Rule 20

AngKek Chan vs Bello

Facts:- Petitioner questions the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction committed
by respondent Judge Abundio Bello in violating Administrative Circular No. 7 regarding the raffle of Criminal
Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431, and prays that the Court orders the outright dismissal of the cases.
-It appears from the records that petitioner Ang was charged before the then Manila City Court Branch VIII, with
the crimes of "MALTREATMENT," "THREATS," and "SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
-the then presiding judge of MTC Branch VIII (where the cases were pending) was promoted to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. As a consequence, respondent judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC (Manila), directed the
return of the case records to the Clerk of Court for "re-raffle." Petitioner, however, alleged that he received the
corresponding order only on August 23, 1984, or AFTER the cases had already been actually "re- raffled" and
assigned to respondent judge on August 16, 1984.
-Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Did respondent judge commit GAD in the manner he conducted the raffle of Criminal Cases?
Held: Yes!
- The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to insure impartial
adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases public suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined
judges is obviated.
-A violation or disregard of the Court's circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be
countenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal.
-When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question, apparently in violation of
the Court's Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but
he violated the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above board. We consider the procedure of
raffling cases to be an important element of judicial proceedings, designed precisely to give assurance to the
parties that the court hearing their case would be impartial. On this point, we found the petition meritorious.

Rule 21

Universal Rubber Products vs CA

Petition for certiorari
Facts:- Records disclose that the two respondent corporations(Converse Corp. and Edwarson Manufacturing)
herein sued the present petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for unfair competition with damages
and attorney's fees. In due time herein petitioner, who was the defendant in that court suit, answered the
complaint and joined issues with the plaintiffs therein, forthwith respondent Judge, to whom that lawsuit was
assigned, proceeded with the trial thereof.
-After they have presented about nine witnesses and various pieces of documentary evidence, herein private
respondents made a request to the respondent Judge to issue a subpoena duces tecum against the treasurer of
herein petitioner. Acting favorably on that request, said respondent Judge issued a subpoena duces tecum on
February 13, 1968, directing the treasurer of the present petitioner to bring with him to the lower court on
February 26, 1968 and March 8, 1968 at 2:30 p.m. "all sales invoices, sales books and ledgers wherein are
recorded the sales of Plymouth Star Player rubber shoes from the time the corporation started manufacturing and
selling said shoes up to the present.
- petitioner filed a motion in the court below praying that the subpoena duces tecum dated February 13, 1968 be
quashed on the grounds that: (1) the said subpoena is both Unreasonable and oppressive as the books and
documents caned for are numerous and voluminous; (2) there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof;
and (3) the books and documents are not relevant to the case pending below. The private respondents herein
opposed that motion of the petitioner. Acting on the said motion and on the opposition thereto, respondent Judge
issued the first controverted order on May 6, 1968, denying the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
-herein petitioner filed in the court a quo a motion for reconsideration seeking the said court to reconsider its
order denying the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. This, too, was opposed by the private
respondents. Acting on this motion, as well as on the opposition thereto, respondent Judge. issued the second
controverted order on June 28, 1968, denying the motion for reconsideration.
-petitioner Universal Rubber Products, Inc. filed its present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
alleging that in so denying its motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:Is the issuance of the "subpoena duces tecum" is proper in a suit for unfair competition?
Held:Yes!
- As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an
accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of,
his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is
required in equity to account for and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee
with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestuique trust, and defendant's profits are
regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum ", it
must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains
evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document
containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces
tecum once issued by thecourt may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and
oppressive or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf
the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
-In the instant case, in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena duces tecum are relevant and
reasonable in relation to the complaint of private respondent for unfair competition, We have to examine Republic
Act No. 166.
- In recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to unfair competition," Sec. 23 of R.A. 166 grants the
complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages recoverable, either (1) the
reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed his said rights;
or (2) the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement; or (3) the court may award as
damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of the defendant of the value of the
services in connection with which the mark or tradename was issued in the infringement of the rights of the
complaining party.
-In giving life to this remedial statute, We must uphold the order of the court a quo denying the motion. of the
petitioner to quash the "subpoena duces tecum" previously issued against the petitioner. In a suit for unfair
competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party
is afforded his full rights of redress
- The argument that the petitioner should first be found guilty unfair competition before an accounting for
purposes of ascertaining the amount of damages recoverable can proceed, stands without merit.. The complaint
for unfair competition is basically a suit for "injunction and damages". Injunction, for the purpose of enjoining the
unlawful competitor from
proceeding further with the unlawful competition, and damages, in order to allow the aggrieved party to recover
the damage he has suffered by virtue of the said unlawful competition. Hence, the election of the complainant
(private respondent herein) for the accounting of petitioner's (defendant below) gross sales as damages per R.A.
166, appears most relevant. For Us, to determine the amount of damages allowable after the final determination
of the unfair labor case would not only render nugatory the rights of complainant under Sec. 23 of R.A. 166, but
would be a repetitious process causing only unnecessary delay.
-The sufficiency in the description of the books sought to be produced in court by the questioned "subpoena
duces tecum is not disputed in this case, hence, We hold that the same has passed the test of sufficient
description.

