G.R. No.

L-32477 October 30, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO APOSAGA and CONSTANCIO MONTE, accused-appellants.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Automatic review of the decision dated April 28, 1969 of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in
Criminal Case No. 1625 for murder, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants Francisco Aposaga and
Constancio Monte for the murder of Atty. Jose Barranda.

The victim, who was popularly called "Attorney", was a law practitioner in Cotabato and Agusan. At the time of his
death, he lived in his 36-hectare farm at Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with his common-law wife Gloria
Salongcong and their four children namely, Ruth, Samuel, Ester and Jose, Jr. Gloria had four other children by a
previous liaison, namely, Fe, Noe, Felomena and Fely, all surnamed Cabrera, who were likewise staying with the couple
at their house on the said farm. In the same barrio live the two accused-appellants as well as Sotera Salongcong
Resaba a sister of Gloria, whose house near the highway is about 1/2 kilometers away from the Barrandas', Jesus
Francisco, an ousted ex-tenant of "Attorney" and a nephew of Gloria and Sotera, whose house is also along the
highway; and Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of accused-appellant Aposaga.

Monte was recruited by the deceased from his former employment as security guard of Lianga Industries, Inc. in Tumbis
,Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to be the administrator of his farm. He arrived in Polomolok with his family in July, 1965 and
stayed in a house owned by the Barrandas near their own.

From the house of the Barrandas there were three then as now possible routes to the provincial highway, one passing
through the house of Sotera and Jesus on the General Santos side, another through the house of Aposaga and
Estorque on the Marbel side, and the third was a short cut through a small road, to the highway.

The deceased was last seen alive in the morning of December 13, 1965. lie had summoned Monte to their house at
about six o'clock that morning, and they conferred about the farm. Afterwards, Monte had breakfast with "Attorney's"
family before leaving the house. "Attorney's also left shortly thereafter to go to Dadiangas, taking the second route
(Marbel side) described above. Gloria Salongcong also left the house one minute later for Dadiangas, taking the first
route on the General Santos side, to pass by the house of her sister Sotera to fetch her daughter Fe, who was then
staying with Sotera, to bring her to Dadiangas for her medical examination.

While walking on the trail to the highway, Atty. Barranda was chased by 3 men armed with bolos or knives, who acted
concertedly in hacking or stabbing the victim to death. His lifeless body was later buried inside a dry well, while his
portfolio and personal papers were buried around 300 meters away from the body,

Nothing was mentioned or heard about the death of Atty. Barranda until on January 20, 1966, Pio Francisco came to
Barrio Palkan to barter fish and visit his son Jesus. The latter told his father that he could hardly sleep at night because
he was being "abused" or raided by Aposaga, Monte and alias Calbo, and that these three had killed the attorney. Pio
verified the matter from Sotera Salongcong, who confirmed the killing of the deceased. He decided to report to the
authorities, but waited for the picture of accused Aposaga in the possession of Gloria Salongcong before he made a
report.

Pio first mentioned the matter to a Sgt.Edoria of the Philippine Constabulary when he saw him in front of their house
on January 30, 1966 or 48 days thereafter. Sgt. Edoria immediately brought him, together with Felomena Cabrera, to
the office of Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the 101st PC Company. They showed Sgt. Vargas a newspaper clipping about a
certain Francisco Lozada, who was wanted by the authorities with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of
robbery and murder cases After being told that the wanted man was in barrio Palkan, Sgt. Vargas lost no time in going
to the said barrio, together with other PC soldiers. When they reached the said barrio, Felomena pointed to them the
house of Aposaga. But when he confronted Aposaga, he found out that his name was Francisco Aposaga and not
Francisco Lozada, and that his physical features did not tally with the description in the newspaper clipping. He
therefore returned to headquarters without making an arrest.
At noon of the same day, Felomena Cabrera came to see him again, this time with Jesus Francisco, informing him that
Aposaga was the killer of Atty. Barranda. It was only then that he learned of the murder of Atty. Barranda. He therefore
returned to Palkan with 2 other PC officers to conduct an investigation. when they arrived there, Aposaga was no longer
in his house, having left for Norala to harvest palay, according to his wife. Nevertheless, he proceeded with his
investigation.

On February 1, 1966 he took the statements of Constancio Monte (Exh. "k", pp. 19-20, Folder of Exh. Vol. 1) and his
wife, Bienvenida Ferrer Monte (Exh. "M", pp. 24-25, Folder of Exh. Vol. I), both pointing to Aposaga and Calbo as the
killers, and of Noe Cabrera (Exh. "I ", p. 1, Folder of Exh. Vol. 11), naming Aposaga, Monte and Calbo as the culprits.
Thereafter he filed a motion to exhume the body of the deceased (Exh. "D", p. 10, Folder of Exh. Vol. I).

The examination was conducted on February 2, 1966 in the presence of Dr. Teodoro J. Reyes, municipal health officer
of Polomolok, the PC provincial commander, the chief of police, and members of the Rural Health Unit of Polomolok.
They found the already decomposing body of Atty. Barranda, which was Identified through the Identifying information
furnished by his wife, like the dentures, the clothes he was wearing, his height and built, as well as the I.D. and personal
papers in his wallet and other things found on his body. After the exhumation, they also unearthed the valise or portfolio
of the deceased which was buried about 300 meters away from the body and 15 meters from the house of Jesus
Francisco. The spot was pointed to them by Jesus Francisco himself who admittedly buried the same. The valise
contained the raincoat and other personal things of the deceased. They also recovered a cellophane bag containing
some legal documents and land titles purportedly removed from the bag of the deceased. On the basis of the above, a
criminal complaint dated February 1, 1966 was filed against Francisco Aposaga, alias Calbo, alias Pedoy, Sotera
Salongcong and Constancio Monte (p. 5, CFI rec.).

On February 14, 1966, after more statements were taken, the complaint was amended (p. 4, CFI, rec.), such that the
name of alias Calbo was indicated as Alfredo Villanueva, that of alias Pedoy as Jesus Francisco, and Gloria Salongcong
was included among the accused. Of the six accused named in the amended complaint Aposaga Monte, Villanueva,
alias Calbo, Francisco, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong), Villanueva remained at large and
never faced trial; Gloria Salongcong was ordered excluded from the complaint on June 10, 1966 for insufficiency of
evidence (p. 29, CFI rec.); and Jesus Francisco alias Pedoy was likewise dropped from the complaint on January 10,
1967 upon motion of his counsel (pp. 45-48, CFI rec.) for the purpose of utilizing him as a state witness (p. 54, CFI
rec.); and Sotera Salongcong was also excluded from the complaint upon her own motion (pp. 5051, CFI rec.) on
January 27, 1967. The warrant issued for Gloria Salongcong was therefore recalled, while Francisco and Sotera, who
had been under detention, were ordered released. On August 4, 1967, Jesus Francisco was ordered re-included in the
complaint and a new warrant issued for his arrest (p. 76, CFI rec.). Yet, despite his appearance in court as a witness
for the prosecution, he was never re-arrested. Thus, only Aposaga and Monte faced trial after they waived their right to
the second stage of the preliminary investigation (p. 79, CFI rec.), and an information was filed against them on April
24, 1968 (p. 81, CFI rec.).

After trial, the trial court in its decision (pp. 136-179, CFI rec.) dated April 28, 1969, found the two accused guilty of
murder and sentenced them to the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of ?12,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.

The trial court noted that the evidence for the prosecution suffered from many flaws and some inconsistencies (p. 31,
rec.). Nevertheless, it gave credence to the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses and other corroborative witnesses
for the state.

Noe Cabrera, 13 years old, student, and a resident of Pag-asa, General Santos City, testified that at about six o'clock
in the morning of December 13, 1965, while he was riding his carabao, he saw his stepfather, Atty. Barranda, walking
towards the highway. Paran (Francisco Aposaga) and Calbo (Alfredo or Jessie Villanueva) ran after him. All at once
Paran hacked him in the neck while Calbo thrust his knife at the victim. The deceased ("Attorney") was trying to parry
their blows with the sweater he was carrying. Then Constancio Monte arrived and also hacked the victim. When the
victim stumbled and fell, Monte rode on him and thrust his knife through the victim's stomach. He was just about 25
meters away from them. Later, the two dragged the victim's body to the cogonal area, after which they approached the
witness (Noe), and Paran threatened him that if he should squeal, he and his mother, sisters and brothers were going
to be killed. Monte got the bag carried by the deceased and they left towards the direction of the highway. The witness
went home to eat. His mother was not in the house yet, having left earlier for Dadiangas.

When his mother arrived home in the afternoon, she asked him if he had seen his stepfather, to which he answered
no. She therefore asked him to accompany her in looking around for the victim. They went to the house of Dorot
(Doroteo Estorque) where they saw Dorot, Monte, Paran and Calbo, the wife of Monte, and others, drinking. His mother
made several inquiries about his stepfather.

The wife of Dorot said that Attorney rode a yellow bus going to Marbel. Dorot and his son Vicente also gave the same
information. She asked other persons, who gave negative information. When they went home, Monte and his wife came
also. His mother told them that she was going to San Francisco (Agusan) to look for Attorney. But Monte advised her
not to go any more because there were three persons who came to fetch him to go to Davao. Noe went downstairs.
Monte followed him to borrow his sledge, which he lent to him. Afterwards, he brought his horse to Crossing Palkan to
drink. When he was returning home, he saw Vicente, Calbo and Paran Vicente was riding the carabao while Calbo and
Paran were following the sledge, where the body of their stepfather was loaded. They were going towards barrio Palkan.
He let his horse run and headed for home. He did not tell his mother or his brothers and sisters about the attack on Ms
stepfather because he was afraid. It was only when he was brought to the PC headquarters in Dadiangas that he talked
of the incident for there he was no longer afraid (pp. 5-63, TSN).

Felomena Cabrera, 16 years old, student and residing at Pag-asa, Lagao, General Santos City, testified that she was
living with her mother, stepfather (the victim), brothers and sisters at their house in crossing Palkan on December 13,
1965. In the morning of the said date, her stepfather summoned Monte to their house, and the two talked for sometime.
Thereafter, Monte ate breakfast with them before returning to his house. When he had gone, Attorney prepared to leave
for Dadiangas. He left via their kitchen towards the west to the national highway. One minute later, her mother also left,
leaving her to care for her younger brother. She cooked soup rice. While cooking, she went to the balcony to get her
younger brother. From there she saw Monte running towards the direction of Attorney. She followed him with her eyes,
and saw him hacking her stepfather with two others, namely Aposaga and alias Calbo. She went to the house of Monte
and asked Monte's wife, Bienvenida, why they killed Attorney. Bienvenida answered "because the attorney is a bad
man". The two of them went down towards the road. They met Monte who warned them not to reveal, otherwise they
will kill first Felomena's mother. She just went home and fed her younger brother.

When her mother arrived home that afternoon, she (mother) asked if the Attorney had returned home, to which she
answered in the negative. Her mother then asked Noe to accompany her in looking for the Attorney. The two went out
and were away for more than an hour, while she stayed in the house to take care of her younger brother.

Drawing a sketch, the witness explained the relative position of their house with those of Dorot (D. Estorque), Sotera
and Monte, and the national highway, as well as the three (3) possible routes from their house to the highway (pp. 65-
84, TSN).

