conventional spiritistic philosophy upon scientists and
nee. Thus we may differentiate between a valid and an invalid
osophy of science. The form er is an aid to both philosophy and science
je the latter misrepresents and mystifies scientific works.*W hether a
ntist’s philosophical assumptions are valid or invalid depends upon the
gruity or incongruity of postulates, hypotheses, protocols, and laws,
1 original data: In the following paragraphs we display some examples
>uch congruities and incongruities from various sources, including
ventional philosophy itself.
. Mathematics. The assumption that geometry is a closed and absolute
em became established and endured for several thousands of years
:>re it was discovered that the Euclidean premises were only one of a
ying series and that other geometrical systems were possible and
ducible on the basis of very different premises.
. Physics. Einstein’s notion th at a mysterious capacity of a
:hematician enables him to formulate an equational system which later
liscovered to fit data is a good example of invalid premises. He
8
developed this notion on the basis that “nature is the realization of the
simplest conceivable mathematical ideas” and that “the creative principle r
resides in mathematics.” 5_It was based on the disregard of the many details
involved in the process of choosing the parameters of equations. Einstein
z overlooked the fact that only the mathematician experienced with the data
< in question and the expertise to see the relations between constructions and
^ events can succeed in such enterprises. Einstein was unjustified in accepting
vj- the Kantian dictum that philosophers give laws to nature.
c. Ethics. The impropriety of assuming fixed and absolute premises is
well illustrated in the dom ain of morals. Students of ethics adopt either the
assumption that there are absolute laws, guides, or descriptions of the good
and proper life or they assume a vacuous relativism. In both cases they
perform a great leap away from the actual situations of moral behaviorand
^ resort to verbal abstractions, thus failing to present adequate descriptions
of proper conduct, justiceTand injustice which initiate their system building
in the first place.
d. Education. Because the dom ain of conventional formal education is
so intertwined with social, economic, and political circumstances, it affords
a large num ber of invalid assumptions. These center about the questions of
5Einstein. A., Essays iniScience. New York, Covici-Friede. 1934. pp. 17, 18.
PERENNI AL PROBLEMS OF P H I L O S O P H Y
1NTERBEHAVIORAL P H IL O SO PH Y ID E N T IFIE D
Barnes aside, since names are only imposed attributes o f things, our
nmary of the descriptions of an authentic or valid philosophy marks it
from all historical and transcendental speculations. There is no place in
;rbehavioral philosophy for ultimate reality, absolutes, eternal truths.
versality, totalism , o r infinities of any description whatever,
erbehavioral philosophy remains forever within the bounds of
Fractions of persons with the things and events with which they comeT
3 contact. O nly inferences derived from such contacts have any place in
losophical systems.
Scientific or valid philosophy is sufficiently identified as a type of hum an
ction to the things and events confronted in their observable form. The
il of such behavior is to arrive at the nature of things and events as free as
;sible from the verbal patination laid upon them by generations of
nkers from all sorts of periods and places. Philosophical reactions as
ihisticated approaches to things and events become increasingly expert
h experience, that is the multiplication of critical interactions.
Descriptions of confrontations with things and events as well as of the
rigs confronted are obviously constructs, but instead of being media for
aosing qualities on inorganic objects, biological organisms and their
tavior, and psychological and social events, they are records of
;ervations and experiments performed upon the things studied.
jreover, there is strict limitation placed on the extrapolation from the
dies. Otherwise the evaluations and speculations tend toward vacuous
1 misty verbiage. What no observation or experiment reveals is purely
Istic.
While constructions are very different from the things observed,
>erimented upon, or speculated about, they must in the final analysis be
ived from those things. There is a continuity in the behavior of
losophers from bare contact with things to the construction of the most
;tract hypotheses and axioms. Notions of hidden qualities, mysterious
itions. and theologically based arcana are delusory inventions.
10
I DE N T I T Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
11
SECTION
I
Philosophical Systems
in Succession
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
IN FO R M A L A N D U N SY ST E M A T IZ E D INTERVAL
15
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
: Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational, Boston. Beacon Press. 1957.
16
SERIES OF P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS
spirit though classicists well know the great emphasis Greek philosophers
put upon the four exclusive elements of nature — fire, water, air, and earth.
There is a continuity in hum an affairs, social systems, politics,
economics, and all other forms of organization and behavior constitute a
unity of many variations. This is true of philosophy. M any specific items
have become integrated into abiding institutions of current times. It is the
task of current philosophers to analyze the thinking of the times and to
differentiate between what has been thought under specific conditions and
what can be thought now that events and their stimulations have evolved a
new competence. We turn now to a purview of the formal philosophical
systems.
17
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCES SI ON
in clu sio n s from the observations he made and did not create autistic
in stru c tio n s on the basis of language which is so fertile a potentiality for
nythology and superstition.
It is quite remarkable that such an eminent scientist as Schrodinger*
ooks down upon the Greeks because they resorted to what he calls Sense
Data and did not make great use of the kind of speculation and
magi nation which results in all sorts of spiritistic thought and the division
sf the world into inner and outer or spirit and matter.
For convenience of exposition the succession of periods or intervals may
De divided into six distinct groups as follows:
The Confrontational Interval.
The Transcendental Interval.
Science Intrudes upon Faith.
The Materialistic Interval.
The Positivistic Interval.
The Interval of Linguistic Analysis.
Each is discussed in the above order.
•Schrodinger, E., Nature and the Creeks. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 1954.
18
CHAPTER 3
TH E C O N F R O N T A T IO N A L INTERVAL
/
The Naively Objective Postulations
o f the Early Greek Philosophers
When philosophical attitudes were first recorded, the search for reality
carried thinkers to a simple cause for the various objects in the world. It
19
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
’ Cohen. H., Logik tier reinen Erkenmniss, Berlin, Cassirer, 1902, p. 27.
* Hartmann, E.. Platos Ixjgik des Seins, in H. Cohen and P. Natorp’s Philosophische Arbeiten, vol.
3. Giessen. Topetmann, 1909, p. 44.
vWindclhand, W.. History o f Ancient Philosophy (H. E. Cushman, trs.), New York, Scribner’s,
1899. p. 62.
22
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NTERVAL
II
The Development o f Definite Postulates
in the Platonic Doctrine o f Knowledge
P ra c tic a lly fro m th e b eg in n in g o f th e A th e n ia n period th e o rie n ta tio n in
th e w orld o f things is m a d e w ith a fairly critical view to th e validity o f the
categ o ries fu n c tio n in g in this o rie n ta tio n . A fter passing th ro u g h the stages
10In contrast with the Ionian philosophers who merely quote the changes to support their doctrines
of fundamental substance. Cf. in this connection Woodbridge, F. J. E.. Philosophical Review. 10,
359-374.
11Comford, F. M.. Op. cil. p. 154.
23
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
24
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NTERVAL
//
The Development o f Definite Postulates
in the Platonic Doctrine o f Knowledge
P ra c tic a lly fro m th e b e g in n in g o f th e A th e n ia n perio d th e o rie n ta tio n in
th e w orld o f things is m a d e w ith a fairly critical view to th e validity o f the
categ o ries fu n c tio n in g in th is o rie n ta tio n . A fter passing th ro u g h th e stages
10In contrast with the Ionian philosophers who merely quote the changes to support their doctrines
of fundamental substance. Cf. in this connection Woodbridge. F. J. E.. Philosophical Review, 10.
359-374.
"Comford, F. M.. Op. cil. p. 154.
23
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCES SI ON
24
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NT ERVAL
“ Socrates’ main aim was of course to determine ethical concepts, cf. Windelband, W„ Praludien,
Aufsatze und Reden zur Philosophic und ihrer Geschichte, Tubingen, Mohr, 1915, p. 73.
■’ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 987b, 10.
“ Plato, Republic, 511.
25
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
|.-
W e m ay d istin g u sh several d ifferent m otives w hich e n te r in to th e fo rm u -
u io n o f th e d o c trin e o f ideas. P ro m in e n t a m o n g these are th e m a th em ati-
al basis o f P la to ’s scientific th in k in g a n d his in terest in m ed iatin g betw een
tie P a rm e n id e a n a n d H e racle itian o p p o s itio n ,19 w ith w hich is co n n n e cted
he related p ro b lem o f th e O n e a n d th e M an jk A n o th e r im p o rta n t m otive
> th e a tte m p t to estab lish th e v alid ity o f p re d ic a tio n over ag ainst th e
ceptical c o n te n tio n o f A n tisth en es.20 A ll these m otives are closely con-
lected a n d in fo rm us c o n c e rn in g th e p e c u lia r d ev elo p m en t w hich P la to
>oes th ro u g h b efo re he reaches a secure logical p osition. It is h ard ly
questionable th a t he is re ally a tte m p tin g to d ev elo p a m eth o d o lo g y o f
(n ow ledge, b u t he is d o in g so u n d e r th e stress o f a m ystical a n d m etap h y si
cal influence.21 All these d ifferen t m otives w hich a p p e a r in P la to ’s p h ilo
sophical fo rm u la tio n find th eir e x p la n a tio n in the cu ltu ra l s itu a tio n o f his
period, a n d it is o n ly by s tu d y in g th e in tellectu al b a c k g ro u n d o f P la to th a t
we ca n get a n y light as to th e a p p a re n tly d irect c o n tra d ic tio n s o f th e
d o ctrin e o f ideas.
T h e logical d e v e lo p m e n t o f P la to reaches th e p o in t at w h ich he e x a m
ines very critically th e fu n c tio n o f ju d g m e n t.22 H e clearly ap p reciates th e
necessity o f rigidly an d critically d eterm in in g th e n a tu re o f reality in a n
effort to o rien t h im self in th e w o rld o f things an d events. T h e critical
interest o f his p h ilo so p h ic al p e rio d e m b ra ces th e p ro b lem o f th e validity o f
know ledge, fo r th in k e rs have p ro g ressed b ey o nd the naive n atu ralism o f
th e Io n ia n s a n d are re ach in g o u t fo r a m o re p ro fo u n d in te rp re ta tio n o f
nature.
B ecause o f th e c irc u m sta n ces u n d e r w h ich P la to ’s th o u g h t d evelops, his
w ork does n o t result in a m e th o d by w hich th e co n crete objects o f everyday
events are ev a lu a ted . In ste a d , h e a r r iv e s ja tth e resu lt th a t th e essence o f
things m u st be included in th e term s d escribing th e m . P la to th u s isolates
th e " c o m m o n ” o r g en e ral p re d ic ates w h ich a re logical ab stra c tio n s o f
existence.23 His achievem ent lies in ca rry in g fo rw ard the w o rk o f S o crates
w ho m akes th e P y th a g o re a n fo rm s in to d escriptive functions. P la to co n -
)
26
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NT ERVAL
L
27
. s>
.r*'
A
\ P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
/// ty k * 1
The Statical Function o f the Aristotelian Categories
T h e c o n su m a tio n o f th e m e th o d o lo g ic a l ach iev em en t o f G re ek th o u g h t
is A risto tle’s logic, w hich is e s s e n tia lly ^ p ro cess!o f su b su m in g a co n c rete
object T inder a perfect form . T h is process ch aracterizes th e final dev elo p
m en t o f G reek science, w hich is a m e th o d o f classification a n d d escrip tio n ,
11 N a t o r p . P „ Plains Ideenlehre, p p . 1 2 6 IT.. 144.
'■Ibid., p. 229.
28
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NTERVAL
33Cf. Zeller, E„ Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, ‘Philosophy of the Greeks' (B. F. C. Costelloe,
and J. H. Muirhead, trs.), vol. I., New York, Longmans, 1897, p. 162 ft.
MAristotle, Metaphysica, bks. i. xiii, xiv.
35Aristotle, De Partibus Animatium, i, 5.
“ Cf. Windetband, W„ History o f Philosophy(i. H. Tufts, trs.). New York. Macmillan. 1910. p. 132.
29
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCES S I ON
30
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NT E RVAL
31
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
32
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I N T E R V A L
33
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
34
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NT E RVAL
35
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
.ristotle finds it necessary on s sveral occasions to defend the study of concrete facts. Cf. De
>us Animaliwn, i, S.
'f. Taylor. A. E., Aristotle, p. 41
T. Aristotle's criticism of Demo< ritus*
i doctrine of touch, in Beane, J., Greek Theories o f Bemen-
'ognition, Oxford, Clarendon, |906, pp. 181 f.
36
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NTERVAL
'"Zeller. E.. Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 2. pp. 216 IT.
,0Cf. Aristotle. Metaphvsica. xii. 6.
''/hid.. 1051a. 20.
’•’ No doubt Aristotle's insistence upon the importance of the individual in his political philosophy
and the reality of particulars in his natural philosophy reflects clearly the current political conditions of
Greece.
” Cf. Livingstone. R. W.. The Creek Genius and its Meaning to Vs. Oxford. Clarendon. 1912. ch. 3.
74/hid.
37
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
38
THE C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I NTERVAL
*■The concept of the “Good” is probably the most important category in Greek philosophy.
,JThe neo-Kantians overtly assert the uselessness of interpreting Plato from the standpoint of his
cultural background. Cf. Hartmann. E.. Plains Leigik ties Seins. p. v.
*JZeller, E„ Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, vol. I. p. 399.
39
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSION
40
C H A PTER 4
T H E T R A N S C E N D E N T A L IN T E R V A L
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
T h e tra n sc e n d e n ta l ag e is th e a g e o f m a n , an age o f h u m a n is tic p a ra n o ia
w ith freed o m to w a llo w in th e g ro ssest m ythology a n d m ysticism . By
m ean s o f th e spiritistic d ic h o to m y m a n created a p e rso n a l g o d w h o is
o m n isc ie n t a n d o m n ip o te n t a n d w h o m m a n n o t only resem bles b u t is a
p a r t of. T h is is th e a g e o f th e d iv in ity o f m a n a n d also o f th e h u m a n ity o f
go d , th e m a n god.
41
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSION
42
THE T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I NTERVAL
infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the stale, a conversion of the soul to
God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to
help the society to which he belongs and enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures; but rather,
by means of a burning faith, by contempt for the world and its standards, by ecstasy,
suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his
immeasurable sin. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of
sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.
Now this antithesis is often exaggerated by the admirers of one side or the other. A
hundred people write as if Sophocles had no mysticism and practically speaking no
conscience. Half a dozen retort as if St. Paul had no public spirit and no common sense. I
have protested often against this exaggeration; but, stated reasonably, as a change or
proportion and not a creation of new hearts, the antithesis is certainly based on fact. The
historical reasons for it are suggested above, in the first of these essays.
My description of this complicated change is, of course, inadequate, but not, I hope,
one-sided. I do not depreciate the religions that followed on this movement by describing
the movement itself as a “failure of nerve". Mankind has not yet decided which of two
opposite methods leads to the fuller and deeper knowledge ol the world: the patient and
sympathetic study of the good citizen who lives in it, or the ecstatic vision of the saint who
^"rejects it. But probably most Christians are inclined to believe that without some failure and
sense of failure, without a contrite heart and conviction of sin, man can hardly attain the
religious life. 1can imagine a historian of this temper believing that the period we are about
to discuss was a necessary softening of human pride, a P ra e p a ra lio E v a n g e lic a l
Wherefore, when it is asked what we ought to believe in matters of religion, the answer is not
to be sought in the exploration of the nature of things (re ru m n a u tra ), after the manner of
those whom the Greeks called “physicists.” Nor should we be dismayed if Christians are
ignorant about the properties and the number of the basic elements of nature, or about the
motion, order, and deviations of the stars, the map of the heavens, the kinds and nature of
animals, plants, stones, springs, rivers, and mountains; about the divisions of space and
time, about the signs of impending storms, and the myriad other things which these
“physicists” have come to understand, or think they have. For even these men. gifted with
such superior insight, with their ardor in study and their abundant leisure, exploring some
of these matters by human conjecture and others through historical inquiry, have not yet
learned everything there is to know. For that matter, many of the things they are so proud to
have discovered are more often matters of opinion than of verified knowledge.
For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, whether in
heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the
Creator, who is the one and the true God. Further, the Christian believes that nothing exists
' Murray. G.. Five Stages of Greek Religion. New York. Doubleday. Doran. 1955. pp. 119 f.
43
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
jod himself and what comes from him; and he believes that God is triune, i.e. the
;r, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same
;r, but one and the same Spirit of the Father and the Son.*
44
THE T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I NTERVAL
45
CHAPTER 5
SCIENCE INTRUDES UPON FAITH
46
SCI ENCE I N T R U D E S UPON FAITH
T H E P R E E M IN E N C E O F S P IR IT
By th e 17th ce n tu ry scientific a c h ie v em en ts sto o d o u t w ith a c k n o w l
ed g ed a p p re c ia tio n . In th e re g istry o f h o n o r th ere w ere th e rev o lu tio n izin g
o f th e S u n -E a rth re la tio n s, h e lio c e n trism w as well estab lish ed , th e law s o f
G a lileo (1564-1642) a n d o f K e p le r (1571-1630) lead in g to th e w o rk o f
N e w to n ’s ( 1642-1727) law o f g ra v ita tio n . A ccepted to o w as th e h y p othesis
th a t th e so u l o r m in d w ith th e a id o f G o d a n d m a th e m a tic s w as c a p a b le o f
p en e tra tin g to th e v ery basis o f all existence.
In th e 17th c e n tu ry F ra n c e b e c am e th e m o d el o f h u m a n p ro sp e rity and
ach ie v em en t. P o litically , ec o n o m ic ally , a n d cu ltu ra lly th a t n a tio n sh o n e
w ith so la r brilliance. T h a t su ccess w as reflected in th e m irro r o f p h ilo so p h y .
It w as a F re n c h m a n , D e sc a rte s (1596-1650), w h o set th e p ace fo r th a t
discipline. H is o u ts ta n d in g p rin c ip le w as th e p o w er a n d c o n q u e st o f th in k
ing. U p o n his b a n n e r w as e m b la z o n e d th e m o tto C o g ito E rg o S u m .
T h in k in g g u a ra n te e d all e x is te n c e a n d all kn o w ledge. W ith th e fu n d a m e n
tal p re m ise ex p ressed b y his m o tto D e sc a rte s filled th e pages o f the h isto ry
o f p h ilo so p h y b o th w ith a d h e re n ts a n d o p p o n e n ts.
D e sc a rte s is o fte n c h a ra c te riz e d as a lead e r a n d fo re ru n n e r o f m o d e m
th in k in g , a n d o f c o u rse o n th e b asis o f c o n v e n tio n a l m o d e m p h ilo so p h y he
richly deserves his acclaim . By a ll m e a su re s he w as a tru ly em in en t an d
v ersatile scentist. A p ro d u c tiv e m a th e m a tic ia n , physicist, a n d physiologist,
he achieved g reatn ess in th e q u e s t fo r k n o w led g e o f thin g s a n d events.
A n d o f c o u rse he w as a p rim e d u a list. H e d eclared the universe is m ad e
47
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
48
SCI ENCE I N T R U D E S UPON FAI TH
SU B ST A N C E S A S PSY C H IC SY N T H E SIS
O f K a n t (1728-1804) it is re p o rte d th a t he never left his beloved K oriigs-
b u rg th o u g h h e c o m p o s e d a tre a tis e o n P h y sical G e o g ra p h y . It w as this
v ic a rio u s p e re g rin a tio n th a t in d u c e d h im to cro ss th e c h a n n e l a n d find
in sp ira tio n in th e w o rk o f H u m e . S in ce h e c o u ld n o t fo rsa k e th e teac h ings
o f L eib n izian in tu itio n ism he s ta n d s as th e great synthesizer o f d iverse
co g n itiv e p sy ch ism s. S o h e d e c la re d th a t w hile all k n o w led g e certain ly
'C begins w ith ex p erien ce it d o es n o t arise fro m experience. N o th in g is m o re
c e rta in fo r h im th a n th a t th e re a re a p rio ri principles o f so u l n o t derived
1Hume, D., A Treatise o f Human Nature (L. A. Sclby-B ed.). Oxford, Clarendon. 1896. p. 252.
49
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
TH E REALITY O F K N O W L ED G E A N D TH IN K IN G
. . . I maintain that in every special nalural doctrine onlyso much science proper is to be met
/ith as mathematics; for. in accordance with the foregoing, science proper, especially
science) of nature, requires a pure portion, lying at the foundation of the empirical, and
ased upon a priori knowledge of natural things. Now to cognize anything a priori is to
ognize it from its mere possibility; but the possibilit.y_.of determinate natural things can not _
■eTnow-'n from mere conceptions; for from these the possibility of the thought (that it does_
ot contradict itself) can indeed be known, but not of the object, as a natural thing which
an be given (as existent) outside the thought. Hence, to the possibility of a determinate
ratufarifiing. and therefore io cognise it a p r io r i , it is further requisite that the in tu itio n
orresponding a p r io r i to the conception should be given: in other words, that the concep-
ion should be constructed. But coEnilion of the reason through construction of conceptions,
s mathematical. A pure philosophyof nature in general, namely, one that only investigates
vh'afconstitutes a nature in general, may thus be possible without mathematics; but a pure
loctrine of nature respecting d e te r m in a te natural things (corporeal doctrine and mental
loctrinc). is only possible by means of mathematics; and as in every natural doctrine only so
nuch science proper is to be met with therein as there is cognition a p r io r i, a doctrine of
tature can only contain so much science proper as there is in it of applied mathematics.
So long, therefore as no conception is discovered for the chemical effects of substances on
>ne another, which admits of being constructed, that is, no law of the approach or retreat of
he parts can be stated in accordance with which (as, for instance, in proportion to their
Icnsitics) their motions, together with the consequences of these, can be intuited a p r io r i (a
Icmand that will scarcely ever be fulfilled). chemistry will be nothing more than a systematic
irt or experimental doctrine, but never science proper, its principles being merely empirical
md not admitting of any presentation a priori-, as a consequence, the principles of chemical
50
SCI ENCE I N T R U D E S UPON FAI TH
phenomena cannot make their possibility in the least degree conceivable, being incapable of
the application of mathematics.
But still farther even than chemistry must empirical psychology be removed from the
rank of what may be termed a natural science proper; firstly, because mathematics is
inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and its laws, unless indeed we consider
merely the la w o f p e r m a n e n c e in the flow o f its internal changes; but this would be an
extension of cognition, bearing much the sime relation to that procured by the mathematics
of corporeal knowledge, as the doctrine of the properties of the straight line does to the
whole of geometry, forjhc pure internal intuition in which physical.phenomena arc
constructed js time^ which has only one dimension. But not even as a systematic art of
analysis, or experimental doctrine, can it ever approach chemistry, because in it the
manifold of internal observation is only separated in thought, but cannot be kept separate
and be connected again at pleasure; still less in another thinking subject amenable to
investigations of this kind, and even the observation itself, alters and distorts the state of the
object observed. It can never therefore be anything more than an historical, and as such, as
far as possible systematic natural doctrine of the internal sense, i.e. a natural description of
the soul, but not a science of the soul, nor even a psychological experimental doctrine.2
51
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS l S' SUCCES SI ON
1Reid, T.. Essays on the A etive Powers o f the Human Mind, in The Works o f Thomas Reid. D. D.
'. Hamilton, ed.), 2nd ed.. pp. SI 1-679, Edinburgh. Maclachlan. Stewart. 1849. essay 2. ch. 16.
52
SCI ENCE I N T R U D E S UPON FAITH
53
CHAPTER 6
THE MATERIALISTIC INTERVAL
T H E P A R A D O X O F M A TER IA LISM
W H A T IS M A TER IA L ISM ?
1Holbach, P. H. T., Systeme de la Nature, ou les loix du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral. 2
vols., London, Mirabaud, 1774.
55
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCE S S I ON
t is. then, important to seek to destroy the influences which are good only to mislead us.
; time to draw from nature the remedies for the evils done us by Enthusiasm: reason
ded by experience must finally attack at their source the prejudices of which mankind
so long been victim. It is time that this reason, unjustly degraded, sloughs off the
.illanimous tone which has made it the accessory of falsehood, and of folly. The truth is
it is necessary to man, it can never harm himJtsjnyincible power will make itself felt
nerorTater,Ti must be unveiled' then, to mortals who must be shown its charms with the
of arousing their disgust for the shameful worship given to error, which too often
rps their homage under the disguise of truth, whose brilliance can wound only the
mies of mankind whose power subsists only by the obscure darkness they spread over
ids.
t is not at all to these depraved men that reason must speak; its voice is heard only by
uous hearts, accustomed to thinking, sensitive enough to lament the calamities without
iber with which religious and political Tyranny tries the earth; enlightened enough to
:cive the immense chain of evils suffered by disheartened humans in all ages from error.
; error which strengthens the crushing chains forged by the Tyrants and the priests
•ywhere in the nations. It is error to which is due Slavery, which, in almost all countries,
;t her are the downfall of the people, whom nature destined to strive freely for their own
piness. It is error to which is due these religious terrors which everywhere wither men in
or ruin them for chimeras. It is error to which is due these inveterate hates, these
barous persecutions, these continual massacres, these revolting tragedies for which,
er the pretext of heavenly interests, the earth has so often become the theatre. Finally it
i errors consecrated by Religion which are due the ignorance and uncertainty in which
1 finds himself with respect to his most evident duties, his clearest rights, the most
tonstrable truths: he is in almost all climes no more than a degraded captive, destitute of
grandeur of soul, of reason, of virtue, who is never permitted by the inhuman Jailers to
the light of day.
