UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
Paguirigan
PROPERTY
LEUNG YEE, PLAINTIFF v. FRANK L.
STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY
G.R. No. 11658, February 15, 1918,
CARSON, EN BANC
One who purchases real estate with
knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his
vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner
of the land or of an interest therein; and the
same rule must be applied to one who has
knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might
be necessary to acquaint him with the defects
in the title of his vendor. A purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor.
A building, by itself, may be mortgaged
apart from the land on which it was built
even if a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of
the improvements thereon, buildings.
Such a mortgage would still be a real
estate mortgage (REM) for the building
would still be considered immovable
property even if dealt with separately
and apart from the land (Yee v. Strong
Machinery Company, G.R. No. 11658,
February 15, 1918)
Dean Viviana M.
The "Compañia Agricola Filipina" (CAF) bought a considerable quantity of rice-cleaning machinery from Strong
Machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage to secure payment. It included in the mortgage deed the building
of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. Not being
able to pay, the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff. The mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage
registry, and the sale of the property to the machinery company in satisfaction of the mortgage was annotated in the
same registry on 29 December 1913. Sometine in January 1914, CAF executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the
building stood to the machinery company, but the deed was not registered. Thereafter, CAF executed another mortgage
to Leung Yee upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance
of its indebtedness for the construction of the building itself. Upon the failure pay, the Yee secure judgment for that
amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it in at the sheriff's sale, and had the sheriff's certificate of the sale
duly registered in the Cavite land registry.
At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the Strong Machinery, which was in possession, filed
with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy.
Thereafter Yee filed an action to recover possession of the building from the machinery company. The trial court ruled
in favor or Strong Machinery on the ground that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of
registry of the plaintiff's certificate in accord with Art. 14731.
Who among Yee and Strong Machinery has a better right over the said building?
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant.
Building separate from land does not affect character as real property;
Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building and the
machineries installed therein.
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages
of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage
registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," mortgages of
personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute.
The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was
real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its
character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the
chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel
mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the
annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any
effect whatever so far as the building was concerned. Possession before
sheriff’s sale, not Article 1473 (on good faith), controlling as to ownership of
property.
The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of Article 1473, second
paragraph, but on the ground that the agreed statement of facts discloses
that neither the purchase of the building by plaintiff nor his inscription of
the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor was made in good faith, and that
the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the property under
the third paragraph of the above cited article of the code, it appearing that
the company first took possession of the property; and further, that the
building and the land were sold to the machinery company long prior to the
date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE Petitioner DPB granted a loan to the spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To secure it, the latter executed a
PHILIPPINES vs CA, et al. REM on several properties among which was Lot No. 2029 situated in Zamboanga del Sur.
G.R. No. 109946, 1996-02-09,
BELLOSILLO, J. At the time of the mortgage the property was still the subject of a Free Patent application filed by the Olidiana spouses
with the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Molave for taxation
purposes. Thereafter, they filed with the Bureau of Lands a request for amendment of their applications in which they
DBP could not have acquired a renounced, relinquished and waived all their rights and interests over several parcels of land including Lot No. 2029 in
valid title over the subject property (public favor of respondents Jesusa Chupuico and Mylo Quinto. This request was granted and OCTs were issued to Chupuico
land) by virtue of the foreclosure and over one half of Lot No. 2029 and to Quinto over the other half. An additional loan was extended by DBP to the Olidiana
subsequent sale at public auction spouses who executed an additional mortgage on the same parcels of land already covered by the first mortgage. Later
on, for failure of spouses Olidiana to comply with the terms and conditions of their promissory notes and mortgage
contracts, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties including Lot No. 2029. Theses properties were
then sold at public auction and awarded to DBP as the highest bidder. Ownership was then consolidated in its name.
However, when it tried to register the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to have the tax declaration transferred
in its name it was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had already been divided into 2 parcels and covered by 2 OCTs in the
name of Chupuico and Quinto.
Consequently, DBP filed an action for Quieting of Title and Cancellation or Annulment of Certificate of Title against
them. After trial the RTC rendered judgment against DBP. The court ruled that the contracts of mortgage and the
subsequent foreclosure could not have vested valid title to DBP because the mortgagors were not the owners in fee
simple of the property mortgaged. When the Olidiana spouses mortgaged Lot No. 2029 to DBP it was still the subject
of a miscellaneous sales application by the spouses with the Bureau of Lands. Since there was no showing that the sales
application was approved before the property was mortgaged, the Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee
simple when they mortgaged it. The court also found the mortgages were in violation of Art. 2085, par. 2, of the New
Civil Code which requires that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. The court also said that
with the subsequent issuance of the Free Patent in the name of Chupuico and Quinto, it could be gleaned that the
property was indeed public land when mortgaged to DBP. Therefore DBP could not have acquired a valid title over the
subject
property by virtue of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction. On appeal, the CA
likewise ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.
Was the mortgage on Lot No. 2029 valid despite being the subject of a Free Patent
Application?
G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016 Delfin Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in Iligan City. They allegedly
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND bought the property in 1951 from Felix Natingo and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of
SOLEDAD DELFIN, NAMELY the property since time immemorial. The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for tax
EMELITA D. FABRIGAR AND purposes since 1952. Sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing Authority allegedly forcibly took possession of a
LEONILO C. DELFIN, Petitioners, v. 10,798 square meter portion of the property. Despite their repeated demands for compensation, the National Housing
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Authority failed to pay the value of the property. The Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint.
Respondent. They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less than P40 per square meter13 and that its
LEONEN, J: improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees should be valued at P13,360.00 at the time of taking. They similarly
claimed that because the National Housing Authority occupied the property, they were deprived of an average net
yearly income of P10,000.00.
NO. We hold that DBP did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute
because it was public land when mortgaged to the bank.
We cannot accept DBP’s contention that the lot in dispute was no longer
public land when mortgaged to it since the Olidiana spouses had been in
open, continuous, adverse and public possession thereof for more than 30
years. In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer we ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of the land so
that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final
patent could be issued in his favor.
Meanwhile the government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the
application could still be canceled and the land awarded to another applicant
should it be shown that the legal requirements had not been complied with.
What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales
patent and its subsequent registration with the RD. It is the registration and
issuance of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass
of public domain and convert it into private property. Since the disputed lot
in the case before us was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when
mortgaged to DBP and no patent was granted to the Olidiana spouses, Lot
No.
2029 remained part of the public domain. With regard to the validity of the
mortgage contracts entered into by the parties, Art. 2085, par. 2, of
the New Civil Code specifically requires that the pledgor or mortgagor be
the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. Thus, since the
disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses when they
mortgaged it to DBP the contracts of mortgage and all their subsequent legal
consequences as regards Lot No. 2029 are null and void.
Finally, anent the contention of DBP that respondents fraudulently obtained
the property in litigation, we also find for the latter. As correctly found by
the lower courts, no evidence existed to show that respondents had prior
knowledge of the REM executed by the Olidiana spouses in favor of DBP.
The act of respondents in securing the patents cannot therefore be
categorized as having been tainted with fraud.
1. No. For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be
satisifled: first, the property is established to be private in
character; and second the applicable prescriptive period under
existing laws had passed.
Only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are
susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529. Consistent with this, Article 1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties
of the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible
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Only publicly owned lands which are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent
with this, Article 1113 of Civil Code
demarcates properties of the state, which are
not patrimonial in character, as being not
susceptible to prescription
For land of the public domain to be converted
into patrimonial property, there must be an
express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
of the Philippines
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
Alienable and disposable lands of the State
fall into two categories, to wit:
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
In its Answer, the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin Spouses' property was part of a military
reservation area. It cited Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No. 2143, the National Housing Authority made
an erroneous citation) as having supposedly reserved the area in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum
improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by the National Steel
Corporation's five-year expansion program.
Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-interests' open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the Iligan Property for more than 30 years converted the property from public to private. They then posit that they
acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription.
Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, that petitioners cannot rely on 'Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 because the property was not yet declared private land when they filed their Complaint.
1. WON petitioners acquired ownership over the Iligan property through acquisitive prescription under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
2. WON petitioners are entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent
National Housing Authority.
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters.
Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
to prescription. Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be
viable, the publicly-owned land must be patrimonial or private in character
at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it into
patrimonial property.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property,
there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
2. Yes. While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they
may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act), which enabled
the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens
occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an
interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to those who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945".
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to
be alienable and disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy
Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land attest
to this. Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax
declarations showed that their possession went only as far back as 1952,
Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land
nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been
occupied as early as June 1945.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership.
Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code, without
limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public
lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only
be agricultural.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s
application for land registration. CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession.
Whether or not petitioners were entitled to the land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms
part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of
the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to
be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless
the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may
be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into
two categories, to wit:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN
ET. AL.
G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000,
FIRST DIVISION, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.
The property subject of private respondents'
application was only declared alienable in
1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest
land incapable of private appropriation. It
was not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy,
could not convert it into private property,
(unless) and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect
title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965
until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty
(30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940. Conflicting applications for
confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De Guzman over
parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit -
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows:
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned
therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under the operation of
Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-
67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by it technical descriptions now forming
parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian Ermitaño De
Guzman, Deogracias Ermitaño De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De Guzman, Alicia Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador
Disposition of alienable public lands
We now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land
or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State
and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as
of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal
fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
NO.
In the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application
was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest
land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private
property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any
occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the
thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in
Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation
of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK G.R.
No. 179990 October 23, 2013
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The
Property Registration Decree
enumerates the persons who may apply
for the registration of title to land, to
wit:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite,
subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitaño, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro
de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and Esmeranso Ermitaño under an instrument entitled 'Waiver of Rights with Conformity"
the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title
to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court. Court of Appeals affirmed.
Did the petitioner acquire the property through acquisitive prescription?
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration under her name of the two lands situated in Jugan, Consolacion,
Cebu and alleged that:
(a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for taxation at ₱2,400.00;
(b) that to the best of her knowledge , there is no mortgage nor encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any
person having interest therein, legal or equitable;
(c) that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner over said
parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years, including the possession of her predecessors-in-interest;
(d) that she acquired title to said land by virtue of the deeds of absolute sale; and
(e) that said land is not occupied. The respondent, as far as known to her, also alleged that the full names and complete
addresses of the owners of all lands adjoining the subject land.
The petitioner filed an opposition stating:
(1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
(2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the respondent attached to or
alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
an owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax
declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended possession of the respondent to be of recent vintage;
(3) That the respondent can no longer avail of the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant
since she has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from February 16,
1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner further alleged that the instant
application was filed on July 7, 1995;
(4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the petitioner and that the said
parcel is not subject to private appropriation.
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent. CA also denied,
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application of their
petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in
giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject
land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private
respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot
consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the
land as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the
possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied
by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have
acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which
reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them
into private property.
Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or
centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to
abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex".
NO. It must be noted that the respondent did not file any comment on the
petition despite efforts to notify her and her counsel of record. Thus, this
Court resolved to dispense with the respondent’s comment and shall decide
the instant petition based on available records.
Respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State
declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public
use, public service, the development of the national wealth and have been
converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the period of possession
and occupation required by law.
In the assailed decision granting the respondent’s application for registration
of title, the CA explained that the RTC’s decision was based on Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. The CA said:
However, a judicious scrutiny of the attendant facts would reveal that the
assailed decision of the RTC was based not on PD No. 1529, Section 14(1),
but under Section 14(2) of said issuance. The pertinent portion of the decision
is quoted as follows: "From the documentary evidence presented and
formally offered by the applicant, the Court is convinced that she and her
predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open, complete, continuous,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands herein applied
for registration of title, for a period of over 40 years, in the concept of an
owner and that applicant has registrable title over same lots in accordance
with Sec. 14, PD 1529."
Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the
respondent’s application for registration of title.
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(4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by law.
Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for one to qualify under paragraph
(b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of
the land must not be mere fiction.
The fact that the disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in the
names of the applicants for registration or of
their predecessors-in- interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely
indicia of a claim of ownership."
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
WAS THE RESPONDNET ABLE TO PROVE THAT SHE AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN
OPEN, COMPLETE, CONTINUOUS, NOTORIOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS
SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 40 YEARS THROUGH
MERE TAX DECLARATIONS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF WHEN THE SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
HOWEVER  PETITIONER : respondent failed to show proof of an
expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer
intended for public use, public service, the development of the national
wealth or have been converted into patrimonial property. Certification
which the respondent submitted did not indicate when the lands applied for
were declared alienable and disposable.
Indeed, the respondent attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands
were declared alienable and disposable. Certification issued and signed by
Fedencio P. Carreon (Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the respondent
attached in her Appellee’s brief in the CA, as a supplement to her earlier
submissions, particularly Annex "G" and Annex "G-1" or the June 28, 1995
Certifications issued by Eduardo M. Inting, CENRO.
One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent
provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is the "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land by the
applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over
his own property.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation."
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the order [sic]. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of
the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.
In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation" does not suffice. An applicant for a grant or
title over a lot must be able to show that he has exercised acts of dominion
over the property in question. The applicant’s possession must not be simply
a nominal claim where he only plants a sign or symbol of possession. In other
words, his possession of the property must be patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine; it should be uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; it should demonstrate exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and it should
be conspicuous, which means generally known and talked of by the public
or the people in the neighborhood.
HOWEVER, in the present petition, the respondent failed to specifically
show that she and her predecessors-in-interest had exercised acts of
dominion over the subject lots. Admittedly, the respondent’s best evidence
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G.R. No. 194077. December 3, 2014.*
FLORENTINO W. LEONG and ELENA
LEONG, et al., petitioners, vs. EDNA C.
SEE, respondent.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to
someone who "buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in it, and who pays a full
and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another
person's claim."[6 One claiming to be an
innocent purchaser for value has the burden
of proving such status
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Spouses Florentino and Carmelita Leong owned a property located in Quiapo , Manila, where Florentino’s sister-in-
law, Elena stayed rent-free with her in laws.
The Spouses Leong immigrated to the USA and not long after, got divorced in Illinois. In their divorce settlement,
Florentino conveyed all his right, title , and interest over the subject property. Intercalated in the lower margin of page
12 of the instrument was a long-hand scribbling of a proviso, purporting to be a footnote remark": Neither party shall
evict or charge rent to relatives of the parties, or convey title, until it has been established that Florentino has clear title
to the Malabon property. Clear title to be established by the attorneys for the parties or the ruling of a court of competent
jurisdiction. In the event Florentino does not obtain clear title, this court reserves jurisdiction to reapportion the
properties or their values to effect a 50-50 division of the value of the 2 remaining Philippine properties.
On November 14, 1996, Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of
absolute sale, Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a waiver of interest notarized on March
11, 1996 in Illinois. In this waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the
land.17 Consequently, the land’s title, covered by TCT No. 231105, was transferred to Edna's name.
On April 1, 1997, Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong
ex-spouses.
In response, Elena’s cited the title’s legal infirmity for lack of Florentino’s signature and that Carmelita’s non-compliance
with the scribbled proviso annulled the transfer to Edna. Florentino filed a case of for declaration of nullity of contract
of title and damages to Carmelita, alleging that the sale was without his consent, The 2 cases were consolidated.
RTC ruled in favor of Edna See. Ordered Elena to vacate the property, but ordered Carmelita to pay Florentino his half
of the sale with interest and damages. CA affirmed in toto,
WON the Edna See was an Innocent Purchaser for Value?
to prove possession and ownership were tax declarations and receipts issued
in her name or the names of her predecessors-in-interest, but these tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right
of possession over a piece of land. "WELL SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT
TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OR OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS LAND
WHEN NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE.
THE FACT THAT THE DISPUTED PROPERTY MAY HAVE BEEN
DECLARED FOR TAXATION PURPOSES IN THE NAMES OF THE
APPLICANTS FOR REGISTRATION OR OF THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST DOES NOT NECESSARILY PROVE OWNERSHIP. THEY ARE
MERELY INDICIA OF A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP."
In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her
predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the said
parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who testified to
substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone
else to support her claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation." Unfortunately, her testimony simply made
general declarations without further proof.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts that correctly
found that the respondent is a purchaser in good faith for value who
exercised the necessary diligence in purchasing the property.
First, good faith is presumed, and petitioners did not substantiate their bold
allegation of fraud.
Second, respondent did not rely on the clean title alone precisely because of
the possession by third parties, thus, she also relied on Florentino’s waiver
of interest.
Respondent even verified the authenticity of the title at the Manila Register
of Deeds with her father and Carmelita. These further inquiries prove
respondent’s good faith.
The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and
to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further."
One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when
dealing with registered property.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 known as the Property
Registration Decree recognizes innocent purchasers in good faith for value
and their right to rely on a clean title.
Even assuming the procurement of title was tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation, "such defective title may still be the source of a
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completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value."