On cross-examination, the witness indicated on the sketch prepared by her, the specific spot where she saw her
stepfather being hacked, and where she first saw Monte running. She also described the attacks on her stepfather how
Aposaga hacked him first while he was walking, followed by the thrusting by Monte. She averred that when she later
talked with her brother Noe, they agreed not to tell anyone about what they saw; otherwise they will all be killed starting
with their mother (pp. 85-135, TSN).

Dr. Teodoro Reyes, 51 years old, Municipal Health Officer of Polomolok, South Cotabato, testified that he has been
the Municipal health Officer of Polomolok for more than 10 years. On February 2, 1966, he was fetched by a policeman
of Polomolok to exhume the body of Atty. Jose Barranda. He went to a field about 500 meters north of the residence
of Atty. Barranda, together with a few policemen and PC soldiers. they found the already decomposing body buried in
a well 5 feet deep and about 3 meters in diameter, covered with bloodstained newspapers, a jacket and soil about one
foot deep. He established the Identity of the cadaver as that of Atty. Barranda from the description furnished by Mrs.
Barranda (Gloria Salongcong). Besides, he knew Atty. Barranda when he was still alive as he had been handling cases
in Polomolok. When he examined the body, he found 4 fatal wounds, 3 of which were caused by sharp-bladed
instruments and one by mauling. His findings are embodied in his medico-legal post-mortem certificate (pp. 2-4, Folder
of Exhibits, Vol. 1), as follows:

DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED:

Under this, are other pertinent findings on this cadaver and its clothings which have bearings on the
injuries sustained or direct causes of death. Premise or statement of the General Condition of the
Cadaver during time of examination: The cadaver although in a state of much decay there are still
some or big portions of the skin left specially on the chest, back and abdomen; big portions of muscles
much softened and some parts melting; big portions of abdominal viscerae are inside and soft; and
semi-melted. So also is the condition in the chest,
(a) One stab wound of the right chest, entering into the interspace between the 5th and 6th costal
cartilage. This stab wound coincides with the cut through the polo shirt of the cadaver and that of his
camiseta T-shirt he was wearing. The cut is about four (4) cm. wide, going inside the chest to a depth
of at least five (5) inches. The direction is towards the back. The medial edge of the wound is 2-1/2
cm. lateral to the right lateral border of the typhoid. The width of the cut is parallel to the direction of
the rib. Wide area of old blood stain can be seen on the clothing over the chest, also some part of
the upper abdomen. This is a fatal wound.

(b) A big cross-wise cut of the left upper abdomen, with a length of about five (5) inches, as can be
seen on the intact part of skin of the cadaver, and cut portions of loops of intestine inside. The medial
edge of this cut or wound starts from about the middle portion of the front part of the abdomen going
lateralwards to the left to a length of about five (5) inches. This is a fatal wound.

Remarks: There is no evidence of cut on the clothing, for we found that all the clothings on the left
side of the body were lifted or raised that might have escaped the cutting.

(c) Fracture of the left part of the skull:

Description is divided into the upper portion of the skull and that of the lower mandible or jaw. Upper
portion of the skull:

There is a rounded depressed fracture of the bone beneath the left upper gum, about a ten centavo
coin size. Its medial border is about 1-1/2 inches distant from the center of the upper gum. Also, the
zygomatic process of the left temporal bone is broken (fractured) and detached. That completely
broken piece is still attached only by a ligament.

Lower portion of the skull or lower jaw: The neck of the head (the posterior elevation for articulation)
of the left mandible or left side of the lower jaw is completely fractured, and the head portion is
missing. The fractured head is missing.

The picture taken for this is herewith attached. The back part of this picture is marked 'C'.

Remarks: I honestly believe the deceased was mauled on the left face so hard that caused the fatal
fracture. The rounded depressed fracture is most probably due to the elevated portion or the nail of
the hard object used for mauling. This is fatal The brain cannot escape big injury.

(d) A big cut on the apple green jacket the cadaver is covered (with) [picture taken of said jacket
herewith attached. The back part of the picture is marked "D")

Description: There is about 6-1/2 inch cut of the right shoulder of this jacket going medial-ward and
more on its back portion. The inner shirts on this part are stained with old blood stains. The jacket is
somewhat loose for the cadaver.

Remarks: I strongly and sincerely believe that this cut involved the lower part and the base of the
right side of the neck. It is a big cut. This is a fatal wound.

With the big cut on the jacket the cadaver is covered on its right shoulder area and reaching up to
the base of the right side of the collar, with the corresponding cuts on the inner shirts the cadaver is
wearing, but no evidence of cut could be found on the bones as scapula and right clavicle, simply
means that the big cut involved only the muscles, big blood vessels and vital nerves of the right side
of the lower part of the neck and shoulder area near that side of the neck-in short, the soft tissues
were cut, without cutting the bones (called the hard tissue).

Conclusion: (a) With all honesty and sincerity, it is very definite that the cadaver now exhumed is
Atty. JOSE BARRANDA'S.

(b) The causes of death are mentioned under the item

 DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED.

(c) The causes of death are purely foul play or murder. All the cuts are due to sharp-bladed
instruments; the fracture on the face due to blunt hard object with hard protection on it.

xxx xxx xxx

According to the doctor, the wound described in paragraph (a) was a thrust wound inflicted while the victim was standing
in front of the assailant (p. 219, TSN); the one under paragraph (b) could have been inflicted while the victim was lying
down; the other one under paragraph (c) could have been caused by mauling while the victim was lying down; and the
wound in paragraph (d) was inflicted while the victim was standing, with the assailant at the back of the deceased,
probably ahead of the other wounds (p. 222, TSN).

Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to the 27th Traffic Team, 45 years old, and residing at
Cotabato City, declared (pp. 262-320, TSN) that in 1966 he was assigned to the 101st PC Company at General Santos,
Cotabato, having been transferred thereto since December 1, 1965. He did not know the accused before, and he met
them only on January 30, 1966. He first met Francisco Aposaga on said date when Felomena Cabrera came to his
office with Pio Francisco and Sgt. Edoria to report the presence in their barrio of a certain Francisco Lozada who was
wanted by the police with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of robbery and murder cases. After being
shown a newspaper clipping with a picture and description of Lozada, he went to Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato
with 2 other PC soldiers to verify the report. The house of Aposaga was pointed to them by Felomena when they were
about 300 meters therefrom. Proceeding to said house, they called for Francisco Lozada, but it was Francisco Aposaga
who came and Identified himself as Aposaga, not Lozada. When Sgt. Vargas compared the photo and description of
Lozada from the newspaper clipping to the person of Aposaga, the Description did not tally, as there was no mole, scar
or tattoos at the back of his body. As a result, they returned to the PC headquarters without making an arrest.

After lunch on the same day, Felomena Cabrera showed up again at the PC headquarters with Jesus Francisco, the
son of Pio. Jesus was ask; 'ng him why he released Aposaga when he was the killer of Atty. Barranda. That was the
only time he learned of the death of Atty. Barranda. He lost no time in returning to Palkan. But when he arrived there,
Aposaga was no longer in his house. His wife informed him that Aposaga went to Norala to harvest palay. He (Sgt.
Vargas) proceeded to the house of Monte, who informed him that Aposaga killed Attorney in the morning of December
13 (1965). Sgt. Vargas invited Monte and his wife to the headquarters for investigation. While there, they gave
corroborative statements to the effect that Aposaga and a companion known as Calbo hacked and killed Atty. Barranda
upon inducement by Sotera Salongcong who paid them P 200.00 (Exhs. "K" and "L", pp. 19-21, Folder of Exh. Vol. 1).
He also took the statements of Noe and Felomena Cabrera, then filed a motion to exhume the body, which was actually
done by the municipal health officer in his presence as well as in the presence of their commanding officer, Capt.
Adriano Bulatao the Polomolok chief of police and some other persons.

Jesus Francisco, 36 years old, farmer and resident of Marbel Crossing, Tampacan, Tupi South Cotabato, declared that
on December 13, 1965, he was in his house near Crossing Awas in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Constancio Monte
passed by his house that morning, then left in the direction going to Sulit. At about 6:30 a.m., he went to his sanguta
(where tuba is extracted). He met Sotera Salongcong, who was going to Dadiangas. She gave him P 200.00 from
Francisco Mendez, telling him to deliver it to Aposaga, which he did at the latter's house at about 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock.
Aposaga was then with Constancio Monte and Wilfredo Villanueva, alias Calbo. After that he saw these three again at
about 11:00 a.m. near their house which was near his sanguta. The three told him that Atty. Barranda was already
dead, and gave him the bag of the Attorney with instructions to bury it. In the bag was a cellophane folder containing
papers and documents. He buried the bag in the land of Cestua and kept the papers in the cellophane under a banana
tree. These he did because the trio told him he will be killed if he didn't, which made him afraid. When he asked them
why they killed the Attorney, their answer was "Don't talk". He did not report the matter to the authorities because they
had been threatening him with death if he did so (pp. 322-350, TSN).

The statement of accused-appellant Monte (Exh. "K", pp. 17-18, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I) on February 1, 1966, may
be summarized as follows: that he has been a tenant of Atty. Barranda since July 1965; that sometime in the morning
of December 13, 1965, Atty. Barranda was hacked and killed by Francisco Aposaga and a companion known to him
only as Calbo; that Aposaga told him they were given P 200 by "Suterania" (Sotera) Salongcong; that the latter hired
them to kill Barranda because he had raped Fe Cabrera; that Fe Cabrera confirmed this raping to him; that the cadaver
of Atty. Barranda was thrown into a deep Japanese dug-out somewhere in the farm lot of Alfredo Acejo that Aposaga
used a bolo while Calbo used a knife (flamingo); that at the time of the killing, Barranda was carrying a leather bag
(portfolio) containing land titles and records of cases he was handling; that the said bag was given to Pedoy a nephew
of Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong; and that the said bag was buried while the contents were wrapped in cellophane
and covered by banana leaves among banana plants near the house of Pedoy.

These allegations were mostly reiterated by Monte in Exhibit "L" (pp. 21-23, Folder of Exh. Vol. I ) In addition, he stated
that the killing was plotted by his family, as he accidentally learned when he overheard a conversation between Gloria
and Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong where the latter was saying "If in case somebody went up the house Gloria and
the children will just go upstairs and they will not be disturbed because the purpose is just Atty. Barranda" (sic).

The other prosecution witnesses were:

(1) Gloria Salongcong, the common-law wife of the deceased who narrated that the latter failed to appear at their
appointed meeting in Dadiangas on December 13, 1965, and that she and her son Noe went out to look for him upon
her return to Palkan in the afternoon of the same day (pp. 137-173, TSN).

(2) Pio Francisco, who learned of the slaying of the deceased from his son Jesus on January 20, 1966, and who first
brought it to the attention of the authorities on January 30, 1966 (pp. 187-205, TSN).

(3) Epifanio Doria, the PC sergeant who was first told by Pio Francisco about the killing, and who brought him to the
PC headquarters for the actual reporting (pp. 178-187, TSN).