People vs Montejo
A petition for certiorari
Facts:-It was alleged by the City Fiscal of Zamboanga, as counsel for the People of the Philippines, that on
September 23, 1963, Criminal Case No. 3225 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City against
a certain Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, the trial of the
case having commenced on November 7, 1963, and thereafter continued subsequently. After which, it was stated
that a certain Ernesto Uaje y Salvador, "a permanent resident of Montalban, Rizal," then a patrolman in the
Montalban Police Department, "is a material and important witness in the case" his affidavit having served as the
basis for filing the information as he "happened to be an eye-witness during the traffic incident wherein a Private
Jeep bearing Plate No. J-6172 driven recklessly by the accused Felix Wee Sit on August 15, 1963, turned turtle
in the public highway in Zamboanga City causing the death of two (2) prominent young girls and serious physical
injuries to four (4) equally prominent young girls, who are all students of a local religiousinstitution."
- It was then alleged that at the time the case against the accused was called for trial in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, then presided by respondent Judge, the witness had returned to Montalban, Rizal;
that pursuant to a formal request of the City Fiscal, respondent Judge issued a subpoena to patrolman Uaje
addressed at his known address at Montalban, Rizal, for him to appear at the trial of the case set for continuation
on February 1, 1965; that such subpoena was served on Uaje the return showing that he had received it on
January 19, 1965, at Montalban, Rizal; that when the case was called for continuation on February 1, 1965, he
did not appear "and forthwith the undersigned City Fiscal formally moved for an order of arrest" or in the
alternative "to cite him for contempt for willful failure to appear at the trial of the case as a material witness. . . ."
Such a motion was formally presented on February 3, 1965 and denied on the same day by the respondent
Judge in the Order sought to be annulled in this petition. Then came a motion for reconsideration which was
likewise denied for not being "well-founded". In addition to the plea to declare void such order refusing to have
the witness either arrested or cited for contempt, there was the further prayer that respondent Judge be required
to grant the aforesaid motion
-Respondent Judge and the other respondent, the accused in Criminal Case No. 3225, were required to answer.
In their answer filed on March 4, 1965, there was a denial of the allegation that Uaje was "a material, much less
an important, witness," such denial being based on the very affidavit executed by him which as noted in the
answer admitted "that the said witness did not see how the accident had occurred and was, therefore, not an
eye-witness. . . . "There was an admission that respondent Judge was "poised to order the immediate
continuation of the trial of the case upon the insistence of the accused who relies upon his constitutional right to a
speedy trial but denied that the prosecution is entitled to compulsory process" for under the Rules of Court it is
the defendant, not the prosecution, that is conferred such a right, alleging further that the issuance of compulsory
process is, under the Constitution, a right granted to the accused "only and exclusively", no corresponding
provision being made for the prosecution. As a First and Special Affirmative Defense, they relied on the aforesaid
Section 9 of Rule 23 contending that if a witness was not bound by a subpoena since his residence was
admittedly not less than 50 kilometers from the place of trial, the failure to obey the same or to comply with it
could not in any manner whatsoever constitute contempt of court. Respondent Judge therefore did not commit
any error; nor did he abuse his discretion in refusing to issue an order of arrest or to cite said witness for
contempt.
Issue: Did respondent Judge, in denying a motion for the arrest of a material witness, in a criminal case, or in the
alternative, to cite him for contempt, relying on Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court to the effect that a
witness is not bound to attend as such before any court, judge or other officer out of the province in which he
resides unless the distance be less than 50 kilometers from his place of residence to the place of trial by the
usual course, act with grave abuse of discretion?
Held: Yes!
- It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the inherent power of the Court to compel the attendance of persons to
testify in a case pending therein. Section 9 of Rule 23 is thus interpreted to apply solely to civil cases. A
recognition of such power in a court of first instance conducting the trial of an accused may be gleaned from
principle that justifies it when satisfied "by proof or oath, that there is reason to believe that a material witness for
the prosecution will not appear and testify when required," to order that he "give bail in sum as [it] may deem
proper for such appearance. Upon refusal to give bail, the court must commit him to prison until he complies or is
legally discharged."
-Under the circumstances, in view of the serious handicap to which the prosecution would thus be subjected in
proving its case, the order of respondent judge denying the motion for an order of arrest or a citation for contempt
in the alternative, based on a clear misapprehension of the Rules of Court, could be viewed as amounting to
grave abuse of discretion. It would follow then that respondent Judge should decide said motion without taking
into consideration Section 9 of Rule 23.

