ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the
petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issues: WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
Held:No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law,
indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is
alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects –
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left
to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No.
146738, March 2, 2001
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On
October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000,
the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by
a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP
withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall
be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent
disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent
to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive
Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between
Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation,
the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at
that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called
on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The
inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed
a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also
passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses
of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon
petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto
to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying
the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending
that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers
when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the
Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of
the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial
salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning
real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary,
assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the
effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an
infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and
block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character
of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but
a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.
Gore).
Endencia vs. David, G.R. No. L-6355, August 31, 1953
FACTS:Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a provision that removed
all income tax exemptions of public officers, including that of judges.
Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a case to declare it unconstitutional
before the CFI of Manila. The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and declared the said
provision unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of Internal Revenue, Saturno David, to
refund the income tax collected from the magistrates.
Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the collection of income taxes was a
diminution of magistrates’ compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9, Article VIII of the
1935 Constitution, which states that “members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall receive compensation will not be diminished during their continuance in the
office.”
The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was promulgated precisely because of the
unfavorable reception of the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether Sec. 13 of RA no. 590 is constitutional – YES
RATIO:Congress enacted Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 immediately after the Supreme Court
interpreted Sec. 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Consitution in Perfecto V. Meer, where the High
Court held that the collection of income tax from judges and justices was a diminution of their
compensation. The congressional act explicitly counters the heart of the ruling. Because the
constitution is above every enactment of Congress, it follows that Sec. 13 of RA No. 590
should also be considered null and void.
Moreover, Congress’ enactment of the RA 590 clearly manifests that it has a different
interpretation of of the constitutional provision. This act, however, violates the doctrine of the
separation of powers among the branches of the governmentis and invades the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is that of interpreting and
applying the laws and the Constitution.
Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987
FACTS:Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from
making deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries.
According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a
violation of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased”.
In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are
being decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis.
In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6,
Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to
revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries.
The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to representations
that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. While the question has been resolved, the Court decided to settle the
legal issues through a judicial pronouncement.
ISSUE/HELD:Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES
RATIO:
Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax
This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease
of their salaries during their continuance in office. Further, the deletion of the grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring
the equality of the three branches of government.
Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners.
The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10,
Article VIII further clarified the issue:
Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased”
and that the word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after “decreased”, it is
with the understanding that the salaries of justices are subject to tax. He cited that this is
based on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section
6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states that no salary of
any public officer shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia vs
David were not applicable anymore.
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local
Government Code
Facts:This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute,
Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.
Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of
two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
Case Digest: People vs Nazario
Facts:Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal
taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance
4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a
fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in
question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was
not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being
ambiguous and uncertain2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex
post facto
Held: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond
thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and
maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get
any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin
and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-
payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a
retroactive penalty
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.
PRIMICIA V URDANETA
Facts:On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta
when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The
Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal
Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code
Issues:1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per
general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal
order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is
not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision
at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed
with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour
Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for
banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was
made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial
and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.
Held:Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied
power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to
the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress
in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace
and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
FACTS:Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its
decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals
which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the
name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that
the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the
notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:YES. Petition was granted.
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the
notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.
Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must
strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law
is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus,
the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.
People v. Concepcion
G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)
FACTS:Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-partnership.
Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of
violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not, directly or
indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to
agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No.
2938 approved on January 30, 1921.
ISSUE:W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were
repealed by Act No. 2938.
HELD: In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a
punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends
that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal
prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an
offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not
have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
offenders charged with violations of the old law.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
FACTS:Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided
share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro
Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when
it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking
the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of
the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales
by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision
of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New
Civil Code.
HELD:YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing
was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during
the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in
1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to
“the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-53766
FACTS:The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the services of the law firm of Cruz
Durian &Academia (now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a case for land recovery
against MariaC. Ramos et al
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their appearance as
supervising counsel in the case for land recovery
Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as counsel for the municipality
Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that private counsel only wanted to serve
his native town
Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, who
sustained the ruling of the trial court, thus the case is appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE
WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to represent LGU is correct
RULING
Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes,
Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of
a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has
caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is inconsiderable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them
fit personal Ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have
agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming,
fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to
the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
'interpretation and construction
.There are two specific laws prohibiting private counsels representing the government- Sec.
1683 of the Revised Administrative Code states
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof
are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.”
Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides that the
municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality,
"shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such
powers as may be assigned to him by thecouncil"
Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
“Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”
The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES
to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.
A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia,
allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages.
In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE
TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the confrontation.
Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES.
The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly
makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)."
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's
office.
In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated,
following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law
(Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act
of recording through the tape constitutes an offense.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-
recorders as among the acts punishable.
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing
its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations
“found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press
statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by
the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For
this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test,
the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive
that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with
formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for
and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal
order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, vs.
ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April 12, 2005
Facts:The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable
decision of the latter’s pending case in the Court of Appeals.
Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still
asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer
of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing,
the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the
PAOCC.
During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never had
any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision
came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the
whole incident.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone
and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not
incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was
transacting with complainant.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and
texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
Issue:Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court?
Held: Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text
messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s
pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee
since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence65 which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . .
and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of
said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and
import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s
cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent
may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and
her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.The Court has no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent
in this case.
MAMBA v. GARCIA
Facts:On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal
possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial
Police Command beforethe sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal
Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.Respondent set the preliminary investigation, but the same was
subsequently postponed and reset asrespondent was not present, although the complaining
officers appeared in court.Later, the preliminary investigation was again reset. On the day
before the new date of preliminaryinvestigation, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to
the NBI that at the first scheduled preliminaryinvestigation, the arresting officer demanded
P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador andrespondent judge. As
Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced toP6,000.00.Based on
B
ulatao’s report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge.
Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the
money. Afterhanding the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's
chambers. Upon his signal,the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's court then rushed
to the judge's chambers and arrestedthe two police officers after recovering marked bills in
their possession.After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for
investigation, the latter scheduledseveral hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings wereset on different dates, but respondent did
not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemedto have waived the right to
present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only hiscounter-affidavit
was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who askedpermission to talk
to the two police officers.
Issue:Whether the investigating judge’s reliance on the taped conversation is proper?
Held:The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao
and thetwo police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the
consent of theparties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as
the Anti-Wire TappingLaw, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding.In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in
accordance with theevidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of
improper conduct but of seriousmisconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct which
affects a public officer's performance of hisduties as such officer and not only that which
affects his character as a private individual.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Facts:This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents
and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
GANAAN V IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions
for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait
for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue:W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under
Rep. Act No. 4200
Held:No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement”
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
ALFON
Facts: Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro
Alvarez, prayed before the trial court that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. From the testimonial and document evidence presented,
it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952
at the U.S.T. Hospital. She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents,
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and
Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo
Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When
petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade
up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. Her
scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of
Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition: 1. She
has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; 2. She has been enrolled in the
grade school and in college using the same name; 3. She has continuously used the name
Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this
name
MARIA B. CHING v. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., et al.
506 SCRA 735 (2006)
In line with the policy of the State, the law emphatically prohibits the sale of properties
between spouses.
Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against Maria Ching, praying for the
nullification of the deed of sale and of transfer certificate and the issuance of a new one.
Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real owners of the property involved. They further
contend that it was after their father‘s death that they found out that a contract of sale Ruling:The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
involving the same property has been executed by their father and common-law wife Ching. Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
However, Ching claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who property. Prior to the death of Felix
provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the complaint against Ching, declaring that Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void, fictitious and marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code,
simulated. she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the... plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null and other half
void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405. WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with
ISSUES:Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. 138405, in favor of the Maria costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and
Ching, was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the... property in question recognized. The case is
HELD:The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriage remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to the conjugal opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear Principles:
and convincing proof to the contrary, the court find no evidence on record to conclude A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the
otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania have been estranged spouses during the marriage.
for years and that he and defendant-appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
as common-law husband and wife, there has never been a judicial decree declaring the 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were
dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable not spouses. They... became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years
that the property located at Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the after the deed of donation had been executed
subject property was not conjugal, still the court cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during
property by Joseph, Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
evidence on records that they have been living together as common-law husband and wife. morality require that the... same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
The court therefore finds the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching
null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The purported sale, having been
made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine, undermines the stability of the family, a basic
social institution which public policy vigilantly protects.
CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, GR No. L-28771, 1971-03-31
Facts:The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of
marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after
noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the
latter's stand. Hence... this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court
not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista,[2] by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this
Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The
conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls... within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."[3] Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
Issues:whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.