(4) Sotera Salongcong, who narrated that a certain Francisco Mendez gave her P 200 for delivery to accused Aposaga
without explaining what the money was for, and who delivered it to Aposaga through Jesus Francisco without her asking
for what purpose it was (pp. 230-260, TSN).

The theory of the defense is that the charge is a frame-up on the part of the victim's family, whose members plotted his
murder, with Jesus Francisco as the mastermind and alias Calbo the lone hatchetman. Testifying on their own behalf,
both accused- appellants denied knowledge of and participation in the commission of the crime, and maintained that
they never knew of the death of the deceased until investigations were already under way some two to four months
thereafter.

The testimony of accused-appellant Aposaga, 27 years old, farmer and resident of Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato,
dealt mainly in explaining about his sudden departure from Palkan on January 30, 1966, the date the PC went to his
house. He narrated that when Sgt. Vargas came to his house (the date of which he could not remember), he was
looking for Francisco Lozada. He informed Vargas that his name was Francisco Aposaga and not Lozada. Vargas
examined his body and was convinced that he was a different person. So Vargas left, but not before he told him that
he was going to Iloilo for a vacation. He proceeded to Norala (South Cotabato) that same afternoon. When he reached
Norala, his aunt told him that his mother was sick so he should proceed to Iloilo. Because of such information, he left
Norala hurriedly, taking MV Legaspi at Cotabato City and disembarking in Iloilo. He learned of the murder of Barranda
3 or 4 months later when his wife wrote him informing that he was wanted for the murder. He then went to the PC in
Iloilo, requesting for an escort to Mindanao as he was afraid he might be killed. But the PC in Iloilo could not provide
him with any escort, so he stayed in Iloilo. He visited the PC in Iloilo for about 5 times, until the PC from Polomolok
came to get him. He admitted having been a tenant of the deceased, but denied participation in his killing. He also
denied having received P200.00 from Jesus Francisco. He did not know the person of alias Calbo.

On cross-examination, he stated that he threw away the letter of his wife when he went to the PC because he did not
think it was important. He did not know what was the company or organizational unit of the PC he visited in Iloilo, nor
the name of its commanding officer. He stayed in Iloilo for 8 to 10 months.

His cousin, a certain Jose, who is married to his first cousin Clomia Viana fetched him at Palkan because his mother
was ill. He had to go to Norala, however, to inquire from his aunt, Paz Aposaga, how serious his mother was. His aunt
told him in tears to go home to Iloilo because his mother was serious, per information of the same Jose. He never
received any letter from his parents, brother or sister or any relative from Iloilo asking him to go home (pp. 440-462,
TSN).

Defense witness Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of Aposaga, 58 years old, farmer, and resident of
Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato declared that on December 13, 1965, he and Aposaga were plowing in
the farm lot of the deceased from 6:00 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., stopping only for breakfast and lunch. There was no unusual
incident that transpired on said date, except that in the morning he heard someone call "wait, wait" and saw Gloria
Salongcong coming down their house. At that time Aposaga was 30 meters behind him, also plowing. The place where
they were plowing was about 150 meters from the house of Barranda. He did not see Atty. Barranda that morning. He
only learned about his death through the PC. He knows that Atty. Barranda and Gloria Salongcong usually quarrelled
about Gloria's children because the place he is working is near their house. On cross-examination, he admitted having
subscribed to an affidavit (Exh. "J", p. 16, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1) wherein he had stated that he could not see
Aposaga because of the tall talahibs, but he explained that such answer was wrong and his real answer was, "I cannot
see him when he was covered by talahibs but if we will be out from the talahibs I can see him" (P. 386, TSN).

Vicente Estorque, 20, married, son of Doroteo and brother-in-law of Aposaga and likewise residing at Crossing Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, corroborated his father's testimony about the whereabouts of Aposaga on December 13,
1965. He testified that on that day, he had been plowing from 10:00 A.M. with his father and brother-in-law Aposaga.
In the afternoon he plowed from 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. Afterwards he met Vicente or Jesus Francisco (Pedoy) on his way
home. Francisco borrowed his sledge, so he had to carry his plow on his shoulder because he lent his sledge to
Francisco. The sledge was returned two hours later with bloodstains and with its bamboo breast missing. He could not,
however, recover the missing part because Francisco had been avoiding him. On questioning by the court, he stated
that they did not go back to plow in that field any more (p. 407, TSN); in fact, that land was never planted because
Aposaga left for Panay (p. 409, TSN).

Accused-appellant Constancio Monte, 38 years old, farmer and resident of Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, testified (pp. 463-525, TSN), that he met Atty. Barranda when the latter was a lawyer of Lianga Industry in
San Francisco, Agusan, where he used to work as guard of its bulldozer department. In July of 1965, Atty. Barranda
convinced him to go with him to Palkan, South Cotabato, to be the overseer of his 36-hectare farm, as a condition of
which he need not give any share of the harvest to Barranda as landowner but only to his wife, Gloria Salongcong. In
addition, he (Monte) will get 25% of the proceeds of the 18-hectare land in Matatum which was planted to potatoes and
cabbage, plus P5.00 monthly per head of the carabaos, horses and cattle he was supposed to care for. When he
arrived with his family in Palkan in the same month, Atty. Barranda called for Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco,
his erstwhile tenants, and told them that it was their last day as Monte was taking over. Atty. Barranda instructed him
(Monte) to get the carabao and plow from Jesus Francisco.

In the month of December, Fe Cabrera informed him that she was raped by Atty. Barranda. Sometime later, while he
was under the Barranda's house to fetch the cow, he overheard a conversation among Jesus Francisco, Sotera
Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong, wherein Sotera was saying, "We better have Attorney killed ... so that we can
revenge of what he has done to your child who was being raped (sic).

Early one morning, about the second week of December, 1965 (he could not exactly remember the date), Barranda
called for him to instruct him to take care of the carabaos and cows because he was leaving for Agusan to become a
judge. After their talk, he took breakfast with the Barranda family. Thereafter, he brought the children Ruth, Fely, Samuel
and Noe to his house upon instruction of Atty. Barranda. He went to the toril with Noe to tie the carabao. While there,
Noe told him that Atty. Barranda was leaving. At the same instance he heard someone shouting, "wait for me", and
saw Jesus Francisco running, followed by Calbo. He did not know who Calbo was, but Noe told him that he is from
Polomolok. However, he did not know what transpired afterwards as he did not look anymore. From the toril he could
see Aposaga plowing with Doroteo Estorque. He stayed in the toril for about 30 minutes.

Monte admitted having gone to the PC headquarters for investigation and having executed an affidavit (Exh. "K", p. 19,
Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1); but when he appeared before Judge Mirabueno (municipal court of Polomolok), he was
made to sign by Sgt. Vargas although he told the judge that there was an error. The error was that when he mentioned
the name "Francisco" as the person who hacked and killed the deceased, he meant Jesus Francisco and not Francisco
Aposaga. However, since he had no lawyer then, he did not know how to go about the correction. It was only when
Francisco Aposaga, who is his friend, contacted his lawyer that he was accommodated in his defense by Atty. Velarde,
as he had no money. As for the second affidavit which he executed one week after (Exh. "L", P. 21, Folder of Exhibits,
Vol. 1), he was made to sign the same without appearing before Judge Mirabueno.

On cross-examination, he maintained that he did not know who is Pedoy whose name is mentioned in his affidavit as
the nephew of Sotera Salongcong to whom the killers gave the bag of Atty. Barranda. He denied having been asked
the question and having given the answers found in his affidavits referring to Aposaga. He did not know what he was
signing as he does not know how to read.

Against this background, the trial court promulgated its aforementione d decision on April 28, 1969 and denied the
defense's motion for reconsideration and new trial on May 31, 1969 (p. 200, CFI rec.).
Hence, this appeal.

Appellants now raise only one issue that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They try
to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of the two eyewitnesses which, they claim,
are corrupt, bias, unreliable and incompetent because of their inherent improbabilities" pp. 86, rec.), as shown by the
following circumstances:

A. As to Noe Cabrera

1. If Noe really witnessed the murder of his stepfather, why did he not shout for help (pp. 32-33,
TSN)? Why did he not tell his mother about it when the latter arrived home from Dadiangas and was
asking about the victim (p. 35, TSN)? Why did he have to go with his mother around the barrio to
look for his stepfather if he knew — after having witnessed the killing — that his stepfather was dead
(pp. 15-18, TSN)?

2. If he were really threatened by the culprits (p. 10, TSN) so as to produce fear in him, why did he
have to go riding his horse by himself that evening of the incident (p. 20, TSN)? Why did he consent
to sleep in the house of Monte after the PC arrived to conduct the investigation (p. 23, TSN)? Why
did he continue to visit the houses of Monte and Aposaga after December 13, 1965 (pp. 163-164,
TSN)?

B. As to Felomena Cabrera

1. How could Felomena have witnessed the murder of her step- father from the kitchen of their house
when, according to the PC investigator, Sgt. Vargas, the place of the incident was not visible from
the kitchen or balcony of the Barranda house because it was covered by banana hills, talahibs and
calamansi trees (pp. 301-302, TSN)?

2. Why did she not secretly tell her mother about the incident (p. 72, TSN)?

3. Why was her first report to the PC not about the murder of her stepfather but about the presence
of a certain wanted man in their barrio (p. 264, TSN)? Why did it take her 48 days to make such
report?

WE find the above observations insufficient to warrant the exculpation of the appellants. While it is true that the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses may have suffered flaws and inconsistencies, the same refer only to minor details
which are not sufficient to destroy their credibility. Their actuations after witnessing the commission of the crime (i.e.,
not shouting or running for help, not reporting earlier, etc.), do not indicate that they were not present when the killing
of their stepfather took place. Likewise, the testimony of the PC investigator that the place of the incident is not visible
from the kitchen of the victim's house, because of the presence of banana hills, talahibs and calamansi trees, cannot
overcome the positive assertion of Felomena that she saw her stepfather killed, especially so since the investigation
took place about 50 days after the incident and conditions obtaining them may be different from those at the time of the
offense.

A closer scrutiny of their testimonies shows convincingly that they had indeed witnessed the commission of the crime.
The only doubtful portion is their allegation that they were threatened with death—with their mother the first to be
killed—against revealing it. Because, even if there were such a threat, they could have secretly revealed it to their
mother who would certainly take steps to protect them. Besides, if the danger of the threat was real to them, they should
have stopped going to the houses of the accused, instead of maintaining normal relations with them after the incident;
Felomena should not have gone to the PC headquarters twice on January 30, 1966; and Noe should not have slept in
the house of Monte after his family had gone to Dadiangas to make the report,

These actuations are inconsistent with the reality of the threat. It is easier to believe that they discussed the incident
with their mother but had to deny it to protect her. The maxim "blood is thicker than water" must have prompted these
two (2) eyewitnesses to insist that their mother did not know anything about it. Otherwise, the involvement of their
mother and other close relatives will be an undeniable conclusion.
Besides, the trial court, while noting the same flaws and inconsistencies, gave credence to the testimonies of the said
eyewitnesses who, despite their minority, the excitement generated by the court proceedings and the long and
searching cross-examinations, firmly stuck to their testimonies which pointed to the appellants and a companion known
as Calbo as the killers of their stepfather. Time and time again WE have ruled that where the issue is credibility of the
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial judge, who heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This exception does not obtain here. (People vs,
Laguisma 98 SCRA 69 [1980]; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 386 [1980]; People vs. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA
465, 472 [1979]).