Genorga vs Quintain
Facts:- It was the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant Dr. Gil Geñorga the former municipal
health officer of Claveria, Masbate, thereafter assigned to Tayasan Negros Oriental, for his failure to appear as
government medico- legal witness in a pending murder case before respondent Judge Pedro C. Quitain of the
Court of First Instance of Masbate, that started the train of events leading to this administrative complaint for
grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. The excuse offered for such non-appearance was the
fact that he had previously sent a telegram to respondent Judge seeking information as to whether he would be
reimbursed for the traveling expenses to be incurred and that he had received no reply. As a result thereof, he
"terribly suffered from the humiliation of having been arrested and confined in the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary as if [he] were a criminal, from May 9, 1975 to May 14, 1975 when, upon [his] repeated pleas that
[he] was not going to escape, the Provincial Commander o f Negros Oriental, allowed [him] to proceed to
Masbate alone at [his] own expense." That he did, and he was able to testify.
-Respondent Judge then dictated in open court the order for his release. Thereafter, in the chambers of the latter,
when he sought to explain why he f to appear, he complained that he was ignored and treated with discourtesy.
That was the basis for his charge of conduct unbecoming a district judge. Respondent Judge was required to
comment on such complaint
- He submitted an eight-page explanation, the relevant portion of which follows: "Clearly, this charge stemmed
from the order of arrest issued by the undersigned against the complainant for his failure to appear in Court on
March 5, 1975, in spite of a subpoena duly served upon him as a government witness in the case hereinabove
mentioned. True, the complainant addressed a telegram to the undersigned, in exact words, to wit: " [Advice
undersigned agrave (sic) party Masbate Masbate province shoulder traveling expenses per them appear
government witness Azanares case March 5 ... Dr. Geñorga]." True, the undersigned did not make any reply
because it was the honest conviction of the undersigned that he is not duty bound to make any inquiry for the
complainant, much less advice the complainant in any manner, not to mention the fact that the telegram carried
the tone of an order. It lacked the element of courtesy since the telegram did not sound as a request. It is also
true that the complainant did not appear in Court on March 5, 1975 that he might testify as tie last witness for the
prosecution. Hence, on March 5, 1975, the undersigned, on motion of the Fiscal, ordered the complainant
arrested ... . There is no doubt that the complainant received the subpoena issued by the undersigned requiring
him to appear on March 5, 1975 so he could not testify for the government. This is borne out by the records of the
case
- The matter was then referred to the Acting Assistant Judicial Consultant Lorenzo Relova of the Court of Appeals
for study, report and recommendation. After setting forth the above facts and in the light of People v. Montejo, he
recommended that the charges be dismissed. He explainedwhy: "It is submitted, therefore, that Respondent
cannot be administratively held liable. To hold otherwise would be allowing a [disregard] of the coercive power of
the courts to compel attendance in court of cited witnesses. (Section 5 (e) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court). This
is not to mention the very satisfactory explanation of the Respondent on all the charges imputed against him.
Furthermore, Complainant was furnished a copy of the comment/explanation of Respondent as early as July 15,
1975 ... , but up to now, no reply was ever received by the Court from Complainant. It would seem that
Complainant is satisfied of the explanation of respondent Judge.
Issue: Is respondent judge administratively liable?
Held:No!
-This Court accepts such recommendation. The aforecited case of People v. Montejo is in point. (Quinote lang
yung ruling ng People vs Montejo, so see case above hahaha)
-What was done by Judge Quitain was, therefore, within his discretion. There was no grave abuse of authority.
Nor can the accusation of conduct unbecoming a judge be taken seriously. In Bartolome v. De Borja, it was held:
"As far as the behavior of a trial judge is concerned, however, it is not realistic to assume, considering the nature
and the burden laid on his shoulders, that he will at all times personify equanimity." Even if his conduct in
chambers did not live up fully then to the demands of politeness and courtesy, disciplinary action does not lie.
Moreover, as shown in the memorandum of Acting Judicial Consultant, the fact that he did not even bother to
refute the allegation of respondent Judge that he behaved as gentleman should during their talk in chambers may
justifiably lead to the inference that complainant, on calmer reflection with his resentment diminishing with the
passage of time may have decided not to press this particular accusation anymore.