Respondent, an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value with title in
her name, has a better right to the property than Elena. Elena’s possession
was neither adverse to nor in the concept of owner.

[G.R. No. 175763 : April 11, 2012] Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared Having possessed the property for the period and in the character required
by her in a 1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND and Cornelia Sanga. have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right
ARACELI TANYAG, NAMELY: cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring again the property for
ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father -in- tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name
AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencia’s husband. Florencia in 1998.
PETITIONERS, VS. SALOME E. Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated.
GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to
GABRIEL-ARNEDO MARRIED TO tax purposes, as shown by TD No. 11445 issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag; TD No. recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right
ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL- 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. TD Nos. 3380 and 00486 also in the name of Araceli Tanyag. to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and
CALINGO MARRIED TO FELIX As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed second, his title thereto.
CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and declared the same for tax purposes.
MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who
MARRIED TO EUSTAQUIO caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land. claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of
NATIVIDAD, AND ERLINDA
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have not the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
VELASQUEZ MARRIED TO
established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’ name. They further thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence
HERMINIO VELASQUEZ,
argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it of the meters and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with
RESPONDENTS.
was irregularly or unlawfully procured. the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035, which would have
shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously
DECISION
Respondents’ evidence showed that the subject land was among those properties included in the Extrajudicial included in respondents’ title. The testimony of Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son
Settlement of Estate of Jose P. Gabriel executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No. B-014-00643 (1985) in the name would not suffice because said witness merely stated the boundary owners
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: of Jose Gabriel. Respondents declared the property in their name but the tax declarations (1989, 1991 and 1994) carried as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. On his part,
the notation that portions thereof (686 sq. ms.) are also declared in the name of Araceli Tanyag. Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such plan
successfully maintain an action to recover the In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed to was presented in court.
ownership of a real property, the person who establish ownership of the subject property and finding the respondents to be the declared owners and legal possessors.
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) It likewise ruled that petitioners were unable to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents acquired title An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; over the property through fraud and deceit. imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of
and second, his title thereto. In regard to the the acts.
first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The CA found that apart from the Affidavit
the person who claims that he has a better executed by Benita Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father, Mateo Gabriel, there is no evidence In addition, registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
right to the property must first fix the that she, not Jose Gabriel, was the true owner thereof. It noted that just four years after Benita Gabriel’s sale of the create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
identity of the land he is claiming by subject property to the Sulit spouses, Jose Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax purposes, paying the certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
describing the location, area and boundaries corresponding taxes. The appellate court stressed that petitioners’ allegation of bad faith was not proven. particular property described therein. Thus, notwithstanding the
thereof.[46] In this case, petitioners failed to indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The