Condillac, E. B. de. T w ite ilex ,w‘m otions, in O euvresphilosophiques tie Condillac, vol. I (G. Le
ed), Corpus general des philosophies framjais (R. Bayer, ed.), Auteurs modemes, vol. 33,.pp.
114, Hans. Presses Univcrsitaires de France, 1947. Cf. also English translation by G. Carr. Los
des, Univ. of Southern California, 1930.
56
THE M A T E R I A L I S T I C I NTERVAL
We thought we should begin with smell, because of all the senses it is the one which
appears to contribute the least to the awareness. The others were, following that, the objects
of our inquiries, and after having considered them separately and together, we saw the
statue become an animal capable of guarding its own preservation.
The awareness of our statue limited to the sense of smell can extend only to odors. It can
no more have the ideas of extension, form, or of anything outside of itself, or outside of its
sensations, than those of color, of sound, of taste.
Ifwe present the statue with a rose, it will be in relation to us a statue smelling a rose; but
in relation to itself, it will be the odor itself of this flower.
The statue will be, then the smell of rose, pink, jasmine, violet, according to the objects
which act on its organ. In a word, odors are only its own modifications or modes of being; \
and it could not think itself anything else, since these are the only sensations of which it is )
susceptible.
Let those philosophers* to whom it appears so evident that everything is material put
themselves fora moment in the statue's place, and let them imagine how they could suspect
there exists something that resembles what we call m a iler.
One may, then, already convince himself that it would be sufficient to augment or to
diminish the number of the senses to cause us to make completely different judgments from
those that are today so natural; and our statue limited to the sense of smell can give us an
idea of the class of being whose awareness is the least extended.
/•
. . . With the first odor, our statue's capacity to sense is entirely directed to the impression
being made upon its organ. This is what 1 call attention.
From this moment the statue begins to enjoy or to suffer for if the ability to sense is
totally directed to an agreeable odor, this is enjoyment; and is totally directed to a
disagreeable odor, suffering. 7 .
But the odor that the statue smells does not escape it entirely as soon as the odoriferous
body ceases to act on its organ. The attention that it gave to this color still holds the statue;
and there remains of it a more or less strong impression, accordingly as the attention itself
had been more or less active. That is memory.^
A judgment is then only the perception of a relation between two ideas that one
compares.
/ Thus we can establish that there are two degrees of action in the faculty of memory the
1 weaker is that where the memory can with difficulty cause enjoyment of the past: the more
^ active is the_one-where-ilcauses enjoyment of the past as if it were present. ------- -
So this faculty is given the name of m e m o r y when it recallsthings only as being past; and
it takes the name of im a g in a tio n when it retraces them with such strength that they appear
present. Imagination occurs, then, in our statue as well as memory, and these two faculties
differ only in degree. The mem.ory.is the beginning of an imagination which has as yet little
strength; imagination is the memory which has reached the full activity of which it is
susceptible.
Having proved that our statue is capable of giving its attention, of remembering, of
comparing, of judging, of discerning, of imagining; that it has abstract notions, ideas of
number.and duration; that it knows general and specific truths; that it forms desires, has
passions, loves, hates, wants; that it is capable of hope, of fear, and of astonishment; and
r.
57 1}
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SlICCESSIO N
ly. lhai it acquires habits: we must conclude that with a single sense the understanding
is many faculties as with the five senses together. We shall see that those which appear to
eculiar to us are only these same faculties which being applied to a greater number of
cts are more fully developed.
ic soul is therefore but an empty term of which no one has any idea, and which an
htened mind must not use except to indicate the part in us which thinks. Set down the
principle of motion; animated bodies will have everything necessary to move, feel,
it. and in a word, to conduct themselves in the physical realm and in the moral realm
h depends on it.-1
a Mettrie. J. O. de, Stan, a Machine (G. C. Bussey and M. W. Calkins, trs.). French-English text;
igo. Open Court, 1912, pp. 128 f.
a Mettrie. J. O. de. Man. a Machine, p. 128.
itl.. p 130
58
THE M A T E R I A L I S T I C I NTERVAL
u (;l „v y
59
W v ;
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
60
THE M A T E R I A L I S T I C I NTERVAL
the other, it finds in the eternal laws of nature the foundations of the rights and the duties of
man. In a word it illuminates the study of the understanding, and delineates the art of
guiding and perfecting it, while recognizing in the impressions and needs peculiar to each
sensible nature the true causes or the true laws of the relations amongatl the beings deriving
from that nature or included in its domain: and from the same principle flow, in the eyes of
medicine, the rules of their reciprocal behavior, and the reasoned art of their happiness; that
is. morality. 10
B ecaus£-of C ab a n is' tre a tm e n t o f v a rio u s bodily influences u p o n psycho
logical a c tio n he has been called th e fa th e r o f physiological psychology.
C e rta in ly h e sto o d fo r th e p h y sio lo g ic al m o d e o f a tta c k u p o n th e m in d -
b o d y p ro b le m [C a b a n is is th e p a r a g o iy o f all th o se w h o hav e reg ard ed the
m en tal as d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e p hysical o r n eu ro lo g ical p ro cesses. In
a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e p rin c ip le o f e x p la in in g psychological activity as th e
fu n c tio n in g o f specific s tru c tu re s h e p u t g re at stress u p o n th e b ra in as an
o rg a n ic unity. A lth o u g h C a b a n is arg u ed th a t th e secretion o f th o u g h t by
■i th e b ra in is n o g re a te r a m y stery th a n th e d ig estio n o f food by th e sto m ach ,
still h e w ent o n to e la b o ra te his belief th a t th a t is ju s t w hat h appens. T h u s,
by a p ro cess o f irrelevant a n a lo g y he a ttrib u te d to th e b ra in fu n ctio n s o f
consciousness a n d th o u g h t.
T o develop a correct idea of the operations which result in thought one must consider the
brain as a particular organ, specially designed to produce it; as are the stomach and
intestines to produce digestion, the liver to filter the bile, the parotids and maxillary and
sublingual glands to secrete the salivary juices. The impressions, on arriving at the brain, set
it in activity; as food, on falling into the stomach excites it to more abundant secretion oQhe__
gastncjmceandtoJhe_moYpments which facilitate its own dissolution. The proper function 7
of the one is to perceive each particular impression, to attach signs to them, draw from that
comparison judgments and conclusions; as the function of the other is to act on the nutritive
substances whose presence stimulates it, to dissolve them, to assimilate the resultant juices >
into our own being.
Will it be said that the organic movements by which the functions of the mind arc carried
out are unknown to us? But the action by which the stomach nerves determine the different
operations which constitute digestion, the manner in which they mix the gastric juice with
the most active dissolving power, are no more revealed to our inquiries. We see the aliments
fall into this organ with qualities peculiar to them; we see them leave it with new qualities:
and we conclude that the organ has truly caused them to undergo this alteration. We see.
likewise, the impressions arrive at the brain through the medium of the nerves: they are, at
that time, isolated and without coherence. The organ begins to act on them: and sootLiL
sends them back metamorphosed into ideas which facial expression and gesture, or symbols
or word and writing manifest externally. We conclude, with the-same certituderthat the
, brain in some way digests the impressions; that it secretes thought organically."
10Cabanis, P. J. G., Du degre de certitude de la medicine, in Oeuvres Philosophiques de Cahanis (C.
Lchccand J. Cazeneuvre, eds.), vol. I.pt. I, Corpus general dcs philosophes frangais(R. Bayer, ed.),
Auteurs Modemes. vol. 44, I, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956, pref.
11Cabanis. P. J. G., Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme, in Oeuvres Philosophiques de
Cahanis (C. Lehec and J. Cazeneuvre, eds.), vol. 1, pt. I, Corpus general des philosophes fracais (R
Bayer, ed.). Auteurs Modemes, vol. 44, 1, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. Memoire 2,
sec. 7.
61
V /V it*- *' . /!•,< / ^ >>
' ' ^ 4 j' .
■ / ' ' ^r •' . »x
P H I L O S O P I N C A l SYSTEMS IN SUCCES SI ON
62
THE M A T E R I A L I S T I C I NT E RVAL
G E R M A N M A T E R IA L ISM IN T H E 19th C EN TU RY
A s we sh o u ld ex p e ct th e m a te ria listic tra d itio n in th e 19th cen tu ry
p ro v e d to be m o re precise a n d d e ta ile d th a n in th e p reced in g p erio d .
S cientific k n o w led g e h a d g re a tly a c c u m u la te d , especially in th e biological
b ra n ch es. W rite rs inclined to w a rd th e m aterialistic tra d itio n co u ld ta k e
a d v a n ta g e o f th e n ew er findings in physics a n d ch em istry as in terre lated
w ith biological a n d p sychological m atters.
T o be m e n tio n ed a m o n g th e m o st rep resen tativ e o f th e G e rm a n m ate
rialists is J . M o le sc h o tt (1822-1893), o n e o f th e m o st c o m p eten t an d
a ttra c tiv e w riters w h o in sisted u p o n o b s e rv a tio n an d research , a n d n a tu ra l
law s as ag a in st rev elatio n . In his fa m o u s v o lu m e en titled , Der Kreisfaufiles
Lebens'2 he criticized th e e m in e n t ch em ist L iebig (1803-1873) o n th e
g ro u n d th a t th e la tte r held th a t ev en ts revealed th e w isd o m a n d th e m ight
v o f th e creato r.
B u t M o le sc h o tt like m a n y scien tists is a m u ltip le p erso n ality . H is em
p h asis u p o n ev en ts a n d th e ir o b se rv a tio n sta n d s o u t as o n e o f his m ost
fa v o ra b le aspects as a p h ilo so p h e r. T h is a d m ira b le scientific trait paralleled
a d e e p sp iritistic a ttitu d e w h ich w as p ro b a b ly a h o ld o v er fro m his early
S ch e llin g ia n a n d H e g elia n stu d y a n d his sy m p ath ies w ith F e u rb a c h ’s
(1804-1872) spiritism .
C o n s o n a n t w ith his intellectual b a c k g ro u n d an d d ev e lo p m e n t M ole-
sc h o tt’s p h ilo so p h ic al m ateria lism is clearly evident in his fo rm u latio n .
All facts, every observation of a flower, or an insect, the discovery of a world, or the
J detection of the characteristics of man, what else are they but relations of objects to our
r' senses? • /.
* i f t ‘ .. '
• ' .; /. t r j J' "
F u rth e rm o re , /> x '
. . . because the knowledge of the object resolves itself into the knowledge of their relations,
all my knowledge is an objective knowledge. 13 /
63
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
64
v $ i'( L S/s/'Sj — /sa t' ^>Sif /
i'C’tS'fstStO d e* j a.
sfiC /. C i - A ' s * / r / u - r . zfcs ^ ,
/
THE MATERIALISTIC INTE R V AL </,
■r- ■J',t <f i,'
■&'/'<-!■?/Utl ---
e x tru d e d b u t m erely re d u ced to se n su o u s states a n d id eatio n al co n sc io u s
ness. T h ere is n o lessening o f th e b elief in th e ex istence o f m in d in its v ario u s
fo rm s o f k n o w in g , th in k in g , feeling, a n d so on.
— A ssim ila tin g so m e o f th e n a tu ra lis tic d e v e lo p m e n ts in biology, th e m a te f
rialistic p h ilo so p h e rs s o u g h t a b asis in th e psychological view th a t m en tal i
ity is a fu n c tio n o f o rg a n ic s tru c tu re ^ C o n sc io u sn e ss in its va rio u s fo rm s is J
l_ p ersisten tly re g ard e d as secre tio n s o f th e b ra in . . ____
T h a t th e m a te ria listic p sy ch o lo g y is e n tire ly m e n ta lis ts a n d d u a listic is
clea r fro m th e fact th a t p sy ch o lo g ical b e h a v io r is fa r re m o te fro m the
in te ra c tio n s o f o rg a n ism s w ith o th e r o rg a n ism s a n d o b jects in co n crete
situ atio n s. P sychological ev en ts a r e p re su m a b ly processes o ccu rrin g in the
h ea d . T h e re is n o th e o re tic a l a p p r e c ia tio n o f p sy ch o lo g y as a n objective
scien ce sim ila r in a ll re sp ects to th a t o f all th e sciences w ith o n ly th e
differences b ase d o n th e in te rb e h a v io r o f d ifferent p ro tag o n ists a n d a m
b ien t circum stances.
65
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES S I ON
66
CHAPTER 7
THE POSITIVISTIC INTERVAL
67
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCES SI ON
PO SITIV ISM : N A T U R E A N D O R IG IN
ause th e te rm “ P o sitiv ism ” is em p lo y ed in so m an y d ifferent w ays, it
sable to identify th e p a rtic u la r in terv a l w ith w h ich w e are concerned.
lly p o sitiv ism consists o f a m o v e m e n t designed to a m e lio ra te -th e . ;iA /
68
THE P O S I T I V I S T I C I NT E RVAL
PO SITIV ISM IN P E R S P E C T IV E
W h ile all th e intervals o f m o d e rn p h ilo so p h y a re in terre lated , p o sitivism
reveals a special re la tio n sh ip to th e m aterialistic interval. B o th seek w avs to
f */
. av o id m etap h y sical m e ta p h o rs in d esc rib in g th in g s a n d th e ir b eh a v io r. In -
th e ir a tte m p t to d o so th in k e rs em p h asiz e a n d generalize th e j? s y c h ic
fa c to rs p re s u m e d to be th e c ru cial b ase s o f all co g n itio n s.^ In detail,
f h o w e v er, th ey differ in th a t m a te ria lism inclines to w a rd o n to lo g ical a tti-
* tu d e s w hile positivism is sla n te d to w a rd e p istem o lo g y a nd t h e p rocesses o f
valid m e th o d s o f in v estig atio n a n d e x p la n a tio n . - ■j
Tv 5 *
o n th e basis o f a g en eral sp iritistic p h ilo so p h y , w hile o th e rs co n cern ed
k them selves w ith th e psy ch ic a sp e c ts re la tiv e to specific p ro b le m su ch as 1)
c a u s a tio n , o r th e influence o f in v e stig a to rs o n th e ir o p e ra tio n s, findings,
a n d in te rp re ta tio n s . T o th e fo rm e rly m e n tio n e d list o f p ro m in e n t scientific
1^
W- *
p ro p o n e n ts o f p o sitiv ism m ay b e a d d e d K. P e a rs o n (1857-1936), H . s - V
v.
H e lm h o ltz (1821-1893), P . W . B rid g m a n (1882-1961), H . D in g le (1890- V, \
1978), a m o n g m an y o th ers.
A s w e sh o u ld expect, th e re a re specific v aria tio n s in view s o f scientists
D ^ v
g ro u p e d u n d e r th e b a n n e r o f p o sitiv ism . S u c h early m em b ers as K irchoff, 1
H e rtz, a n d M a c h sim ply w ished to s e p a ra te o u t fro m physics su ch a b s tra c
tio n istic c o n stru c ts as “fo rces” a n d “p o w e rs.”6 'h e y m e rito rio u sly h o p ed to
b uild system s o f physics o n th e basis o f o b serv ab le d a ta , an d n o t to
c o n fo u n d c o n stru c ts w ith e v e n tsT A d o p tin g th is defensive a ttitu d e signal
'vT
ized a d iscrim in atin g science w ifn a n a m b itio n to achieve k n ow ledge o f
ac tu a lly o c c u rrin g events. T h ere is n o d e n y in g th e p o ten tiality o f su ch
view s fo r scientific en terp rises ev en th o u g h th eir a u th o rs m ight so m etim es
o v e rlo o k th e c o n s ta n t c o rrig ib ilitv o f h y p o theses co n c ern in g th e p rocesses
\
69
') -,V'|
!•»
• I I I LOS OPHI CAL SYSTEMS IN S UCCES S I ON
assertion, then, is correct that the world consists only of our sensations^ \ v
tin,
rs do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations)
p bodies^ If, to the physicist, bodies appear the real, abiding existences, whilst the
its" are regarded merely as their evanescent, transitory appearance, the physicist
in the assumption of such a view, that all .bodies are but thought-symbols for
xes of elements (complexes of sensations). Here, too, the elements in question form
, immediate, and ultimate foundation, which it is the task of physiologico-physical
1 to investigate. By the recognition of this fact, many points of physiology and
assume more distinct and more economical forms, and many spurious problems
iosed of.
us, therefore, the world does not consist of mysterious entities, which by their ■
ion with another, equally mysterious entity, the ego, produce sensations, which I
e accessible. For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,. . . are provisionally the ultimate; /,
s. whose given connexion it is our business to investigate. It is precisely in this that ( >
loration of reality consists. !n this investigation we must not allow ourselves to be'
d by such abridgments and delimitations as body, ego, matter, spirit, etc., which
en formed for special, practical purposes and with wholly provisional and limited
view. On the contrary, the fittest forms o f thought must be created in and by that
n itself, just as is done in every special science. In place of the traditional, instinctive
' thought, a freer, fresher view, conforming to developed experience, and reaching
ond the requirements of practical life, must be substituted throughout.6
h. E., Popular Scientific Lectures (T. J. McCormack, irs.), Chicago, Open Court, 1895, pp.
:h, E„ The Analysis o f Sensations and the Relation o f the Physical to the Psychical (C. M.
s. trs.). New York, Dover, 1959, p. 46.
.p. 12.
:h, E.. The Analysis o f Sensations and the Relation o f the Physical to the Psychical, pp. 29-31.
70
THE P O S I T I V I S T I C I NTERVAL
F inally,
When we find that the mind is entirely limited to the one source, sense-impression, for its
contents, that it can classify and analyze, associate and construct but always with this same
material, either in its immediate or stored form, then it is not difficult to understand what,
and what only, can be the facts of science, the subject-matter of knowledge. Science, we sav
^at once, deals with conceptions drawn from sense-impressions, and its legitimate field is the
whole content of the human mind. Those who assert that science deals with the world of
external phenomena are only stating a half-truth. Science only appeals to the world of
phenomena — to immediate sense-impressions — with the view of testing and verifying the
accuracy of its conceptions and inferences, the ultimate basis of which lies as we have seen in
such immediate sense-impressionsj^cience deals with the mental, the “inside” world, and
the aim of its processes of classification and inference is precisely that oTinitinctive or
mechanicarassociation. namely, to enable the exertion, best calculated to preserve the race
7Ibid., pp. 4 |, 42.
8 Pearson, K„ The Grammar o f Science, London, Walter Scolt, 1892, p. 79.
71
/') p /.-/• I
" , 'V
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON ^
f. ■-/•
f r ■/ ,:U IP'/*
: individual, to follow on the sense-impression with the least expenditure of time a nd
lectual energy. Science is in this respect an economy of thought — a delicate tuning
nterestsoTthe mind of the organs which receive sense-impressions and those which
te activity.’ ~ ^
v?Yv •
i the problem round and ponder over it as we will, beyond the sense-impression,
I the brain .terminals of the sensory nerves we cannot get. Of what is beyond them, of
-in-themselves,” as the metaphysicians term them, wexan know but one characteris-
! this we can only describe as a capacity for producing sense-impressions, for sending
jes along the sensory nerves to the brain. This is the sole scientific statement which-
made with regard to what TiesTieyond sense-impressions. But even in this statement
st be careful to analyze our meaning. The methods of classification and inference,
hold for sense-impressions and for the-conceptions based upon them, cannot be
ed outside our minds, away from the sphere in which we know them to hold, into a
which we have recognized as unknown and unknowable. The laws, if we can speak __ ' n f o j
i, of this sphere must be as unknown as its contents, and therefore to talk of its / y <'"'c
:s as p r o d u c in g sense-impressions is an unwarranted inference, for we are asserting ?
I ffle ffe c t— a~law of phenomena or sense-impressions — to hold in a region bevond
oerience.10
72
THE P O S I T I V I S T I C I NTERVAL
from this point of view leads to the recognition that tiueslions-can be formulated which
allow no possible procedure for checking the correctness of a hypothetical answer. An
example is the celebrated question of W. K. Clifford, “Is it possible that as time goes on the
ij dimensions of the universe may be continually changing, but in such a way that wc can I
I never detect it, because all our measuring sticks are shrinking in the same way as everything |
* else?""
To start as far back as possible, it is obvious that I can never get outside of myself; direct
experience embraces only the things in my consciousness — sense impressions of various
sorts and various sorts of cerebrations — and naught else. In the material of direct
experience I distinguish features which 1 describe as external to myself and others which I
recognize as internal, and possibly there are features where the decision is difficult, as for
example whether the pain in my foot is due to a sliver beneath the skin or due to a stone in
my shoe. The external features often arouse in me reactions of adjustment of one sort or
another, and there are certain conventional devices which I use in making the adjustments.
Success in making these adjustments I recognize as desirable, and is something that I strive
for, but I do not always attain the success that 1 could desire.1*
This position, which I suppose is the solipsist position, is often felt to be absurd and
contrary to common sense. How, it is asked, can there be agreement as to experience unless
there are external things which both you and 1 perceive? Part of the hostility to the solipsist
position is, Hhink, merely duejo confusion of thinking, and there isa stronjielement of the
pseudp-problemTnixjed up here. If 1say that an externa) thing is merely a part of my direct
experience io which I findlHai you react in certain ways, what more is there to be said, or
indeed what other operational meaning can be attached to the concept of an external thing?
It seems to me that as I have stated it. the solipsist position, if indeed this be the solipsist
position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to
adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repu gn ant." ^ >/>Vi/. X +* y
, r■*£. ' /.'•
PO SITIV ISM — C R IT IC A L ANA LYSIS & iX, &
m - t ■-
E a c h in terv al flushes u p its o w n covey o f p ro b lem s. T h e positivistic
in te rv a l p e rh a p s m o re d efin itely th a n o th e rs brings to th e su rface th e
fu tility o f a p h ilo so p h y b ase d u p o n ab so lu te n e ss, univ ersality , a n d sp irit
ism . N ev erth eless, such v acu ities a re fe a tu re d as b asic to th e p h ilo so p h y
p ra cticed by p ro fessio n al scientists.
A s in th e d e m o n s tra b le cases o f th e o th e r p h ilo so p h ic al in terv als o r
types o f th in k in g , so here we o b serv e th e irresistible p o w e r o f spiritistic
p o stu la tio n s. S cientists a re in flu en ced , h o w e v er unw ittin g ly , by ab so lu tes ?
a n d u n iv ersa ls to the d is a d v a n ta g e o f a c tu a l o b se rv a tio n o f th in g s an d &
events. T h e resu lt is co m p le te m is u n d e rs ta n d in g o f ex p erien ce a n d n a tu re . "
"Bridgman. P. W., The Nature o f Physical Theory, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1936, pp.
11-12.
'-‘Ibid., p . 13.
"Bridgman, P. W., The Nature o f Physical Theory, pp. 14-15.
73
r 'itv tiiC '? ' •
/ '/ft n- ■‘ ■
r t s . r •"/'* y '
PHI LOS p 'P II I C A L SYSTEMS IN S U C C E S S I O N
74
THE P O S I T I V I S T I C I NT E RVAL
Philosophical
Systems
in Multiple
Variations
System
Postulates
Metasystems
Protopostulates
M etapostulates
Cultural Matrix
Type o f Civilization
Institutional Equipment
75
I* n 1 L () S O I* I I I C A l . S V S T E M S IN S !' f C F. S S I () N
G reek L anguage.
’eligion. A n a p p a re n tly cle a r-c u t e x a m p le o f th e influence o f reli-
n stitu tio n s u p o n p h ilo so p h y a n d science is th e to ta lita ria n psychol-
’ s o u th e rn G e rm a n y as o v er a g a in s t a to m istic asso c ia tio n ism o f
;rn E u ro p e . T h e sam e so rt o f in te ra c tio n is n oticeable in th eo ries o f
al science a n d eco n o m ics.
•ience. T h e lo n g stru g g le b etw een C a rtesia n ism a n d N ew to n ian ism
edly exem plifies th e influence o f scientific fo rm u la tio n s o v er o th er
il facto rs. M a n y fu rth e r specific ex a m p le s are av ailab le fro m th e
ice o f science o n p h ilo so p h y a n d th e p ro b le m s o f th e su p e rio rity o f
ed n a tu ra l sciences o v er th e social a n d h u m an istic types.
76
CHAPTER 8
THE INTERVAL OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
T R A N S F O R M A T IO N O F P H IL O S O P H IC A L INSTITUTION S
1"The desire lo understand the world, is they think, an outdated folly." Russell. B„ My philosophical
Development, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959. p. 219.
1An excellent example is Wittgenstein about whom contentions have raged, and whose every word
has been the subject of excgetical disputation.
dH tin f 77
t., rein-* *HjCy. rL, »
• H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES S I ON
analysis o f language. T h e p ro p o n e n ts o f th e m o v em en t to im p ro v e
)p h y asserted th a t to a v o id m etap h y sics it is sufficient to an aly ze an d
e th e lan g u ag e used b y p h ilo so p h ers.
s th e re a ro s e th e in stitu tio n o f L in g u istic o r S e m a n tic A nalysis
ng a n u m b e r o f p h ilo so p h ic al sects o p e ra tin g u n d e r v a rio u s n am es
s L o g ical P o sitiv ism , L ogical E m p iricism , A n a ly tic P h ilo so p h y ,
itical C ritic ism , L ogical A nalysis, a n d so on.CN o n e o f th e m envisage
>phy as a ttitu d es o f p erso n s to w a rd n a tu ra l o r c u ltu ral events, b u t
: a discipline c o n c e rn e d w ith w o rd s a n d sentences^ By c o n tra st w ith
to ric a l n o tio n th a t p h ilo so p h y h a s n o su b ject m a tte r o f its o w n,
rs tu rn e d to lan g u ag e as th e p ro p e r o b ject o f p h ilo so p h ical investiga-
he p re se n t c h a p te r is d e v o te d to th e e x a m in a tio n o f th is m o v em en t.
h, H. B., Language and Ethics, in Proceedings and Addresses o f the American Philosophical
on, 1970-71.