Rule 22

Luz vs National Amnesty Commission

Facts:-petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 427.
-On March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro
Manila. In due course, the board denied the said application. On August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC) issued a Resolution affirming that of the Local Amnesty Board. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC.
-Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1999, the petitioner had until December
7, 2002, a Saturday, within which to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals. On
December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an extension of fifteen (15) days from
December 9, 2002, or until December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The petitioner alleged therein that
he had just engaged the services of counsel who needed additional time to study the case and draft the petition.
However, the petitioner failed to file his petition for review.
-December 24, 2002 was declared a national holiday; December 25, 2002 was also a holiday. On December 26,
2002, the petitioner filed a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26, 2002 or until
January 10, 2002, within which to file his petition. The petitioner filed his petition for review with the Court of
Appeals on January 10, 2003.
-On January 13, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution granting the petitioners first motion for a fifteen-day extension
counted from December 7, 2002 or until December 22, 2002, within which to file said petition. On February 20,
2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners second motion for having been filed out of time. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 20, 2003 Resolution claiming that, since the last day
to file his petition was a Saturday, December 7, 2002, and the next day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the
last day for filing the petition was December 9, 2002. He reasoned that since he filed his motion for extension of
time to file his petition for review on the said date, the said motion was timely filed. On August 19, 2003, the CA
issued a Resolution denying the petitioners motion, relying on A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000,
which provides that any extension of time to file the required pleading should be counted from the expiration of
the period regardless of the fact that the said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Issue: Did petitioner timely file his second motion for extension of time to file his petition for review?
Held: No, but…
- In its comment to the petition, the respondent avers that the ruling of this Court in Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, has not voided, overturned nor vacated A.M. No. 00-2-14- SC; as such, the latter
should prevail. It asserts that the petitioner should not have presumed that the CA would grant him an extension
until December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition for review.
-We agree with the appellate court that the petitioners motion for a second extension of time to file his petition for
review was filed out of time.
-The Court clarified the provision when it issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, which reads:
Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is
deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately
following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for
extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the
original expiration of the period;
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1,
Rule 22 speaks only of the last day of the period so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is
granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time
to file the required pleading shouldtherefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact
that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
- The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the
CA has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the
expiration of such period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
-The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the petitioners first motion for extension of fifteen (15) days
within which to file his petition for review, reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from December 9, 2002 as
prayed for by the petitioner. In so doing, it merely applied, with fealty, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, as clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC. Had the CA granted the
petitioners first motion for extension and reckoned the fifteen-day period from December 9, 2002, instead of from
December 7, 2002, the appellate court would have acted with grave abuse of its discretion
- In this case, the CA specifically stated that the first extension it granted to the petitioner was reckoned from
December 7, 2002 and not from December 9, 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner.
-Moreover, as stated by this Court in Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, the underpinning
consideration in the Moskowsky case is the liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court, as amended, to attain
substantial justice.
-Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, we agree with the petitioners plea for a liberal interpretation and
application of A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC in light of the peculiar factual mileu in this case. It appears that the petitioners
counsel relied in good faith on the ruling of this Court in Moskowsky. Moreover, the petitioner filed his petition for
review on the same day, January 13, 2003, even before the CA granted his first motion for extension of time to
file his petition for review. In fine, when the CA granted the petitioners first motion, the petitioner had already filed
his petition for review even as his second motion for extension had yet to be resolved by the CA. As we ruledin
Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines:
The underpinning consideration in Moskowsky, Vda. de Capulong and in the case at bar, is the liberal
interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if
the original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15-day extension period. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. The unfairness of the situation becomes even more apparent when we consider the fact that
petitioner received notice that the extension was to be counted from the original period and not from the date that
she had prayed for, a month after she had already filed her petition.
-IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