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metes and bounds thereof, so that the same
may be compared with the technical
description contained in OCT No. 1035,
which would have shown whether Lot 2
consisting of 147 square meters was
erroneously included in respondents’
title. The testimony of Agueda
Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice
because said witness merely stated the
boundary owners as indicated in the 1966
and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. On
his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had
the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation
for the consolidation of the two
parcels. However, no such plan was
presented in court
GERARDO, TRINIA AND IYLENE,
ALL SURNAMED MENDOZA v.
SOLEDAD SALINAS
G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007,
THIRD DIVISION (Austria-Martinez,
J.)
“A writ of possession may be issued under:
(1) land registration proceedings under Sec.
17 of Act No. 496;
(2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no
third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135.”
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained OCT No. 1035 in their names fraudulently and in
bad faith. They also claim to have acquired ownership of the subject lots by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
WON petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription (Yes as regards Lot 1)
The RTC granted Salinas’s application for registration and OCT was issued in her name covering a parcel of land.
The Mendozas opposed claiming that they were not oppositors/parties to the registration case and they have been in
actual physical possession of the property since 1964. The RTC rejected their arguments and granted respondent's
application for the issuance of a writ of possession. Hence, the present petition.
The Mendozas set forth that the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction, reiterating their argument that they cannot be ousted of their possession
of the property, having been in actual possession of the property since 1964, as evidenced by Gerardo C. Mendoza's
Sales Application made in January 1986 over the property.
Salinas counters that the petition should have been initially with the CA based on the principle of hierarchy of courts,
and that the general order of default issued by the RTC binds them and personal notice was not necessary.
Is the issuance of the writ of possession by the RTC proper?
rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to
review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible.
What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.
Thus, respondents are ordered to reconvey the said 686-square meter portion
to the petitioners.
No. A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances:
(1) land registration proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act No. 496;
(2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; and
(3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No.
3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
In land registration cases, principles regarding the issuance of a writ of
possession are well-settled. A judgment confirming the title of the applicant
in a registration case and ordering its registration in his name necessarily
carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the
right of ownership.
This is sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally
accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. Also, a
writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and
adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree, and it is the
duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the
successful claimant.
Based on these tenets, the issuance of a writ of possession, therefore, is
clearly a ministerial duty of the land registration court. Such ministerial
duty, however, ceases to be so with particular regard to petitioners who are
actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership.
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption
of ownership. This conclusion is supported by Article 433 of the Civil Code,
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which provides: Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a

disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property. Under said provision, one who
claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the
appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial
process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action,
in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly
heard and adjudicated.

It is noted that there already exists a final and executory decision

disregarding respondent's claim for possession over the property. In a
Decision dated January 21, 2002, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 4643, an action
for unlawful detainer filed by respondent and her spouse against petitioners
and several other occupants of the property, the case against petitioners was
dismissed by the MTCC for lack of cause of action. While the MTCC Decision
was appealed by the other defendants, respondent and her spouse
manifested that they will not appeal the decision and, instead, will file for a
writ of possession in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97.

Note should also be made that petitioners registered their opposition to

respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession and
apprised the RTC of their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted
possession since 1964, including therein documents supporting their claim,
consisting of Gerardo C. Mendoza's Sales Application made on January 1986
and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985, among others.
The RTC, nevertheless, disregarded their opposition and, instead, relied on
the ruling in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, that a writ of possession may be
issued in a land registration proceeding.

A reading of the Serra Serra case, however, supports the Court's conclusion
that a writ of possession should not have been issued in this case. It was ruled
by the Court that while a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to
a decree of registration in an original land registration proceedings, it cannot
issue against possessors under claim of ownership, as actual possession
under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership,
and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property, not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.

Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession
against petitioners. This conclusion, of course, is without prejudice to any
case that respondent may file for the recovery of the property

VILLASI VS. GARCIA G.R. No. 190106 Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey While it is a horn-book doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that
January 15, 2014 condominium building located Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything
demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material