A. J., Language, Truth, and Logic, New York, Dover, 1946, p. 35.
A. J., Op. cit., p. 57.
78
I NTERVAL OF L I N G U I S T I C ANALYSI S
L IN G U ISTIC PH ILO SO PH Y :
^ VALID P R E M ISE S, IN V A LID CONCLUSION S
79
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
J
ves p erso n s w h o sp eak o r w rite a b o u t th in g s a n d events. Basically
reduce lan g u ag e to in d e p e n d e n t signs o r sy m b o ls th a t p re su m a b ly
sen t th in g s a n d events. W h e n w e in q u ire w h a t th e linguistic p hilos-
rs u n d e rs ta n d b y lan g u ag e w e find th a t th ey re g ard language as
s o r sy m b o ls, b u t n o t a n y c o n c re te a c tiv ity o f p erso n s w h en th ey refer
jects o r events.
i ex cellen t e x a m p le o f h o w lin g u istic p h ilo so p h e rs tre a t w o rd s is
;enstein’s d en ial th a t “n o t” is th e n a m e o f a re la tio n , su c h as “rig h t” o r
n a m e re latio n s. H e th in k s “ n o t” is n o t a n a m e a t all, since if it w ere
n o t-P ” w o u ld be differen t fro m “ P ” a s n am in g tw o nots w h ich “P ”
n o t m e n tio n .6 L a n g u a g e , h o w e v er, c a n n ev er b e d isso ciated fro m
in activities a n d in terests b asic to ad ju stm en ts o r a d a p ta tio n s to
oning th in g s a n d circ u m sta n ces. T h e c o n v e n tio n a l view o f lan g u ag e
:es all th e a d ju stm e n ta l fe a tu re s o f lan g u ag e w ith a rc a n e “m eanings"
:d b y w o rd s o r signs. L a n g u a g e in n o sense re q u ires th e in v o catio n o f
scendent m ean in g s” in o rd e r to fit sp eech o r lan g u ag e as references o r
ols to deal w ith things a n d events.7 ^
T H E EXTEN SIVE R A N G E O F LA NG U A G E
TH IN G S A N D LA N G U A G E EVENTS
80
I N T E R V A L OF L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S
81
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
82
I N T E R V A L OF L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S
AN INTERBEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO
„ PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS
T h o u g h th e P n ilo s o p h ie a rIn te r v a l h a s failed to co rre c t th e w ro n g s o f
p h ilo so p h y , it m erits th e a p p ro v a l o f a ll w h o a b h o r th e e n ta n g le m e n t o f
p h ilo so p h y w ith spiritistic m e tap h y sics. In a sense, to o , th e fo u n d e rs a n d
follo w ers have d e m o n s tra te d th e n ecessity f o r a n im p ro v ed a p p re c ia tio n o f
th e ro le o f lan g u ag e in th e reflective d o m a in w ith its re la tio n sh ip to
th in k in g a n d system m ak in g . S in c e th e w riter assu m es th a t su ch a n
im p ro v ed a ttitu d e to w a rd p h ilo so p h y is av ailab le in th e In te rb e h a v io ra l
a p p ro a c h , th e re m a in d e r o f th is c h a p te r is d ev o ted to th e ex p o sitio n o f th a t
v iew p o in t a n d its im p act o n the g en e ral p h ilo so p h ic al trad itio n .
j(? T h e basic a ss u m p tio n o f th e in te rb e h a v io ra l a p p ro a c h is th a t all
scientific a n d p h ilo so p h ic a l w o rk c o n sists o f in te rb e h a v io r o f in d iv id u als
w ith (1) th in g s a n d events, a n d (2 ) th e p ro d u c ts o f such in terb eh av io r.
^ a. Interbehavior with Events. S cien ce a n d logic like all o th e r h u m a n V>
83
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E MS IN S U C C E S S I O N
84
/_ //a J>s/,asssjn
r fU & c to
n t e r v a l o f l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s
85
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN SUCCESSI ON
IN TE R B EH A V IO R A L IM PL IC A TIO N S FOR SC IE N C E
ro b a b ly th e basic im p lica tio n o f th e in te rb e h av io ral a p p ro a c h fo r
ice a n d p h ilo s o p h y is th a t th e m ateria ls in te ra c te d w ith a re nev er
luced in th e act o f o b serv in g th em , n o m a tte r how c o m p licated th e
rv a tio n . N o investigation o r ex p e rim en t creates th e cru d e o r p re a n a -
ev en ts w hich orig in ally stim u late th e in terests o f th e scientist. Scientific
ngs a r e full o f suggestions to th e effect th a t things consist o f “sense
" w hich a re p re su m a b ly processes o f k n o w in g instead o f qu alities o f
»s k n o w n . A lso “ physical objects” a re alleged to be scientific co n stru c -
as well a s “ reality ." B o th o f these ideas are su m m ed u p in th e factitio u s
lion c o n c ern in g th e existence o f a n ex te rn a l w orld.
86
NTERVAL OF L I N G U I S T I C ANALYSI S
87
t
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SYSTEMS IN S UCCES SI ON
88
I N T E R V A L OF L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S
/ IN T E R B E H A V IO R A L IM PL IC A TIO N S FO R P H IL O S O P H Y
89
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T^E^M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
90
N T E R V A L OF L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S
T H E C O M P A R IS O N O F P R O P O SIT IO N S W ITH R E L A T E D T H IN G S
91
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
11We emphasize Ihc term logical lo indicate that it is here used in the conventional sense of something
non-existing. In other words, it does not exist as lahlesand planelsexist. An example frequently given
of such non-exislenls is a hippogriff.
11Wclirmly oppose Dewey's assertions (Log/V. The Theory o f Inquiry. New York. Holt. 1938, pp. 45.
117, 271, el pawimi concerning the non-temporality of propositional terms and relations. Such
assertions certainly imply an objectionable view concerning the non-naturalistic character of logical
things and events.
92
I N T E R V A l , ' O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S
LIN G U ISTIC PH IL O SO PH Y A N D PH IL O SO PH Y IN G E N E R A L
A s u m m a riz in g e v a lu a tio n o f L in g u istic P h ilo so p h y b rin g s to light a
n u m b e r o f a d v a n ta g e s fo r th e ev o lu tio n o f th e p h ilo so p h ic al en terp rise.
T h e in te n tio n to ex c lu d e m etap h y sical n o tio n s a lo n e a p p e a rs as a m a rk e d
ad v a n c e in p h ilo so p h ic a l th in k in g . T h e n th ere is th e stirrin g u p o f p ro b lem s
c o n c e rn in g th e p lan a n d m e th o d s o f p h ilo so p h y zing.
B u t w h e n th e q u e s tio n o f p e rm a n e n t ac h ie v em en t is in o rd e r, th e final
resu lts o f th e m a n y p a rtic ip a n ts o f th e m o v e m en t offer little e n c o u rag e
m en t. T h e L in g u istic P h ilo so p h y interval fails to d e p a rt fro m m etap h y sica l
p u rs u its. T h e in te rv a l d o e s n o t b re ak c o n n e c tio n w ith th e g en e ral p h ilo
so p h ical tra d itio n w h ich is e n sh ro u d e d in d u a listic ra im e n t. P h ilo so p h y
re m a in s still o n ly v erb ally o p p o se d to th e m etap h y sical tra d itio n .
A s to th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f linguistic reso u rces fo r use in p h ilo so p h ic al
d iscu ssio n , th e L in g u istic P h ilo so p h y in terv al scores d istin c t d isa p p o in t
m en t. T h e n a tu re a n d fu n c tio n , o f lan g u a g e is g re a tly m isin te rp re te d .
A cco rd in g ly , la n g u a g e as a n in s tru m e n t fo r im p ro v in g p h ilo so p h y is a frail
reed to rely u p o n .
A p rim a ry fa ilu re o f th e L in g u istic P h ilo s o p h y lies in th e m isco n ce p tio n
o f th e n a tu re o f p sychology. It is tru e th a t so m e m em b ers o f th e L ing u istic
P h ilo s o p h y g ro u p u rg e th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f th e d u a listic o r tw o -w o rld
93
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
I “ For example Ryle, in his book. The Concept o f Mind (London, Hutchinson House. 1949). but
I the notion of mind is retained though renamed dispositions and organizations.
CHAPTER 9
TOWARDS SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHYZING
G U ID E T O V A LID T H IN K IN G
SPE C IFIC A T IO N I.
F R E E D O M FR O M M E T A P H Y SIC A L IN ST IT U T IO N S
95
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
W h e n w e a r e ca lle d u p o n to an a ly z e a n d e v a lu a te th e n a tu re a n d th e
failings o f p h ilo s o p h y th r o u g h o u t its c o n tin u ity since th e beginnings o f th e
tra n s c e n d e n ta l e ra , w e c a n p o in t w ith a s s u ra n c e to th e false ideas th e n
e n g e n d e re d c o n c e rn in g p h ilo so p h ers a n d th e ir b asic p o stu la tio n . F ro m
th a t p e rio d o n to th is d a te , p erso n s a s well a s th e w o rld h av e b een d ic h o to
m ized in to so u ls a n d flesh, m in d s a n d b o d ies, egos a n d b ra in s, m in d a n d
m a tte r, a n d sim ila r dualities.
In tra in w ith th ese d u a lism s c o m e su c h p uzzles as th e ex isten ce o r
k n o w led g e o f o th e r m inds, w h e th e r th e m in d creates reality o r th e exist
ence o f a n o u te r w o rld , a n d so on.
96
T O W A R D S S I G N I F I C A N T F H I LOS OP H Y Z I N G
SPE C IF IC A T IO N V. W IT H D R A W A L FR O M T R A N SC E N D E N C E S
97
P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S IN S U C C E S S I O N
98
S E C T IO N
II
The Philosopher
and His World
CHAPTER 10
NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE
101
N A T U R E OF H U M A N N A T U R E
M A N K IN D A S BIOSOCIAL A N D C U L T U R A L O R G A N IS M S
What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and
moving, how express and admirable! in action.how like an angel! in apprehension, how
like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!
103
N A T U R E OF H U M A N N A T U R E
105
C H A P T E R II
THE INTIMACY OF PHILOSOPHY A N D SCIENCE1
1The material of this chapter is a modified version of an article entitled, “Scientific Psychology and
Specious Philosophy.' first published in the Psychological Record, 1969, 19, 15-27.
106
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
f
a n d th e im m o ra lity o f th e soul.'iThe difference betw een th e sacred a n d the
p ro fa n e types o f p h ilo so p h y lies only in th e q u estio n ab le belief th a t so m e
h o w th e la tte r ca n be asso c ia te d w ith scientific m a t t e r s ^
-:ll*
I f th e re a d e r c o n clu d es fro m w hat I h av e ju s t said th a t scientists sh o u ld
be w a ry o f p lu n g in g in to th e stream o f p h ilo so phy, his inference is correct.
107
THE P H I L O S O P H E R AND HIS W O R L D
108
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
J See Chapter I.
109
THE P H I L O S O P H E R AND HIS W O R L D
110
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
</
is sim p ly a p erv ersio n o f th e fact th a t e a c h ev ent is a u n iq u e o cc u rre n ce. A ll
su c h u n a d u lte ra te d v e rb ig e ra tio n s p re v e n t u s fro m lo o k in g u p o n philos
o p h y as a n a tte m p t to b e c o m e o rie n te d to th e co m p lex ities o f th e ev en ts o f
n a tu re a n d th e c o n tin g e n c ie s o f so cial life. T h e y m u s t b e rega rd e d as
p ath o lo g ies o f im ag in a tio n a n d speech. ''
~~ S ince o u r in terest in p m lo so p h y hinges u p o n its influence fo r g o o d o r evil
u p o n science, I m u s t rem in d y o u o f th e b aleful d o m in a tio n o f cu rren t
p h ilo so p h y b y th e sp iritistic in stitu tio n s o f o u r cu ltu re. D u a listic attitudes-
vitiate o u r p h ilo so p h y o f science, a n d also m isco n stru e th e ev en ts and
th eo ries o f science. T h e y m an ife st them selves in th e p ra ctically u niversal
ac c e p ta n c e o f p sychophysical assu m p tio n s. H ere is th e reaso n w hy scien
tists w h o w ish to fo s te r science m u st reject co n v e n tio n a l p h ilo so p h y .
T h e p ern ic io u s influence o f sp iritistic p h ilo so p h y o n science is effectively
illu stra te d by th e c o n tin u e d p resen ce o f tra n sc e n d e n ta l fa c to rs in p ra cti
cally all p sy ch o lo g ical d esc rip tio n s, th o u g h we m u st lim it ourselves to tw o
(j) o u ts ta n d in g ex a m p le s: o n e, th e c u rre n t d o c trin e o f p e rc e p tio n , a n d die
o th e r, th e d o c trin e o f th e biological b asis o f b eh av io r. W e e x a m in e first the
it, ’ c u rre n tly a c cep ted m o d el o f sen so ry ev en ts w h ich h o ld s th a t w h e n a n
o rg a n ism d isc rim in a te s b etw een o b jects, th e ir q u alities are p ro jec ted to the
so u rc e o f stim u la tio n , as in th e fo llo w in g q u o ta tio n .
The external ear delivers sound waves through the external auditory canal to the middle
ear, and thence they pass to the inner ear. There in the cochlea, the sensory (ells of the organ
of Corti are stimulated and initiate nerve impulses in the fibers of the auditory nerve. The
impulses pass through a series of nuclei and fibertracts in the medulla and midbrain to the
auditory area of the cerebral cortex: and there s o m e h o w they generate the sensations that
we know subjectively as “sounds". (Italics ours?)*"-------
I ll
THE P H I L O S O P H E R AND HIS W O R L D
R a n so n says,
I shall leave out of account entirely the most difficult part; how when these propagated
disturbances reach the brain they give rise to conscious sensation, which appears to be
something of an entirely different order than a neural activity. I can not understand how
such a thing as a sensation of warmth makes its appearance as a result or a concomitant of
the activity of certain nerve cells in my brain. I can only admit the fact and leave to the
future, perhaps the far distant future, the problem presented by the relation of brain and
mind.8
112
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
Is it n o t p lain th a t N e w to n b e q u e a th e d to p re se n td a y sc h o la rs a m o d el
w h ich he did n o t d erive fro m valid k n o w led g e o f th e p lace o f light in vision,
n o r fro m a c o m p e te n t a c q u a in ta n c e w ith b iology, b u t fro m th e m etascien -
tific tre a s u ry o f religious lore? It is as th o u g h N ew to n ’s hypotheses non
•7
fingo a pplied o n ly to m ech a n ics. N o te th a t w e d o n o t fau lt N e w to n fo r
living in th e se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry , b u t w e s h o u ld p o in t o u t th a t e m a n c ip a
tio n fro m tra d itio n a l p h ilo s o p h y w o u ld be o f g re at service in u n d e rs ta n d
in g ev en ts to d ay .
2, ■W e tu r n n o w to th e sec o n d illu stra tio n o f th e d e v a sta tin g influence o f
d u a listic p h ilo so p h y o n science. T h is is th e n o to rio u s d o ctrin e especially
p re v a le n t a m o n g self-styled scientific p sy ch ologists th a t m e n ta l processes,
th o u g h o ccu lt a n d p riv ate , a re v o u c h e d fo r a n d su p p o rte d b y th e n erv o u s
system . E ssen tially th is d o c trin e tra n s fo rm s th e b rain , w h ich is a biological
o rg a n , in to a su rro g a te fo r th e soul. T h e d o c trin e tak es o n v a rio u s form s:
(a) th e b ra in is m a d e in to a g en eral sea t o r locus o f m ind o r consciousness;
( b) v a rio u s p o rtio n s o f th e b ra in a re p re su m e d to subserve specific m en tal
“fu n c tio n s" o r “experiences;" a n d (c) th e n erv o u s system is reg ard ed as th e
basis o f b ehavior.
E ven p h ilo so p h e rs w h o d is ta in d u a lism ju stify these p ro p o sitio n s o n the
g ro u n d th a t th e e q u a tio n o f th e b ra in a n d th e m in d , o r s o m e h o w to
c o m m ix th em , m inim izes th e in fluence o f spiritism . B u t w h a t ac tu a lly
h a p p e n s is th e m isc o n stru c tio n o f th e a n a to m ic a l stru ctu re s o f th e o rg a n -
113
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
114
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
115
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
A
■
! <:
special sciences. It is co n c ern e d w ith th e sa m e co n c rete th in g s a n d ev en ts as
a n y scientific discipline p rio r to th e a p p lic a tio n o f specialized co n stru cts.
In d eed , it is o n e o f th e fu n c tio n s o f scientific p h ilo so p h y to reject all
■f co n s tru c ts th a t a re illegitim ately im p o sed u p o n o bserved events. T h e falla
cio u s belief th a t p h ilo so p h y lacks a d istin ctiv e subject m a tte r stem s fro m
\ th e failu re to notice th a t p h ilo so p h y zin g b eh av io r, like all o th e r kinds,
\ ‘
\ consists o f in teractio n s w ith stim u lu s objects.
N o w , a lth o u g h tech n ical p h ilo so p h y as th eo retical science d o es n o t have
a n y different field o f o p e ra tio n s fro m th e special sciences, it does h av e its
ow n u n iq u e task s w hich ca n be categ o rized u n d e r th ree heads, (a) m o n
itorial, (b) co o rd in ativ e, an d (c) sem antic.
^ \) T h e m o n ito ria l task o f p h ilo so p h y is to e x am in e a n d critically analyze
p ro p o sitio n s w ith respect to th eir o rig in a n d v alidity. S u c h a n ex a m in a tio n
o f cred en tials is c o n tro lled by tw o rules, (a ) c o n stru c ts m u st be derived
fro m c o n ta c ts w ith events, an d (b ) en tan g lin g cu ltu ral institu tio n s m u st be
suppressed.
Q ) P h ilo so p h y co o rd in a tes th e findings a n d in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e special
sciences. T h u s th e p ro p o sitio n s o f physics a n d ch e m istry m ay n o t c o n tra
d ict th e p ro p o sitio n s o f biology an d psychology, a n d reciprocally th e
p ro p o sitio n s o f biology o r psychology m ay n o t g o c o u n te r to th e valid
fo rm u la tio n s o f physics o r chem istry. F u rth e rm o re , th e findings o f one
science m ay n o t o v e rsh a d o w th o se o f o th e r sciences, a s in v a rio u s fo rm s o f
red u ctio n ism , o r w here th e a ssu m p tio n s o r con clu sio n s dev elo p ed in one
science a re im p o sed u p o n th e d a ta o f a n o th e r. F o r e x a m p le , findings
reached in n eu ro lo g y m ay n o t b e im p o sed u p o n psychological events. In
116
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
g en eral, p h ilo so p h y im plies cro ss referen tial stu d y as in in terd iscip lin ary
c o o rd in a tio n . p
( 3 ) S e m an tic su p erv isio n is th e th ird ta sk o f p hilo so p h y . T h e guideline is th e \
fo restallin g o f th e m a n y gross e rro rs co n stan tly c o m m itte d by scientists \
b ecau se o f th e w ay c e rta in term s a re used. A ny term , o f co u rse, is subject to \
p ro p e r an d im p ro p e r usage d ep e n d in g u p o n ac tu a l c o n ta c ts w ith things
a n d ev en ts referred to o r d e sig n ate d . A n o u tsta n d in g e x a m p le o f gross
m isusage is th e h av o c w ro u g h t b y em p lo y in g th e w o rd “ex p erien ce.’’ In
p sy ch o lo g y th is usage has h elped to p e rp e tu a te psychic entities a n d p ro c
esses. T h e te rm “p ro cess" itself, as well as th e te rm “event,” has helped to
m a in ta in m ystic n o tio n s. T o sp eak o f m en tal “events" o r psychic “energy”
is, o f co u rse, to tra d u c e scientific te rm in o lo g y . A n o th e r freq u en tly tro u b le - l
so m e te rm is “fu n c tio n ,” w hich h as b u rd e n e d science a n d p h ilo so p h y w ith A
n u m e ro u s in ep titu d es o f d escrip tio n a n d in terp re tatio n . 1
It m u st n o t be a ssu m ed th a t th ese ta sk s are in n o w ise th e responsibility >
o f th e specialized scientist. T h a t a s s u m p tio n im p lies a n o n e x iste n t d isju n c
tio n betw een th e assu m p tiv e a n d o th e r asp ects o f scientific w ork. R a th e r, it
is a m a tte r o f g re a te r o r lesser em p h asis. ^
A sid e fro m th e v aria tio n in task s, tech n ical p h ilo so p h y differs so m ew h a t
fro m th e special sciences in a n u m b e r o f o th e r p artic u la rs; fo r ex am p le, it
en c o u rag e s a g re a te r relativ e fre e d o m w ith respect to d a ta . T h e specializa
tio n o f th e sciences lim its th e m to localized p ro b le m s a n d to investigative
tech n iq u es asso ciated w ith specified tech n o logical co n d itio n s. In this sense
p h ilo so p h y c a n be m o re sp ecu lativ e a n d m o re co m p reh en siv e th a n an y
p a rtic u la r science. T h e scientific p h ilo so p h e r is g enerally m o re inclined
to w a rd w id er in terd iscip lin ary c o o p e ra tio n . A lso h e is m o re interested in
th e o rg a n iz a tio n a n d sy stem izatio n o f findings th a n in th e im m ed iate
d isco v ery o f th e tra its o f th in g s a n d th e in te ra ctio n s o f th e c o m p o n e n ts o f
events. In o th e r w o rd s, h e stresses in te rp re ta tio n s m o re th a n d escriptions.
G ra n tin g th e v alid ity o f th e p ro p o se d p h ilo so p h y o f science, it is a d m it
ted ly difficult to estab lish it, b ecau se it d e m a n d s th e re p la cem e n t o f venera
ble in tellectu al in stitu tio n s. H o w ev er, in view o f th e recip ro cal relatio n s
b etw e en p h ilo so p h y a n d science, th e re ex ists a g re at p o te n tia lity th a t a
n a tu ra listic p sy ch o lo g y ca n c o n trib u te a g reat d e a l to th e desired result.
A ccordingly, w e co n sid er briefly th e tra its o f a scientific psychology.
T h e first a n d fo re m o st ch a rac te ristic o f a scientific p sychology is th a t all
its d esc rip tio n s a n d in te rp re ta tio n s a re d eveloped fro m o rig in al interb eh av
io rs w ith th e activities o f o rg a n ism s as th ey in teract w ith o th e r o rg an ism s o r
o th e r objects. T h u s scientific p sy ch o lo g y s ta n d s in s trik in g c o n tra s t to
117
THE P H I L O S O P H E R AN D HIS W O R L D
118
I N T I M A C Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E
119
CHAPTER 12
THE BIRTH OF EPISTEMOLOGY
AND ONTOLOGY
K N O W LED G E A N D EX ISTE N C E
K N O W L ED G E A S A D A P T A T IO N A N D O R IE N T A T IO N
120
E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G Y
F R A C T IO N A T IO N O F A D A P T A T IO N S TO EV E N T S
EPISTEM O LO G Y
121
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
a. The Senses
T h e senses as th ey a re tre a te d in tra d itio n a l p h ilo so p h y have n o existence
w h a tso e v e r. A t b est th ey a re c o n s tru c te d o n th e basis th a t th e re a re sense
o rg a n s su c h as th e re c e p to rs o f m o d e rn p h y sio lo g y , th a t is, retin as, co c h
leae, sk in re c e p to rs, a n d so o n . A t o n c e w e n o tic e th a t th e n o tio n o f sense
o rg a n s th ro u g h w hich k n o w led g e is first stim u la te d is n o t tru e to ob serv a
tio n , o r th e ex isten ce o f th e in te rre la tio n s o f o rg an ism s a n d stim u lu s
o b jects. T h e fact is th a t sen se o rg a n s a re sim p le fe atu res o f a n o rg a n ism
sensitive to c e rta in so rts o f energy o r p re ssu res. N e x t it follow s th a t th e id ea
o f k n o w led g e b ein g in itiated th ro u g h sense o rg a n s does n o t c o m p o rt w ith
th e fa ct th a t it is alw ays a n o rg a n ism th a t is in tera ctin g w ith stim u lu s
o b jects. T h e esse n tial fe a tu re o f sen sin g is th a t th e energies o r th e pressu res
th a t in h e re in th e th e o ry o f senses a re m ean s f o r th e co n ta c ts o f o rg an ism s
w ith o b jects. F o r ex am p le, in th e case o f v isu al in tera ctio n s w ith objects,
th e light w h ich strik es th e re tin a is n o t a stim u lu s o r in citer o f m e n ta l states
^ r processes in th e m in d o r the b rain~ b u t r a th e r t h e m ean s by w h ich th e
'P
' o rg a n ism c a n in te ra c t w ith th e objects. S im ilarly th e a ir w aves w hich are
p re su m e d to act ex a ctly like th e lig h t rays a r e sim p ly a u d ito ry m ed ia. T h e y
m a k e it p o ssib le fo r th e o rg a n ism to re act to so u n d s. In c id e n tally th e re is
<1
im p lied h e re th e view th a t sen sin g is a d efinite m a tte r o f in teractin g w ith
objects. T h e tra d itio n a l view w hich m ay b e tra c e d b a c k to N e w to n ’s
e x p e rim e n t th a t co lo r, fo r ex a m p le , is so m e s o rt o f p sy ch ic p ro cess in th e
so-called sen so riu m sh o u ld n o t be in v o k ed . W h a t th e o rg an ism s o r perso n s
| in te ra c t w ith a re a c tu a l o b jects w ith th e ir v a rio u s q u a litie s a n d p ro p e rtie s
I w ith in a c o o rd in a te space tim e system .
b. The Understanding
By th e sa m e to k e n th e u n d e rs ta n d in g w h ich ep istem o lo g ists m a k e use o f
d o es n o t a c c o rd w ith th e facts o f p sy ch o lo g y. In this case as in th a t o f th e
senses w h a t really is being ob serv ed a n d discu ssed is th e b eh a v io r o f
o rg a n ism s w ith respect to objects. U n d e rs ta n d in g is a m o d e o f in teractin g
w ith o b jects b ased o n , in m o st cases, m an y p rev io u s co n ta c ts w ith objects.