Furthermore, no motive was shown why the two eyewitnesses should testify against them falsely; hence, they must be
telling the truth. (People vs. Arevalo, 92 SCRA 207 [1979]; People vs. Lim 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).

The appellants likewise theorize that the prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco and probably
Gloria Salongcong must have plotted against the life of the deceased. Sotera and Jesus harbor resentment against the
victim for having ousted them from their tenancy in favor of Monte. Besides, Sotera wanted to revenge the raping of
her niece by the deceased. These are strong motives to do away with the victim, whereas the appellants have no
motive to kill him.

In the case of People vs. Veloso (92 SCRA 515, 524 [1979]), WE held that motive, as distinguished from criminal intent,
is not an essential element of a crime and hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is essential to
conviction in murder cases only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, something which does not obtain
in this case (also People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; People vs. Caggauan 94 Phil. 188 [1953]).

The defense vainly tried to utilize the apparent involvement of the prosecution witnesses Gloria and Sotera Salongcong
and Jesus Francisco in claiming a frame-up and a scheme to lay the blame on the two (2) accused-appellants. While
WE agree with the observation that these 3 witnesses are probably involved in various ways and degrees, and their
exclusion from the charge is questionable, WE cannot find any reason to believe that the appellants are innocent as
they pretend to be. As aptly held by the trial court, "that there were principals by induction in the commission of a crime
who were not prosecuted is no legal impediment to a finding of guilt of the principals by direct participation for the same
crime. ... [T)he non-prosecution of Gloria and Sotera Salongcong in the case at bar did not make the indictees before
us less guilty much more, innocent was to be blessed with a judgment of acquittal" (pp. 52-53, rec.).

On the contrary, the guilt of both appellants appear to be a moral certainty, even without the testimonies of Gloria,
Sotera and Jesus. Aside from the positive Identification of the two eyewitnesses, the evidence even of the defense tend
to establish the guilt of the appellants.

The tale woven by Aposaga about his sudden departure from Polomolok as soon as the authorities started the
investigation, was not only uncorroborated but was also too improbable to believe. First, he said he told Vargas that he
was going to Norala for a vacation. When Vargas returned after he had gone, his wife told Vargas that Aposaga went
to Norala to harvest palay. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him to proceed to Iloilo because his mother was ill.
But the source of his aunt's information was the same cousin who allegedly fetched him from Polomolok for the self-
same reason the alleged illness of his mother. He allegedly stayed in Iloilo for about 8 to 10 months although according
to the records, he was there for more than a year until the policemen from Polomolok came to arrest him. It should be
pointed out that his sudden departure must have left his wife and child in Polomolok without any means of support, as
the land he was plowing was never planted after he left (p. 409, TSN). All these could lead to but one conclusion that
he had to flee and hide with his guilty conscience to avoid arrest. Flight and going into hiding indicate a guilty
conscience. (People vs. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 [1979]; People vs. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649 [1978]).

Defense witnesses Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, father and brother, respectively, of Aposaga's common-law wife,
tried to establish an alibi for Aposaga. Their testimonies, however, are inherently weak and doubtful in many substantial
aspects, and appear to be nothing more than vain attempts to save a "family member" from conviction. For instance,
they testified that Aposaga was plowing with them at the time of the incident. Doroteo, however, stated that when he
heard the shout "wait, wait", Aposaga was 30 meters behind him although he could not see him as he was hidden by
talahibs (p. 385, TSN; Exh. J-1). Vicente, on the other hand, plowed with Aposaga and his father only from 10:00 to
10:30 that morning (p. 404, TSN), whereas the incident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. Doroteo further declared
that there was nothing unusual that happened on December 13, 1965 and he does not remember what day it was. Yet,
he could recall at the witness stand four (4) years later that he saw Gloria Salongcong running at five o'clock that
morning; what dress Gloria was wearing; what time they started plowing (6:00 A.M.); what time they left the farm; what
time they took their meals; what they ate for breakfast and lunch, and other minor details of daily life. Doroteo claimed
that he does not know Calbo but he admitted seeing him in the house of Monte that fateful morning of December 13th
(p. 394, TSN). He never tried to find out who uttered the words "wait, wait" (p. 394, TSN). He was surprised to learn of
the death of the victim whom he had believed to be in Bislig (p. 386, TSN); but he never visited the remains after
exhumation when he already knew he was dead (p. 379, TSN). Is this the natural reaction to a surprising death of
barrio-mate who owned the land he was plowing? Vicente's testimony likewise suffered from similar inconsistencies
and improbabilities as to command little, if any, probative value. The testimonies of these defense witnesses are mere
concoctions that cannot neutralize the positive Identification of the appellants by the two prosecution witnesses.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the accused
was alleged to be must be located at such a distance that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime when it was committed (People vs. Tirol, L-30538, January 31, 1981; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 387 [1980];
People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980]; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 [1979]). Such was not the situation in
this case; for the place where Aposaga was allegedly plowing was only about 150 meters from the house of the victim
(p. 368, TSN) and within hearing distance from the place of the incident. The place of the incident in turn was only 60
to 70 meters from the victim's house (p. 314, TSN). It was therefore very convenient for Aposaga to slip away from his
plowing and participate in the murder of the deceased even if he actually plowed the farm in the morning of December
13, 1965.

Furthermore, Aposaga was named as a killer of the deceased in two sworn statements executed by his co-accused
Monte (Exhs. "K" and "L"), which sworn statements were corroborated by his wife Bienvenida (Exh. "M"). Monte tried
to retract these statements on the witness stand by explaining that when he said "Francisco" he meant Jesus Francisco,
and not appellant Francisco Aposaga, and that the said affidavit was never read to him by Municipal Judge Narciso
Mirabueno, before whom he signed and swore to it. The latter claim was belied by Judge Mirabueno who testified that
he read the contents of all affidavits to the affiants and made sure they understood. He also asked searching questions
to determine the truth of their statements (pp. 557-569, TSN). Since it has not been shown that the said judge has any
interest in the case, it is not difficult to determine which of the two (2) testimonies deserves consideration.

As to the claim of mistaken Identity of the person named "Francisco", it is obvious from the very substance of Monte's
sworn statements that the "Francisco Aposaga" he named therein as a killer of the deceased was different and distinct
from the "Jesus Francisco" (Pedoy) who buried the leather bag of the deceased. Besides, it is understandable that
Monte will try his best to save his co-accused who had so gallantly provided him a defense counsel which he could not
afford.

For his part, Monte tried to establish his innocence by pointing out that it was unnatural for him to kill Atty. Barranda
after the latter had satisfactorily explained about the problems of his work and after they had breakfast together (p. 82,
rec.). Besides, he had no motive to kill his employer and benefactor who had given him better opportunities and
sufficient means to support his family by taking him as tenant and supervisor (pp. 89-90, rec.). Unfortunately, these
allegations cannot overcome the incriminating testimonies of the two (2) eyewitnesses. Besides, even from his own
testimony, the following circumstantial evidence appear to be inconsistent with his innocence:

1. Monte testified that he heard of a threat against the life of the deceased in a conversation among Gloria Salongcong,
Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco (p. 471, TSN). Yet, when he saw Jesus running after the deceased carrying
a bolo, he did not even look to see what Jesus intended to do (pp. 485486; 500-501, TSN).

2. He did not do anything about the disappearance of his employer for forty-eight (48) days, even though the last time
he saw him (deceased) was when somebody Jesus Francisco) was running after him (pp. 500-501, TSN).

3. If it were true that the deceased had told him he was going to Agusan to become a judge (p. 475, TSN), why did he
not remind Gloria of such fact when Gloria came looking for her husband (p. 489, TSN)?

4. Although he saw Jesus running after the deceased that morning, he did not say so when Gloria asked him about the
deceased; and when Gloria expressed the possibility that the deceased might have been waylaid, his answer was,
"Nobody could do that because it is daytime" (p. 490, TSN).

5. Monte escaped from the municipal jail on July 9, 1966, allegedly because his wife was sick in San Francisco, Agusan,
He explained that when he wired his wife to inform her that their hearing will be in May (1966), his father-in-law replied
that she was sick (p. 524, TSN). If that were true and this allegation was never corroborated, his escape should have
been timed around May, 1966, and not July of that year. The records do not disclose any hearing in July 1966. Surely,
it is more logical to conclude that Monte's flight, like that of his co-accused, indicated a guilty conscience.
All the above could lead but to one conclusion, that the guilt of the two (2) accused-appellants has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

This case should, however, be further investigated to determine the participation of Sotera Salongcong, Jesus
Francisco and Gloria Salongcong in the perpetration of the crime. Their own respective statements implicate
themselves. Moreover, as pointed out by the appellants, these prosecution witnesses have strong motives to kill the
deceased: Sotera and Jesus for their ouster from tenancy, and Gloria for the rape of her daughter Fe.

However, for lack of necessary votes. the death penalty cannot be imposed,

WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT
APPELLANTS ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA, WITH COSTS AGAINST THEM.

LET A COPY OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
SO THAT OTHERS WHO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME MAY BE DULY PROSECUTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12718 February 24, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
OLIMPIO CORPUZ alias ALIPIO and JULIAN SERQUINA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.
Braganza and Castillo for appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting defendants-appellants Olimpio
Corpuz and Julian Serquiña of murder and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Juan Tobias, in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay proportionally the costs.

A review of the records discloses the following facts: .

On the night of May 12, 1953, at around 9 o'clock in barrio San Leon, Balungao, Pangasinan, the occupants of the
house of Juan Tobias were roused by the barking of dogs. Peeping from the side of the house, Francisco Bartolome,
a nine-year old boy, and Pedro Quibolen, who helped Tobias work his lands, saw and recognized Julian Serquiña, and
a little farther off, the other accused, Olimpio Corpuz, revealed by the light of a petroleum lamp hung outside the door.
Juan Tobias invited defendants-appellants to come up, but instead, Julian Serquiña told him to come down and asked
him to lead them to Esmeralda, "even up to the stream only"; and when his request was refused, Julian Serquiña
ordered Tobias to go ahead of him. When Tobias was already on the ground with his back turned to defendants-
appellants, both of them struck Tobias several times with Exhibit "B", a shovel, and Exhibit "C", handle of a plow, felling
him. While running away, witnesses for the prosecution Pedro Quibolen and Francisco Bartolome still heard the
deceased being struck repeatedly by defendants-appellants.

From the place of the killing, Pedro Quibolen and Francisco Bartolome ran to the house of Francisco Tobias, brother
of the deceased, to call for help, but the latter, seized with fear, would not go to the scene of the crime but instead
reported the killing first, to the Philippine Constabulary barracks nearby, and, in the early morning of May 13, 1953, to
the municipal authorities who, after an investigation conducted at the scene of the crime,arrested both accused and
brought them to the Municipal Building at about 11:00 a.m. The deceased Juan Tobias suffered multiple wounds,
particularly described in Exhibit "A", the medical certificate prepared by Dr. Triumfo Magpali, Municipal Health Officer.