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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
In cases where there is a clear and convincing
evidence to prove that the principal and the
accessory are not owned by one and the same
person or entity, the presumption shall not be
applied and the actual ownership shall be
upheld.
GEMINIANO v. CA
Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good
faith are not synonymous. Article 1678 may
apply to the former’s case and Art 448 may
apply to the latter’s case. If a person knew that
his stay would likely end or that he knew
somehow that he is not the owner of the land
then he is not a BPS in good faith.
AQUINO VS. AGUILAR G.R. NO.
182754 JUNE 29, 2015
By its express provision, Article 1678 of the
Civil Code applies only to lessees who build
useful improvements on the leased property.
It does not apply to those who possess
property by mere tolerance of the owners,
without a contractual right. In this case, there
is absolutely no evidence of any lease contract
between the parties. In fact, respondents
themselves never alleged that they were
lessees of the lot or the building in question.
As builders in bad faith, respondents are not
entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
allegations of the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered
the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project.To enforce her right as
prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located
Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in
which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Garcia. The Spouses Garcia argued that the building
covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI and that it could not be levied
upon not being owned by the judgment debtor.
Whether the general rule on accession can be applied in the case at bar
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished bungalow to
the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the latter. The property was later leased to the respondents
for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40 a month as evidenced by their written lease contract. The respondents built
their house and introduced some improvements in the lot. In 1985 petitioner’s mother refused receiving monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was subject to litigation which resulted to its acquisition by Maria Lee which was
sold to Salcedo, who further sold to Dionisio spouses. The property eventually came back to the petitioner when the
Dinisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot was
registered in the latter’s names. (petitioners never lost possession of the land because Lee and company never issued a
writ of possession against them).
In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding them to vacate the premises and when the latter refused,
petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be entitled to buy the land because of the promise of the
petitioners to sell them the land and because they were builders in Good faith. The courts now are deciding which one
to use: Art. 448 regarding builders and land owners in good faith or Art. 1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can
be reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such lessee
have the right to retain in the premises until fully reimbursed.
Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith?
Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
Teresa and her husband Crispin Aquino owned a house and lot at Makati City. Since 1981, this property has been
occupied by Teresa‘s sister, Josefina Aguilar and the latter‘s family. It appears from the record that the Aguilars
stayed on the property with the consent and approval of the Aquinos. The Aguilars demolished the old house and
constructed a three-storey building and occupied the third floor of the building for 20 years without any rental. In
2003, Aquinos sent a letter to the respondents informing them that an immediate family member needed to use the
premises and demanding the surrender of the property within 10 days from notice. Aguilars refused to vacate and a
suit for ejectment was filed by the Aquinos. Aguilars claimed that they had contributed to the improvement of the
property and the construction of the building, both in terms of money and management/supervision services. They
averred that the construction of the three-storey building was also at the uncompensated supervision of Aguilar, of
which only P 2 Million was spent by the Aquinos while they (Aguilars) spent around P 1 Million as contribution t o
the construction cost. MeTC ruled in favor of the Aquinos and declared that the Aguilars were builders in bad faith
who were not entitled to recover their purported expenses for the construction of the building. It emphasized that
their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of petitioners and, as such, could be terminated. RTC and CA
affirmed. The CA remanded the case to determine the cost of necessary expenses incurred by the Aquinos during the
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception.
In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the
principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or
entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall
be upheld.
When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building
and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be
treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can
be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their
stay would end after the lease contract expires. They can’t bank on the
promise, which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the latter will sell
the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise by
petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove their claim.
2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the
lessor chooses to appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners
refused to exercise that option, the private respondents can’t compel them to
reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents’ sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing
any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
Builder in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code,
refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the land, builds on that
land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title
or mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in
the validity of one‘s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. The Spouses Aguilar cannot be considered as
builders in good faith on account of their admission that the subject lot
belonged to the Spouses Aquino when they constructed the building. Article
1678 is not applicable to this case. By its express provision, Article 1678 of
the Civil Code applies only to lessees who build useful improvements on the
leased property. It does not apply to those who possess property by mere
tolerance of the owners, without a contractual right. In this case, there is
absolutely no evidence of any lease contract between the parties. In fact,
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING CORP. v. COURT
OF APPEALS &
EDUARDO UY
G.R. No. 108894, 10 February 1997,
THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J. )
Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the
former. And possession acquired in good faith
does not lose this character except in case and
from the moment facts exist which show that
the possessor is not unaware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good
faith ceases from the moment defects in the
title are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
period of possession and the cost of useful improvements introduced by the Aguilars in the construction of the
building.
Whether or not the Aguilars are builders in good faith and therefore entitled to reimbursement of the improvements
on the property based on Article 1678.
Tecnogas is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro Manila. It
acquired the said land by purchase from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings and
improvements including the wall existing thereon. Eduardo Uy is the registered owner of a parcel of land.
That said land, which adjoins Tecnogas’ land was purchased by Uy from a certain Enrile Antonio also in 1970.
In 1971, Uy purchased another lot also adjoining Tecnogas’ land from a certain Miguel Rodriguez and the same
was registered in Uy’s name. Portions of the buildings and wall and the land bought by Tecnogas are occupying a
portion of Uy’s adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of a
portion of Uy’s land, Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy that particular portion of his land occupied by portions of its
buildings and wall with an area of 770 square meters, more or less, but Uy, however, refused the offer.
In 1973, the parties entered into a private agreement before a certain Col. Rosales in Malacanang, wherein Tecnogas
agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to Uy possession of a portion of his land
previously enclosed by plaintiff’s wall. Later on, Uy dug or caused to be dug a canal along plaintiff’s wall, a portion of
which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the filing by Tecnogas of the complaint and a separate criminal complaint for
malicious mischief against Uy and his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction in court of Uy’s wife for the
crime of malicious mischief. While trial of the case was in progress, Tecnogas filed in Court a formal proposal for
settlement of the case but said proposal, however, was ignored by Uy.
The RTC ruled in favor of Tecnogas, ordering Uy to sell to Tecnogas that portion of land owned by him and occupied
by portions of Tecnogas’ buildings and wall at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter. The CA reversed the RTC and
ordered Tecnogas to pay Uy rentals and to remove the improvements in the encroached area.
Hence, this petition.
1. Is Tecnogas considered a builder in bad faith because, as held by CA, it is presumed to know the metes
and bounds of his property as described in its certificate of title?
2. Does Tecnogas succeed into the good faith or bad faith of his predecessor-in-interest which presumably
constructed the building?
respondents themselves never alleged that they were lessees of the lot or the
building in question. As builders in bad faith, respondents are not entitled
to reimbursement of useful expenses following the Civil Code provisions:
―Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity; Art. 450. The
owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing
be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent;
and Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is
entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.‖ Respondents
however may recover the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation
of the property but without the right of retention.
1. YES. There is no question that when Tecnogas purchased the land from
Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in
existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures,
but it may well be assumed that Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the
Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of Uy land was done in
bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be
presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession
continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building
on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good
faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor, Tecnogas in this case. Further,
(w)here one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property,
is evidence against the former. And possession acquired in good faith does
not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in
the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit
for recovery of the property by the true owner.
Recall that the encroachment in the present case was caused by a very slight
deviation of the erected wall (as fence) which was supposed to run in a
straight line from point 9 to point 1 of Tecnogas’ lot. It was an error which,
in the context of the attendant facts, was consistent with good faith.
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner for recovery
of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil
Code.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, vs. CA, WILSON
KEE, C.T.
TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and
ELDRED JARDINICO
G.R. No. 79688 | February 1, 1996|
PANGANIBAN, J.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder
that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road,
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo.
At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
On December 19, 1978, when Jardinico was about to secure from the RD of Bacolod City his TCT over the said lot, he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession
thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres
Enterprises Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner.After the preparation of the lot plan and a
copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Kee,
to inspect Lot 8.
Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his
residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable
settlement, but failed. Jardinico then demanded Kee to vacate the said lot and remove all the improvements therein
but he refused, so a compliant for ejectment with damages was filed by Jardinico against Kee before the MTCC. Kee,
in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTT EI.
The obvious benefit to the builder under Article 448 is that, instead of being
outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a
choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying
the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the
owner of the building to remove it from the land.
2. YES. In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner was
aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired the property from Pariz
Industries.
The Court agrees with the RTC that various factors in evidence adequately
show Tecnogas’ lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof has
not overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil
Code, as already stated, taken together with the disputable presumptions of
the law on evidence.
In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz Industries, as
seller, to Tecnogas, as buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the property.
Consequently and as earlier discussed, it is deemed to have stepped into the
shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable
sold, including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either
of the two options provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Yes.
Kee was a builder in good faith, as observed by the Court of Appeals from
the following:
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in
ascertaining the identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of land
registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds
of the propertywith which he is dealing.
But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property,
he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561
matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developer’s agent and
applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for theproduction of
a lot plan by CTTEI’s geodetic engineer. Upon Kee’s receipt of the map, his
wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI’s employee,
Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to
was indeed Lot 8.
Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of
the company’s positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to
suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further ruled that petitioner
and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin
construction required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-sari store
without. the prior approval of petitioner required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of
these requirements was merely to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the lot. HOWEVER, the
MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latters failure to pay the
installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission.
The rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had
any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner.
Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement
for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
On appeal, the RTC ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no
preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. It found Kee a builder in
bad faith. It further ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of
unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate
said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The appellate court however, ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the mix-up when he
began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the
negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The
appellate court also ruled that the award of rentals was without basis.
Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the
owner`s agent, a builder in good faith?
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed P100,000.00 from Teresita, Erlinda‟s sister, as
SANTOS vs. ALBERTO ABEJON and evidenced by a Promissory Note. As security, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property in Makati City. After
the estate of TERESITA DINGLASAN Pedro died, Erlinda failed to pay their loan, and as such, allegedly agreed to sell the subject land to respondents
Abejon for ₱150,000.00. They executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage. Thereafter, the Abejons constructed
protect his interests were reasonable. There was no need for him to have
acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the geodetic
engineer’s relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to
countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their
owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Because
ofCTTEIs blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kees
efforts all went to naught.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on
is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
However, petitioner failed to prove bad faith on the part of Kee. Thus, it is
the petitioner acting as principal of CTTEI that should be held liable,
The petitioner cannot rely on Kee`s violation of pars. 22 and 26 of the
Contract of Sale of Installment because such concerns the breach of contract
between Kee and the petitioner. Neither can petitioner rely on the
subsequent rescission of its contract wih Kee, such fact does not negatethe
negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot to Kee. Such
circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for
unlawful detainer against Kee.
Also, the subsequent compromise or agreement of sale between Jardinico
and Kee will not operate to absolve petitioner from his liability because such
governs only the matters between Jardinico and Kee and not the petitioner`s
liability.
In sum, the Court ruled that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition
of the Court of Appeals that Kee is entitled to the rights granted him under
Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code is deleted, in view of the
deed of sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the
rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. There is also no further need, as
ruled by the appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of origin for
determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot
9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the
New Civil Code.
Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T.
Tones Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily liable for damages due to
negligence; however, since the amount and/or extent of such damages was
not proven during the trial, the same cannot now be quantified and
awarded, they are however ordered to pay attorney`s fees to Jardinico plus
litigation expenses.
As to the loan
Since Erlinda and Pedro were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code and absent any showing of any pre-nuptial agreement, their property
relations were governed by the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
ABEJON G.R. No. 215820, March 20,
2017
Deed of Sale involving the subject land was
done in 1992. However, Teresita Abejon was
apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990. As
such, she knew all along that the Deed of Sale
was void (signature of Pedro was forged) and
would not have operated to transfer any
rights over the subject land to her name.
Despite such awareness, Abejons still
proceeded in constructing a building thereon.
Indubitably, they should be deemed as
builders in bad faith. On the other hand,
Delos Santos knew of the defect in the