A t first so m e o b ject w hich m a y be called new a n d stra n g e to a n o rg a n ism is
little u n d e rs to o d . It is m erely seen, th a t is, perceived. If th e o rg a n ism
p e rfo rm s la te r re actio n s to th e sam e o b ject w h e th e r m erely o b serv in g w h a t
h a p p e n s to it w h e n in c o n ta c t w ith a n o th e r o b ject, o r th e result o f th e
o rg a n ism ’s m a n ip u la tio n o f th e object, th e n th e later reactio n s m ay be
✓ called u n d e rsta n d in g .
122
E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G Y
ON TO LO G Y A N D EX ISTE N C E
124
E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G Y
M A T H E M A T IC S A S AN O N TO LO G IC A L PR O BLEM
a. What is Mathematics?
A s to m a th e m a tic s it is ad v isab le to ta k e a c c o u n t o f th e fact th a t it is a t
th e sa m e tim e (1) a la n g u a g e , (2) a calcu lu s, (3) a n a rt, a n d (4) a n in d e p e n d
e n t science.
125
fra te rn ity , w ith a b stra c t an d c o n c rete re la tio n s o f m an y so rts as subject
m a tte r. S o m e evidence o f th is fa ct is d isc ern ib le in th e insistence th a t
m ath em atics is logic o r derived fro m logic.2
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY
Scientific p sychology m ak es p lain th a t th e classical views a b o u t b o th
o n to lo g y an d ep istem o lo g y w ere b ad ly m isconceived, since th ey a re based
u p o n fallacious views o f psychology a n d the w ay ind iv id u als p erfo rm ed
creativ e an d o th e r fo rm s o f b eh av io r.(§ ecau se th e n o tio n h a s lo n g prevailed
th a t p erso n s a re d o u b le beings m a d e u p o f m inds an d bodies, th e m en tal or
so u l p a r t w as re g ard e d as free a n d a u to n o m o u s an d th u s ca p ab le o f
c re a tin g a w o rld an d all it c o n ta in s ) W h a t w as flagrantly o v erlo o k ed was
th a t n o psychological a c tio n o r p e rfo rm a n c e does o r can o c c u r except as an
in te ra c tio n w ith so m eth in g in th e am b ien c e o f a p e rfo rm in g individual.
T h a t so m e th in g c o u ld be o n ese lf as w ell o r ill, erect o r p ro n e , a n o th e r
p e rso n o r o th e r o rg a n ism , o r im ag in ary o b ject o r q u a lity o f a n o bject. D ue
c o n sid eratio n o f psychological b eh a v io r leaves n o ro o m fo r th e dichotim i-
z a tio n o f ep istem o lo g y an d o n to lo g y , e x c ep t as referen tial term s fo r o rg a n
ism s a n d th e ir a c tio n s in c o rre sp o n d e n ce w ith th in g s a n d events. I nvestiga
tio n o f th e n a tu re o f th in g s can o n ly be p e rfo rm ed by th e critical te c h n iques
o f th e special sciences. T h ere c a n be n o m o re general disciplines n o r m o re
valued o r precise ones.
; R u s s e l l , B ., Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, L o n d o n . A lle n a n d U n w in . 1919.
C H A P T E R 13
EGOCENTRIC KNOWING VERSUS COGNITIVE FIELDS
S P IR IT IST IC P H IL O SO PH Y D O M IN A T E S T H E SC IEN C E
O F K N O W IN G
G A LILEO SP1RITIZES K N O W IN G
1Burtt, E. A., The Metaphysical Foundations o f Modem Science, Garden City, Doubleday, 1954.
127
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
them, particular and different from those of the other primary and real accidents, we induce
ourselves to believe that they exist just as truly and really as the latter.
I think that by an illustration 1 can explain my meaning more clearly. 1 pass a hand, first
over a marble statue, then over a living man. Concerning all the effects which come from the
hand, as regards the hand itself, they are the same whether on the one or on the other
object—that is, these primary accidents, namely motion and touch (for we call them by no .
other names)—but the animate body which suffers that operation feels various affections
according to the different parts touched, and if the sole of the foot, the kneecap, or the
armpit be touched, it perceives besides the common sense of touch, another affection, to
which we have given a particular name, calling it tickling. Now this affection is all ours, and
does not belong to the hand at all. And it seems to me that they would greatly err who
should say that the hand, besides motion and touch, possessed in itself another faculty
different from those, namely the tickling faculty; so that tickling would be an accident that
exists in it. A piece of paper, or a feather, lightly rubbed on whatever part of our body you
wish, performs, as regards itself, everywhere the same operation, that is, movement and
touch; but in us, if touched between the eyes, on the nose, and under the nostrils, it excites
an almost intolerable tickling, though elsewhere it can hardly be felt at all. Now this tickling
is all in us. and not in the feather, and if the animate and sensitive body be removed, it is
nothing more than a mere name. Of precisely a similar and not greater existence do I believe
these various qualities to be possessed, which are attributed to natural bodies, such as tastes,
odours, colours, and others.
** But that external bodies, to excite in us these tastes, these odours and these sounds.
demand other than size, figure, number, and slow or rapid motions, I do not believe; and 1
i judge that, if the ears, the tongue, and the nostrils were taken away, the figure, the numbers,
and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours nor the tastes nor the sounds,
which, without the living animal, I do not believe are anything else than names, just as
tickling is precisely nothing but a name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be removed;
"I . . and turning to my first proposition in this place, having now seen that many affections
& which are reputed to be qualities residing in the external object, have truly no other
existence than in us, and without us are nothing else than names; I say that I am inclined
sufficently to believe that heat is of this kind, and that the thing that produces heat in us and
yg makes us perceive it, which we call by the general name fire, is a multitude of minute
corpuscles thus and thus figured, moved with such and such a velocity;. . . But that besides
^ their figure, number, motion, penetration, and touch, there is in fire another quality, that is
ji heat—that I do not believe otherwise than I have indicated, and I judge that it is so much
due to us that, if the animate and sensitive body were removed, heat would remain nothing
more than a simple word.
128
K N O W I N G VS. C O G N I T I V E F I E L D S
129
THE P H I L O S O P H E R AND HIS W O R L D
JTaylor, L. W., Physics the Pioneer Science, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1941.
130
K N O W I N G VS. C O G N I T I V E F I E L D S
Tennis-Ball struck with an oblique Racket, describe such a curve Line. For, a circular as well
as a progressive Motion being communicated to it by the Stroke, its Parts on that Side,
where the Motions conspire, must press and beat the contiguous Air more violently than on
the other, and there excite a Reluctancy and Reaction of the Air proportionably greater.
And for the same Reason, if the Rays of Light should possibly be globular Bodies, and by
their oblique Passage out of one Medium into another acquire a circulating Motion, they
ought to feel the greater Resistance from the ambient Ether on that Side where the Motions
conspire, and thence be continually bowed to the other. But notwithstanding this plausible
Ground of Suspicion, when I came to examine it, I could observe no such Curvity in them.
And besides (which was enough for my purpose) I observed, that the Difference betwixt the
Length of the Image, and the Diameter of the Hole through which the Light was transmit
ted, was proportionable to their Distance.
The gradual Removal of these Suspicions at length led me to the Experim eruum Crucis,
which was this. (Fig. 2). I took two Boards, and placed one of them close behind the Prism at
the W indow, so that the Light might pass through a small H ole, made in it for the purpose,
and fall on the other Board, which I placed at about 12 Feet distance, having first made a
small Hole in it also forsome of that incident Light to pass through. Then 1 placed another
Prism behind t his second Board, so that the Light trajectcd through both the Boards might
pass through that also, and be again refracted before it arrived at the Wall. This done, I took
the first Prism in my Hand, and turned it to and fro slowly about it Axis, so much as to make
the several Parts of the Image, cast on the second Board, successively pass through the Hole
in it, that I might observe to what Places on the Wall the second Prism would refract them.
And I saw by the Variation of those Places, that the Light, tending to that End of the Image
towards which the Refraction of the first Prism was made, did in the second Prism suffer a
Refraction considerably greater than the Light tending to the other End. And so the true
Cause of the Length of that Image was detected to be no other, than that Light is not similar
or homogeneal, but consists of difform Rays, so m e o f which are m ore refrangible than
others ; so that without any Difference in their Incidence on the same Medium, some shall be
more refracted than others; and therefore that, according to their particular Degrees o f
Refrangibilitv, they were transmitted through the Prism to divers Parts of the opposite
Wall.
I shall now proceed to acquaint you with another more notable D ifform ity in its Rays,
wherein the Origin of Colours is unfolded: Concerning which I shall lay down the Doctrine
131
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
first; and then, for its Examination, give you an Instance or two of the Experiments, as a
Specimen of the rest.
The Doctrine you will find comprehended and illustrated in the following Propositions.
1. As the Rays of Light differ in Degrees of Refrangibility, so they also differ in their
Disposition to exhibit this or that particular Colour. Colours are not Qualifications of
Light, derived from Refractions, or Reflections of natural Bodies (as 'tis generally believed)
but original and connate Properties, which in divers Rays are divers. Some Rays are
disposed to exhibit a Red Colour, and no other, some a Yellow, and no other, some a Green,
and no other, and so of the rest. Nor are there only Rays proper and particular to the more
eminent Colours, but even to all their intermediate Gradations.
2. To the same Degree of Refrangibility ever belongs the same Colour, and to the same
Colour ever belongs the same Degree of Refrangibility. The least refrangible Rays are all
disposed to exhibit a Red Colour, and contrarily, those Rays which are disposed to exhibit a
Red Colour, are all the least refrangible: So the most refrangible Rays are all disposed to
exhibit a deep Violet Colour, and contrarily, those which are apt to exhibit such a Violet
Colour, are all the most refrangible: And so to all the intermediate Colours in a continued
Series belong intermediate Degrees of Refrangibility. And this Analogy betwixt Colours
a and Refrangibility is very precise and strict; the Rays always either exactly agreeing in both,
or proportionally disagreeing in both.
3. The Species of Colour, and Degree of Refrangibility proper to any particular Sort of
p! Rays, is not mutable by Refraction, nor by Reflection from natural Bodies, nor by any other
Cause that 1could yet observe. When any one Sort of Rays hath been well parted from those
of other Kinds, it hath afterwards obstinately retained its Colour, notwithstanding my
1 utmost Endeavors to change it. I have refracted it with Prisms, and reflected it with Bodies,
ifli which in Day-light were of other Colours; I have intercepted it with the coloured Film of
Air, interceding two compressed Plates of Glass, transmitted it through coloured Mediums,
and through Mediums irradiated with other Sorts of Rays, and diversely terminated it; and
yet could never produce any new Colour out of it. It would by contracting or dilating
m become more brisk, or faint, and by the Loss of many Rays, in some Cases very obscure and
dark; but I could never see it changed in Specie.. . .
7. But the most surprizing and wonderful Composition was that of Whiteness. There is
no one sort of Rays which alone can exhibit this. T is ever compounded; and to its
Composition are requisite all the aforesaid primary Colours, mix’d in a due Proportion. I
41 have often with Admiration beheld, that all the Colours of the Prism being made to
*•' converge, and thereby to be again mix’d, as they were in the Light before it was incident
upon the Prism, reproduced Light, entirely and perfectly White, and not at all sensibly
differing from a direct Light of the Sun, unless when the Glasses 1 used were not sufficiently
tQ| dear; for then they would a little incline it to their Colour.
8 . Hence therefore it comes to pass, that Whiteness is the usual Colour of Light; for
Light is a confused Aggregate of Rays indued with all sorts of Colours, as they were
promiscuously darted from the various Parts of luminous Bodies. And of such a confused
Aggregate, as I said, is generated Whiteness, if there be a due Proportion of the Ingredients;
but if any one predominate, the Light must incline to that Colour; as it happens in the blue
Flame of Brimstone; the yellow Flame of Candles; and the various Colours of the Fixed
Stars.
9. These things considered, the manner how Colours are produced by the Prism is
evident. For, of the Rays, constituting the incident Light, since those which differ in Colour
proportionally differ in Refrangibility, they by their unequal Refractions must be severed
and dispersed into an oblong Form in an orderly Succession, from the least refracted
Scarlet, to the most refracted Violet.
132
K N O W I N G VS. C O G N I T I V E F I E L D S
TH E N EW T O N IA N M O D E L O F PER C EIV IN G
L ig h t
R ays
Fig. 3. Conventional Theory of the Function of the Brain in Mediating Between Physical Light and
Mental Qualities.
If at any time I speak of light and rays as coloured or endued with Colours. I would be
understood to speak not philosophically and properly, but grossly, and according to such
conceptions as vulgar people in seeing all these Experiments would be apt to frame. For the
rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain power
and disposition to stir up a sensation of this or that Colour. For as sound in a Bell or musical
133
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
Siring, or other sounding Body, is nothing but a trembling Motion, propagated by the
Object, and in the Sensorium ’tis a sense of that Motion under the form of sound; so Colours
in the Object are nothing but a disposition to reflect this or that sort of rays more copiously
than the rest; in rays they are nothing but their dispositions to propagate this or that Motion
into a Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are sensations of those Motions under the
forms of Colours.^
C R IT IC A L A N A L Y S IS O F N EW TO N ’S S E N SO R Y M O D E L
134
K N O W I N G VS. C O G N I T I V E F I E L D S
T h o u g h it w as h a rd ly possib le fo r N e w to n in his d a y to k n o w m u ch
a b o u t n eu ro lo g y , nevertheless his a u th o rity prevailed. H a rtle y w ith great
assu ra n c e fo rm u la te d th e tw o follow ing p ro p o sitio n s w h ich su m m ed u p his
fu n d a m e n ta l n eu ro lo g ical view point.
* Newton, I., Opticks, p. 328.
135
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
The white medullary substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and the nerves proceeding
from them, is the immediate instrument of Sensation and Motion.
The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate instrument, by which
Ideas are presented to the Mind: or in other words, whatever changes are made in this
substance, corresponding changes are made in our Ideas; and vice versa.5
NEW TON’S B A N E F U L IN FL U E N C E ON SC IE N C E A N D PH IL O SO PH Y
'Ibid.
6Reid. T., Essays on the Intellectual Powers o f Man (J. Walker, ed.), 6th cd., Boston, Phillips,
Sampson, I8SS, Essay 2, ch. 2.
’Kantor, J. R., The Logic o f Modern Science, Chicago, Prindpia, 1953.
136
K N O W I N G VS. C O G N I T I V E F I E L D S
137
THE P H I L O S O P H E R A N D HIS W O R L D
a tta c k o n th e d istin c tio n betw een p rim a ry a n d sec o n d ary qu alities p lay ed a
large p a rt in tra n s m ittin g th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l p h ilo so p h y to posterity.
SUM M A R Y
138
SECTION
III
Human Events
in Philosophical Perspective
C H A P T E R 14
LINGUISTIC EVENTS AS INTERBEHAVIORAL FIELDS
141
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
Fig. 4. De Saussure’s representation of the processes of transforming psychic states into words and
vice versa. From the Course in General Linguistics, p. 11.
142
L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D S
* ‘
V
>1
Fig. 6. Hearer Becomes Speaker
l!
d. Intercommunication. In in terc o m m u n icativ e situ atio n s th e trian g le H
a lte rn a te s betw een F ig . 5 a n d a n o th e r recip ro cal Fig. 6 in w hich th e referee
p erso n becom es th e sp ea k er a n d the original referring p erso n becom es the
referee in th e in terb e h av io ral interchange.
S peech it is clear co n stitu te s u n its o f a d ju stm en t o r a d a p ta tio n s to
en v iro n in g o bjects a n d c o n d itio n s e xactly as in th e case o f every o th e r type
o f psychological p erfo rm an c e. T h e fields in each case are m o re o r less
u n iq u e as affected by th e circum stances prevailing a t th e tim e.
'Cf. Kantor, J. R„ Psychological Linguistics, Chicago, Principia, 1977, also Kanlor, J. R.. An
Objective Psychology o f Grammar, Chicago, Principia, 1936.
143
H U M A N E V EN T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
y .
; • l \ '■ , ‘
1. Referential Behavior 1. Sign Behavior [ m .> .‘ i
V V V
i »7* . . 1n-; "
2. Symbolic
* Behavior 2. Signal
a Behavior \l \ ;. i ‘
J ,/••
t
Fig. 7. Comparison of Linguistic and Semiotic Fields
144
L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D S
SPE EC H A S T H E M A T R IX O F L A N G U A G E
145
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
146
/
/
' fA'
L I N G U I S T I C FIELDS
i*
th in g s an<i_the_developm ent o f sign b eh a v io r su ch as re sp o n d in g to the
w o rd s, “N o tresp a ssin g ,” “ B ew are o f th e d o g ." a nd, telep h o n ic an sw erin g
m essages. S igns like d iag ra m s, statistical lines, a n d curves m ay b e a u x ilia ry
featu res o f a c tu a l speech a n d w riting b u t things an d b e h a v io r m u st still be
k ep t a p a rt in view o f th e ir v ariab le stru ctu re s a n d functions.
147
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PE RS PE CTI VE
a. Grammar4
F o r co n v e n tio n a l linguistics g ra m m a r is th e ab stra c tio n istic d escrip tio n
o f w h a t is p resu m ed to be an aly zed o u t o f w h a t is reg ard ed as sta n d a rd
speech , o r fro m te x tu a l m aterials. In g en e ral th e re a re p re su m e d to be fo u r
phases o f lan g u ag e— p h o n o lo g y , m o rp h o lo g y , sy n tax , a n d sem antics.
C learly th e b asic p a tte rn o f th in g lan g u ag e is reflected in th e tre a tm e n t o f
so u n d s o r p h o n es, th e s tru c tu re o f w o rd s, the in terre latio n s o f w o rd s, an d
finally th e m eanings o f w o rd s s o lo o r in sen ten ce co m b in atio n s. B ecause.of
th e stru c tu ra l im p licatio n lan g u ag e req u ires .“ m ean in g ” fu n c tio n s to ac
c o u n t for references to objects sp o k e n o f o r sym bolized.
In terb eh av io ra l linguistics reg ard s g ra m m a r as th e style b o th o f co m
m u n icativ e b e h a v io r w h e th e r o f so-called s ta n d a rd speech, any d ialect, o r
th e th in g -lan g u ag e o f texts. In n eith e r case, o f course, is th e re an y ro o m fo r
tran sc e n d e n ta l factors. F o r th e d esc rip tio n s o f a n y linguistic style it suffices
to rely o n th e b eh a v io r o f persons in c o n n e c tio n w ith stim u lu s objects o f th e
tria n g u la r o r linear type. T h e styles in th e tw o cases o f co u rse a re very
different. T h e g ra m m a r o f speech is n o t lim ited to u tteran ces b u t tak es strict
ac c o u n t o f th e specificities o f linguistic b eh a v io r, th e p erso n sp eak in g , th e
• C f . K a n i o r , J . R .. A n O bjective P sych o lo g y o f G ra m m a r, C h i c a g o , P r i n c i p i a . ( 1 9 3 6 ) . I 9 S 2 .
148
L I N G U I S T I C FIELDS
b. Meaning
C o n v e n tio n a l linguistics a s descended fro m venerable philology is lim
ited to th e exegetical in te rp re ta tio n o f w o rd s w ith o u t differen tiatin g be
tw een w o rd th in g s a n d w o rd actio n . A p ro m in e n t s tu d e n t o f sem antics
asserts,
the present book is concerned solely with the meanings of words.5 V - , ' '
Thought or Reference
F ig . 9 . O g d e n - R i c h a r d s * C o n c e p t o f S y m b o l - R e f e r e n t R e l a t i o n
149
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPECTI VE
150
L I N G U I S T I C FIELDS
S t im u l a t io n R e spo n se S e q u e n c e
i
F ig . I I . O b j e c t i v e P s y c h o l o g y 's R e l a t i o n B e t w e e n L i n g u i s t i c S t i m u l u s a n d R e s p o n s e
>
T a b l e I. C o m p a r is o n o f C o n v e n t io n a l a n d In t e r b e h a v io r a l V ie w s
C o n c e r n in g M e a n in g s
M e a n in g s
10I n c o m p l e x s i t u a t i o n s a n a d d i t i o n a l a n d s u c c e e d i n g a u t o n o m o u s r e a c t i o n s y s t e m o c c u r s .
11 C o n v e n t i o n a l l i n g u i s t i c s r e d u c e s l i n g u i s t i c s t o a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d i s c i p l i n e v a r i o u s l y c a lle d
s e m a s io lo g y , s e m io s is , s e m io tic s , o r s o m e o th e r c o g n o m e n .
151
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
1. C enter o f a flower.
2. Leaf-bud o f a potato.
3. Spot on a peacock’s tail.
4. The opening through which issues the water o f a fountain.
5. A central mass; the brightest spot (of light).
6. The center of revolution.
7. An aperture in a needle, tool, etc.
8. A loop o f metal; thread, cord, or rope.
9. (In architecture): the center o f a part, as the eye of a dome.
10. (In typography): the enclosed space in letters like d, e, o.
152
L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D S
153
H U M A N E V E NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
154
L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D S
LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY
F o r th e m o st p a r t w e h a v e b een co n c ern ed in th is c h a p te r w ith th e
p h ilo so p h y o f lan g u ag e, th a t is th e licit a n d illicit a ttitu d e s to w a rd th e all ^
p re v ad in g lin g u istic p h e n o m e n a . I n th e p re sen t sectio n o u r in terest is in th e
u n iq u e ty p e o f p h ilo so p h y z in g in w h ich th e em p h asis is o n th e im p ro v e
m e n t o f p h ilo so p h ic a l th in k in g b y th e an aly sis a n d m o n ito rin g o f th e 1111
lan g u a g e em p lo y e d w hile d ev elo p in g system s o f a ttitu d e s c o n c ern in g
th in k in g o r th e w o rld th o u g h t ab o u t.
L ight is th ro w n u p o n th e n a tu re o f linguistic p h ilo so p h y by th e co n d i
tio n s o f origin. P h ilo so p h e rs in th e 20th c e n tu ry sen sin g th e futility o f
tra d itio n a l m etap h y sics b eg an to insist u p o n th e clarification o f th e refer
en ts fo r th e te rm s a n d sen ten ces em p lo y ed . T h ey ask ed w h a t is th e signifi
can ce o f su c h te rm s as “ G o d ,” “ F re e d o m ," a n d “Im m o rta lity .” S o o n the
q u e stio n e x p a n d e d so th a t v a rio u s schools o f linguistic p h ilo so p h y aro se
155
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
156
L I N G U I S T I C F IE L D S
157
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
1 58
C H A P T E R 15
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ETHICAL SITUATIONS
159
H U M A N E V EN TS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
T a b l e 2. S a m p l e s o f C o n v e n t io n a l E t h ic a l C r it e r ia
P h il o s o p h ic a l
P r in c ip l e
S p o n s o r s h ip
»*’l
Now it is undeniable that each of the traditional standards of morality
has its appeal. Interesting also are some of the argum ents for the proposed
standards. But it is Questionable whether there is a single type of good that
Ifc'l
& is basic to ethical behavior. or to moral judgements about right or wrong
160
ISSUES IN E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S
161
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this
value. Its usefulness would be merely, as it were, the setting which enables us to handle it
better in our ordinary dealings or to attract the attention of those not yet sufficiently expert,
i but not to commend it to experts or io determine its value.1
1Kant, I., Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals (H. J. Paton, trs.), London, Hutchinson’s
Univ. Library, 1947, pp. 61,62.
5Cooper. D. E.,"Moral Relativism," in Studies in Ethical Theory (P. A. French. T. E. Uehling. Jr..
H. K. Wettstcin, eds.), Morris, Minnesota, The Univ. of Minnesota, 1978.
162
I S SU E S IN E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S
163
H U M A N EV E NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
164
I S S U ES IN E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S
165
H UMA N EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
A gain he writes,
'•hi
If I am asked ‘What is good? my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the
matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined,
and that is all l have to say about it. But disappointing as these answers may appear, they are
of the very last importance. To readers who are familiar with philosophic terminology, lean
express their importance by saying that they amount to this: That propositions about the
good are all of them synthetic and never analytic; and that is plainly no trivial matter. And
the same thing may be expressed more popularly, by saying that, if I am right, then nobody
can foist upon us such an axiom as that 'Pleasure is the only good' or that The good is the
desired’ on the pretence that this is The very meaning of the word.’’