Defendants-appellants claim that they never left their respective houses on the night of May 12, 1953, and that, as a
matter of fact, they went to sleep at about 7 o'clock that evening. This is sought to be corroborated for Olimpio Corpuz
by the testimonies of Juan Corpus and Teofilo Ancheta, son and son-in-law, respectively, of Olimpio; and for Julian
Serquiña, by the testimony of her sister, Felipa Serquiña, who claims that her brother never left their house on the night
in question. This defense of alibi cannot be given much credence. By a long line of decisions, it has been held that, in
order to prosper, alibi must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubting its accuracy, plausibility
and verity. Clearly, the alibi offered herein does not meet this test, for the only persons seeking to confirm the assertion
of the accused that they never left their houses that night are very close relatives who would naturally testify in their
favor.1

Moreover, defendants-appellants were living only a short distance away from the house of the deceased Juan Tobias.
As admitted by Olimpio Corpuz, his house was just around one kilometer from the house of Juan Tobias. For hispart,
Julian Serqui_¤_a estimated that he was residing about 1-1/2 kilometers from barrio San Leon where the killing took
place. Due to their proximity to the place of the deceased, it could not have been impossible for the accused to go to
the house of Juan Tobias and return to their houses at a later hour of the evening. As has been previously held, for an
alibi to be given credence, it must clearly appear that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the place of
the crime at the time it occured.2

Another factor weighing heavily against the defense of alibi put up by defendants-appellants is the fact that they have
been clearly identified by the witness Pedro Quibolen and also by Francisco Bartolome. While the latter testified that
the companion of Julian Serqui_¤_a that night was merely "very similar to Olimpio Corpuz", the testimony of Pedro
Quibolen definitely identifying Olimpio Corpuz makes the evidence sufficient to establish alsothe latter's identity,
considering among other things that the witness was familiar with his features, having known him for years. An alibi
cannot prevail over an identification of the accused which is substantially clear and satisfactory. 3
Indeed, there is no reason why the testimony of the witness Pedro Quibolen and Francisco Bartolome should not be
believed, for, as admitted by both accused, there is no motive for these witnesses to testify falsely against them. This
lack of a motive to make a false imputation against the accused further strengthens the credibility of the eyewitnesses
and is one more factor that discredits the alibi relied on by the accused. 4 The record shows that the two accused were
promptly arrested in the morning of May 13, 1953, and it can hardly be believed that between the killing done late in
the previous night and the next morning, Pedro Quibolen and Francisco Bartolome, without any motive, could have
connived to implicate innocent persons in a charge as serious as the one at bar. The early revelation of the identity of
the killers which led to their prompt arrest bespeaks of a spontaniety of reaction not dictated by ulterior considerations.

The defense further alleges that there was no motive on the part of defendants-appellants sufficient to have induced
them to commit the crime charged. It does appear of record, however, that the manager of the hacienda wherein the
deceased and the accsed Serquiña were tenants, proposed that both should exchange lots, but the plan fell through
because of the objections of the late Tobias. Anyway, as repeatedly held, proof of motive is not indispensable where
guilt is otherwise established by sufficient evidence. ln other words, motive need not be established if the identity of the
accused is otherwise shown beyond reasonable doubt. 5

The lower court found that the murder was qualified by evident premeditation. This is not borne out by the evidence in
this case, because it is not shown when the plan to kill Juan Tobias was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was
carried out. There is no basis for determining whether defendants-appellants had sufficient time between the inception
of the plan and its fulfillment, dispassionately to consider and accept its consequences; and this time is essential to
premeditation.6

However, the record shows that the killing was qualified by treachery, for, aside from the fact that the attack was sudden
and unexpected, the deceased Juan Tobias had his back turned when he was first struck on the back of the head at
the inception of the aggression, catching him totally unprepared to make a defense of his person. Under such
circumstances, defendants-appellants employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves. 7

Although the crime was commited at nighttime, nocturnity is absorbed by treachery. 8

There is no evidence that the crime was committed is an uninhabited place because for this factor to be appreciated, it
must be proven that there were no houses nearby;9 but this was not done in this case.

There is no showing that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased, it not appearing that the latter was
attacked or killed in any part of the house or its dependencies.

Wherefore, with the modification that the killing is qualified by treachery instead of premeditation, the judgment of the
lower court is affirmed, with costs against defendants-appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montermayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
People vs. Masilungan, 104 Phil., 621; 56 Off. Gaz. (7) 1406;People vs. Villaroya, 101 Phil., 1061; People vs. de la Cruz, 76 Phil., 601;43 Off. Gaz., 137;
People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718.
2
People vs. Saladino, No. L-11893, Prom. May 23, 1958; People vs. Divinagracia, 105 Phil., 281; People vs. Andam, L-11383, April 30, 1958.
3
People vs. Aguipo, L-12123-34, July 31, 1958; People vs. Moises Fernando, et al., L-10876, September 23, 1958; People vs. Dara-ug, L-11470, September 30,
1957.
4
People vs. Garciola, 90 Phil, 285; People vs. Baltazar, L-5850, January 4, 1956.
5
People vs. Sespene, 102 Phil., 199; People vs. Divinagracia, 105 Phil., 281; People vs. Arcillas, L-11792, June 30, 1959; People vs. Bugagao, L-11328, April 16,
1958.
6
People vs. Custodio, et al., 97 Phil., 698; 52 Off. Gaz., (4) 1999 and cases cited therein.
7
People vs. Felipe, L-4619, February 25, 1952; People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil., 524; People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil., 635.
8
People vs. Jimenez, 99 Phil., 285; 54 Off. Gaz., (5) 1361; People vs. Balines, et al., L-9045, September 28, 1956.
9
People vs. Piring, 35 Off. Gaz., (13) 2272.
G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing
forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay
exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their
purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This Court
once described their plight in a local proverb as being "naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala." 1

In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, 2appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal
recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.

Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised
Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1397 3 (Francisco T. Labadchan — P45,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil —
P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay — P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
(Corazon del Rosario — P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan — P24,200.00); (6) Criminal
Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega — P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino —
P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog — P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-
1649 (Lorenzo Belino — P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega — P25,000.00) and (11)
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge — P18,500.00).

Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission of the crime, the
following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for the crime of estafa:

That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or subsequent thereto, at
Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses made by her prior to
or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there representing herself as
a duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment, when in truth and in fact she was
not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total
amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad and after having received it, she appropriated and misappropriated the same for
her own use and benefit and despite-repeated demands made upon (her) to return the same, she
refused, failed, neglected, and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage
and prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 4

For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations were also instituted
against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-
CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-
1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these indictments read:

That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality of La
Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
 above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit one ARTHUR
JUAN for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized
or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to be false but by reason of her said
misrepresentations which were completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from
the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00),
Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to Law. 5

The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1,
of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read:

That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the following: PETER
ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO B. SALBINO,
DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by then and there
misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she was
not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied upon by the said
complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group amounting to illegal recruitment
in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able to obtain and received from them the
aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00),
Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the foregoing complainants in the total sum
aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 6

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed were raffled off
to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated at the instance
of the prosecution.

Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation
Service ("CIS").

The Evidence for the Prosecution. —

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to appellant
by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet,
who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in
Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid that month and the balance
of P15,000.00 before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount of P30,000.00 on 23 September
1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his
flight would be on the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance of P15,000.00 of the fees.
He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included
the amount in the old receipt for the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers
to fill up and gave last-minute instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.

On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel
near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other people, among them, his
co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991, Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport
with Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At
the airport, however, appellant told the group that their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan
returned to Baguio City.

On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however, that his passport was still
with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs
office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his picture appeared on it, the passport was made
out in the name of a person from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the passport just so
he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but only to be later sent out because the ticket
he had was one intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and company were mere "chance
passengers," appellant sent them all home with a promise that another departure date would be set. She also took
back the "show money" of US$1,000.00.

Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her assurances. Finally,
Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had given her would be refunded. When this promise
neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office,
appellant executed a promissory note stating that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which included the
amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a passport, to Labadchan. 7

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder sister, Feling
Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. During the second week of January 1992, she, along with
her husband Gabriel, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a
job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave
appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at her (Victoria's) shop in Shopper's Lane, Baguio City which appellant
acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three
weeks.

When Victoria went to appellant's house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had been postponed
supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven more times only to
be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly "fooled" by the "main office" in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless,
demanded an additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the
amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave a corresponding receipt.

When on 18 April 1992 still "nothing happened," Victoria demanded from appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an
"advance" of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with appellant's signature affixed thereon would evidence that
payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the promised refund. 8

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No 92-CR-1415

Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by appellant
who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a monthly salary of US$800.00.
Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea.
Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence during the first week of April 1991.

Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told
her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead
met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellant's friend and accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean.
There, Cherry met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was
not going to have a job in the factory promised by appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying
rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the
others. Brought in for questioning by Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they were
illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were
deported.

Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a refund of their money. Cherry
executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in Korea. 9

Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherry's "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated Cherry's testimony that
appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the
payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated in Korea. 10
 In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known appellant, an
acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone
booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to
persuade Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would visit Corazon in her
brother's house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able to convince Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she
could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance of P25,000.00 in May
1991. The payments were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the
corresponding receipts for these amounts.

Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea, to call up
a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing the number
but each time only a Korean woman would answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself
as appellant's friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their "show money" of US$1,000.00. The group stayed
overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two hours away by car
from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on leather jackets, for which they were not paid,
until a policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport personnel would tell
them was that they should be thankful they were only being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities
confiscated everything that they had.

At home, appellant promised to return Corazon's money. Not having received the promised refund, Corazon went to
the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn statement. 11

Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay whenever she was in Baguio,
corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of
which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from
the bank which she likewise paid to appellant. 12

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her house at Buyagan, La
Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see
appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told
that he could work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan
initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to
the airport and gave appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to be remitted
to appellant on a salary deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09 October 1991)
because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back Juan's passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart
in a few days. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it became clear to Juan
that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that would have been
his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.

13
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting
workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her house in Buyagan some time in
December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to see appellant. When she produced the required
identification pictures and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a factory worker
in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance
by installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by
"Antonine Saley," with the remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for abroad.

Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other applicants, thrice went to
appellant's office at the Shopper's Lane to check. She also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa terminal,
for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded
a refund of the amount she had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to
Benguet. 14

—0—

The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had been
submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case, respectively, in —

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker,
Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas employment. Interested, he, in the company of his
nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon,
Mariano Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get employed in Taiwan for a
monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the processing and placement fees would amount to
P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.

On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for the
amount. She told Arcega to just wait "for the results." On 30 September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for another
P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon,
Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon her signature.
Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the
balance of P15,000.00 should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with appellant in
October 1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay Avenue,
Baguio City, and when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he also filed his own
complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian Licnachan. 15

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July
1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she was recruiting
workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly
salary. Salbino submitted various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid appellant the
amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang "temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel papers could be
processed. The payment was receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant
again issued an acknowledgment receipt.

Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to appellant's house in
Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her.
Appellant's where abouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate her, Salbino and his companions went to the
POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they were to learn that appellant was not in the
list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others, then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan. 16

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to appellant's residence in Buyagan
in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was recruiting
workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied
for a position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a month. He, after being
required to pay a processing fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him
a cash voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.

When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had happened to his application.
Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone to
Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for "screening
purposes." Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay another
P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he,
together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over
his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt, signed by "Annie Saley" which, according to
appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.

December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions to repair to appellant's house
in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to wait a few more days. When
still "nothing happened," Damolog and his companions went to the POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a
certification stating that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his companions filed a joint
affidavit-complaint executed before Atty. Licnachan 17against appellant.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992 looking for
employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant could help. Belino saw
appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20
September 1992 in Buyagan.

On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega
and Peter Arcega already in appellant's residence in Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they
wanted her to be "responsible for representing" them to get themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of
P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form. Appellant also made them
understand that they would each have to pay her the total amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be
forthwith paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything would have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.

On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a
cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino went down to Manila after appellant had
sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00
demanded by appellant. Appellant signed her name as "Annie Saley" on the receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he
should wait for her telephone call regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and
Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in
Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and others, namely,
Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega, 18 decided to file a complaint against appellant with
the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn statements were taken.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00 to
appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to acknowledge the payment. Peter,
subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by "Annie
Saley." He was among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.

Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CN-1645, 19 as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25 year-old unemployed
from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an employment abroad, likewise went to see
appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the
necessary papers, including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to be a factory
worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to
pay a placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher,
dated 08 September 1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant another P15,000.00 for
which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport
before his flight to Taiwan. No further word came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others
called her up, appellant informed them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March
1993, Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against appellant. 20

Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request for verification on
whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was not authorized to recruit
"in the City of Baguio and in the region" from 1989 "to the present." Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.

—0—
The Case for the Defense. —

The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for overseas employment
with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission. 21

According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from
1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job orders for applicants" and
assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio
where she engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she would not hesitate
extending help to applicants for overseas employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said
applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International as such licensed
agencies. She had, in the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and
Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad. 22

Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time asking for assistance in
getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her
to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her tourist visa. For Cherry's visa and plane ticket,
appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and delivered the
amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila
confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she
did not like the work she had in Korea. 23

Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to appellant.
Since the agency had already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in Kalaw Street,
Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon
again sought appellant's assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant introduced her to Dynasty Travel and
Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from
Corazon but these amounts, being for Corazon's ticket and hotel accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel
and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her
tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was
also issued a receipt by that travel agency showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received from Corazon
but the CIS men took the receipts and other documents from her. When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to
Korea, she again sought appellant's help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in going back to that
country. 24

Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in
securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo
Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and
US$250.00 which she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that agency but that, too,
was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were
able to leave." The others had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.

Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them back the plane ticket and
the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The next time she saw Labadchan
was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job
for Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast International failed to push through. 25

Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latter's sister was a former client at the Friendship Recruitment
Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave
appellant the amount, and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the travel agency
which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all the documents in her attache
case. 26 Appellant was able to process Victoria's visa for Korea but when someone informed the latter that she could
have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for
Korea had already been obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to her P15,000.00
that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into dollars for her "show money." Victoria issued a receipt for
the amount but appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria. 27
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was interested in
securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the
amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline.
The latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in going to Korea and that her passport application
should, instead, be "diverted to Hongkong." In fact, Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against
appellant because when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00
or just a half of the P10,000.00 she wanted. 28

Fidel Opdas was appellant's client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked her if
she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew someone who could help, Opdas brought
along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours
who told Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993,
Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents
required by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to
see appellant, he brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two
to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later
when Opdas came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and Carol.
The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two gave
her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never returned. The group
subsequently withdrew their applications although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund. 29

In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents that could bail her out of
the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8, the policemen went to the house of appellant's cousin at
2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia, however, they did not
get anything from appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the CIS,
he did not even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief case. 30 Apparently because of what had turned out
to be Deladia's adverse testimony, the defense presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding house
when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the boarding house. Santiago
did not see what might have happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out,
they had with them an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp
Crame where one of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did not see any brief case in the
office but one of the men told them that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could "produce"
the amount of P50,000.00. 31

On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for "bonding purposes" and that
they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief case. 32

The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime from appellant to Maritess
and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old farmer, who testified that appellant had
failed to assist him in going to Korea to work "because it was difficult." While following up his application in Manila, he
met Marites and Carol in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew someone who could
"transfer his application to Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened
constraining him to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to him. 33

Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a "Motion to Reopen Trial" with an urgent motion to
defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 34 In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court, noting
that the "newly discovered evidence" consisted of affidavits of desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the
motion. It held that "presentation of the same does not give valid ground for possible amendment of the decision as the
private complainants had already testified." It agreed with the prosecutor that "the affidavits of desistance only (had)
the effect of satisfying the civil liability." 35

The Judgment of the Trial Court. —

On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or
Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true, said the court, appellant could have presented her
principals; instead, that failure exposed her to the "adverse inference and legal presumption that evidence suppressed
would be adverse if produced." It also found "hard to believe," the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case,
supposedly containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by the CIS and remained
unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:

In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud them. This
was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The complainants willingly
parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the
accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the accused come from hard-
earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed from money lenders who have no qualms about
collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate
to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow money just so they could give a decent future to their
families even to the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their
hopes shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup
their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light
appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to
serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or those who are
about to trek the same pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would
be too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be
stopped. 36

All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley, also
known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as charged
in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-
1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an indeterminate sentence for the
duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the damages due the private complainants,
to wit:

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397

Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan
P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il
P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
 (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay
P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days ofprision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario
P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427

Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM
and to pay the costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645

To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) each to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando
Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B. Salbino
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

 Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
ofprision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge y
Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397, let
these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have been
arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.

In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of Arrest
issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.

SO ORDERED. 37

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had erred in giving credence to
the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the
prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt. 38 Finding no merit in the motion,
the trial court, on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its decision. 39 The following day, appellant filed a notice
of appeal. 40 The trial court gave due course to the appeal on 17 April 1995. 41

The Instant Appeal. —

Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her assertion that the
trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged with by the prosecution. 42 She avers that her
transactions with the complainants have been "limited to her assisting them secure their respective
travel visa specifically for tourist" and that "her assistance to them (has been) only to refer them to travel agencies"
such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts
solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the
commissions "for bringing in clients interested in getting tourist visas." 43

At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not only for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses for which
lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary
appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher. 44 The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal of criminal cases involving penalties lower than reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus —

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, or
where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death
or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this Section.

In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has directed that the "entire
records of the seventeen cases" should be forwarded to this Court. 45 It might be observed that this appeal,
which has been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned under different
circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the case for illegal recruitment
in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard jointly below. The appeal made
directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which incidentally should have been assigned a separate
docket number in this Court, is properly taken.

Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority." Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code as referring —

. . . to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:

1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by

law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and

2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the

meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article
13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34. 46

Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be liable
under Article 38(a) thereof. 47 The proviso in Article 13(b) "lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is
collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement." 48 The article also provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or "the act of passing along
or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment
to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau." 49

The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal recruitment.

The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent herself as being in a position
to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and
receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for
employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:

Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before you were put to jail did you
have any occupation?

A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.

Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any other source of income?

A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and asked if I know some agencies
who can assist them to go abroad.

Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to go abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas employment?

A Yes, sir.

Q By whom?

A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.

Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?

A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International is duly licensed by the
government to recruit applicants abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is that?

A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for
applicants to go abroad.

Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants going abroad what do you
mean by applicants going abroad?

A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for abroad and they are being
issued tickets.

Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you remember some of them?

50
A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and others." (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring for them plane tickets and
tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made referrals of job applicants to
 recruitment agencies. 51 She evidently knew all along that the persons she was dealing with were applicants
for employment abroad.

52Rule
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by the POEA. II, Book
II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment provides:

Sec. 11. Appointment of Representatives. — Every appointment of representatives or agents of

licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration.

The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following requirements:

a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;

b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;

c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing

person or company assuming full responsibility for all acts of the
agent or representative done in connection with the recruitment
and placement of workers.

Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the agent or
representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency represented.

Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the Administration.

Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or amended.

The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped the
complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, 53 it being enough that he or
she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad. 54

The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in
each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not thereby make the case for
the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses
be numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony
of a single witness. 55 Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that
the witness has perjured himself or that his observations have veered from the truth. 56

The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant
an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able
to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment,
a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. 57

Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is
indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit,
appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor
more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application
of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being
inapplicable to special laws. 58

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 59 whenever the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall impose
on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 60 Accordingly, in imposing the
penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has
acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more persons "individually or as a
group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities as so
defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is
committed against three or more persons. 61 The prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for a fee,
appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven
complainants. For this offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant by the trial
court.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction
while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. 62Under Article 315, paragraph
2(a), 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another
by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused
to the offended party or third person. 64 Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.

The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided
that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means: . . . .

In the case of People vs. Gabres, 65 the Court has had occasion to so state that —

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense.
The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered
in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate
sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in
favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-
appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months . . . . 66
 The Court reiterates the above rule, however, in fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty ofprision
correccional maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal portions of
time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence —

Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period

From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months

and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years

5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days —

in consonance with Article 65, 67 in relation to Article 64, 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Code "shall
be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion
temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be added to the maximum period
of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.

Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually charged appellant with illegal
recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount of P45,000.00,
two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added
to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum toprision mayor minimum (or added
to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying Labadchan the amount of
P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days ofprision mayor medium.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from
paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccionalmaximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of P18,000.00, appellant,
besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccionalminimum to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount of P40,000.00,
appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from Arthur Juan,
appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00, appellant
shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case against appellant for illegal
recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a job recruiter, appellant was able
to make the seven complainants believe that they could land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each
complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement fees.

It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only five 69 of them filed separate
charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only be held liable for five counts of
estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00
from each of the five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period or prision mayor in its
minimum period (not any higher on account of the fact that the amount in excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code is less than P10,000.00). 70 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being
no attending circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days ofprision correccional medium as minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the
five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.

The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be shown that appellant had
already paid the complainants.

WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment, illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications hereunder specified, and only
to the extent thereof, in the following cases:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of

from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccionalmedium period as MINIMUM, to
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayormedium period as MAXIMUM and to pay
Francisco T. Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the
amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.

3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.

4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of

from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to seven (7)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge
the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.

The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and
No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, except for
the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are
DELETED, either because similar awards have already been provided for by the trial court, or for insufficiency of proof,
in the estafa cases aforenumbered.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 People vs. De Leon, 267 SCRA 644, 652.