execution of the Deed of Sale from the start,
but nonetheless, still acquiesced to the
construction of the building thereon. Hence,
they should likewise be considered as
landowners in bad faith.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
a 3-storey building worth 2 million on the subject land. However, Erlinda (petitioners) refused to acknowledge the
sale on the ground that the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was forged since Pedro died in 1989. As such, Abejons
demanded petitioners to return the amount of ₱150,000.00 (consideration for the sale) and 2 million (building
construction cost), but to no avail. Thus, Abejons filed a complaint for cancellation of title with collection of sum of
money.
In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious Deed of Sale. They likewise asserted that
Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject land to Teresita Abejon and did not receive any demand for the payment of
the loan as well as the construction of the building.
The RTC ruled that Abejons should be reimbursed for the amount of the loan, as well as the expenses incurred for the
construction of the building in view of Delos Santos‟ categorical admission of their indebtedness to her. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Whether or not Abejons are entitled to the amount of ₱100,000.00 (loan) and 2 million (building construction cost)
Therefore, the loan obligation is chargeable to their conjugal partnership.
While the portion attributable to Pedro was not considered extinguished by
his death, it is merely passed on to his estate; and thus, his heirs, i.e., herein
petitioners, could not be held directly answerable for the same. Furthermore,
respondents have the option to either file a personal action for collection of
sum of money or institute a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
These remedies are alternative, meaning the choice of one will operate to
preclude the other.
As to the construction cost of the 3-storey building
This case involves a situation where the landowner (Delos Santos) is
different from the owner of the improvement built therein, i.e., the three (3)-
storey building (Abejon). Thus, there is a need to determine whether they
are in good faith or bad faith.
It bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject
land was done in 1992. However, Teresita Abejon was apprised of Pedro's
death as early as 1990. As such, she knew all along that the Deed of Sale was
void (signature of Pedro was forged) and would not have operated to
transfer any rights over the subject land to her name. Despite such
awareness, Abejons still proceeded in constructing a building thereon.
Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad faith. On the other
hand, Delos Santos knew of the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale
from the start, but nonetheless, still acquiesced to the construction of the
building thereon. Hence, they should likewise be considered as landowners
in bad faith.
Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and
the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if
both of them were in good faith. Whenever both the landowner and the
builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in bad faith, pursuant to the
afore-cited provision), the landowner is given 2 options under Article 448,
namely: (a) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after
reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful
expenses under Articles 546 and 548; or (b) he may sell the land to the buyer,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in
which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
Applying the rule in this case, under the first option, Delos Santos may
appropriate for themselves the three (3)-storey building on the subject land
after payment of the indemnity. Under this option, Abejons would have a
right of retention over the building as well as the subject land until
petitioners complete the reimbursement. Under the second option,
petitioners Delos Santo may sell the subject land to respondents Abejons at
a price equivalent to the current market value thereof. However, if the value
of the subject land is considerably more than the value of the building,
respondents cannot be compelled to purchase the subject land. Rather, they
can only be obliged to pay petitioners reasonable rent. Thus, the instant case
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et
al. G.R. No. 179518. November 19, 2014.
THIRD DIVISION. Velasco, Jr., J.
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted and sown without right to
indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the
work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price
of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146259 September 13,
2007
FLORENTINO, TROADIO and
PEDRO, all surnamed OCHOA,
petitioners,
vs.
MAURO APETA and APOLONIA
ALMAZAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Good faith is an intangible and abstract
quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition, and it encompasses,
among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design to
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Garcia (Garcia), doing business under the name Trans American Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), agreed to the sale of
the aforementioned property subject to the conditioned that Garcia shall cause the reconstitution of the original title.
Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the original owner’s copy of TCT 156254 and other related
documents. Unknown to Yap and Vicente, Garcia took possession of the property and advertised the construction and
sale of "Trans American Townhouse V" thereon. Later, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed
upon.
Thereafter, Yap and the Sanchezes filed before the RTC in Quezon City a Complaint dated for the rescission of
contract, restitution and damages with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction against TSEI and Garcia. Meanwhile,
Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of TCT 156254 and its replacement with TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI
and use such to entice buyers who to buy the townhouse units being constructed by TSEI on the subject lot.
Furthermore, Garcia was able to convey parts of the property to several buyers who intervened in the instant case: the
spouses Jose and Visitacion Caminas (Caminas), Reynaldo V. Maniwang (Maniwang), Generoso C. Tulagan
(Tulagan), Varied Traders Concept, Inc. (VTCI), and Arturo Marquez (Marquez).
The RTC ruled that anent the rights of intervenors, the Sanchezes to have a better right over the subject property
considering that the transactions between Garcia/TSEI and the intervenors suffered from several irregularities, which
they, the intervenors, in bad faith, ignored.
Whether or not the Sanchezes and Yap are entitled to the remedies provided in Article 449- 450 of the Civil Code.
Since 1910, the above-named petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying Lot No. 1580
consisting of 886 square meters situated in Malaban, Biñan, Laguna. The lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
They built their houses and apartment building thereon.
Sometime in May 10, 1982, Mauro Apeta and Apolonia Almazan, respondents, found that they are the true owners of
Lot No. 1580 being occupied by petitioners.
On January 22, 1988, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. B-2777. Respondents alleged in
the main that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1580 covered by Certificate of Title No. RT-599 (10731) issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
In their answer to the complaint, petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that they
are the owners of Lot No. 1580 as shown by TCT No. T-40624 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
is remanded to the court a quo for the purpose of determining matters
necessary for the proper application of the afore-cited provisions.
Yes. The Sanchezes are to elect their option under the Arts. 449-450 of the
New Civil Code. The bad faith on the part of TSEI, Garcia and the intervenors
leads to the application of Articles 449- 450 of the New Civil Code.
Consequently, the Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the
property with the townhouses and other buildings and improvements that
may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand
from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property
at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay
the price of the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these
options within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the
Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case shall
be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market
value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
If the Sanchezes decide to appropriate the townhouses, other structures and
improvements as their own pursuant to Article 449 of the Civil Code, then
the intervenors-purchasers Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, Marquez and
VCTI shall be ordered to vacate said premises within a reasonable time from
notice of the finality of the decision by the Sanchezes. They have a right to
recover their investment in the townhouses from Garcia and TSEI. If the
Sanchezes do not want to make use of the townhouses and improvements
on the subject lot, then the purchasers can be ordered to demolish said
townhouses or if they don’t demolish the same within a reasonable time,
then it can be demolished at their expense. On the 3rd option, if the
Sanchezes do not want to appropriate the townhouses or have the same
demolished, then they can ask that the townhouse purchasers pay to them
the fair market value of the respective areas allotted to their respective
townhouses subject of their deeds of sale.
NO
petitioners’ contention that respondents’ action has been barred by
prescription, suffice it to state that no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary
successors of the registered owner, because they step into the shoes of the
decedent and are merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in-interest.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that respondents are
the true and lawful owners of Lot No. 1580. Hence, they "should now be
placed in possession thereof."
Parenthetically, considering that petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest have built their houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580,
should respondents be allowed to take possession of those improvements?
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of one’s right,
ignorance of a superior claim and absence of
intention to overreach another.9 Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
were in good faith when they built their
houses and apartment building on Lot No.
1580 since they were convinced it was
covered by their TCT No. T-40624.
Under the foregoing provisions, the
landowner can make a choice - either by
appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to
pay the price of the land. The choice belongs
to the owner of the land, a rule that accords
with the principle of accession that the
accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around. He must choose only one.
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE
NAZARENO and LETICIA
NAZARENO TAPIA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, et.al.
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996, ROMERO,
J.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature. When a land was not formed solely by
the natural effect of the water current of the
river bordering said land but as a
consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it man-made accretion
and, as such, part of the public domain.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
During the proceedings before the RTC, upon agreement of the parties, the trial judge commissioned Engr. Romulo
Unciano of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a resurvey of the disputed property. The result of the
resurvey (approved by the Bureau of Lands) shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners, was registered in the
name of Margarita Almada, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest; and that the lot covered by TCT No. T-40624 is not
Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. This lot
has been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.
On March 24, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, CA affirmed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its Hence, the instant
petition.
Whether or not Lot No. 1580 belongs to the petitioners and that respondents’ action is barred by prescription.
Petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed as a result of sawdust dumped
into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river by Sun Valley Lumber Co. Private
respondents Jose Salasanan and Reo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from Petitioner
Antonio Nazareno. For refusal to pay rentals, respondents were ejected.
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion
area being claimed by him. However, it was protested by private respondents. The petitioners claim that the subject
land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not Article 457 of The Civil Code applies
In order to settle this matter, we should determine whether petitioners were
builders in good faith.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning
or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek
an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry.8 The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim and absence of intention to
overreach another.9 Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.10
Using the above parameters, we are convinced that petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest were in good faith when they built their houses and
apartment building on Lot No. 1580 since they were convinced it was
covered by their TCT No. T-40624.
Under the foregoing provisions, the landowner can make a choice - either by
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the
land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. He must choose only
one.
Following the above provisions, respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580,
may choose between appropriating as their own the houses and apartment
building constructed thereon by petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest by paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging petitioners to
pay the price of Lot No. 1580 which is not more than that of the
improvements.
No. The following requites should all concur in order for accretion to apply
as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast).
Petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders,
soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual
and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. Absence of the first and second
requisites, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997
Alluvium must be deposited on the portion of
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river
bank.
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES,
ALUDIA ROBLES AND EMILIO
ROBLES,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES VIRGILIO
SANTOS AND BABY RUTH
CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA,
INC., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO
PALAD JR. IN
HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, AND JOSE MAULEON IN
HIS CAPACITY AS
DISTRICT LAND OFFICER OF THE
BUREAU OF LANDS,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 123509, 14 March 2000,
Panganiban, Third Division
It is a fundamental principle that a co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent any
clear repudiation of the co-ownership
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. The Director of Fisheries, gave due
course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau
of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of
land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in
Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered
has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay. He was a lessee and in
possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and
confirmed by the Office of the President and also that he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a
fishpond.
Is land be considered as foreshore land?
Leon Robles primitively owned a land which he occupied the same openly and adversely as early as 1916 and paid its
taxes. When Leon died his son Silvino Robles inherited land, took possession and paid taxes. Upon Silvino’s death, his
widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property, took adverse possession and paid taxes. However,
the task of cultivating the land was assigned to Lucio Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to
their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, the tax declaration in Silvino’s name was canceled and transferred Hilario Robles and his wife. In 1966,
Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. When the
mortgage debt was unpaid, it was auctioned for sale and Rural Bank was the highest bidder. Consequently the
spouses Robles failed to redeem property. Thus, title was transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Then Rural Bank sold
the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
In 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. The spouses
Santos also took possession of the property and secured a free patent in their names. Hence a petition for quieting of
title to the land was filed.
Will the petition prosper?
Article 457 excludes all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. When a land was not formed solely by
the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but as
a consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
Yes. The third requisite of accretion is absent in the case at bar. It states that
alluvium must be deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is
adjacent to the river bank.
Here private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies the disputed land where
before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed
to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium
should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western
boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or
on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private
respondents’ own tract of land on the northern side. Hence, the land which
is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an
accretion caused by the action of the two rivers
Yes. Ostensibly, the CA failed to consider irregularities in the transactions
involving the disputed property.
First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel in 1962, there was no
instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer from the heirs of
Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the petitioners are
alleging continued possession of the property.
Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario, to whom petitioners had
entrusted the payment of the land taxes.
Third, considering that the subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel
to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and infact declared
in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able to sell it to Spouses Hilario and
Andrea in 1966?
Lastly, inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of
Cardona, Inc., did not observe due diligence in determining Hilario's title
thereto.
Contrary to the disquisition of the CA, Hilario effected no clear and evident
repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET
AL. VS. CA AND CAMILO AVILES,
G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996,
PANGANIBAN, J.
The court cannot, in an action for quieting of
title, order the determination of the
boundaries of the claimed property, as that
would be tantamount to awarding to one or
some of the parties the disputed property in
an action where the sole issue is limited to
whether the instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding involved
constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’
interest or title in and to said property. Such
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. In fact he mortgaged the same
with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank. When the property was inspected by a bank representative,
Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property
and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction but this
was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name.
On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an
area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes,
thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Will the remedy of quieting of title apply for settling a boundary dispute?
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favour of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property;
neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment
thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of
entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership.
As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to
alienate his share, as he in fact did.
As to the REM, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. In the present
case, it is apparent that Hilario was not the absolute owner of the entire
subject property; and that the CRB, in not fully ascertaining his title thereto,
failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith2.
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed
property not as absolute owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged
to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his undivided
share therein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos
spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the
entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the
bank, only to what legally pertains to the latter — Hilario's share in the
disputed property.
No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. To avail
of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or
casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest
in real property.
However, the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and
his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest), in
which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon,
and the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda.
de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale are in no way
documents that constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
determination of boundaries is appropriate in
adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and
where evidence aliunde, other than the
"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding" itself, may be introduced. An
action for forcible entry, whenever warranted
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within
the prescribed period, may be availed of, in
which proceeding the boundary dispute may
be fully threshed out.
JENESTOR B. CALDITO and MARIA
FILOMENA T. CALDITO vs. ISAGANI
V. OBADO and GEREON V. OBADO
G.R. No. 181596, January 30, 2017
The respondents have been in possession of
the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an
owner for almost 42 years. This period of time
is sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive
prescription over the property on the
respondents. As such, it is immaterial now
whether the respondents possessed the
property in good faith or not.
The Calditos' claim of legal title over the
subject parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of
Sale and Affidavit of Ownership issued by
Antonio cannot stand because they failed to
prove the title of their immediate
predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses
Ballesteros. The Court cannot give full
credence to Antonio's Affidavit of Ownership
for he simply made general and self-serving
statements therein which were favorable to
him, and which were not supported with
documentary evidence. The Calditos' must
present proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate his claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
As early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felipe Obado (Felipe). After Felipe's
death, Paterno Obado (Paterno), whom Felipe treated like his own son, subsequently occupied the subject lot and
continued to pay the realty taxes.
Sometime in 1995, Antonio Ballesteros (Antonio) executed an Affidavit of Ownership narrating his claim over the
subject parcel of land and claiming that the subject lot was co-owned by Felipe with his five siblings, namely: Eladia,
Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa, all surnamed Obado. On the day following the execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership, Antonio and Elena Ballesteros (Spouses Ballesteros) sold the subject parcel of land to the petitioners
Calditos. Eventually, Calditos built a house on the subject lot but the Obados prevented them from completing the
same. This led Calditos to file a complaint for quieting of ownership against the Obados.
The Obados averred that the Spouses Ballesteros were not the owners and possessors of the subject parcel of land.
They maintained that Lot No. 1633 was inherited by their father, Paterno, from its original owner Felipe, and they
have been paying the real property taxes for the entire property. They asserted that the Calditos are buyers in bad
faith since their family had been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 since 1969 and had been in open, peaceful,
and uninterrupted possession of the whole property up to the present or for more than 30 years in the concept of an
owner.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Calditos and upheld the validity of the sale between them and the Spouses Ballesteros.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision on the ground that the Calditos failed to prove the title of Spouses
Ballesteros from whom they obtained the property. The Calditos moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Whether or not the Calditos were able to prove ownership over the subject parcel of land
In fact, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the
boundary between their respective properties.
The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and
the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be
removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to quiet title or to remove
cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
No. The Court concurs with the disquisition of the CA that the petitioners
failed to: (1) prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the
Spouses Ballesteros; and (2) present evidence supporting the claim that Lot
No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe and his siblings, Eladia, Estanislao, Maria,
Severino and Tomasa.
In this case, the Calditos' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title
which has two indispensable requisites, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; find (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the Calditos' cause of action
must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite since
they were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the subject
parcel of land.
On the other hand the Obados' presentation of the tax declarations and tax
receipts which all are of ancient era indicates their possession in the concept
of an owner and their predecessors-in-interests. The tax declarations in the
name of Paterno take on great significance because the Obados can attack
their claim of ownership to that of their father. It is worthy to note that the
Obados‟ father Paterno from whom they inherited the entire Lot No. 1633
paid the taxes due under his name from 1961 to 1989; and subsequently, then
after Paterno‟s death in 2003, respondents Obado paid the taxes due thereon.
Granting without admitting that Felipe's possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot
be tacked with the respondents' possession, the latter's possession can be
tacked with that of Paterno. Thus, from 1961 to the time of the filing of the
quieting of title by the Calditos in 2003, the respondents have been in
possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an owner for almost
42 years. This period of time is sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive
prescription over the property on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial
now whether the respondents possessed the property in good faith or not.
© AYAME NOTES : 21 | P a g e
 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
G.R. No. 179011 April 15, 2013
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO and MARGIE1 LAURON,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J:
A co-owner may bring such an action,
without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the
suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession
for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao,
Iloilo a Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron on the subject lot owned by Lilia, the
petitioner's mother. Sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of
Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of the lot covering an area of one
hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various demands for respondents to vacate the premises and
even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them but the same was unavailing and the petitioner reiterated the
demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January 15, 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully
withhold such possession.
In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not the
owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent
Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in Mildred's name.
On November 14, 2003, the M TC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. Based on the allegations and evidence
presented, it appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of Lilia Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and
that respondents are occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party who may bring the suit in accordance with
Article 487 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action for ejectment under Section
l, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as they are the occupants of the
subject lot which they do not own.
Respondents filed their appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, which rendered its Order and
affirmed the decision of MTC.
The CA issued its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA found that only petitioner
filed the case for ejectment against respondents and ruled that the other heirs should have been impleaded as
plaintiffs citing Section I Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; that the presence of all indispensable
parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power; that when an indispensable part y is not before
The Calditos' claim of legal title over the subject parcel of land by virtue of
the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand
because they failed to prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-
interest, the Spouses Ballesteros. The Court cannot give full credence to
Antonio's Affidavit of Ownership for he simply made general and self-
serving statements therein which were favorable to him, and which were not
supported with documentary evidence. The Calditos' must present proof of
specific acts of ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence
of possession.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the Calditos were not able to
prove equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for
their claim that they merely purchased the same from the Spouses
Ballesteros, the Calditos presented no other justification to disprove the
ownership of the respondents Obado. Since the Spouses Ballesteros had no
right to sell the subject parcel of land, the Calditos cannot be deemed to have
acquired lawful ownership of the land.
Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners.
In Wee v. De Castro, wherein petitioner therein argued that the respondent
cannot maintain an action for ejectment against him, without joining all his
co-owners, we ruled in this wise:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e.,
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M.
Tolentino: A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the
suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and
not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court
declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for
ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
SPOUSES MANUEL AND
SALVACION DEL CAMPO v. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND
HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR.,
G.R. No. 108228, February 01, 2001,
SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING,
J.
Salome's right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute
in accordance with the well settled doctrine
that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another
person in its enjoyment Since Salome's clear
intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot
share in Lot 162, in our view no valid
objection can be made against it and the sale
can be given effect to the full extent.
[ G.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014 ]
EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO AND
ELY B. FLESTADO, RESPONDENTS.
Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the
absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose
of his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits
and other benefits arising from that share,
independently of the other co-owners
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
the court, the action should be dismissed as without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court
could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the respondents.
Whether Petitioner can file the action without impleading his co-owners.
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-
owners of 27, 170 sq. m. lot known as Lot 162 under OCT No. 18047. The lot was divided in aliquot shares among the
eight co-owners.
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took
possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo,
mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. Then three of the eight co-owners
of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged
portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of
Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs
sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and
Salvacion Quiachon.
Is the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid?
Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe were husband and wife. They have two children, Juan Irenea. Juan is
married to Leonarda and they have six children. Irenea on the other hand is married to Santiago Samson and they
have two children, respondents Herminia Samson-Bico and Merlita Samson- Flestado.
Apolonio owned a 29,748 sq.m. parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal that was later inherited by his 2 children. Upon
their death, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners.
In April of 2002, the heirs of Juan (Ballesteros), without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in
favor of petitioner Extra-ordinary Development Corp (EDC) a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property for
P 2,974,800.00. Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a
contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the
existence of coownership over the subject
property. EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to further establish the basis of their
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful
detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late
Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her
parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but
he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which
would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized
the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
Yes. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned
property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment. Since Salome's clear intention was to sell merely part of her
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against
it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only
his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-
owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent
of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey.
Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share
to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to
substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land.
Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of
TCT No. 14566 in Regalado's name in 1977.
As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly establish
their co-ownership over one-half of the subject property.
Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the
subject property through her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing
counsel. Furthermore, Juan testified during the 12 March 2007 hearing that
respondents are co-owners of the subject property. A party may make
judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal
or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.
The Answer submitted by the heirs of Juan, as well as the testimony of Juan
constitute judicial admissions. Well-settled is the rule that a judicial
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
claims.
EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal
and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name. This prompted respondents to file the
Complaint for Annulment of Contract and reconveyance of property with damages. In defense, EDC alleged that it is
a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are
the only heirs of the late Apolonio. On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and
were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received
their share in the down payment made by EDC but they were both unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land.
RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents. The decision stated that respondents and the heirs of Juan are co- owners of the
subject property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one half share of the heirs of
Irenea and thus the sale is null and void; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale when the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one half of the property
sold is owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents were co
owners of the subject property because Herminia informed EDC of such fact through a letter.
CA: Affirmed with modifications. It ruled that The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EDC is not void, but valid, but
only to the extent of onehalf of the subject property or 14,874 square meters, but not as to the other half of 14,874
square meters which is coowned by the respondents. The heirs of Juan were ordered to return to EDC half of the
purchase price.
WON respondents are able to prove co-ownership.
admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take
a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property
he is selling. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation
of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the property sold. Also, Article 1459
of the Civil Code provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must
have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. The
execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
subject property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-
owned by them together with the [respondents], was valid only to the extent
of the former’s undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title or
interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the
[respondents] without the latter’s consent. It is an established principle that
no one can give what one does not have – nemo dat quod non
habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to
sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s rights over the subject property
originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said corporation merely
stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than
what its sellers have. Indeed, a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
Moreover, EDC was given an ample opportunity to be heard through
counsel. The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party
seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and
air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail. 26
It is apparent that despite numerous resetting of the case for EDC, it failed
to appear because of the absence of its counsel. On 3 October 2007, EDC was
required by the court to secure a new lawyer for the next hearing but during
the two hearings that followed, no counsel appeared for EDC. It is of no
moment that on some dates the resetting was on motion of the other parties
to the case. The fact remains that EDC’s counsel failed to appear on 25 April,
25 June, 13 August, 5 November and 5 December 2007. Therefore, EDC was
not deprived of its day in court and he cannot feign denial of due process.
Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the subject
property, we find no error in the appellate court’s ruling sustaining the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but only with respect to the rights of
the heirs of Juan over one-half of the property.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to
freely dispose of his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits
arising from that share, independently of the other co-owners