*Moore, G. E., Principia Eihica, Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929. Pref. p. viii.
•Ibid., preface, p. viii.
5Ibid., pp. 6-7.
166
I S S U ES IN E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S
167
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
168
SSUES IN E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S
*Hartmann, N., Ethics (S. Coit, trs.), Vol. I, London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 177.
169
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
PU B LIC A N D PR IV A T E M O RALITY
A d istin c tio n o f c o n s id e ra b le im p o rta n c e m u st b e o b serv ed as betw een
w h a t a re called p riv a te a n d p u b lic m o rality . T h e b e h a v io r in e a ch case m ay
b e a r s o m e re se m b la n c e to th e o th e r b u t in essential d etails th ey a re very
different. A b rie f co m p a riso n d e m o n s tra te s this.
B eh av io r re fe rre d t o a s p u b lic m o ra lity co n sists p rim a rily o f co n fo rm ity
o r sh a re d b eh a v io r. T h e y fit in to a system o f a c tio n w hich sociologists call
cu sto m s, m o res, ta b o o s, o r folkw ays. S o cio lo g ists9 d o n o t h esitate to say
th a t it is m o re s o r c u sto m s th a t d efine w h a t is w ro n g o r rig h t to d o . F ro m a
p sych o lo g ical p o in t o f view p u b lic m o ra lity b eh a v io r is in teractio n sjw ilh.
in stitu tio n a l stim u lu s o b jects u n d e r ru les as results o f cu ltu ralizatio n .
^ P u b lic m o ra lity b e h a v io r is th u s identified as ite m s o f social psychology.10
By co n tra st w ith p u b lic m o ra ls p riv a te m o ra l a c tio n s m a y be reg ard ed as
id io sy n cratic o r in d iv id u a l b e h a v io r w h ich is recip ro cal w ith occasional
ev en ts, usu ally m o re serio u s a n d req u isite o f g re a te r alertn ess o n th e p a rt o f
th e reactin g in d iv id u al. C rite ria in th e case o f p riv ate m o rality m ay differ
fro m o n e p e rso n to a n o th e r.
*f<r M e n ta lis ts o r subjectivistic p sy ch o lo g ists d ifferen tiate betw een public
a n d p riv ate m o ra lity o n th e g ro u n d th a t p riv ate m o ra lity is b ased u p o n
I
u
171
C H A P T E R 16
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF POLITICS
H UM A NITY AS C O L O N IA L O R G A N ISM S
J u s t as h u m a n beings c a n n o t ex ist in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e ir terrestial an d
cosm ic en v iro n m e n ts, so they c a n n o t b e free o f in tim ate relatedness w ith
o th ers o f th e ir ilk. A ctu ally , h u m a n beings, like c o rals a n d o th e r sim p ler
o rg a n ism s, are co lo n ial c reatu re s, albeit w ith g re at differences in e v o lu tio n
ary origin, stru c tu re , fu n c tio n , a n d g en eral b eh av io r. M u c h as h u m a n
beings a re in d iv id u a lists a n d u n iq u e th ey a re in escap ab ly a n d in v ariab ly
greg ario u s. N o p e rso n ca n o r d o es live w h o lly a lo n e, a n d th a t fact is th e
p rim a ry basis o f p o litical ex isten ce. A s A risto tle has m ad e clear in his
ex p ressio n Z o o n P o litik o n , h u m a n beings a re social creatu re s. T h is is th e
basis fo r th e h a rm o n ie s a n d strifes a m o n g in d iv id u als, p lu s th e conflicts,
claim s, a n d benefits o f in d iv id u als relativ e to th e a u th o rity a n d c o n tro l by
societies a n d social in stitu tio n s.
H IE R A R C H Y O F H U M A N G R O U PIN G S
172
ASPECTS OF PO L I T I CS
173
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
PO L IT IC A L SYSTEM S A N D P O L IT IC A L PH IL O SO PH Y
174
ASPECTS OF PO L I T I CS
SPE C IM E N S O F PO LITIC A L P H IL O S O P H IE S
175
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
JHobbes, T., Leviathan (E. Rhys, ed.), New York, Dutton, (1651), 1950.
1 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, ch. 14.
176
ASPECTS OF P O L I T I C S
177
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E RS P E CT I V E
178
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
’ Hume, D., “Of the First Principles of Government,” Essay 4 in The Philosophical Works. 4 vols.,
Edinburgh, Black-Tail, 1826, vol. 3, p. 31.
10He quotes Pope:
For forms of government let fools contest
Whate’er is best administered is best
Essay on Man. bk. 3 quoted
in Hume, D.,"That Politics may be reduced toa ScienceEssay 3 in The Philosophical Works. 4 vols.,
Edinburgh, Black-Tait, 1826, vol. 3, p. 14.
179
H U M A N E V EN TS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
alike, and that the only difference consists in the character and conduct of the governors,
most political disputes would beat an end, and all Z e a l for one constitution above another
must be esteemed mere bigotry and folly. But. though a friend to moderation, I cannot
forbear condemning this sentiment, and should be sorry to think, that human affairs admit
of no greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of
particular men. 11
[j\.n o u ts ta n d in g featu re o f H u m e’s p o litical theories is his co m p lete an d
final o b jectio n to a n d criticism o f th e th e o ry o f c o m p a c ts^ H e ad v an ces a
n u m b e r o f a rg u m e n ts ag a in st th e c o m p a c t id ea o f orig in o f g o v ern m en ts.
A lth o u g h H u m e o f c o u rse w as n o t c o n v e rs a n t w ith m o d e rn a n th ro p o lo g i
cal view s w hich w ould ipso fa cto rule o u t an y such n o tio n as co m p acts, he
ad v a n ces re a so n a b le o b jectio n s. F o r e x a m p le , he assum es th a t w hen gov-
ern m e n ts w ere fo rm ed th e p rim itiv itv o f th e h u m a n p o p u la tio n a t th a t tim e
m a d e it u n re a s o n a b le to s u p po se th a t th ey c o u ld form c o m p a c ts . A lso he
relies o n th e fact th a t n eith er he n o r a n y b o d y else co u ld cite a case o f a
g o v e rn m e n t being form ed o n th e basis o f th e c o n se n t o f th e p eo p le fo rm in g
th e n a tio n o r state. In general H u m e th in k s th a t n o th in g is a clea rer p ro o f
\ th a t th e social c o n tra c t th e o ry is e r ro n e o u s th a n th a t it leads to “p a ra d o x e s
re p u g n a n t to th e c o m m o n sen tim en ts o f m a n k in d , an d to th e practice an d
o p in io n o f all n atio n s an d all ag e s."12
r
,
the P o s t-G re c o -R o m a n religious w ay o f th in k in g . C o n v ersely to w hat
Hegel h im self w ould agree to , he d o e s a w a y co m p letely w ith the n atu ra l
w orld o f th in g s an d co n d itio n s. He w o u ld say th a t he glorifies th e ex tern al
w orld by p u ttin g it sq u arely in to c o n sc io u sn e ss, a n o th e r n am e fo r spirit.
I Specifically, he invented a co m p lete to ta lita ria n system in w h ich th e cu-
180
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
181
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
182
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
proletariat, it thus puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms and thus also to
the state as state. . . . The first act in which the state really comes forward as the
representative of the whole of society — the taking possession of the means of production in
~the name of society — is at the same time its last independent an as a state. The interference
of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and
then dies away of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of
1/ things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not ‘'abolished," it
w ith ers a w a y .18
' ‘ Engels, F., Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975, pp. 93.94.
183
H U M A N E V EN TS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
''•Proudhon, P. .1. M-'Anl n Pru/tern 'A n enquiry mm the Principle o f Right ant! Government (B. R.
lucker, trs). New York. II. Fertig, IWi.
(iodwin. W . I.itquin m n tvrn in i1 ‘olilital Justice am! its Influence on General i'irtue and
llup/nnew (K. A. Preston, cd). 2 vols„ New York. Knopf, 1926.
Sorel. <i . Illusions duprugres. 2nd ed.. Paris, Marcel Riviere, 1911.
..................Ktflexiuns stir la violence. Paris. Marcel Riviere, 1972.
_____ . Mulenaux pour one tliruric do proletariat. Ird ed., Paris. Marcel Riviere. 1929.
184
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
Bakunin, M.A., The Political Philosophy o f Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism (G. P. MaximofT, ed.),
Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1953.
______________ , Sialism and Anarchy (C. H. Plummer, trs., J. F. Harrison, ed.). New York, Revision
ist Press, 1976.
_______________ The Confession o f Mikhail Bakunin (R. C. Howes, trs.). Ithaca, New York, Cornell
Univ. Press, 1977.
Stimer, M., The Ego and His Own (S. T. Byington, trs.). New York, Benj. R. Tucker. 1907.
Most, J., Memoiren. erlebtes, erforschtes und erdachtes, New York, Selbstverlag des Vcrfassers,
1903.
Kropotkin, P. A., Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection o f Writings (R. N. Baldwin,
ed.). New York, Dover, 1970.
---------------------- Ethics. Origin and Development (L. S. Friedlartd and J. R. Piroshnikoff. trs.). New
York, Dial Press, 1924.
_____________ _ Mutual Aid. A Factor o f Evolution (P. Avrich, ed.). London. Penguin Press. 1972.
Blanqui, A., Critique sociale, Paris, F. Alcan, 1885.
Goldman, E„ My Disillusionment in Russia. Garden City, New York, Doubleday. Page. 1923.
---------------------- Living My Life. New York, Knopf, 1931.
185
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
IN D IV ID U A L S VERSU S P O L IT IC A L SYSTEM S
S PE C IF IC PO LITIC A L P R O B LEM S
Spencer, H., The Man t'enus the State (T. Beale, ed.). New York. Kennerly, 1916.
186
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
187
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
"Russell. H.. I'tnwr: A new Stniul Anatv\i\. New York, Norton. I9.1K, p. 4X.
188
A S P E C T S OF P O L I T I C S
189
\ H U M A N E V E NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
r V
rh e to ric o f c o n s titu tio n s w h e th e r o r n o t it ac tu a lly reduces re strain ts
im p o sed o n p erso n s, refers to fre e d o m g ra n te d by th e agencies o f a
g o v ern m e n t. A ccordingly, th e te rm “fre e d o m ” is a universal a b stra c tio n
re m o te fro m a c tu a l so cietal s itu a t i o n s ^ V h e n w e co n c ern ourselves w ith
sp erific circu m stan c es it is~Im possible fo r a n t n d ividual t o b e politically ffeeT^'
\J A m o n g th e m ost c o m p e llin g e x a m p le s are~tfie im possibility fo r a n ind iv id
NJ ual n o t to c o n fo rm to th e im p o sitio n o f tax es, to ev ad e being d ra fted fo r
m ilitary service, to p ro d u c e a n d c o n su m e c e rta in beverages, o r to w ear
K c e rta in clothes.
■x ■^4-To a v o id m etap h y sical p ro b le m s is to esch ew all sp ec u la tio n a b o u t
g en e ral fre e d o m o r co e rcio n . W h e th e r a p e rso n is free to d o som e act o r to
reTrairTTrom a c tin g is e n tire ly .a .m a tte r o L p a rtic u la n c irc u m stan ce s. T h ey
m ay d ep e n d u p o n legal in ju n ctio n s, e c o n o m ic o r d o m estic co n d itio n s, a n d
freq u en tly m atters o f health.
W h ile co n sid erin g p ro b le m s o f po litical freed o m it is well to em p h asize
th a t it is th e state, n a tio n , o r o th e r g o v e rn m e n ta l agency th a t is in c o n tro l o f
th e p o w e rs a n d forces to co m p el c o n fo rm ity . In m an y o th e r cases th e re is a
p ro b a b ility o f p e rfo rm in g c e rta in ac ts o rig inally stim u lated by p riv ate
c o n sid e ra tio n s. In m o st d e m o c ra tic o rg a n iz a tio n s th ere is little co m p u lsio n
to g o to th e polls to vote. In o th e r m o re d ic ta to ria l system s th e re is no
ch o ice a n d th e re fo re n o freed o m in this respect. T h e c o m p ariso n o f the tw o
ty p es o f s itu a tio n a d d s to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e p ro b lem s o f freed o m in
political life.
f. Equality. M an y p o litical c o n s titu tio n s fe a tu re th e g en eral prin cip le o f
e q u a lity , b u t in n o case c a n e q u a lity c o n sist o f a n y a r b itra ry a b stra ctiv e
q u a lity . F o r ex a m p le , a co n g ress o r p a rlia m e n t c a n d eclare th a t a n y p erso n
b o rn in th e c o m m u n ity is eligible to p a rtic ip a te p olitically, to vote, to ru n
fo r office. In view, how ever, o f th e sta tu s o f c e rta in racial m em bers, w om en,
o r re lig io u s affiliates w h o are n o t tre a te d as citizens, it is q u ite a futile an d
Active p ro p o s itio n th a t all p e rso n s a re c re a te d eq u a l. E q u a lity is a sta tu s
alw a y s allo w ed o r c u ltiv ated by a n ag e n cy o f g o v e rn m e n t a n d th ere fo re
m u st a c co rd w ith th e rules o f th e g o v e rn m e n t.
T h e local d isc o rd a n c e m e n tio n e d sy m p to m ize s th e g re at difference be-
/ tw een co n v e n tio n a l a n d in te rb e h a v io ra l p h ilo so p h y . A c co rd in g to co n v en -
/ tio n al p h ilo so p h y o f politics e a c h in d iv id u a l is g ra n te d eq u a l pow ers an d
) cap acities ju s t because he is a p erso n . A c tu a lly , how ever, th a t e q u a lity is
\ sim ply a n a b stra c tio n , a statistical n u m b e r, a n av erage. T h e in terb eh av -
( ioral view re g ard s e q u a lity o r in eq u ality as co n c rete a n d specific qualities
( a n d potentialities. W h e th e r o r n o t A is eq u a l to B is ev a lu a ted on th e basis
190
A S P E C T S o f p o l i t i c s
o f p recise crite ria o f d efin ite legal, c u ltu ra l, ec o n o m ic , in tellectu al, political,
a n d so cial situ a tio n s. A a n d B m ay b e eq u a l legally b u t n o t eco n o m ically o r
socially. C a n d D m ay b e eq u a l in telle ctu ally b u t n o t eco n o m ically o r
socially. E v ery possible c o m b in a tio n exists a n d a n y single e q u a lity m ight
be th e sole e q u a lity o n th e basis o f law o r o th e r criterio n .
g. Liberty. I f ju stific a tio n is re q u ire d fo r tre a tin g th e p ro b le m o f political
lib erty a lo n g w ith th e p ro b le m o f freed o m , w e c a n find it in th e a s su m p tio n
th a t liberty consists in allo w in g p e rso n s to exercise th e ir n a tu ra l rights.
^ A t o nce, h o w e v er, th e serio u s q u e stio n arises w h e th e r th ere a re rights,
rq u a litie s, o r privileges in h erin g in p erso n s d e rived fro m n a tu ra l co n d i
t i o n s o r w h e th e r th e n o tio n o ^ n a t u r a l r i g h t s ) 5 sim p ly a n a p p ro v e d
' sen tim en tality . -------------
■p O n ly c o n v e n tio n a l p h ilo so p h y allo w s th e p o ssib ility th a t th e re are a n y
n a tu ra l rig h ts. T h is is b ec au se c o n v e n tio n a l p h ilo so p h y o p e ra te s o n the
b asis o f a u tis tic c o n s tru c tio n s in ste a d o f o b s e rv ab le ev en ts. E v en c o n v e n
tio n a l p h ilo s o p h e rs a p p e a r to q u e s tio n th e ex isten c e o f n a tu ra l rights, fo r
ex am p le, S tu a rt H a m p s h ire a n d H . L. A. H a rt. T h e la tte r w rites,
1 shall advance the thesis that if there are any moral rights at all it follows that there is at least
one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free.27
27Han. H. L. A., "Are there any Natural Rights?" in Poliiical Philosophy l A. Quinton, ed.), New
York, Oxford Univ. Press. 1967, p. 53.
191
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
| societal circ u m sta n ces. W h a te v er tra its in d iv id u als d isp lay in th eir political
b e h a v io r h av e been o rig in ated a n d d ev e lo p ed u n d e r th e influence o f cul
tu ra l co n d itio n s. N o p erso n is a m o n a rc h ist, d e m o c ra t, re p u b lic an , o r
; a n a rc h is t w ith o u t th e in tera ctio n s o f th e in d iv id u al w ith p a rtic u la r circ u m
i
stan ces w hich fa v o r th e d ev elo p m en t o f su ch attitu d es.
192
ASPECTS OF PO L I T I CS
193
C H A P T E R 17
PHILOSOPHY A N D ECONOMICS
EC O N O M IC S IN P H IL O SO P H IC A L PER SPE C TIV E
O b se rv e rs o f th e e c o n o m ic scene a p p e a r to fa c e m o re in h e re n t am b ig u i
ties th a n stu d e n ts o f m o st o th e r d iscip lin es, w h e th e r o f th e h u m a n a n d
societal realm s, o r in q u iries in to ev e n ts o f n a tu re . T h u s th e p h ilosophical
an aly sis o f e c o n o m ic s en tails g re a t difficulty. E co n o m ic ev e n ts a re clear-cut
w ith in th e fra m e w o rk o f o b serv ab le ev en ts, w hile e c o n o m ic th e o ry co nsists
to a g re at e x te n t o f o p in io n s, beliefs, a n d v e rb alism s w h ich in d u ce scepti
cism a n d d o w n rig h t d e n ials o f th e v ery ex isten ce o f m a n y types o f h u m a n
affairs. M an ifestly , th e re is a tre m e n d o u s h ia tu s b etw een ec o n o m ic events
a n d th e d e sc rip tio n s a n d in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e m . T h is g re a t g a p is filled u p
w ith v erb al a b s tra c tio n s w h ich fo rm b a rrie rs b etw een ev en ts a n d valid
p ro p o sitio n s. A s P ro fe sso r K n ig h t says,
. . . all ‘economic' theory in the proper sense of the word, is purely abstract and formal,
without content. It deals, in general, with certain formal principles of ‘economy* without
reference to what is to be economized, or how; more specifically, price-economics deals with
a social system in which every individual treats all others and society merely as instrumental
ities and conditions of his own Privatw irtschaft, a mechanical system of Crusoe economies.1
1Knight, F. H„ Risk, Uncertainty a n d Profit, New York, Kelley, (1921), 1964, p. xii.
194
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O MI C S
195
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
C R U C IA L P R O B L E M S IN EC O N O M IC A N A L Y S IS
iik
B ecause o f th e u b iq u ity , co m p lex ity , a n d v ariab ility o f ec o n o m ic events__ .
(K
th e p h ilo so p h y o f ec o n o m ic s faces a n u m b e r o f cru c ia l p ro b lem s cen tered
a b o u t th e v alid ity o f d esc rip tio n s a n d in te rp re ta tio n s c o n c e rn in g eco n o m ic
i ft d a ta ^ B asically th ese p ro b le m s arise fro m th e a d h e re n c e to invalid ph ilo
so p h ical a s s u m p tio n s a n d fo u n d a tio n s. T h e result is a n in h ib itio n o f critical
analysis. In g en e ral, th e p h ilo so p h y o f ec o n o m ics is b ased o n a n ab stra c-
tio n istic a n d u n iv ersa listic set o f a ttitu d e s a lo n g w ith a fallacio u s p sy ch o l
ogy. In th e p re s e n t c h a p te r w e e x p lo re th e c o n sid e ra tio n s w h ich m a rk off
a n a d e q u a te fro m a n in a d e q u a te a ttitu d e to w a rd e c o n o m ic events. F o r
e x a m p le , u n iv ersa l ec o n o m ic s is re g ard e d as a su bjectivistic a n d n o t a n
o b jectiv e d iscipline. T h e ec o n o m ic p h ase o f h u m a n so ciety involves c o n
l» crete ev e n ts o f p erso n s a c tin g a n d m a te ria ls acted u p o n , b u t th e th eo ries are
en c ased in to v a c u o u s a b s tra c tio n s fre q u en tly o f a su p e rn a tu ra l co m p lex
io n .2 E c o n o m ic s is m a d e in to a d ism al science in stead o f a d e p ictio n o f
co m p le x h u m a n living.
EX C E SSIV E A B ST R A C T IO N ISM IN E C O N O M IC S
196
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
o v e r a g a in s t th e ec o n o m ic s o f specialized su b -g ro u p s o f p ersons. M o re
gen erally th e re is a d iffe ren tiatio n if n o t o p p o sitio n b etw een th e statistica l
g ro u p in g o f e c o n o m ic ev en ts as a g a in st th e a c tu a l specific b e h a v io r a n d
tra n s a c tio n s o f ec o n o m ic s itu a tio n s.
N ex t th e re is th e u n w ittin g a d m ix tu re o f th eo retical p re su p p o sitio n s w ith
th e b asic d a ta o f a c tu a l e c o n o m ic events. P e rh a p s even m o re th a n G o e th e 3
in te n d e d to asse rt, ev en ts o r facts a re a lre a d y th eo ries. E ven perceiving
eve n ts b e sp e a k p r io r in te rb e h a v io rs a n d th e assig n m en t o f p ro p e rtie s to
stim u lu s objects.
T h e co n c lu sio n is in escap ab le th a t ec o n o m ic d esc rip tio n s an d in te rp re ta
tio n s a re heavily c h a rg e d w ith su p p o sitio n s derived fro m such sources as
o n e’s g e n e ra l W e lta n sc h a u u n g , n a tio n , a n d c o u n try lived in, social statu s,
an d p erio d o f stu d y .
T H E LAW O F SU P PL Y A N D D E M A N D
' Das Hochste wa re: Zu begrcifen. das altes factische schon Thcorie ist. Ma ximen und Reflexionen.
No. 575.
197
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
S PE C IF IC IT IE S IN T H E EC O N O M IC C O M PL E X
198
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
199
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
200
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
T H E D O G M A O F P R IC E
201
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
SU PPL Y A N D D E M A N D AS D O G M A S A N D AS EVENTS
EQ U ILIBRIU M IN EC O N O M ICS
4Ayres. C. E., The Theory o f Economic Progress, Chape) Hill, North Carolina Press, 1944, p. 267.
202
P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C S
BUSINESS A N D PU B LIC W E L FA R E
203
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
EC O N O M IC C O N FU SIO N S: C A U SES A N D R E M E D IE S
O b serv ers o f th e e c o n o m ic scene c a n n o t b u t c o n c lu d e th a t th e discipline
is rep lete w ith u n c e rta in tie s a n d c o n fu sio n s. A w ide g a p sep a rates eco
204
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
’"In 1974. American business spenl $26 billion dollars on advertising." according to Attiych. R..
Back. G. H.. and Lunsdcn. R.. Basic Economics: Theory aiul Cases. Englewood Clifls. 1977.
205
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
IN T E R R E L A T IO N S O F P H IL O S O P H Y A N D ECO N O M ICS
206
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
1. Continuity of Economics
In a sm u c h a s eco n o m ics in clu d es th e ele m e n ta ry life processes o f o rg a
nism s as they m a in ta in them selves by in te ra c tin g w ith th e ir biological an d
social en v iro n m e n ts as well as th e p ecu n iary circu m stan ces o f com m u n ities,
th e re ex ists a c o n tin u u m in th e a ttitu d e s s tu d e n ts o f eco n o m ics fo rm u la te
c o n c e rn in g th e ec o n o m ic activities p erfo rm ed by in d iv id u als a n d groups.
B ut w ith in this c o n tin u u m th ere is a succession b ased u p o n th e v aria tio n s in
ec o n o m ic s itu a tio n s o c c u rrin g in different cu ltu res, g eo g rap h ical centers,
natio n s, a n d o th e r political groupings.
2. Economics in Antiquity
T h e sto ry o f th e beginnings o f th e discipline o f eco n o m ics m ay pro p erly
be lo calized in G re ek tim es w h en well fo rm u la te d ph ilo so p h ies becam e
av a ila b le d esp ite th e c o m p a ra tiv e sim plicity o f ec o n o m ic situ atio n s th en
prev ailin g . It is tru ly said th a t a m o n g th e G reeks, in clu d in g th e em in en t
P la to a n d A risto tle , ec o n o m ic s a re m erely h o u seh o ld system s by c o n tra s t
w ith th e m o re g e n e ra l ec o n o m ic s o f la te r n a tio n s o r cu ltu re s. A s it m u st be
w h e n intellect uaF disciplines a re o n ly p artia lly specialized th e eco n o m ics o f
th e g re a t p h ilo so p h e rs a re o n ly in cid en tal to p o litical a n d eth ica l doctrines.
A n cien t ec o n o m ic tra n sa c tio n s a n d general eco n o m ic ev en ts are treated
fro m th e s ta n d p o in t o f eth ical a n d political p ro p rie ty an d n o t so m u ch on
th e basis o f effective a d a p ta tio n s.