2 Presided by Judge Romeo A. Brawner.
3 In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, appellant was charged together with Conchita Tagle who remained at large.
4 Records of Crim. Case No. 93-CR-1652, p. 4.
5 Records of Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1427, p. 1.
6 Records of Crim. Case No. 93-CR-1645, p. 5.
7 TSN, April 13, 1993, pp. 3-13.
8 TSN, May 4, 1993, pp. 3-9.
9 TSN, June 21, 1993, pp. 12-20.
10 TSN, August 19, 1993, pp. 3-10.
11 TSN, May 4, 1993, pp. 17-24.
12 TSN, August 16, 1993, pp. 5-10.
13 TSN, August 17, 1993, pp. 2-7.
14 TSN, February 22, 1994, pp. 3-8.
15 TSN, February 7, 1994, pp. 3-11.
16 TSN, January 21, 1994, pp. 2-12.
17 TSN, February 8, 1994, pp. 14-23.
18 TSN, January 19, 1994, pp. 2-13.
19 TSN, February 8, 1994, pp. 27-28.
20 TSN, February 8, 1994, pp. 28-36.
21 TSN, July 20, 1994, p. 4.
22 Ibid., at pp. 3-5.
23 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
24 Ibid., pp. 9-14.
25 TSN, July 26, 1994, pp. 2-9.
26 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
27 TSN, September 13, 1994, pp. 6-9.
28 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
29 Ibid., pp. 11-16.
30 Ibid., pp. 3-6.
31 TSN, September 26, 1994, pp. 3-4.
32 Ibid., p. 8.
33 TSN, September 23, 1994, pp. 3-5.
34 Records of Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396, p. 363.
35 Ibid., p. 376.
36 Rollo, p. 224.
37 Rollo, pp. 227-229.
38 Records of Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1396, p. 418.
39 Ibid., p. 422.
40 Ibid., p. 424.
41 Ibid., p. 425.
42 Rollo, p. 65.
43 Rollo, pp. 69-70.

44 Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d), 1987 Constitution. If the penalty imposed is lower than reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, an appeal to this Court may still be possible by way of a petition for review on certiorari. (Sec.
3 (d), Rule 122, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.)

45 Rollo, p. 54.
46 People vs. Diaz, 259 SCRA 441, citing People vs. Cabacang, 316 Phil. 640; People vs. De Leon, supra.
47 See People vs. Diaz, supra., citing People vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664.
48 People vs. Panis, supra, at p. 667.
49 People vs. Agustin, 317 Phil. 897, 907.
50 TSN, July 20, 1994, pp. 4-5.
51 TSN, September 21, 1994, p. 3.
52 People vs. Diaz, supra.
53 People vs. Cabacang, supra.
54 People vs. Diaz, supra., citing People vs. Manungas, Jr., 231 SCRA 1 and Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622.
55 People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408.
56 People vs. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574.
57 Ibid., at p. 585.
58 People vs. Respecia & Lagunan, 107 Phil. 995.
59 Act No. 4103, as amended.
60 Sec. 1, Act No. 4103.
61 People vs. Benemerito, 264 SCRA 677.
62 Ibid., at p. 692.
63 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
64 Ibid., citing People vs. Ong, 204 SCRA 942.
65 267 SCRA 581.
66 At pp. 595-596.

67 Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed
by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.

68 Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed
by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of
the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its
medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum
period.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class
against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty
than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
69 Fidel Opdas did not even testify while Dembert Leon testified but only as a corroborative witness in Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1645.70 People vs. Benemerito, supra, at p. 694.
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.

Florentino Saguin for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and
one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following
information:

That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his
bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his
instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the court
erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.

The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were
Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to
Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept.
There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting
to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy
and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from
Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point
of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.

There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that
the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses,
the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or
ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and
were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam;
he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct
was perfectly lawful.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who
attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.

There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant
alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo.
Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The
widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his
death.

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest
with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to
wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did
so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted
to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act,
since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.

The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were
actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that
it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest,
without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see
Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And
then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was
an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted
by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.

We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the
solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:

The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely
ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation.

In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty
person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to
article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is
hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.

Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

RECTO, J.:

Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven months
and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon appeal to this court for the review of the case.

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the house of
Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of
the relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen,
who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon
with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where
the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present
a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident.

There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing facts. The question to be
determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called Simeon
Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness stand.

The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan
Quianzon. However, we find the testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent and contradictory that we
consider meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of the lower court to have taken it into consideration
in formulating the findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the testimony of the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay,
one of the persons present at said gathering, testified that he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of
Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the witness and the other guests were gathered,
telling that he was wounded and was going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him. He
also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by him about the incident, admitted to him attacked
Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the incident, forthwith
conducted an investigation, questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded him.
He likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the deceased with a bamboo
spit. Upon being brought before Juan Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno
that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit. Before the chief of
police could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the later retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for
which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by
Quianzon but not of having wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit.

The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and Llaguno, is not questioned
by the defense. Neither the accused, in his testimony, nor his counsel, in the brief filed by him in this court, was able to
assign any unlawful, corrupt or wicked motive that might have actuated them to testify falsely in this case and knowingly
bring about the imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is not even a relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio
lieutenant, is a nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, is an officer of the law whose intervention of
this case was purely in compliance with his official duties. All the appellant has been able to state in his brief to question
the credibility of these witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the other witness for the prosecution,
who testified that he had not seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime. But
the position of the defense in invoking Simeon Cacpal's testimony for the purpose of discrediting the other witnesses
for the prosecution is untenable, after having vigorously impeached said testimony, branding it as improbable,
incongruent and contradictory. If Cacpal is a false witness — and the court believes this claim of the defense as true — ,
none of his statements may be taken into account or should exert any influence in the consideration of the other
evidence in the case.
After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence presented by the prosecution relative to the appellant's
criminal liability for the death of Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement immediately after
receiving the wound, naming the accused as the author of the aggression, and the admission forthwith made by the
accused that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him, besides, with a bamboo spit. Both
statements are competent evidence in the law, admissible as a part of the res gestae (section 279 and 298, No. 7, of
the Code of Civil Procedure; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second,
in the extrajudicial confession of the accused to the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police Llaguno,
in the same afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had inflicted it by means of
a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly corroborated and appears to have been
made by the accused freely and voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his liability as author of the
crime charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil., 379; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3 P.R.A., 52;
Francisco's Quizzer on Evidence).

The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had wounded the deceased and that he had confessed
his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the adverse testimony
of these three veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more because neither the accused nor any other witness
for the defense has stated or insinuated that another person, not the accused, might be the author of the wound which
resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because it is admitted by the defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had
been pestering with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck with a firebrand, afetr which
Aribuaboappeared wounded in the abdomen, without the accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how
and by whom the aggression had been made.

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was
not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr.
Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection. This contention is without merit. According to the physician who
examined whether he could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic
peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large intestine which has been perforated. The
possibility, admitted by said physician that the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the
drainage, does not mean that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the
juridical consequences of the punishable act of the accused.

One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death
does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)

Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge
that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living
beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state
of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the
contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a
perforation of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by violent shivering and pain first localized at a
point in the abdomen, extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is aggravated by the
slightest movement, becoming unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. The pain is continuous
but it gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter, which are very
annoying and terribly painful, take from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-America
Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that
the victim in this case was mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes more evident that the accused
is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of
Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is
responsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case the physical condition and temperament of the offended
party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but
by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be
qualified as homicide, etc."
In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal wound was less serious than that received by Aribuabo
in this case, as it was not penetrating, merely involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of the victim was
due to a secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours after the wound had been inflicted, because of the "bodily
movements of the patient, who was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting up and pacing about the room,
as as a consequence of which he internal vessels, already congested because of the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage
thus produced caused his death." The court in deciding the question stated that "when a person dies in consequence
of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness or a
desire to increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted
by said assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of the
opinion that the wound might have healed in seven days."

The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:

While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to be settled rule of the common law
that on who inflicts an injury on another will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that the
deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical operation,
or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death was
immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The principle
on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of the criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put
life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed,
it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which are of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have
been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible.
But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon
the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as
to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment.

Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's testimony, there is no evidence of record that the crime charged
was committed by means of the knife, Exhibit A, and we only have the extrajudicial admission of the accused that he
had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with which the wound of the deceased might have been caused because,
according to the physician who testified in this case, it was produced by a "sharp and penetrating" instrument.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the
committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances adverse
to him, we modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years
of prision correccional and a maximum of a eight years of prision mayor, affirming it in all other respect, with cost to
said appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-9426 August 15, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILOMENO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant.

Silvester Apacible for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while
engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the
municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to approach them.

On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating the division line between the
lands of the two.] "Let us make it straight."

Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain
logs and trees on your land.?"

To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza.

On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon
Mendoza seized the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying upon the ground
the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which held the dagger and
attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife, the wife of the
accused came forward and took the dagger from her husband's hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized who
after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless.

As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the
most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the left hand
was rendered useless.

The story of the affair told by the accused is quite different from that just related, but the facts as stated were as found
by the trial court and the evidence given fully supports the findings. We have examined the case carefully and see no
reason why it should be reversed upon the facts. We may say the same as to the law.

The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be given another opportunity to
present evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to
have been rendered useless by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless member, inasmuch as, if the
accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts that he
could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third finger
instead.

We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case
whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one
of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.

Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical
operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which
disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON MABUG-AT, defendant-appellant.

Vicente Sotto for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one
day cadena temporal, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and to pay
the costs, for the crime of frustrated murder.

The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two assignments of error as committed by the trial court, to wit:

1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, and

2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense, finding the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous
of the accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations were such
that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him
a note of excuse. On the third day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's
house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested
Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not
want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."

The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the direction of
their house. The accused, who was seen by the two girls, followed them without saying a word. It is only a short distance
from the house where the devotion took place to that of the offended party, the houses being adjacent. As the two girls
were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded
Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof and coming
out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die
and is on e of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.

The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends that the
crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it was
the accused's intention to kill.

The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to
take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion
was being held, later following her to her house, and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which,
in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill.

In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:

We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient
to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant
circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was not in fact
animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed,
it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so
far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver is twice discharged
point-blank at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it needs but little
additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par.
3, Penal Code.)

The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence premeditation and treachery. Even
when there is sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established), yet, it cannot
be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case, because the person whom the accused intended to kill
was not Perfecta Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo. Had evident premeditation been proven,
and there being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder present in this case, the acts should be held to
be frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law. (Question 2, p. 28,
1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But, the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this
case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure the execution of the
crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The treachery
which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this
case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the accused
when he fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in holding
a crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the following:

Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in article 10 of the Civil code dealing
with said circumstance, it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the
death of Nazario Iñigo, he employed means which tended to insure the commission of the crime without any
risk to himself arising from any defense that might be made by the offended party, for neither the wounded
party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not testify as to
the assault committed upon him shortly before, as held by the trial court, was not in a position to defend himself
in any way, nor could Nazario Iñigo become aware of any attack so unjustified, rapid and unforeseen;
considering, further, that the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than
the one intended was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements constituting the crime of murder
qualified by the treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted, whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome
Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario Iñigo, for which reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable herein,
the culprit not having, in fact, committed a crime different from that which he intended, taking into consideration
the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof, etc.

Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder, the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to
the case at bar so far as the concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned.

The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill and performed all the acts of
execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

We find no merit in the first assignment of error.

In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts enumerated above constitute the crime of
frustrated murder.

With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no other aggravating circumstance.

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all
its parts costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, alias FRANCISCO
ADMONES, aliasBUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY), defendant-appellant.

