Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of 2.
2. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under
the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.
COMMON CARRIER v. PRIVATE CARRIER
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
DE GUZMAN v. CA
Facts: DE GUZMAN contracted with CENDENA for the hauling of Liberty filled milk from a
warehouse of GENERAL MILK in Makati to DE GUZMAN’S establishment in Urdaneta. Some
of the milk did not reach the establishment because one of CENDENA’S trucks was hi-
jacked by armed men. CENDENA denied that he was a common carrier because he only
transported the milk as an incident to his junk dealership and argued that the hi-jacking
relieved him from any liability
HELD: COMMON CARRIER; it appears to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic
or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their
goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
DOCTRINES:
1. The above article (ART 1732) makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline").
a) Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
b) Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no
certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is
palpable error.
the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment
a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier
has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and
implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or
other franchise.
To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has
not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to
sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to
comply with applicable statutory requirements. The law imposes duties and liabilities
upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services
and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely
facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.
DURATION OF LIABILITY – CARRIAGE OF GOODS
Art. 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the
provisions of Article 1738.
Art. 1737. The common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods
remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit,
unless the shipper or owner has made use of the right of stoppage in transitu.
Art. 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even
during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of
destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had
reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.
STIPULATIONS LIMITING LIABILITY: CARRIAGE OF GOODS
Art. 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the
liability of the former for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less
than extraordinary diligence shall be valid, provided it be:
(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the common
carrier; and
(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.
Kinds of stipulation limiting liability:
1. One exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its
own negligence;
2. One providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation;
3. One limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation, unless the shipper declares
a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
The 1st and 2nd kinds are invalid for being contrary to public policy, but the 3rd is valid and
enforceable.
 LIABILITY FOR PASSENGER’S BAGGAGE
Art. 1754. The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger's baggage
which is not in his personal custody or in that of his employee. As to other baggage, the
rules in Articles 1998 and 2000 to 2003 concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall
be applicable.
Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by the travellers in hotels or inns shall also be
regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as
depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects
brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take the precautions which
said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their
effects.
Art. 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding articles shall include the loss
of, or injury to the personal property of the guests caused by the servants or employees of
the keepers of hotels or inns as well as strangers; but not that which may proceed from any
force majeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of the keeper
of the hotels or inns shall be considered in determining the degree of care required of him.
 Samplex 2017: still liable even if MacBook not checked in
Art. 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the hotel is not deemed force
majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force.
Art. 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the loss is due to the acts of
the guest, his family, servants or visitors, or if the loss arises from the character of the things
brought into the hotel.
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the
hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in articles
1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
THUS:
NOT IN THE PERSONAL CUSTODY: provisions on carriage of goods applicable (extraordinary
diligence)
IF IN THE PERSONAL CUSTODY OF THE PASSENGER: CARRIERS LIABLE AS DEPOSITARIES
(ordinary diligence only), PROVIDED:
1. Notice was given to them or their employees; and
2. The passengers take precautions which the common carrier or their substitutes
advised relative to the care and vigilance over their effects.
CARRIER LIABLE FOR NON-DECLARED BUT ACCEPTED CARGO: Liable even if not declared
and charges thereon not paid, as long as it accepted them for transportation.
STIPULATIONS LIMITING LIABILITY: CARRIAGE OF GOODS
Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required
in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the
posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common
carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but not for wilful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier's liability.
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF EMPLOYEES
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Art. 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot
be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the
tickets or otherwise.
Maranan v Perez:
Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers.
o It is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It
is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.
o The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the
passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.
Ratio:
1. the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that
full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care
prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of
strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own
servants charged with the passenger's safety;
2. said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the
result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his
contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and
3. as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of
wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since
it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
 LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF STRANGERS
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Pilapil v CA:
a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the
latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is
held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort
from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.
Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract
is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to
be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good
father of a family.
connection therewith. For the causative negligence in such cases is personal to the
employees actually in charge of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this
kind of damages by way of example or correction, unless by the demonstrated tolerance or
approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and their fault is of the
character described in Article 2232 of the Civil Code.
A principal or master can be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages based upon the
wrongful act of his agent or servant only where he participated in the doing of such wrongful
act or has previously authorized or subsequently ratified it with full knowledge of the facts.
Reasons given for this rule are that since damages are penal in character, the motive
authorizing their infliction will not be imputed by presumption to the principal when the act
is committed by an agent or servant, and that since they are awarded not by way of
compensation, but as a warning to others, they can only be awarded against one who has
participated in the offense, and the principal therefore cannot be held liable for them merely
by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the agent

The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers.
o Where the carrier uses:
1. cars of the most approved type,
2. in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and
3. exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition,

the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this respect.

DAMAGES

MORAL
Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract of transportation, in view of the provisions of articles 2219 and 2220.

The exceptions are:


1. Where the mishap results in the death of a passenger; and
2. Where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not
result.

In awarding moral damages as a result of death of a passenger, the heirs who are entitled
to such are the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased, as provided in Art. 2206, and such does not include collaterals (brothers, sisters,
nephews, nieces.

EXEMPLARY (MUNSAYAC V DE LARA)

Owners of common carriers cannot be held liable for exemplary damages unless it is shown
that it authorized or ratified the driver’s reckless driving which resulted in the breach of the
contract of carriage. It should be the driver who is to be made liable for such damages. It is
difficult to conceive how the defendant in a breach of contract case could be held to have
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or violent manner within the meaning
of Article 2232 for something he did or did not do after the breach, which had no causal