Reiner Pacific Intl. vs Guevara

Facts:- Guevarra tiled a case for illegal dismissal and damages against Reinier Shipping and its principal.
-The Labor Arbiter found Guevarra’s dismissal illegal and ordered Reinier Shipping and its principal to jointly and
severally pay him the US$11,316.00 that represent his salaries for the remaining balance of the contract plus
attorney’s fees of US$1,131.60.
-Reiner Shipping appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but on February 22, 2002 the
latter affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
-The due date to file a petition for special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) fell on July 26,
2002, a Friday, but Reinier Shipping succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, which period counted from
July 26 began to run on July 27, a Saturday, and fell due on August 10, a Saturday. Reinier Shipping filed its
petition on the following Monday, August 12, 2002.
-On November 11, 2002 the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. The CA ruled that Reinier
Shipping violated Supreme Court’s A.M. 00-2-14-SC. Since August 10, 2002, the last day of the extended period,
fell on a Saturday, automatic deferment to the next working day did not apply and Reinier Shipping should have
filed its petition before August 10, a Saturday, considering that the court is closed on Saturdays.
Issue: Did theCA err in dismissing its petitionfor having been filed out of time?
Held:Yes!
-Reinier Shipping’s last day for filing its petition fell on July 26, a Friday. It asked for a 15-day extension before
the period lapsed and this was granted. As it happened, 15 days from July 26 fell on August 10, a Saturday. The
CA held that Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10 (Saturday) or at the latest on August
9 (Friday) since, in an extended period, the fact that the extended due date (August 10) falls on a Saturday is to
be "disregarded." Reinier Shipping has no right to move the extended due date to the next working day even if
such due date fell on a Saturday. Since the courts were closed on August 10 (Saturday), Reinier Shipping should
have filed its petition, according to the CA, not later than Friday, August 9.
-But this is obviously wrong since it would mean compelling Reinier Shipping to file its petition one day short of
the 15-day extension granted it. That would unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that extension. Since its new
due date fell on a Saturday when courts are close, however, the clear language of Section 1, Rule 21, applies.
This gives Reinier Shipping up to Monday (August 12), the next working day, within which to file its petition.
-The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of
extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the
period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any extension of time to file the required pleading
should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday."
-For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this happens to be a Saturday, the time for filing it shall not run,
applying Section 1 of Rule 21, on July 1 0 (Saturday) nor on July 11 (Sunday) but will resume to run on the next
working day, which is July 12 (Monday). The pleading will then be due on the latter date. If the period is extended
by 10 days, such 10 days will be counted, not from July 12 (Monday) but from the original due date, July 10
(Saturday) "regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday." Consequently, the new due date will be 10
days from July 10 or precisely on July 20. As stated above, the situation of Reinier Shipping is different.

Neypes vs Ca
Facts:- Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
- In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15thday thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
-On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998.
-Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
-In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.
-On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of
Appeals on January 6, 2000. In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Issue: Did petitioners file their notice of appeal on time?
Held:Yes!
- First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads
to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
- Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court
to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
-As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion forreconsideration
should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since
they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
-What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the MR?
- In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it
aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later
on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this
was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable
under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration
of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we again
considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case.
-Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
- We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementaryperiod to appeal, did
petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
- Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners
did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the
MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a
fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration
- To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
- Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution
- We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
- To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period
may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
-Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period
of 15 days, as already discussed