W.A. Caldwell and Sotto and Astilla for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Bengzon for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of asesinato, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and
treachery, assault and attack one Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head,
under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of his purpose without
risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground
as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left
occipital region, which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.

After hearing the evidence, Judge Luis P. Torres found the defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to
suffer reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the
sum of P1,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon, the victim
to the crime charged in the information.

2. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon (a fact which we specifically
deny), the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim.

3. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon, and that the appellant did
strike his supposed victim (facts which we specifically deny) the trial court erred in finding that the blow was
dealt from the victim's rear.

4. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully established.

5. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without merit, the trial court erred in convicting the
appellant of the crime of murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of convicting him of
the crime of maltreatment, under article 266 of the said Code.

It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped
to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was
standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back
and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man that had been
passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with
his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the
lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through San
Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung,
who were walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The
wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination
was made the next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and
fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis,
though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in the left kidney.
Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police, and about 3 o'clock the next morning Sergeant Sol Cruz and other
detectives, accompanied by Yu Yee, went to the scene of the crime and found blood stains in the street. Yu Yee said
that he could recognize his father's assailant, and described him as being about five feet in height, 25 or 30 years old,
with long hair and wearing a suit of dark clothes. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had been working on the case for three or
four days he received information that the accused might be the person that had assaulted Yu Lon, and on August 4th
the accused was arrested by detectives Manrique and Bustamante. He was wearing a dark wool suit. Yu Yee was
immediately called to the police station. The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven persons that
had been detained for investigation. They were wearing different kinds of clothes. Yu Yee without hesitation pointed
out the defendant as the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. He identified him not only by his long hair combed towards
the back and worn long on the sides in the form of side-whiskers (patillas), but also by his high cheek-bones and the
fact that his ears have no lobes. The defendant was identified at the trial not only by Yu Yee, but also by Chin Sam and
Yee Fung.

With respect to the first four assignment of error, which raise questions of fact as to the identification of the accused,
and whether or not be struck the deceased, and if he did assault the deceased, whether he did so in a treacherous
manner, we see no sufficient reason, after considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, to doubt the correctness
of the findings of the trial judge. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other Chinese, and although Yu Yee
may have overstated at the trial some of the facial peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed to have observed at
the time of the incident, it must be remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation picked the defendant out of a group of
eleven persons as his father's assailant, and that he had exceptional opportunities for observing his father's assailant,
because while that person was walking back and forth behind Yu Lon, Yu Yee was facing the assailant.

We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to the whereabouts of the defendant on the night in
question unworthy of credit.1awphil.net

The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the deceased and then ran away is corroborated by the testimony
of a 15-year old boy, Dominador Sales.

As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck on the back of the head, the
expert testimony shows that in such a case a person instinctively makes an effort to preserve or regain his balance,
and that as result thereof the deceased may have fallen backwards. Another consideration is that sidewalks almost
invariably slope towards the pavement, and this being true, when the deceased straightened up, he naturally tended to
fall backwards. The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the accused struck the deceased on the back of the head,
because when the deceased was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk, facing each other, and if
the accused had not struck the deceased on the back of the head, it would have been necessary for him to go between
the deceased and Yu Yee. Since the accused struck the deceased from behind and without warning, he acted with
treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Article 14, No. 16, of the Revised Penal Code.)

The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the first.

In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with
article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.

Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in order that a
person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the
two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs.
Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344.)

In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal
region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; that where death result as the direct
consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under
the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one
does not intend to produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt
from criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96.)
The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause
of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct
consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury
does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs.
Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22).

The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. Can
the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill the deceased?

We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his
death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not
committed the assault in a treacherous manner. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did
not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder,
because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no incompatibility, moral or legal, between alevosia and the
mitigating circumstance of not having intended to cause so great an injury:

Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility between treachery and the mitigating circumstance
No. 3 of article 9 of the Penal Code, because the former depends upon the manner of execution of the crime
and the latter upon the tendency of the will towards a definite purpose, and therefore there is no obstacle, in
case treacherous means, modes or forms are employed, to the appreciation of the first of said circumstances
and simultaneously of the second if the injury produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused; and for
that reason it cannot be held in the instant case that this mitigating circumstances excludes treachery, or that
the accused, being chargeable with the death of the offended party, should not be liable due to the voluntary
presence of treachery in the act perpetrated, although with mitigation corresponding to the disparity between
the act intended and the act consummated, etc. (Decision of May 10, 1905, Gazette of April 20, 906; Viada:
5th edition, Vol. 2, p. 156.)

In the case of the United States vs. Candelaria (2 Phil., 104), this court speaking through Chief Justice Arellano said:

In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted treacherously (alevosamente). Whether it was to prevent
him from making resistance, whether it was to torture him for the purpose of making him give information, or
whether it was for the purpose of inflicting further punishment, the fact is that by this means the defendants
secured themselves against any risk which might have arisen from an attempt at self-defense on the part of
the victim. We are of opinion that they had no intention to cause so great an evil as that which resulted, but
this does not neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting death, because if there was
no alevosia for the purpose of killing there was alevosia for the purpose of the illtreating. The means employed
were not made use of for the precise purpose of making certain the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe
means of illtreating him without risk to the persons who were doing so. If by this means the ill treatment was
aggravated, it follows that it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which resulted. It was not a condition of
the purpose, but it was a condition of the criminal act itself, in whatever sense this be taken.

The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
and there being present in this case one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the
appellant is reduced to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-28620 February 24, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANDRES ANCASAN, defendant-appellant.

Arsenio Suazo for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

Andres Ancasan and Domingo Bancailan were charged with the crime of homicide upon the following information:

That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1927, in the municipality of Banganga, Province of Davao, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of that province, the said accused conspiring
together and acting in accord, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, attacked Eugeniano Felizardo with a club
causing him a wound in the occipital region, as a consequence of which said Eugeniano Felizardo died.

It appears from the evidence that on May 3d, 1927, a celebration of the last day of novenario took place in the house
of one Faustino Lancian in the municipality of Banganga, Province of Davao. A number of persons were present, among
them Andres (Mandaya), Venancio Lamncian, Domingo Bancailan, the accused Andres Ancasan, and now deceased
Eugeniano Felizardo. After supper, Domingo Bancailan and Eugeniano Felizardo undertook to sing a duet, but as
Felizardo sang in a higher pitch than Bancailan, the latter became very angry and tried to throw Felizardo down on the
floor. His efforts did not meet with success and he himself fell down with Felizardo on the top of him. While the two men
were lying in that position, the accused, a friend of Bancailan, struck Felizardo on the back of the head with a heavy
cudgel, causing a wound which became infected with tetanus and led to the death of Felizardo a few days later.

The trial court found the defendant Ancasan guilty as charged in the complaint and sentenced him to suffer twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay one-half of the costs. The defendant Domingo Bancailan was acquitted with
the costs de oficio. Ancasan appealed to this court, and his counsel makes two assignment of error: (1) That the trial
court erred in believing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and declaring the appellant guilty of the crime
charged in the information and (2) that the court erred in taking into consideration the testimony of the wife of the
deceased as to the statements made shortly before his death.

The first assignment of error is entirely without merit; there is nothing unreasonable in the testimony of the witnesses
for the prosecution, and we see no reason to doubt their veracity. Under the second assignment of error counsels
argues that the statements made by the deceased to his wife very shortly before his death could not be regarded as a
dying declaration inasmuch as the deceased did not directly state that he at that time believed that death was
impending. A sufficient answer to this contention is that it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a dying
declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances
are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time declaration was made, the declaration did not expect to
survive the injury from which he actually died (U.S. vs. Schneider, 21 D.C., 381; People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil.,
182).

The uncontradicted testimony of the widow of the deceased is to the effect that in one of his conscious moments he
told her that Andres Ancasan had inflicted the wound from which he was suffering; that he at the same time enjoined
her to take care of their children; and that he immediately thereafter again lost consciousness and died within an hour.
In our opinion, the surrounding circumstances and the reference to the children clearly show that the deceased had
lost hope of recovery at the time the declaration was made and his statement was therefore admissible in evidence as
a dying declaration.

The deceased was struck from behind and the aggravating circumstance of treachery is therefore existed, but it is also
evident from the record that the defendant was intoxicated and that he probably did not intend to kill the deceased. This
two extenuating circumstances more than offset aforesaid aggravating circumstance and brings the penalty down to
the minimum degree of reclusion temporal, the penalty imposed by the court below.

The appealed judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found
the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio
Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that
he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back
portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away
from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding
him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was
brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not
attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a
medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which
reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me
only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original
Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to
pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared
before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police
blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this
Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are
 neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him
and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against
each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to
Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as
follows:

Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular
spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag
resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no
avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18
P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by
rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison,
in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the
present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and
other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
 That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the
ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals
and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches
which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which
was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto
Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching
fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of
tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be
incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered
a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier
was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of
Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve
serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause
of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in
the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be
infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently,
the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence
in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish
in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate
attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet
healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a
disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own
negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after
two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time
of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within
2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen,
or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity
becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs
and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle
groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time;
trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
 convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of
the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano
used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered
the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records
show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped
out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier.
This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects
of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
 The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However,
since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the
civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the
heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit
by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men
left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled
it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts
were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was
intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not
sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal
Code where:
 . . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving
the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent
might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically
possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist
School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something
quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because:
(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must
be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation
is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there
is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended
act does not amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in
reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent
to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter
was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and
where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown
to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter
did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained
that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason
of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case
when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob.
In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no
one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered,
equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension
that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance
of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was
inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the
judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue
at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation
of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter.
What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the
cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S.
vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that
in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing
the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender
intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to
him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable
for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of
impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed
federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held
that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the
law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment,
the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where
the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as
an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that
in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense
to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or
physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible
of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan
was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a
person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense
will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 People vs. Intod, C.A-G.R. No. 09205, August 14, 1991; Justice Fidel P. Purisima, Ponente: Justices Eduardo
R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya, concurring.
2 TSN, p. 4, July 24, 1986.
3 Records, p. 65.
4 Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 15 (4th ed., 1946).
5 Albert, Ibid.
6 Albert, Ibid.
7 Albert, Ibid.
8 Albert, Ibid.
9 Grogorio and Feria, Comments on the Revised Penal Code 76 (Vol. I, 1st ed. 1958).
10 Reyes, The revised Penal Code, 90 (Vol. I, 11th ed., 1977).
11 Reyes, Ibid.
12 Reyes, Ibid.
13 U.S. vs. Berrigan, 482 F. 2nd. 171 (1973).
14 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.
15 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, (Vol. I, 1987).
16 U.S. vs. Berrigan, supra, p. 13.
17 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.
18 21 L.R.A. 626 (1898).
19 21 L.R.A. N.S. 898 (1908).
20 17 S.W. 145 (1888).
21 71 S.W. 175 (1902).
22 U.S. vs. HENG AWKAK ROMAN, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 874 (1974).
23 565 F. Supp. 1416 (1983).
24 Supra, n. 13.