there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and
Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale
did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership.
As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly
stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from
Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly
transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property
is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has
full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since
Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot
162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be
given effect to the full extent.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully

dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the
co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided
interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the
parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights
as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate
abstract share in the property held in common

G.R. No. 187987 November 26, On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr., Mariano Velez and Carlos Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint praying for 1. YES.
2014 the nullification of the sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of possession A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso
VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages. share in the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and
VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment
MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA Petitioners alleged in that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several parcels of land including the disputed Lot. provided that no personal rights will be affected. This is evident from Art.
CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR No. 43897 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land 493 of the Civil Code.
CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN against the petitioners and other co-owners. On 13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a compromise
CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG agreement signed by the parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the
VELEZ, Petitioners, the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the agreement right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is
vs. was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Pursuant to their mandate, the petitioners inspected the truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a co-owner who
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third
VELEZ, Respondents. virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by petitioner that as a consequence of person in its enjoyment.
DECISION what they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid.
PEREZ, J.:
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of
Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a

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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his
undivided and proindiviso share in the co-
owned property. He has the right to alienate,
assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of
substituting a third person in its enjoyment
provided that no personal rights will be
affected. This is evident from Art. 493 of the
Civil Code.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-
owners have no right to enjoin a co-owner
who intends to alienate or substitute his
abstract portion or substitute a third person
in its enjoyment
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
The petitioners prayed inter alia that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale of a definite
portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect. They further argue
that Lapinid, as the successor-in-interest of Jesus, is also bound by the 2001 judgment based on compromise stating
that the parcels of land must be sold jointly by Jesus, Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds of the sale be divided
among the co-owners. To further strengthen their contention, they advance the argument that since the portion sold
was a definite and specific portion of a co-owned property, the entire deed of sale must be declared null and void.
Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involving several parcels
of land including the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted that as early as 6 November 1997, a motion was
signed by the co-owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-
owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other lots be divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of
Torres. Jesus further alleged that even prior to the partition and motion, several co-owners in his group had already
sold their shares to him in various dates of 1985, 1990 and 2004. Thus, when the motion was filed and signed by the
parties on 6 November 1997, his rights as a majority co-owner (73%) of Lot No. 4389 became consolidated. Jesus
averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot was already adjudicated in his favor. He clarified
that he only agreed with the 2001 Compromise Agreement believing that it only pertained to the remaining parcels of
land excluding Lot No. 4389.
On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of
land with an area of 3000 square meters. However, he insisted on the validity of sale since Jesus showed him several
deeds of sale making him a majority owner of Lot No. 4389. He further denied that he acquired a specific and definite
portion of the questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does not mention any boundaries or
specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters
conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners.
Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but the same was already
dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers, including
Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the
property.
On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the CA. It validated the sale
and ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and
Lapinid.
Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments posited before the lower courts.
1. Whether Jesus can validly sell the property in question
2. Whether the aforementioned compromise agreement is binding upon Lapinid.
transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the
execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected,
the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus
as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in
common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid
eventually became a co-owner of the property.
Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the
disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite
portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
No individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition
of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or
alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share
before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null
and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share,
subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their
consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. Consequently,
whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-
owned property, the sale remains validly executed.
2. YES.
The validity of sale being settled, it follows that the subsequent compromise
agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the already accrued
right of ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus. As early as 9
November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property and
thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by the other co-owners. The judgment
based on the compromise agreement, which is to have the covered properties
sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the proportionate
share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise
agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent, said agreement could
not have affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell
Lapinid’s share absent his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet – "no one can
give what he does not have."
This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent tothe sale. This is because the sale or
other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common.
The Court also found unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay
rental payments to the other co-owners. As previously discussed,
Lapinid,from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to
enjoy the property held in common, including those under Arts. 486 and 493
of the Civil Code. Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court
of Appeals that:
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
G.R. No. 210252
June 16, 2014
VILMA QUINTOS vs. PELAGIA I.
NICOLAS
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable
title or ownership over the property
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or efficacy. In the case at bar, the
CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause
of action must necessarily fail mainly in view
of the absence of the first requisite.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away, leaving to their 10 children
ownership over the subject property. An action for partition was subsequently brought before the RTC. However, for
failure of the parties and their counsels to appear despite due notice, the case was dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10
siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds issued a new one. The respondents
subsequently sold their 7/10 undivided share in favor of the spouses Candelario.
The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the respondents.
Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one
of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an
admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido
and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario
had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios
accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by
way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings were entitled to their respective
shares and that the subsequent transfer of interest in favor of the respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.
Likewise, the court ordered the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses
Candelarios.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the
property.
x x x Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over
the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being
that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same. From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid,
who is already a co-owner, be ordered to pay rental payments to his other
co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the property owned in
common must be respected despite opposition and may not be limited as
long he uses the property to the purpose for which it is intended and he does
not injure the interest of the co-ownership.
The petition is meritorious in part.
1. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the
property
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. In the case at bar, the CA
correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail
mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.
Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of
the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005,
entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over
the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of
evidence
2. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot
defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is
Article 494 of the Civil Code.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted
to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI &
PURIFICACION SERASPI v. COURT
OF APPEALS and
SIMEON RECASA
G.R. No. 135602, 28 April 2000,
Mendoza, J.
Real actions over immovables prescribe
after thirty years. Good faith consists in
the reasonable belief that the person
from whom
the possessor received the thing was its
owner but could not transmit the
ownership thereof
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
The lots in question were originally owned by Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in Barangay Lapnag, Banga,
Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts to his
corresponding heirs in his Three (3) marriages during his lifetime.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share to Dominador Recasa
(representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950, Dominador sold their share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being the security, however,
they failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and subsequently
sold the same to Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who allowed Quirico to administer the same.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelino’s heir by his third marriage) took advantage of the fact that
Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter filed a case against Simeon
Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA reversed on appeal.
Whether there was acquisitive prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa?
amended by a procedural rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the
New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that
Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to
the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent
on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.
In the case at bar, the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently,
there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the
partition of the property through counterclaim.
3. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses
Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated
in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the agreement was a
falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. It,
therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes
of partitioning the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court.
No, there was no acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may
be ordinary or extraordinary. In the case at bar, respondent claim ordinary
prescription through adverse possession of the property for more than Ten
(10) years under Art. 1134 of the Civil Code.
However, for purposes of prescription, respondent was not able to prove his
just title or good faith required by acquisitive prescription, as he did not
acquire possession of the property through the modes recognized by the
Civil Code for acquisition of ownership or other real rights, namely:
1. Occupation
2. Intellectual creation
3. Law
4. Donation
5. Succession
6. Tradition in consequence of certain contracts
7. Prescription
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
CATAPUSAN vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. 109262 – November 21, 1996
The tax declarations of neighbors stating that
Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not
conclusive, so as the testimonies of the
neighbors that they saw him working on the
lot. As oppose to the tax declarations of the
respondents showing they own the land
VERDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 109972 – April 29, 1996
The right to redeem spawned from the non-
disclosure of the sale to all co-owners when
the sale is in favor of a third person. In fact,
written notice is required under Article 1623,
and the redemption period is 30 days from
receipt of such notice.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga Piguing, their (4)
children are the private respondent in the case at bar. Narcissa died in 1910, Bonifacio got married for the second time,
and the children in the second marriage are the petitioners in this case.
Bonifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in 1974, petitioners filed an action for partition of the lot in question
located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners claim that the Wawa Lot is the property of their father (Bonifacio) therefore
it is co-owned by the heirs of the first and the second marriage. As proof of their claim, they have presented tax
declarations of the four (4) adjacent land owners stating in such document that the owner of the subject lot is
Bonifacio Catapusan. Witnesses were also presented and testified that they saw Bonifacio working on the lot.
Respondent on the other hand, argues that the Wawa lot was originally owned by Dominga Piguing and
inherited by Narcissa Tanjuatco as her paraphernal property; hence petitioners have no right over the lot. As
evidence, they’ve presented tax declarations in their names and also alleged that they have been in open, continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more than 50 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents declaring them as owner of the property, and such decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for Attorney’s fees.
Whether Bonifacio is the owner of the lot?
Macaria Atega was married twice during her lifetime, first with Angel Burdeos, and second with Canuto Rosales. She
owned a land in Butuan City about 248 sq. m., Macaria died in 1956.
The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who purchased the lot in question for P23,000.00 from heirs of
Macaria’s son (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife of the deceased David Rosales who died some time after
his mother Macaria died) found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to Verdad, she sought intervention of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of P23,000.00 was refused because the current value of the
property is higher.
Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired
by occupation, nor can respondent claim that he acquired his right through
succession because he was an heir to the original owner, remember that the
property was validly partitioned and the subject lots are not part of those
which he inherited, and lastly, he cannot be considered in good faith as he
entered the property without the knowledge and permission of the original
owner, thus making him a mere usurper.
When the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the
former has the right of action against the latter fir the recovery of the
property and such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the
property and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
*1974-1983 in only 9 years.
No, He is not an owner.
The tax declarations of neighbors stating that Bonifacio is the
owner of the lot is not conclusive, so as the testimonies of the neighbors that
they saw him working on the lot. As oppose to the tax declarations of the
respondents showing they own the land.
Possession by mere tolerance cannot ripen into ownership even if such
possession have been for a long period of time. Also, the declaration of
ownership made by the RTC in favor of respondents is proper because
ownership must be decided first before partition may be granted.
Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make the redemption.
Even if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is an heir to David
Rosales who inherited a share of his mother’s estate.
Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate
descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate and their descendants,
whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under article 1001.
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
TABUSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 108558 – June 21, 2001
The totality of evidence presented leans
heavily in favor of herein private respondents.
They have been able to adduce evidence which
support their claim that they have been in
open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession for more than 60 years. Also, in
view of the size of the land which is 11,927
square meters, it is unbelievable for an alleged
owner such as Tabuso to build only a
“barong-barong” (small house) in the lot,
which was latter shown to be allowed by mere
tolerance by a letter addressed to plaintiff
asking them to vacate the property within 3
months time.
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C.
CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN,
and the Heirs of JULIET B. PULKERA,
Petitioners,
vs.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
October 16, 1987, no settlement was reached, thus a case was filed by Socorro (private respondent) for
“Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction”, which the RTC denied stating that redemption period already
lapse.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the right to redeem
the property.
Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales is capacitated to redeem the property even if she is only
related by affinity to Macaria Atega and not an heir?
The lot in question is an unregistered parcel of land in Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square meters,
which latter turned out to be in fact 11,927 square meters.
A case was initiated to declare ownership of the land in question. Herein petitioners claim ownership of
the land through succession from Ignacio Montes and presented tax declarations from 1944 – 1947 in the name of
Ignacio Montes, but were only paid in 1981. Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claim to be a successor in interest of Andrea
Elaba (daughter of Maria Montes [Maria is the Sister of Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house built on the lot by
Marcelo Tabuso (father of Andrea Tabuso).
Private respondent however, alleged that the land was originally owned by Maria Montes, but she
donated it to Isabel Elaba as supported by a document executed on September 24, 1923, thereafter Isabel sold the lot to
Esteban Abad in 1948. Various tax declarations were also presented by respondent showing that from 1948 – 1982 tax
has been paid on the lot by respondent’s predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban Abad. Also, part of the lot is
being rented by one Valentin Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir of Esteban) as evidenced by a lease contract.
During trial, petitioners also presented as witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Gonzales, who
testified that he owns a lot adjacent to the land in question and that he have personal knowledge that the land in
question had been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad.
RTC ruled that owner of the property is the respondents, which was upheld by the CA on appeal.
Whether the CA was correct in declaring respondents as owner of the land in question?
Carmeling Crisologo, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican , filed her complaint for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas
L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of and covered by, two (2)
certificates of title; that the properties were covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty
The right to redeem spawned from the non-disclosure of the
sale to all co-owners when the sale is in favor of a third person. In fact,
written notice is required under Article 1623, and the redemption period is
30 days from receipt of such notice.
In the case at bar, no notice was given, hence, the 30 day period
stared from the time of discovery of the sale on March 30, 1987, and stayed
by the proceedings in the Punong Tagapamayapa.
There was clear intent to redeem at that time but the offer was rejected by
Verdad.
Yes, Court of Appeals was correct.
The totality of evidence presented leans heavily in favor of
herein private respondents. They have been able to adduce evidence which
support their claim that they have been in open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession for more than 60 years. Also, in view of the size of
the land which is 11,927 square meters, it is unbelievable for an alleged
owner such as Tabuso to build only a “barong-barong” (small house) in the
lot, which was latter shown to be allowed by mere tolerance by a letter
addressed to plaintiff asking them to vacate the property within 3 months
time.
Also, petitioners are bound by the testimony of Atty. Gonzales
even if he is counsel for the private respondent because he was presented by
the plaintiff themselves as hostile witness.
Petitioners’ possesses the land as mere holders, distinguished
from possession in the concept of an owner, being a mere holder
acknowledges another superior right over the property he possess.
*Petitioners also raised an issue regarding the adjudication of
11,927 square meters to private respondent when the tax declarations only
state 3,267 square meters. This is untenable, because what defines a piece of
land is not the numerical data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or
“metes and bounds” specified in its description as enclosing the land
indicating its limits.
The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over the
subject parcels of land.
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
CARMELING CRISOLOGO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
In the case at bench, the records show that the
subject parcels of land were registered on
August 24, 1967. The titles are, thus,
considered valid although subject to the
conditions set. But whether or not Crisologo
complied with the said conditions would not
matter because, this would be a collateral
attack on her registered titles.
At any rate, petitioners, as private
individuals, are not the proper parties to
question the status of the respondent’s
registered titles. The Solicitor General shall
institute such actions or suits as may be
necessary to recover possession of lands
covered by all void titles not validated under
this Decree."
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA
and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
petitioners, vs.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE,
respondent. [G.R. No. 137944. April 6,
2000, PANGANIBAN, J.]
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
taxes on the said properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered,
occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their
houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican
personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their
structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for; that despite several
demands they were not able to pay and or vacate.;
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1,
Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court., that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions
provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had
been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith.
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such, had declared
these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes thereon. It stated that with
Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land, hence appealed was made with the RTC
which reversed and set aside the MTCC ruling.
Appeal to the CA was made. It held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels of land. It
explained that her possession was established when she acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and when the
certificates of title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her payment of realty taxes due on
the said properties since 1969 further strengthened her claim of possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican as
administrator of the subject properties and her offer to sell the lots to the petitioners showed that she had control over
the same. Accordingly, the CA concluded that Crisologo’s right to remain in possession of the subject lots should be
preferred over the petitioners’ possession regardless of the actual condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners, who
used force in occupying her properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her lawful possession of the subject
parcels of land.
Who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.
Both contending parties claim that they have a superior possessory right over the disputed lands.
Prior to 1954, the land situated in Bangad, Binangonan Rizal was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of Honorata Bolante. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit,
the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared
in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. Margarito also has three children,
namely: petitioners Fernanda and Ruperta, and Miguel Mendoza.
independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration
of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership,
the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has
the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of titles in Section 1
of P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute.
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees of registration and
certificates of title within the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that sweeping. The said
provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before
July 31, 1973shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall
be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners"
upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject title is not within
any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military or
otherwise, as certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2)
compliance by the titleholder with the payment to the Republic of the
Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within the required
period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were
registered on August 24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although
subject to the conditions set. But whether or not Crisologo complied with the
said conditions would not matter because, this would be a collateral attack
on her registered titles.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to
question the status of the respondent’s registered titles. The Solicitor General
shall institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession
of lands covered by all void titles not validated under this Decree."
The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the
subject parcels of land.
Admissibility of the Affidavit
The affidavit is inadmissible. Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the
affidavit was not the best evidence of their father's ownership of the disputed
land, because the "affiant was not placed on the witness stand."
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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie
proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid.
Coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, they may become the basis of a claim
for ownership. By acquisitive prescription,
possession in the concept of owner -- public,
adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted -- may
be converted to ownership. On the other
hand,
mere possession and occupation of land
cannot ripen into ownership.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Honorata is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, in 1975, Honorata and Miguel, during the cadastral
survey, had a dispute on the ownership of the land. After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment, declaring that
the parcel of land covered by a tax declaration in the name of Margarito belong to his heirs, and ordering respondent
Honorata to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit
allegedly signed by the Honorata and her mother had not been sufficiently established. It also held that the
probative value of petitioners tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with Honorata’s proof of ownership
of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave
her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
1. Is the affidavit presented by the petitioners admissible in evidence?
2. Who enjoys the preference of possession?
3. Does "actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession by respondent of
the land since 1985" prove ownership of a land?
4. Who has acquired ownership the over of the disputed land?
They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to establish the
authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against respondent's
interest and was an ancient document.
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered
as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved first. In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the
respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the
affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the
declarant is available to testify as a witness. The affidavit cannot also be
considered an ancient document because such document must on its face
appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how
the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado (Honorata’s mother) could have
been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an
illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling.
This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity. Furthermore, the
affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land
was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself,
an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Preference of Possession
Respondent Honorata enjoys preference of possession. Petitioners contend
that respondent came into possession through force and violence, contrary
to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not
lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force
or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if
physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who
can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such
possession.
HOWEVER, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the
respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’
father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the
respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father
(Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso
died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his
son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued
residing on the lot. When respondent came of age, she paid realty taxes for
the years 1932- 1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in
1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA,
the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being
tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred
possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer
period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only
in 1952.