Rule 23

Koh vs IAC
Facts:- respondent Bank(First Interstate Bank of California) filed a Complaint against petitioner to recover the
sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid to
her on October 8, 1981.
- In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the allegations in the Complaint and alleged that
immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to return the overpayment, she offered to pay respondent
Bank through its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a month but the offer was unreasonably rejected
- On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141, sent
the following "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" to the parties through their respective lawyers.
G R E E T I N G S:
Please take notice that cases where issues have been joined will be scheduled for pre-trial conference only after
Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29-where applicable, necessary and or feasible have been resorted to by the
parties.
If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to him, he
shall file a manifestation to that effect.
The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the respective manifestations of having resorted to, or of
dispensing with, those modes of discovery have been filed by the parties. The party, who has dispensed with
those modes of discovery shall be deemed to have waived resort thereto, and, unless for good cause shown,
motion to resort thereto, after termination of the pre-trial, shall not be grantee. The costs entailed the waiving
party in presenting evidence during trial that could have been obtained through any of those modes of discovery
which were waived, shall not be assessed against the adverse party nor awarded as part of the litigation
expenses.
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall be archived or
dismissed as the case may be
-No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the presiding Judge (not respondent
Judge), issued the following order:
For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status) dated August 19, 1983, more particularly the last
paragraph thereof, this case is hereby dismissed.
- respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which was assigned to Branch 143 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati presided over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, as well as a supplement thereto, which was opposed by respondent
Bank. On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on November 27, 1984, he
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
- petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying that the orders denying the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be set aside as null and void and that the complaint be
ordered dismissed. the appellate court, finding no merit to the petition resolved not to give it due course. It said:
We concur with the above reasoning of respondent Judge. We should add to that our observation that the order
of dismissal of Judge Elbiñas in Civil Case No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void for lack of legal basis. The
'notice of case status' (Annex D) was not an order' of the court. I t was, as its title indicated, only a 'notice,' not an
order. Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a judgment. It did not constitute
a bar to the refiling of the bank's complaint.
Issue: Did the CA err in denying petitioner’s petition?
Held:No!
-True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should have taken the precaution of complying with the instructions
contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent delay resulting from non-
compliance; that respondent Bank's counsel was negligent in not seeking a reconsideration or clarification of the
order of dismissal or appealing therefrom. But, fortunately for respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel are
not fatal to its cause in view of the defective procedure which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint.
-The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are intended to enable a
party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of third parties through
depositions to obtain knowledge of material facts or admissions from the adverse party through written
interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or
relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or
other property in the possession or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical or mental condition
of a party when such is in controversy. This mutual discovery enables a party to discover the evidence of the
adverse party and thus facilitates an amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the case. All the parties are
required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
-Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the rules on discovery. However, recourse to
discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the pre-trial
conference should be set pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20
-As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of the court. It was signed by
Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such manifestation has been filed after
30 days from receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of
the parties to heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a lawful order of the court. Consequently, the
order of dismissal could not have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. Neither could respondent Bank be
considered to have failed to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as petitioner's
Answer was dated August 17, 1983 and the order of dismissal was dated November 29, 1983.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan(sarule 25ata to)

Facts:- Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago — together with Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-
Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21,
1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C.
Aquino
-After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF
OTHER PORTIONS” The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. By order
datedJanuary 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants,
gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.
-Tantocoand Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." Basically, they sought an answer to the
question: "Who were theCommissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified
the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike
out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose
thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise”
-Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and
on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents. The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's
amended complaint, through such questions.
-the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection
of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively. On September 1, 1989,
the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production and
inspection of documents).
-the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration
(of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to
serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG). Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Can petitioners object to the interrogatories?
Held: No!
-The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court
cannot be sustained
-The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus
prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by
depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at
trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only
those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of
all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.
-What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation
for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . .
-To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or
part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the
party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to
compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party
seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses;
striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
-The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it
is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for the State
-The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the
Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its
possession.
-The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had
already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact
viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing
secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of
the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use
them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
-The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the
corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently
established that the denial is false.
-The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The
PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional
or statutory.
-The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and
inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the documents are,
according to the verification of theamended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said
complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which
inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-
trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.

Caguiat vs Torres
Facts:- Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII,
presided over by respondent Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat is the defendant therein
-after defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the plaintiffs, their reply to defendant's answer the
herein petitioners served on respondent Caguiat a notice to take his deposition. On August 26, 1964 respondent
Caguiat filed with the lower court an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to restrict its scope
which urgent motion the petitioners opposed. On the 29th of the same month the respondent Judge issued an
order to hold in abeyance the resolution of his co-respondent's urgent motion until after the pre-trial. The parties
however failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
-On October 3, 1964 herein petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his
deposition upon oral examination to prevent which, the latter filed an urgent motion on the 14th of the same
month. Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat's urgent motion. Resolving the urgent motion and the opposition
thereto, the respondent Judge, on the 17th, granted his co- respondent's urgent motion and ordered the
petitioners to refrain from taking the contemplated deposition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
- The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of respondent Caguiat is to get the latter to lay his
cards on the table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the proceedings. Respondent Caguiat, on the other hand,
affirms that he has already revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent of naming his witnesses,
during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition has been obviated. In fact, according to respondent
Caguiat, he had expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, but apparently the petitioners did not
want to
Issue:Is there still a need for deposition of respondent?
Held:No!
- appellants contend that the disclosure by appellee of practically all his evidence at the pre-trial and the danger
of heightening the animosities between the parties during the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee are
not enough to warrant the trial court's order preventing completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention
is untenable.
-There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not
be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955, unreported) That
the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is implicit in the provisions of
the
-Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, which are precisely designed to
protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions
under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such instances,
these provisions expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop one that is
already being taken.
-In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-trial, appellee expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants rejected. Moreover, according to Court of
Appeals, the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders in question were
issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that there was indeed no further need for the
deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to
discover. Appellants have not shown any real concrete reason for such deposition.