H o w so ev er sim p le a n d fra g m e n ta ry G reek eco n o m ics m ay be, to it
b elo n g s th e g lory th a t it c o rre sp o n d s to an objective a n d n atu ralistic
philo so p h y . G re e k p h ilo so p h ic al a ttitu d e s are firm ly ce n te red u p o n ac
tu a l ev en ts o b serv ed a n d sp ec u la tio n s b ased u p o n co n stru c tio n s free o f
a rb itra ry a n d p erso n al assertiveness, o r m ystical trad itio n s. A n cien t m ini
eco n o m ics co n fin ed itself to a c tu a l o ccurrences o f p ro d u c tio n , c o n s u m p
tio n , co m m o d ities, a n d interchanges o f v ario us sorts.
Transcendental Economics
A s w e learn fro m th e h isto ry o f p h ilo so p h y a n d fro m social h isto ry in
gen eral, th e objective c u ltu re o f p re ch ristian d a y s w as follow ed by a p erio d
in w hich p h ilo so p h y becam e en tirely s a tu ra te d w ith n o tio n s o f a p u tativ e
fu tu re a n d b e tte r life to co m e. T h e a c tu a l w o rld w as reg ard ed as u n real an d
only a c o rrid o r to the real su p e rn a tu ra l heaven o f G o d an d th e angels. O n
th e basis o f su ch a p h ilo so p h y n o reg ard needs to be h a d fo r th e co n d itio n s
207
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
Protosecular Economics
By th e 16‘h a n d 17Ih cen tu ries th e c u ltu re o f W estern E u ro p e re ach e d a
h ig h p o in t in th e ev o lu tio n a w a y fro m th e d o m in a tio n o f th e c h u rc h an d
th e s u p e rn a tu ra l. P ro m in e n t in th e g en e ral c u ltu re o f th e tim e is th e gro w th
o f sec u la r states w ith th e ch an g e in p ro b le m s o f living, a n d in th e th in k in g
o f th e p h ilo so p h ers o f th e tim e. A ty p ical in sta n c e is th e th in k in g o f H obbes
(1588-1670) w hich stressed th e a b so lu te n e ss a n d th e in d isp u ta b le sover
eig n ty o f u n it states, a lth o u g h th e b asic s u p e rn a tu ra l p h ilo so p h y o f th e
tra n s c e n d e n ta l p erio d w as m a in ta in e d . S tu d e n ts o f ec o n o m ic affairs how
ever, p a id in creasin g a tte n tio n to p a rtic u la rs o f p ro d u c tio n a n d c o n su m p
tio n as co n crete experiences m u ltip lied .
A b o v e all th e p resen t p erio d w as m a rk e d by th e g re at b u rg e o n in g o f
science. T h e ac h ie v em en ts o f C o p e rn ic u s (1473-1543), K ep ler (1571-1630),
a n d N e w to n (1642-1727) w ere re co rd e d in th e a n n a ls o f science. G re at
em p h a sis w as being placed o n th e a sc e rta in a b le law s o f n a tu re w hich co u ld
m in im ize th e o m n iscien ce a n d o m n ip o te n c e o f a su p re m e law giver a n d
ruler. ...
P ro to s e c u la r eco n o m ics usu ally called p lerc an tilism )is_p ro b a b ly th e
b eg in n in g o f m o d e rn o r p ro fessio n al e c o n o m ics, its p rim ary ch aracteristics
a re s u m m ariz ed by R o sch er ( 1817-1894) as sh o w in g th e influence o f an
estab lish ed sta tg -Q m atio n ,.m an u fa ctu re processes, foreign trad e , em p h asis
o f m o n e y j s w ealth, a n d a su p re m e in te rest in m etals.8
A n o u ts ta n d in g tra it o f th is p e rio d is th e tu rn in g to w ard q u a n titiv e
asp e cts o f ec o n o m ic affairs, th a t is, e c o n o m ic ev e n ts a n d processes becam e
ex p re sse d in te rm s o f n u m b e r, w eig h t, o r m e a su re as W illiam P e tty said in
his P o litical A rith m etik .
•Cf. Johnson, E. A. J., Predecessors o f A dam Sm ith, New Vork. Prentice-Hall, 1957, p. 3.
208
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
Instead of using only comparative and superlative words and intellectual arguments, I have
taken the course. . . to express myself in terms of n u m b e r , w e ig h t, or m easure-, to use only
arguments of sense, and to consider only such causes as have visible foundations in nature.9
’ Petty, W„ quoted in Spiegel, H. W., The Growth o f Econom ic Thought, Englewood Cliffs, N. J„
Prentice-Hall, 1971. p. 122.
l0Hcckscher, E. F„ M ercantilism , (E. F. Soderlund. ed.. M. Shapiro, trs.). 2 vols., 2nd rev. cd„
London. Allen and Unwin, I9SS.
"Smith. A.. A n Inquiry into the Nature an d Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, vol. 2, Everyman ed„
1937, p. 157.
209
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
210
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O MI C S
211
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E RS P E CTI VE
212
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E CONO MI CS
7. Neoclassical Economics
T h e n eoclassical ec o n o m ic s o f th e C a m b rid g e S ch o o l offers a n in fo rm
ing ex a m p le o f th e co n tin u ity o f th in k in g in th a t discipline. T h e an aly sis o f
th e w o rk o f A lfred M a rsh a ll (1824-1942) d e m o n stra te s th e m o d ificatio n o f
earlie r views to fo rm a new er system w h ich assu m es stability an d p o p u la r
ity befo re it is fu rth e r re h ab ilitate d . M a rsh a ll’s trea tise The Principles of
Economics d o m in a te d th e ec o n o m ic s a tm o s p h e re o f E n glish-speaking
n a tio n s fro m a b o u t 1890 to th e 1930’s in c o n n e c tio n w ith th e ex p erien tial
eco n o m ic s o f A d a m S m ith , D a v id R ic a rd o , a n d J o h n S tu a rt M ill as based
o n th e asso c ia tio n istic p h ilo so p h y , b u t it th e n b ecam e re b o rn by reaffirm a
tio n a n d e x te n sio n .20 A lth o u g h M arsh a ll, a n d th e m e m b e rs o f th e C a m
b rid g e sch o o l, reacted a g a in st th e a b s o lu te a n d universal fo rm o f th eo rizin g
o f th e ir pred ecessors, th ey d o n o t really d e p a rt fro m th o se q u estio n ab le
ch a rac te ristic s. W h a t M a rsh a ll aim s a t, h o w ever, is a g re a te r em p h asis o f
th e d e ta ils o f e c o n o m ic tra n s a c tio n s irisT re a so n a b le to tra c e b a c k this
a s p e c to T M a rs h a irs th eo ries to his m ath e m a tic a l b a c k g ro u n d an d training.
A n o th e r basis p e rh a p s fo r his e m p h a sis o f d etails a n d m a th e m a tic a l pres
e n ta tio n is th a t his a m b ia n c e is th e scientific e n v iro n m e n t o f C a m b rid g e
U niversity. In fa v o r o f th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n o f C a m b rid g e eco n o m ics is
M arsh a ll’s close in tellectu al re la tio n w ith R ic a rd o . F o r ex am p le, he asserts
th a t v alu e is d e te rm in e d by th e eq u ilib riu m o f su p p ly an d d e m an d . A c co rd
ingly, his th eo ries a re ra th e r re m o te fro m specific circum stances. H is great
service to ec o n o m ic s is to be m easu red by his clear a n d definite statem en t o f
ec o n o m ic e v e n ts a n d th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f a definite system o f econom ics.
20Cf. Burtt, E. G., Jr., Social Perspectives in the History o f Economic Theory, New York, St.
Martin’s, 1972, pp. 201 f.
213
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
214
P H I L O S O P H Y AN D E C O N O M I C S
. . . I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the subject that a good
mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good
economics: and 1 went more and more on the rules —( I) Use mathematics as a shorthand
language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you have done. (3)
Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life. (5)
Bum the mathematics. (6) If you can't succeed in (4) bum (3). This last I did often.21
Communistic Economics
O n e o f th e m o s t s trik in g re la tio n sh ip s b e tw e en ec o n o m ics a n d p h ilo s
o p h y is th a t w h ich o b ta in s in c o m m u n istic e c o n o m ic s. In ste a d o f philo s
o p h y a p p e a rin g as th e basis o f ec o n o m ic s, it a p p e a rs as id en tical w ith
e c o n o m ic s. T h e e x a m p le is th e M a rx ia n re v o lu tio n a ry c o m m u n is m in its
c o m b in a tio n w ith th e R o m a n tic p h ilo s o p h y o f H egel. If w e c e n te r o u r
o b se rv a tio n u p o n K a rl M a rx we c a n n o t o m it th e d irect co n n e c tio n o f this
re v o lu tio n a ry th in k e r w ith H e g elia n teach in g s. Be it recalled th a t K arl
M a rx g re w u p in telle ctu ally in th e d e n sity o f th e H eg elian p h ilo so p h ic a l
a tm o s p h e re . In his y o u th h e revealed his e n a m o r o f H egel’s th in k in g as
in d icated in this sta te m e n t th a t, ;i
The outstanding thing in Hegel’s P h 'a n o m en o lo g ie is that Hegel grasps the self-creation of
man as a process. .. ; and that he therefore grasps the nature o f l a b o u r and conceives the
object man . . . as the result of his own labour. 22 11
21Memorials o f Alfred Marshall (A. C. Pigou, ed.), London, MacMillan, 1925. p. 427.
**Quoted from Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (T. B. Botto-
more, and M. Rubel, eds.). New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 2.
a Spiegel, H. W., The Growth o f Economic Thought, p, 463.
215
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
(h Engels. cd.. S. Moore and E. Aveling. trv). New York. International. 1967.
216
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
25Marx, K„ “Thesis on Feuerbach," in Marx, K., and Engels. K.. Feuerbach: Opposition o f the
Materialist and Idealist Outlooks, London. Lawrence and Wishart. 1973, p. 95.
26Hobson, J. A.. IFork and Wealth: A Human Valuation, London. Allcnand Unwin, rev. cd., 1933,
p. 34.
" Pigou. A. C., Wealth and Welfare, London, MacMillan, 1912.
a Mitchell, W. C„ Types o f Economic Theoryfrom Mercantilism to Institutionalism(J. Dorfman,
ed.), 2 vols.. New York. Kelly, vol. I, 1967, vol. 2, 1969.
217
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E RS P E CT I V E
218
P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C S
219
H U M A N E V E NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T ]
220
P H I L O S O P H Y AN D E C O N O M I C S
stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor
consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the
buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction oranother. Self-imposed in
elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram
of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the line of the resultant. When the
force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before.
Spiritually, the hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the seat of a process of living,
except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforced upon him by
circumstances external and alien to him.,:
Veblen. T.. “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" in The Place o f Science in Modern
Civilisation and Other Essays, New York, Viking. 1942, pp. 73 f.
*>Klein, L. R.. The Keynesian Revolution, New York. MacMillan. 1947, p. I.
u Keynes. J. M„ A Treatise on Probability. London, MacMillan, 1921.
221
HU MA N ’ E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
222
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
T a b l e 3. K e y n e s ia n H e r e s ie s
C l a ssic a l D o c t r in e K eynes V a r ia t io n 43
Laissez faire government controls
free play of economic forces
Parsimonious Savings Free spending
Excessiveness of
Capital
Opposition to inequalities of Wealth Favors inequalities and rejects absti
nence of the wealthy
Vested interests dangerous for good Ideas, not vested interests dangerous
or evil
4>Mainly from Keynes, J. M., General Theory o f Employment, /merest and Money, New York,
Harcourt, Brace, 1936.
223
H U M A N E V EN T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V
224
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O M I C S
225
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
226
P HILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS
S 6
§ 5
sc3 23
Institutional Economics
£c
E c
c &
C
/5
S/5 CO >»
•5 c o £
of
3 2
E
T able 4. S chema
E tS
3 2 o c»
6 < a. Q Economics as Cultural Behavior
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
C h a rt 2. Ec o n o m ic O p in io n s I7™-19, h C enturies
T o p ic P ro po n en t B asis
228
P H I L O S O P H Y AND E C O N O MI C S
T o p ic P r o po n en t Basis
a
Adam Smith revenue derived from stock
Malthus differences between advances and value of produced object
Ricardo Capitalist's portion
Storch circulating: remuneration for use of capital and trouble
229
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVI
230
P H I L O S O P H Y A ND E C O N O M I C S
The Trend of Emm units (R. C. Tugwell. cd.). New York. Knopf. 1024
'' Mitchell, W. C.. thinness Ci t ies: Vie Problem and its Seitinn. New York. National Bureau of
Economic Research. 1127.
'"Commons. .1. R., InslilulionalEconomies, its/’lacein Political Ecomnnv, New York. MacMillan.
19.14.
231
C H A P T E R 18
PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND AESTHETICS
A R T T H R O U G H TH E AGES
1Lewis, C. I.. A n Analysis o f Knowledge and Valuation, LaSalle, Illinois, Open Court, 1947, p. 4.
232
ART AN D A E S T H E T I C S
EVOLUTION OF AESTHETICS
I
A lo n g w ith th e gen eral e v o lu tio n o f p h ilo so p h ical c o n te m p la tio n th ere
d ev e lo p e d in th e h isto ry o f p h ilo so p h y n u m e ro u s c o n stru c tio n s a b o u t a r t
o f all types. T h eo rie s a b o u n d co n cern in g taste, rh eto ric, m usical co m p o si- ,!
tion, p a in tin g a n d scu lp tu re, a n d th e n a tu re o f b eau ty in general.
a. Informal Aesthetics. T h e p h ilo so p h ic al in terest in A esthetics devel-
o p ed o f c o u rse pah passu w ith th eo rie s p ro p o u n d e d by sch o lars in terested ^
in th e v a rio u s a r t d e p a rtm e n ts, fo r ex a m p le, lite rary critics, p a in ters, p>
scu lp to rs, co m p o se rs, a n d so on. B ut w ith th e increase o f know ledge a b o u t
a r t p ractices a n d th e m u ltip licatio n o f ex p e rtn ess concerning th e reactions
to th e p ro d u c ts o f v ario u s types o f artists, th ere developed a definite ?
p ro fessio n al ae sth e tic discipline.^A esthetics th e n becam e technical w ith th e »
p a rtic ip a tio n o f th e reso u rces o f p h ilo so p h ers, psychologists, sociologists, t.
a n d o th e r in tellectu al w o rk ers. In g eneral th e scope o f aesthetics b ecam e
b ro a d e r a n d m o re fo rm a l.^ *
b. Modern Formal Aesthetics. T h e origin o f aesthetics a s a technical
discipline is c o n v e n tio n a lly traced b ac k to th e w o rk o f A lex a n d er G o ttlie b a
B a u m g a rte n (1714-1762), a disciple o f J o h a n n C h ristia n W olff (1679-
1754), w h o so u g h t a basis fo r in q u iries in to th e realm o f sense p ercep tio n
su c h as logic m ad e av a ila b le fo r ra tio n a l k n o w ledge.2 B ecause B au m g arte n
w as re a re d in th e R atio n alistic tra d itio n o f Leibniz an d W olff, he could
only th in k in term s o f th e ab stru se a n d ab stra c t in stitu tio n s o f the C o n tin e n -
1A gigantic paradox overshadows the origin of aesthetics as a formal discipline. The effective
originator of the term “aesthetics’' and erstwhile student of an and beauty was less concerned with the
origination of a special department of philosophical scholarship, than the advancement of the
rationalistic philosophy of his immediate intellectual forebcarers.
233
»
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V
234
ART AN D A E S T H E T I C S
235
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
3 Dewey, J., A rt as Experience , New York, Minton Balch, 1934; and Prall, D. W., Aesthei
Judgm ent , New York, Crowell, 1929.
4Vivas, E.,MA Definition of the Aesthetic Experience,*' Journal o f Philosophy , 1937, 34,628-63
. fr*
236
/'i>"%
ART AND A E S T H E T I C S
237
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
*Wollheim, R., “Art and Illusion," in Aesthetics in the Modern World (H. Osborne, ed.), Ne
York, Wcybrighi and Talley, 1968, pp. 235-36.
«Cf.ch.8.
10Gombrich, E. H ..Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology o f Pictorial Representation, Ne
York, Pantheon, 1960.
238
ART AND AESTHETICS
239
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
240
ART A N D A E S T H E T I C S
241
H U M A N E V EN T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
3. A rt is n o t craft.
— '■* 4. A rt c a n n o t a ro u se e m o tio n b ecau se if it did it w o u ld be craft.
5. A rt is th e e x p re ssio n o f em o tio n .
T h is s u m m a ry in d icates h o w ra d ic ally C ollingw ood av o id s a n y an;
b ased o n actu al o b se rv a tio n s o f ae sth e tic events.23
h. Indeftnabilii v of Aesthetic Data. W h at h as fo r ce n tu ries blocke
^ p ro g ress o f aesth etic p h ilo so p h y h a s b een th e effect o f th e tw o philos<
'i cal d o g m a s so o ften m e n tio n ed in this w o rk (a) ab so lu tism an d abstrac
'• ism . p lu s (b ) soul p sy chology. It is th ese d o g m a s w h ich interfere w
^ p ro p e r a ttitu d e to w a rd s defin itio n . C o n seq u en tly aesth etic lite rati
N rep lete w ith th e a sse rtio n th a t b ea u ty , su b lim ity, an d o th e r qualities ca
s be defined.
D e fin itio n in aesthetics, as in every o th e r in tellectual field, is act
( ^ d e s c r i p t i o n . Influenced by th e fallacio u s p h ilosophy o f essentiality, ae
tician s th in k o f d efin itio n as a series o f v erb al item s s tru n g toge
H ow ever, fro m th e s ta n d p o in t o f a n atu ra listic p h ilo so p h y , defir
co n sists o f c o n stru c tin g a d e sc rip tio n o f som e object o r event. W hih
ty p e o f d esc rip tio n m ay so m e tim e s be rep resen ted by a v erb al co m pie?
n o valid d efin itio n th a t d o e s n o t k eep clo se to so m e th in g o r ev en t tl
v being described.
P ro p e rly to u n d e rsta n d th e n a tu re o f b e a u ty we m ay need to resc
c o m p a ris o n s o f th in g s o n e o f w hich is b e a u tifu l th e o th e r n o t, o r wre
h av e to reso rt to a scale o f m o re o r less beautiful. W h en w e con-
b e a u tifu l w ith n o n b e a u tifu l th in g s a n d e v e n ts we hav e no pro b le
d evising scales fo r d iffe ren tiatin g betw een th e p resen ce o r absent
q u alities o r p ro p erties o r to in d icate th e v ariatio n s betw een things o
basis o f c e rtain criteria. F o r n o n ae sth e tic o b jects criteria m ay consi
w eight, s h a d e , ta ste q u ality , lastin g n ess, rate o f increase, o r d eterio ra
S im ila r features, c o n d itio n s, a n d re la tio n s c a n be fo u n d fo r beai
things.
i. Aesthetic Reality. B ecause th e p h ilo so p h y o f aesth etics is su b jt
th e g en e ral o n to lo g y a n d ep iste m o lo g y o f its devotees, ae sth e tic the
a r e fo rm u la te d o n th e b asis o f th e re ality assu m p tio n s held by th e sp
p h ilo so p h e r. T h u s, th e q u e stio n is raised w h eth er aesth etic objects
e v e n ts ac tu a lly exist, a n d if th e y d o , in w h at w ay. A n ex cellen t illustn
o f th is issue is in d icated in H u m e ’s essay en titled , T h e S ta n d a rd o f 1
H e w rites, 2
242
ART A ND A E S T H E T I C S
(^Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates
them: and each mind perceives a different beauty] One person may even perceive deformity,
where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own
sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real
deformity, is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter.
According to the dispositions of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter,
and the proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. It is very
natural, and even quite necessary, to extend this axiom to mental, as well as bodily taste: and
thus common sense, which is so often at variance with philosophy, especially with the
sceptical kind, is found, in one instance at least, to agree in pronouncing the same decision.'1
T a b l e 5. A e s t h e t ic S it u a t io n s
“ Hume, D., “The Standard of Taste,” in Essays. London. Routledge. n.d., pp. 167-68.
243
HUMAN' E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
244
ART A ND A E S T H E T I C S
/M
w ith n a tu re b ecau se th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f science has resulted in a lack o f ,
in terest in n a tu ra l th in g s ex cep t th o se th a t have to be in tera cted w ith by s
m ean s o f m icro sco p es a n d telescopes. H o w ever, th o se w h o ag ree th a t •
b e a u ty is a q u a lity o f th in g s c a n n o t b e so in to le ra n t as to d ep riv e n a t u r a l :
things o f aesth etic qu alities an d values.
b. Objective versus Nonobjective Art. A recen t w id esp read m o v em en t
in th e a e sth e tic w orld co n sists o f th e p ro d u c tio n o f p ain tin g s an d scu lp
tu re s w h ich a re n o t re p resen ta tiv e o r fig u rative. A rtists refrain fro m p a in t
ing scenes o r o b jects su ch as still lifes, o r lan d scap es an d seascapes, a n d so
on. T h e p a in tin g s p ro d u c e d co n sist m ain ly o f lines, p a tte rn s, c o lo r c o m b i
A ,
n atio n s, a n d d istrib u tio n s o f v a rio u s so rts. C ertain ly th e galleries w hich
fi it* specialize in n o n o b jectiv e o r n o n fig u rativ e a r t d isplay different k inds o f
r /
l' t artistic objects fro m th e o ld e r type o f objective art. T h eo retically , how ever,
th e re is n o b asic difference in th e p sy ch o lo g ical p rocesses o f th e a rtists an d
th e ir w o rk . It sh o u ld be recalled th a t p sy ch o lo g ically sp eak in g in each case
a p e rso n called a n a rtis t p ro d u c e s a n o b ject, a p ictu re o f a definite so rt. N o
psy ch o lo g ist cou ld s u p p o rt th e view th a t th e re is n o object o n th e canvas,
b u t o f co u rse, th e re is o r m ay be a g re a t difference b etw een figurative an d
n o n fig u ra tiv e p ro d u c tio n s . In b o th cases th e w o rk p ro d u c e d m a y o r m ay
n o t be b ea u tifu l. If n o t, th e p ro d u c tio n m a y still fall w ith in the range o f
aesthetics.
In c o n n e c tio n w ith th e p ro b le m o f n o n o b jectiv e o r n o n fig u rativ e a r t it is
essential to av o id th e fallacio u s view th a t th e sim ple m a n ip u la tio n o f a rt
m ateria ls, ca n v ases, b ru sh e s, p ig m en ts, m a rb le , chisels, an d so o n , o r the
exercise o f n im b le c ra ftsm a n sh ip m u st ipso facto be a r t o r artistic. T h e
o b jects p ro d u c e d m ay be very useful a n d im p o rta n t to the m a k e r o r o th e r
p e rso n , b u t in th e in tere st o f p recisio n th e differences in th e ran g e o f
aesth etic things m u st be realized a n d a p p reciated .
c. Seeing versus Knowing. A n in tere stin g fo rm o f pseu d o p sy ch o lo g y is
ex h ib ite d b y th o se stu d e n ts o f aesth etics w h o jo in in th e d e b a te as to
w h e th e r n o n o b jectiv e o r n o n fig u ra tiv e p a in tin g is o r is n o t a rt. S u ch
w riters p ro p o s e th e view th a t n o n o b jectiv e p a in tin g as o p p o sed to figura-
245
H U M A N E VE NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
246
ART A N D A E S T H E T I C S
247
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
NCf. Winkler. W„ Psychologie der Modernen Kunst. Tubingen, Alma Mater. 1949.
Beardsley. M. C., Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy o f Criticism, New York. Harco
Brace, 1958, p. 384.
" Beardsley. Ibid., p. 546.
Schoen. M.. Art amt Beauty, New York. Macmillan. 1932, p. 109.
248
ART AND A E S T H E T I C S
"BEAUTY”: U N IV E R SA L A P PL IQ U E
MReichenbach, H.. Atom and Cosmos: the World o f Modern Physics (E. S . Allen, trs.). New >
York, Braziller, 1957, p. 103.
“ Sigerot, H. E., A History o f Medicine. VoL II, Early Greek. Hindu, and Persian Medicine, New
York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961, p. 100
15Thomson, Sir W„ and Tail, P. G., Elements o f Natural Philosophy, pi. 1, Oxford. Clarendon
Press, 1873.
* Russell, B„ Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays, London, Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 60.
” Hardy, G. H., “The Theory of Numbers." Science, 1922, 56. p. 405.
MVossler, K., The Spirit o f Language in Civilisation (O. Oeser, irs.). New York. Harcourt. Brace.
1932, p. 56 n.
wMoore, C. N .,“Mathematics and Science,"Science. 1935, 81, 28.
"Sullivan, J. W. N., The Limitations o f Science, Mentor ed., 1950, 13.
41 Courant, R„ and Robbins, H., What is Mathematics? A n Elementary Approach to Ideas and
Methods, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1941, p. 300.
249
H U M A N E V ENT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
beautiful experiments42
beautiful idea43
beautiful theory44
beautiful simplicity of animal economy45
250
ART A N D A E S T H E T I C S
» Ducasse. C. J.. The Philosophy o f Art, New York, Dial Press, 1929, p. 16.
* Munro, T., Toward Science in Aesthetics, Indianapolis, Bobbsand Mercill. 1956. p. 265.
•’Winckelmann, J. J., Geschiehte tier Kunst des Alteriums, 2nd ed., Leipzig. Dtlrr. 1882, p. 105; also
Bell.C. Expressionism: Its Anatomy and Philosophy, New York, Wells, 1873, p. 23; and Mengs. A. R„
Ubcr Schonheit undguten geschmack in der Malerei, Zurich, Orell el at. 1774, cited by Kovach. Op.
cit., p. 143.