Possession of Better Right

NO. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely
disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one who is
disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto
by the means established by law.

Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different
from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the
ways provided by law.

Issue of ownership
The respondent has acquired ownership over the land. Ownership of
immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed
through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more
than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to
reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband
engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners'
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the
concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts
and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of
actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership
through prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject

land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be
acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility
toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners
cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two
years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire
disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.

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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
SUBIC BAY RESORTS VS
FERNANDEZ GR 193426 September 29,
2014 (559)
Since respondent became the owner of the
chips, he could very well have given them to
Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held them
as "possessors in good faith and for value"
and with "presumptive title" derived from
the respondent
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
An operation was launched by Legenda Hotel and Casino to zero-in on Ludwin whose picture was furnished its
security section. Legenda had CCTV cameras, and said it was unusual for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated
chips.
After playing with his brother (and losing $100.00) only one round of baccarat, the siblings had their chips encashed at
two separate windows. Since the cashiers were apprised of a supposed irregularity, they "froze" the transaction.
Shortly thereafter, Legenda's internal security officers accosted Ludwin and Deoven and ordered them to return the
cash and they complied because they were being pulled away. The two were eventually escorted to private rooms
where they were separately interrogated about the source of the chips they bought. They were held for about seven
hours until the wee hours of the morning, without food or sleep.
Finally, the brothers succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement implicating
Cabrera as the illegal source of the chips.
Respondent thereafter filed civil case for recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner on the
illegally confiscated casino chips.
Regional Trial Court favored Ludwin and Deoven, since there was no dispute that the subject chips were in the
possession of the plaintiff. He claims he got hold of them as payment for car services he rendered to a Chinese
individual. Defendant however, contends that said chips were stolen from the casino
CA held that, applying Article 559 of the Civil Code, respondent had the legal presumption of title to or ownership of
the casino chips.
WON Court erred in ruling that circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of Art. 559 (No.)
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the
disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of
tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership
or possession of the property for which taxes
have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession,
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
Thus, petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
There should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin's
and Deoven's possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in
confiscating the same without basis.
Petitioner's underlying theory is that the subject casino chips were in fact
stolen by its employee Cabrera, then handed over to respondent's brothers,
Ludwin and Deoven, for encashment at the casino; that Ludwin and Deoven
played at the casino only for show and to conceal their true intention, which
is to encash the chips; that respondent's claim that he owned the chips, as
they were given to him in payment of services he rendered to a Chinese
client, is false. These arguments require the Court to examine in greater detail
the facts involved. However, this may not be done because the Court is not
a trier of facts Court subject only to specific exceptions.
CA's conclusion sprang from respondent's admission during trial that the
chips represented payment by a Chinese customer for services he rendered
to the latter in his car shop. The CA added that since respondent became the
owner of the chips, he could very well have given them to Ludwin and
Deoven, who likewise held them as "possessors in good faith and for value"
and with "presumptive title" derived from the respondent
. On the other hand, petitioner failed to convincingly show that the chips
were stolen; for one, it did not even file a criminal case against the supposed
mastermind, Cabrera - nor did it charge Ludwin or Deoven - for the alleged
theft or taking of its chips. There has also been gross violation of
constitutional rights.
Thus, the presumption that a person in possession of personal property is
the lawful owner of the same, pursuant to Art. 559 has not been rebutted.
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