••Osborne, H„ Theory o f Beauty. London, Koutlcdge and Kegan Paul, 1952. p. 122.
’’ Greenough, H„ in Form and Function (H. A. Small, ed.). Univ. of California. 1947, p. 71, 79.
“ Ames, Van M., Introduction to Beauty, New York. Harper, 1931, pp. 5, 17 1. 205.
61 Ross, W. D„ The Right and the Good. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1930. pp. 70. 127.
MAlexander, S., Beauty and Other forms o f Value. London, Macmillan, 1933. p. 132.
251
H U M A N E V ENT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
PARAESTHETIC BEHAVIOR
The large range of aesthetic qualities and the great variations i
concepts of beauty suggest the corresponding acts of creation and ap
ation of aesthetic objects. It is in order now to consider variatio
reactions and to differentiate between central aesthetic behavior:
* peripheral activities in aesthetic situations. We examine a few specimc
paraesthetic responses of persons.
a. Aesthetic Tastes. As a feature of aesthetic situations tastes are
esting and important. F or example, a gallery may be hung with the
* specimens of paintings yet some individuals may pass them by wi
interest or appreciation. Such persons lack aesthetic taste for a
particular types of art. Again tastes may be high or low, good oi
though not absent all together. In general, individuals vary frot
* standpoint of particular standards. Aesthetic standards are of c
9- cultural in character and they mark off the backgrounds or experien
different persons.
* Now the question arises as to the basis for the variations of indi'
behavior in given aesthetic situations with respect to the same or simi
i objects. A common tendency exists to assume that aesthetic last-
somehow inborn. But this is obviously a confused and false notion.
252
ART AND A E S T H E T I C S
6’ Burke, E.,"On Sublime and Beautiful," in The Works o f the Right Honourable Edmund Burke.
vol. I, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1920, p, 67.
253
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
254
,i
Ti m e
ART
A N D
A E S T H E T I C S
I,
.1
»
*■<
H U M A N E V EN T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
A. The Artist
W h e th e r the ae sth e tic situ a tio n c e n te rs a b o u t aesth etic objects o f nal
o r art, it m u st o b v io u sly in clu d e a n in te ra c tin g a rtist o r view er, th e form
c reato r, a n d th e la tte r a n ob serv er. In th e case o f a rt p ro d u c tio n it is o f g:
im p o rta n c e to specify th e tra its a n d activities o f th e w o rk e r, th a t is,
d ev elo p m e n t o f aesth etic cap acities a n d in tere sts essential fo r p ain t
poetizin g , m usical c o m p o sin g , a n d so o n . C learly, one o f the o u tsta n c
ch a rac te ristic s o f a n a rtis t is th e u n iq u en ess o f his o r h e r d ev elo p m en
■JN vtMvf’S
256
ART AND A E S T H E T I C S
257
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
D. Setting or Auspice
A s we have see n in o u r d iscu ssio n o f a r t as illusion, th e v a ria tia
a e sth e tic styles o v e r p e rio d s o f tim e c a n b e a c co u n ted fo r o n th e b a
c h a n g e s in th e e n v iro n s o r a u sp ic e s u n d e r w h ich a r t w o rk s a re createi
258
ART AND A E S T H E T I C S
RECAPITULATION
259
H U M A N E V E NT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I '
26 0
ART AND AESTHETI CS
261
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
in
262
C H A P T E R 19
EDUCATION IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
ED U C A TIO N A N D H UM A N M A TU RA TIO N
1Cf. Wynne, J. P., Theories o f Education: an Introduction to the Foundations o f Education. New
York. Harper and Row. 1963.
263
H U M A N E V EN TS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T 1
264
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
265
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPECT1
ED U C A TIO N D ESC R IB ED
266
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
EDUCATION IN INTERRELATION
E d u c a tio n a n d its p ro b le m s o b v io u sly d o n o t exist in a v acu u m . Indeed,
e d u c a tio n a l e v e n ts a re in tim ately in te rre la te d w ith all so rts o f fa cto rs th at
influence its n a tu re a n d o p e ra tio n . S o m e o f th e in terre latin g fa cto rs fa v o r
th e o p e ra tio n o f e d u c a tio n a l processes w hile o th e rs a p p e a r as hin d ran ces
a n d interferences. In b o th cases th e in te rre la tin g fa c to rs p e rfo rm as c o n
tro ls a n d guides o f in d iv id u al d ev e lo p m e n ts. T h e influences m ay be categ o
rized as D irect o r as P erip h eral. T h e y influence b o th fo rm al a n d casual
d evelo p m en ts.
a. Direct Influences. D irect influences u p o n casu al p erso n ality devel
o p m e n ts a re clearly illu stra te d w here e d u c a tio n a l facilities a n d p ro ced u res
a re hedged a b o u t by social, political, a n d ec o n o m ic facto rs, w ith a resulting
neglect o f in trin sic in d iv id u al differences e n g e n d ered by v aria tio n s in the
co n fro n ta tio n s o f p erso n s in different h u m a n situ atio n s.
D ire ct h in d e rin g fo rm a l e d u c a tio n a l p rocesses a re exem plified by th e
difficulties ex p erien ced by e d u c a to rs w ith te a c h er-p u p il ratio s, th e over
c ro w d in g o f classro o m s, a n d th e m o re serio u s p ro b le m s o f sta n d a rd iz a tio n
267
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
268
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
269
H U M A N E V ENT S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V
SEQUENTIAL O R D E R IN E D U C A TIO N A L D EV E LO PM EN T
B ecause p erso n ality e v o lu tio n is c u m u lativ e a n d often progressive, f<
low ing a n d paralleling b io lo g ical m a tu ra tio n , it varies so m ew h a t o n t
m basis o f age a n d m o re definitely u p o n a d a p ta tio n s to social c irc u m sta n c
•p O n th e w hole, th e g re a te st n u m b e r o f new tra its a re m o re easily a n d me
ra p id ly d eveloped in th e e a rlie r life o f in d iv iduals. In fa n ts a n d c h ild r
8* m u st d ev elo p re a c tio n a l e q u ip m e n t in o rd e r to b eco m e o rien ted a:
ad ju ste d to novel a n d d e m a n d in g e n v iro n m e n ts a n d a t th e sam e tim e n
u be h am p ered by a p rio r a c c u m u la tio n o f b eh av io ral eq u ip m en t. It is tl
early d ev e lo p m e n t o f h a b its, in c lin a tio n s, likes, an d dislikes w h ich reg
lates an d facilitates fu tu re d e v e lo p m e n t in p a rtic u la r directions.
By c o n tra s t w ith th e ease a n d sm o o th n e ss o f tra it d ev e lo p m e n t in y o u
perso n s, ad u lt trait d e v e lo p m e n t in m o re c o m p lex circum stances is com p
ca te d by p ro b le m s o f d irec tio n , o b lig a tio n , responsibility, a n d d u ty . O n t
o th e r h an d , o f course, th e a d u lt p erio d m ay b e m ark ed by k n ow ledge ai
w isdom w hich fav o r p a rtic u la r lines o f fu tu re g row th.
T h e sequential o rd e r o f e d u c a tio n o r p erso n ality d e v e lo p m e n t can
effectively observed in th e a c tu a l p sy ch o lo g ical d e v e lo p m e n t o f p erso n s.
270
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
271
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I -
272
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
273
H U M A N EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
th ree R ’s, while p aro ch ial in stitu tio n s aim a t the cu ltiv atio n o f m ora
religious traits. F u rth e rm o re , it m ay be the edu catio n al goal o f a co m r
ty to req u ire new co m ers to a d a p t them selves to local tra d itio n s
c o n d itio n s w ith o u t q u e stio n as to th e p ro p riety o f existing institut
O th e r goals m ay be to cu ltiv ate in d ividuals to w o rsh ip eco n o m
political success a t any co st, o r to becom e “leaders” even by aggressii
chicanery o f an y sort.
In general, th e p ro b lem o f ed u c atio n al goals ru n s directly inu
relatio n s o f individuals a n d th e g ro u p s in w hich they are ensconced. \
it is tru e th a t individuals are d o m in ated by groups, it is also true
individuals by th eir inv en tio n s, p ro d u ctiv ity , an d general creativity-
pow erful influences u p o n th e co m m u n ities am o n g w hich they live
o th ers related to them . A lw ays th ere rem ain th e facts o f individual d
ences w hich the exigencies o f in d iv id u al an d social living inevitably
duce. S u ch are th e exigencies o f h u m a n living th a t they result it
d ev e lo p m e n t o f m an y varieties o f personality. C riteria are n o t lackin
th e categ o rizatio n o f som e as in ferio r an d som e as su p erio r. T h e cri
in voked range in value f o r tra its o f know ledge, skills, creativity, aflecti
a n d so on.
C learly, the influences o f g ro u p s u p o n individuals an d individuals i
g ro u p s are invariably reciprocal. T h is fact th ro w s considerable light o
p ro b lem o f elitism an d its value fo r social life. T h o u g h we banisf
fallacies o f innateness, it c a n n o t be denied th a t th e developm ent o f sup'
a n d inferior personalities carries m an y p otentialities fo r social d ish arn
an d conflict. H ow ever, it is still p ro b a b le th a t th e em phasis u p o n ex
ness, know ledge, g o o d ju d g m e n t, valid reasoning, individualism inste;
m ass co n fo rm ity , as well as sensitivity to n a tu ra l an d artistic beauty
i i 1 have a salu tary influence u p o n the co n d itio n o f m an an d his civilizat
274
E D U C A T I O N IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
275
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECT
SU M M A R Y
276
EDUCATION IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
277
CH A PTER 20
P H IL O S O P H Y O F R E L IG IO N
278
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
279
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
280
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
\x
living. R elig io n s a re m u c h m o re cu ltiv a te d in p o v erty th a n in riches, in
sickness th a n in h e a lth , in slavery th a n in m astery . S o m e tim es, o f co u rse,
th e g o d s a re fa v o ra b le to elect th e rich to c o n tro l w ealth n o m a tte r how
o b tain ed .
b. Religion as Unification o f Experience. A n o th e r p ro m in e n t a s s u m p
tio n a b o u t relig io n is th a t it serves to u n ify w h a t is re g ard e d as the
ex p e rien ce o f th e p ra c titio n e r o r p a r tic ip a to r in a religious c o m m u n ity .
R elig io u s sch o lars assert th a t even befo re p h ilo so p h y , religion w as d ev o ted
to th e o rg a n iz a tio n a n d u n ificatio n o f ex p erien ce, th a t is, th e ideology o f
th in k in g p erso n s a b o u t th e w orld o r th e universe in g en eral.1
c. Religion as Basis o f Self Identification and Adulation. It is a u n iq u e
n o tio n o f religion as a cu ltu ra l in stitu tio n th a t it pro v id es fo r its p artic ip a n ts
a sense o f definite b elo n g in g n ess a n d even se lf-ad u latio n . It.m a k es p o ssible t(
th e illu sio n o f b ein g a m o n g th o se ch o se n , a n d at th e sam e tim e fortifies the
belief o f p o ssessing th e sterlin g q u alitie s o f ideal values a n d s u p p o rts the
p e r s o n a l c a n d id a tu re fo r so u l salv a tio n . G re a t sto re is placed u p o n b ein g a i1
m o n o th e ist, a n d a s h a re r in th e g lo ries o f th e h ighest a p p e a rs a w ittin g o r
u n w ittin g a ttitu d e o f self flattery o f th e m em b ers o f v ario u s cults. (,
d . Religion as Creation. A fu n d a m e n ta l fe a tu re o f religion is th e p ro
d u c tio n o f relig io u s ob jects a n d in stitu tio n s o f m a n y sorts. P erso n s invent
o m n ip o te n t a n d o m n iscien t go d s, p laces like h eav en a n d hell, a n d codes o f
su p e rio r m o ra l practices. A ll th e beliefs a n d fa ith s a re p resu m ed to alleviate
o p p ressiv e a n d in to le ra b le c o n d itio n s, a n d p ro v id e a m o re c o m fo rta b le
circ u m sta n ce fo r th e ir existence. W h e n th e p ro d u c ts b ec o m e diffused
a m o n g m em b ers o f co m m u n itie s o rg an ized religious in stitu tio n s arise.
1See Oman, J., "The Sphere of Religion," in Religion, and Reality (J. Needham, ed.). New York,
MacMillan, 1925.
281
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
282
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
3Waters, F. W„ The Wav in and the Way Out: Science and Religion Reconciled, T oronto. Oxford
Univ. Press, 1967. p. 235.
‘ Waters. Ibid, p. 255.
’ Waters, Ibid., p. 240.
283
V
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C 1
284
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
285
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
286
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
p a rt th e c o n te n ts o f p r a y e r a re sim p ly w ishes o r h o p es fo r ch an g es in
in to le rab le s itu a tio n s .!
S cien tists in th e ir c a p acity a s in v e stig a to rs o f things an d events o cc u rrin g
in th e im m e d ia te tim e -sp ac e situ a tio n s o b ject to the religious ty p e o f
k n o w led g e a n d th e effo rts to ju stify th e b elief o n th e g ro u n d s th a t th e belief
an d fa ith in tra n s c e n d e n t c o n stru c tio n in terfe re w ith th e p ro p e r a d ju st
m en ts o f h u m a n beings to th e a c tu a l am b ia n c e, including p erso n s a n d
v a rio u s th in g s o c c u rrin g in n atu re . E v id en ces fo r th e views o f scientists can
c o n s ta n tly b e m u ste re d b y su ch cases a s th e c u ltists refusing to m a k e use o f
m edical k n o w led g e a n d skills in o rd e r to c u re obv io u sly lethal diseases.
T h e g re a t p re v alen ce o f relig io u s in s titu tio n s based a s th e y are o n the
re ta rd e d s ta te o f all h u m a n p o p u la tio n s, reveals itself in m yths, su p ersen su -
ou s realm s, a n d so o n . B ut o f c o u rse th e re a re in d iv id u al differences so
th e re e x ists a ra n g e o f p h ilo so p h ie s a m o n g in d iv id u als. In so m e th e re are
, signs o f m a tu rity , o f a n a tta c h m e n t to m aterialistic influences.
A t th e basis o f su ch view s is th e p h e n o m e n o n o f fa ith w hich sid estep s the
facts a n d c o n d itio n s o f specific c o n ta c ts w ith th in g s a n d ev en ts w h ich
a c tu a lly are th e e n v iro n m e n ts o f p erso n s. It m ay be a d d e d h ere th a t th e
o b v io u s th in g th a t o p e ra te s is th e efficiency o f in d iv id u a ls to fo rm u la te
m e ta p h o rs a n d legends w h ich in m a n y ca ses g o d irectly c o u n te r to th e
events w ith w h ich they a c tu a lly are in co n ta c t.
a. Science and Supernaturalism. R elig io u s lite ra tu re w h ic h is basically
th eo lo g ical is replete w ith illu m in atin g case histories w h ich reveal the
m o o d s a n d th e m o tiv es o f believers w h e th e r w ith little o r m u c h k n o w led g e
o f science.
- t ' A n ex c ellen t e x a m p le is R u s t11 a fo rm e r s tu d e n t o f science b u t w h o
shifted o v er to th e B ap tist m in istry a n d religious teaching. T h o u g h a
fo rm e r s tu d e n t o f science, he u n d e rv a lu e s scientific w o rk a n d co n clu d es,
b ecau se it is lim ited to th in g s a n d events o f the n a tu ra l w o rld , th a t it is
it1' th ere fo re in co m p lete. H e seeks, as is ch a ra c te ristic o f religious th in k ers,
y/ so m e th in g b e y o n d science. A s it is o u r in te n tio n to m ak e use o f this w rite r
i:'-" as o n ly a n ex a m p le , w e reg ard his view s w hich ac tu a lly a re re p eated in
m a n y o th e r w rite rs, as c o m m o n a n d g en e ralized . All su ch w riters w h o
sta n d firm ly o n sp iritistic g ro u n d "a p p e a r to a c c ep t th e fa ctitio u s rule th a t if
th ere is so m e th in g la ck in g in scientific w o rk it is p ro o f o r p ro b a b ility th a t
th e sp iritistic p o in t o f view is co rrect.
11Rust, E. C., Science and Faith: Towards a Theological Understanding o f Sature. New York,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.
287
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
288
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
289
H U M A N E V EN TS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T
290
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
291
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
stu d ies, b u t they still u n w ittin g ly d isp lay th e effects o f a spiritistic sys
w h ich d o m in a te s th e lives o f m a n y p erso n s in a n y co m m u n ity . A signifu
illu s tra tio n o f this s o rt o f c irc u m sta n c e is in d icated by a s c h o la r w h o w
p h y sician a n d ex p e rim e n ta l scientist in p sychology w h o in evitably fi
th a t ex p e rim en ts sh o w th e existence o f individual souls o r psyches.16
In c id e n tal to th e su b ject o f science a n d religion is th e view p o in t
w h ile h u m a n beings a re p h y sio lo g ic al a n d a n a to m ic a l m ach in es, they
e n d o w e d w ith sp iritistic p ro p e rtie s. T h is view c a n o f c o u rse be tra c e d b
to theological origins.
W h a t m ay seem a g re a t p a r a d o x is th a t a p erso n w ith consider!
a q u a in ta n c e w ith scientific issues s h o u ld still e n te rta in a religion basec
d o ctrin e s o f In c a rn a tio n a n d R e su rrectio n . T h e p a ra d o x is resolved w
w e co n sid er th e p o w e r o f c u ltu ra l in stitu tio n s o n th e beliefs a n d th in k in
in d iv id u a ls w h o a c cep t su ch beliefs a s a re c o n tra ry to every observat
^ a n d every ex p erien ce o f p e o p le a n d m u st be lo o k ed u p o n as ac ts o r tr
i w h ich a re a c q u ired in early life, so th a t a n in d iv id u al believes su ch im pc
*■ V ^ bilities as events ju s t as he b ec o m e s in v aria b ly a sp ea k er o f a p a rtio
' dialect c u rre n t in his h o m e a n d c o m m u n ity .
a. God: Creator or Creation. S cien tists a n d laym en alike appea:
assu m e th a t G o d is th e c re a to r o f th e w o rld a n d th e m aster o f all th e pov
i assigned to h im by w ritte n o r sp o k e n d o g m as. T h ro u g h o u t th e h isto r
w estern religion in n u m e ra b le a tte m p ts have been m a d e to specify
n a tu re a n d fu n c tio n s o f G o d in clu d in g his p o w ers o f creatio n , b u t op
' n en ts co n c e n tra te d in a g ro u p fa v o rin g n eg ative th eo lo g y h av e w a rn ed i
hi th is is a n im p o ssib le th in g th a t n o ca te g o ry , n o d escrip tio n , n o in te rp r
in tio n is possible. T h e re seem s to be la ck in g th e re a ljz a tio n jh a t th e e r
G o d c o m plex is a c o n s tru c tio n by in d iv id u als in th e in terests o f so m e
* o f im m u n ity fro m difficult a n d su p p re ssin g co n d itio n s. T h e re is 1
a p p re c ia tio n o f th e fa c t th a t all g o d o r sp iritistic religion is b ased u;
hi cf n o th in g m o re th a n th e ca p a c ity to u se w o rd s o r sy m b o ls to m ak e
m e ta p h o rs a n d c o m p lete d o ctrin e s. V a rio u s w riters h av e p o in ted o u t
a n o m a ly o f m a k in g G o d in to a m ale, a c o n d itio n w hich m ay be m o d i
w h e n w o m en achieve g re a te r re c o g n itio n in th e v ario u s co m m u n ities.
A n in terestin g side light o n th e p ro b le m o f G o d as c re a to r o r creatic
to be fo u n d in th e w idely p re v alen t n o tio n th a t if th ere is n o p ro o f o f
existence o f G o d , th e re is a t th e sam e tim e n o p ro o f o f th e n o n ex isten c
su ch a being. T h is rid d le flies in th e face o f th e fact th a t h ard ly a n y tl
re la tin g to e v o lu tio n a n d a n th ro p o lo g y is m o re definitely estab lish ed t
14Moore, T. V., Cognitive Psychology, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1939.
292
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
/ RELIG IO N A N D VALUES
293
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E RS P E CTI VE
294
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
R ELIG IO N A N D M O R A LS
295
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPECT1V)
R ELIG IO N A N D PO LITICS
296
P H I L O S O P H Y OF R E L I G I O N
297
C H A P T E R 21
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
LAWS IN P H IL O S O P H IC A L PERSPECTIV E
LAW S O F N A T U R E A N D O F SOCIETY
T a b l e 6. S c h e m a o f L a w C o n s t r u c t io n
298
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
VARIOUS P H IL O S O P H IE S O F LAWS
299
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E RS P E CT I V
JCampbell, N. R., Physics: The Elements , Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921.
’Kantor. J. R., The Logic o f M o d em Science, Chicago, Principia. 1953; and Interbeht
Psychology: A Sample o f Scientific System Construction, Chicago, Principia, 1959.
300
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
301
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERS PECT
302
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
B. LAW S AS SO C IE T A L INSTITUTION S
304
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
7Cf. for example. Holmes, O. W., The C om m on Law, Boston, Little, Brown, 1881; also. Holmes,
O. W., “The Path of the Law," in Collected Papers, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1920.
•For example, Cohen a n d Cohen's Readings in Jurisprudence an d Legal Philosophy (P. Schucb-
man, ed.), Boston, Little, Brown, 1979; also Kent, E. A., L aw a n d Philosophy: Readings in Legal
Philosophy, New York, Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1970.
•Frank, J., L aw a n d the M o d e m M ind, New York, Brentanos, 1930.
10Benditt, T. M„ Law as Rule an d Principle: Problem s o f Legal Philosophy, Stanford, Stanford
Univ. Press, 1978.
305
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C
m o re o n o b s e rv a tio n th a n o n a p r io r i re a s o n in g . T h u s H o lm e s d ecla
law is n o t a “b r o o d in g o m n ip re s e n c e in th e s k y ," 11
The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voia
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with
have disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact.
" Holmes, O. W„ dissenting opinion in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Jensen. 244 U S. 205. 1
"Cohen, F. S., "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," in C oh en am
Readinx* in Jurispru den ce a n d t e g a l P h ilosoph y (P. Schuchman.ed.), Boston, Little, Browi
2K8.
"Cf. Llewellyn, K., “Some Realism about Realism," H a rva rd L aw R eview 44. 1931,
Llewellyn, K„ The C o m m o n Ixtw T radition, Boston, Little, Brown, I960.
306
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
You can hire logic, in the shape of a lawyer, to prove anything you want to prove.
307
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E K S P E C T U
308
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
309
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPEC
th e b asis o f F re u d ia n fa n ta s ie s .18 F ra n k m ak es a g re a t d ea l o f
a u th o rity , F a th e r w o rsh ip , a n d in g en e ral influences o f u n co n scio u s
pies. In th e follow ing p a ra g ra p h s 1 illu stra te th e fu n c tio n o f p sycho
ev ery d ay law situ a tio n s a n d in th e c o u rts o f law.
Ig n o ra n c e o f th e law ex cu ses n o b o d y . It is a p re su p p o sitio n
m a k e rs a n d law a d m in is tra to rs th a t o rd in a ry citizens sh o u ld b e respi
fo r k n o w in g th e law s a n d a b id in g by th em . B ut ac tu ally even codifk
a re n o t p a rt o f th e e v e ry d ay a c q u a in ta n c e o f p riv ate citizens. U sual
are b u sy an d co m p letely o cc u p ie d w ith all so rts o f affairs o f a n econc
d o m e stic type. T h e rem o ten ess o f p riv a te citizens fro m th e business
a n d its c o m m a n d m e n ts is m e a su re d b y th e m a g n itu d e o f th e p o p u la
v a rio u s legal units.
T h e m o re se rio u s p ro b le m o f p sy ch o lo g y an d th e law concei
b e h a v io r o f ju d g e s as th ey m a k e th e ir decisions. T h e so-called reali
B lack sto n e (1723-1780) a ssu m e th a t ju d g e s a re sim ply seek ers a n d <
erers o f in d ep en d e n t, o b jectively existing, self-sufficient, entities. <
o th e r h a n d , th e m o re p ra g m a tic legalists like G ray (1839-1915), f
(1841-1935), F ra n k ( 1889-1957), a n d o th e rs regard th e law as m ad e
ju d g es. A s G ra y 19 p u ts th e m a tte r, “all law is ju d g e -m a d e law .” T h e p
here b esp eak s a fallacio u s view o f psychology. Scientific psychology
p re ts ju d ic ia l decisio n s as in v a ria b ly in te rb e h av io ral processes. T h a t
m ak e d ecisio n s a t all d e p e n d s u p o n th e ir a c q u a in ta n c e w ith th e mv
o f asc e rta in a b le fa cto rs in c u rre n t specific situ atio n s. Ju d g e s a re o r
be le a rn e d in th e law , th a t is, ex p e rie n c e d w ith respect to th e
c o n d itio n s p rev ailin g fo rm e rly a n d cu rren tly . P rec ed en ts m ay be vi
o r n o n re le v an t. E v id en ce o p e n s th e w ay to p ro p e r u n d e rs ta n d ^
e v a lu a tio n o f ev e n ts a n d a rg u m e n ts a b o u t th em . Ju d g e s sh o u ld be r
o f probabilities.
Scientific psy ch o lo g y insists th a t all legal events m u st be baser
o cc u rrin g activities o f p e rso n s in in te ra c tio n w ith o th er p erso n s, thin;
events in th eir am b ian c e. N o m etap h y sical principles sh o u ld b e a lio
d is to rt th e b e h a v io r o f ju d g e s o r th e th in g s an d ev e n ts th ey encc
A p p eals, reviews, a n d reverses re p re se n t n o n -in fallib le checks a r
ances. T h ey su p p ly th e sta n d a rd s a n d crite ria th a t re g u la te affairs pr<
fo r ad ju d ica tio n .
Frank, J., Law a n d the M odern M ind, New York, Brentanos, 1930.
’’ Gray, J. C., The N ature and Sources o f the Law , Boston, Beacon. 1909, p. 125.
310
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
311
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPECT
T able 7. C o n s t it u t io n a l M o d if ic a t io n
312
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LAW
313
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERS PECTI VE
See for example. Kipnis. K., Philosophical Issues in Ia w : Cases and Materials. Englewood Cli
New Jersey. Prentice-Hall. 1977.
11fo r example. Henkin. I... Him Malians Behave: law and Foreign Policy. New York. Colum
Univ. Press, 1979.
Hart, H. I.. A., The Concept of law , Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, p. 209.
314
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
315
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H IL O S O P H IC A L P E R S P E C T 1 '
316
C H A P T E R 22
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF HISTORY
A M B IG U ITIES C O N C ER N IN G T H E P H IL O S O P H Y O F HISTORY
H IS T O R IO G R A PH Y E M E N D E D x
■Cohen, M. R., The Meaning o f Human History , Chicago, Open Court 1947.
; Elton. G. R.. The Practice o f H istory , London. Sydney Univ. Press. Methuen, 1967.
317
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PE RS P E CTI
1Hegel, G. W. F., The Philosophy o f History ( i . Sibree, trs.), New York, Wiley, 1944. To a sci
it is astounding how popular and sympathetic the vaporings of this religious romantic are at
historians.
4Cf. Atkinson, R. F., Knowledge and Explanations in History: An Introduction to the Philos
o f History, Ithaca, Cornell, 1978.
318
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
319
HUMAN EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L PERSPECTIV1
in metaphysics Marx was not a simple materialist, but a supporter of the theory t
emergent evolution, according to which conscious life has developed from conditions whic
were at first wholly material.’
320
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
321
H U M A N E V EN TS I N’ P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I
322
ASPECTS OF HISTORY
323
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIV
324
ASPECTS OF HISTORY
O N TO LO G IC A L A SPECTS O F H ISTORY
325
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
326
ASPECTS OF HISTORY
327
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
328
ASPECTS OF HISTORY
329
HUMAN EVENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
330
ASPECTS OF HISTORY
E PIST E M IC ISSUES IN H IS T O R IO G R A PH Y
331
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
332
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
The notion that history obeys law. whether natural or supernatural, that every event of
human life is an element in a necessary pattern, has deep metaphysical origins: infatuation
with the natural sciences feeds this stream, but is not its sole nor, indeed, its principal source.
In the first place, there is the teleological outlook whose roots reach back to the beginnings
of human thought. It occurs in many versions, but what is common to them all is the belief
that men, and all living creatures and perhaps inanimate things as well, not merely are as
they are, but have functions and pursue purposes. These purposes are either imposed upon
them by a creator who has made every person and thing to serve each a specific goal; or else
these purposes are not, indeed, imposed by a creator but are, as it were, internal to their
possessors, so that every entity has a ‘nature’ and pursues a specific goal which is ‘natural’ to
it, and the measure of its perfection consists in the degree to which it fulfils it.41*44
333
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
P ro fe ss o r H e m pel adds,
. . . Much of the appeal of the ‘method of understanding' seems to be due to the fact that it
tends to present the phenomena in question as somehow‘plausible' or‘natural' to us; this is
often done by means of attractively worded metaphors. But the kind of‘understanding’ thus
conveyed must clearly be separated from scientific understanding.51
i 334
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
u n n ec essary in o rd e r to u n d e rs ta n d , in te rp re t, o r ex p la in a n ev en t to h a rk
b a c k to a n c ie n t soul-flesh d o g m as. T h e basic ev e n ts a n d im p licated inten
tio n s a n d c o rre la te d c o n d itio n s c a n be sa tisfac to rily tre a te d by m ean s o f
su b stitu te stim u li o f v a rio u s sorts.
c. Historiographic Description. T h e ev ents o f h isto ry a n d th e ir stu d y
alm o st in v a ria b ly b rin g up th e p ro b le m o f d e sc rip tio n . S in c e ep istem o lo g i
cal p ro b le m s in h is to rio g ra p h y arise fro m th e e sp o u sa l o f d u alistic psy
ch ology, h isto ria n s c o n c e rn them selves w ith q u e stio n s o f c e rta in ty a n d
v alu e o f o b se rv a tio n s. It is generally h eld by p h ilo so p h e rs o f h isto ry th a t
th e g re a t difference b etw een states o f m in d a n d o b serv ed ev en ts m ak es a
m a tc h o f k n o w le d g e w ith th e q u alitie s o r essences o f ev en ts difficult. It
follow s th a t f o r th e m h isto rical d esc rip tio n s a re fairly w ell c o n ta m in a te d
w ith im a g in a ry fa c to rs w hile su ch scep ticism is th e b asis fo r v erb alistic
universals.
T h e situ a tio n in d ic a te d a b o v e is excellently illu stra te d b y th e w itticism s
e x h ib ite d b y h isto ria n s a t th e fa m o u s e x p re ssio n o f R a n k e , “ W ie es eig en t-
lich gew esen.” O f c o u rse d esp ite the a p p a re n t scepticism a b o u t th e cer
ta in ty o f e x isten c e o f h isto rical events, h is to ria n s h av e to believe th a t th o se
ev e n ts h av e ex isted . In th is c o n n e c tio n L eff asserts th a t, “h isto ry is to
disco v er h o w w h a t h a p p e n e d d id h a p p e n .”54 A ll th e view s fo r a n d ag a in st
th e n o tio n o f th e ex isten ce o f h isto rical ev ents b rin g u p th e p ro b le m o f
d escrip tio n .
F o r th e m o s t p a r t p ro b le m s o f d e sc rip tio n a rc tied in w ith q u e stio n s o f
in te rp re ta tio n a n d e x p la n a tio n , a lth o u g h M a n d e lb a u m 55 refers to P ass
m o re ’s view th a t m u c h o f th e tim e th e h isto ria n s ta sk is really n o t o n e o f
e x p la in in g a t all, b u t is m erely th e o n e o f d escrib in g , i.e., o f telling “ h o w ,”
n o t e x p lain in g “w hy.”
W h y th e re sh o u ld b e su c h a q u e stio n is clearly ow in g to n o th in g else th a n
th a t ep istem ic q u e stio n s arise fro m th e fact th a t co n v e n tio n a l h isto ry
w ritin g in all its phases b o th as h isto ry a n d as p h ilo so p h y o f h isto ry goes
b a c k to s p u rio u s g en e raliza tio n s a n d false n o tio n s o f psychology. T hese
false n o tio n s c o n stitu te a co m p ellin g influence even th o u g h th e w riters
m e n tio n ed m a y be ig n o ra n t as to th e ir o w n view s a n d th e n a tu re o f
cognitive processes o f a n y so rt.
F ro m th e s ta n d p o in t o f scientific p h ilo so p h y o f histo ry , w h ich d o es n o t
g o b ey o n d th e p e rfo rm a n c e s o f in teg ral p e rso n s w ith respect to events, no
335
H U M A N E V E N T S IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
p ro b le m o f h isto rical d esc rip tio n is d iffe ren t fro m p ro b lem s o f d escrip tio n
in a n y o th e r field. M a n y cases o f precise a n d satisfa c to ry d e sc rip tio n s a re
a v a ila b le th ro u g h th e m e d ia tio n o f re c o rd s a n d d o c u m e n ts o f a credible
so rt. S in c e p sy ch o lo g ical d e sc rip tio n s in g en e ral v a ry w ith different indi
v id u als, d e sc rip tio n s th a t th e y m a k e o f h isto rical ev en ts differ a n d fo rm a
series, so m e o f w h ich a re m u c h m o re e x a c t a n d m u c h b e tte r th a n o th ers. It
is su c h v a ria tio n s in o b se rv a tio n a n d d esc rip tio n th a t lead to th e p ro b lem o f
in te rp re ta tio n .
d. Historiographical Interpretation. In te rp re ta tio n in h istory is based
on v a ria tio n s in th e o b s e rv a tio n a n d d e s c rip tio n o f h isto rical events.
G en erally in te rp re ta tio n consists o f th e im p o sitio n o f subjective o r p erso n al
view s b o th w h en th ey a re re g ard e d as them selves subjective o r objective.
All co m p lex events lend them selves to leg itim ate in te rp re ta tio n s w hich m ay
v ary w idely. T h a t in d icates v a ria tio n s in a p p r o a c h to th e situ a tio n s u n d e r
d iscu ssio n . N o c o n d e m n a tio n a tta c h e s to su c h v a ria tio n s n o m a tte r how
w idely th ey differ fro m ea ch o th e r. B u t th is c o m m e n t includes th e objective
in te rp re ta tio n s b ased o n th e w o rk o f c o m p e te n t h isto ria n s w ith respect to
sufficiently k n o w n hap p en in g s.
e. Historiographical Evaluations. V a rio u s e v alu atio n s are m a d e by his
to ria n s co n c e rn in g th e n a tu re o f h isto ry in g en eral, o f h isto ry as a universal
process, a n d h isto rical in v estig atio n . A n e x tre m e in stan ce is th a t it is
n on sen sical. T h e su b ject m a tte r o f h isto ry is ta k e n to be so m eth in g not
a m e n a b le to direct o b se rv a tio n a n d th e re fo re w h a te v er o n e does in th e w ay
o f th e o riz in g a n d e v a lu a tin g th e g lo b a l d o m a in o f h isto ry is o f n o value.
T h e view ju s t m en tio n e d is in d irect c o n tra d ic tio n w ith th e view th a t h isto ry
is a n e x tre m ely im p o rta n t d iscipline. V a rio u s types o f praise are acco rd ed
to h isto ry o n th e basis th a t it is p le a s a n t to c o n te m p la te a n d m ight even
h av e so m e im p o rta n t uses. A d istin c tiv e ju d g m e n t a b o u t h isto ry is th a t it
p ro d u c e s a n en lig h ten in g effect, a re a d e r o f h isto ry becom es kn o w led g e
ab le, a n d it even p e rfo rm s a m o ra l fu n c tio n in th a t th e c u ltiv a to r o f h isto ry
m ay im p ro v e his o w n b e h a v io r as a co n se q u en ce o f his a c q u a in ta n c e w ith
g o o d ex am p les.
Illogical o r illegitim ate in te rp re ta tio n s are th o se th a t assu m e th a t th ere
a re in te rn a l forces o r co n d itio n s w h ich ad d to a n d en h a n ce th e original d a ta
th a t a re th e h isto rical h ap p e n in g s. T h e y a re b ased p rim arily o n v a ria tio n s
in th e assa y in g o f th e im p o rta n c e o f p a rtic u la r fa c to rs in the co m p lex
h a p p e n in g th a t is being in terp re ted . B asically su ch in te rp re ta tio n s are
fo u n d e d u p o n faulty ax io m s o r h y p o th eses p e rta in in g to so m e aspects o f
th e h isto rio g rap h ica l situ atio n .
336
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
“ Cf. Butterfield, H., Moral Judgments in History and Hum an Relations, London, Collons, 1931.
51Burckhardt, J., “Fortune and Misfortune in History," in Force and Freedom ( J . H. Nickels, ed.),
New York, Pantheon, 1943, p. 274.
337
H U M A N EVENTS IN P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E
unfortunate that the Reformation triumphed in only half of Europe and that Protestantism
was divided into two setts;
fortunate that first Spain, then Louis XIV were eventually defeated in their plans for world
dominion, etc.
RANGE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY
W ith th e b an ish m en t o f absolutes, universals, an d ficticious psychology
fro m th e p h ilo so p h y o f th e historical d o m ain , th e w ay is o pened to th e
scientific co n sid eratio n o f H isto rio g ra p h y . T h e n a tu re an d processes o f
h isto ry a n d h isto rian s can be analyzed a n d described on the basis o f
observ in g actu al historical events as stim u lu s o bjects w ith w hich h istorians
in teract. W e analyze tw o im p o rta n t issues, th e co n tin u ity principle an d the
ran g e o f history.
a. The Continuity Principle. M an y o f th e p ro b lem s a n d fru stratio n s
connected w ith conventional h isto rio g rap h y arise fro m th e attitu d e th a t the
en tire accep ted subject m atter o f h isto ry is lo cated in a rem o te space-tim e
difficult to observe. T his em phasis o n th e pastness o f events results in a false
5" Meinecke, J.. “ Hisloricism and its Problems.” in The Varieties o f History (F. Stern, ed.) New
York, Meridian. 1957, pp. 268-288,
**LcfT, G., Op. Cit.. p. 32.
338
A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y
339
C H A P T E R 23
EPILOGUE
340
EPILOGUE
341
EPILOGUE
Fig, 13. Reciprocal Influence of Culture upon Individuals and Vice Versa.
342
EPILOGUE
343
EPILOGUE
p ro fessio n al p h ilo so p h e rs c a n n o t b e g ra d e d h ig h e r th a n th e th in k in g o f
u n e d u c a te d a n d u n in fo rm e d p erso n s.
By c o n tra s t th e view s a n d p ro p o sitio n s o f p ro fessio n al p h ilo so p h ers
p re su m a b ly co v e r th e ra n g e o f all k n o w led g e a n d research. In tran sc en d en
ta l p e rio d s th e view receives c u rren c y th a t p h ilo so p h y , as o v e r ag a in st th e
special sciences, h as n o su b ject m a tte r o f its o w n . T h is is clearly false fro m
th e s ta n d p o in t o f n atu ra listic p h ilo so p h y ev e n if th e view tru ly ev alu ates all
tra n sc e n d e n ta l su b ject m a tte rs as zero.
In te rb e h a v io ra l p h ilo so p h y , a s n a tu ra listic a ttitu d e s, articu lates w ith all
th e re so u rces o f th e special sciences a lo n g w ith g en eral experience. T h e
difference b etw een p h ilo so p h y a n d science, th e n , as w e h av e in d icated in
c h a p te r 11 is sim p ly a m a tte r o f o rg an izin g all k n o w led g e, th e p h ilo so p h ical
c o m p o n e n ts te n d in g to w a rd m o re a d e q u a te criticism a n d ev alu atio n . T h is
o rg a n iz a tio n in clu d es th e c o o rd in a tio n o f th e findings o f th e v ario u s special
sciences b y w ay o f p erfectin g one’s g en eral p h ilo so p h ic al positio n .
3. Constructions and Events. O n e o f th e o u ts ta n d in g m erits o f interbe
h a v io ra l p h ilo s o p h y is its em p h a sis o f th e d iv e rsity b etw een (1) o b jects a n d
events, a n d (2) co n stru c tio n s (d escrip tio n s a n d ev alu atio n s) m ad e a b o u t
th em . E x am p le, a n in d iv id u al is o b serv ed to diffe ren tiate betw een a red ripe
stra w b e rry an d a n u n rip e g reen o n e b u t tra d itio n a l p h ilo so p h y w o u ld h ave
it th a t th e respective co lo rs a re in a n o n e x is te n t m in d in stead o f bein g based
o n th e c h e m istry o f th e berries in th e ir v a rio u s stag es o f biolo g ical m a tu ra
tio n . S u c h a tr a d u c tio n o f events, co n sistin g o f p erso n s in tera ctin g w ith
o bjects, o th e r p erso n s, a n d e n v iro n in g c o n d itio n s, is a c e n tra l fe a tu re o f th e
subjectiv e a n d sp iritistic p h ilo so p h ie s in w h ic h so-called e x te rn a l o b jects
in clu d in g p e rso n s a re c re a tio n s o f g o d s, a b so lu te s, a n d p erso n a l spirits.
V a ria n ts o f c o n v e n tio n a l p h ilo so p h ic al sy stem s co n ceal th e grossness o f
su ch th in k in g b u t still re ta in th e false in te rp re ta tio n o f ex istin g events
co n c e rn in g w h ich they sp ecu late a b o u t.
4. Philosophy: A Constructional Product. P h ilo so p h ic a l system s a re
alw ay s th e c o n stru c tio n a l p ro d u c t o f p e rso n s w ith g re a te r o r lesser cap acity
to ob serv e freely a n d e v a lu a te th e th in g s a n d e v en ts th a t h a p p e n in th e ir
su rro u n d in g s , a n d h a v e c o m e to th e ir n o tice. T h u s a critical o b serv er c a n
readily d ifferen tiate b etw een (1) p h ilo so p h ic a l system s w h ich depict th in g s
a n d e v e n ts a s th e y a re o b serv ed to h a p p e n , o r in fe rre d fro m relev an t ev en ts
a n d (2) v erb al system s au tistically in v en ted b y a n a lo g y a n d legend. In te r-
b eh a v io ra l p h ilo so p h y obv io u sly belongs t o th e g ro u p d escribed in (1).
5. The Specificity Principle. By c o n tra s t w ith c o n v e n tio n a l p h ilo so p h y
w hich im plies ab so lu tes, to talities, a n d u n iv erses, scientific p h ilo so p h y is
344
EPILOGUE
345
EPILOGUE
346
EPILOGUE
347
SU B JE C T IN D E X
349
I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
Linguistic analysis, ch. 8 history of. 5; human and divine. 176; identity
Linguistic influences on philosophyzing. 154 of. 3: infallible. 163; interbehavioral. 3; legal,
Linguistics, interhchavioral. 148; valid. 98 paradoxes in. 312: observational. 4; of an and
Linguistic, the. problem in aesthetics and philos aesthetics, ch. 18; of ethics. 159; of history,
ophy. 261 contradictions of. 317; of history, based on
Literacy, advent of. 147 certainties and absolutes. 317; scientific. 5
Logos. 154 Philosophyring. 3.4. 16. 95; eight specifications
for, ch. 9; linguistic influences on. 154; signi
Macroeconomics, 198
ficant, specifications for. 95
Marbury versus Madison. 311.312
Physics. 8
Marginal utility. 211
Marx's, Karl, theses on Feuerbach. 182 Physiocratism. 209
Physis. 20.21
Materialism, nature of. 54;, .radox of. 54; sym Political systems, variety in. 175
bol of enlightenment. 55 Political utility philosophy. 178
Materialistic interval, ch. 6; significance of. 65
Politics, and humanity as colonial organisms.
Mathematics. 8. 125
172; and hierarchy of human groups, 172: of
Meaning, 149, ISO. 158
Aristotle, 175; philosophical aspects of, 172;
Mercantilism. 209 philosophy of. 178: problems of. 186: speci
Metaphors. 16. 288; of mind, consciousness as mens of. 175
religious products. 288
Polysemy. 152
Metaphysics. Greek. 29. 30. 31,39
Positivistic interval, ch. 7
Microeconomics. 198 Postulation(s). 156; definite. 23: naive. 19
Middle Ages. 5 Price, as dogma, 201
Mind. 16; and body, dualism, vii. viii, ix, 5 Primum mobile. 39
Mona Lisa. 237 Problem, of abstraction inaesthclics. 260; of axi
Morality, public and private. 170 oms in aesthetics. 259; of orientation in philos
Morals and values. 168 ophy. 259; of politics of specificity in philos
Moral situations, isolation and identification of. ophy. 259 f.; subjective-objective, in aesthetics
159 and in philosophy, 261; the linguistic, in aes
Moral standards. 169 f. thetics and philosophy, 261
Mysticism, 289 Problems, of educational situations. 271; specific
Natural rights and positive law. 311 political. 186: unity-plurality, in aesthetics and
Nonfigurative painting. 245 philosophy. 261 f.
Proletariat, the. 182
Objective versus nonobjective art. 245 Proliferation, of human groups. 172
Objectivity of historical events. 330 Psyche. 155. 288
Observational aspects of philosophy. 4 Psychic atoms. 48
Obsolescence and seasonality in economics. 200 Psychic distance. 237
Ordinary, the, and the elite in educational situa Psychic faculties. 234
tions. 271 Psychic powers. 16
Orientation problem in philosophy. 259 Psychic research. 289
Psychic synthesis. 49
Paradoxes in legal philosophy. 312 Psychological aspects of political philosophy. 192
Paradoxy and orthodoxy in law. 312 Psychological model of ethical behavior. 167
Paraesthetic behavior. 252 Psychological problems in philosophy. 260
Personality development, two phases of. 264 f. Psychology. 102. 104, 105. 157. 192; and psycho
Pctites perceptiones. 234 logical behavior, 285; historical. 192; inlerbe-
Philosophical intervals. 18 havioral. in aesthetics. 254; scientific. 105. 192;
Philosophical systems, informal interval. 15; valid. 98
formal and systematic interval. 16
Philosophies of science, valid and invalid. 8 Reality. 7. 154; and religion. 284; of knowledge
Philosophy. 158; absolutes in. viii. a human en and thinking. 50
terprise, 343; as queen of the sciences. 3; as Relativistic laws. 299
religion. 3; as stage in intellectual evolution. 3; Religion. 16. 76; and morals. 295; and politics.
as systems of assumptions or beliefs. 3; as web 296 f.; and reality. 284; and science. 286: and
spinning. 3; autistic. 4 f.; conventional. 9. 340. theology. 283; and truth. 2831; and values. 293
341; Greek. 16; handmaiden of theology. 3; IT.: as contention. 282; as creation. 2XI. as criti-
351
I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
352
N A M E INDEX
353
i n t e r b e h a v i o h a l p h i l o s o p h y
354
NAME INDEX
Kipnis, K., 314 Moore, G. E„ 160, 166, 219, 221, 252, 299
KirshofT, G. R.. 67 Moore, T. V., 292
Klein, L. R„ 221, 222 Most, J., 184, 185
Knight, F. H., 194 Muller, M„ 278
Knight. R. P.. 252 Mun. A. A. M.. 227
Kovach, F. J.. 237, 251 Munro, T„ 251
Kropotkin. P„ 184, 185 Murray, G„ 43
Kiilpe. O., 108
Nagel, E., 74
La Mettrie. J. O., 58 f„ 64 Namier, L. B.. 320, 323
Langdell, 313 Napoleon, 321, 331
Lange, F. A., 54.63 Natorp, P„ 22. 27, 28
Laplace, P. S.. 6 Newton. 6,47.49.50, 53.113, 130,131.132, 133,
Lask, E„ 35 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,208
Lauderdale, J. M., 228
Leif, G.. 327, 335, 338 Ogden. C. K.. 149
Leibniz, G. W.. 48. 53. 54, 107, 210, 222, 233 Ogle. \V„ 17
Lenin, N„ 227 Oman. J. W.. 278, 281
Levy-Bruhl, L., 60 Osborne. H.. 238. 251
Lewis. C. ]., 232 Ostwald, W„ 70
Liebig, J., 63
Linnaeus. C„ 17 Parker, D. H„ 244
Lipps, T„ 237 Parmenides, 22, 26
Livingstone, R. W., 37. 38 Passmore, J. A., 80, 91. 330, 335
Llewellyn, K., 306 Paul. St., 43
Pea no, 85
Locke, J., 48. 54, 70, 72. 107, 108, 177. 210, 222
Lucretius, T„ 19, 54 Pearson, K., 69, 71, 72
Lunsden, R.. 205 Petrie. H. G„ 265
Petty, W.. 208. 219. 227
McCulloch. J. R„ 211,228,229 Picasso, P., 248
McDonald, L. C., 175 Pigou. A. C . 215, 217,219
McTaggart, J. M. E„ 279 Planck, M„ 6, 70
Macaulay, T. B., 320 Plato. 16, 19, 24. 25. 26, 28. 29. 39.41. 160. 175,
Mach, E., 67, 71, 72, 86 189
Malthus. T. R.. 210. 227. 228, 229 Plotinus, 42, 114
Mandelbaum, M., 333, 335 Poincare, H„ 86
Marshall, A., 213. 214, 227 Pollock. F.. 308
Marshall. J-, 311 Popper, K. R.. 332
Marx. K., 182 L. 203,215.216.217.227.278.319, Pound, R., 316
326 Prall, D. W„ 236
Mead, G. H„ 38 Proudhon, P. V., 184
Meinecke, J., 338 Pythagoras, 19, 21, 22, 26
Menger, C., 211. 212, 227, 228. 229, 230
Quesnay, F., 209, 226
Mengs, A. R„ 251
Mersenne, M„ 176 Radin, P„ 15
Meyershoff, H.. 324 Ramsey, 1. T., 291
Michelangelo, 244, 252 Ranke. L. von, 328, 329, 335. 338
Mill. J., 210,211 Ranson, S. W., 112
Mill. J. S„ 160, 210, 211,213,219,222,224,228, Rawls. J., 189
229 Reichenbach, H„ 249
Millikan, R. A.. 288 Reid, T.. 51, 52. 53, 109, 115. 135. 136. 137
Minucius, Felix, 42 Renan, E„ 278
Mitchell, W. C„ 203, 217, 218.224, 227.231 Ricardo. D.. 210. 213. 219. 224. 227.228, 229
Moleschott, J., 63 Richards, I. A., 149
Momigliano. A. O., 321 Rickert, H., 333
Moore. C. N„ 249 Robbins, H., 249
355
I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
356